


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PROSPECTUS.

1. AN ENCYCLOPÆDIA is indispensable to every library, as a *concentration* of human knowledge; while to the voyager, the naval and military officer, the colonist, and that numerous class of enterprising Britons whose want of a settled residence may isolate them from the world of letters, it is the only possible *substitute* for all other books. Works of this description are therefore among those few literary projects which have uniformly secured the patronage of the public. The reason is obvious: an Encyclopædia is to the rising education of the country at once a reservoir and a fountain—it receives perpetual accessions of knowledge from the genius of the age, which it yields again in willing abundance to posterity.

2. With the ancients, the term Encyclopædia, explained itself. It was really *Instruction in a cycle, i. e.* the cycle of the seven liberal Arts and Sciences, that constituted the course of education for the higher class of citizens. Unfortunately, the inapplicability of a strictly *scientific* method to a modern Encyclopædia, such as shall include the whole of its contents, has led to the abandonment of all principle of *rational* arrangement; and it may be safely asserted of all our universal dictionaries hitherto, that the chief difference between them, in respect of their *plan*, consists in the more or less complete disorganization of the Sciences and Systematic Arts; now retaining certain integral portions of the system as integers, forming each an entire treatise, but resigning these treatises to the places severally assigned to them by the accident of their initial letters; and now splintering all alike into their fractional parts, with an arrangement merely alphabetical. Nor has the imperfection rested here. This very alphabetical position was but too frequently determined by the caprice or convenience of the compiler; inasmuch as the division of parts into minor parts had no settled limit. Thus, one technical or scientific term included as its subordinates, and to be explained in the same article, sometimes more, sometimes fewer, other terms: and the arrangement became neither properly scientific, nor properly alphabetical. It had the inconveniences of both, without the advantages of either.

3. The results are such as might have been expected, in part from the necessity of such plans, and in part from the interference of individual whim, carelessness, and procrastination, to which it afforded the amplest opportunities, and even frequent temptation. Numerous articles of important information are found where the reader could have least expected to find them; while articles of equal interest are in many cases not to be found at all.

4. A second result is, that an Universal Dictionary so constructed, equally with an Encyclopædia the most methodically arranged, requires alphabetical references; but with a twofold inconvenience, from which the latter would be free. First, the references, instead of being collected in one appropriate index, or at least in some known portion of the work, are scattered throughout the whole; and this is no slight annoyance, when a scientific term happens to have many synonyms, as, for instance, Azote, Nitrogen, Phlogisticated Air, &c. Secondly, the references must eventually lead the reader through as many volumes, as those other words happen to be placed in, which are necessary to be *previously* understood in order to a tolerable comprehension of the term first sought.

5. A third evil, resulting from the same causes, is the utter want of all proportion in the space occupied by each article, relatively either to the importance of the particular subject, or to the promised limits of the whole work. Hence, too, it arises that the proprietors are frequently reduced to a choice of evils. The work must be extended far beyond the first expectation of the purchasers, or the articles assigned to the latter volumes must be crowded in scanty and superficial abridg

ments. They contract to give the public an Universal Dictionary of the Arts and Sciences, but the execution outgrows the plan. Either openly then, or in the form of supplementary volumes (bearing perhaps a large proportion to the whole work), this pledge must be redeemed. In both cases the disorder and dislocation, and in many instances the deficiencies, remain unremedied.

6. The fourth ill consequence of this arbitrary arrangement calls for a somewhat fuller consideration. It requires but a moment's reflection to be convinced, that the most voluminous Encyclopædia which has yet appeared, is incomparably too narrow to contain an Universal History of Knowledge in its present state; and that the authors and compilers will have satisfied all rational expectations if only nothing shall be found excluded from any other cause than the higher importance of that which has been admitted; in order that on *all* subjects the ends of *general* information at *least* may be accomplished. Where, therefore, selection is so imperiously required, there must be an equal necessity that certain fixed and intelligible principles should be pre-established. An Encyclopædia neither is, nor can reasonably be considered as, the book which a man of profound science is likely to consult for those things in which he is himself eminent. He will seek for accessions to his knowledge in the works of contemporaries employed like himself in extending the pomœria of science, and will often be most interested in *speculations*, the worth and stability of which are yet undetermined. But an Encyclopædia is a *History* of human knowledge, in which therefore these intellectual embryos, which at best are (as it were) but truths in the *future* tense, have no rightful or beseeming place. This, indeed, we hold to be a principle of such paramount importance, that we take the earliest opportunity of avowing our determination of a strict and systematic adherence to it; and we here give our public pledge that the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA shall be so far *historical* in all respects, that only what has been *established*, or is at least already *publici juris*, and to be found in the records of Science and Literature, shall form the main body of every article; and that any opinions or speculations of the writer himself shall be declared to be such, and be given distinctly as a mere appendix of the article to which they belong.

7. We shall now particularize the evil to which we have been referring. From the licence which the planless plan of former works allows to the separate writers—in one place, instead of a systematic history of the received truths and established discoveries in the department of knowledge, which was to have been exhibited, the larger portion of the space is filled up with the individual writer's own crude conceptions and prolix argumentation—while in another, on some subject of the highest interest, lo! in tarnished fragments over the numerous volumes, an old work torn asunder by all the letters of the alphabet! and reminding the classical reader of the decrepit Pelias, whose credulous daughters were induced by the artifices of Medea to cut his aged limbs in pieces, as the sole and certain means of restoring him, like another Æson, to the blooming honours of youth.

8. The SCHEME which we propose to substitute, or the principal outlines of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA, we now lay before the reader, as follows:—The work will consist of four main divisions. The first, which for the sake of distinction we have called the Philosophical part, comprises the Pure Sciences; and the second, or Scientific part, the Mixed and Applied Sciences. The third, or Biographical part, is devoted to Biography chronologically arranged, History, Chronology, and Geography; and the concluding or Miscellaneous part, besides being referential and supplementary to the preceding volumes, will have the unique advantage of presenting to the public, for the first time, a Philosophical and Etymological Lexicon of the English language; the citations selected and arranged chronologically, yet including all the purposes of a common Dictionary. The volume of Index will complete this division. It will be instantly seen that the first two divisions of a work, thus arranged, will grow naturally out of each other; the needful references will therefore be generally *retrospective*, and rarely made to future volumes. In our Biographical department we shall teach the same truths by example, that have been evolved in the former divisions, and stimulate to the exertions that have developed them;—while in our Miscellaneous

portion or in the Index, every word will be found in its usual alphabetical place, as in any other Dictionary, with a plain reference to the volume and page containing its full explanation in the present work; together with a variety of interesting articles, either illustrative of the former divisions, or in their own nature miscellaneous. Each division of the work will be separately paged.

9. Such is the general outline of the proposed Scheme. The Table at page 13 places the principal subdivisions, likewise, before the reader's eye, with as much detail as is compatible with the limits, or requisite for the purposes, of a Prospectus. It will be seen, too, that a more particularized and systematic justification of the principles, on which the Scheme has been constructed, will be afforded in the Preliminary Treatise, or General Introduction to the Encyclopædia.

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12. From what has been already seen of our plan, in the necessary discussion of its relative merits, we presume that we appropriate to the work the title of an Encyclopædia by an especial right, and that of a Philosophical System on a plea of superior propriety. But we cannot neglect the argument for such a work as the present, which is derivable from the peculiar circumstances of our times. The political changes of the world have not been more wonderful than the scientific and moral revolutions that have occurred within the last few years. The new views, new discoveries, and fresh facts, especially in all the different branches of Experimental Philosophy, which every year has brought with it, are unparalleled in the history of human knowledge; and the accessions have not seldom been of such a nature as no mere supplementary postscript can embrace. For in many instances they affect the whole theory and consequent arrangement of the Art or Science to which they belong. Our project is in this respect therefore singularly fortunate in point of time. It will have to collect and combine the rich but scattered elements of future Science; while a still more important argument for our plan and for the period of its execution, will be found in the manifest tendency of all the Arts and Sciences at present, from the most purely intellectual even to the labours of the common mechanic, to lose their former insulated character, and organize themselves into one harmonious body of knowledge. The civilized world is now doing that which the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA is preparing to do; and for which it is providing a correspondent repository.

13. The Proprietors have not disguised from themselves that their undertaking is of the most *arduous* kind. The mass of ability requisite, will be great in proportion to the originality of our plan; and the perseverance, harmony, and punctuality, that are indispensable conditions of its success, must be commensurate with the difficulty of uniting variety with system, and of reconciling selectness and calculated proportion with universality as a whole, and fulness in each component part. If, in addition to this, the amount of capital demanded and already dedicated to the one purpose of securing this coalition, and of overcoming these difficulties, be considered; with the number and high character of the artists, the men of science, and men of letters, on whose zealous co-operation, now pledged to us, we rest our pretension to the first acts of the public favour, and our confident hopes of continued support—not forgetting the relief and moral influence of a regular employment afforded during all seasons of the year to so many industrious mechanics as must necessarily be engaged on this work—the Proprietors of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA dare promise themselves, that by no reflecting reader will the present prospectus be deemed too serious.

14. Having explained the *Principles* on which the Encyclopædia Metropolitana was founded, we proceed to state a few facts, in reference to the manner in which the FIRST EDITION of the work was executed, and the *Modifications* now intended to be made in the SECOND EDITION.

15. The Encyclopædia Metropolitana was projected by the late eminent poet and philosopher, S. T. COLERIDGE. It differs in its plan from other Dictionaries of Universal Knowledge in being strictly methodical. The contributions of the scientific and learned men by whom it was composed, are arranged, not according to the letters of the alphabet which happen to form the initials of the English *names* of the Treatises, but in agreement with a PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM, based on the *nature* of the Subjects,—a method which causes the entire work to become a rational exposition of the state of human knowledge, and the mutual dependence and relative importance of its different branches. In virtue of this classification, the work forms both a course of study for the scholar, and a book of reference for the man of business: the former has the principles of the sciences laid before him in the philosophical order of their natural sequence; the latter is enabled to find readily the specific information he requires on any subject that interests him.

16. The system, projected by Mr. Coleridge, was ably executed by the Editors * and Authors to whom the execution of the scheme was confided. To confirm the truth of this assertion, it is sufficient to refer to the names of the Authors, and to state the fact, that many of the Treatises have been admitted by the Learned throughout Europe to be of the highest order of merit, and to have enlarged the boundaries of the scientific world, and placed their authors in the first rank of men of science in the present age.

17. The following ABSTRACT OF THE CONTENTS OF THE QUARTO EDITION, taken from the GENERAL PREFACE, will show in what manner the early professions of the projector of the work were realized.

We shall speak of the four great divisions of the Encyclopædia separately.

PURE SCIENCES.

18. The order in which these sciences are exhibited, and the plan on which the MATHEMATICAL portion of the *Encyclopædia* is conceived, resemble considerably the series of Elementary Treatises projected many years ago for the University of Cambridge by Dr. Wood, the late Dean of Ely, and Professor Vince; but with this difference, that the present volumes are far more comprehensive in the subjects they embrace, and far more elaborate and scientific in their execution. But this very similarity shows that the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* has attained one of its professed objects,—systematic instruction and scientific information, conveyed—not in a confused mass, but in the natural sequence of the sciences.

Indeed this portion of the work has met with a degree of approbation in many quarters, but especially in the University of Cambridge, which no other Encyclopædia has ever yet received. The student who has really mastered these sciences in the systematic form in which they are arranged here, will never in the course of the longest life find occasion to *un*learn any portion of what he has here acquired, and will find no difficulty whatever in adding to his stores any new results which the mental energy and labour of mankind may hereafter develop from principles now known. It may, indeed, be safely affirmed, that any person of good mathematical abilities, who shall follow the course of Mathematical treatises in this Encyclopædia, which are so arranged that a student may pursue them even without the assistance of a tutor, may become by that means a mathematician of very high character, and be enabled to master the most difficult and delicate speculations of continental mathematicians.

19. The names of the authors of the Treatises on *Pure Mathematics* are suffi-

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The EDITORS of the original edition of the Encyclopædia Metropolitana were—The Rev. EDWARD SMEDLEY, M.A., late Fellow of Sidney College, Cambridge; the Rev. HUGH JAMES ROSE, B.D., late Principal of King's College, London; and the Rev. HENRY JOHN ROSE, B.D., late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge.

cient to prove that the *Encyclopædia* is worthy of the present state of science, and that its most important articles are contributed by those who have themselves been foremost in the onward march of science. The elaborate Treatise on ARITHMETIC, by the present Dean of Ely (Dr. Peacock), Lowndian Professor of Mathematics in the University of Cambridge, is interesting alike to the scholar, the mathematician, and the speculator in metaphysics. The brief but comprehensive Treatise on TRIGONOMETRY, by Professor Airy, now Astronomer Royal, is of considerable value from the general elegance of its demonstrations. The publications of the Rev. H. P. Hamilton on ANALYTICAL GEOMETRY and CONIC SECTIONS, and that of Professor Barlow on the THEORY OF NUMBERS, are so highly esteemed, that any eulogium on their papers on these subjects would be superfluous. The Treatises of Professor Levy on the DIFFERENTIAL and INTEGRAL CALCULUS are calculated to carry the student to a very high point of proficiency. The GEOMETRY, ALGEBRA, and GEOMETRICAL ANALYSIS complete the Volume in a manner worthy of the treatises with which they are associated.

20. These sciences are, however, in some degree elementary; and although by them the student would be so far advanced as to enter upon the works of some of the ablest analysts, it would be unworthy of such a publication as the Encyclopædia Metropolitana to leave untouched or imperfectly treated, the more refined applications of the higher Calculus. It will be found, accordingly, that the highest branches of mathematical analysis have been treated by writers conversant with all its intricacies, and the mathematical student is furnished in them with results of far greater variety and of a more subtle nature than can at present be used in the application of analysis to Mixed Mathematics.

21. The CALCULUS of VARIATIONS, and the CALCULUS of FINITE DIFFERENCES by Professor Hall, are distinguished by the clearness peculiar to his treatment of these refined and subtle portions of analysis. The CALCULUS of FUNCTIONS and the THEORY of PROBABILITY are the work of Professor De Morgan. The latter (on a subject which has exercised the talents of the greatest mathematicians, even down to the times of Laplace) is, as might be expected, one of the most complete in any language. The Treatise on DEFINITE INTEGRALS completes the series of these elaborate surveys on the higher branches of Mathematical Analysis. The name of Professor Moseley is a sufficient warrant that his Essay is also of the highest character.

22. Without wishing, therefore, to offer any undue eulogium on the Treatises enumerated above, we confidently ask that portion of the public which is qualified to judge of their merits, to compare the whole system of *Pure Mathematics* here presented to them with that in any similar work, whether of this country or of the Continent, on the grounds of *arrangement*, *clearness*, *ability*, and *completeness*.

23. We must now allude to such of the Pure Sciences as are not included in the Mathematical department. Sir John Stoddart has given a lucid and able summary of the General Principles of GRAMMAR, or the Philosophy of Language. The LOGIC and RHETORIC of Archbishop Whately require no commendation here, as they have long since been published in a separate form, and have taken their place among the standard works of our language. The Treatise on LAW is the work of Richard Jebb, Esq., Professor Graves, and Archer Polson, Esq. It embraces one of the most difficult portions of Philosophy—the general foundations of Law and Morals; and the Editor is happy to state that testimony from the very highest quarters has been given both to the profoundness of the views entertained, and the ability with which they are developed.

24. In the present state of metaphysical knowledge, it would be presumptuous to put forth any *system* of Metaphysics; but a general HISTORY OF MORAL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY affords the most convenient opportunity for displaying the principles on which the greatest philosophers have hitherto endeavoured to form their systems, for pointing out their difficulties, and for marking how far each has contributed to the progress of the science. Such a sketch, however, required the hand of a master; and the Editor confidently believes that the Treatise on Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy which is here given is calculated fully to sustain the

deservedly high reputation of the Rev. F. D. Maurice. Of the Outlines of THEOLOGY, it does not become the Editor to say more than to acknowledge with gratitude the very able assistance of Professor Corrie, to whom two chapters are due. He has endeavoured to render this Treatise as practically useful as possible, not only to avoid passing controversies, but to bring forward the sound and genuine doctrines of the Church of England; and perhaps he may be allowed to add that, in pursuance of this object, he has spared no pains or labour.

MIXED AND APPLIED SCIENCES.

25. From *Pure Mathematics* we proceed in natural order to their application to physical phenomena. Of these sciences, some belong to the elementary branches of physical knowledge, and others to a higher and more advanced stage. Now, the treatises on MECHANICS, HYDRODYNAMICS, PNEUMATICS, OPTICS, and PLANE ASTRONOMY, have been written by Professor Barlow with an express view to this distinction. They are elementary enough to enable any student, with a competent knowledge of Pure Mathematics, to overcome their difficulties; and yet they are so based on scientific principles, that they will also prepare him to enter readily on the higher branches of Mixed Mathematics. In *Mechanics*, more especially, a foundation is laid for the succeeding investigations of Physical Astronomy, which is, in fact, only one of the higher branches of Analytical Physics.

26. Some of the treatises in the volumes devoted to the Mixed Sciences demand a separate notice, as enlarging the boundaries of our scientific knowledge. Of this class are the Treatises on LIGHT and SOUND, by Sir J. F. W. Herschel. The Treatise on LIGHT, by Sir J. F. W. Herschel, from the position it has already obtained in the scientific world, both in England and on the Continent, cannot require any recommendation here. The simple mention of Sir J. F. W. Herschel's name is a sufficient recommendation to the Treatise on PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY, and proves at once that it must be an Essay of the highest order of merit, and worthy of the present state of the Science; and the conductors of this *Encyclopædia* may justly be proud that that distinguished writer has contributed so largely to its pages. But although Plane and Physical Astronomy had been thus ably treated, it was considered that something more was required; and the late Captain Kater kindly furnished the very useful and able Treatise on NAUTICAL ASTRONOMY, a subject with which his acquaintance was at once profound and practical.

27. MAGNETISM and ELECTRO-MAGNETISM are treated by Professor Barlow with the same ability and research which he has displayed in the other Essays contributed by him; and GALVANISM, by Dr. Roget, whose scientific character is too firmly established to leave any doubt as to the merit of his contributions. The author of the Treatises on ELECTRICITY, HEAT, and CHEMISTRY, the late Rev. F. Lunn, was one whose merits as an experimental philosopher and chemist were not so extensively known as they deserved to be; but at Cambridge his acquirements were acknowledged to be of the highest order. The treatises themselves, it is believed, will amply justify their favourable anticipations.

28. The Third Volume of *Mixed Sciences* is chiefly devoted to the FINE ARTS; but there are two or three Essays in the early part of the Volume which belong to the more exact sciences, viz., the Essay on the FIGURE OF THE EARTH, by Professor Airy, the present Astronomer Royal, and his Treatise on the TIDES. With regard to the former much novelty was hardly to be expected; but it is presumed that this Treatise contains the most complete combination and discussion of observations relating to the subject hitherto produced in England. The treatise into which this great mathematician has thrown all his power is the Theory of the Tides. The terms in which some of the most distinguished mathematicians of Cambridge have spoken of this treatise prove that they consider it to have greatly advanced the knowledge of this difficult subject. Every previous treatise on the theory of the tides is entirely superseded by this production, and it will supply, for many years to come, the only sound foundation of our knowledge upon this subject.

29. The Treatise on POLITICAL ECONOMY was written by N. W. Senior, Esq.

30. The Treatises on BOTANY and HORTICULTURE are supplied by G. Don, Esq.,

whose profound acquaintance with every department of knowledge which belongs to the vegetable kingdom is known to all botanists and florists. The ZOOLOGY combines GENERAL PHYSIOLOGY with COMPARATIVE ANATOMY, and is the work of J. F. South, Esq., Surgeon of St. Thomas's Hospital (assisted in one portion of Physiology by Mr. Clark and Mr. Solly). The descriptions in this Treatise possess the very unusual and peculiar merit of being given by Mr. South, in every practicable instance, *from the specimens themselves.* Of the ANATOMY, by Mr. South and Mr. Le Gros Clark, and the MATERIA MEDICA, by Dr. G. Johnson, it may be said that their names are a sufficient pledge that these Treatises are of first-rate character. The Treatise on MEDICINE, by Dr Robert Williams, of St. Thomas's Hospital, is an attempt to give a more philosophical view of the classification of disease than has hitherto been taken in any work of modern date. To W. Bowman, Esq., the Encyclopædia is indebted for an able outline of SURGICAL PRACTICE. The medical volume is closed by a comprehensive Treatise on VETERINARY ART, by W. C. Spooner, Esq.

31. The METEOROLOGY of the late Mr. Harvey, and the CRYSTALLOGRAPHY of Mr. Brooke, have been referred to respectively with especial commendation by Professor Forbes and Dr. Whewell. The names of Mr. Phillips and Dr. Daubeny will sufficiently recommend the Treatise on GEOLOGY, as exhibiting an adequate representation of that science at the time of its publication. The Treatise on MINERALOGY by Mr. Brooke; the Essays on CARPENTRY, by P. Nicholson, Esq.; on FORTIFICATION, by Major Mitchell and Captain Procter; and on NAVAL ARCHITECTURE, by the late Mr. Harvey, must not be passed over. The names of these writers guarantee the value of their contributions.

32 In this class of *Mixed Sciences* a novel feature is exhibited in the Sixth Volume of the series, viz., *A Systematic Account of the* ARTS *and* MANUFACTURES *of Great Britain.* There is probably no writer who would be able to do such ample justice to so extensive a range of matter, requiring both theoretical and practical knowledge, as its author, Mr. Barlow; but that nothing might be wanting to the completeness of this portion of the work, Professor Babbage supplied a Preliminary Discourse on the *Principles of Manufactures;* and it may confidently be asked, to what other source could the conductors of the work have appealed with equal confidence on so difficult and multifarious a subject?

HISTORICAL DIVISION.

33. It is not possible, in this rapid sketch, to specify all the papers in this portion of the work; but as nearly every contribution is assigned to its proper author at the beginning of each volume, such a course is unnecessary either for the information of the public, or as a tribute of respect to the distinguished authors themselves. Ample care has been taken to enlist among the contributors to this department writers not only of splendid endowments, but also of the highest attainments in different classes of historical knowledge. There will be found among the numerous writers in this division contributions from Bishop Blomfield, Dr. Whewell, Mr. Justice Talfourd, Dr. Arnold, Dean Hinds, Rev. J. A. Jeremie, Rev. G. C. Renouard, Rev. J. H. Newman, Bishop Russell, Archdeacon Hale, Dean Lyall, Rev. J. B. S. Carwithen, Bishop Hampden, Rev. R. Garnet, Major Mountain, Rev. J. H. B. Mountain, Captain Procter, Rev. J. E. Riddle, Archdeacon Ormerod, T. Roscoe, Esq., W. Macpherson, Esq., Rev. R. L. Browne, Rev. H. Thomson, Rev. J. G. Dowling, Rev. J. W. Blakesley, Rev. J. B. Ottley, W. Lowndes, Esq., Q.C.

34. A good work on General History has long been a great desideratum in our literature. The summaries of Tytler and Russell are too brief, and the Universal History, independently of the heavy manner in which it is written, is too long. It is presumed that the Historical Volumes of the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* will be found to meet this want in an efficient manner. They are written by men of undoubted ability; they exhibit the history of the world at first in a series of biographical sketches, and then in a continuous history of each remarkable country, combined with an Ecclesiastical History remarkably full and rich in the most interesting epochs of the Christian Church. Dissertations of great importance in a

philosophical point of view, such as those on Ancient Philosophy and Literature, on the Crusades, the Feudal System, and the Scholastic System, are introduced into the text at the most convenient periods, for the illustration of the respective subjects.

MISCELLANEOUS PORTION.

35. Although the *Miscellaneous Division* of this *Encyclopædia* occupies a larger number of volumes than any other, it requires a less extended notice. It appears, however, desirable to explain in some degree the *principle* on which this portion of the work was executed, and to indicate the authors of some of the most remarkable series of papers.

The leading features in this division of the *Encyclopædia* are—

1. The ENGLISH LEXICON.
2. The GEOGRAPHY.
3. The NATURAL HISTORY.
4. The MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES.

The universal approbation with which the LEXICON, compiled by Dr. Richardson, has been received, precludes the necessity of enlarging either on the plan itself or on the gigantic labour involved in its execution. The plan of giving the quotations of each word *chronologically* has the advantage of embodying in a philosophical Lexicon a *History of our own Language.*

36. For the whole of the Articles on GEOGRAPHY, the proprietors feel that they may fairly advance the claim of having obtained the co-operation of persons more than competent to bring forward whatever is most valuable for a work like this from all usually accessible sources of information. In this respect, the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* claims to take a high station among similar works; and the names of the contributors of the Articles on *European* and *American Geography* are a sufficient pledge of the ability and care with which they are executed, viz.:—T. Myers, Esq., Captain Bonnycastle, R.E., C. Vignoles, Esq., C.E., H. Lloyd, Esq., G. H. Smith, Esq., A. Jacob, Esq., W. D. Coolie, Esq., and Cyrus Redding, Esq.

One class of Geographical Articles demands especial mention, and may be said to be wholly without a rival in any similar work in our language, viz.: those on *Ancient, Oriental,* and *African Geography,* which were entirely supplied by the Rev. G. C. Renouard (of Cambridge, formerly Chaplain at Smyrna), and evince the most extensive familiarity with every variety of language, ancient and modern. The Editor believes that if these essays were collected together, and published as a system of Oriental Geography, they would surpass in accuracy and value anything at present existing in our own or any other European language.

37. The section of NATURAL HISTORY is divided chiefly into *Botany* and *Zoology.* In these two sciences the *Genera* will be found described in their alphabetical order, while their scientific arrangement and the principles of the sciences form part of the treatises in the volumes devoted to the *Mixed Sciences.* For these two departments, the services of several eminent naturalists were engaged. In *Botany*, T. Edwards, Esq., and G. Don, Esq., &c. In *Zoology*, T. Bell, Esq, F.L.S., &c., J. E. Gray, Esq., F.L.S., &c., of the British Museum; J. F. Stephens, Esq., and J. F. South, Esq.

38. The highly-gifted individual to whom this Encyclopædia owes so many of its attractions—the late Rev. Edward Smedley,—enriched the Miscellaneous Division with a series of articles which embody a vast store of curious and recondite information, communicated in a manner at once instructive and agreeable. Besides these articles, the *Geographical Gazetteer* and the *Dictionary* of *Law* and *Political Philosophy,* a large number of very important and valuable articles will be found scattered through the volumes of the *Miscellaneous Division.* Attention may be called, amongst a variety of others, to the *Biblical Articles,* by the Rev. T. H. Horne; to the *Philological* and *Oriental,* by the Rev. G. C. Renouard; the *Scientific Articles,* (as *e. g., Dialling, Surveying, Weights and Measures, &c.*) by Mr. Barlow; *Meteoric Stones,* by Professor Miller; *Stove and Ventilation,* by C. Hood, Esq., F.R.S.; *Stucco,* by T. L. Donaldson, Professor of Architecture in University College, London; the *Theological Articles,* by Archdeacon Hale; Essays on *Engineering,* by C. Vignoles, Esq., C. E.; and *Writing,* by the Rev. R. Garnet.

THE PLATES are for the most part the work of those two eminent engravers

Messrs. Lowry. They require only a simple inspection to prove their beauty and excellence.

The GENERAL INDEX was, at an early period in the publication of the *Encyclopædia*, intrusted to the Rev. J. Hindle, and occupied the attention of this very competent person for several years. It will be found to contain ample reference to all that is most important and interesting.

From this review of the FIRST EDITION of the Encyclopædia Metropolitana, we proceed to describe the peculiarities of the projected SECOND EDITION.

39. THE SECOND EDITION of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA will be handsomely printed in a series of CABINET VOLUMES, in CROWN OCTAVO, in the style shown by the SPECIMENS on pages 14 and 15.

40. The whole work will be THOROUGHLY REVISED; many NEW TREATISES will be added; and the Articles will all be provided with comprehensive INDEXES, or with analytical TABLES of CONTENTS.

41. It will be abundantly illustrated by Maps, Woodcuts, and Engravings.

42. It will be published in WEEKLY PARTS, PRICE ONE SHILLING, and in MONTHLY VOLUMES, varying in price according to the number of Parts contained in each.

43. METHODICAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE SECOND EDITION.—In preparing the SECOND EDITION of this Encyclopædia for publication, very little change will be made in its SYSTEM. The peculiar characteristic impressed upon it by Mr. Coleridge—ITS METHODICAL ARRANGEMENT—will be followed strictly. Indeed, the chief difference that will appear between the arrangement of the Second Edition and the First, will proceed from a more rigid adherence in the Second Edition to the *principles of Method* established by Mr. Coleridge, than it was possible to attain in the First Edition. The work being wholly original and composed by more than a hundred Contributors, it happened, during the first publication, that many of the articles, either because they were not produced in proper time to be incorporated in their systematic places, or for other unexplained reasons, were cast into the great "*Alphabetical, Miscellaneous, or Supplementary Division*," where they are connected together by no stronger scientific bond than their alphabetical initials. But now that we have the whole work before us, complete (as respects the First Edition), and capable of re-arrangement, we propose to rectify these accidental departures from the true method of the Encyclopædia, and to transfer, from the Alphabetical Miscellany, every article that is capable of transference, to its appropriate position in the Philosophical Classification. Thus, the Article GEOGRAPHY, properly organized, will form a new division, complementary to that on History, as was originally intended, see § 8; the details of NATURAL HISTORY will be grouped with the General Treatise on that science; the art of Diplomacy will be subjoined to the science of the Law of Nations; and so on. What remains in the Alphabetical Division, after this effective re-arrangement has been made, will form a SERIES of DICTIONARIES, Lexicographical, Classical, Theological, Technological, &c.

44. REVISION AND ENLARGEMENT.—Though the changes contemplated in the *General System* of the Encyclopædia are not important, the improvements to be made in the *details* will be considerable. In all possible cases, before the articles are reprinted for the Second Edition, they will be thoroughly revised, either by their authors or other competent persons, and Indexes and Tables of Contents will be added; the Historical series will be completed and re-arranged; the Treatises on the Natural and Experimental Sciences will either receive important amendments.

or be replaced by others entirely new; while the Mechanical and Chemical Arts, and the applications of the sciences to affairs of public utility, will be treated of in the Second Edition, much more practically than they were in the First Edition.

45. PROPOSED EXTENT OF THE WORK.—The series of scientific and historical TREATISES on the important SUBJECTS comprehended in the philosophical scheme of this work (page 13), which form indispensable links of the great chain of human knowledge—the Series necessary to complete the *circumference* of an Encyclopædia—cannot be compressed into *fewer* than EIGHTY CABINET VOLUMES. That is the *minimum* extent. But since the methodical plan of the work, as developed in this Prospectus, will permit at all times of the incorporation of such additional Treatises, as may be requisite to keep its scientific principles and historical facts in accordance with the progress of the age,—a permission of which the conductors will freely avail themselves,—it is impossible to state what may be the *maximum* number of its volumes. An Encyclopædia intended to reflect always the existing state of human knowledge, "to act," (in the language of Mr. COLERIDGE,) "at once as a reservoir and a fountain,—to receive perpetual accessions of knowledge from the genius of the age, and to yield the knowledge again in willing abundance," —such a work can never be effectually "*completed.*" That word applies with as little propriety to such an Encyclopædia, as it does to the Times Newspaper or the Philosophical Transactions; for, like those celebrated journals, this Encyclopædia will be at all times ready to incorporate an account of every important Event and new Principle that Time and Discovery may furnish, and for which its philosophical system provides an adequate Repository.

46. IMPROVED PLAN OF PUBLICATION.—A great alteration, and, it is hoped, an important improvement, will be made in the METHOD OF PUBLISHING the Second Edition, as contrasted with the method adopted for the first edition of this Encyclopædia. The PARTS of the CABINET EDITION will not, like the Parts of the Quarto Edition, contain letter-press and engravings belonging to different subjects or different Divisions of the Encyclopædia, forming a heterogeneous and unreadable mixture of fragments of many Treatises; but *each* PART will relate only to *one subject;* and whenever it is possible, *each* VOLUME of the CABINET EDITION will embrace ALL that relates to one subject. That, however, will necessarily depend upon the nature of the Subjects and the consequent extent of the Treatises. Very frequently several will be comprised in one Volume, and occasionally an important subject,—the principles of a leading Science, or the History of a great nation,—will occupy two volumes. But care will be taken to ensure a due proportion in size among the several Treatises, to avoid unnecessary prolixity, to combine comprehensiveness in matter with convenience in form, and to avoid the incongruous binding together of Treatises on irrelative Subjects—such, for example, as occurred in Vol. 5 of the First Edition, where the Treatises on the FINE ARTS were combined with two profound MATHEMATICAL TREATISES belonging to the Department of ASTRONOMY.

47. ADVANTAGES TO THE SUBSCRIBERS.—Those who subscribed to the original edition, and who remember how it was contrived to convert the most *Methodical* of Encyclopædias into the most IM*methodical* of Publications, will readily recognise the importance of an alteration, which INSURES TO THE SUBSCRIBER TO THE SECOND EDITION the possession of a complete readable portion of the work in recompense for every Subscription he is required to make.

48. ORDER OF PUBLICATION.—It seems not unnecessary to call the attention of intending Subscribers to the difference that exists between the *order* in which the SUBJECTS *occur* in the general system of this Encyclopædia and the *order* in which it may be *advisable to publish* the TREATISES on those subjects. In consequence of the different amount of corrections that will be required by the various Treatises that compose the Encyclopædia, and the circumstance that many Treatises on subjects that demand extensive investigation must be written entirely anew,—it would be impossible, without submitting to great delay and irregularity, to publish the revised Articles and new Treatises in Weekly Parts, in the exact order in which the subjects occur in Mr. Coleridge's methodical plan. Neither is it desirable

to adhere to that order pertinaciously, because it would not be agreeable to the great body of the SUBSCRIBERS to so comprehensive a work as this ENCYCLOPÆDIA, to receive, for months together, a series of WEEKLY PARTS relating solely to Mathematics, or to Geography, or to History, or indeed to *any* Department, in its order—*all other subjects being, for the time, systematically excluded.* A proceeding of that sort could hardly fail to excite dislike or indifference to the work in the FAMILIES of many of the SUBSCRIBERS. The Proprietors consider, therefore, that they will consult the general convenience, both of the Authors and the Subscribers, by publishing the Treatises in an indeterminate order,—giving History, Science, and Art alternately, but carefully indicating on the title-page of each Volume its exact place in the entire System, in accordance with the Plan given in page 13. In order, however, to prevent mistakes, every PART and VOLUME of the work, *as published*, will be marked with a running Number, simply to indicate the order of Publication, and irrespective of the ultimate Philosophical Arrangement of the articles. The Parts that constitute a Volume will be published as near together as circumstances permit, and, from time to time, General Title Pages and Tables of Contents will be supplied, to complete the Volumes of the several Divisions.

49. REGULARITY OF PUBLICATION.—The vast amount of original writing of the highest class, in every department of literature and science, which is comprehended in the First Edition of this Encyclopædia, and the proved excellence of its methodical plan, will so greatly facilitate the preparation of the CABINET EDITION, that the Conductors trust to be enabled to issue the WEEKLY PARTS in uninterrupted succession,—correcting in the work, as they go on, what requires correction; retrenching what is superfluous; and supplying what is deficient; so as to bring the whole more strictly into accordance with Mr. COLERIDGE'S great idea of the essentials of an Encyclopædia, and producing, if possible, a "SYSTEM OF UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE," more philosophical in its plan, more ably executed in its details, more convenient in size, and more economical in price, than any work of the kind that has ever hitherto been produced.

50. We conclude this Prospectus with a short extract from the Preface to the First Edition of the Encyclopædia:—

"The foregoing enumeration of the principal parts of the Encyclopædia embodies all the observations which the Editor considers it necessary to make in recommending the work to the patronage of the public. The exertions made by the Proprietors to procure the just fulfilment of the high expectations formed of the work, and of the promises they had made, as well as the perseverance with which they have conducted this important publication to its completion, amidst the many obstacles which must necessarily arise in so extensive an undertaking, entitle them to high consideration from that portion of the Public which is interested in works of a sterling and substantial character. From the present position of Literature, and *the system now in fashion of publishing small and superficial works which may be cheaply produced, and are really of no intrinsic value*, it is probable that a long period must elapse before any similar undertaking will be entered upon, from the enormous outlay of capital it requires, and the uncertainty of remuneration which it offers. It is hoped, therefore, that this GREAT NATIONAL WORK, for such it really is, may meet with that patronage which the Proprietors feel confident it fairly and fully deserves. They feel assured that, whether it be viewed as a whole or in its separate divisions, *it embodies a mass of information at once extensive, accurate, and scientifically arranged, which must place it in a pre-eminent and triumphant position.* Whatever its measure of success may be in a pecuniary point of view, they may justly feel a high gratification in having been instrumental, under Providence, in bringing to a successful termination *a work which, whether its* LITERARY MERIT OR THE SOUNDNESS OF ITS MORAL AND RELIGIOUS VIEWS *be regarded, must ever be considered as an* INESTIMABLE BENEFIT TO THEIR COUNTRY AND A PERMANENT ORNAMENT TO ITS LITERATURE."

London, October, 1849.

PLAN OF THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA.

The INTRODUCTION.—On the Laws and regulative Principles of EDUCATION; or in the Language of the Schools, the Elements of METHODOLOGY.

FIRST DIVISION.

PURE SCIENCES.

SECTION I.
FORMAL SCIENCES.

Philosophy of Language.
Logic.
Rhetoric.
Mathematics:—
- Geometry.
- Arithmetic.
- Algebra.
- Geometrical Analysis.
- Theory of Numbers.
- Trigonometry.
- Analytical Geometry.
- Conic Sections.
- Differential and Integral Calculus.
- Calculus of Variations.
- Calculus of Finite Differences.
- Calculus of Functions.
- Theory of Probabilities.
- Definite Integrals.

SECTION II.—REAL SCIENCES.

Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy.
Law:—
- General Principles of Law.
- Roman Law.
- English Law—
  - Laws of England.
  - Laws of Ireland.
  - Laws of Scotland.
  - Colonial Law.
- Canon Law.

Politics:—
- Law of Nations—
  - Diplomacy.
- Political Philosophy—
  - Statistics.
- Political Economy—
  - Commerce.

Theology:—
- Natural Theology.
- Evidences of Revelation.
- Scripture Doctrine.
  - Biblical Literature.
  - Biblical Antiquities.
  - Religions and Religious Customs.

SECOND DIVISION.

MIXED AND APPLIED SCIENCES.

SECTION I.
MECHANICAL PHILOSOPHY.
(*Mixed Mathematics*).

- Mechanics.
- Hydrostatics.
- Pneumatics.
- Optics.

Astronomy:—
- Plane Astronomy.
- Nautical Astronomy.
- Physical Astronomy.

Figure of the Earth.
Tides and Waves.

SECTION II.
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

- Magnetism.
- Electro-Magnetism.
- Electricity.
- Galvanism.
- Heat.
- Light.
- Chemistry.
- Sound.
- Meteorology.

SECTION III.—THE FINE ARTS.

- Architecture.
- Sculpture.
- Painting.
- Heraldry.
- Numismatics.
- Poetry.
- Music.
- Engraving.

SECTION IV.
THE USEFUL ARTS.

- Agriculture.
- Horticulture.
- Floriculture.
- Arboriculture.
- Carpentry and Joinery.
- Fortification.
- Engineering.
- Naval Architecture.
- Manufactures.
- Mechanical Arts.
- Chemical Arts.

SECTION V.
NATURAL HISTORY.

Inanimate:—
- Crystallography.
- Mineralogy.
- Geology.

Insentient:—
- Botany.

Animate:—
- Zoology.
- Physiology.
- Comparative Anatomy.
- Vertebrals:
  - Mammalia. | Reptiles.
  - Birds. | Fishes.
- Invertebrals:
  - Molluscs. | Spined Skins.
  - Insects. | Sea Nettles.
  - Crustaceans. | Infusories.
  - Arachnidans. | Polyps.
  - Myriapods.

SECTION VI.—APPLICATIONS OF NATURAL HISTORY.

- Anatomy.
- Materia Medica.
- Pharmacy.
- Medicine.
- Surgery.
- Veterinary Art.

THIRD DIVISION.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

INTRODUCTION:—
- On the Uses of History.
- Chronology.
- Chronological Tables.

ARCHÆOLOGY.

ETHNOLOGY.

ANCIENT HISTORY:—
- Sacred History.
- The Jews.
- Greece.
- Greek Literature.
- Greek Philosophy and Art.
- Ancient Oriental Nations.
- Rome.
- Roman Literature.
- Roman Philosophy.
- Classical Antiquities.
- Heathen Mythology.

MIDDLE AGES.

MODERN HISTORY:—
- The Christian Church.
- Greek Empire.
- Ottoman Empire.
- The Crusades.
- Italy.
- Germany.
- France.
- Spain.
- Portugal.
- Netherlands.
- Switzerland.
- Britain.
- America.
- India.

FOURTH DIVISION.

GEOGRAPHY.

PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY.

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY:—
- European.
- American.
- Oriental.
- African.
- Classical.

BRITISH TOPOGRAPHY.

FIFTH DIVISION.

LEXICOGRAPHICAL.

English Lexicon, &c. &c. &c.
See Prospectus, § 43.

GENERAL INDEX.

derived from them the greatest encouragement to carry on the war against Darius, not doubting but that he was the person described in the prophetic books.

Alexander's favour to the Jews.

At his departure these circumstances so effectually recommended the Jews to the favour of Alexander, that when they petitioned him to allow them to live under their own laws, and in the free exercise of their religion, and further to be exempted from tribute every seventh year, because their law forbade them to cultivate the soil in the year of the sabbath, he immediately complied with their request. The Jews further implored his protection for their brethren whom he would find settled in Babylon; and many of them, won by his kindness, enlisted as soldiers in his service, and accompanied him on his expedition.

His behaviour to the Samaritans.


The Samaritans envying the Jews the favour they had so unexpectedly gained, and jealous of the distinction conferred upon them, thought by a similar line of conduct to gain as much influence with the king. They met him as he returned from Jerusalem in a solemn religious procession, and professing their kindred with the Hebrews, sought from him a grant of the same privileges which he had given to their brethren. Alexander excused himself from paying attention to their request till after his return from Egypt; but, during his absence, a rebellion taking place in the city, in which Andromachus, the governor, perished, at his return he caused all those who were concerned in the disturbance to be put to death, and driving out the Samaritans, planted their city with Macedonians: those who survived retired to Shechem, under Mount Gerizim, which from that time became the metropolis of the Samaritan sect, and continues so to this day. The eight thousand Samaritans who had joined Alexander at Tyre, and had been with him ever since, he settled in Thebais, the remotest province of Egypt, lest their presence in Samaria should revive the mutinous spirit of their countrymen. This treatment contrasts strikingly with that which the Jews subsequently received, for when Alexandria was built, he settled therein many of that nation, giving them great privileges, and allowing them not only the use of their own laws and religion, but also the enjoyment of equal franchises and liberties with his own people, the Macedonians.

Influence of the preceding events upon Alexander's conduct.

It does not fall within our province to pursue the narration of Alexander's conquests, or to trace him in his rapid progress to the highest pinnacle of martial glory; one part, however, of his character is so closely connected with the occurrences related to have taken place on his arrival at Jerusalem, that we cannot forbear stopping to direct the reader's attention to it. It has often created surprise that a man of Alexander's strength of mind, should have been guilty of such folly and weakness as to feign himself to be the son of Jupiter Ammon, and to undertake a most laborious expedition to his Temple, which was situated in the midst of the deserts of Lybia, and twelve days journey from Memphis, for no other purpose than that of procuring himself the title of son of Jupiter.


The water to be distilled is poured into the Still at the opening marked *t*. The water of the Condenser is continuously renewed by the supply-pipe T T′, and when heated by the steam, it is suffered to run off by the escape-pipe *o*.

200



It is frequently necessary, in the laboratory, to distil volatile liquors, in which case the condensing power must be very effective, that loss be not occasioned by the escape of uncondensed vapour. For such operations, the apparatus represented by fig. 201 is employed. The

201



liquor to be distilled is placed in a glass Retort, the neck of which is connected, by means of an adapter, to a straight Condenser, consisting

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THE

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COMPREHENDING

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR,

OR THE PURE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE;

AND

GLOSSOLOGY,

OR THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS OF LANGUAGES.

By Sir JOHN STODDART, Knt., LL.D.

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REVISED BY THE AUTHOR, AND EDITED BY

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PREFACE.

THE present work was originally composed for the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*, a publication which was designed to have been produced under the editorial care of the late Samuel Taylor Coleridge. That accomplished scholar, distinguished poet, and profound metaphysician, was unfortunately prevented by ill health, and other adverse circumstances, from carrying the intended editorship into effect. He, however, not only devised the comprehensive plan which was described in the Prospectus of the Encyclopædia, but furnished the original materials for a general introduction, which his friend, my uncle, Sir John Stoddart, undertook, at the desire of the proprietors, to arrange for publication, in the form in which it eventually appeared.

My uncle was led, from this circumstance, to draw up an article on Grammar, which, though hastily executed, in the intervals of a laborious profession, was deemed by Mr. Coleridge not unworthy to occupy a place in the Encyclopædia. The subject was one which had attracted the author's attention at a very early period. He was educated at the school in the Close of Salisbury, an institution attached to the Cathedral, and of which a Minor Canon, Dr. Skinner, was Master, and the Rev. E. Coleridge (an elder brother of the poet), Under Master. Grammar was then taught on the ancient plan of the once

famous WILLIAM LILLY, whose *Propria quæ maribus* and *As in præsenti* English boys were, for centuries, compelled to repeat by rote, without the slightest suspicion that they involved anything like a rational principle. Fortunately, however, for my uncle, his godfather, Mr. Benson Earle, was a sound classical scholar, and had been a ward of the celebrated James Harris, the author of *Hermes*. This book Mr. Earle put into the hands of his godson, then about fourteen years of age, and the young student, on opening it, felt as if his mental eye had been couched, discovering with surprise that the lessons which had appeared to him, of all his scholastic tasks, the driest and most unmeaning, involved many profound speculations of intellectual philosophy. Of course he was not yet in a capacity to judge of the correctness of all Mr. Harris's theories; but he saw enough to convince him that *Hermes* contained much of that acute investigation, perspicuous explication, and elegance of method for which it had been celebrated by Dr. Lowth. His classical pursuits at Christchurch, Oxford, of which college he was elected a Student, somewhat moderated, though they did not wholly extinguish, his estimation of Mr. Harris's work; and the perusal of Hickes's *Thesaurus*, in the Bodleian Library, showed him that the northern languages afforded a new field for grammatical research. On his subsequent arrival in London, to follow the study of the law, he found the literary circles of the day much occupied with Mr. Horne Tooke's *Diversions of Purley*, a work which promised great results from the cultivation of Gothic, Anglo-Saxon, and Old English etymologies. Falling into company with Mr. Porson, he consulted him on its merits. The Professor said, that, on the first appearance of Mr. Tooke's *Letter to Dunning*, he had been struck with the originality of its views; but though the *Diversions of Purley* (of which only the first volume had then appeared)

certainly contained some new and curious matter, he did not perceive that it effected much toward the development of the principle set forth in the early pamphlet. This opinion confirmed my uncle in his resolution to investigate the subject for himself. Having chosen the Ecclesiastical and Admiralty Courts for the future scene of his professional exertions, he had some time before him for miscellaneous study; and as he had devoted part of his leisure at Oxford to the Bodleian Library, he employed much more in London among the Anglo-Saxon and Old English manuscripts of the British Museum; until he was called to the Bar in Doctors' Commons, from which period he was for several years too much occupied, first with his professional duties and subsequently with political discussions, to do more towards Philology than add an occasional article to the large mass of notes which he had previously collected. Several of these articles, however, threw no small light on the legal institutions, as well of England as of other countries. For instance, he traced the word *cavere* from its use in the Twelve Tables, the earliest monument of Roman Legislation, to the Mediæval *cautio*, the Italian *cauzione*, the Spanish *cauçion*, the French *cautionnement*, the Scotch *cautioner*, the English *caveat*, and writ *cautione admittenda*, and numerous other legal terms, ancient and modern, derived from the same source. So he found the *vades publicus* (a security first given at Rome, as Livy, Book iii. cap. 13, tells us, 460 years before the Christian era) to agree in origin with the Latin *vas, vadari, vadimonium;* the Mediæval *vadium-mortuum, gadiator, contragagiamentum;* the Italian *gaggio, gaggio-morto, ingaggiare;* the French *gage, gages, engager;* the Scotch *wad, wadset, wadsetter;* the English *wed, wedding, wedlock, gage, mortgage, engagement, wages, wager, wager of law, wager of battle*, &c. &c. Again, in the Italian *subastatore* (an auctioneer), he

recognized the Præco, to whose "most bitter voice" (as Cicero says) the goods of the great Pompey were subjected *sub hastâ.* Many other such investigations kept alive, amidst the more serious occupations of the law, his regard for the study of language; and it was under these circumstances that he was applied to for that treatise on Grammar which appeared in the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana.* A few years afterwards he was raised to the high station of Chief Justice of Malta; the arduous duties of which office absorbed, for many years, nearly the whole of his time. At length, in 1839, he was relieved from that important charge, and left to close a long life in the *otium cum dignitate* which he still enjoys.

For the last ten years he has not been an inattentive observer of the very valuable accessions which this branch of literature has received, not only on the Continent but in our own country. Many ages elapsed before Philology ventured beyond the classic circle of the Greek and Roman tongues. The languages of modern Europe were long thought unworthy of the grammarian's attention; and when they were first subjected to rules, it was in the vain endeavour to make them march only in the Greek or Roman step. Some zealous Divines put in a claim for the supremacy of Hebrew, which they essayed to prove was the language of our first parents; but this theory made little impression on the scholastic systems then or since in use. CONRAD GESNER had the merit of first extending philological speculation very far beyond the classical or judaical bounds. In 1555 appeared his *Mithridates,* a treatise in Latin, "De differentiis linguarum tum veterum tum quæ hodie apud diversas nationes in toto orbe terrarum in usu sunt." His notices of various languages, however, were, as might be expected from the then limited knowledge of the different countries, very slight, and led to little that was con-

clusive in point of principle. Nor can anything be more gratifying, in this branch of study, than to observe the vast progress which had been made between the *Mithridates* of Gesner, in the 16th century, and the *Mithridates* of Adelung, in the 19th. In the 16th century, too, GOROPIUS BECANUS perceived, though indistinctly, that affinity between the Indian and Teutonic languages, which has, in our day, been so clearly made out by GRIMM, BOPP, SCHLEGEL, EICHHOFF, &c., and recently in our own country by the very learned Dr. BOSWORTH, in his *Origin of the English, German, and Scandinavian Languages and Nations.*

To these, as well as to the ingenious speculations of Drs. JAMIESON, LATHAM, and PRICHARD, Messrs. JOHNES, WELSFORD, and others, my uncle has paid much attention, and has from time to time availed himself of their learned labours, in correcting and extending his own views, as well of the philosophy as of the history of language. When, therefore, Messrs. Griffin, in the prosecution of their energetic purpose to reproduce, in an improved shape, both as to matter and form, the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana,* of which they had become the proprietors, invited my uncle to revise his Treatise on Grammar, desirous of doing full justice to the subject, he resolved not simply on correcting the Treatise as originally printed, and inserting such notes as had since occurred to him, but on entirely reconstructing the work, and dividing the purely Scientific part from the Historical. This, therefore, he did; but as he felt that, at his advanced age, the labour of editing the whole would be more than he could prudently undertake, he devolved that task on me; placing at my disposal all the materials which, in a long course of years, he had collected, and giving me every facility for the fulfilment of my humble share in the work.

From what has been said, it is seen that the *Treatise on the Philosophy of Language,* now presented to the public, amounts, in manner, certainly, and, to a large extent, in matter, to a new work, bringing up our knowledge on this most important subject to the present day.

WILLIAM HAZLITT.

Chelsea, Nov., 1849.

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PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.

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PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.

INTRODUCTION.

Method.

1. In attempting to treat of any subject philosophically, it is advisable first to define the term or terms employed to designate that subject, and then to explain the philosophical method of treating it which the author intends to pursue.

Language.

2. The word "Language," which comes immediately to us from the French word *langage*, originates in the Latin *lingua*, "the tongue;" and therefore anciently signified only the use of the tongue in *speech*. A just analogy, however, has extended its meaning to all intentional modes of communicating the movements of the mind: thus we use the expressions, "articulate language," "written language," "the language of gesture," &c.; for man is formed as well internally, as externally, for the communication of thoughts and feelings. He is urged to it by the necessity of receiving, and by the desire of imparting, whatever is useful or pleasant. His wants and wishes cannot be satisfied by individual power: his joys and sorrows cannot be limited to individual emotion. The fountains of his wisdom and of his love spontaneously flow to fertilize the neighbouring soil, and to augment the distant ocean.

3. But the thoughts and feelings of man, which belong to his mental and spiritual nature, can only be communicated by means of corporeal acts and objects—by gestures, sounds, characters more or less expressive and permanent, instruments not merely useful, as *signs*, for this particular purpose, but many times pleasing in themselves, or rendered so, by the long-continued operation of habit. These, reason, the peculiar gift to man of his Creator, enables him to select, to combine, to arrange; and the result is a language.

Speech.

4. *Speech*, the language of articulate sounds, is the most wonderful, the most delightful of the arts which adorn and elevate our being. It is also the most perfect. It enables us, as it were, to express things beyond the reach of expression, the infinite range of existence, the exquisite fineness of emotion, the intricate subtleties of thought. Of such effect are those shadows of the soul, those living sounds, which

we call *words!* Compared with them, how poor are all other monuments of human power, or perseverance, or skill, or genius! They render the mere clown an artist; nations immortal; orators, poets, philosophers, divine!

Words, how effective.

5. Yet it is not to be supposed that spoken language, "with all appliances and means to boot," can always fully convey to others the conceptions or emotions of the speaker; and much less that it always does so. Joys beyond expression, and griefs too sad to vent themselves in words, are of every day's occurrence. On the other hand, there are persons, who habitually wrap up their thoughts in the language of mystery, equivocation, or falsehood, for the very purpose, or at least with the constant result, of misleading their hearers: and there are words and phrases susceptible of so many different interpretations, that nothing but an attentive comparison of them with the whole context, or with all the concomitant circumstances, can enable any one to comprehend their full force and effect. Dugald Stewart has well observed that, in consulting Johnson's Dictionary, the reader may meet with a multitude of words with five, six, or more significations attached to each of them, and after all the pains that the lexicographer has taken, may perhaps find no one of the definitions applicable to the passage which he has in view; and yet when he considers the whole passage together he may have no difficulty whatever in comprehending the intended sense of the particular word. This proves that the powerful effects of speech are not owing to the mere signification of separate *Words*, but to the activity of the *Mind* in seizing on the relations which they bear to each other, and in giving scope to the thoughts and feelings they are meant to excite.

Speech, its diversities.

6. Again, the dialects, or systems of speech adopted by various races of men, in different ages and countries, have been, in many respects, strikingly distinguishable. We may remark the copious Arabic, the high-sounding Spanish, the broad Dutch, the voluble French, the soft Italian: we may trace minute gradations from the monosyllables of the Chinese, to the long paragraph words of the Sanscrit; or we may rise, still more gradually, in the scale of expression, from the barbarous muttering of a poor Esquimaux in his solitary canoe, to the thunders of Athenian eloquence, and those delightful strains of our own Shakspeare, which are "musical as is Apollo's lute," and "a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets." Nor is this all: a thousand collateral circumstances tend still further to diversify the numerous spoken languages of the world. Not only does time produce gradual progress, or sudden change in their forms; but their effect is endlessly modified by combination with other arts of expression, with looks and actions, with sights and sounds.

Method of study.

7. In this labyrinth of interesting observations, what objects have we to pursue; what clue to guide us? Shall we be content to learn one or two dialects by rote; to burthen the memory without exercising the understanding? Or, if we would rise above this, to a know-

ledge of their construction, must we draw our general principles from the minute comparison of those numberless particulars, which the longest life would be too short even to contemplate, and which the united wisdom of ages has never attempted to arrange? The very statement of these questions is a sufficient solution of them. They indicate at once the necessity of assuming some comprehensive principles as the rule and basis of our further inquiries. These first elements of our reasoning must afterwards be followed out into all their concrete forms. The history of language must verify the science; but the science must precede.

The science and the history of language.

8. Obvious as is the distinction between science and history, between a principle and an event; yet several writers on language, especially within the last seventy or eighty years, and particularly in England, have strangely confounded these two modes of knowledge. Whether there be two parts of speech, or twenty, or any other number, and how they are to be distinguished from each other, are questions of science: whether a given word in one language be derived from another given word in the same or a different language, or whether both be derived from a common source, and through what transitions and changes of sound or meaning they have respectively passed, are questions of history. The method which I propose to pursue, is to treat of the former topics first, and afterwards of the latter; but in like manner as it would not be easy to acquire a knowledge of Geometry (at least in its early stages) without the aid of diagrams, so there might be some difficulty in making the first principles of the science of Language intelligible, without occasional reference to examples drawn from particular languages.

Grammar.

9. The science of Language has for some centuries been usually known by the name of *Grammar*, a word which, like the word Language, we have borrowed from the French; but which (like the word Language also) is far removed from its original source. The Greek word γράφω, "I write," is connected with many Teutonic words, signifying to cut into, or engrave; and was, no doubt, first applied to engraving on stone. Signs or letters, hieroglyphical, symbolical, or alphabetical, so engraved, were, according to a common analogy in the Greek tongue, called γράμματα, "things engraved," and that term being afterwards extended to letters *written*, as well as engraved, a knowledge of reading and writing letters in general was called γραμματική, "the grammatical art." In the course of time, teachers of reading and writing, in any one language, found it necessary to lay down *rules* for reading and writing it well, which rules were deemed the Grammatice, or *Grammar*, of that Language; and these again were found to result from certain common principles, which constitute the science of *Universal Grammar*, and of which I intend to speak in the first part of the following treatise. The rules which form the Grammar of a particular language, in so far as they differ from those of any other, are owing to accidental and temporary

circumstances, the investigation of which belongs rather to the history than to the science of Language. Universal Grammar, on the contrary, disregarding that which is peculiar to the speech of this or that individual, tribe, nation, or race, considers only what is common to man in all ages and countries, both as to the arrangement of his thoughts and feelings, with a view to their communication to others, and also as to the bodily organs, or instruments, with which the Almighty has furnished him, for the purpose of such communication.

Glossology. 10. The History of Language, in all its various bearings, may be not improperly designated by the term *Glossology*, which I prefer to Glottology, a word recently employed by some continental writers; first, because the former sounds to English ears less harsh; and, secondly, because it suits better with several words which we already possess, such as *Gloss*, *Glosser*, *Glossator*, *Glossographer*, *Glossography*, all derived from the common Greek word γλώσσα (Atticè, γλώττα), the Tongue. Glossology, then, will form the subject of my second treatise, comprehending,—

1. The *Etymology*, or derivation, of particular words.
2. The different modes of their *Construction* in different languages.
3. The comparative similarities and dissimilarities of words and construction in those languages.
4. The theoretical origin of languages in one or more sources.
5. The possibility and probability of forming from the existing languages, or otherwise, an Universal Language.

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THOSE FACULTIES OF THE INTELLECT AND WILL ON WHICH THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE DEPENDS.

11. In order to study Universal Grammar with effect, it is necessary to take a preliminary view of those faculties of the intellect and will on which the science of language depends.

Consciousness.

12. In the mind of man the consciousness of simple existence is the source and necessary condition of all other powers; as in language, the expression of that consciousness by the verb *to be*, is at the root of all connected expression.

13. But we are conscious of different states of existence, in some of which we act, and in others we are acted upon: and thus in language, a verb is a word which signifies *to do*, or *to suffer*, as well as *to be*. No language, indeed, ever was, or ever could be, formed without such verbs; but the case is different with regard to theories of language, and systems of Grammar. These may be, and have been constructed, on the hypothesis, that the mind of man is a mere passive recipient of mechanical impressions; a something which may be impelled like a foot-ball, but which cannot give to itself, or to anything else, the slightest impulse beyond that which it has first received. On such a question as this, the only appeal lies to the common sense and daily experience of mankind; and the result of that experience is clearly attested by all languages, living and dead—a species of evidence which is the less to be resisted, because it is not the result of any common agreement. Every language in the world has grown up from the necessities of those who have used it, and not from intention; from accident, and not from theory; and yet there is among them an universal acquiescence in certain fundamental principles: these principles, then, are indisputably founded on the common constitution of the human mind.

Sensations and emotions.

14. The mind is, no doubt, passive in some respects. If I open my eye to the light, I cannot choose but see; if a sound strikes my ear, I cannot help hearing. These, and many like states of existence, derived from the bodily organs, are called *sensations;* there are other states, in which we are more or less passive, derived from the mind, and commonly called *emotions*. When we come to analyse these latter, we shall easily discover that we are not so entirely passive in their reception, as is often supposed: nevertheless, as we in both cases "suffer," that is to say, are acted upon by external causes, we

Feeling. may not improperly include sensation and emotion as modes of the passive principle, under the common name of *feeling*. The states of sensation, which are agreeable to our nature, we properly call *pleasure*, those of an opposite kind we call *pain;* and the same names are naturally transferred to those emotions of the mind which seem analogous to the respective sensations of the body. Thus the feeling of guilt is called painful, and that of joy pleasant. The pleasurable sensations and emotions, and their real or supposed causes, are all called by the common name of *good*, and their opposites by that of *evil*. The expression of feeling is what constitutes in language the *passive verb*.

Will. 15. As I have called the passive principle, feeling; so I call the active principle *will*, or volition. It is this principle, which may truly be called the life of the human mind; it is this, which forms and fashions the mind; it is this, which impels and governs the man. The conscious being, in his active state, has a power: he says, I *do* this or that: and hence arises the *active verb*. Hence also arises the *pronoun*: for the very idea of an act involves the idea of a *cause;* and it has been clearly enough shown by different writers, that if the idea of a cause did not exist within the mind, it could never be suggested from without.

16. The will, in its growth, becomes a *moral* energy; that is, it impels us to good, as good, and consequently to the greater good rather than to the less. To choose the greater good is to do *right*, to choose the less good is to do *wrong*. Let philosophers argue, as they please, on liberty and necessity; let them reconcile, as they can, those high doctrines

> Of Providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate,
> Fix'd fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute;

still the individual, from the first dawnings of reason, distinguishes right from wrong, and knows that he is a cause of the one, or of the other; and feels that the power which he exercises as a cause, is a talent for which he is responsible. Thus is formed *Conscience*, the light and guide of life. I have not now to discuss at length the nature and effects of this precious faculty: other and fitter occasions may be found for that investigation; but I cannot avoid noticing, that as the ideas of right and wrong are seated not merely in the mind, but in the first and elementary rudiments of the mind, it is a dangerous and fatal error to represent them as contrivances of language, to say that "Right is no other than the past participle of the Latin verb *regere*," and that "Wrong is merely the past tense of the verb to *wring*." This is part of the history of words: it is no part of their philosophy.

Reason. 17. Neither will nor feeling has in itself any limit. The stream of conscious being is continuous; it exists alike amid the roar of cannon, and in the soft breathing of the vernal air: in the deep, protracted meditation of a NEWTON, and in the brief glimpse that is caught of

> The snow that falls upon the river,
> A moment white, then lost for ever.

What is it, then, that reduces the chaos of will and feeling first into distinguishable elements, and then into individual masses? It is the forming and shaping power within us. It is the divine faculty, "looking before and after," to which in its perfection we give the name of *reason*. Reason holds, as it were, the balance between the passive and active powers of the mind. It is fed and nourished by the impressions of the one: it grows and moves by the energy of the other. It has several stages or degrees, of which the first is *Conception*.

Conception.

18. By conception, I mean that faculty which enables the mind to apprehend one portion of existence, separately from all others. In other words, the first act, or exercise of the reasoning power is to conceive one object, or thing, *as one*. Hence arises in language the *noun;* for "the noun is the name of a thing." Here it is that many modern writers on Grammar have erred. They seem to have considered no such power in the mind to be necessary, and no such act to be performed. They seem to have supposed that *things*, or objects, affected the mind as such, by their own power; and that the mind was quite passive in this respect. When we come to examine this fundamental part of their system, we find the greatest possible confusion of terms. According to one, the first elements of thought are *ideas*, another calls them *objects*, a third *sensations*, and so forth. If you ask what is meant by these respective terms, you are still more bewildered. "An idea," says one, "is that which the mind is applied about whilst thinking." A most vague and insignificant expression, then, it must surely be; and yet it has been justly observed, that "vague and insignificant forms of speech and abuse of language have so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have by prescription such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance and hinderance of true knowledge." All this is eminently true of the abuse and misapplication of the word *idea*, which had a perfectly distinct and specific meaning, until it was in an evil hour made "to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks," or "whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking."

19. Some of these ideas, it has been said, are simple, and some complex. In the former the mind is passive, in the latter there is an act of the mind combining several simple ideas into one complex one; but this distinction has been altogether denied, in more recent times; and we have been told, that "it is as improper to speak of a complex idea, as it would be to call a constellation a complex star." Be these ideas, however, simple or complex; be they ideas of sensation, or ideas of reflection; ideas of mode, of substance, or of relation, the great difficulty is to understand in every case how each idea exists as *one;* how it is bounded, limited, and set out in the mind; and this, I say,

cannot be done, in any case, without an act of the mind, an exercise of the peculiar faculty which I call conception.

Objects. 20. What one set of writers say of *ideas*, another set say of *objects*. "An object, in general," says Condillac, "is whatever is presented to the senses, or to the mind." But still the question returns: What constitutes *one* object? What is meant by *one* presentation? Is it the sensation, or thought, which takes place in a minute, in a second, or in any other portion of time? Is it the impression made on one sense, or on one part of the organ of that sense? Is it the sensation of warmth, for instance, experienced by the whole body; or that of light experienced by the whole eye? Is it the impression made on the retina by a house, by the door of the house, by the panel of the door, or the pane of the window? Is it the altitude of the building, or the colour of the brick? These questions are endless, and perfectly insoluble, if that which makes an object one thing to the mind be not an act of the mind itself; but if it be an act of the mind, then it follows, that with regard to the very first materials of our knowledge, the mind is not wholly passive, but exercises some peculiar faculty; which faculty I call conception.

Attention. 21. Mons. Condillac, indeed, admits that objects are only distinguished by remarking some one or other of them particularly; and this particular remarking he calls *attention;* and attention, according to him, is a simple faculty, acting only in one mode, and acting *necessarily* from an external cause. Thus he states that the cause of attention to sensible objects is an *accidental* direction of the organs; manifestly, therefore, according to him, the mind is no less passive in attention than in sensation.

Conception. 22. I say, on the contrary, that in conception the mind acts. The word "to conceive," in its origin, affords an easy explanation of the mode of action. This word, which is derived from *con* and *capio*, expresses the action by which I *take up together* a portion of our sensations, as it were water, in some vessel adapted to contain a certain quantity; for I have before observed that sensation is in itself continuous, as an ocean, without shore or soundings: it does not divide itself into separate portions, but is divided by the proper faculty of the mind. The faculty of conception, like all other faculties, operates by certain laws, in a certain direction, and in a certain manner; for such is its constitution. It cannot enable us to view things temporal under the form of eternity, to conceive that a certain time occupies a certain space; or that an emotion belongs to the class of sensations; that jealousy, for instance, is red, or green, or blue, or smooth, or rough, or square, or triangular. These laws, which regulate the power of conceiving thoughts, it will be necessary for a while to consider.

Space. 23. The first law that I shall notice, is that of *extension*. We are so constituted, that we cannot conceive certain objects otherwise than as occupying *space*. The faculty of conceiving them, therefore, pre-

supposes in the mind a sense of space; but this sense has again its necessary laws or modes of operation. In other words, we cannot conceive space but as extending in length, and breadth, and thickness, and bounded by points, and lines, and surfaces. It is by applying these laws to certain objects, that we conceive them to be more or less extended, and to possess different shapes and forms. To say that we get the idea of space by the sense of sight or touch, is to confound our notions of sense, which imply an existence in space; it is to reverse the order of knowledge; for if the mind were originally unfurnished with a peculiar faculty, enabling, and indeed compelling it to refer the sensations of sight and touch to some part of space, it could no more acquire an idea of space from those sensations, than from the emotions of gratitude or fear. This peculiar faculty, applied to the sensations of sight and touch, of hearing, taste, and smell, enables us to conceive our own bodily existence, and that of the external world. According as we apply it more or less comprehensively, we conceive the existence of objects larger or more minute: and according as we exercise it with more or less care and attention, the external forms and disposition of objects appear to us more or less accurately defined. It is not, therefore, the external object which necessarily gives shape and form to the conception; but the conception, which by its own act embraces a given portion of space, and thus gives shape and form to the external object.

Time.

24. Similar observations may be made on the law of duration, or *time*. To say that time is a complex idea gathered from reflection on the train of other ideas, is to forget that the very notion of a train is that of a succession in time, and therefore presupposes what it is adduced to prove. There is nothing complex in the nature of time or duration, but it is a form under which we are necessarily forced to contemplate all things external to us, and some things within ourselves. It is a law of our nature, and so far as regards its peculiar objects, is inseparable from the human mind. But again, it is not the lapse of any particular portion of time which necessarily limits the duration of any object of our thoughts, for we can as easily think and speak of a century as of a second: it is the mind which conceives, as one object, the life of a man, or the gleam of the lightning, a long year of toil, or a brief moment of delight.

Number.

25. By these laws of *simple* conception, whatever occupies a certain portion of time, or of space, or of both, may be considered as *one* thing, or *one* thought; but things or thoughts succeed each other incessantly, and by dividing sensation into units, we have done no more than we should do by dividing the ocean into drops, or the sand into grains. A further law of conception succeeds. This faculty takes a more complex form. We distinguish conceptions by their *number;* and hence, in all languages, the noun has a *plural number* as well as a singular, in signification, and generally in form. But as the plural is derived from the singular, so the power of conceiving *many* depends on the

power of conceiving one. It has been justly observed by Mr. Locke, that "there is no idea more simple than that of unity, or one."—"Every object our senses are employed about," says he, "every idea in our understandings, every thought in our minds brings this idea along with it." Now since this is the case, since no object, no idea, no thought, ever is conceived in our minds without this impression of unity, why should we imagine that any can be so conceived? And if it cannot be conceived without such impression, then must we consider the power by which that impression is produced as essential to the conception. Before we can speak or think of anything, we must first conceive it to be one. This *one* may be finite or infinite; that is, our conception may be perfect or imperfect—but still, in order to become an element of reason, it must exist, as one, in the mind. Even the conception of *many* exists in the mind as that of *one multitude;* and if that multitude be divided into distinct parts, so as to be numerically reckoned, the number, whatever it may be, is still contemplated as *one number*. Simple conception, indeed, could never have advanced us beyond the notion of an unit or integer; it is by the aid of the other reasoning faculties, which I shall hereafter notice, that we are enabled to form the complex conceptions of number, and so to build up the whole science of Arithmetic.

Identity.

26. Conceptions succeed each other indifferently, whether they are like or unlike; but the mind can only number them by classing them, and can only class them by their similarity; which similarity, when complete, is in the contemplation of the mind *Identity*. Much has been said of the source from whence we derive the notion of our own personal identity. Surely if anything is essential, not only to reason, but to feeling, to will, and even to consciousness, it is this notion. When Descartes invented his famous reasoning, *Cogito, ergo sum*, he clearly assumed his personal identity: and it is utterly impossible for a human being to reason or think at all, without such an assumption. Even in madness, though the actual identity is often confounded, though a man may fancy himself to be Alexander the Great, or even to be the Almighty, he has before his mind an imaginary identity: he thinks and acts as one being, and not as two: and again, in dreams, when we sometimes see ourselves dead, or alive, yet the self which we contemplate is a mere imaginary personage, with whom we have a strong sympathy, as we have with the hero of a romance. The contemplator always seems to think and act as a separate individual, and never loses the deep sense of identity.

Substantive and adjective.

27. If we next inquire into the different *kinds* of conception thus formed, we shall find that the ancients were right in dividing them into two, namely, *substance* and *attribute;* whence arise in language the *substantive* and *adjective*. It must be remembered that we first conceive, as one thing or one thought, a given portion of sensation, and that those sensations in their simplest form are limited by the laws of time and space; but those laws are always operating on the

mind together, though not always with equal force. Sensations which spread over a large extent of space may occupy a short time, and those which continue for a long time may lie within very narrow bounds of space. Many parts of space too may be contemplated in one moment of time, and many portions of time may refer to the same point of space. Our first notion of substance is personal, unless we should prefer saying that the notion of substance is derived from that of *person;* which might perhaps be a more philosophical mode of speaking; though the former more immediately applies to the common arrangements of grammarians. We refer all our states of being to a substance called *self*, to which each man gives the name of *I*: and thus I feel and know that I am the cause of all the active states of my being. By an inevitable necessity of my nature I am led to believe that there must be a cause or causes foreign to me of all the impressions made on me without my own act. With respect to myself, the conceptions which are limited by time and space give me the notions of *matter* and *motion* as belonging to me; those which are not so limited give me the notion of *mind.* To external causes, therefore, I attribute the same distinctions of character: and hence the most general notion of external substance is that of a cause of the impressions formed in me. But one cause often appears to be common to several different sensations. I therefore conclude that it is one *thing.* I have, for instance, the sensations of heat, and light, and colour, cotemporaneously, and this not once, but often: and I conclude, that there is some common cause of all these sensations, to which cause I give the name of Fire. Substance.

28. The notion of *material substance* it is said is obscure; it is no otherwise obscure, than as a thinking and sentient being cannot sympathise with an unthinking and insentient one. Obscure as it is said to be by philosophers, it is what the common bulk of mankind consider as the very plainest and clearest of all their notions. A common man is never troubled with any doubts of the existence of the table or chair that he sees before him, any more than he is of his own personal identity. Material substance.

29. Others again think, that they have a very clear notion of the existence of these external objects or substances. They think that they can easily understand how the mind conceives the cause of a particular sensation of heat, and a particular sensation of light, to be one object, called fire, and contemplates that object as separate from the sensations produced by it; but they cannot understand how the mind should conceive as one thing, or thought, or one object of contemplation, a notion *common* to all similar sensations. Yet it is certain that men frequently use words expressive of such notions, *e. g.* Gr. ὁωφροσύνη, Lat. temperantia, Eng. temperance—so, Gr. λευκότης, Lat. albitudo, Eng. whiteness, &c. These notions are by some writers called " abstract ideas," and supposed to be formed by a process of *generalisation*, in which the mind, after contemplating several Abstract ideas.

Abstract ideas.

particular objects, *abstracts* from each some one quality, in which they all agree, and regards it as "a sort of Universal, or One Being in Many," "ut universale quiddam, sive Ens unum in multis." But this neither accords with the old signification of *abstract*, as distinguished from *concrete;* nor with the proper meaning of *Idea:* and the greater part of the conceptions represented to be so formed, may be shown to be produced in a totally different manner. Thus the conception of a straight line, and the consequent conception of straightness in general, is certainly not formed by abstracting it from various lines of various inequality; for if it were so, every man would have a different notion of a straight line from every other man, and every man would go on abstracting, and consequently improving his conception of straightness as long as he lived. Whereas, in truth, the idea of a straight line, as soon as it is once steadily contemplated in the mind, is perfect, and is equally so in all minds. This could not be the case if all minds did not act by some general laws; and since we are so constituted as to be able to reflect on such laws, we may separate those reflections from the general mass of consciousness, as easily as we can separate a particular sensation from the same mass; we may form of each, a *conception*, a thought, as distinct from all other thoughts as one external object is conceived to be separate from all other external objects.

30. It is indeed objected, that these laws have no real existence; that there is no *truth* but that of opinion, and consequently, that "two persons may contradict each other, and yet both speak truth;" for such are the precise words of Mr. Horne Tooke. (Vol. ii. p. 404.) The same objection may be made with much more force against the existence of the external world; for the learned and pious Bishop Berkeley has fully shown, that we have no assurance of the reality of matter or motion, but that which depends on our intuitive conception of their existence, as causes of the changes which we experience in ourselves. But as we are utterly unable to believe, that there is no truth in our own existence; and, as we find it hard to imagine, that this "goodly frame, the earth," this most "excellent canopy, the air," this "brave o'erhanging firmament," this "majestical roof fretted with golden fires," are all fictions and nonentities; so it is difficult for us to imagine, that truth and virtue, beauty and wisdom, glory and happiness, are all empty names: we cannot well believe that time and space are mere fictions of our own minds; and yet it is easier to believe this, than to conceive their existence according to laws different from those which we actually experience; it is easier, for instance, to conceive that there is no real existence in space, than that if it exists, a straight line in space is not the shortest that can lie between two given points, or that a figure may be completely bounded by two straight lines, or that the radii of a circle are unequal, or that the three angles of a right-lined triangle are greater or less than two right angles.

Subjective and objective truth.

31. Hence arises the distinction of *subjective* and *objective* truth. The former we consider as existing in ourselves, the latter as existing in objects out of ourselves; the truth of a mere opinion is subjective, the truth of the fact to which that opinion relates is objective; but if all truth were merely subjective, each man's mind would be the only universe, and it would be a solitary universe, without a creator, without time, or space, or matter, or motion, or men, or angels, or heaven, or earth, or virtue, or vice, or beginning, or ending—one wild delusion without even a framer of the monstrous spell! Now, since it is utterly impossible to believe this, either deliberately or instinctively, it follows that there is some objective truth, and that what a man *tryeth*, *troweth*, or *trusteth* to (for these are all said to be of the etymological family of the *word* truth) is in itself, more or less, substantial and permanent. But if this be the case with our conception of a stone, why not of a man? And if of the motion of a stone, why not of the thoughts of a man? And if of thoughts bounded by the laws of time and space, of number and identity, of good and evil, why not of those laws themselves? For the purposes of Grammar, it is hardly necessary to press this argument; for language has been made by men, according to their instinctive opinions; and certainly the prevalent opinion has always been, that there is something which the mind contemplates, when it reasons on man in general, as well as when it reasons on Peter or John. It is probable that Sir Isaac Newton had some object before his mind when he argued on light and colours, as well as a lamp-lighter has, when he lights a lamp; or as a country lass has, when she buys a yard of blue or red ribbon at a fair.

Particular conceptions.

32. Conceptions are either particular, general, or universal. In strictness of speech nothing is particular, but that which occupies only one given portion of time, or of space, or of both. Thus the emotion of fear at a certain moment of time; the sensation of warmth at a given moment, and in a certain part of the body; or the sensation of brightness in a particular part of the retina, are all particular conceptions; and it is somewhat remarkable in language, that men (in early ages, and before they had much turned their thoughts to reflection), so entirely confounded the subjective and objective truth, both of sensations and emotions, that they used the same word to denote both. A man, for instance, would say indifferently, "I am *hot*," or "the fire is *hot*." So, in common parlance, we say "the bird *fears* the scarecrow;" but Shakspeare uses the verb *fears* in a sense still prevalent in some parts of the country,

> We must not make a scarecrow of the law,
> Setting it up to *fear* the birds of prey.

33. Nor is it only a single sensation or emotion, of which we may form a particular conception. We may certainly conceive as one thing, a substance; that is, many sensations or emotions united in

one common substratum; whether that substratum be active as a person, or passive as a thing; for the notion of a person is founded on *self*, as an active being, and that of a thing on the same *self*, as passive.

Particular conceptions.

34. These, I say, are the only conceptions which, in strictness of speech, are absolutely particular; but almost all writers call those persons or things particular, which they consider to be identical: thus Peter or John is said, perhaps, to be a particular individual, though the name Peter, or John, may be given to an object which I have only seen on some particular occasions, and only known to be identical by reflection and comparison. In like manner, Pall Mall is the name of a particular street, though consisting of many houses; and the Thames is a particular river, though flowing through several counties. I dwell the more on this observation, because it shows that those who strongly contend for the existence of nothing but particular objects, overlook the fact, that what they call particulars are not such in strictness of speech; and that, if the only business of the mind were to receive impressions, we could never acquire even what they call a particular idea or conception; we could never know that the John of to-day was the same person as the John of yesterday.

35. This latter species of particulars, however, is the first element of language. We employ signs, not to indicate a single impression, but the same impression often repeated; and these are of three kinds, the simple sensation or simple quality producing it, which we call an adjective; the simple action, which we call a participle; and the person or substance in which the cause of sensation or of action resides, which we call a substantive, or personal pronoun.

36. To these particulars we may add the notion of numbers, either distinct or confused; for the notion of many objects or many qualities may still be viewed as a particular notion: and hence arise, not only the plural of nouns, but the singulars which imply plurality, and are commonly called nouns of multitude, as a troop, an army, a crowd.

General conceptions.

37. I have shown that a particular conception is formed by the mind separating and sorting its sensations and emotions according to certain necessary *laws;* and arranging them in certain *forms* more or less distinct. Thus a certain form is that of Peter; but the same form applies nearly to John, the same nearly, though with some other difference, to William; and so on. Now, when we contemplate this form as possibly applicable to a variety of particulars, it constitutes what may be called a *general* conception; and these general conceptions, duly ordered and arranged one within the other, form *genera* and species; and of these, more or less distinct, opinion is chiefly formed.

Universal conceptions.

38. But there is yet one higher step in the power of conception, namely, the Universal. This is when we contemplate the *form* itself in which our lower conceptions were cast, the *law* which governs it.

Thus, there is a certain law by which the mind can only conceive a straight line in a certain manner, namely, as length, and as partaking in no degree of curvature, nor interrupted, nor distorted in any manner whatsoever. Now, the first line that we actually conceive to be straight, is not exactly so, yet it approaches to the form in the mind sufficiently to make us give it the name of straight. The second, the third, the fourth, and all successive lines, are perhaps equally deficient; and, by comparing them with each other, were there no common standard to refer them to, we should never attain the knowledge of a simple straight line. All the lines which we actually see, have breadth together with their length, all have some curvature or irregularity; but reflection shows us in the mind, a line, which is merely length without breadth, and which lies evenly between its points. Of this we are able to make a distinct conception, which, when we have once attained to, we find it entirely independent of time or space, always the same, necessarily true in all its relations, equally applicable to all the particulars which fall under it—a law of the mind—in short, what was alone and properly called by the ancients, and ought still to be called—an *idea*. The higher, the nobler, the purer these ideas are, the more difficult is it for man to conceive them. They are never conceived without meditation and effort; and the deepest meditation, the highest stretch of our faculties, leaves us lost in admiration and awe at the great overpowering idea of our Almighty Father.

Conceptions, how presented to the mind.

39. Conceptions present themselves to our minds, either as accompanied, or not accompanied, with a sense of objective reality. If they are not so accompanied, they are mere creatures of the *imagination*: if they are so accompanied, then, if the object producing them is past, they are conceptions of *memory*, and if yet to come, of *expectation*; but, when the object is present, the conception becomes a *perception*, whether it be of an external thing, or of a general notion, or of an idea.

Assertion: the verb.

40. I have hitherto spoken only of the faculty of conception, by which the mind gives its thoughts their separate forms; but we have next to see these forms put into action, and rendered, as it were, living and operative. Thoughts and opinions come to us in the mass; and it is by resolving them into their constituent parts that we ourselves understand them; but in order to communicate them to others, we must pursue the contrary process; we must state the parts, and *assert* their union. *Assertion*, then, is the faculty which we have next to consider: it is, as it were, the uniting and marrying together of two thoughts, and pronouncing them to be one. Hence the word, which expresses that function of the mind, is called, by some writers, the *copula*, or bond; but in common Grammars, the *verb*: and I rather adopt the latter term, because the former may be apt to lead to the erroneous conclusion, that the mind in assertion, passively contemplates two thoughts as united, whereas, it is active in declaring that

union, as it were, by its proper authority; an authority, indeed, often exercised hastily and amiss, but still the proper act of the mind itself. Conception, then, forms nouns, including under that term substantives, adjectives, and even pronouns and participles; but these nouns lie dead and inoperative to any purpose of reasoning, till they are vivified by the verb, which pronounces their existence to be a truth. Thus *John*, *existing*, *good*, *loving*, are all perfectly intelligible as conceptions of the mind; yet so long as they stand alone, we see not what use is to be made of them in reasoning; but let us introduce the verb, and a truth immediately *flows* from the mind, whence possibly some etymologists might derive ῥῆμα, a verb, and *reor*, to think, from ῥέω, to flow. Thus we say, John exists, John is good, John loves, and each of these assertions at once takes the form of a truth, and becomes, as will be hereafter shown, the germ and seed of other truths in the mind.

Affirmative and negative.

41. To assertion belong affirmation and negation. We assert, that conceptions exist, or that they do not exist; and the one of these excludes the other. A thing cannot be, and not be at the same time; "such is the πρός ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσις, which the Eleatic Philosopher, in Plato's 'Sophist,' applies to the ideas of existence and non-existence, and which accompanies every other idea as its shadow, whether in physics, in intellect, or in morals; for the finite is necessarily opposed to the infinite, the false to the true, the evil to the good," &c. And as these conceptions are the opposites of each other, so affirming the one is denying the other. To say that black is white, is therefore, in common parlance, to utter a gross and palpable untruth.

Moods.

42. Neither affirmation nor negation, however, is always positive. The mind contemplates some truths as actual, that is to say, it conceives the subjective truth within itself to be certainly agreeing with the objective truth in the nature of things, and therefore pronounces unhesitatingly and distinctly upon its existence; but of other subjective truths it sees no objective counterpart, and therefore pronounces them not actual, but hypothetical, that is probable, or merely possible. On this distinction depend certain differences in the *moods* of verbs.

Tenses.

43. Again, we assert truths either with or without reference to the time in which we speak. When we speak with such reference, as we most frequently do when we speak of particulars, we are necessarily compelled to distinguish the present from the past and future; and hence the origin of *tenses;* but when we assert anything of ideas, we speak of a truth ever present, and therefore we use the present tense in its most comprehensive import. Thus, when we say John is good, we imply a possibility that he might at some other time be bad; and when we say John is writing, we imply a certainty that he was not writing at some previous time, and will not be writing at some future time; but when we say two and two are four, we not only assert a truth of to-day, or of this year, or of this century, but a truth which must be ever present; since we cannot conceive it

ever to have beginning or ending. This remark is sufficient to show that those grammarians are in error, who make the signification of time a necessary characteristic of the verb.

The mind active in assertion.

44. In whatever way we assert anything, the assertion is a declaring of some truth, real or supposed; it is a propounding of that truth, or, in the language of logicians, it is the enunciating of a proposition. This is not done by a peculiar word, as for instance the word *be;* but by the force and effect of the word in construction; for the word *be*, in some of its forms, as, *to be*, and *being*, is the mere name of a conception; and so are the words *love*, *hate*, *walk*, and indeed all others which may be used as verbs. Every verb, therefore, includes a noun; or, as has been truly said, it is "a noun, and something more." What that "something more" is, has been much disputed; but it is clearly something which shows the mind of man to be *active*, not only in forming conceptions, but in uttering, propounding, predicating, declaring, *asserting* them to be truths.

Existence and Action.

45. The truth declared or asserted, regards either *existence* or *action*. If the former, we either assert it simply of a conception, as "God exists;" or we assert it conjointly of two conceptions, which are of a nature to exist together, as the substance with its attribute, or the whole with all its parts, or the universal with the particular. Thus we say "God is good," "two and two are four," "gratitude is a virtue." If we assert an action, we must consider it either as proceeding from its cause, or as received by its passive object, that is to say, we must employ either the active or the passive verb; and whichever we employ primarily, we may (if such be the nature of the action) add the other secondarily. There are, indeed, actions which rest in their causes; and the verbs expressing these, whether active or passive, in construction, are really of the kind called neuter, or intransitive, such as, "to rejoice," "to sing," and the like.

Conclusion.

46. A truth asserted leads to a further truth, by that faculty, which Shakspeare calls "discourse," from the ancient scholastic and accurate term *discursus*. Hence that beautiful and philosophic passage—

> He that made us with such large *discourse*,
> Looking before and after, gave us not
> That capability and godlike reason
> To rust in us unused.

The power of forming *conceptions*, and that of giving life and animation to them by *assertions*, would leave human reason barren and useless for the purposes for which it was conferred on mankind, without the additional power of drawing from them *conclusions*. All human beings exercise this last-mentioned power more or less distinctly; but it is still matter of dispute among very able writers on what principle its correct exercise is to be explained. Without entering into this discussion, I shall here assume that the most perfect form of reasoning or argument is that known by the name of Syllogism,

which may be shortly described as the inferring of a particular conception from an universal or general: and even in the Enthymeme, which is an imperfect syllogism, the universal or general, if not expressed is understood. The inference may be made either from positive, or from hypothetical premises. Hence arises a further explanation of the use of moods in the verb. We assert a truth, not as actual, but as possible, and the consequence which we deduce becomes a contingency, necessarily following from the premises, but not necessarily true, because the premises themselves are not necessarily so.

Review.

47. Thus have I enumerated the three faculties which go to the making up of the reasoning power, and which are conception, assertion, and conclusion, answering to the *simplex apprehensio*, *judicium*, and *discursus* of the logicians. All continued exercise of reason resolves itself into a repeated exertion of these faculties; and the only difference is, that the truths produced by one conclusion serve to enlarge or improve the conceptions which are employed in framing other assertions and conclusions.

Secondary parts of speech.

48. Hitherto I have had occasion to notice only those operations of the mind, as giving birth to the primary parts of speech, the noun and the verb, the substantive and the adjective, the pronoun and the participle, which are in most cultivated languages distinguished from the adverb, the conjunction, and the preposition, by being subject to inflection or change of form, either in the beginning, the middle, or the end of the words by which they are expressed. This latter circumstance, however, is merely accidental, and with respect to the essential difference of the adverb, conjunction, and preposition, from the other parts of speech before mentioned, I must repeat what I have before stated, that the mind contemplates truths at first in the mass, and then by reflection breaks down that mass into certain portions which again are subdivisible; so that, in asserting one truth, we cast as it were a rapid glance over the subordinate branches of which it is composed; as in viewing the whole beauty and proportion of the Apollo Belvidere, we see at once the graceful turn of the head, the animated advance of the arm, and the receding of the opposite foot; or as in contemplating the agonised frame of the Laocoon, the two sons, with the folds of the serpents which twine around them, occupy a secondary place in the imagination. When we come to develop these secondary parts of the composition, we find in them the same principles of unity and connexion, as in the general outline of the whole group: and so it is with the subordinate parts of a sentence; which are, if we may use the expression, truths within truths, assertions within assertions. Thus even the long and flowing sentences of Milton's prose are each reducible either to an assertion, or at most to a conclusion, as their ground-work; but upon that ground-work are built many other assertions, which are assumed, though not formally stated as such. Each adverb, each conjunction, each preposition, contains such subordinate assertion, and of course involves a con-

ception; it is therefore true, that these parts of speech ultimately resolve themselves into nouns and verbs—ultimately, I say, but in the first glance and motion of the mind, as it were, they only appear in their secondary character, as helps and expletives to the principal words in the sentence.

Operation of the Passions.

49. The *passions* must not be overlooked, in considering the mind in its relation to language. It often happens that an abruptness, a transposition, and that which might be called an irregularity, if we referred only to the operations of reason, become appropriate, and even necessary forms of speech, when the mind is under the influence of passion. The reasoning powers are then disturbed and imperfect: the emotions become inordinate, the will obtains a preternatural force. Hence arises the *interjection*, which some grammarians have refused to reckon among the parts of speech; but their refusal is vain: so long as there are men with human passions and affections, there will be interjections in their speech, words which stand out from the rest, very significant of emotion though not of conception, defying the ordinary rules of construction and arrangement, because such rules bear reference principally to the power of reason, which is suspended or superseded, whenever passion produces the animated and expressive interjection. Passion, too, has given birth to what we commonly (though not always very appropriately) call the *imperative mood*. When Esau says, "Bless me, even me also, oh, my father!" we feel the earnestness of the prayer, widely different as it is from a command. Again, this same example shows us, that the *vocative case* of the noun is of similar origin. "Oh, my father," is a strong expression of passion; but it is totally dissevered in construction from the enunciation of any truth, and has no immediate relation to any operation of reason. Many other forms and modes of speech take their character from passion; as may be particularly observed of the *interrogative*, so often the result of an eager desire to know the very fact, which, it may be, we fear and tremble to assert.

Conclusion.

50. It is to be observed, that all the exercises of all the human faculties may be clear or obscure, distinct or confused. Our very consciousness may be that of mere dotage, our feelings may be blunted, our will wavering and undetermined, our conceptions vague, our assertions doubtful, our conclusions uncertain, our passions a chaos. It has been elsewhere said, that "the thousand nameless affections, and vague opinions, and slight accidents which pass by us 'like the idle wind,' are gradations in the ascent from nothingness to infinity; these dreams and shadows, and bubbles of our nature, are a great part of its essence, and the chief portion of its harmony, and gradually acquire strength and firmness; and pass, by no perceptible steps, into rooted habits and distinctive characteristics." Still the channels in which the stream of mind flows, so long as it has any current, remain always the same: the mental faculties which we exercise, so long as we can exercise any, are subordinated to the same

laws, and display themselves in the same manner. Hence speech is, in all nations, necessarily formed on the same principles; and though no one language was ever constructed artificially, yet it is astonishing how distinctly all present the traces of the same mental powers, operating, in the same manner, on materials so exceedingly different.

51. The general view thus taken of the human mind, appeared to me to be indispensable toward a right understanding of the science of language; for as I consider language to be a signifying or showing forth of the mind, it would have been impossible for me to have rendered myself intelligible, in explaining the laws or modes of signification, had I not first stated what I understood to be the nature of the thing signified.

Gradations of Science.

52. In different languages there are some things accidentally different, and some things essentially the same. It has been owing to accidental circumstances in the history of mankind, for instance, that the name of the Universal Creator, among the Jews, was *Jehovah;* that it is in France *Dieu*, and in English GOD; and that the Latin words *locum tenens* came to be changed into the Italian word *luogotenente*, the French word *lieutenant*, and the English word, which we spell like the French, but pronounce *leftenant*. It is also by accident, that the word *luogotenente* signifies, in some parts of Italy, the civil magistrate of a small community; that in France and England the word lieutenant expresses a rank in the military and marine services; and that in Ireland it is applied to the viceroy, or chief representative of the sovereign. On the other hand it is owing to causes which exist more or less permanently in human nature, that in the sounds uttered as language by an Esquimaux, a Hottentot, or a Chinese, there are certain qualities common to them with the eloquent voices of a Cicero or a Demosthenes. Though their articulations vary in many respects, they all articulate; and the nations that whistled like birds, or hissed like serpents, never existed but in the inventions of the same sort of travellers, as those who told of Cynocephali and Cyclops, and of men who sheltered their whole body while they slept, by the shade of one enormous foot. Cicero or Demosthenes, Plato or Newton, Dante or Shakspeare, might express sublimer, bolder, clearer, lovelier thoughts than men of a common stamp, but they could only express them according to the laws by which every human mind must necessarily act in conceiving and uttering thought. Here then we arrive at *Universal Grammar*, at the *pure science*, which places this part of knowledge on an immoveable basis, renders it demonstrable and certain, and connects it with that TRUTH, which is one and uniform through all ages, and which rashness and ignorance perpetually assail, but can never subdue.

Universal Grammar and Particular Grammar discriminated.

53. It is necessary to keep in view the distinction between *Universal Grammar*, such as it is here described, and the *Particular Grammars* of different nations, ancient and modern. The word Grammar, taken in its most comprehensive sense, may be briefly de-

fined, the *science of the relations of language considered as significant;* or more accurately, *the science of the relations, which the constituent parts of speech bear to each other in significant combination.* Now, of those relations in any particular language, for instance the English, some are peculiar to that language, some are common to it with certain other languages, but not with all, and some are common to all languages. Every particular Grammar then has to do with all these three classes of relations; but Universal Grammar with the last only. It has been disputed whether Grammar be a science or an art. Universal Grammar is a science, Particular Grammar is an art; though like all other arts its foundations must be laid in science; and the science on which it rests is Universal Grammar.

Writers on Universal Grammar.

54. I am far from asserting that *Universal Grammar* has been hitherto so successfully cultivated, as to leave to future investigators no hope of improving this science. Its principles have certainly been nowhere laid down with that happy and lucid order, which has rendered Euclid's Elements, for above two thousand years, a text-book in geometry. Much, however, has been done. The ancient Greek and Latin writers have traced all the principal paths of the labyrinth, and elegant edifices of science have been raised in modern times by such writers as SANCTIUS, VOSSIUS, the writers of PORT ROYAL, and the learned and amiable HARRIS. These grammarians, as well as those who in the middle ages cultivated the Arabic and its kindred dialects, and those whose disquisitions on Indian Philology have been laid open to us by recent discoveries, all agree in founding the science of Grammar, on that of the mental operations.

Fallacies of modern writers.

55. Recent authors have rashly called in question the utility of these learned labours. It is not to be denied, that the many new sources of information opened to us in modern times, the numerous dialects, barbarous and polished, which we have the means of studying, the progress of the same language through many successive ages, which we are enabled historically to trace, and, in short, the extended sphere of our experimental investigations in language, may have served to correct some errors and oversights even in our scientific views of Universal Grammar. But if the ancients failed (as they generally did fail) in what regards the history of language, some modern writers have much more lamentably failed in what regards its science. Instead of founding language on the mind, they most preposterously found the mind on language. "The business of the mind (says one) as far as it concerns language, is very simple: it extends no further than to receive impressions, that is, to have sensations, or feelings. What are called its operations, are merely the operations of language." * Another says: "We cannot distinguish our sensations, but by attaching to them signs which represent and characterise them. This is what made Condillac say, that we cannot think at all without the help of language. I repeat it, without signs there exists neither

* Diversions of Purley, vol. i. p. 70.

thought, nor perhaps even, to speak properly, any true sensation. In order to distinguish a sensation, we must compare it with a different sensation: now their relation cannot be expressed in our mind, unless by an artificial sign, since it is not a direct sensation." *

Origin of Words.

56. It is somewhat difficult to deal seriously with phrases so incoherent. But let us ask, what can be meant by "the operations of language?" Every operation must have an operator; and it is the operator that causes the operation, and not the contrary. It is not the amputation that causes the surgeon, but the surgeon that performs the amputation. It is not the furrow that directs the ploughman; but the ploughman who guiding his plough gives shape to the furrow. True it is, that every person who uses a word is not its inventor; but somebody must have invented it. True also it is, that an individual may have many thoughts which never would have entered his mind, had they not been first excited in it by words: he might never have thought of such a place as Timbuctoo, or such an animal as the Ornithorhynchus had he not read or heard of them; but the name of the place or of the animal did not start into existence of itself. It was imposed by some person, and for some reason existing in that person's *mind*.

Sensations, how distinguished.

57. Again, it sounds absurd to say that we cannot distinguish our sensations otherwise than by attaching signs to them. A burnt child dreads the fire because he has felt the sensation of burning, and not because somebody may have spoken of it in his hearing by the word *burnt*, or *brulé*, or *brugiato*. Still more absurd is it to say that without a sign there exists neither sensation nor thought. And as to the concluding assertion, that the relation between two sensations cannot be expressed in the mind except by an artificial sign, it seems to be altogether unintelligible.

Active operation of the Mind.

58. The chief ground of these inconsistencies is an incapacity or unwillingness on the part of their authors to view the human mind as anything more than an inert mass, receiving impressions from external objects, and returning them back, with some modification, perhaps, from the structure of the mental machine, but purely mechanical; such, for instance, as the light of a candle might undergo, if thrown on a reflector of many facets. But—

Cúm ventum ad verum est, sensus, moresque repugnant.

The practical testimony of all human conduct is against this theory. The fact that every human being has within him an *active* energy,

* "On ne distingue les sensations qu'en leur attachant des signes, qui les representent et les caractérisent. Voilà ce qui fait dire à CONDILLAC, *qu'on ne pense point sans le secours des langues*. Je le répète, sans signes il n'existe ni pensée, ni peutêtre même, à proprement parler, de véritable sensation. Pour distinguer une sensation il faut la comparer avec une sensation différente: or, leur rapport ne peut être exprimé *dans notre esprit* que par un *signe* artificiel, puisque ce n'est pas une sensation direct."—CABANIS. Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme, vol. i. p. 72.

a self-moving power, in short a *mind* governed by its own laws, and burthened with its own responsibilities, is a simple truth, obvious alike to every unprejudiced individual, high and low, learned and unlearned.

> The dull swain
> Treads on it daily with his clouted shoon;

and it was the chosen theme of Socrates—

> Whom, well-inspired, the Oracle pronounc'd
> Wisest of men.

59. It is this active energy, this mind or spirit of man which gives to speech its *forms;* that is to say, the characteristics of noun, of verb, and of those other constituent parts of speech which I have noticed as essential to a combined signification of any thought or feeling. The *matter* of speech consists in the articulate sounds which serve to express the different forms. These sounds have certain properties common to the bodily organization of man in general, and others which have been differently employed by different nations and communities. The consideration of the former is necessary as a subordinate part of Universal Grammar; the latter belongs to particular grammars, and consequently to the History of Language.

Forms of speech created by the Mind.

CHAPTER II.

OF SENTENCES.

Forms of speech are needed by the mass of mankind.

60. THE *forms* of speech to which I have above adverted, though we employ them, with more or less accuracy, from the very dawn of our reason, are far from being obvious to the great mass of mankind. It is a remarkable circumstance in the constitution of our nature, that the most complex things are most familiar to us, that the most general laws, by the very reason that they are most general, and most constantly in action, become habitual to us without our reflecting upon, and consequently without our understanding them. We conform to the complex and intricate laws of sight, we judge of distances and magnitudes by the angles which objects subtend, and yet during a great part of our lives we have not the most distant suspicion that any such things as angles exist, or that they are subtended on the retina; nay, ninety-nine men out of a hundred, and probably a much greater proportion of mankind, exercise the power of vision throughout their whole lives, without so much as wasting a thought on its laws. So it is in regard to speech. All men, even the lowest, can speak their mother-tongue; yet how many of this multitude can neither write nor read; how many of those who read know nothing even of the grammar of their own language; and how many who have been instructed so far, have never studied Universal Grammar! The fact is, that men at first regard the practice of speech, as the exercise of some natural faculty, which proceeds spontaneously from the wish of communicating their thoughts and feelings. By and by they observe, that this faculty operates partly from sudden impulses, and gives birth to expressions not easily to be analysed into any component parts, as in the ejaculations of Philoctetes, which fill up many lines of the Greek tragedy, representing his sufferings; and that, on the other hand, it is in far greater part the result of thought, and distinguishable into portions separately intelligible. In analysing these, we at once perceive that every discourse, however long, consists of *sentences;* and therefore, before I proceed to analyse speech any further, it may be useful to notice the different kinds of sentences.

The sentence.

61. Our word *sentence* is from the Latin *sententia*, and that from *sentio* to feel, to think, to judge; whence in legal language a sentence signified primarily the judgment formed in the judge's mind, and then the same judgment pronounced by him. Grammatically, it answers to the Greek term λόγος, as defined by Aristotle, *φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ, ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ' ἀυτὰ σημάινει τι*—"a complex significant

sound, of which certain parts are significant by themselves;"* which definition, so far as it goes, is correct; but for the fuller understanding of the subject, I would suggest the following: "A sentence is a number of words put together, and obtaining from their combination, a particular power of *enunciating* some truth, real or supposed, absolute or conditional, or else of expressing some distinct *passion*, together with its object." From this definition, it would follow, that the main distinction in classifying sentences should be into the *enunciative*, and the *passionate;* or, as Harris calls them, sentences of assertion, and sentences of volition. Other writers have classed them somewhat differently, but yet with reference to similar principles. Thus Ammonius states that there are four kinds of sentences besides the enunciative, namely, the interrogative, the optative, the deprecatory, and the imperative; but that in the enunciative alone is contained truth or falsehood.

The enunciative sentence.

62. The *enunciative* sentence, like all others, obtains its power of expressing fact or opinion, by the connection of the words of which it is composed; for Aristotle observes (what indeed is self-evident), that "of those words which are spoken without connection, there is no one either true or false; as for instance, 'man'—'white'—'runneth'—'conquereth.'" But let us put together only these two words—

Jesus wept,

and we have recorded an historical fact most affecting in itself, and furnishing abundant food for deep and interesting meditation.

When we read in Shakspeare—

The quality of mercy is not strained,

we immediately perceive the enunciation of a beautiful truth, which is again presented under an expressive form to the imagination by the following lines—

It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath.

So when Milton says—

——————— in the soul
Are many lesser faculties, which serve
Reason, as chief,

a truth respecting our intellectual (as the former did our moral) nature is distinctly asserted.

63. This kind of sentence may enumerate many particulars, all bearing on one point of time, or referring to one general idea: such is the following picturesque delineation of what presented itself to young Orlando, when in pacing through the forest, chewing the cud of sweet and bitter fancy, he threw his eye aside—

* Poetic., s. 34.

Under an oak, whose boughs were moss'd with age,
And high top bald, of dry antiquity,
A wretched ragged man, o'ergrown with hair,
Lay sleeping on his back; about his neck
A green and gilded snake had wreath'd itself,
Who, with her head, nimble in threats, approach'd
The opening of his mouth; but suddenly
Seeing Orlando, it unlink'd itself,
And with indented glides, did slip away
Into a bush; under which bush's shade
A lioness, with udders all drawn dry,
Lay couching, head on ground with cat-like watch,
When that the sleeping man should stir.

Such also is the following argumentative sentence in Bishop Taylor's Sermon on the Duties of the Tongue, urging the Christian office of administering consolation to the afflicted:—

God hath given us speech, and the endearments of society, and pleasantness of conversation, and powers of seasonable discourse, arguments to allay the sorrow by abating our apprehensions, and taking out the sting; or telling the periods of comfort; or exciting hope; or urging a precept, and reconciling our affections, and reciting promises; or telling stories of the Divine mercy; or changing it into duty; or making the burden less by comparing it with greater, or by proving it to be less than we deserve, and that it is so intended and may become the instrument of virtue.

The interrogative sentence.

64. Under the head of enunciative sentences I include the *interrogative;* for the same fact which is simply asserted may be stated as beyond the sphere of the speaker's knowledge, or as being doubted by him, and desirable to be known. This is commonly effected in language by a slight transposition of the words, sometimes by a mere change of accentuation. As in Sterne's celebrated sermon, "We trust that we have a good conscience."—"Trust that we have a good conscience?" Again, by transposing the lines above quoted, we make them interrogations—

Is not the quality of mercy strained?
Droppeth it as the gentle rain from heaven?

But it is to be observed, that as some degree of emotion is implied in the very nature of an interrogation, so it is often used by the poets, orators, and others, to give life and animation to their style, although no doubt exists in their mind or that of their hearers, and the matter which is questioned in point of form, is meant to be asserted in point of fact. Thus when the poet says—

——— who to dumb forgetfulness a prey,
This pleasing, anxious being e'er resign'd?

he means positively to assert that no one ever quitted life with indifference. The humorous speech of Falstaff, when personating the king, illustrates our observation—

Shall the blessed sun of heaven prove a micher, and eat blackberries? A question not to be asked. Shall the son of England prove a thief and take purses? A question to be asked."

65. Again, the enunciative sentence may be *conditional* or contingent; that is, it may be placed in dependence on, or in counterbalance against, some other truth; as in Macbeth— The conditional sentence.

> If it were done, when 'tis done, then t'were well
> It were done quickly.——

Or in Hamlet—

> —— Duller should'st thou be than the fat weed
> That rots itself at ease by Lethe's stream,
> Wouldst thou not stir in this.——

Or again in Macbeth, where the contingency takes place in spite of obstacles which might be supposed capable of preventing it—

> Though Birnam wood be come to Dunsinane,
> And thou oppos'd being of no woman born,
> Yet will I try the last.

66. In all these and similar instances, the enunciation of a truth is the immediate object in view: but another class of sentences owe their form and construction solely to some *passion*, of which they indicate the object. And it is to be observed, that the indication of an *object* of passion is essential to the constituting such sentences as these. Thus, when the Nurse, in Romeo and Juliet, on finding her young lady dead, cries and laments vociferously, and the parents enter, asking, "What noise is here? What is the matter?" Her answers, "O lamentable day!" "O heavy day," are not sentences; for, though they plainly show the grief with which she is agitated, they do not at all express the cause or object of that grief. But when Hamlet cries— The passionate sentence.

> O! that this too, too solid flesh would melt,
> Thaw and resolve itself into a dew!

we perceive a distinct expression of the wish to be delivered of life, as burthensome to him. The sentence is as complete and grammatical, and much more poetic, than if the place of the interjection O! had been supplied by a verb; for instead of an impassioned and beautiful line, it would have been perfectly absurd, if the poet had said—

> *I wish* that this too solid flesh would melt!

67. We may observe, that these passionate sentences, combine quite as readily as the enunciative with dependent sentences, as "O! that I had wings like a dove! Then would I flee away and be at rest;" which implies (but more forcibly) the same fact as the sentence, "If I had wings like a dove, I would flee away," &c.

68. Sentences of the passionate kind either express a passive feeling, as admiration and its contrary, or an active volition, as desire and its contrary. Of the former kind, is that passage of the apostle, "O! the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!" and the line of Milton, comparing the receptacle of the fallen spirits with their former happy seat—

> O! how unlike the place from whence they fell!

The passionate sentence.

Those sentences which express desire and aversion are commonly expressed by the mood called *imperative;* but they as often imply humble supplication or mild intreaty, as authoritative command; and in such cases are called by some *precative.* Thus the poet describes Adam gently calling on Eve to awake—

> He, with voice
> Mild as when Zephyrus on Flora breathes,
> Her hand soft touching whisper'd thus: *Awake,*
> My fairest, my espous'd, my latest found,
> Heav'n's last, best gift, my ever new delight,
> *Awake!*

And again, when our first parents offer up in lowly adoration their morning orisons, they say—

> Hail, universal Lord, *be* bounteous still
> To give us only good!

But these emotions are widely different from others, expressed in the same form of sentence: as when King Henry says to Hotspur—

> *Send* us your prisoners by the speediest means,
> Or you shall hear from us in such a sort
> As may displease you.

Or when Juliet exclaims—

> *Gallop* apace, ye fi'ry-footed steeds,
> To Phœbus' mansion!

Or when Macbeth cries to the ghost of Banquo—

> *Avaunt!* and quit my sight! Let the earth hide thee!

69. Passionate sentences are generally short; but their repetition in continuous succession is often a beauty of the highest kind, especially in poetry. The mighty Master of Poetry, inimitable in this, as in all the vast variety of styles which he adopts, has given an instance of the passionate iteration of feeling, in one of his earliest productions, the "Rape of Lucrece." After a beautiful enunciation of the powerful effects of time—("Time's glory is to calm contending kings," &c. &c.)—Lucretia calls on Time to heap evils on the head of her ravisher—

> Disturb his hours of *rest* with *restless* trances!
> Afflict him in his *bed* with *bedrid* groans!
> Let there *bechance* him, *pitiful mischances,*
> To make him moan, but *pity* not his moans!
> *Stone* him with harden'd hearts, harder than *stones!*
> And let *mild* women to him lose their *mildness,*
> *Wilder* to him than tigers in their *wildness!*
>
> Let him have time, to tear his curled hair!
> Let him have time, against himself to rave!
> Let him have time, of Time's help to despair!
> Let him have time, a beggar's orts to crave;
> And time to see one that by alms doth live,
> Disdain to him disdained scraps to give!

Let him have time, to see his friends his foes,
And merry fools to mock at him resort!
Let him have time, to mark how slow time goes
In time of sorrow; and how swift and short,
His time of folly, and his time of sport!
And ever let his unrecalling crime
Have time to wail th' abusing of his time!

The passion, which would dictate this terrific variety of imagery in its maledictions, might well arm the injured woman (Roman as she was) to the act of self-sacrifice so celebrated in history.

Imperfect sentences.

70. The examples hitherto given are of perfect sentences; but instances often occur in which a sentence is manifestly left imperfect, and that with great beauty, as in the well-known line of Virgil—

Quos ego—sed motos præstat componere fluctus.

And so Satan first addresses Beelzebub, in the opening of the Paradise Lost—

If thou be'st he—but oh! how chang'd, how fallen!

In both these cases, the words, though not in themselves fully and clearly expressive of the thought which we may suppose to be in the speaker's mind, are yet not wholly unconnected, and, therefore, show at once that they are parts of sentences which, indeed, it would be easy for the reader to fill up in his own imagination.

CHAPTER III.

OF WORDS, AS PARTS OF SPEECH.

Words.

71. THE next step in the grammatical analysis of Speech is to resolve Sentences into their significant parts, namely *Words;* for most persons will readily grant that a sentence consists of words; and that every word has some separate force or meaning, as so used. The origin of our term "*Word*" is lost in the obscurity of ages. It comes to us from a Teutonic source, and appears in many dialects, as in Mœso-Gothic, *Waurd;* Anglo-Saxon, *Word;* Dutch, *Woord;* Frankish and Alamannic, *Wort;* Danish, Swedish, and Icelandic, *Ord*, whence it would seem not improbably to be allied to *Oro*, which in old Latin was to speak. Be this as it may, in its grammatical import, as it will here be used, *Word* answers to the Latin *Dictio*, which that admirable grammarian PRISCIAN defines "the least part of a constructed (that is, orderly-composed) sentence; understanding a part to be such *in relation to the meaning of the whole sentence.*"

Composition of words.

72. Words themselves may, indeed, generally be subdivided as to sound into syllables, and these syllables into letters. But where a word is capable of such subdivision, the syllables or letters, though they may signify something separately in other sentences, are not separately significant *with relation to the sentence in which the word is used.* Thus, to take Priscian's instance, in Virgil's sentence,—

Fama——*vires* acquirit eundo;

the two syllables *vi* and *res* form parts of the word *vires;* but they are only parts of its sound; they have no separate signification with relation to the sentence here quoted. Yet, in other sentences, each of these syllables may form a word, if it be significant, in relation to the sentence in which it is used; as—

——— volat *vi* fervidus axis

And elsewhere—

Res dura et regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri.

So the English term *handsome* is to be taken as one word in a sentence, in relation to which it has one signification, *e. g.*, comely, beautiful, or liberal; but in another sentence, where *hand* signifies a portion of the human body, and *some* an indefinite quantity or number, it forms two words. The same may sometimes be said even of a single letter; for instance, the letter *i*, in most words, has no sepa-

rate signification; but when it stands alone, as a significant part of a sentence, it is then a word, as in the Latin—

I, decus, *i* nostrum, melioribus utere fatis!

And so in the English—

——— always *I* am Cæsar.

73. "If, therefore, all speech," says Harris, "whether in prose or verse, every whole, every section, every paragraph, every sentence, imply a certain meaning, divisible into other meanings, but *words* imply a meaning which is not so divisible, it follows that words will be the smallest *parts of speech;* inasmuch as nothing less has any meaning at all." This argument would have been more accurately stated had the accomplished author inserted, after "a meaning not so divisible," the clause above employed, viz., "with relation to the sentences in which they are used." The want of some such explanatory cause has led to much misapprehension of Mr. Harris's whole doctrine. It has been assumed that he meant by *signification* something positive; that a certain sound must be under all circumstances significant, or under all circumstances destitute of signification; whereas the science of Grammar is relative; the signification of a sentence, be it a simple or a complex, a long or a short one, depends on the mutual relation of all its parts; and the signification of one word in a sentence depends on its relation to another in the same sentence. In this sense, we must understand the proposition that words are the least *parts of speech* capable of grammatical classification; how they are to be classed remains to be considered, for some principles of classification are better than others. It is not sufficient that we comprehend all our notions on a given subject under certain heads; but we must be prepared to show why we choose those heads rather than others. Words, the smallest parts of speech.

74. Take, for instance, Shakspeare's well-known lines—

The man that hath no music in himself,
Nor is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons——

Here we know that various grammatical writers call the word *the* an article; *man*, *music*, *concord*, and *sounds*, substantives, or nouns substantive; *no*, *sweet*, and *fit*, adjectives, or nouns adjective; *that*, and *himself*, pronouns; *hath* and *is*, verbs; *moved*, a participle; *not*, an adverb; *and*, a conjunction; *in*, *with*, and *for*, prepositions. Parts of speech.

75. The first question that occurs to us is, whether these classes themselves are all recognised in all languages, and by all grammarians? And a very little experience will show that they are not. The same thing has happened in Grammar, which has happened in all other sciences. Some authors have divided speech into two parts, some into three, four, and so on to ten or twelve. Others again have made their division depend on the supposed utility of words; others on

Parts of speech.

their variation; others on the external objects to which they refer, and others on the mental operations which they express. On this point, it is worth while to hear what QUINTILIAN says, in the fourth chapter of his first book—"On the number of the parts of speech, there is but little agreement. For the ancients, amongst whom were ARISTOTLE and THEODECTES, laid it down, that there were only verbs and nouns, and combinatives (*convinctiones*); intimating that there was in *verbs* the force of speech, in *nouns* the matter (because what we speak is one thing, and what we speak about is another), and that the union of these was effected by the *combinatives*, which I know most persons call *conjunctions;* but I think the former word answers better to the original Greek *σύνδεσμος*. By degrees the philosophers, and particularly the Stoics, augmented the number; and first, they added to the combinative the *article*, then the *preposition*. To the noun they added the *appellative*, then the *pronoun*, and then the *participle*, being of a mixed nature with the verb; and finally to the verb itself, they subjoined the *adverb*. Our (Latin) language does not require articles, and therefore they are scattered among the other parts of speech; but we have added to the others the *interjection*. Some writers of good repute, however, follow the doctrine of the *eight parts of speech*, as ARISTARCHUS, and in our own day PALAMON, who have ranked the *vocable*, or *appellative* under the noun, as one of its species; whilst those who divide it from the noun, make nine parts. Again there are others who divide the vocable from the appellative, calling by the former name all bodies distinguishable by sight and touch, as *a bed*, or *a house*, and by the latter what is not distinguishable by one or both these means, as the *wind*, *heaven*, *virtue*, *God*. These last-mentioned authors, too, add what they call *asseverations*, as (the Latin) *Heu!* and *attractations*, as (the Latin) *fasceatim;* but these distinctions I cannot approve. As to the question whether or not the vocable or appellative should be called *προσηγορία*, and ranked under the noun, as it is a matter of little moment, I leave it to the free judgment of my readers."

76. Although Quintilian, who only touches on Grammar incidentally, speaks of Aristotle as maintaining that there were three parts of speech, yet VARRO says truly that Aristotle asserted there were *two* parts of speech, the verb and the noun. In fact, Aristotle, in his book *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, treats of these two alone; considering that of them is made a perfect sentence, as "Socrates philosophises:" and therefore PRISCIAN says "the parts of speech are, according to the logicians, *two*, viz., the noun and the verb, because these alone, conjoined by their own force, make up a full speech, or sentence; but they called the other parts *syncatagorematics*, or consignificants. Priscian, himself, however, maintained that there were eight parts of speech; and he seems to have been implicitly followed for many centuries; but, though it is of little consequence whether we give the name of parts to particular divisions or subdivisions, it is of great im-

portance to determine on what principle speech should be divided and subdivided.

77. Recurring, therefore, to the sentence above quoted from Shakspeare, let us inquire how the words can be grammatically distinguished: and many various modes will readily present themselves:—

Variable and invariable words.

78. It may be observed that some of the words admit of variation, and others do not. Thus *man* may be varied into *man's* and *men*: *hath* into *have*, *hast*, *had*, and *having*: *sweet* into *sweeter*, and *sweetest*, &c., and, on the contrary, the words *the*, *in*, *and*, *not*, &c., cannot be altered. But this is manifestly not an essential distinction, since it does not take place in the same manner in all languages; but, on the contrary, every language is distinguished, more or less, from every other, by peculiar modes of varying its words. Thus the Gothic, Greek, Hebrew, Sanscrit, and Arabic languages, and it is said, those of Patagonia, Lapland, and Greenland, have a variation in some or all of their nouns to mark the *dual* number, which is unknown to our own and many other tongues. So the Greeks and Romans varied their adjectives by the triple change of gender, number, and case; whereas the English never vary them in any of those ways. If then the distinction of variable and invariable will not answer our purpose, let us look for one that is more essential.

Affective and discursive parts of speech.

79. Having considered in the former instance the sound of the word, I shall now take a distinction which arises from its signification. Thus M. BEAUZÉE divides the parts of speech into two classes, of which he says "the first includes the natural signs of *sentiment*, the other the arbitrary signs of *ideas*: the former constitute the language of the heart, and may be called *affective;* the latter belong to the language of the understanding, and are *discursive*." It is manifest that the principle of this distinction is universal; for though M. Beauzée does not use the word "Ideas" in the senseless manner introduced by Descartes and followed by Locke, "pro omni re cogitatâ," but for acts of the understanding or reason alone, as distinguished from sentiment or feeling, yet the two classes taken together are applicable to language in general; for all men must be influenced by sentiment and understanding, and all languages must possess some means of distinguishing these different faculties. But the question is, whether this distinction is sufficient to account for the different classes of words: and most assuredly it is not; for though there are some words which express only the objects of sentiment, and others which express only the objects of knowledge, yet there are many which express both together, and many which directly express neither. Nor is it always sufficient to use a word of one class in order to convey either an emotion or a truth. These circumstances more frequently depend upon the combination, than upon the distinction of words.

Object and manner.

80. Let us now come to a third distinction, that of the PORT ROYAL Grammarians, who say "the greatest distinction of what passes in our minds, is to consider in it the *objects* of our thoughts, and the

form or *manner* of our thoughts, of which latter the principal is reasoning or judging; but to this must be added the other movements of the soul, as desire, command, interrogation, &c." This, again, is a distinction universally applicable to language in point of signification: and when we come to apply it to existing languages, it will be found sufficiently accurate.

Necessary words and abbreviations.

81. But it has been observed, that this may be done with more or less facility and despatch; and that some words are absolutely *necessary* for the communication of thought, whilst others may be considered as *abbreviations*, in order to make the communication more rapid and easy; as a sledge may have been first constructed to draw along heavy goods, and may have been afterwards placed on wheels to add celerity to the motion. Such is the theory of Mr. HORNE TOOKE, and so far as we are here considering it, that theory is perfectly just.

Principal and accessory words.

82. The words which are necessary for communicating the thought in any given sentence with the utmost simplicity, may well be called *principals*, and those which only help to make out the thought more fully and distinctly may be called *accessories*. These are the terms employed by Mr. HARRIS, and consequently his theory so far coincides with that of Mr. Tooke. Mr. Harris, however, adds, that the principals are significant by themselves, and the accessories significant by relation: whereas, Mr. Tooke says that the necessary words are signs of things, and the abbreviations are signs of necessary words. I shall hereafter have occasion to enter more at large into this part of his doctrine. It is sufficient at present to observe, that the doctrine does not interfere with the fundamental principle of classification in all Grammars which deserve the name; that is to say, of all which have proceeded on the signification of words, and not merely on their sound.

Noun and Verb. Plato's opinion.

83. Now, this principle, in whatever terms it is clothed, is, that the *noun* and the *verb* are the primary parts of speech; and that without them, neither can a truth be enunciated, nor a passion expressed, in combination with its object. This principle is the most ancient. It boasts the support of the greatest of philosophers, of him, whom for many ages, even Christianity recognised by the title of "the divine," as approaching the nearest of all heathens to the divine light of the Gospel. PLATO, in his Dialogue called *The Sophist*, having most profoundly and unanswerably argued on the nature of truth, thus speaks of language: "We have in language two kinds of manifestation respecting existence, the one called *nouns*, the other *verbs*. We call the manifestation of action a verb; but that sign of speech which is imposed on the agent himself a noun. Therefore, of nouns alone, uttered in any order, no sentence (or rational speech) can be composed, neither can it be composed of verbs without nouns; thus 'goes,' 'runs,' 'sleeps,' and such other words as signify action, even though they should all be repeated in succession, would not

make up a sentence. And again, if any one should say 'lion,' 'stag,' 'horse,' or should repeat the names of all the things which do the actions before-mentioned, still no sentence would be made up by all this enumeration; for, neither in the one way, nor in the other, do the words spoken manifest any real action, or inaction, or declare that anything exists, or does not exist, until the verbs are mixed with the nouns. Then, at length, the very first interweaving of them together, makes a sentence, however short; thus, if any one should say, 'man learns,' you would pronounce at once that it was a sentence, though as short a one as possible; for then, at last, something is declared which either exists, or has been done, or is doing, or will be done; and the speaker does not merely name things, but limits and marks out their existence, by interweaving verbs with nouns, and then, at last, we say 'he discourses, and does not merely recite words.'" The only great name that for nearly 2000 years was ever brought into competition with Plato's, was that of his scholar ARISTOTLE; but Aristotle also, as has been seen, agreed with Plato, in stating the noun and the verb as the two primary parts of speech, and indeed the only parts necessary to be considered in the formation of a simple sentence. In other portions of his works, looking at the composition of language in a more general point of view, he enumerated *three* parts, viz., the noun, the verb, and the connective; and, finally, in his treatise on Poetry, s. 34, he enumerated two parts of speech as significant, viz., the noun and the verb; and two as non-significant, viz., the article and conjunction.

Noun and Verb.

Aristotle's opinion.

84. The doctrine that the noun and verb are the primary parts of speech, is incontestable. APOLLONIUS, the grammarian, calls them the most animated; and all grammarians concede to them, at least, the superiority over all the other parts of speech, in whatever manner they choose to account for their preference. I am not, however, inclined to adopt this, as the *first* step in a methodical arrangement; because I conceive that by approaching to the most general *idea* of speech, it will be easier to reconcile the apparent differences, and to correct the real errors of the different grammatical systems. I have already defined speech to be the language of articulate sounds; and language to be any intentional mode of communicating the mind. The most general idea of speech, therefore, is, that it is any intentional mode of communicating the mind by articulate sounds. Now, keeping in view this idea, let us see how it will apply to the doctrines of those grammarians whom I have already mentioned, in respect to the mode of distributing speech into its parts.

General idea of speech.

85. When writers of any eminence advance a particular doctrine, we may generally be persuaded, that it is not wholly destitute of foundation; although, from the natural partiality that men have for their own thoughts, they may probably rank such doctrines higher than they deserve. All the different theories that I have here noticed

Combination of theories.

are true, to a certain degree, and, by combining them together, the best and clearest view of our subject may perhaps be attained.

Combination of theories.

86. In the method which I am disposed to pursue, the principle of M. BEAUZÉE first merits attention. There are words which are simply *affective*, namely, *interjections;* all other words are *discursive*, inasmuch as they may be employed in expressing the operations of reason. Again, all words which are employed in reasoning must be considered either as *principals*, or as *accessories*, and thus the common principle of HARRIS and TOOKE may be combined with that of BEAUZÉE; but with this caution, that the question whether a particular word be a principal or an accessory, depends on *the relation which that word bears to the sentence in which it is employed.* I repeat this; because it has been often overlooked by grammarians, many of whom seem not to have adverted to the circumstance that speech is an expression of the mind, when actually engaged in some operation. They treat words as if they were corporeal substances, cast in a mould, for use. Now, the very same words, that are principals in one sentence, may become accessories in the next. The principal words in a sentence are of course *necessary* for the communication of thought; but we cannot communicate what we do not comprehend; and as we cannot comprehend any thought without first *conceiving* it as an object, so we cannot communicate it to others, unless we either *assert* something concerning it, or express some *emotion* in connexion with it. Here, therefore, the theory of the PORT ROYAL grammarians properly finds its place; for they include the assertion of a truth and the expression of an emotion under the words, "the manner of thinking." With respect to the writers who divide words, according as they are susceptible of variation, or the contrary, although it is true that such a quality exists in the words of most languages, yet it cannot be taken into consideration in treating of Universal Grammar, being a circumstance merely contingent and accidental.

Recapitulation.

87. The result, therefore, of the preceding remarks, is, that speech should be considered as intended to communicate either passion or reason: when it communicates mere passion, without any precise object, it supplies the part of speech called the *interjection;* when it communicates passion, and at the same time indicates an object, it indirectly reasons, and therefore employs some at least of the parts of speech, which are required in reasoning. Now, the parts of speech required in reasoning are either such as are necessary to form a simple sentence, or such as serve for accessories, in order to give complexity to sentences; but a simple sentence cannot be formed without a noun and a verb, and is immediately formed by putting a noun and a verb together. The *noun* and the *verb* then are the necessary parts of speech, the former serving to name the conception, the latter to supply in reasoning the assertion, or in passion the emotion. There is, however, one observation very important to be made with respect

to the verb, namely, that it involves a noun; that is to say, we cannot assert a truth, or express an emotion, which truth or emotion may not be considered by the mind as a conception. Thus, if we say "God *exists*," we excite in the mind the two distinct conceptions of "God" and "Existence," as much as if we said, "God is in *existence*:" and so if we say "Come, Antony," we excite the conception of coming, as well as of Antony; but the difference is, that the words "come" and "exists" are not presented to the hearer *as* mere objects of thought, but as modes of thinking about other objects, viz., "Antony" and "God." The principle, on which the noun and the verb are to be reckoned among the parts of speech, being thus fixed, will enable us to clear up several difficulties which occur in the subdivision of these classes.

Substantive and Adjective.

88. The old grammarians in general divided nouns into nouns substantive and nouns adjective; but R. Johnson, Harris, Lowth, and others, consider the *substantive* alone as a noun; and Harris ranks the adjective with the verb, under the common name of *attributive*. Tooke asserts that the adjective is truly and simply a substantive: whilst a recent writer contends that primitive nouns are not names of things, at least not of substances or material objects, but of their qualities or attributes. The latter theory is so far plausible, that the names of many substances are derived from their qualities, as the words denoting a Fox, in English, German, and Sanscrit, signify a *hairy* animal, while those in Persian and Icelandic denote a *thievish* animal; but this is a mere *fact* in the history of language, and involves no such necessity in the constitution of the human mind, as to render it a *principle* in the science of language. The question is, whether we cannot as readily form a conception of an attribute or quality, as of the substance to which it belongs, and *vice versâ*. Now, if we appeal to common experience, we shall find that men of the most untutored or most uncultivated minds have as clear a conception of the colour "blue," as they have of a garment, and can as readily distinguish "blue" from "red," as they can a "coat" from a "cloak." To every ordinary understanding, the "Sun," a "Horse," or a "Man," is an object of thought, and therefore may have a name, which name is a noun; but "bright," "swift," "wise," are also objects of thought, and therefore have names, which names should in like manner be deemed nouns.

Noun substantive.

89. A noun is considered *substantively*, when in asserting anything concerning it, we make it the subject of the assertion, and regard it as that to which some other noun relates, expressing a quality belonging to it, or an action done or suffered by it, or a class to which it belongs. Thus, when we say, "Socrates was wise," "the Horse is running," "Prudence is a virtue," the words "Socrates," "Horse," and "Prudence," are *nouns substantive*.

Noun adjective.

90. A noun is considered *adjectively*, when in asserting anything concerning it, we refer it to some other noun, as that of which it

expresses a quality. Thus, when we say, "Socrates was wise," we contemplate wisdom only so far as it was a quality of Socrates; and the noun "wise" is therefore a *noun adjective.* In this case, the assertion is direct; but the same consequence results where the assertion is merely implied; for, if we say "*wise* Socrates dwelt at Athens," we impliedly assert that he *was* wise, though the direct assertion is only that he dwelt at Athens; "wise," therefore, in this instance also, is a noun adjective. As to the above-mentioned sentences, "the Horse is running," and "Prudence is a virtue," they will hereafter demand consideration, in a different point of view.

Particip'es. 91. When we speak of Socrates as wise, we speak of him as possessing a quality fixed and permanent; but if, instead of saying Socrates is wise, we say "Socrates is speaking," or "is walking," or "was speaking" or "was walking," or "will be speaking" or "will be walking," we speak of a quality in action at a given time: and this difference of meaning has led grammarians to distinguish words of the latter class from nouns, and to call them *participles;* because they *participate* of the nature of a noun, and also of the nature of a verb, as it will presently be explained. Since the word participle has been so long in use among grammarians as designating a separate part of speech, I shall not hesitate so to use it; for although in some languages (as it is said, in the Ethiopic) there is no peculiar form corresponding to this distinction, there must always exist in the human mind a difference between the operations which answer to our word adjective, and those which answer to our word participle. It must be remembered, however, that both fall under the definition of a noun, as the mere name of a conception in the mind, without asserting that it does exist or does not; for "Socrates walking" is no more an assertion than "Socrates wise," without the interposition of a verb, such as "is," or "has been," or "will be." Of the Latin gerunds and supines, which some reckon among participles, I shall speak hereafter.

Pronouns. 92. Hitherto I have spoken of nouns substantive and adjective in their primary mode of use; but there is a secondary operation of the mind, which makes certain nouns act as mere representatives (so to speak) of whole classes of other nouns. These representative, or secondary nouns, are called by grammarians *pronouns*, and form in all languages very conspicuous parts of speech. They are divided, like the primary nouns which they represent, into substantive and adjective; thus, "*I*," "*thou*," and "*he*," are pronouns representing substantive nouns, namely, "I," the speaker, when speaking of himself; "thou," the person to whom he directs his discourse; and "he," some other person. On the other hand, when we say "this man and that man," *this* and *that* are pronouns, the former representing some noun adjective, such as "near," or "present," or "first," the latter representing a different noun adjective, such as "distant," or "absent," or "second." But these and other distinctions of the pronoun I shall presently consider more in detail. The *Article*,

which has frequently been treated as a pronoun, and which, in those languages in which it exists, was originally a pronoun, represents the exercise of that faculty of the mind by which we limit an universal or general conception to a particular conception. In this respect it differs from the pronoun, as well as from the adjective and substantive nouns, and may therefore properly be considered as a separate part of speech; but inasmuch as it neither expresses an emotion, nor is necessary to form a simple sentence, I shall notice it among the accessories. The Article.

93. Besides the noun, the only principal necessary part of speech, is the *Verb*. Of this I shall hereafter speak at large. For the present, it is only material to remark that they who confound it with the adjective and the participle, overlook its peculiar function, which is that of asserting; as the function of the noun, is that of naming. As to the separate classes of verbs, the verb substantive, the transitive, the active, the passive, &c., since these have not been treated of by any grammarians as separate parts of speech, it will not be necessary to notice them in this chapter. The Verb.

94. The great dispute, especially in modern times, has been with respect to the *accessory* parts of speech, the nature of which has been illustrated by a variety of similes. They have been said to be like stones in the summit or curve of an arch, or like the springs of a vehicle, or like the flag of a ship, or like the hair of a man, or like the nails and cement uniting the wood and stones of an edifice; and hence some persons have contended that they are only significant by relation; some that they are not parts of speech; and some that they are not even words but particles.—Thus APULEIUS says, "they are no more to be considered as parts of speech than the flag is to be considered a part of the ship, or the hair a part of the man; or, at least, in the compacting and fitting together of a sentence, they only perform the office of nails, or pitch, or mortar." PRISCIAN, however, one of the most acute and intelligent of grammarians, observes, that if these words are not to be considered as parts of speech because they serve to connect together others which are parts, we must say that the muscles and sinews of a man are no parts of a man; and he, therefore, concludes by declaring his opinion, that the noun and verb are the principal and chief parts of speech, but that these others are the subordinate and appendant parts. Accessory parts of speech.

95. The decision of this and similar questions will be easily made, if we only advert to the mental operations which these accessory words express; and in order to explain this, we must first ask, what words in a sentence are accessories? This question again is answered by referring to what has been said of sentences. In a simple sentence, all the words are principals. Thus "Man is fit," contains two nouns, which are the names of two conceptions, viz., "man" and "fitness," and the assertion of their coincidence by the verb "is;" and moreover, since the conception of fitness is regarded as existing Simple sentence.

not separately but in the other conception, man, the word "fit" is an adjective and "man" is a substantive. The same would be the case if the place of the noun "man" were supplied by the pronoun "*he*," and that of the adjective "fit," by the participle *suited*.

Complicated sentence.

96. Such is the case when the sentence is simple; but we are next to consider how a simple sentence is rendered complex; and this is no otherwise done than by engrafting on it other sentences; but in these latter the conceptions only are expressed, and the assertive part is assumed or understood. Thus, if referring to the passage before quoted from Shakspeare, we say "Man is fit," we may be asked, of what kind is the aptitude of which you are speaking? The answer must be "it is *treasonable*." And again if we are asked, of what disposition is the man of whom you make this assertion? We may say "he is *unmusical*;" and suppressing the assertions in the two secondary sentences, we may form of the whole one complex sentence, thus, "unmusical men possess treasonable aptitudes."

Further complication.

97. In this first process of complication we find only words capable of being used as principals, viz., nouns, substantive or adjective; pronouns, participles, and verbs; but suppose we again resolve these into their constitutent conceptions and assertions; suppose we ask what do you mean when you speak of a treasonable fitness, or aptitude? We may answer, we mean that the fitness looks to treason; treason is *before* the fitness (as its mark or object), the fitness is *for* treason. Here it is plain that the word "*for*" involves the conception of *foreness* (or objectiveness), and applies that conception to the other conception of treason: but it does so still more rapidly and obscurely, than in the cases before supposed; and hence it is that in this second process of complication we meet with words which are no longer thought significant, and therefore no longer called nouns or verbs, but articles, adverbs, conjunctions, and prepositions; and these words are the more numerous and frequent of occurrence, in proportion as men become more civilised, and more frequently render their sentences complex by subdividing the primary truth into many others. Thus, as the word "treasonable" may be supplied by the words "for treasons," so the word "unmusical" may be supplied first by the words "hath no music in himself," and secondly, by the words "is not moved with concord of sweet sounds;" both which, and many similar modes of speech, consist of various aggregations of sentences, in which the subordinate assertions are assumed by the mind in the manner already shown.

Change of signification.

98. The words, which, by use, come to be most frequently employed in any particular language for these secondary purposes, often lose their primary signification, and perhaps undergo some little change of sound; from which circumstances a great dispute has arisen of late among grammarians whether they are *significant* words or not. Thus the preposition *for*, which, as we have shown, conveys the conception of *foreness*, is nothing more than the word *fore* in *foremost*, *before*,

fore and aft, and the like words and phrases; but by use, and by the slight change which it has undergone, it has come to lose the property of forming a principal part in a sentence. These circumstances, however, it must be observed, are merely accidental; they may happen to the same conception in one language and not in another; and, therefore, they cannot form a just scientific criterion between the parts of speech; but on the other hand, those parts may, and must, be distinguished by the different operations of mind which they express; and as we have seen that the operations, expressed by the articles, adverbs, conjunctions, and prepositions, are clearly distinguishable from those expressed by the nouns, pronouns, verbs, and participles, inasmuch as they relate to a subordinate step in the analysis of thought; so there can be no impropriety in calling them accessories, with reference to the others, which we call principals.

Etymology of accessory words.

99. From what I have said, it will not appear strange, that the accessory words should be for the most part traceable to their origin as principals; that is to say, that the parts of speech last mentioned should in general be found to have been once used (with little or no difference of sound) as nouns and verbs. It has been supposed that this was a *new discovery* of Mr. HORNE TOOKE'S, and in many parts of his work he seems to have entertained that notion himself; how justly, may be seen from the following, among other authorities to the like effect.

Spinosa.

100. B. de SPINOSA composed a Hebrew Grammar, published with his posthumous works in 1677. In this, he says, "*Omnes Hebrææ voces, exceptis tantùm Interjectionibus et Conjunctionibus, et unâ aut alterâ particulâ, vim et proprietates* NOMINIS *habent.*" (p. 17.)

Koerber.

101. The same doctrine is laid down in a treatise by C. KOERBER, printed at Jena, in 1712, entitled "Lexicon Particularum Ebræarum, vel potius Nominum et Verborum, vulgò pro particulis habitorum." This writer says, in his preface, that his tutor *Danzius* taught that "most, if not all the separate particles, were in their own nature nouns;" that this was indeed a "new and unheard of hypothesis;" but that on investigation the reader would find reason to conclude universally (in respect to the Hebrew language at least) that "all the separate particles are either nouns or verbs." His words are these: "*Particulæ separatæ si non omnes certè plerœque suâ naturâ sunt* NOMINA"—"*hanc thesin hactenus novam et inauditam;*" and again, "*Omnes omninò Ebræorum particulas separatas aut nomina esse aut verba.*" Koerber illustrates his position by comparing the Hebrew particles with radical words, both in that and the cognate languages, particularly in the Arabic. Among the instances which he gives, are the following, viz.:—

Juxta, near, being the same as *Latus*, side.

Præter, beside or beyond { *Defectus*, deficiency. / *Terminus*, boundary.

Inter, between . . . . . *Distinctus*, divided.

Post, after . . . . . *Tergum*, the back.
Quoque, also . . . . . *Adde*, add.
Vel, or . . . . . *Elige*, choose.

He even explains the interjection *Lo!* as being identical with the pronoun of the third person; and suggests that the *termination of the accusative case* is a noun, signifying *object*.

Bayer. 102. T. S. BAYER, in 1730, published his *Museum Sinicum*, in which he says the same of the Chinese Language—"*Eadem vox et substantivum et adjectivum et verbum, et qualiscumque pars Orationis fieri potest, si id natura rei fert; v. g.*: SIEN *Sacrificium, sacrifico;* HIN *lætari, lætitia, lætus, hilariter;* XO *mollities, emollesco, molliter;* ÇA *misceo, mixtura, mixté, confusé.*" (v. i. p. 17.)

Lennep. 103. In the posthumous work of J. D. van LENNEP, who died in 1771, on the Analogies of the Greek Language, is this passage:—"Ex octo igitur *partibus orationis* quas vulgò statuunt Grammatici, *Verbum* et *Nomen* principem locum obtinent, cum reliquæ omnes facile ad harum alterutram referri queant, quare etiam Aristoteles, aliique e veteribus *duas tantum partes orationis* statuerunt. Addunt quidem nonnulli *tertiam*, utriusque nempe et verbi et nominis, *ligamentum*, quod nempe particulæ aliæque ea pertinentia orationem veluti connectunt, sed qui attentiùs eas res consideraverit, facile animadvertet, *omnia ferè*, saltem quod ad exteriorem formam, referenda esse vel ad *nominum* vel ad *verborum classem*. Ita v. g. particula τὸ οὖν, 'igitur,' verè participium est contractum ex ἐον, quod a participio ἐων, verbi ἔω, unde εἰμὶ, adeòque ad nominum classem propriè pertinet. Eadem ratio manifesta est in vocabulis ποὶ, πῆ, ποῦ," &c.

This treatise was probably written some years previously to the author's death; for in 1752 he delivered an academic discourse comparing the analogies of language with those of the mental operations.

Tooke. 104. Whether or not Mr. Tooke ever saw any of these treatises is immaterial. His discovery may, probably, have been a *bonâ fide* one, so far as regarded his own reflections, though not one that was new to the world. But he seems to have connected with it a very material error in Grammar, namely, that because a word was once a noun, it always remained so, and consequently that adverbs, conjunctions, &c., expressed no new or different operation of the mind, and were not to be considered as separate parts of speech, so far at least as related to their signification. Had Mr. Tooke been as well acquainted with the writings of Plato, as he was with some old English and Saxon authors, he would hardly have fallen into this error; for he would have perceived that speech receives its forms from the mind; and would have acknowledged with that great philosopher that "thought and speech are the same; only the internal and silent discourse of the mind, with herself, is called by us Διάνοια, thought, or cogitation: but the effusion of the mind, through the lips, in articulate sound, is called Λογος, or rational speech." It is, therefore, the mind that shapes the sentence into its principal parts and accessories:

it is the mind which distributes alike the principal and the accessory parts into subdivisions, according as they are necessary to its own distinguishable operations.

Ancient theories.

105. Those ancient grammarians who acknowledged only three parts of speech, viz., the noun, verb, and conjunction, ranked some of the parts which we here call accessories under the principal parts. Thus Apollonius of Alexandria, and Priscian, rank the *adverb* under the verb, and with them agrees Harris, who calls the adverb a secondary attribute; but Alexander Aphrodisiensis, who is followed by Boethius, observes, that it is sometimes more properly referred to the class of nouns; and so Tooke asserts some adverbs to be nouns and some verbs. The *preposition* which was referred by Dionysius and Priscian to the *conjunctions*, is on a similar principle included by Harris with the common conjunction in the class of connectives; and Tooke distributes both prepositions and conjunctions (in many instances rightly, as far as their etymology is concerned) among the verbs and nouns. Lastly, the *article* appears to have most disturbed the grammarians in their arrangements: for Fabius says it was first reckoned among conjunctions; and we have seen that, when Aristotle divided speech into four parts, he separated the article from the conjunction, making of it a class apart from the three other parts of speech. Vossius inclines to rank it among nouns, like a pronoun; but Harris having divided the accessory parts of speech into definitives and connectives, makes the article a branch of the former. Tooke says that our article *the* is the imperative mood of the Anglo-Saxon verb *thean*, to take! Lastly, Scaliger says, the article does not exist in Latin, is superfluous in Greek, and is, in French, the idle instrument of a chattering people.

New principle proposed.

106. Since in this diversity of opinions, I can perceive no common view of any principle which connects itself with the idea of language before laid down, I find myself compelled to seek a new division. I say, therefore, that the *accessory parts of speech* represent *operations of the mind*, which from their frequent recurrence have become *habitual*, and from their absolute *necessity* in modifying other thoughts, must be found more or less in all cultivated languages. It is true, that these operations are not performed by all men with the same distinctness, and therefore do not exist among all nations in the same degree of perfection; and lastly, it is true, that in some languages they are expressed by separate words, and in other languages by different inflections of the same word. Hence a close connection is found between the prepositions of one language, and the cases of another; and between the auxiliary verbs of one language, and the tenses of another. Hence, too, the comparison of adjectives, usually effected in Latin by different terminations, is often effected in English by adverbs prefixed to the adjectives. In short, numberless illustrations of this remark will easily occur to the recollection of any person at all acquainted with different languages, ancient or modern, barbarous or refined.

Article.

107. Of the mental operations above described, one, and that not the least essential, consists in determining whether we view any given conception as an universal, a general, or a particular; and if as a particular, whether as a certain, or an uncertain one; and if certain, whether of one known class, or another known class; and so forth. Thus there is a certain conception of the mind expressed by the word "man;" but if we employ that expression for the purpose of communicating the conception, it is necessary that those who hear us should know with what degree of particularity it is to be applied; for it would be one thing to say, that, according to our idea of human nature, man is universally benevolent; and another to say, that men in general are so; and a third to say that any man, under given circumstances, may be so; and a fourth to say, that this or that man is so. Of these different degrees of limitation some may be marked by separate words; and of those words, some may express a conception so distinct and self-evident, as to be capable of forming a simple sentence, in which case we should reckon them as pronominal adjectives, among the principal parts of speech; as when we say, "this man is good," "that man is bad," the words *this* and *that*, are pronominal adjectives. But since we cannot say "the is good," or "a is good," and since these words *the* and *a*, serve no other purpose but to define and particularize some other conception, and do not even perform this function completely, without reference to some further conceptions, we may, in those languages in which they exist, reckon them as a separate, but accessorial part of speech, under the name of the *article*.

Preposition.

108. The word *Preposition* is badly chosen from its use (and even that use not without exception) in the Latin language; nevertheless, it has become sufficiently intelligible to signify a class of words which describe another sort of mental operation. When one object is placed in a certain relation to another object, whether it be a relation of time, of space, of instrumentality, causation, or the like, the conception of that relation serves as a bond to unite them in the secondary parts of a sentence. That expression may form part of a word, as "to *over*leap a fence;" or it may constitute a separate word, as "to leap *over* a fence;" and in the latter instance the word *over* is called a preposition, which I therefore do not hesitate to rank as a separate part of speech.

Conjunction.

109. As the preposition connects conceptions, the *Conjunction* connects assertions; or, as it is commonly expressed, the preposition joins nouns, the conjunction verbs, and consequently sentences. By connecting, in both instances, I mean showing the relations, whether of agreement or disagreement; and these also may be expressed either in the form of the verb, or by means of a separate particle: of which a sentence before quoted affords an illustration—

> Duller should'st thou be than the fat weed,
> *Wouldst* thou not stir in this;—

where, if rendered into the more common expression, "*if* thou

wouldst not stir," the relation between stirring in the cause, and being dull, would be expressed by the word *if*, to which I therefore give the name of a conjunction. Hence, it appears, that the conjunction may not improperly be reckoned a distinct part of speech, since it expresses a distinct operation of the mind.

Adverb.

110. More doubt may perhaps exist as to the *Adverb*, a class in which grammarians have often confounded words of very various effect and import, such as interjections and conjunctions. Neither do I, in this instance, any more than in those of the participle and preposition, pay much regard to the etymology of the word adverb; but I take it as a word in common use, and applicable to a large class of words which describe operations of the mind very distinguishable from those which have been already considered. The adverb either expresses a conception which serves to modify another conception of quality or action; or else it expresses a conception of time, place, or the like, by which the assertion itself is modified: in either case it serves to modify by its own force, and not, like the preposition, as an intermediate bond between other conceptions.

Classes of Words.

111. The following TABLE will show how *Words*, as significant constituents of a complex sentence, may be distributed into classes, or *Parts of Speech*.

I. Words used in enunciative sentences:
- I. principal words,
  - 1. The *Noun*, the name of a mental conception.
    - i. primarily,
      - 1. Expressing a substance, (the *Noun substantive*).
      - 2. Expressing a quality.
        - 1. without action, (the *Noun adjective*).
        - 2. with action, (the *Participle*).
    - ii. secondarily, (the *Pronoun*).
  - 2. The *Verb*, asserting existence or action.
- II. accessorial words,
  - 1. limiting the extent of an universal or general conception to a particular (the *Article*).
  - 2. showing the relation, in a complex sentence, of one substantive conception to another, or to an assertion, (the *Preposition*).
  - 3. connecting one assertion with another, according to their relations, (the *Conjunction*).
  - 4. modifying a conception of quality or an assertion, (the *Adverb*).

II. Words used either in passionate sentences, or as separate expressions of passion, (the *Interjection*).

Mental operations.

112. The mental operations which these various classes of words represent, are obviously distinct; but it by no means follows from thence that the words themselves are so; that a word which has been employed as a substantive may not also be employed as a conjunction;

Mental operations.

or that the very sound by which we have expressed an assertion may not be used as a preposition or an interjection. In short, there is no reason why one word should not successively travel through all the different classes here stated; for it must be remembered, that words do not communicate thought by their separate power and effect only, but infinitely more so by their connection: and consequently the mode of connecting the signs, and not the signs themselves, determines their place in any given class. The first exercise of the reasoning power, we have seen, is conception; and of all our mental operations, whether relative to the external world, or to the laws of mind itself, conceptions may be formed; and to all the conceptions which we form, names may be given; and those names are nouns; and therefore it is not surprising that all other words, except interjections, should be historically traceable to nouns as their origin. Nay, since reason and passion are so complicated in man, we must not wonder that a connection is often to be found even between interjections and nouns. Thus our substantive *Woe*, which is the Scottish *Wae*, agrees with the Latin interjection *Vae!* probably pronounced by the Romans *Wae;* and with many interjections and other parts of speech, in various Teutonic languages, as will be shown hereafter. Surely, this affords no proof, nor shadow of a proof, that the different uses of the same, or different words, do not depend on the different exercise of the mental faculties; but, on the contrary, it absolutely demonstrates the necessity of some mental operation to distinguish between the different meanings, force, and effect of the same sign, as employed on different occasions.

CHAPTER IV.

OF NOUNS.

113. THE classes of words, which form grammatically the *Parts of Speech*, being thus determined, I proceed to explain them in order, beginning with that which, according to all systems, stands first in importance, the *Noun*.

The Noun.

114. "It is by nouns," says COUR DE GEBELIN, "that we designate all the beings which exist. We render them known instantly by these means, as if they were placed before our eyes. Thus, in the most solitary retreat, in the most profound obscurity, we are able to pass in review the universality of beings, to represent to ourselves our parents, our friends, all that we have most dear, all that has struck us, all that may instruct or amuse us; and in pronouncing their names we may reason on them with our associates. We thus keep a register of all that is, and of all that we know; even of those things which we have not seen, but which have been made known to us by means of their relation to other things already known to us. Let us not be astonished, then, that man, who speaks of every thing, who studies every thing, who takes note of every thing, should have given names to all things that exist, to his body and its different parts, to his soul, to his faculties, to that prodigious number of beings which cover the earth or are hid in its bosom, which fill the waters, and move in the air; that he gives names to the mountains, the rivers, the rocks, the woods, the stars, to his dwellings, to his fields, to the fruits on which he feeds, to the instruments of all kinds with which he executes the greatest labours, to all the beings which compose his society, or, that the memory of those illustrious persons who deserve well of mankind by their benefactions, and their talents, is perpetuated by their names from age to age. Man does more. He gives names to objects not in existence, to multitudes of beings, as if they formed but a single individual, and often to the qualities of objects, in order that he may be able to speak of them in the same manner as he does of objects really existing."

Its origin.

115. This great power of the *Noun* is to be attributed solely to that faculty of the mind by which it is formed: and that power I have called Conception. Every act of this power produces one thought, presents to our view one object, more or less distinct. We conceive a certain impression to which we give a name, be it "red" or "white," "John" or "Peter," "man" or "woman," "animal" or "vegetable," "virtue" or vice;" or whatsoever else we can distinguish from the mass of continued consciousness which constitutes our being.

116. We do not name every impression that we receive, or every

act that we perform. In truth, we do not name any one separately and distinctly from all others. It would be useless to do so, in a single instance: it would be impossible to do so in all. But we name what often occurs to us. We have often a sensation of colour; we call it "white:" we have often a feeling of pleasure; we call it "joyous:" we often see an object which affects us with peculiar sentiments of regard or aversion; we call it "father" or "enemy:" we often meditate on thoughts, which appear to us amiable or the reverse; we call them "benevolence" or "hatred." In this manner it is that our catalogue of names is formed.

117. Each of these thoughts or conceptions has its natural and proper limits; but these we do not always very accurately observe. No man confounds "red" with "white," but he confounds "whitish" with "reddish." A boy does not think his hoop square, but he knows not whether it is circular or elliptical. Thus it is, that men do not agree in their opinions of many things, to which they nevertheless agree in giving some common names; otherwise it would be impossible for them to communicate to each other anything like the thoughts or feelings which they respectively entertain.

118. The relation between words and thoughts has been expressed in various ways by writers on language. Plato calls the Verb *δήλωμα*, a "*showing forth*," and the Noun, *σημεῖον*, a "*sign*;" Aristotle sometimes calls a word *σημεῖον*, a *sign*, and sometimes *σύμβολον*, a *symbol*; Plotinus says, *ὁ ἐν φωνῇ λόγος, μίμημα τῶ ἐν ψυχῇ*, "the word (or sentence) in the voice is an *imitation* of that in the soul;" Cicero renders the *σύμβολον* of Aristotle by the Latin *Nota*, a "*mark*." More modern writers have described words as the *Pictures*, the *Echoes*, the *Colours*, the *Vestments* of thoughts, the *representatives* of thoughts, of ideas, of mental operations, &c. The author of a recent work, entitled "The Discovery of the Science of Languages," objects to all expressions which imply that words in any manner represent thoughts. He observes, that if words had this power, "we should have as many names for the same object, as we receive various impressions from it;" that "no single person can ever see the same thing twice in the same manner;" and that, "no two persons could ever have a common impression of it;" consequently intelligible language would, on this supposition, be wholly impossible. The objection would be just, if we were to take such expressions, as those above quoted, in their literal sense; but they are obviously figurative; because we have no other means of explaining mental operations than by the analogies which we suppose them to bear to sensible acts and objects. What the authors in question mean is not that every word, as uttered by a speaker, is an exact representation of a thought existing in his mind at the time; but that words in general serve to indicate what is passing in the human mind. And this indeed words do, partly by their separate signification, but more by their grammatical arrangement.

The Noun.

119. It is according to the place which a particular word occupies in such an arrangement, and to the function which it therein exercises, that it receives its grammatical designation as a part of speech. A word is called a *Noun* when in a simple sentence it serves merely to *name* a conception, and not to assert anything concerning it. Indeed, the English word *noun* is nothing but a corrupt pronunciation of the French *nom*, which, like the Italian *nome*, was again a corruption of the Latin *nomen*, and this latter was of common origin with the Greek ὄνομα, which, both in the Iliad and Odyssey, signifies the name by which a *person* is distinguished from others; the radix being found in the verb νέμω, to allot, attribute, or distribute. And as a personal name distinguishes the man, to whom it is allotted, from other men, so a noun distinguishes the thing or thought, to which it is allotted, from other things or thoughts. The trite definition of a noun, as "the name of a *thing* which may be seen, felt, heard, *or understood*," is equivocal; for it may or may not include adjectives, and nouns commonly called abstract, according as the words "thing" and "understood" receive a stricter or more lax interpretation. I therefore prefer defining a noun, the name of a conception; and it has been seen that, by a conception, I mean whatsoever we can contemplate in thought as *one* existence, either subjectively in the mind, or objectively in the external world, and either as substance, or as attribute; for *red* is as much the name of a certain colour, as *Peter* is the name of a certain man, or *England* of a certain country; and in like manner *virtue* is as much the name of a certain thought, as a *ship* is the name of a certain thing; all these, therefore, and whatever other words serve, in a simple sentence, to name any conception of the mind, are nouns.

Classes of Nouns.

120. It is next to be considered, how nouns may be best distributed into classes, with reference to the different kinds of conceptions, which they serve to name. "Many grammarians," says VOSSIUS, "and among them some of the highest celebrity, first distribute the noun into *proper* and *appellative*, and then into *substantive* and *adjective;* but erroneously; since even the proper noun is a substantive, inasmuch as it subsists by itself in speech. But let us seek our method from the schools. Our great Stagirite first divides τὸ ὄν (or that which is) into that which subsists by itself, and is therefore called substance, and that which exists in another as in its subject, and is therefore called attribute. Afterwards he proceeds to distinguish substance into primary and secondary, the primary being an individual, the secondary a genus or species. By parity of reason, therefore, we should divide the noun first into that which subsists by itself in speech, and is called *substantive*, and that which needs the addition of a substantive in speech, and is called *adjective;* and afterwards we should distribute the substantive into that which belongs to a single thing, and is called *proper*, and that which comprehends many, and is commonly called *appellative*."

Conceptions discriminated.

121. The distribution proposed by Vossius seems most consonant to grammatical principle. I therefore begin with distinguishing substantives from adjectives, and I call them both *Nouns;* for they are both names of conceptions, and they are nothing more. They do not imply any assertion respecting these conceptions; and herein they are clearly distinguished from verbs. It is true that the adjective agrees with the verb in expressing, not substance, but attribute; and therefore it is, that Harris, and some other grammarians, rank these two classes of words together under the title of attributives. I do not deny that this arrangement is so far correct; but I say that it interferes with the *method* which I conceive it advisable to pursue, as the most direct and scientific. As Vossius justly postpones the consideration of the classes of substantives, to the distinction between substance and attribute; so I postpone the consideration of the assertion of an attribute, to the consideration of those conceptions both of substance and of attribute, which must necessarily precede all assertion. This, I apprehend, is strictly the order of science. Language is a communication of the mind; the mind, as far as it is capable of communication, consists of thoughts and feelings. Thoughts are formed by the reasoning power. The reasoning power is divided into three faculties, conception, assertion, and conclusion; but conception necessarily precedes assertion, because we cannot assert that anything exists, until we know what that thing is.

122. Conceptions are either conceptions of substance, that is of something considered as subsisting of itself, or conceptions of attribute, that is of something considered as a quality or property of a substance. It may appear unnecessary to dwell on a distinction so obvious. No man, it may be said, however ignorant, can suppose that in the phrase "a white horse," the word "white" does not denote a quality belonging to the "horse;" or that in the phrase "glorious victory," the word "glorious" does not denote a quality belonging to victory. No man, when he says "the sun is shining," thinks of the sun as an attribute of shining; but, on the contrary, he considers "shining" to be an energy, or property, or quality, or attribute of the sun. This is no doubt true; but unfortunately there have been writers in modern times, who have treated the distinction in question as a "technical impertinence," and as resting on "false philosophy, and obscure because mistaken metaphysics;" and it therefore becomes necessary to examine the arguments on which their objection is founded.

Substantives and Adjectives not convertible.

123. It has been contended that "the substantive and adjective are frequently convertible *without the smallest change of meaning*," and in proof of this, it is asserted that we may indifferently say "a perverse nature," or a "natural perversity;" now surely, although I would not assert, that the person advancing such an illustration was altogether of "a perverse nature," I might without offence attribute his opinion, on this particular point, to a little "natural perversity." In the one

case, the friends of the person in question would understand me to assert, that his whole mind was tainted with the vices of obstinacy and self-willedness, that he wilfully shut his eyes against the truth, and maintained opinions which he knew to be wrong in literature, in philosophy, in politics, and in religion—a description of his character, which would naturally occasion them to take great offence. In the other case, they would understand me to give him credit for such reading and literary acquirements, as might well have corrected what I look upon as an error; and they could hardly take it amiss that I attributed that error, rather to a slight defect, from which the best natures are not wholly exempt, than to gross ignorance, or total want of understanding. So much for the particular expressions quoted as proof that substantives and adjectives may be convertible without the smallest change of meaning: on the other hand, the well-known instance of a "chesnut horse," and a "horse chesnut," affords an example of a change of meaning produced by such convertibility, scarcely less ludicrous, than rendering into English the *miles gloriosus* of Plautus by the phrase "military glory." The fact is, that in all such instances, the views taken by the mind are different, according as it regards the one conception, or the other, as principal; just as the man who is on the eastern side of the street considers the western to be the opposite side; whilst he who is on the western side thinks the same of the eastern. We may speak of a "religious life," or of "vital religion." In the one case, we are considering the conception of "life," as that which must necessarily form the basis of our assertion, and which may be differently viewed, according as it is put in connexion with the conceptions of religion, irreligion, business, pleasure, or the like: in the other case, we take the conception of "religion" as the direct object of thought, and then limit it by the conception of life, or vitality.

Substantives and Adjectives not convertible.

124. It is objected, that this limitation may as regularly be effected by a substantive as by an adjective; and that "man's life," or "the life of man" is exactly equivalent to "human life;" which I by no means deny; but then it must be observed, that the sentence takes a different form, and instead of simple becomes complex; the termination ('s) or the word (of) signifies "possession," or "belonging to," and renders one sentence resolvable into two. For instance, the proposition "the life *of* man is precious," includes two propositions—

Sentence how made complex.

1. Life *belongs* to, or is *possessed* by, man.
2. Life is precious.

Dr. WALLIS, indeed, in his valuable English Grammar, first published in 1653, treats the genitive "man's" as an adjective. He says, "Adjectivum possessivum fit à quovis substantivo (sive singulari, sive plurali) addito *s* —— ut *man's nature, the nature of man*, natura humana vel hominis; *men's nature, the nature of men*, natura humana vel hominum." But no other grammarian has adopted this notion,

and the principle on which it rests, would equally go to prove that all the oblique cases of substantives, in all languages, should be considered as adjectives; for Mr. Tooke has justly observed, that these cases cannot stand alone; although he has not noticed that this is owing to the complexity of the sentences in which they are used.

Mr. Tooke's theory.

125. The last-mentioned writer contends, that "the adjective is equally and altogether as much the name of a thing, as the noun substantive." If he means by *thing*, a conception of the mind, he is perfectly right; but if he means by thing, an external substance, such as "a horse," or "a man," or "the globe of the sun," or "a grain of the light dust of the balance," he is as clearly wrong. "Red" and "white," "soft" and "hard," "good" and "bad," "virtuous" and "wicked," do not represent any *such* things as the latter; but they do represent conceptions of the mind, some of which conceptions may be considered as belonging exclusively to external bodies, others as belonging exclusively to mental existence, and others as common to both. Mr. Tooke says, he has "confuted the account given of the adjective by Messrs. de Port Royal," who "make substance and accident the foundation of the difference between substantive and adjective;" but if so, he has confuted an account given not only by Messrs. de Port Royal, but by *every* grammarian who preceded them from the time of Aristotle; and whatever respect may be due to the abilities of Mr. Tooke, I must a little hesitate to think that he alone was right, and that so many men of extensive reading, deep reflection, and sound judgment, were all wrong. But how has he confuted this doctrine? Why, truly, by showing that when a conception is not regarded as a substance, it may be regarded as an attribute; and when it is not regarded as an attribute, it may be regarded as a substance. —"There is not any accident whatever," says he, "which has not a grammatical substantive for its sign, *when it is not attributed;* nor is there any substance whatever which may not have a grammatical adjective for its sign, *when there is occasion to attribute it;*" which is pretty much like saying, there is not any captain whatever who may not be degraded, and placed in the ranks; nor any private soldier whatever who may not be raised from the ranks and honoured with a captain's commission; *and therefore there is no difference between a captain and a private soldier.* The premises are incontestable: the only fault is, that they have nothing to do with the conclusion. On this point, I trust, I have satisfactorily vindicated the principle laid down by Aristotle, and adopted by all grammarians from his time to that of Mr. Tooke, viz., that the noun substantive is the name of a conception, considered as possessing a substantial, that is, independent existence; the noun adjective is the name of a conception, considered as a quality, or attribute of the former.

CHAPTER V.

OF NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE.

126. THE accounts given by different writers of the noun substantive are remarkably different. According to Tooke, it would seem, that with exception of the verb (if even that be excepted) the noun substantive is to be considered as the only part of speech; whilst a recent writer (Mr. Kavanagh) says " there are no such words as substantives," and he afterwards maintains that the words called substantives are " adjectives in the fourth degree of comparison." Harris, Lowth, S. Johnson, L. Murray and others, consider the substantive as the only noun; Vossius and most earlier writers consider, as I have done, that the term noun comprehends both substantive and adjective. In this conflict of opinions, it is no wonder that the various definitions of substantive, or noun substantive, are not easily reconcilable together. Frischlin says it is a noun of one, or at most two genders, in contradistinction to a noun adjective, which has three. This definition has nothing to do with Universal Grammar; and is not correct, even in the Latin language, to which he refers. A. Caucius defines a substantive that which signifies something by itself, " quod aliquod per se significat." But this definition may as well be applied to adjectives, verbs, or pronouns, and even to interjections, which by themselves signify emotion, if nothing else. Vossius says, " *That* is called a substantive which subsists by itself, in a sentence"—" substantivum dicitur quod per se subsistit, in oratione." Harris speaks thus: " Substantives are all those principal words, which are significant of substances considered as substances." Lowth says, " A substantive is the name of a thing, of whatever we conceive in any way to subsist, or of which we have any notion." And Dr. Johnson defines substantive, " a noun betokening the thing, not a quality." Various definitions.

127. In each of the four last-mentioned definitions there is an approach to accuracy, but neither of them is entirely satisfactory. It is proper to observe, with Vossius, that the grammatical character of a word is not necessarily attached to its sound, but to the function which it performs in a sentence. Particular languages indeed may appropriate certain forms to certain parts of speech, and therefore in the dictionaries of such languages we find words marked as substantives, adjectives, adverbs, &c.; as, in Latin, *Dominus* is a substantive, *flebilis* an adjective, *prudenter* an adverb: and these words cannot be used otherwise in that language; but this is matter of particular Grammar, and not of universal. Again, we must agree with Harris, that substantives signify substances considered as substances; but it must be remem- New definition proposed.

bered that the significance is not always direct. The word signifies primarily the conception, and if that conception be of an external object, the word signifies that object secondarily. Lowth introduces in his definition the word "Thing," which is equivocal; but he fortunately adds, by way of interpretation, "whatever we *conceive*:" and lastly, Johnson, who also employs the doubtful word "Thing," limits it, by adding that substantive does not betoken a *quality*. From all these considerations taken together, a noun substantive may not improperly be defined "a word employed in a sentence to name a conception, existing separately, and not involved as a quality in any other conception."

Distribution of Substantives.

128. This definition will lead to a distribution of substantives according to their differences *essential* or *accidental*. The essential differences exist in all languages, and may be classed under the heads of *kind* and of *gradation*: the accidental differences vary, as to their mode of expression, in different languages, and these include differences of *number*, *gender*, and *relation*.

Kinds of Substantives.

129. The *kinds* of nouns substantive are differently considered by different grammarians. According to Harris, there are three sorts (or kinds) of substantives, representing as many sorts of substances, the natural, the artificial, and the abstract. To the natural (he says) belong such words as "Animal," "Man," Alexander;" to the artificial, "Edifice," Palace," "Vatican;" and to the abstract, "Motion," "Flight," "this or that flight." This distinction, however, rests on no sound grammatical principle. A natural substance indeed may be either a thing or a person, whilst an artificial substance can only be a thing; but the conception of each is contemplated by the mind as that of an *individual* substance limited by time and space, and existing out of the mind objectively; and so far as regards Universal Grammar, both the one and the other sustains the same part in the construction of a sentence; for we cannot speak of many Alexanders, or many Vaticans, otherwise than by a rhetorical figure of speech. On the other hand, the kinds of substance, which Harris calls natural, expressed by such words as "Animal," "Man," or the artificial, as "Edifice," "Palace," without some definitive word or particle to individualize them, are neither individual things nor persons, and are not limited by time or space, nor have they any objective prototypes in the external world, but they are subjective conceptions of the mind, agreeing, in this respect, with the conceptions expressed by the words "motion" or "flight."

Conceptions bodily and mental.

130. It is unnecessary here to dwell on various logical distinctions applicable to nouns substantive; such as those of words "simple and complex," words "of the first intention, and of the second intention," &c. But that difference of substantives, which I mean by the difference of *kind*, is between their expressing conceptions of *bodily* impression, and conceptions of *mental* action. To this, the ancient grammarians CHARISIUS and DIOMEDES alluded, when they defined a

noun a part of speech signifying a thing *corporeal* or *incorporeal*, " pars orationis significans rem corporalem vel incorporalem :" and on this also rests the popular and ordinary distinction between a *Thing* and a *Thought*, as well as the more learned distinction between *phænomena* and *noumena*. This difference of kind, indeed, is denied by some persons to exist. They say that we can have no conceptions but those of bodily impression; that nouns are only the names of *Things;* and that there being (as they think) no incorporeal things existing, or at least none cognizable by human faculties, there cannot be any noun signifying an incorporeal thing. I answer, that Universal Grammar, as I understand it, rejects alike the two extreme theories, that everything is mind, and that everything is matter. It agrees with the common sense, and common experience of mankind, in assuming that there are certain *Things*, or objects external to us, and certain *Thoughts*, or mental acts, which we experience internally. Of both these, the human mind forms conceptions: and to conceptions of each kind *names* are attached, which names, when the conceptions are contemplated as existing substantially, are nouns substantive.

Substantives proper and common.

131. Those nouns substantive, which simply express conceptions of things external to us are necessarily *particular;* those which express mental acts, whether employed on the generalization of external things, or on the internal operations of the mind, are either *general* or *universal*. *Alexander* was a particular human being, and the *Vatican* is a particular building; but the word *Conqueror* designates a general conception of the mind applicable to Alexander and many other human beings, and the word *Palace* designates a conception of the mind applicable to the Vatican and many other buildings. Hence arises the ordinary distinction of grammarians between nouns substantive *proper*, and *common*, or, as some say, proper and appellative; a distinction marked by Varro with the terms *nomina* and *vocabula*, and answering to the logical distinction of words singular and common.

Substantives proper.

132. A noun substantive *proper* is a name of the *conception* of a particular *Thing*. It must be remembered that our English word " Thing " may be used in different senses, and particularly in two, viz., first, as any external object contradistinguished to " Thought;" and secondly, as an external object not personal, contradistinguished to " Person." I here use it in the former sense, including either an inanimate mass, for instance Mount *Etna*, or a person, for instance *William* the Conqueror. Every such particular thing, whether viewed as present, remembered as past, or imagined as possible, is considered to be always identical. Etna is, to the present gaze, the same vast mountain mass, which has towered over the surrounding region for ages beyond historical record; William lives, in memory, as the same bold warrior, who nearly eight centuries ago won the battle of Hastings, and with it the crown of England; and so long as our language lasts, even the fictitious Hamlet will remain the same wondrous creature of

the mighty dramatist's imagination, as when he first formed it from his rude materials. I say, the noun substantive *proper* is the name not of a thing, but of the conception of a thing; for though it would be an idle scepticism to doubt whether such a mountain as Etna exists, or whether such a warrior as William the Conqueror ever existed, yet it must be remembered that words (as has before been shown) represent primarily our thoughts, and secondarily the external objects of our thoughts, when any such exist. I speak of Etna such as I conceive it to be, and of William such as I conceive him to have been; and hence arises one great source of misapprehension among men, when one man has formed a certain conception of a particular thing, and another man has formed of the same particular thing a very different conception.

Examples of their formation.

133. This will be the more obvious, when we consider how our conceptions of particular external objects are formed. They are not stamped on the mind by the objects, as an impression is stamped on wax by a seal; for, if so, every man's conception of the same object would be precisely the same, which is certainly not the case. But the process which takes place may be thus illustrated. Let us suppose that a lofty mountain existed long ago in Sicily, and still exists there; and that the first person who gave it the name of Etna had previously seen it; how came he to give it a name? Because he had formed a conception of it. And how came he to form such a conception? Because he had *seen* the mountain, as a distinct, external thing. But what is seeing? An affection of the nerves of the eye. Now it never happens, when we see any one thing distinctly, that it equally affects all the nerves of the eye. Therefore, when the "Mountain" was first seen, other things were also seen. What was it that distinguished these different affections of the eye into marks, signs, or thoughts of different things? What was it that made the "Mountain," in particular, a *thing*, in the contemplation of the *thinking faculty*. Could such an effect have been produced otherwise than by an act of the thinking faculty itself? And if this was an act of the thinking faculty, then the thought was parent of the thing, so far, at least, as grammar can have anything to do with it, namely, as capable of being known to the mind, and communicable by language. Let us pursue this investigation a little further. The word "Mountain" does not signify a thing only seen at one moment of our lives: let us suppose, then, that we do in fact see the *same* mountain several times; it must necessarily happen, that we see it under very different circumstances. As we approach to, or recede from it, every step makes it affect the eye differently, both as to form and colour. What is it that still makes us consider the cause of these different impressions as one *thing?* Plainly the thinking faculty; so that here again, and in a second degree, the thought is parent of the thing; and, be it observed, that it is not until after this secondary process has been oftentimes repeated, that we give the thing a name. Now, what are

the acts of the thinking faculty, by which we form the conception of this external object as one thing? The applying to it certain *laws* of the mind, which enable us to discriminate not only between thoughts, but between things. By certain laws of the mind we know that an object subtending a given angle at a given distance is of a certain altitude. The law may not be distinctly contemplated by us, but it so far governs our judgments that we must approximate to it more or less; we cannot think the directly contrary. In like manner the laws of similarity, of contrast, of association, &c., enable us to say that the top of the mountain is white with snow, or tinged with a roseate hue from the beams of dawn, that the sides are dark with groves of ilex, the lower declivities bright with verdure; and by another law of our nature, we know that all these and numberless other impressions of sense are bound up together in one vast material mass forming the particular object, which we call by the proper name of Etna.

Proper names cannot form a language.

134. It has been truly observed by Mr. LOCKE, that "it is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name; for the signification and use of words depending on that connection which the mind makes between its *internal operations* and the sounds which it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, in the application of names to things, that the mind should have distinct *conceptions* of the things, and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that conception. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct *conceptions* of all the particular things we meet with; every bird and beast men saw, every tree and plant that affected the senses, could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory, that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army by his proper name, we may easily find a reason why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads, much less to call every leaf of plants, or grain of sand, that came in their way, by a peculiar name." So far Mr. Locke, in which quotation I have only taken the liberty to substitute for the word *ideas*, in one place *internal operations*, and in two others *conceptions*. The reasoning, however, is not affected by this change, and it is such reasoning as must carry conviction to every mind. I also agree fully with this writer, that to name every particular thing, if possible, would be useless for the purpose of communicating thought, unless every man could first teach the whole of his own endless vocabulary to every other man with whom he conversed, or for whose information he wrote. And again, supposing even this possible, it would not conduce at all to science; for as Aristotle has said, "of particular things there is neither definition nor demonstration, and consequently no science, since all definition is in its nature universal."

Sometimes used as common.

135. Proper names are therefore comparatively few in number. They serve to denote a very small part of the immense multitude of

particular objects which fall under our observation. Some of these, indeed, obtain a distinguished celebrity within a small circle; they are

> —— Talked of far and near at home.

But the poet, the orator, or the historian, may raise them to a prouder eminence. He may render them the symbols or representatives of the classes to which they belong. It is thus that "Alexander" becomes the synonym of a conqueror, and "Cicero" of an orator. Even proper names, however, have in general been given to individuals from some quality or action not strictly peculiar to them. Hence the old English rhyme alluded to by VERSTEGAN, in relation to the family name of *Smith*—

> Whence cometh Smith, albe he knight or squire,
> But from the Smith, that *smiteth* at the fire?

Nevertheless it must be admitted, that the common notion is soon lost in the particular application. Few people reflect, that *George* originally signified "a husbandman," or that *Charles* and *Andrew* both signified "manly" or "strong," the former from its Gothic, the latter from its Grecian etymology. These names have now come to indicate individuals; and as even thus a single word is not found to answer the purpose sufficiently, we have the *baptismal* name and *surname;* as the Romans had the *prænomen*, the *cognomen*, and the *agnomen*.

Common Substantives.

136. The designation of *common* is usually given by Grammarians to all nouns substantive, except the proper. Consequently, under this term, common, are included alike words answering to general and to universal conceptions; but these two classes I think it advisable to consider separately; as well because the distinction is in itself extremely important; as because different writers have employed the terms expressing it in very different ways. LOCKE, for instance, calls all common nouns "*general* words." HARRIS uses the words "general and *universal*" as synonymous; for he calls all common substances "symbols of general or universal ideas." Other writers employ the term "universal" alone (including general) as the contra exponent to particular.

General Substantives.

137. Those nouns substantive which correspond to *general* conceptions are names imposed on whole classes of individual substances, as Man, House, Mountain; all of which, notwithstanding each may have its peculiar qualities, agree in possessing some one or more distinctive qualities. Mr. Locke says truly of these words, that they are "the inventions and creatures of the understanding;" for it is no doubt a mental act which makes the word "Man" stand for Peter, James, John, and millions of other individuals, past, present, future and even imaginary. "Ay," says Macbeth to the murderers—

> Ay, in the catalogue ye go for *men;*
> As hounds and greyhounds, mungrels, spaniels, curs,
> Shoughs, water-rugs, and demi-wolves are cleped
> All by the name of *dogs*.

Yet the word "Man" or "Dog" alone would not designate this or that man or dog, without some addition which will presently be noticed.

Corporeal and incorporeal

138. Nor is it only to classes of corporeal substances that such nouns are applicable; for it must be remembered that by the word "substance," grammatically speaking, we mean not merely a material and bodily substance, which we can see, or handle, or weigh, or measure; but also any mental conception considered as having an independent and separate existence, and of which something may be affirmed or denied substantively, that is, without reference to any other thing as its basis and necessary support. Nouns of this sort, therefore, form the great bulk of language; since they comprehend not only such words, as man, house, mountain, or animal, plant, ship; but also such as affection, thought, passion, delight, when spoken of as individuals of a class of particular conceptions. Thus SPENSER says—

> What war so cruel, or what siege so sore,
> As that which strong *Affections* do apply
> Against the fort of Reason?

So Coleridge—

> All *Thoughts*, all *Passions*, all *Delights*,
> Whatever stirs this mortal frame,
> All are but ministers of Love.

When used as particulars.

139. Such words are formed by the process of generalisation described in a former chapter, and though they thus obtain a general signification, they are easily made to express a particular conception, or a number of particulars, by adding to them a definitive, or numeral, or an attribute, as "*that* Mountain," "these *six* men," "the *ruling* passion," "the *domestic* affections." On the other hand, they cannot form the subject of any proposition absolutely and universally true, however nearly it may approach to the truth. Thus it may seem at first sight that Hamlet's mother utters an universal truth, when she says to her son—

> Thou know'st 'tis common: *all that live must die.*

But the instances of Enoch and Elijah destroy the universality of the proposition; and even if no such instances had occurred hitherto, it would not necessarily follow, that some such might not occur hereafter. Indeed, St. Paul expressly says, "we shall *not all* sleep," (meaning, die,) "but we shall all be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump."

Universal conceptions

140. The other class of nouns substantive common, namely, those which correspond (as I maintain) to *universal* conceptions, have given occasion to great diversities of opinion. To this class belong such words as "Flight," "Whiteness," "Temperance," "Motion," "Colour," "Virtue," when not used as individuals of a class. These Harris considers as expressing "abstract substances," or as others say "abstract ideas," and Johnson calls them "abstract names."

But the term "abstract" in these expressions is of equivocal signification. By some, as has been before observed, abstraction is explained as a process of generalisation, by which the same attribute being found to exist in many substances is contemplated as one substance, forming as it were a part of each, just as a substance called saccharine forms part of the sugar-cane, and of various other plants, and may therefore give name to them as a class. Harris explains it somewhat differently as a refined operation of the mind, by which we abstract any attribute from its necessary subject, and consider it apart, devoid of its dependence. I do not deny the possibility of either of these operations; but they do not explain the real character of the class of nouns under consideration, namely, their universality. Whiteness is so called, not because it is found to exist in snow, or in lilies, or in the foam of the sea, or in all these alike, but because it expresses the result of a certain physical *law*, which would exist if snow had never fallen, nor lilies blossomed, nor the sea cast up its foam. Temperance is a moral habit, and might be contemplated as such by a person who had unfortunately passed his whole life among gluttons and drunkards. And similar observations might be made on the other words of this class above quoted.

called by some Abstract Ideas.

141. Certain modern writers have treated the nouns here called universal, in a way which, I own, I cannot well understand. M. Condillac, for instance, supposes them to serve the purpose of what he calls "abstract ideas;" for he says that "abstract ideas are only denominations." On this notion, Mr. Tooke enlarges at great length. His several chapters on abstraction, which abound with much curious etymology, occupy above 400 quarto pages, in the course of which he is pleased to inform his readers, that "heaven and hell" are "merely participles poetically embodied and substantiated." What practical inference is to be drawn from this statement, I know not; but Mr. Tooke's doctrine, so far as it relates to the nouns called abstract, appears to me confused and contradictory. It may be stated. I think, in the following propositions:—

1. The verb is the noun, and something more (vol. ii. p. 514).

2. The adjective is the noun, directed to be joined to another noun (vol. ii. p. 431).

3. The participle is the verb adjectived, *i. e.* "it has all that the noun adjective has, and for the same reason, viz. for the purpose of adjection" (vol. ii. p. 468).

4. The abstract nouns "are generally participles or adjectives used *without* any substantive to which they can be joined" (vol. ii. p. 17).

The result of this seems to be, that when an abstract noun is a participle (as Mr. Tooke says *heaven* is) it is *a noun and something more, converted into a noun directed to be joined to another noun, but used without any noun to which it can be joined.* How far this mode of reasoning goes to show that there are not in the mind any such ideas, as "whiteness," "strength," "virtue," and the like; or that these

words do not serve to communicate anything but conceptions of solid, tangible, corporeal, substance, in an abbreviated form, must be left to the determination of the judicious reader; for my own part, I cannot see that it tends much to enlighten what may be thought obscure, in the works of the ancient grammarians; still less does it appear to me to cast a doubt on those principles, which the ancients have stated with great clearness and precision.

142. An *universal* conception, as I have before said, is an *Idea*, in the true and proper sense of that word; a word which was used by Plato, and according to him by his great instructor Socrates, to express a *Law* of our conceptions, a *Form* which they must necessarily take, or to which they must at least make some approach, before they can be at all distinguished the one from the other. These laws are impressed on the mind of man in the same manner as the laws of vitality, of growth, and of varied action, are impressed on his bodily organs; that is to say, they exist from the first moment of birth as faculties not yet put in action, and in that sense not innate, but capable, from the first, of development, each in its order and degree, and in that sense *innate*. Ideas.

> —— So from the root
> Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves
> More airy, last the bright consummate flow'r
> Spirits odorous breathes.

Hence ideas were termed by the Stoics λόγοι σπερματικοὶ, *seminal* reasons, or forms, of all natural things. So Cudworth says, that "the cognoscitive power of the mind contains within itself virtually, *as the future plant is contained in the seed*, general notions, which unfold or discover themselves, as proper circumstances occur." So Leibnitz says, "the *germs* of our acquired knowledge, or in other words, our *Ideas* and the eternal truths resulting from them, are contained in the mind itself; nor ought we to be surprised at this; for if we examine our own consciousness, we shall find that we possess in ourselves the ideas of *existence*, of *unity*, of *substance*, of *action*, and all other ideas of the like nature." And so Thomson speaks of the

> —— Seeds of art deep in the mind
> Implanted.

143. This analogy, which from its truthfulness has struck so many individuals, suggests several important considerations regarding the class of conceptions in question. It intimates that, as on the one hand, the vivifying and shaping power, which gives form to our thoughts, is no material quality drawn by the organs of sense from surrounding objects, but an intangible and invisible principle in the mind itself; so, on the other hand, that principle may long remain inactive, and unfelt, whilst— At first inactive.

> —— In th'unconscious breast
> Sleep the lethargic powers.

And yet it may be preserved

> Pure in the last recesses of the mind,

and ready to burst forth into noble thoughts and high actions, under the invigorating impulses of the outward world. The human mind was not intended by its divine Creator, to exist in a perpetual state of solitary contemplation, or amid dreams and phantoms of its own creating, but to act and be acted on, to influence and be influenced by the scenes and beings amidst which it is placed.

Laws regulating conceptions.

144. In the threefold nature of man, spiritual, intellectual, and corporeal, the *laws* which regulate conceptions, and give them their appropriate *forms*, belong to the intellectual power, which we commonly call reason; but those laws and forms may be applied to objects as well spiritual or corporeal, as intellectual. In those of mere intellect, indeed, their nature is most obvious, and particularly in mathematical conceptions. Every one, who knows anything of Geometry, must at once perceive that the pure idea of a circle, can only exist in the mind, that it is true, necessary, absolute, universal, and entirely independent of the question of fact, whether any man ever did, or ever can receive the sensible impression of a perfect circle. And the more we dwell on this idea, the more plainly we perceive, that it not only is not furnished to the mind by the senses, but is directly opposed to what is commonly regarded as the evidence of the senses, for both the radius and the periphery are lines which have length without breadth; the centre is a point which has neither parts nor magnitude, which terminates innumerable radii without being a part of any one of them, and which must remain at absolute rest, though the other extremity of a radius proceeding from it should move with incalculable rapidity round the whole circumference. Nevertheless it has been by applying these and similar ideas to sensible objects, that a great proportion of the physical sciences and arts have reached that high degree of perfection to which they have at present attained.

Transcendental conceptions.

145. Universal conceptions of the highest order have been termed *transcendental*. This designation was confined by the old logicians to six conceptions, *Ens*, *Res*, *aliquid*, *unum*, *verum*, *bonum*; but it is extended by other writers to all conceptions, understood to exist *à priori*, that is prior to their application to sensible impressions. That the human mind has a power of forming such conceptions, by its very nature, has been admitted to a greater or less extent, and expressed in various terms, by philosophers of all ages, countries, and sects. I have mentioned Plato and the Stoics. ST. AUGUSTIN called them "innate notions;" Cardinal CUSANUS, "concreated judgments;" FICINUS, "notions of the divine mind;" MELANCTHON, "innate fixed points," and "principles of knowledge;" Lord BACON, "essential forms," and "ideas of the divine mind;" Sir K. DIGBY, "universal notions;" SPINOSA, "modes of thinking;" LEIBNITZ, "necessary truths;" KANT, "Notions of the Reason," "Transcendentes," and "Noumena;" DUGALD STEWART, "intuitive truths;" ABERCROMBIE, "First Truths," and "intuitive articles of

belief;" COLERIDGE "necessities of the mind" and "forms of thinking, which though first revealed to us by experience, must yet have pre-existed in order to make experience itself possible;" and WHEWELL "fundamental ideas," from which he considers "ideal conceptions" to be derived. Nor among the ingenious physiologists of the present day are there wanting authorities for the same doctrine. Professor MULLER says, "that *innate Ideas* may exist, cannot, in the slightest degree, be denied." Mr. MAYO says, "certain Truths may be called *intuitive*." And Mr. GREEN, in his Hunterian Oration of 1840, describes Ideas, as "principles, which give to the results of sensuous experience their connexion and intelligibility"—"powers predetermining and constructive"—"intelligential acts."

Contrary theories.

146. The doctrine of Ideas, as first taught by Plato, and afterwards (though less clearly) by his scholar Aristotle, continued to prevail with the great majority of philosophers throughout Europe, till within less than two centuries ago. The successive theories, by which it was to a great degree superseded, were these:—

1. That Ideas are not acts of the mind, but separate and distinct objects which it perceives.
2. That Ideas comprise all our thoughts.
3. That Ideas (*i. e.* all our thoughts) are derived partly from sensation, and partly from reflection.
4. That Ideas of reflection are mere transcripts or combinations of sensations.
5. That both sensations and reflections are mere bodily acts.

Thoughts and thinking are the same.

147. The first and apparently most simple notion of thoughts, proposed as a philosophical theory, was that they were a kind of airy shapes detached from external bodies, and conveyed through the senses to the mind, as Lucretius assures us—

——— ——— ——— quæ rerum *simulacra* vocamus,
Quæ quasi membranæ summo de corpore rerum
Dereptæ volitant.

And again—

Quippe etiam multò magis hæc sunt tenuia textu,
Quàm quæ percutiunt oculos visumque lacessant;
Corporis hæc quoniam penetrant per rara, cientque
Tenuem animi naturam intùs.

But this was directly contrary to the doctrine both of Plato and Aristotle, the latter of whom says, Ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης, τὸ ἀυτό ἐςι τὸ νοῦν καὶ νοθμενον, 'in incorporeal existences, the thinking faculty and the thought are the same thing." Descartes and others, who rejected the gross fiction of forms emanating from external bodies, held, nevertheless, an opinion equally irreconcilable with the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, viz., that an idea is a substance separate from the mind; that the mind can only receive it passively, contemplate it as the eye contemplates a picture, or work after it as the hand works after a model. "In every exercise of the mind" (says Tucker) "that which discerns is numerically and substantially

Theories of Ideas.

different from that which is discerned." Whether this proposition be true or false, is a plain question of fact, which every human being can determine, if, without being led away by prevalent expressions, such as "abstract ideas," "association of ideas," or the like, he will calmly and quietly appeal to his own internal experience. Are my thoughts different from myself? or are they my own acts? And if they are my own acts (which was the doctrine of Plato and Aristotle), then are they wholly capricious and accidental, or are there any *laws* by which they must be more or less strictly governed? any *forms*, which they must more or less exactly assume? If there be such laws and forms of the mind, as all admit that there are of objects in the external world; if we can no more believe that a square is a circle, or a triangle a parallelogram, than we can that the sound of a flute is the pain of the gout, or that a grain of wheat sown in the earth will grow up an elephant; then those laws are *ideas*, by which every one must be consciously or unconsciously governed in the exercise of his mental powers; and which are universally, necessarily, and absolutely true, whether or not the circumstances, in which an individual is placed, require him to call them into action.

Locke's perversion of the word Idea.

148. Nothing however contributed so effectually to pervert the knowledge of this most important part of our mental constitution, as the very vague use made of the term *idea* in Mr. Locke's work on the Human Understanding. By employing it for all modes and forms of thought without distinction, he introduced into the philosophy of the human mind much the same sort of confusion as a mathematician would into geometry, who should inform his pupils that all figures are circles; and that though Euclid had given that name only to figures possessing certain well-defined properties, no regard should be paid to his doctrines, nor any distinction made between curvilinear and rectilinear figures. Unfortunately for us in England certain extraneous circumstances procured for Mr. Locke's book, at its first appearance, a popularity certainly not due either to its style or matter: and the consequences have been, first, that the original meaning of the term idea has been totally mistaken; and secondly, that the word has obtained the most vague acceptation of any word in our language. It has been supposed that Plato meant by it an image, something like the *simulacra* of Lucretius. On this assumption, Dr. JOHNSON, as we are told by Boswell, "was particularly indignant at the use of the word *Idea*, in the sense of Notion or Opinion, thinking it clear, that idea could only signify something of which an *Image* can be formed in the mind." So, ABRAHAM TUCKER says, "an idea is with respect to things in general, what an *Image* is with respect to objects of sight." And DAVID HUME says, "nothing can be present to the mind but an *Image* or perception; and the senses are the only channels destined to receive (and convey) such images." These supposed mental images answer much more nearly to the *φάντασματα* of Plato, and are totally different from

ideas, which belong to the class of Νοήματα; the former being particular creations of the fancy, the latter universal laws of the intellect. As to the popular use of Idea, for thought, notion, belief, conjecture, and, in short, for almost any vague conception, subjective or objective, if it can be assimilated to any Platonic term, it must be to δόξα, opinion, which, as Plato says, is at best only a medium between knowledge and ignorance—ἡ ὀρθη δόξα μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας.

Locke's apparent materialism.

149. Mr. Locke certainly did not intend to expunge the notion of mind from all philosophy. By distributing ideas, as to their origin, between sensation and reflection, he no doubt meant to imply that there was, in the nature of man, an immaterial mind which reflected, as well as a material body which felt; but the inevitable consequence of his own vague conceptions on the subject was to employ expressions which might be taken in different senses; and accordingly the materialists, not without a plausible appearance of reason, cited him as a conclusive authority in their favour. Thus Condorcet says, "Locke fut le premier qui prouva que toutes nos idées etaient composées de sensations." Locke, at all events, was not the first who maintained such an opinion. It was clearly that of Epicurus, as set forth by Lucretius, in the introduction to the passage before quoted,—

> Nunc age, quæ moveant animum res accipe, et *unde*
> Quæ veniunt veniant *in mentem* percipe paucis.

Montaigne repeats the maxim which he had heard and seems to have approved:—"All knowledge is conveyed to us by the senses; they are our masters: Science begins by them and is resolved into them."* Hobbes in England and Gassendi in France had held the same vague opinion before Locke's book appeared; and since Locke's time it has become the distinguishing characteristic of modern mental philosophy, as professed in England by Hartley, Priestley, Darwin, Beddoes, &c., and in France by D'Alembert, Diderot, Condillac, Condorcet, &c., until it at length attained its climax in the public atheistical lectures of M. Comte. Happily this extreme proof of the insanity, to which false principles of philosophy eventually lead, has produced in France a reaction in favour of M. Cousin's powerful exertions to restore the writings of Plato to their true place in public estimation.

Classes of ideas.

150. *Universal* conceptions, that is to say, *ideas*, though subjectively existing in, or rather forming the basis of the human mind, are objectively applicable to spiritual, mental, and corporeal substances; for none of these can be comprehended by the mind otherwise than according to certain laws imposed on them by the Creator, which laws, as felt by the mind, are ideas. Those applicable to spiritual objects are, to us, by far the most interesting and the most important; but in each class the more profoundly an idea penetrates into the first principles of existence, the more difficult is it for unassisted human faculties to comprehend it, in all its clear and comprehensive certainty;

* Montaigne, by Hazlitt, p. 275.

whilst on the other hand, some faint glimmerings of it are to be perceived in the weakest minds; and there is no human being so constituted as clearly to conceive its direct contrary.

Transcendental idea of God.

151. I have said, that in the mind of man the consciousness of simple existence is the source and necessary condition of all other powers; and accordingly we find that at the head of the six transcendentals above mentioned, is placed *Ens*, "Being." This applies to all objects, spiritual, mental, and corporeal; but, above all, it applies to the great *Ens Entium*, the Being of Beings, the Spirit of Spirits, in whom "we live, and move, and have our being." Of all intellectual energies, therefore, that we possess, the most transcendent is that which offers to our finite conception, however imperfectly, the idea of an infinite, spiritual Ruler of the Universe. It has been said by very worthy and pious writers, that "the belief of one Almighty Governor of all things is not an instinctive and universal principle of our nature." Certainly not, if we speak of such an instinct as teaches an insect to fly as soon as its wings are unfolded from their sheath, or such universality as makes human beings of all ages feel the necessity of food and sleep. But this statement is wholly inconclusive, as to the gradual development of ideas in the human mind. It is like saying, that there is no pure idea of a circle; because a child, in his early notion of roundness, does not reflect on the position of a central point, on the equality of radii, or on that combination of centripetal and centrifugal forces, which produces a circular movement; or it is like denying that a particular plant has within it a principle of fructification, because it has as yet put forth only leaves, or perhaps is just raising its young stem from the earth. There is not, there cannot be, such a thing as a pure atheist; but the idea of Deity developes itself in the human mind slowly: it is easily overlaid and perverted by the phantoms of imagination; and the intellect can make but gradual approaches toward that which, in its brightness, "dark with excess of light," defies human comprehension. The word GOD, our Teutonic name for this adorable Being, is in its origin synonymous with *Good*, the idea of which, Plato, in the 6th book of the Republic, makes Socrates declare to be "the most sublime of all intellectual conceptions;"* adding moreover to this assertion, the following remarkable words:—"We do not sufficiently know it; but if we were wholly ignorant of it, then although we possessed all other knowledge in the highest degree, it would, without this, profit us nothing."† This passage cannot but forcibly bring to mind the expressions of St. Paul, "though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal." Yet though goodness (which in human nature the Apostle calls charity,) be in its infinite purity one element of the ineffable idea of the Divinity,

* Ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ Ἰδιὰ μέγιστον μάθημα.

† αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἴσμεν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης εἰ τι μάλιστα τἄλλα ἐπιστάμεθα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ὄφελος.

two other elements are essential to the mental conception of that idea, namely, the elements of infinite Power and infinite Wisdom. And though this be not the place for theological discussion, yet I cannot omit to observe, that many eminent divines have considered these elements of our finite idea of God to indicate respectively the creative Power of the Father, the enlightening Wisdom of the Son, and the enlivening Love of the Holy Spirit.

Spiritual idea of law.

152. From that combination of Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, which, in its perfection, belongs to GOD alone, flows the spiritual idea of *Law;* which, in its application, comprehends as well "that which God has eternally purposed in all His outward works to observe," as "that which He has set down as expedient to be observed by all His creatures," spiritual, intellectual, and material; and from which all human laws are or ought to be derived. The development of this idea has never been treated with so much depth of thought, or power of language, by any author, ancient or modern, as by our own RICHARD HOOKER, in his invaluable production, the Ecclesiastical Polity; the first book of which, with equal truth and beauty, thus concludes: "Of Law there can be no less acknowledged, than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world. All things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and men, and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent admiring her, as the mother of their peace and joy." Thus may we see, that the more profoundly we meditate on an *idea*, the more prolific we shall find it to be of new and subordinate ideas, each becoming gradually more luminous and comprehensive, as the parent idea is more distinctly seen and felt; for while we dwell in awe and admiration on the idea of an Almighty Lawgiver, not only do we obtain more elevated and philosophic views of Law, but new and clearer ideas present themselves to us of right and wrong, justice and injustice, virtue and vice, order and disorder, with their attendant trains of thought.

Ideas of intellectual objects.

153. The ideas applicable to *intellectual* objects have been differently arranged, in the systems of different philosophers; for instance, in the "Categories" of Aristotle, the "*Verstandes-begriffen*" of Kant, and the "Fundamental Ideas" and "Ideal Conceptions" of Dr. Whewell. Aristotle mixes together those which relate to Space and Time, with others which are more clearly intellectual. Kant, properly as it seems to me, separates the former from the latter, inasmuch as space and time imply the existence of an external world, whereas the ideas of limit and infinity, unity and number, substance and attribute, cause and effect, and the like, might be applied to intellectual conceptions without reference to anything beyond the mind itself. It does not seem that the ancient, or at least the heathen philosophers, distinguished spiritual from intellectual ideas. Indeed Socrates, in the Phædon, places the spiritual ideas of goodness and justice on the

same footing, in point of reasoning, as the intellectual idea of equality. "We must necessarily have known *equality*" (says he), "before we first saw *equal* things, and became aware that they desired (as it were) to partake of the nature of perfect equality, but fell short of that perfection."* "And this reasoning" (he adds) "is not more applicable to equality, than it is to beauty, goodness, justice, and the like."† On the other hand, however, it will be remembered that in the passage above cited from Plato's Republic, the same Socrates is represented as attaching to the spiritual knowledge of goodness a value incomparably higher than that of any mental acquisition.

Ideas of corporeal objects.

154. The remaining class of ideas consists of those which are applicable to *corporeal* objects. Space and time (purely and simply considered) do not necessarily imply the existence of any corporeal object corresponding to them; for space may be contemplated as one infinite vacuum, and even if portioned out and limited by lines and figures, there might be no material forms corresponding to these; and the same might be said of ever-flowing time, if there were no courses of the stars, or revolutions of the planets, by which it could be measured. But when a new idea intervenes—when we suppose *matter* to exist—this idea, like all others, becomes prolific of a vast train of subordinate ideas, according as we apply to it the higher ideas of space, time, substance, attribute, cause, effect, &c. We conceive of matter as occupying space; as enduring for a greater or less time; as the effect of a cause; and as a substance holding together various corporeal attributes, as the mind is a substance holding together various mental attributes. From the idea of matter flows that of *motion*, which combines the idea of *force* with those of time and space, inasmuch as it supposes a portion of matter to occupy at one time one part of space, and at another time another, and to be caused so to do by some force, whether the force be such as urges the planets to move round the sun, or such as makes the smallest conceivable atoms attract or repel each other. All matter, organized and unorganized, and all motion, voluntary and involuntary, have their laws, which become distinctly or indistinctly known to us by sensation and reflection, and may be contemplated either substantively in themselves, or adjectively as attributes of other substances.

Substantives, called abstract,

165. Words which express *ideas* substantively, whether referable to spiritual, mental, or corporeal objects, are for the most part comprehended by Harris and others among "abstract substantives," or words expressing "abstract substances:" and the way in which they are explained is, that "by a refined operation of the mind alone, we *abstract* any attribute from its necessary subject, and consider it apart,

* Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προεἰδέναι τὸ Ἴσον προ ἐκεινοῦ τοῦ χρόνοῦ, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ Ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι ὀρέγεται μεν πάντα ταῦτ' εἶναι οἷον τὸ Ισον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως—

† Οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ Ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγες ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτου τοῦ Κάλου, καὶ αὐτου τοῦ Ἀγαθου, καὶ Δικαίου—κ. τ. λ.

devoid of its dependence;" "for instance" (says Harris), "from body we abstract to fly, from surface the being white, and from soul the being temperate;" and thus are formed the words "*Flight*," "*Whiteness*," "*Temperance*." That such an operation of the mind is possible (as I have before said), I do not deny; but that it is often exercised I doubt; and that it accurately explains all the conceptions of which it is supposed to be the origin, and consequently all substantives naming those conceptions, appears to me more than doubtful.

not formed by abstraction.

156. The term "Abstraction" is the Latin *abstractio*, and the Greek ἀφάιρεσις; but I can find no classical authority for the use of either of the two latter terms, in the sense of the mental operation alluded to. Aristotle appears to have incidentally spoken of geometrical magnitudes as τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, "things abstract;" but this was merely to distinguish the reasoning part of geometry from the diagrams, or visible points, or lines, which Themistius calls ὕλη τῆς γεωμετρίας, "the matter of geometry," in opposition to its intellectual form. The schoolmen seem first to have used the term "abstract," as opposed to "concrete." The former they defined, "quod significat formam aliquam cum exclusione subjecti ut *albedo*;" "that which signifies any form, with exclusion of its subject, as *whiteness*;" the latter, "quod significat eandem formam cum hærentibus subjecti, ut *albus*;" "that which signifies the same form with the accompaniments of the subject, as *white*." Still this decides nothing as to the mental operation by which the conceptions in question are formed, or the manner in which they arise in the mind: I therefore venture to suggest the following explanation, in conformity with the views which I have hitherto taken of the constitution of the human mind.

Corporeal substance.

157. The idea of *Substance* is enumerated above among those which are applicable to intellectual objects; but it has pleased the Almighty that man should possess not only a spirit and a mind, but also a body, which Plato (or whosoever composed the First Alcibiades) has compared to an instrument of the mind. It may also be compared to the soil, in which the spiritual and mental seeds are implanted, and the elements by which they are surrounded, and without which, as seed sown on a rock, they could never put forth their vegetative powers. Hence the idea of an intellectual substance, as an *individualising principle*, not limited by space, but holding together, as attributes, various mental faculties, has its contra-type in the idea of a *corporeal substance*, namely, *matter*, which, as *an individualising principle* limited by space, holds together, as attributes, various sensations, and organic, and elementary powers of action. These ideas of matter, at first vague and obscure, become by experience and observation more and more distinct conceptions, so that we can reason on them, on their parts, constitution, and elements, and hereon is founded the whole of Natural Philosophy.

Corporeal attributes.

158. Further, the corporeal conceptions do not at first come to us

in the shape of substances, but of sensations, as of heat and cold, light and darkness, &c., all which the mind even of an infant can soon distinguish; and it can form conceptions of them before it can refer them, as attributes, to any particular substance. Nay, even in after life, sensations often occur, such as those of faintness, languor, *ennui*, or *tædium vitæ*, of which we know neither the seat nor the cause; and yet we can easily reason on them as independent conceptions. In the early stages of reason, when men first look on external objects as causes of their sensations, they usually suppose the attributes of those objects to be similar to the sensations which they experience; and hence they ascribe heat to fire, light to the sun, cold to ice, &c. Still the conceptions of heat, light, cold, &c., remain the same: they may be viewed *in concreto* or *in abstracto*, as the logicians say, that is, as attributes, or as substantive conceptions.

Corporeal actions.

159. What has been said of the *attributes* of corporeal substance may be understood of its *actions;* which, indeed, are commonly reckoned among its attributes; as Harris, speaking of abstraction, says, "from body we abstract *to fly*." And so Falstaff humorously ascribes to his size an "alacrity in sinking." All corporeal action implies *motion*, and the conception of motion (as has been shown) is no less an idea than that of matter is. The conception of "flight," therefore, may be considered not merely as an attribute of the flying body, but as a substantive conception derived from the idea of motion. Moreover, there are certain things, as light, heat, electricity, magnetism, &c., of which we form substantive conceptions, and express them by nouns substantive, though the learned are by no means agreed whether they ought to be included among corporeal substances themselves, or to be reckoned as attributes, forms, or modes of some unknown substance. The great discoverers in these, and, indeed, in all branches of physical science, have been men who traced our knowledge of the operations of Nature up to some *bright idea*, of which their predecessors had had obscure anticipations, but had never obtained

That sober certainty of waking bliss—

which ever accompanies the "*Heureka*" of a mighty truth.

Etymology not here in question.

160. In what has been hitherto said, it must be observed that I wholly disregard the historical origin of the words expressing ideas. It may be, and it is true, that the English word *Right* and the French word *Droit* are of the same origin as the Latin word *Rego*, "I rule, govern, or command;" but long before any of these words were employed in their present signification, there existed in the human mind an idea of *Right* (still, alas! too imperfectly understood, and too little desired to be understood, by the great mass of men) which is correlative with the idea of *Duty*, and, together with it, flows from a development of the higher idea of *Law*. So the word *Heaven* may be etymologically connected with our common verb "to heave," or with the Anglo-Saxon *heafod*, "the head;" but that there is a state of

greater purity and happiness than can be attained in this mortal life—that there is, indeed, "another and a better world," such as we believe Heaven to be—is an idea wholly independent of these etymologies, and which even the most barbarous nations have in all ages been found to cherish.

General and Universal not to be confounded.

161. I have dwelt at some length on the doctrine of Ideas, not only because the gross misuse of the word *Idea* has become so inveterate, since the time of Mr. Locke, in our literature, but because a clear understanding of it will correct a confusion very injurious to grammatical science between the terms *general* and *universal*. By the former we imply that which is equally common to many individuals, and which therefore may be *particularised*, as "a man," "a slave;" by the latter, that which is absolutely and simply true, whether it can be applied or not to any existing individual, as "manliness, "slavery." These two classes of words are not always distinguishable by their form, but always by their meaning in the sentence in which they are employed. Thus "man" is a *general* word, when King Henry says—

——— Wish not *a man* from England.
God's peace! I would not lose so great an honour,
As *one man* more methinks would share from me,
For the best hope I have.

But Isabella employs it as an *universal* in her passionate exclamation—

——— *Man*, proud *Man*,
Drest in a little brief authority,
Plays such fantastic tricks before high Heav'n
As make the angels weep!

And, on the other hand, the word "Right" is an *universal* in the bold, false, and wicked, but too prevalent assertion—

That what makes the *right* and wrong,
Is a short sword and a long,
Or a weak arm and a strong.

But it becomes merely a *general* word in the Bill of Rights, where the Lords and Commons of England, after setting forth thirteen specific declarations, "claim, demand, and insist upon all and singular the premises as their undoubted *rights* and liberties." How far the distinction between general and universal words may be grammatically indicated by the construction of a sentence, will be noticed hereafter. Logicians term the words indiscriminately "common," which I have distinguished as general and universal; and a proposition in which either is predicated may be the major of a syllogism. Formally, therefore, the two classes agree, but materially they differ; for to general words, strictly speaking, belong only probable arguments, whereas demonstration requires universals.

Gradation.

162. Thus have I considered the first essential distinction of substantives, that of *kind*. I come now to the other essential distinction, that of *gradation*, by which I mean that order or arrangement of

conceptions, and consequently of the words naming them, to which Harris refers when he says, "those several (kinds of) substances have their *genus*, their *species*, and their *individuals*; for example, in natural substances, animal is a genus, man a species, Alexander an individual." Of these three distinctions, logicians rank the two first among the five predicables, *genus*, *species*, *differentia*, *proprium*, and *accidens*: that is to say, they hold that whatever is predicated (or asserted) of anything must be predicated of it as falling under one of these five distinctions. Omitting for the present to notice the three last predicables, I may observe, that an *individual*, which, strictly speaking, is only an object designated by a proper name, as Alexander, Vatican, Etna, may be classed under a *species* by possessing some one or more qualities common to it, with all other individuals of the same species, as Alexander agrees with John and others in the qualities of a man; the Vatican with the Tuileries and others in those of a palace; and Etna with Vesuvius and others in those of a volcano. And again, that a species may be classed under a genus by possessing some one or more qualities common to it with all others of the same genus, as the species man falls under the genus animal by possessing sensibility; the species palace under the genus edifice by possessing construction; and the species volcano under the genus mountain by possessing height. But as there is no one external object which solely and exclusively answers to the terms man or animal, palace or edifice, volcano or mountain, it is clear that these are conceptions of the mind, and that the nouns substantive naming them must be not proper but common,* that is, either general or universal.

Genus and species; their subordination.

163. Harris and others speak only of the three gradations above mentioned, genus, species, and individual; but it is easy to see that the intermediate gradation may be practically multiplied to any extent. Thus by an operation of the mind we may divide the species man into white and black, free and slave, Greek and barbarian, governors and governed; or we may make being the genus, created being the first species, organised being the second, animal the third, and so downwards, in regular subordination. "Every genus," says Harris, "may be found whole and entire in each one of its species; for thus man, horse, and dog are each of them distinctly a complete animal." And again, "every species may be found whole and entire in each one of its individuals; for thus Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon are each of them completely and distinctly a man." "This," he adds, "is what Plato seems to have expressed, in a manner somewhat mysterious, when he talks (in the Sophist) of μιάν Ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου

* Hence the predicate of every proposition must be in effect a common word. In affirmative propositions, to say John is William is merely to say that two names are, by mistake or otherwise, given to the same individual. In negative propositions, such as "John is *not* William," the predicate, though formally a proper name, is in effect common; for the assertion amounts to no more than declaring that John is not Daniel, or Philip, or *any other person*; and in this manner it may be said that an individual word may be generalised.

κειμένθ χωρὶς πάντη διατεταμένην—καὶ πολλὰς, ἑτέρας αλλήλων, ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας. Now there is really no mystery in these expressions to any one who has well studied the use of the word idea by Plato; for he is speaking of an accurate reasoner, one who understands the proper method "of dividing by genera, and neither supposes one species to be another, nor the latter to be the former."* "Such a person," Plato says, "will clearly discern one *idea* spreading through many things widely separated from each other, and will perceive that those many separate things are held together under one."

164. The philosopher's remark may be thus illustrated:—If any person should profoundly meditate (as Hooker did) on the generic *idea of law*, and should know how to divide its species with perfect accuracy into the law divine, revealed and rational, the laws of nature, of nations, and of separate polities, civil and ecclesiastical, assigning to each its due limits, he would clearly perceive that this generic idea pervades all its species, and that all the works of the Creator and of man must alike conform to it, or perish. For want of this animating principle in human laws it is— Illustrated.

> That mighty States characterless are grated
> To dusty nothing.

And what must happen, if we could suppose a like defection from the laws of nature, has been admirably described by the great author of the Ecclesiastical Polity himself—"If those principal and mother elements," says he, "whereof all things in this lower world are made, should lose the qualities which now they have; if the frame of that heavenly arch erected over our heads should loosen and dissolve itself; if celestial spheres should forget their wonted motions, and by irregular volubility turn themselves any way as it might happen; if the prince of the lights of heaven, which now as a giant doth run his unwearied course, should, as it were through a languishing faintness, begin to stand and to rest himself; if the moon should wander from her beaten way; the times and seasons of the year blend themselves by disordered and confused mixture; the winds breathe out their last gasp; the clouds yield no rain; the earth be defeated of heavenly influence; the fruits of the earth pine away, as children at the withered breasts of their mothers no longer able to yield them relief, what would become of man himself? See we not plainly that obedience of creatures unto the *law* of nature is the stay of the whole world?"

165. There are two modes then of acquiring knowledge, with reference to the distinction of genus, species, and individual, the ascending and the descending mode; and these have been explained or typified in various ways, as by the *Arbor Porphyriana* of logicians, the Σειρὴ χρυσέιη of the poet, and the Ladder of the patriarch's dream. Proceeding from genus to species, and *vice versâ*.

* Τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε ταυτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον, ἡγήσασθαι, μήτε ἕτερον ὂν ταυτὸν.

Porphyry, an eminent philosopher of the third century, in his *Isagoge*, or introduction to the five predicables above enumerated, thus forms a scale (usually figured as a *tree*), viz., Socrates, Homo, rationale, animal, vivens, Corpus, Substantia; according to which we may ascend from the individual, Socrates, to the genus, substance; or descend, vice versâ. Homer, in Chapman's spirited translation, thus describes the *golden chain* by which Jove holds all things suspended—

——— Let down our *Golden Chain*,
And at it let all Deities their utmost strengths constrain
To draw me to the Earth from Heav'n; you never shall prevail,
Though with your most contention ye dare my state assail.
But when my will shall be dispos'd to draw you all to me,
Ev'n with the Earth itself and Seas, ye shall enforced be.
Then will I to Olympus' top our virtuous engine bind,
And by it ev'ry thing shall hang, by my command inclin'd.

The patriarch Jacob, in his dream at Luz (afterwards called Bethel), "beheld a *ladder* set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to heaven; he saw the angels of the Lord ascending and descending on it; and the Lord stood above it." (Genes. xxviii. 12, 13.) Every branch of the tree, every link of the chain, every step of the ladder, beginning at the lowest, brings us nearer to the source of all knowledge, until we reach

Things not reveal'd, which the INVISIBLE KING,
Only Omniscient, hath suppress in Night.

In which belief of a wisdom beyond human attainment our great poet agrees with Plato, who intimates that as the bodily eyes of the generality of men are unable to look steadily at the clear meridian sun, so their mental eyes, contemplating the divine light, are unable to sustain its splendour.* On the other hand, the knowledge which begins from the highest intelligible *genus*, and descends in fit gradation through subordinate *species* (as has been above exemplified in the idea of law) is also of inestimable value to mankind. To the former belongs inductive science, to the latter demonstrative; these are the two wings of the human mind, and he who attempts to fly with either alone will effect but an imperfect and limited flight.

Practical utility of gradation.

166. The practical utility of a well-formed gradation from an individual through successive *species* to a *genus*, or the contrary, may be thus briefly explained. The general *aim* and object of the process is to acquire some knowledge that may be useful, not only on one occasion but on all similar occasions; to know some truth which may not only apply to Peter or John, but to all persons who resemble Peter or John; but this cannot be done unless we have a common word which implies that resemblance, and the persons in question cannot resemble each other but by relation to some common conception, which does not necessarily belong to any one of them more than to any other. That common conception therefore supplies the class-

* Τὰ γὰρ τῆς των πόλλων ψυχῆς ὄμματα καρτιρεῖν πρὸς τὸ Θεῖον ἀφορῶντα ἀδύνατα. (Sophist, p. 177. Ed. Ficin.)

word, which renders the truth common. Thus Peter, James, and Andrew may be *slaves;* the conception of *slavery* therefore is common to them all, and whatever is universally true of it is true not only with relation to Peter, James, and Andrew, but to all others who are, or have been, or may be, in the state of life expressed by the word slave. Again, a slave and a free citizen agree in this, that they are *subjects;* a subject and a sovereign in this, that they are *men;* a man and a beast in this, that they are *animals.* Now all these conceptions, to wit, slavery, subjection, human nature, and animal nature, are so many mental conceptions or *ideas*, and they are regularly subordinated, one to another, in a certain gradation, according as they are viewed by the mind; which view is determined, not by any accidental impression received from the senses, but, on the contrary, by the general truth of which the understanding is in search. Thus, if I am in search of some truth relative to the state of slavery, I may consider the conception of *slave* as a genus, and divide it into the species of domestic, political, absolute, limited, and the like; or if I wish to reason on animal nature, I may regard *animal* as the genus, and man, beast, bird, fish, &c. as species. In like manner I may consider an angle as a genus, and right, acute, and obtuse angles as species.

Certainty.

167. They who think that we can have no conceptions but those of bodily impression, that there is no substance but matter, and that sensation and reflection are alike bodily acts, will of course contend that there can be no *truth* or *certainty* in the mental conceptions which we call genera and species, and consequently no precise meaning in the words by which they are signified, inasmuch as there is no external standard to which they can be referred. But an external standard, to which there are no means of referring, is in fact no standard at all. Now this must happen, in the great majority of cases, with regard to corporeal conceptions. No sooner have I seen "Peter" or "John," than he may take his departure. Shall I then say he is a nonentity? And what has truth or certainty to do with external existence, more than with internal? We do, in fact, attain greater certainty, and are more confidently persuaded of truth, in regard to some mental, than we possibly can in regard to any corporeal conceptions. Mathematical demonstration is proverbially clear and unquestionable; but mathematical demonstration is carried on solely by means of ideal conceptions. If men were to trust to physical measurement, aided by the very nicest instruments, they might be employed for ages before they could satisfy themselves that the three angles of a right-lined triangle were universally equal to two right angles.

Species treated as individual.

168. The species is to the genus as the individual is to the species. Hence it is, that though (as I have said) an individual, strictly speaking, is an object designated by a *proper* name, yet a species, though necessarily designated as such by a *common* noun, may be contemplated as an individual, with reference to the genus to which

it belongs. The conceptions of virtue and modesty, separately considered, may be regarded as genera; but if the latter be contemplated only as a species of the former, it may be individualised. When Hamlet says to his guilty mother,

Assume *a virtue*, if you have it not,

he alludes to modesty as one of several species of the genus virtue. Again, when we say, "Virtue is its own reward," we speak of virtue as one of the several species of the genus reward. On this principle we may correct what seems to be an error of the learned grammarians of Port Royal, and of M. Dumarsais. "There are nouns," say Messrs. de Port Royal, "which pass for substantives, but are really adjectives, as 'King,' 'Philosopher,' 'Physician;'" and M. Dumarsais says, in the phrase "Louis is king," king is an adjective. Now it surely would be more correct to say that the words alluded to are substantives common, signifying species or genera, of which the person indicated is an individual. LOUIS was an individual of the species king, and genus ruler. DAVY was an individual of the species chemist, and genus natural philosopher, and so forth. Condillac says that when a substantive is the attribute (he means the predicate), it is the more general of the two terms. Now, this is true with reference to the particular view taken at the time of speaking. When we say "Time is money," we do not mean to use the words time and money both as universals, implying genera, so as to make the proposition merely an identical one; but we suppose the word money to be employed symbolically as a genus, including all the means of acquiring whatsoever men deem valuable; we regard time as a species of that genus, and we might continue the gradations thus, Time is money, Money is power, Power is happiness. So when we say "Gratitude is justice," we mean, that gratitude is a species of the genus justice: it is one of the many forms of rendering *suum cuique*, such as punishing crime, rewarding merit, paying a debt, returning a kindness, &c.

Partition and Division.

169. From what has been said it will be manifest that a genus is an idea including various species, not as a day includes an hour, or as a mile includes an inch; that is to say, as a given measurable portion of time or space, matter or motion, but as involving conceptions of a lower order and less comprehensive nature. This distinction Cicero expresses by the words *Partitio* and *Divisio*. "In partitione," says he, "quasi membra sunt, ut corporis, caput, humeri, manus, latera, crura, pedes, cætera. In divisione formæ sunt, quas nostri species appellant. Formæ sunt hæ in quas genus, sine ullius prætermissione, dividitur; ut si quis jus, in legem, morem, æquitatem, dividat." (Topic, 6, 7.) To partition, rather than to division, belongs the class of nouns called *nouns of multitude*, each of which, though it represents a number of beings definite or indefinite, still represents them as one thing; of this kind are the words "an army," "a regiment," "a troop," "a nation," "a crowd," "a flock." Those writers who have not well comprehended the distinction of genus and species, have sometimes explained

the words representing them as mere nouns of multitude; that is to say, "as representatives of many particular things," instead of being representatives of an idea common to those particular things.

Number.

170. Having thus considered the essential distinctions of nouns substantive, viz., kind and gradation, I have next to speak of the accidental distinctions, viz., number, gender, and relation or case. Whatever is accidental may, or may not, be viewed in connection with that which is essential. Thus the conception of ideas of *number* may or may not be viewed in connection with other conceptions, as that of "man," or "whiteness," or "sun," or "star;" and if viewed in connection with any one of these, the complex conception may be expressed by a single word, or by two words, as happens in regard to other combinations of ideas; thus as "saint" is a single word, including the conceptions expressed by the two words, "holy" and "man," so the word "horses" includes the conceptions expressed by the words "horse" and "number."

Whence derived.

171. In order to understand when the conceptions of number can, and when they cannot, be added to other conceptions, we must consider what the former are. For this purpose I cannot refer to a more satisfactory or better authority than Plato's *Epinomis*, sometimes called the Thirteenth Book on Laws; but the whole passage is too long to be extracted, and I should do it injustice were I to exhibit it in an imperfect state. Suffice it to say that Plato agrees with Mr. Locke in asserting that "number is the simplest and most universal idea," for *unity* itself is in this sense the origin of all our ideas of number. But the latter philosopher is by no means correct in saying that "its modes are made by addition;" for we might as well say that they were made by division, or by subtraction, or by multiplication; since addition is, equally with each of the others, one of the powers of numbers, and presupposes the idea which Mr. Locke imagines it to produce. He says, "by repeating this idea (viz., of unity) in our minds, and *adding the repetitions together*, we come by the complex ideas of the modes of it. Thus by adding one to one we have the complex idea of a couple." Very true, by adding; but not by simply repeating, which is a totally different operation. John is one, and Peter is one, and Henry is one; but one is not two, or three. What makes me then acquire the ideas of two or three? Certainly not the bare act of repeating one, one, one; for children and idiots who cannot reckon three, can do this: and M. de la Condamine mentions whole tribes of savages who cannot reckon beyond three, though certainly they could repeat one, two, three, all the day long. There must, then, be something in the nature of the ideas of number without which it would be impossible for us to "add one to one," and thence to obtain "the complex idea of number." Now, this consists in the still more general nature of all ideas, and in that power, which they have, to grow and multiply by contemplation. Thus, if we enumerate John, and Richard, and Henry, and William, and James, and Edward, and so forth, the

very slightest attention will show us that there is not merely unity, but *multitude*, or the idea of number in its most indistinct form; but in order to distinguish this multitude into given numbers, as twos, threes, or fours, it will be necessary to refer each conception to some other. Thus these two, John and Richard, are tall; these three, Henry, William, and James, are short; or these three, John, and Richard, and Henry, stand in the first line; these two, William and James, stand in the second; or the first, John, is counted on the thumb; the second, Richard, on the fore finger; the third, Henry, on the middle finger; the fourth, William, on the finger next beyond the middle; and the fifth, James, on the little finger. This last mode of sorting and classing conceptions has been very generally adopted by mankind, whence the Greek word πεμπάζειν, "to reckon by fives," was used for "to number." Some barbarous tribes never went beyond the use of one hand for this purpose; whereas the more cultivated nations employed both hands; and this latter mode is the origin of our decimal system of arithmetic, and explains why the numeral figures are still called *digits*, that is, fingers.

Plural number.

172. I have observed that the first conception of number is simply, that it is something beyond, and different from, unity; that it is unity repeated, or multitude. Thus far most nations have gone, in expressing, by one word, the combination of number with any given conception; and this variation in the noun is called, by grammarians, the *plural number*. The plural number usually differs from the singular in form, either by the use of a word altogether different, as "pig and swine;" or by a change in articulation, as "man and men;" or by a syllable added, as "horse and horses," "ox and oxen;" but as the variety of these forms proves that no one of them is essentially necessary; so both experience and reflection will show that no change whatever is necessary in the noun itself, provided that some other word serves to show us that the noun is used with reference to plurality; thus in English we say "fifty *sheep*," and "fifty *head* of cattle;" and so in Latin the genitive and dative cases singular, and nominative and vocative plural of the first declension, are identical.

Dual number.

173. The form in which the noun expresses unity of conception, is called the singular number; but it would not be possible for nouns to have a separate inflection for every separate conception of number, that could be combined with them by the mind. Therefore, they cannot have separate forms for the *dual*, *ternal*, *quaternal* numbers, and so on, *ad infinitum;* but for some of these numbers they may. Experience, indeed, has not shown us that they have ever gone beyond the *dual* number; and that has been done by very few nations. Certain writers argue on this and other matters concerning language, as if the formation of different dialects were a matter of premeditation and study; whereas it is certain that all languages, in their early state, grow up without meditation or reflection, and that the cultivation and polishing of its language is one of the last results of a nation's civilization. Nor

can this be otherwise; for ideas, which are the laws of mind, develop themselves in practice, and guide our mental operations, just as animal laws direct our bodily actions, long before we suspect either of them to exist. We walk, and dance, and ride, according to the laws of gravitation; we swim by the principles of hydrostatics; we form and express thoughts by the laws of conception, assertion, and conclusion; but it is not until long after we have submitted to those laws, that we begin to take cognizance of them as distinct objects of thought; for the last operation of the human intellect is that by which it separates itself from outward things, and discovers within its own nature a world of beauty and order, which even more than this wondrous body of man with all its curious apparatus, chemical and mechanical, more than this terraqueous globe with its animal and vegetable and mineral riches, more than the sun "looking from his sole dominion," or even than the countless numbers of the heavenly host peopling interminable space, discovers to our finite comprehension the traces of that Deity, who cannot be more fully revealed but by his own divine word.

Absolute truth.

174. Thus it is, that in intellectual, as in moral speculation, our simplest conceptions are most closely connected with that absolute truth, of which Mr. Tooke altogether denies the existence. "Truth," says he, "supposes mankind for whom, and by whom alone, the *word* is formed. If no man, no truth. There is, therefore, *no such thing* as eternal, immutable, everlasting Truth; unless mankind, such as they are at present, be also eternal, immutable, and everlasting. Two persons may contradict each other, and yet *both* speak truth." This is not only not common sense, but it is very bad logic. The argument runs thus: A man *trowed* or believed something to exist; he used the word "troweth, troth, or truth," to express this belief; therefore *no such thing* existed. Again, two men believed that two different things existed; they both used the same word to express the same belief: therefore the belief of both was equally well founded. Turn Mr. Tooke's sentences how we will, they come to this sort of reasoning, and can only be accounted for by his loose and hasty conception of the word *thing;* which as he uses it, corresponds exactly to Mons. Condillac's *object*, and to Mr. Locke's *idea;* and really means *nothing;* that is to say, nothing certain, definite, or intelligible.

Truth of numbers.

175. That the human mind can embrace ETERNAL TRUTH, in the widest sense of these terms, it would be folly and madness to assert; but that none of the truths which it is formed to comprehend are eternal, is a proposition, to say the least of it, extremely bold. At all events, the circumstance that men, "such as they are at present," may not be able clearly to comprehend a given truth, is certainly no proof of its falsehood. Suppose a child does not well comprehend that two and two are four, are they the less so? Now, this is the case with all conceptions of number. We begin with unity, we proceed to multitude, we advance to numeration; but the elementary

books of arithmetic will teach us that this last is the introduction to that science by which Newton brought down the old divinities from their starry thrones, and converted lovely Venus and potent Jove into silent monitors of the lapse of time, or friendly guides of the adventurous navigator on a lonely ocean; that science, by which judicial astrology was for ever confuted, and men learnt to gaze unmoved on the comet, which, as they had once thought,

——— from his horrid hair
Shook pestilence and war.

How connected with other truths.

176. Such being the nature and power of the conceptions of number, let us inquire how, and on what principles it is that they are connected with other conceptions: and here it will be seen that these principles are founded in the essential distinctions of the noun, as already described; for the principal office of numbers is to apply science to fact, by distributing the genus into its species, and the species into its individuals; number, therefore, is the bond uniting the universal with the particular, the highest genus with the lowest individual, Eternal Truth with momentary sensation. Therefore it is, that Plato says, *εἰπερ ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐξέλοιμην ὀυκ ἄν ποτε τί φρόνιμοι γενόιμεθα.* "If we were to take out *number* from human nature, we should become void of thought on every subject;" which he again illustrates by observing, that an animal which has not the distinct conceptions of two or three, or of even and odd, and, consequently, is quite ignorant of numeration, can never give any account of those things which he perceives by sense and memory.

How applied to genus and species.

177. "The genus," as has been observed, "is found whole and entire in each one of its species." Thus the genus animal is found in the different species, man, horse, and dog; that is to say, a man is an animal, a horse is an animal, and a dog is an animal. By numbering the species, we find that the genus though one, is capable of being conceived in them as many, and therefore we can speak of many animals. Again, "the species is found whole and entire in the individual." Thus Socrates is a man, Plato is a man, Xenophon is a man; and by applying the conception of number to the species of man, we call them three men. The plural number, therefore, belongs to genera and species: and accordingly we find all languages apply the plural number to words expressing genera and species, that is to say, to the words, called common, or appellative.

Proper names strictly singular.

178. But the case is totally different with proper names, when strictly used as such; for in that case they are applied to individuals, and the individual is *not* found whole and entire in the genus or species. The conception of *Cæsar* is not found whole and entire in the genus animal, or in the species man, or in the class of Romans, or of conquerors, or of generals, or of soldiers, or of scholars. The word Cæsar, therefore, when used to express the very individual who passed the Rubicon, and who spoke with so much affected liberality in behalf of the traitors engaged in the Catilinarian conspiracy, and who

doubted of a future state, and who associated with the debauched and profligate Antony, and who at once flattered and subjugated the Roman people, cannot receive a plural termination; and for this reason, because the particular conception which it expresses cannot be associated with number; since there never was nor ever will be more than one such man; who therefore spoke philosophically and truly, when he said—

For always I am Cæsar.

But if the word Cæsar be used to express a different conception; if it mean something which is also found whole and entire in Alexander, and Attila, and Jenghiz Khan, and Napoleon Buonaparte, *then* indeed "the Cæsars" is a proper grammatical form of speech; because the noun is no longer a proper name, but an appellative: *then* we may reason on the Cæsars, as on a class or species, and what we say of one will be equally true of another; but *then* the word, though the same in sound, will be very different in signification; and the reason which before prevented our adding to it the plural termination will no longer exist.

How they become plural.

179. Mr. Harris has mentioned various ways in which a proper name may come to be used as an appellative. The persons indicated by it may, as members of the same family, or from other accidental causes, happen to bear the same name. Hence the expression of "the twelve Cæsars," to designate twelve Roman emperors who successively bore that name. Hence too the *Howards*, *Pelhams*, and *Montagues*, "because a race or family is like a smaller sort of species;" so that the family name extends to the kindred, as the specific name extends to the individuals. Again, another cause which contributes to make proper names plural, is the marked character of some individual who bears it, whether for eminent virtue, or for notorious vice, or simply for anything extraordinary and singular in his conduct or opinions. It is thus that in speaking on the subject of Grammar, we might not improperly say, "these are the opinions of a *Condillac!*" referring to an author of some celebrity (though, as I think, of remarkable inaccuracy) in his views of that subject. So the liberality of Horace's patron and friend has made every patron of literature be called a *Mœcenas;* the odious cruelties of *Nero* have made his name a synonym with the word tyrant: and on the same principle Shylock, when he would express the integrity and acuteness of the supposed young lawyer, exclaims,

A *Daniel* come to judgment! Yea, a *Daniel!*

Gender.

180. *Gender*, as an accidental distinction of nouns, has given rise to much litigation among grammarians. "Gender," says Vossius, "is properly a distinction of sex; but it is improperly attributed to those things which have not sex, and only follow the nature of things having sex, in so far as regards the agreement of substantive with adjective. Sex is properly expressed in reference to male and female, as

Pythagoras and *Theano; ager*, a field, therefore, is improperly called masculine; and *herba*, an herb, is improperly called feminine. But *animal* is neuter, because it is construed neither way." Scaliger says, that the ancients improperly attributed sex to words; and that with respect to the neuter gender, it is absurd to attribute that to gender which is the negation of gender. Neither is it to be borne, says he, that words should be called of the doubtful gender, from the circumstance of their being sometimes used with a masculine and sometimes with a feminine construction. Mr. Harris, however, has, with some ingenuity, endeavoured to assign reasons for the generic distinction of nouns. "Every substance," says he, "is male or female, or both male and female, or neither one nor the other. So that with respect to sexes and their negation, all substances conceivable are comprehended under this fourfold consideration." Hence he proceeds to consider language as if it had been really and intentionally formed with a view to this classification of substances. As to the first and second class, they are manifestly such as must on many occasions require some mode of expression. The third is rare, and its expression would in general be shunned. But as to the fourth, it must necessarily include by far the greater portion of the objects of thought. In languages which express the natural sexes alone by terms corresponding to them, very little difficulty occurs in this part of Grammar. In general, every noun denoting a male animal is masculine; every noun denoting a female animal is feminine; and every noun denoting neither the one nor the other is neuter. The only exception to this general rule, is an exception which is founded in the poetical part of our nature; and it happily serves to distinguish the language of imagination from that of reality. The instances to which I allude are those in which the conception of a *thing* is raised to the dignity of a person, or where we dwell with such fondness on our *thoughts* as to invest them, as it were, with life and action. *Virtue* stands before us in the enchanting form of a lovely female. *Patience* appears "gazing on kings' graves, and smiling extremity out of act." —So Shakspeare says,—

> The mortal *Moon* hath *her* eclipse endured.

And perhaps a finer instance of this figurative use of gender cannot be cited than its application to the Idea of *Form*, in Milton's noble description of Satan—

> ——— His form had yet not lost
> All *her* original brightness, nor appear'd
> Less than archangel ruin'd.

But in languages where the mere terminations of words imply, or are supposed to imply, any or all of these distinctions, it is no wonder that much confusion arises in the various modes of explaining a circumstance so foreign to the general laws of thought. "The Greek, Latin, and many of the modern tongues," says Mr. Harris, "have words, some masculine, some feminine (and those too in great multi-

tudes), which have reference to substantives where sex never had existence. To give one instance for many, *mind* is surely neither male nor female; yet is *νους*, in Greek, masculine; and *mens* in Latin, feminine." This learned grammarian could not but perceive that "in some words these distinctions seemed owing to nothing else than to the mere *casual* structure of the word itself;" but he was of opinion that in other instances there might be detected "a more subtle kind of reasoning, which discerned even in things without sex a distant *analogy* to that great distinction which, according to Milton, animates the world!"

Mr. Harris's theory.

181. I am far from asserting that in particular instances some such analogy may not have operated. Indeed it appears to be of the nature of that imagination to which we owe the figurative language above mentioned; but it could only have been a rare accident, by no means capable of carrying us far toward the explanation of the principles on which language in general was constructed. Harris, it must be owned, expresses himself modestly enough, observing, "that all such speculations are at best but conjectures, and should therefore be received with candour rather than scrutinised with rigour." "Varro's words, on a subject near akin," says he, "are for their aptness and elegance well worth attending: *Non mediocres enim tenebræ in silvâ ubi hæc captanda, neque eò, quò pervenire volumus semitæ tritæ, neque non in tramitibus quædam objecta, quæ euntem retinere possunt.*" With this allowance, we may therefore notice the general principle for which Harris contends, namely, that "we may conceive such subjects to have been considered as *masculine*, which were conspicuous for the attributes of imparting or communicating; or which were, by nature, active, strong, and efficacious, and that indiscriminately, whether to good or to bad; or which had claim to eminence either laudable or otherwise;" and again, that "the *feminine* were such as were conspicuous for the attributes either of receiving, of containing, of producing, or of bringing forth, or which had more of the passive in their nature than of the active; or which were peculiarly beautiful and amiable, or which had respect to such excesses as were rather feminine than masculine." Hence he thinks it would be reasonable to consider as masculine nouns, the "sun," the "sky," the "ocean," "time," "death," "sleep," and "God;" and as feminines, the "moon," the "earth," a "ship," a "city," a "country," and "virtue." But the question, as respects the science of Grammar, is not whether any or all of these may not occasionally and accidentally be so considered; but whether there be any necessary cause connecting in our minds the conception of sex with any of them. Now, there can be no other such cause than personification, because sex is a personal distinction; but even that cause does not universally apply to any of these conceptions. God, indeed, our creator and preserver, we usually and properly regard as a person; and then the reasoning of Mr. Harris is so far just, that we cannot easily view the Supreme

Being as a female; for even in those heathen mythologies which abound with female divinities, the chief and sovereign Deity is always represented as masculine. But Harris himself admits, what indeed the common experience of every day sufficiently proves, that we often contemplate this ineffable conception without any reference to sex, or even to person, calling it "Deity," "Numen," "τὸ θεῖον." It must be remembered, that personification was more common among the ancients than among the moderns. The Greeks actually worshipped Sleep and Death in the form of men: Virtue was portrayed before their eyes by the statue of a female. Nor must we forget that many of these personifications have been handed down to us from them by mere tradition and the language of the poets. Thus it is difficult for us, who have seen Fame and Victory so often delineated as females, on ancient medals, and in sculpture, who read of them as such in poetry, and know that Fama and Victoria are nouns of feminine termination; it is difficult for us, when we do personify these airy beings, to figure them to ourselves as men, in a different habit and form, with different accompaniments, and expressed by words and sentences of a different character and construction. But there are comparatively few things which we personify in our common prose: and when we do so, the change of the form of words from neuter to masculine or feminine, at once and powerfully marks the transition of the mind from cold matter of fact to ardent imagination. This, however, is again an accidental circumstance appertaining to the particular history of the English language, and not to the philosophy of language in general.

Gender of proper names.

182. There is a curious difference of opinion between SANCTIUS and HARRIS. The former writer asserts "that proper names of men, cities, rivers, mountains, and the like do not admit of grammatical gender;" "*Nomina propria hominum, urbium, fluviorum, montium, et cætera hujusmodi, genus grammaticum habere non posse*:" whereas the latter author says "both number and gender appertain to words.—Number, in strictness, descends no lower than to the last rank of species: gender, on the contrary, stops not here, but *descends to every individual*, however diversified." This apparent contradiction between two eminent writers is nevertheless easily reconciled. Harris attributes gender to words as significant of the conceptions of the mind. Sanctius, on the other hand, following the authority of Varro and Diomedes, considers grammatical gender as relating only to the termination or construction of words. "Thus," says Varro, "we do not call those words masculine which signify male beings, but those before which are properly placed *hic* and *hi*, and those feminine with which we can say *hæc* and *hæ*." "*Sic itaque ea virilia dicimus, non quæ virum significant, sed quibus præponimus hic et hi; et sic muliebria in quibus dicere possumus hæc et hæ.*" The reason which this author assigns for his doctrine is suitable enough to Grammar as an art, but not as a science. *Grammaticæ propositum non est singularum vocum significationes*

explicare, sed usum. "The object of Grammar is not to explain the *significations* of particular words, but their use." Now, though the mere signification of words is not the object of Grammar, the mode of signification is so far from being an immaterial part of that science, that it is its sole foundation. There is no doubt but that the expression or non-expression of the distinction of sex in connection with other conceptions, must affect the relations of language considered as significant, and consequently must fall under the science of Grammar, according to the definition of it above adopted. This expression is not essential to all nouns, but it is an accident universally affecting whole classes of nouns, and therefore demanding for its application some rules of Universal Grammar.

Terminations.

183. Now those rules not only do not depend on the termination or other peculiarity in the sound of words, but even in the Latin language, as Wallis has observed, sex is not so distinguished; for though the termination *um* is neuter, yet the words *scortum*, *mancipium*, *amasium*, &c., are applied both to the male and female sex: and so we find it even in proper names, as *Glycerium mea*, which Priscian notes as figurative.

Union of conceptions.

184. Regarding only the science of Grammar, as dependent on the nature of thought, it is manifest, that those conceptions which are of a nature to coalesce, in reason or fancy, may be considered either distinctly or in absolute union. Thus the conception of "number" and that of "soldier" are absolutely united in the conception of "army" or "regiment," or "troop;" the conception of "royalty" and that of "man" are absolutely united in that of "king;" and so the conception of "sex" and that of "child" are absolutely united in the words "boy" and "girl." This sort of union gives occasion to many classes of words in most languages, as "horse" and "mare," "ram" and "ewe;" "bull" and "cow;" but there is a second class in which the same distinction is expressed by the compound form of the word, as "shepherd" and "shepherdess," "milliner" and "man-milliner;" and lastly, the sexual quality is often expressed by its proper adjective, as the "male and female elephant," the "male and female rhinoceros."

Common gender.

185. There are some conceptions in which that of sex is tacitly included, but may not be absolutely determinable, or may not require to be determined for the purpose of communicating thought. Thus a "child" is either a "boy" or a "girl;" but if we are reasoning on the education of children generally, many thoughts may occur to us which indifferently and equally relate to boys and girls, and in expressing which we may therefore use the neuter word "child." And perhaps this consideration alone would afford a sufficient answer to those persons who contend, like Hobbes, that the general word "man" is no more than the representation of some one particular man in my memory or imagination: for if the word child in my thoughts represented a boy, it could not represent a girl, and *vice versâ;* whereas

we see in practice that it represents the two opposite sexes at the same time, without the least difficulty, and serves the purposes of reasoning quite as well, and oftentimes better than if we had employed different words for the two sexes.

Accidental associations.

186. Lastly, there are conceptions, which in reality have nothing to do with sex, but which, from various causes, principally depending on imagination or habit, we are apt to consider in connection with notions of sex. Thus the English sailor, who has contracted a sort of affection for the tight vessel in which he has braved the winds and waves, and who sees in her neat trim and gallant tackling the elegance of female apparel, is habitually led to speak of her as a female. Who has not been electrified with the feeling expressed in the old seasong—

She rights, *she* rights, boys—we're off shore!

To a similar cause it is to be attributed that we can hardly think of Britannia as a mailed warrior, "an arm'd man for the battle," or as a sea-god wielding his trident over the subject waves; but we see her, like another Minerva, great in arts and arms, circling her brows at once with the olive and the laurel, covering the nations with her ægis, and stretching out her spear for their protection. If we speak of her domestic greatness, it is as

The *nurse*, the teeming *womb* of royal kings;

if we lament her errors, and her failings, we

Feel for *her*, as a lover, or a child.

Animated style.

187. This is the language, not of mere plain unadorned reason, but of reason elevated and sublimed by passion; yet does not this circumstance take it entirely out of the domain of Grammar, viewed as teaching the necessary modes of communicating thought; for passion is a necessary part of our nature, and it unavoidably gives a hue and tinge to our conceptions, and forces us to modify accordingly the forms of expression in language. Unhappy is the critic who knows nothing of this part of Grammar; he will not only miss some of the finest beauties in the poets, but if he attempt to correct what he thinks faulty, he will display, in the most ridiculous light, his own want of taste. Mr. Harris has finely exemplified this remark, by a quotation from Milton—

At his command th' uprooted hills retired
Each to *his* place: they heard his voice and went
Obsequious: Heav'n *his* wonted face renew'd,
And with fresh flow'rets hill and valley smil'd.

"Here," says Harris, "all things are personified: the hills hear, the valleys smile, and the face of heaven is renewed. Suppose, then, the poet had been necessitated by the laws of his language (or we may add by the correction of the critic) to have said, Each hill retired to *its* place; Heaven renewed *its* wonted face—how prosaic and lifeless would these neuters have appeared; how detrimental to the pro-

sopopeia which he was aiming to establish! In this, therefore, he was happy, that the language in which he wrote imposed no such necessity, and he was too wise a writer to impose it on himself. 'Twere to be wished his correctors had been as wise on their parts." That they were not always so wise we have a striking instance in the celebrated Bentley, who has taken upon himself to make a vast number of alterations of this kind in Milton's text. Thus the great poet, in his picturesque description of creation, had written—

> ——— The swan, with arched neck,
> Between *her* white wings mantling proudly, rows
> *Her* state with oary feet.

On which Dr. Bentley has the following note: "The swan, *her* white wings! and *her* state! I wonder he should make the swan of the feminine gender, contrary to both Greek and Latin; always Κύκνος, *cygnus*. Rather, therefore, *his* wings, *his* state." This comes of having learnt only the Greek and Latin Grammars, and not knowing, even of these, the true foundations!

188. I come now to the expression of the relations of nouns to each other, which is effected by declension, or *case*, if the relation and the conception coalesce in one word, and by a preposition, if in different words. By this short statement many disputes of grammarians relative to the cases of nouns will be easily settled. Declension is the term commonly used to signify the variation of case; but Varro considers case as only one mode of declension. His expressions are these: "Of words, as man and horse, there are four kinds of declension; first nominal, as from *equus* comes *equile;* secondly casual, as from *equus* comes *equum;* thirdly augmentative, as from *albus* comes *albius;* and fourthly diminuent, as from *cista* comes *cistula.*" I have, however, at present only to do with the second of these modes. Relation.

189. It was long disputed what number of cases existed in the Latin language. These are thus enumerated and explained by Priscian: "The first case is called the *right*, or *nominative* case; for by this case naming is effected; as this man is called Homer, and that man Virgil. The reason that it is sometimes called the right or straight case is, that it is first formed naturally by merely laying down the word, and then the other cases formed by flexion from this are called *oblique*. The next is the *genitive*, which is also called by some the possessive or paternal. The word genitive is either derived from *genus*, a race, because we signify by it the race to which any one belongs, as 'he is of Priam's race,' or from *genero* to generate, because from this case are generated many other words and parts of speech; at least it is so in the Greek language. Again it is called possessive, because we signify possession by this case, as 'Priam's kingdom,' or the kingdom possessed by Priam: whence possessive adjectives may also be construed by this case; for what is 'the Priameian kingdom' but 'the kingdom of Priam,' or 'Priam's Number of cases.

kingdom?' It is called paternal for a similar reason, because the father's name is thus expressed, as 'Priam's son;' and hence patronymic names may be resolved into this case, as 'Pelidan Achilles' is the same as Achilles the son of Peleus. The following case is the *dative*, which some term the *commendative*. I give a thing '*to* a man,' or I recommend a person 'to a man.' Fourthly comes the *accusative* or *causative*: I accuse a man, or I (as a cause) make a thing. The fifth case is the *vocative* or *salutatory*, as 'O Eneas!' or 'Hail Eneas!' The *ablative* is also called the *comparative;* as 'I take *from* Hector,' or 'I am stronger *than* Hector.' Each of these cases, moreover, has many other different uses; but they have received their names from their most general and familiar use, as we see happen in many other things."

Meaning of the word case.

190. From this enumeration, it is observable that the sort of declension which the ancients called *case*, not only expressed the relation of nouns to each other, but also that which they bore to verbs, as agent or object; and lastly, their use in the expression of passion, without reference either to another noun or to a verb: in order to explain the reasons of which it will be necessary to observe, that the meaning of the word *casus*, which we render case, is, properly, the falling or declining from a perpendicular line. Thus, if the simple notion of the noun be supposed to be expressed by an upright straight line, as in the letter I, the other cases may be supposed to be expressed by lines obliquely declining one way or the other, as in the letter V.

Nominative.

191. It was long disputed among the ancient grammarians, whether the nominative should, or should not, be called a case. On the one hand it was urged, that conceptions are only expressed by speech, in some one of the forms called cases, including the nominative; and that of these forms, the nominative expressing the agent of the verb active was the simplest, and was, therefore, used whenever there was occasion simply to name a thing or person. Thus we should not say, that the name of the person slain by Marcus Brutus was *Cæsaris*, or *Cæsari*, but *Cæsar*. Those, on the contrary, who called it a case, contended that every expression of a conception in speech was a declension, or falling away from the simple conception in the mind, which, taken by itself, does not imply either action, or passion, or relation. Thus, before I can assert anything whatsoever of Cæsar, I must form the conception or thought of "Cæsar" as a person; but when I put that thought to another, when I mention the wife "of Cæsar," or the friends who were faithful "*to* Cæsar," or those who revolted "*from* Cæsar;" or assert that "Cæsar conquered," or that "Cæsar was killed;" or express a feeling of any sort by the exclamation "O Cæsar"—on these and all such occasions my conception declines from its original simplicity, and consequently my expression should be said to decline, or fall away from the pure noun. They added, moreover, that it was not always the simplest form of the

noun, but was sometimes more distant from the radical, and therefore more deserving of the appellation of oblique than some other cases; as, for instance, the vocative or ablative, which latter some writers have considered as the primary and original case of the noun.

Agent or Object.

192. Since the notion of action implies the notion of an agent, there must be a form of the noun which denotes the agent to every verb in a simple sentence. The action, however, may be represented as proceeding from the agent, or as received by the object. On the former supposition, it becomes a verb active, and the nominative case is the form of the noun which denotes the agent. On the latter supposition, it becomes a verb passive; and the nominative case is the form of the noun which denotes the object. Thus, "Cæsar fights," "Cæsar is killed," are two simple sentences, in both of which Cæsar is the nominative case. In the former, the word Cæsar signifies the agent that fights; in the latter, the same word Cæsar signifies the object that is killed. In both instances the nominative is essential to the completion of the sentence; for when we speak of fighting, as proceeding from an agent, we must necessarily express that agent; and when we speak of being killed, as received by an object, we must express the object. Hence the trivial rule, that the nominative answers to the question who, or what; as "Cæsar fights." Who fights?—Cæsar. "Cæsar is killed." Who is killed?—Cæsar. It is justly observed by Harris, that the character of the nominative may be learnt from its verb. The action implied in the verb "fights," shows the nominative "Cæsar" to be an active efficient cause. The suffering implied in the words "is killed," shows the nominative "Cæsar" to be a passive subjcet. Persons may be considered in both these lights; as Cæsar is active in the one instance, and passive in the other. But Things cannot, except figuratively, be considered otherwise than as passive, and, consequently, can only become nominatives to passive verbs; as we may say, "the house is built;" but we cannot say, "the house builds."

Nominatives are necessary.

193. The nominative is the most essentially necessary of all cases; and it has therefore been described as "that case without which there can be no regular and perfect sentence." The sentences in which we make the positive *it* serve for a nominative, and which the Latins used without any nominative at all, as *pluit*, "it rains;" *tædet me*, "it wearies me," or "I am wearied;" are imperfect sentences, which I shall hereafter consider separately. In all other instances, although it may not be necessary to express the object to which an action is directed, or the agent from which a suffering proceeds, yet the converse is absolutely necessary: thus, when we say, "William builds," it is not necessary to add "a house," or "a palace;" but if we say "builds a house," or "builds a palace," it is necessary to prefix the name of the builder.

Accusative and Ablative.

194. In order, however, to extend and enlarge a sentence, it often

becomes necessary to state the object of a verb active, or the agent of a verb passive. Hence arises the necessity for two other cases, which have been called the accusative and the ablative. When I say there is a necessity for such cases, it will be understood, from what I have before observed, that I do not contend for the necessity of any particular terminations, or inflections, or prepositions, or arrangement of words, to mark these varieties of case; I only mean, that it is necessary, that by some means or other the noun, which indicates the conception, should be placed in such or such a relation to the verb which constitutes the assertion. It may happen, and, in point of fact, it does happen in some languages, that there are no inflections of case; but there are means in all languages of determining when a noun is the object of an active, or the agent of a passive verb. It has, indeed, been disputed, whether the cases of nouns should be reckoned according to the relation in which they stand to other words, or according to the diversity of their inflections; nor are there wanting names of high repute on either side of this question. Sanctius contends, that there is a natural partition of cases, according to the relations which they imply, and, consequently, that there must necessarily be the same number of cases, which he estimates to be six, in all languages. Vossius objects to this reasoning, and alleges, that if the cases of nouns were to be reckoned by the relations which they bear to other words, they must be endless. This contest, like many others, has arisen from confounding Universal Grammar with Particular. The difference of inflection, or position, belongs to the latter; that of signification to the former. True it is, that the relations of nouns to other nouns and to verbs are infinite; but yet they are distinguishable into certain great classes; and whether these classes ought or ought not to be called cases is a mere verbal dispute. I shall so designate them, for the sake of convenience; at the same time it must be understood that this arrangement is not intended to interfere with the Grammar of any particular language, in which the cases are arranged according to their inflections.

Primary and Secondary.

195. In my sense of the word case, then, the nominative, that is, the agent of the active, or object of the passive verb, may be called the primary case; and the secondary cases are the accusative and the ablative, in so far as they perform the functions above noticed. These two cases, it is to be observed, are respectively convertible with the nominative, by a change of the verb from active to passive; for "James loves John" is convertible with "John is loved by James;" the accusative of the first being the nominative of the second, and the nominative of the first being the ablative of the second.

Dative, &c.

196. So the matter stands in the simpler combinations of thought; but let us consider what is to be done, if in one and the same sentence we wish to express not only the agent and object of any action, but also the end to which the action is directed: the cause on account

of which it happens, or the instrument, mode, and circumstances of its performance. For these purposes it is necessary that the conception of such end, or cause, or instrument, &c., should be expressed by a noun; and that some means should be adopted to show whether the noun was meant to stand in the relation of end, cause, or instrument, or in any other relation to the verb. It is, as Vossius justly observes, quite impossible that any language should have separate inflections for all these relations, and therefore some of them are, in most languages, represented by separate words, or particles, commonly called prepositions; but others are often expressed by inflections, the number and diversity of which vary exceedingly in different languages, as will be shown hereafter.

Genitive.

197. Thus have I noticed three classes or degrees of relation in which the noun may stand to the verb; but it may also be related to another noun, as depending on, or belonging to it. Thus the words "Priam's kingdom," "the son of William," mark a dependence of "son" on "William," and of "kingdom" on "Priam." This relanion is expressed by a separate inflection in Greek, Latin, English, and many other languages; and it is commonly called the *genitive* case. Now the use of the genitive case in nouns substantive differs but little from the use of an adjective. It expresses one conception, as dependent on another, and the expression of the latter serves to individualise and specify the former. The dependent conception is therefore, in fact, a mere attribute of the other, and consequently the genitive is easily convertible into an adjective. Thus the words Βασιλέος Σκῆπτρον, regis sceptrum, the king's sceptre, are easily converted into Σκῆπτρον Βασιλικὸν, sceptrum regium, the kingly sceptre. For the same reason, we find that in some languages, the Chinese, for example, the adjective is in no manner distinguished from the genitive or possessive case of a substantive; for it is said that the word *haò* signifies goodness, and *gin* signifies man; but *hao gin* is a good man, or man of goodness; and *gin hao* is human goodness, or the goodness of man. Hence, too, we see why Wallis considers the English genitive case as a possessive adjective; *e. g.*, "the *king's* court," aula *regia*, where he differs from all other English grammarians, in calling the word "king's" an adjective. On the other hand, Lowth reckons the words *mine* and *thine*, which are usually called adjectives, as the possessive cases of *me* and *thee*. It is, perhaps, from a similar cause that Dr. Jonathan Edwards asserts the Muhhekaneew or Mohegan Indians to have no adjectives at all in their language; a fact on which Mr. Horne Tooke lays great stress, but which, in reality, proves nothing as to the signification of language, whatever it may do as to its forms or inflections.

Vocative.

198. It seems hardly necessary to distinguish the vocative case by any particular inflection. Indeed, we find the terminations of the nominative and accusative equally employed in Latin as exclamatory:

and it is said that the Sanscrit grammarians do not allow the vocative to be a case. Yet, when we are speaking of the different relations which a noun may bear to other words in a sentence, it is impossible to overlook its use in those sentences where it stands forth prominently as the object addressed or invoked. Thus, in the first ode of Horace, we find two verses almost wholly occupied with vocatives :—

> Mæcenas, atavis edite regibus,
> O et præsidium, et dulce decus meum !

So Plautus uses it as an interjection, "Io! Hymen! Hymenæe!"* From which, and many similar instances, it might be called the interjectional case.

* Casna, a. 4, sc. 3, v. 3.

CHAPTER VI.

OF NOUNS ADJECTIVE.

199. I HAVE said that the noun adjective is the name of a conception or thought, considered as a quality or attribute of another conception. In more popular language, it is a word added to a substantive to designate a quality, which distinguishes it from some other substantive of the same class, as a *red* house, a *lovely* lady, the *moneyed* interest, the *fiftieth* regiment; where red, lovely, moneyed, and fiftieth are all adjectives. In order fully to understand this definition, it will be proper to advert once more to the nature of a simple enunciative sentence or logical proposition. The subject, or that concerning which something is asserted, is always a noun substantive; the predicate may be a noun adjective. Thus, in the sentence "John is tall," the subject is "John," which is a noun substantive; the predicate is "tall," which is a noun adjective. Complex sentences are resolvable into more simple ones: and where adjectives are used, so as to render a sentence complex, they are always resolvable into the predicate of a logical proposition. Thus, if it be said that "a wise man is cautious," this sentence is resolvable into the two simple sentences "a man is cautious," and "that man is wise," and in each of these the adjective is the predicate of the proposition. Definition. Adjective.

200. The inferences to be drawn from this statement are several. In the first place, whenever the name of a conception is employed as the subject of a proposition, it is not an adjective. Thus, the conception expressed by the words "good" and "goodness" is the same; but if we predicate anything of this conception; if, for instance, we say "goodness is amiable," the word goodness must necessarily be a substantive. And this does not depend on the form of the word; for if the idiom of our language allowed us to say "good is amiable," or "the good is amiable," the word "good" would be as much a substantive as "goodness." Not the subject of a proposition.

201. Hence it follows, that the distinction between a substantive and an adjective does not necessarily depend on any difference between the conceptions which they express, but between the different modes in which those conceptions are contemplated by the mind. If we contemplate goodness as a separate idea, if we assert anything of that idea, if we make it the subject of any proposition, then it is a substantive; but if we predicate it of anything else, if we consider it only as a quality of that thing, then it is an adjective. Mode of viewing it.

202. Hence, again, it follows, that an adjective and a substantive cannot be convertible, without wholly changing the meaning of the proposition in which they are employed. Thus, to say that "envy Not convertible.

is criminal," and that "criminality is envious," are two propositions entirely different.

Cannot stand alone.

203. It is equally a rule of Universal and of Particular Grammar, that an adjective cannot stand alone, but must be joined with its substantive; which is, in truth, no more than saying, that a predicate must necessarily refer to some subject. Mr. Tooke, however, controverts this rule, though it is certainly as old as the words adjective and substantive. He objects, that the rule equally applies to the oblique cases of nouns substantive, and that therefore "the inability to stand alone in a sentence is not the distinguishing mark of an adjective;" but, though it were not a distinguishing mark, it might yet be a rule common to all adjectives. However, the real intent of the rule is to distinguish adjectives from the substantives with which they are used, and that in the most simple sentences; and with reference not to their form or inflection, but to their signification. Thus, if we say "a *golden* is valuable," the sense is incomplete, and the adjective "golden" requires the addition of a substantive, as, for instance, "ring," to render it intelligible. On the contrary, if we say "*gold* is valuable," the sentence is perfect.

Have not the same meaning.

204. Mr. Tooke contends that "the adjectives *golden*, *brazen*, *silken*, uttered by themselves, convey to the hearer's mind, and denote the same things as *gold*, *brass*, and *silk*." The short answer to this is, that it is contrary to common sense and experience to confound these terms together; and nobody ever does so, who understands the English language in the slightest degree. But if we wish to trace the source of Mr. Tooke's error, we must examine more particularly his expressions. First, what does he mean by "uttered by themselves?" Words uttered by themselves are like syllables or letters uttered by themselves. They are the mere elements of discourse. Their proper force and effect in rational speech must depend on their connection with each other. Again, what is meant by "denoting the same things?" In so far as they are both of the same origin, there is doubtless a common conception to which they both bear relation; but it does not follow that they both bear the *same* relation to it. A numerous tribe of words derived from, or connected with, this term, *gold*, is to be found in the different European languages. Is it to be said that they all "convey to the hearer's mind and denote the same things?" Let us see how this can possibly be made out. From (1) the splendour of the rising or setting sun, was denominated (2) the yellow colour resembling that splendour. From the name of that colour, was derived (3) that of the jaundice, which rendered the whole body yellow, and (4) that of the gall, which produced the jaundice. From yellow also came (5) the name given to the yolk of an egg. And again, from this colour came (6) the name of gold. Gold, being the most precious of metals, gave its name (7) to riches in general; and particularly (8) to money. Hence were denominated all kinds of payments, whether (9) voluntary gifts, or (10) offerings,

or (11) tribute, or (12) rent, or (13) fines; as well as (14) debts due on any of these accounts. In process of time, certain societies were formed and maintained by regular payments from each member, and these societies received their name (15) from this circumstance. The name was afterwards extended to societies (16) or fellowships in general; and it occasioned the peculiar designation of a building (17) in London, where they assembled. Fines in ancient times were applied, in the nature of punishment, to almost all crimes; and hence their name came to signify (18) punishment in general; and particularly a barbarous mutilation (19) often used as a punishment. Lastly, the general term for punishment was naturally applied to the criminality (20) by which the punishment was occasioned. In a future part of this work I shall trace these progressive changes of signification, as they are to be found in the Mæso-Gothic; Anglo-Saxon; Alamannic; Lombardian; Precopian; Greek; Latin, old, middle, and barbarous; Suevian; Swedish; Icelandic; Russian; German; Dutch; Welsh; Italian; old and modern French, and old and modern English. Every change of application is occasioned by a new operation of the mind. The sound of the word conveys a new thought, similar indeed to the preceding, and having reference to the same conception, but placing it in a new light. It would be absurd to say that the thought remained the same through *all* these different uses; and it is equally incorrect to say, that it remains the same after any *one* step. There is as real, though not the same difference between "gold" and "golden," as there is between "a guilder" and "Guild-hall." If Mr. Tooke were right, to *gild* a thing would be to convert it into *gold*: whereas these words, though of the same origin, are so far from denoting the same conceptions, that they are often used in direct opposition to each other. "Is this *gold?*—No, it is only *gilt*." So gold and golden are not the same. They both, indeed, refer to the same conception; but they refer to it in different ways. In the one instance, the conception (namely gold) is the very thing of which we are speaking; it is the logical subject of the proposition; the mind looks at it, as it were, directly; as when Bassanio says,

> ——— Thou gaudy *gold*,
> Hard food for Midas—I will none of thee.

Whereas, in the other case, it is noticed but incidentally, as a thought passing over, and giving a momentary tinge to another thought, but differing from it as the light in which we view a substance differs from the substance itself. So the same Bassanio, in the same scene, speaking of his mistress's portrait, says,

> ——— here in her hair,
> The painter plays the spider, and hath woven
> A *golden* mesh to entrap the hearts of men.

How treated as substantives.

205. From what has been already said, it will easily be understood that these secondary thoughts, which are expressed by adjectives,

may be brought more distinctly before the mind, and treated as substantives in connection with other substantives. It is thus that instead of "a virtuous man," we may say "a man of virtue;" but though there appears, in this instance, very little difference of meaning, yet, on analysing the two expressions, we shall find that a new and distinct operation of the mind is performed, which operation is here expressed by the word "of." We do not merely, as in the case of the words "virtuous man," contemplate the conception of "man" as a substance, and that of "virtue" as a quality belonging to the individual in question; but we contemplate "man" as having a substantial existence, and "virtue" as having an existence capable of coalescing with man; and further, we contemplate the actual union of these two thoughts, as expressed by the word "of." Slight, therefore, as the difference of meaning is between the words "a man of virtue" and "a virtuous man," yet the grammatical difference is not to be overlooked: and the best proof of this will be to consider how totally the style of any author would be altered if we were always to change the genitive case of the substantive into an adjective, and *vice versâ*. Suppose that, instead of the line,

The quality of mercy is not strained,

we were to say, "the merciful quality is not a quality of compulsion," we should certainly not augment the force and beauty of the language; and we should as certainly change the flow and current of the thought; we should alter the Grammar, and annihilate the poetry.

Necessary to language.

206. The preceding remarks, too, show the absurdity of asserting that "adjectives, though convenient abbreviations, are not necessary to language," and that "the Mohegans have no adjectives in their language;" for though this latter fact is vouched by "Dr. Jonathan Edwards, D.D., pastor of a church in Newhaven, and communicated to the Connecticut Society of Arts and Sciences, and published by Josiah Meigs," it amounts really to this, that the Mohegans cannot distinguish subject from predicate, or substance from quality; and if so, they must be utterly destitute of the faculty of reason, which probably neither Dr. Edwards, nor Mr. Meigs, nor Mr. Tooke intended to assert. The only conceivable ground for the Reverend Doctor's assertion is, that the Mohegans employ the same word in a substantive and adjective sense, as we say "there is *a calm*," and "the day is *calm*," the weather "is *cold*," and I have "a *cold*;" or figuratively, as "*silver* locks," the "*honey*-moon," "*angel* visits," "*serpent* error," "*infans* pudor," and the like.

Agreeing with substantive.

207. It is a common rule, that the adjective should agree with its substantive in gender, number, and case, whence perhaps, it might at first sight be inferred, that gender, number, and case properly belong as well to the adjective as to the substantive. This, however, is not the fact: the adjective simply expresses a quality; but it must of necessity be connected in language with its substantive, and that connection is effected in many languages by a similarity of inflection;

and when the inflections of the substantive express gender, or number, or case, those of the adjective often follow a similar rule of construction. This construction, it is obvious, is a matter belonging only to Particular, and not to Universal Grammar. It may exist in one language and not in another; and, in fact, there are languages (our own, for example) in which all these variations in adjectives are unknown.

Degree.

208. On the other hand, a variation of *degree* belongs, in an especial manner, to certain adjectives, but not at all to substantives; and where there are variations of degree, they may be compared together, whence arise, what are technically called by grammarians, the degrees of comparison.

Not applicable to substantives.

209. Substantives cannot be compared, as such, in point of degree; for that would be to suppose that the nature of substantial existence was variable; and that one existing thing was more truly existing than another, which is absurd. "A mountain," says Harris, "cannot be said more to *be*, or to *exist*, than a molehill; but the more and less must be sought for in their quantities. In like manner, when we refer many individuals to one species, the lion A cannot be called more *a lion* than the lion B; but, if more anything, he is more *fierce*, more *speedy*, or exceeding in some such attribute. So again, in referring many species to one genus, a crocodile is not more *an animal* than a lizard is, nor a tiger more than a cat; but, if anything, they are more *bulky*, more *strong*, &c.; the excess, as before, being derived from their attributes. So true is that saying of the acute Stagyrite, *ουκ' ἂν επιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον*; substance is not susceptible of more and less." Sanctius, referring to this same passage of Aristotle, observes, that we may hence infer that comparatives cannot be drawn from nouns substantive. "Therefore," adds he, "they are deceived, who reckon the words *senex*, *juvenis*, *adolescens*, *infans*, &c., as substantives, for they are altogether adjectives. Nor is it to be objected, that Plautus has made from *Pœnus* the comparative *pœnior*; for he does not there mean to express the substantial existence of the Carthaginian, but his craftiness, as if he had said *callidior*; for the Carthaginians were reputed to be a very crafty people. So the writer who used the word *Neronior*, from *Nero*, meant only to signify an excess of cruelty."

Nor to some adjectives.

210. As substantives in general admit not of degree, so there are some adjectives which equally exclude either intension or remission. Thus Scaliger justly observes, that the word "medius" can neither be heightened nor lowered in degree; and that the same may be said of "hodiernus," and of many other adjectives. On this topic Mr. Harris thus expresses himself: "As there are some attributes which admit of comparison, so there are others which admit of none. Such, for example, are those which denote that quality of bodies arising from their figure; as when we say a *circular* table, a *quadrangular* court, a *conical* piece of metal, &c. The reason is, that a million of things

participating the same figure, participate it equally. To say, therefore, that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is more or less quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all attributives denoting definite qualities, whether contiguous or discrete, whether absolute or relative. Thus the two-foot rule A, cannot be more a two-foot rule than any other of the same length. Twenty lions cannot be more *twenty* than twenty flies. If A and B be both triple or quadruple of C, they cannot be more triple or more quadruple one than the other. The reason of all this is, that there can be no comparison without intension and remission; there can be no intension and remission in things always definite: and such are the attributes which we have last mentioned." This reasoning, which, as far as it goes, is very just, seems nevertheless to require some further development. What is here meant by "things always definite?" Plainly, what we have already called ideas, and those clearly conceived. The idea of a circle, when clearly conceived, is a thing always definite. By mathematicians it *is* clearly conceived; and consequently they would think it absurd to say, that one table was more circular than another; but persons who have not a distinct idea of a circle would not perceive the absurdity of the expression. To them, circularity would appear capable of intension and remission; and therefore they would conclude, that this quality admitted of comparison as much as sweetness or sourness, hardness or softness, heat or cold. Hence we find in language such words as *round*, which expresses the idea of circularity in a vague and indistinct manner; and these words are commonly used in the comparative and superlative, as well as in the positive degree. For the same reason, all words signifying bodily sensation are capable of comparison; for though we agree generally in the meaning which we attribute to them, yet there is no definite idea to which any one of them can be distinctly referred. Men employ the terms "hot, cold, white, black, green," &c., so as to convey to each other's mind certain general notions, but not to communicate precise and distinct ideas, like those expressed by the words, "square," or "triangle." Again, in moral qualities there is usually the same indistinctness. We say, one man is braver or wiser than another; because we possess no absolute standard of bravery or wisdom. If we possessed such a standard, that is to say, if we had a clear *idea* of bravery, or of wisdom, we should simply say, that each of the two was either brave or not brave, wise or unwise. There is no more common comparison in all language than between that which is good and that which is better; yet the pure *idea* of goodness presented to us by the Christian religion excludes all comparison—"There is none good but one, that is GOD."

Three degrees.

211. I have observed, that where there are variations of degree, these variations may be compared together. Grammarians have fixed three degrees of comparison—the positive, the comparative, and the superlative; and it seems material to observe, that the comparison

here referred to is of two kinds. We may either compare a quality, as existing in any given substance, with the same quality as existing in other substances, or we may compare it with some assumed notion of the quality in general.

Positive.

212. The *positive* is the simple expression of the quality: and Harris says, it is improperly called a degree of comparison; but in this he seems to be wrong; for it is that form in which the comparison of equal degrees of the same quality is expressed, either affirmatively or negatively. Thus we say, in the positive degree, "Scipio was as brave as Cæsar;" "Cicero was not so eloquent as Demosthenes."

Comparative.

213. The *comparative* expresses the intension or remission of any quality in one substance, compared with the same quality in some one other substance, as "Cicero was more eloquent than Brutus;" "Antony was less virtuous than Cicero." Hence it is manifest, that there are, properly speaking, two kinds of the comparative degree, one expressing the *more*, and the other the *less* of the quality compared. Languages in general have employed a peculiar inflection only to express the former; but the latter is in its nature no less capable of expression: and both belong to those distinctions which constitute Universal Grammar. It is to be remarked, that the comparative, though it excludes the relative positive, does not necessarily include the absolute positive. If we say "John is wiser than James," we exclude the assertion, that "James is as wise as John;" but we do not necessarily include the assertion either that "John is wise," or that "James is wise." All that may really be intended by the affirmative, is a negation of the negative. It may only be meant to assert that "John is *less unwise* than James."

Superlative.

214. The *superlative* expresses the intension or remission of a quality in one thing or person, compared with all the others that are contemplated at the same time. There must be more than two objects compared, but the number compared may be indefinite: we may say, Octavius was the most prudent of the triumvirate; Homer was the most admirable of poets; Solomon was the wisest of men. In other respects, what I have observed of the comparative, applies equally to the superlative, which may properly be considered as expressing the most or the least of the quality in question, but which does not, any more than the comparative, necessarily include the absolute positive. Of this remark, the common proverb, "Bad is the best," affords a sufficient illustration.

Comparison general.

215. Hitherto I have only spoken of the comparison of qualities existing in one subject with those existing in another or others; but the comparison may be made with a general conception of the quality: and here also may be three similar degrees. Where the quality is supposed to be of the general or average standard, we use the positive; where we mean to imply simply an excess beyond that standard, we use the comparative, which in English is commonly expressed by the adverb *too*, as when Hamlet says, "Why may not imagination trace

the noble dust of Alexander, till he find it stopping a bunghole?" Horatio answers "'Twere to consider *too curiously*, to consider so;" that is, more curiously than is usual or needful. Lastly, where we mean to express a high degree of eminence in the quality of which we speak, we use the superlative, as *vir doctissimus*, *vir fortissimus*, a most learned man, a very brave man; that is to say, not, perhaps, the bravest or most learned of all men that ever existed, or of any given number of men; but a man possessing the quality of learning or bravery in a degree far beyond the common standard.

Names of the degrees.

216. It is of small consequence to inquire whether all these forms of speech together are properly named *degrees of comparison*, and equally immaterial whether the particular names, *positive*, *comparative*, and *superlative*, are well chosen to designate each degree. Many eminent grammarians have contended on these points. Vossius objects to the name *positive*, because the two other degrees are equally positive, that is, equally *lay down* their respective significations, whence the Greeks called the superlative *hyperthetic*, from τιθέναι, to lay down. Not more appropriate, says he, is the name of the *comparative* degree, since comparison is applied to many words, both nouns and adverbs, which are not of this degree, as the adjectives, *like*, *unlike*, *double;* and among adverbs, *equally*, *similiter*, &c. Moreover, comparison is effected no less by the superlative than by the comparative: for it would be equally a comparison if I were to say, speaking of Varro, Nigidius, and Cicero, "Varro is the most learned of the three;" as if I were to say, speaking of Varro and Nigidius only, Varro is the more learned of the two." Lastly, the word *superlative* is not well chosen, since it merely signifies preference, or the raising one thing *above* another; and in this sense the comparative itself is a superlative; for in saying, "Varro is more learned than Nigidius," I prefer, or raise Varro above Nigidius in regard to learning. For similar reasons, Scaliger proposed new names for the three degrees. The first he called the *aorist*, or indefinite; the second, the *hyperthetic*, or exceeding; and the third, the *acrothetic*, or highest degree. Quintilian and others call the positive the *absolute* degree; others call it the *simple*, and so forth; but none of these names having come into general use, I think it more convenient to hold to those which are commonly received; not considering the choice of a name as very important, compared with the accuracy of a distinction; and that the three variations of adjectives in degree are essential to Grammar, has been already sufficiently proved.

Comparison of attributives.

217. It is of more consequence to note, that intension and remission not being confined to adjectives, the degrees of comparison are likewise not confined to them, but are common also to certain verbs, participles, and adverbs; in short, to the whole class of attributives (as they are called by Harris), provided that, in signification, they import qualities which may be increased or diminished. Thus, as the adjective "amiable" admits of the comparative and superlative "more amiable," and "most amiable;" so we may use the ex-

pressions "more loving," "most loving;" "to love well," "to love better," "to love more," "to love most of all." These indications of degree, however, have been rarely expressed by inflection, except in adjectives; and this seems to be the true reason why the degrees of comparison have often, but inaccurately, been considered by grammarians as belonging to adjectives alone. It is scarcely worth while to occupy attention with such words as *ἀυτότατος*, used by Aristophanes; or *ipsissimus*, employed by Plautus. Some critics, indeed, have seriously adduced these as examples of comparison in pronouns, as if I could be more I, or he more he in reality; whereas it is plainly seen, that the comic writer, by a natural boldness in the use of language, employs these pronouns in a secondary sense, as if they expressed a quality instead of a substance; but not as if a man could be more or less himself without losing his personal identity.

Kinds of adjectives.

218. I come now to consider the two great classes into which adjectives may be divided; and these, as I have before observed, depend on their expressing, or not expressing action. Thus, if we say "a *four-footed* animal," although the quality of being four-footed has reference, in this instance, to action, as its final end; yet as it does not express action (for a table or a chair may also be four-footed), this is an adjective of the first-mentioned kind. On the other hand, if we say "an animal *moving*," we clearly express that action is really taking place: this, therefore, is an adjective of the second kind. Now, of these two kinds, the former are exclusively called *adjectives* by the majority of grammarians, and the latter are as commonly called *participles*. I adopt these distinctive terms from an unwillingness to alter the received nomenclature of grammatical science; but at the same time, I wish it to be clearly understood, that both the adjective and participle of the common grammarians fall under the definition which I have above given of the word adjective in its largest sense.

Verbal adjectives.

219. Of the adjective simple, or unmixed with any idea of action, little remains to be observed; but before I proceed to the consideration of the participle, it may be proper to notice a large class of adjectives, which, though they do not express action, yet bear reference to it. Such are those words expressive of the capability or habit of action, which Mr. Tooke has classed among the participles. There is great hazard, when a writer chooses to treat all his predecessors with contempt, that he may fall into gross errors himself. Mr. Tooke has confounded, in his new scheme of participles, the verbal adjectives, gerunds, and participles of former writers; and, at the same time, has laid down no clear definition of his own to guide us out of the labyrinth. What is more, he has adopted as participles the verbal adjectives in *bilis*, *ivus*, and *icus*, and excluded those in *ax*, *arius*, *bundus*, *icius*, &c., which seem quite as much entitled to the same distinction.

are simply adjectives.

220. Upon a full consideration of all these different kinds of adjectives, there seems to be no reason for classing them apart from the simple adjective, and as little for confounding them with the participle. They

ought not to be separated from the simple adjective, because they do, in fact, express only a simple quality; and it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a line between qualities which are originally derived from action, and qualities not so derived. Let us take, for instance, the word *falsus*, false. No doubt this is derived from *fallo*, which expresses the *act* of failing or deceiving; yet, by a transition of meaning, it comes to signify simply that which is not true. In like manner, many of the words which Mr. Tooke treats as participles have been really introduced into the English language as simple adjectives, without the least reference to the *action*, which their radicals expressed in other languages. Such is the word "palpable." We commonly say "it is palpably false," "the truth is palpable," &c.; yet, perhaps, few persons, when they use these phrases, entertain any notion of feeling and handling the truth or falsehood in question, though *palpare*, to feel or handle, is the undoubted origin of this word. The same may be said of "ductile," "frail," "sensible," "noble," and many other English adjectives, which have not the slightest pretence to be considered as participles. If the mere derivation from a verb is to entitle a word to be called a participle, we should have numerous classes both of substantives and adjectives so distinguished: for if *ductilis* be a participle, because it is derived from *duco*, so is *audax*, because it is derived from *audeo; ridiculus*, because it is derived from *rideo;* and a thousand other adjectives. Nay, we may add to this list the substantives derived from verbs, if the mere derivation is to be a test of the grammatical use. Thus, we may say, that *pistrinum*, a bakehouse, is a participle of *pinso*, to bake; *juramentum*, an oath, of *juro*, to swear; *judicium*, a judgment, of *judico*, to judge, &c. In this, as in numberless other instances, Mr. Tooke supposed the history of words to be the science of language. Because *noble* is derived from *nosco*, to know, therefore he called it a participle of that verb! At this rate, all the parts of speech must become an inextricable mass of confusion; for, historically speaking, each is derived from the other, and there can be no rule which gives any one the precedence. If we look to the signification, all is clear. Either a given adjective expresses action or it does not. If it does not, it is a simple adjective; and the circumstance of its referring to the habit or capacity for action cannot alter its character. The words "forcible" and "culpable" relate originally to the actions of forcing and blaming; but they relate to them only as the ground-work of an existing quality, and not as being really in action, or as having been so, or to be so, at any given time. These considerations will probably suffice to clear away all the difficulties which Mr. Tooke raised respecting what he called the participles of the potential mood active, the potential mood passive, the official mood passive, and the future active. They are all, as used in the English language, simple substantives, or simple adjectives: and to rank them among participles, would not only be to oppose the great majority of writers who have treated of these subjects, but to confound all reasonable principles relating to this part of Grammar.

CHAPTER VII.

OF PARTICIPLES.

221. ALTHOUGH, in accordance with the generality of the grammarians, I have enumerated the *Participle* as a distinct part of speech, yet it is in truth (as may be seen by the Table in Chapter III.) a subdivision of the noun agreeing with the adjective in expressing an attribute or quality; but differing from the adjective in expressing a quality not simply, but as being, or having been, in action. Inasmuch, therefore, as action implies time, the participle partakes, in this respect, of the nature of the verb; and hence it received the designation *Participium, a parte capiendâ;* for, as was said, *partem capit a nomine, partem a verbo.* The definitions given by many ancient grammarians of this part of speech were founded on its characteristics in the learned languages. Thus Vossius says, "*Participium est vox variabilis per casus, significans rem cum tempore.*" But here the variation *per casus* is a mere accident of the Greek and Latin tongues; and the word *rem* must not be taken as expressing a substance, but a quality. The words *cum tempore*, indeed, apply to a principle of Universal Grammar; and, so far, the definition is correct. Upon the whole, however, Spinosa's definition in his Hebrew Grammar is more worthy of attention. He says, "*Participia sunt Adjectiva, quæ actionem vel omne quod Verbo significari solet tanquam Rei affectionem vel modum, cum relatione ad tempus exprimunt.*" **Definition.**

222. The participle differs essentially from the verb in this, that it simply *names* a conception, but does not *assert* anything concerning it. The words, "loving, moving, reading, thinking," &c., assert nothing respecting these acts; they merely name the acts, or rather they name the conceptions, as *in action.* It is said that the participle should be ranked among nouns when it constitutes the *subject* of a logical proposition, and among verbs when it forms the *predicate;* but this is not accurate: a participle, as such, can never form the subject of a proposition. The example given is, *Militat omnis amans,* Πᾶς ὁ ἐρῶν πολεμεῖ; but in this instance *amans* has an adjectival force, agreeing with *homo* understood; and it is the same in the Greek. Again, when the participle is a predicate, as *Socrates est loquens,* it equally fills the office of an adjective, and is not to be treated as a verb, at least in the sense which I have attached to the latter term. **The Participle does not assert.**

223. The adsignification of time is proper to the participle. This point, however, Mr. Tooke contests, upon the ground that the Latin participles, present, past, and future, are not confined to the times from which they respectively receive their designations. *Proficiscens* is a participle of the present tense; yet Cicero says, *abfui proficiscens,* **Adsignification of time.**

thus connecting time present with time past. So *profecturo tibi dedi literas*, connecting the past with the future: and again, *quos spero societate victoriæ tecum copulatos fore;* where *spero* is present, *copulatos* past, and *fore* future. None of these examples, however, prove anything against the expression of time by the participles, but merely that time is contemplated in various lights by the mind in one and the same sentence. Thus, in the phrase *abfui proficiscens*, the first word relates to the time of speaking, and the second to the time of acting. The going was present, when the absence (which is now past) was present. Again, *dedi* refers to a time past; but when that time was present, the departure (expressed in *profecturo*) was future. A thousand such cases as these would lead to no inference whatsoever against the expression of time by the participle. It is necessary to observe, however, that words which express time express it in two ways, either as simple existence or as relative to the different portions of duration. Thus, when we say "justice is at all times mercy," the present is a mere expression of existence, a present continuous. So when we say, "the sun *rises* every day," we speak of an act habitually present. It is the nature of the human mind to be able thus to contemplate duration; but this in no degree interferes with, still less contradicts, the view which we take of different portions of time, as past, present, and future, with relation to each other. The assertion, for instance, that the sun rises every day, does not at all clash with the assertion that the sun is rising at this moment. In both cases time is referred to: a certain portion of time is designated in the one case which coincides with the general assertion in the other; and, in fact, the difference between the two assertions does not depend on the verb itself, but on the accompanying words "every day" and "this moment." In these respects the verb and participle agree. The participle is an adjective so far participating the nature of the verb as to signify action, and it cannot signify action without the capability of adsignifying time.

Variety of participles.

224. Particular languages may or may not have separate words adapted by inflection to signify the different portions of time in a participial form. In truth, the notion of time is in all such cases a new element in the compound conception, which compound conception may be expressed by one word or by several. The complexity of conception may go still further: it may include the distinctions of active and passive, of absolute and conditional; and, in short, all those which I shall have to consider when I come to treat of the verb. Hence we see, that languages may have as great a variety of participles as they may of moods and tenses: and it does not seem of the nature of language altogether to exclude participles from the parts of speech; for Mr. Harris is perfectly right in saying, that if we take away the assertion from a verb there will remain a participle. He is speaking of the signification, and not of the sound; and therefore Mr. Tooke's ridicule of this passage is entirely mis-

placed. It is an observation, as old as Aristotle, that the words "Socrates speaks" are equal in signification to the words "Socrates is speaking;" but it is evident that the assertive part of this sentence consists entirely in the word "is," which word being taken away, the word "speaking" still expresses a quality of Socrates, and expresses that quality in action, and is therefore a participle. And so it will happen with every verb, as is instanced by Harris in the verbs, γράφει, γράφων, "writeth," "writing." Tooke misrepresents Harris as saying, that, by removing ει and *eth*, he takes away the assertion; whence he concludes, that Harris supposed the assertion to be implied in those syllables; but Harris says nothing about taking away ει and *eth*. He says what is very true, that the words γράφει and *writeth* imply assertions, and that in the words γράφων and *writing*, the assertion is taken away; and yet there remains the same time, and the same attribute; which expressions of time and attribute, without assertion, constitute a participle.

Where no corresponding verb.

225. It has been laid down as a rule by some writers, that there can be no participles but what are derived from verbs; and hence they deny that such words as *togatus*, *galeatus*, &c., are to be called participles. Augustinus Saturnius, who treats particularly of this point, calls them, by way of distinction, *participials*. It is manifest, however, that this is a distinction altogether nugatory, in regard to Universal Grammar. When Othello says

> My demerits may speak *unbonneted*,

he uses exactly the same form of speech as if he had said *uncovered*, and the one word is as truly a participle as the other; for although there may be no authority for the use of the verb "to bonnet," or "to unbonnet," such verbs would be perfectly consistent with the principles of Universal Grammar; and, indeed, as much so with the English idiom, as the verbs "to veil," and "to unveil," both which are used by Milton. Uncovered, unveiled, and unbonneted equally express an action of past time, viz., the removing the cover, veil, or bonnet from the head; and it is by this signification, and not by their etymology, that the part of speech to which they belong is to be determined.

Pass into each other.

226. We must not be surprised to find, that participles of different classes pass into each other. Many active participles come to have a passive signification. The word *evidens*, which was originally active, is found with a passive meaning, from whence our common adjective, *evident*, is derived. This is a circumstance not peculiar to participles; for when I come to treat more at large of those transitions of meaning, which are the groundwork of sound Etymology, it will be found that they apply to every part of speech indifferently. Men cannot always find a separate term to express each distinct shade of thought, and they naturally avail themselves of those expressions which come the nearest to their meaning.

Admit of comparison.

227. From what has before been said on the subject of comparison, it is clear that participles, as well as adjectives, when they express qualities capable of intension and remission, may admit the three degrees of comparison: thus we may say *amantior* as well as *durior*, *amantissimus* as well as *durissimus*. It matters not, that in some languages the idiom will not allow of expressing the degrees of comparison by inflection; that, for example, in English we cannot say *lovinger*, or *lovingest;* this is a mere accident of the particular language, depending principally on circumstances connected with its sound; and it is to be observed, that however barbarous such words as *lovinger* or *lovingest* might sound to the ear, yet they would be perfectly intelligible to the mind: there would be nothing absurd or contradictory in the combination of the thoughts; for the same combination is effected by the words "more loving," and "most loving;" and in all languages there must be means more or less concise, or circuitous, to express such combinations.

Used substantively.

228. We have seen how the conception of a quality considered alone, and rendered the subject of assertion, becomes a noun substantive; and this applies, in principle, as well to those qualities which are expressed by participles as to those which are expressed by adjectives. Whether the same or a different word shall be employed for this purpose is, again, a matter of particular idiom. In English, we use the very same word for both purposes. Thus, "singing," "dancing," &c., may be used in construction as adjectives, or as substantives of the sort commonly called abstract. We may say "a singing man," "a dancing woman;" or we may say, "singing is an accomplishment," "dancing is a recreation," &c. In Latin, the idiom is different: *cantans*, *saltans*, &c., can only be used in the former of these two ways; but, nevertheless, a similar principle is observable in the use of what are called gerunds and supines.

Gerunds.

229. Scaliger gives the following account of the *Gerund:* "From these (participles) our ancestors chose certain tenses, by means of which they might imitate those Greek terms λεκτέον, μαχητέον, &c., but with a more ample and extensive use. These they called *gerunds*, assigning them to three cases, *pugnandi*, *pugnando*, *pugnandum;* of which the second preserved the power of a participle, but so much the more aptly as the verbs were excelled by the participles. For, as the cause of action is more plainly shown by saying '*cædens* vulneravi,' than by saying *cecîdi*, and better still by saying 'quia *cæderem* vulneravi,' the whole of this is expressed by the gerund '*cædendo* vulneravi.' Moreover, in many things the form and the end are the same; but the end is partly out of us, as the ship is a thing out of the ship-builder; and partly within us, in our minds, as is that which is called an *idea*, by which we are impelled to the external end. Now both of these they very skilfully expressed; for both *pugnandi* and *pugnandum* signify the end. Thus I may say, *pugnandi causâ equum ascendi*, I mounted my horse for the purpose *of*

fighting; or *pugnandum est ex equo*, I must fight (or the fighting must be) on horseback." "Hence it appears that these (gerunds) are participles, differing little from other participles, either in nature, or use, or even in form." Again he observes: "Some writers have called these gerunds from their use *participial nouns;* for they are neither pure nouns, since they govern a case, nor are they pure participles, since, with a passive voice, they bear an active signification."

230. The same author thus speaks of the *Supine:* "Nearly similar is the explanation to be given of the Supines; but these latter express the same meaning more forcibly. Thus, *eo ad pugnandum* signifies a future action; *eo pugnatum* expresses the future so as to be quite absolute." "Hence it signifies activity with actives, and passiveness with passives: *eo factum injuriam*, or *injuria mihi factum itur;* but indeed it always savours, in some degree, of passiveness; for it does not so much mean *eo ut faciam*, as it means *eo ut hoc fiat;* as if one were to say, I am going indeed for the purpose of doing so and so, but I hope it is already done; and like Sosia's speech, *Dictum puta*, "suppose it said." "Since, therefore, the end (or aim) of an action was to be thus signified, the other extreme was not improperly expressed by a different word." Hence Scaliger explains the different use of the supines in *um* and *u*, the latter of which he regards as a sort of ablative case. "There is equally a movement," says he, "from and to an object; and therefore we rightly say *venatu venio*, as we do *venatum vado*." He goes at length into these considerations, opposing in some measure what other grammarians had said of the supine in *u*; but these questions are beside my present object: and all that is necessary here to be shown is the chain of connection which unites the participle, as an adjective, on the one hand with the noun substantive, and on the other with the gerunds and supines. Supines.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF PRONOUNS.

Definition.

231. A PRONOUN is a part of speech so called from the Latin *Pronomen*, and the Greek Αντωνυμία; and agreeably to this derivation, it is defined by the generality of grammarians, "a sign or representative of a noun;" for things (and persons), as Vossius observes, are considered in grammar as named by nouns. When, therefore, a pronoun, such as *he* or *it*, is used to signify a person, for instance "Cæsar," or a thing, for instance, "a crown," the pronoun *he* is a sign or representative of the noun "Cæsar;" and the pronoun *it* is a sign or representative of the noun "crown;" and so forth. Aristotle, indeed, in his treatise περὶ Ἑρμηνείας comprehends the pronoun under the title Noun. By subsequent writers, the term pronoun has been applied to several classes of words, very distinguishable from each other; and it may be doubted, whether it would not originally have been better to restrict its signification within narrower limits than those which were adopted. Upon the whole, however, as the meaning has been so long settled, I deem it advisable to follow the established usage.

Distinctions.

232. Of the many distinctions which have been made in this part of speech, that which first demands attention, as essential, is into *substantive* and *adjective*, answering to the like division of primary nouns, which has been already explained. Thus *he* is a substantive pronoun, which may, standing alone, represent the primary noun substantive, *Socrates* understood, and *they* is a substantive pronoun, which, standing alone, may represent the primary noun substantive, *Men*, or *Ships*, understood; whereas, in the expressions *every* person, *any* nation, *every* and *any* are pronouns adjective, which cannot stand alone, but agree, as adjectives, with the substantives "person," and "nation," expressed. Some of the adjective pronouns, however, may be used substantively, by a sort of ellipsis, which will presently be explained.

Pronouns personal.

233. I consider as pronouns substantive all those which are commonly called *personal*, and distinguished as of the first, second, and third person. Of this distinction the common account is, that the first person is the speaker, the second the person spoken to, and the third the person or thing spoken of. But this is not quite correct; for though the first person be in fact the speaker, and the second, the person spoken to, yet, unless they are also spoken of, they do not enter into the grammatical construction of a sentence. And again, as to the third person's being spoken of, this is a character which it shares in common with both the other persons, and which can never, therefore, be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance

or two. When Æneas begins the narrative of his adventures, the second person immediately appears; because he at once makes Dido, whom he addresses the subject of his discourse.

Infandum, Regina, *jubes* renovare dolorem.

From henceforward for 1500 verses, (though she is all that time the person spoken to) we hear nothing further of this second person, a variety of other subjects filling up the narrative. In the meantime, the first person may be seen everywhere; because the speaker is everywhere himself the subject: the events were, indeed, as he says, those—

——— Quæ ipse miserrima *vidi*,
Et quorum pars magna *fui*.

Not that the second person does not often occur in the course of this narrative; but then it is always by a figure of speech, when those who, by their absence, constitute, in fact, so many third persons, are converted into second persons, by being introduced as present. On the other hand, when we read Euclid, we find neither first person nor second in any part of the whole work. The reason is, that neither the speaker nor the party addressed (in which light we may always view the writer and his reader) can possibly become the subject of pure mathematics.

Priscian's explanation.

234. The clearest explanation of the different persons is that given by PRISCIAN, who took it from APOLLONIUS: *Personæ pronominum sunt tres, prima, secunda, tertia. Prima est cum ipsa, quæ loquitur, de se pronuntiat; secunda, cum de eâ pronuntiat ad quam directo sermone loquitur; tertia, cum de eâ quæ nec loquitur, nec ad se directum accipit sermonem*, l. xii. p. 940. THEODORE GAZA gives the same distinctions: Πρῶτον (πρόσωπον, sc.) ᾧ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ φράζει ὁ λέγων· δέυτερον, ὠ περὶ τοῦ, πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος. τρίτον ὦ περὶ ἑτέρου. Gaz. Gram. l. iv. p. 152: and this explanation is stated more at large by Harris, whose words therefore, I shall, with a slight correction, adopt.

First person.

235. "Suppose the parties conversing," says he, "to be wholly unacquainted, neither name nor countenance on either side known; and the subject of the conversation to be the speaker himself. Here, to supply the place of *pointing*, by a word of equal power, the speaker uses the pronoun I. 'I write, I say, I desire,' &c.: and as the speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this is called, for that reason, the pronoun of the *first person*.

Second person.

236. "Again, suppose the subject of the conversation to be the party addressed. Here, for similar reasons, the pronoun *thou* is employed. 'Thou writest,' 'thou walkest,' &c.; and as the party addressed is next in dignity to the speaker, or at least comes next to him, with reference to the discourse, this pronoun is therefore called the pronoun of the *second person*.

Third person.

237. "Lastly, suppose the subject of the conversation neither the speaker, nor the party addressed, but some third object, different from

both; here another pronoun is provided, viz.: *he*, *she*, or *it*, which, in distinction from the two former, is called the pronoun of the *third person*." "And thus it is that pronouns come to be distinguished by their respective persons." But plain and intelligible, as this explanation is, of the *grammatical* distinction of persons, it must not be understood to imply that the actual conception of a person is subsequent, in the human mind, to that of the noun which the pronoun represents; for, as has been observed, the notion of our own personal identity, which is expressed by the pronoun, "I," is essentially necessary to all consciousness; and by an innate sympathy, we cannot but believe other *Persons* to possess, like ourselves, each his own identity; which notion of identity we even transfer to *Things*, if they appear to us under all circumstances to retain the same qualities.

How differing from the two former.

238. It will not fail, however, to be observed, that there is a marked difference between the third person, and the two former. The first and second are strictly *personal*, the speaker must be a person, and the party addressed must be at least personified, as when Satan addresses the sun,—

> O *thou*, that with surpassing beauty crown'd,
> *Look'st* from thy sole dominion!

But the pronoun of the third person may represent either a person, or a thing; and that by the same word or a different one, according to the idiom of the language employed. Hence, some grammarians distinguish pronouns in general into *personal* and *demonstrative*, including in the former class only those of the first and second person, and referring those of the third person, together with all other pronouns, to the latter class. This arrangement, in so far as it confounds substantive pronouns with adjective, I cannot approve. *He* or *she* may stand as much alone in a sentence, as Peter or Jane, and may regularly be made the subject of a proposition, and connected with an adjective as its predicate. We may say indifferently "he is wise," or "Peter is wise," "she is handsome," or "Jane is handsome." Nor does the pronoun of the third person necessarily represent a noun unknown, or a person or thing absent, any more than a pronoun of the first or second person does. The name of the speaker (that is the noun represented by the pronoun I) may be as little or less known to the person addressed, as the name of the person or thing spoken of; and, in point of fact, the speaker, the person spoken to, and the person or thing spoken of, may be all present, and may as little need to be demonstrated or pointed out, one as the other. Therefore, though a pronoun substantive relating to a *thing* cannot in strictness be called *personal;* yet the grammarian will do right, who includes it under a common head with pronouns of the first and second persons.

How coalescing.

239. The characteristics of the three persons are not so entirely separate, as to preclude a possible coalescence of the pronouns of different persons; but this is subject to certain restrictions. The pronoun of the first or second person may easily coalesce with the third;

but the first and second cannot coalesce with each other. For example, we may say (and the difference of idiom in different languages does not affect these expressions), "I am he," or, "thou art he;" or, as in the text, "art *thou he* that should come, or do we look for another?" But we cannot say, "I am thou," nor "thou art I;" the reason is, that there is no absurdity in the speaker's being the subject also of the discourse; as when we say, "I am he;" or in the person addressed being so, as when we say, "thou art he;" but that the same person, in the same circumstances, should be at once the speaker and the party addressed would be absurd; and, consequently, so would the coalescence be of the first and second person. Some grammarians seem to have inaccurately supposed, that all but the personal pronouns of the first and second person were to be considered as belonging to the third person. This, however, is inaccurate, at least with respect to the relatives, *who*, *which*, *that*, as may be observed in those lines of the old song:—

> What! you, that loved!
> And I, that loved!
> Shall we begin to wrangle?

Where the relative *that* is of the second person in the first line, and of the first person in the second line: and if translated into Latin, it must be rendered, not *tu quæ amabat*, and *ego qui amabat*, but *tu quæ amabas*, and *ego qui amabam*.

Pronoun adjective.

240. The pronoun adjective is distinguished from the pronoun substantive, in the same manner as the noun adjective is from the noun substantive, namely, by its inability to stand alone; because it implies some attribute or quality of a noun or pronoun substantive. It must be admitted, that to determine whether a particular word, which occurs in a speech or literary composition, should be considered as a pronoun adjective, or a noun adjective, is not always very easy; but this is rather a difficulty of idiom than of grammatical principle. Without dwelling on this point, therefore, I proceed to notice the most obvious distinctions of the pronoun adjective.

Possessive.

241. First, I consider that they are either positive or relative. By *positive* I mean those distinctions which regard the word as a member of a single sentence; and by *relative*, those which relate to another sentence preceding or subsequent. The positive either depend on the personal pronoun, and are commonly called *possessive*, or else serve to limit general nouns, and may be called definitive. Some possessive pronouns must be necessarily expressed or understood in all languages; for if it be necessary to have a pronoun personal, which is a word representing a whole class of nouns substantive, it is equally necessary to indicate (in some manner or other), the quality which consists in belonging to that class. If every speaker must indicate *himself* by the word *I*, or *me*, he must indicate what *belongs to himself* by some such expression as *mine* or *of me*. Whether this be done by the former of these two modes of expression, or the latter, is immaterial to the sense,

and must depend on the construction permitted by the idiom of the particular language; but if such a word as *mine* or *my* be employed, it must be regarded as a pronoun adjective, and indeed is treated in many languages exactly as any other adjective is, at least in the positive degree. For instance, *meus*, *mea*, *meum*, is declined in Latin exactly as *bonus*, *bona*, *bonum*, is. Under the head of possessive pronouns may be classed those which Vossius calls *gentilia*, such as *nostrates*, meaning individuals of our race, family, or party; as military officers in this country often mention a comrade, as "of ours," meaning, "of our regiment."

Definitive. 242. The definitive pronouns serve to limit general nouns, with reference either to an individual simply, as when I say "this man," or "that man;" or else with reference to other individuals of the same class, as when I say, "the other man," "every man." How far such distinctions may be carried in practice, depends on the degree of cultivation which particular languages may receive; but some degree of definition seems necessary to the formation of every language: and from pronouns of this class is derived the definite *Article*, which will be considered hereafter. The pronouns which limit with reference to an individual simply may be called *demonstrative*, as they show the individual intended, by reference to his own particular position, situation, or the like. Thus, the words "this man" usually indicate a person near, or present; the words "that man," a person more distant, or perhaps absent. The pronouns which limit a conception with reference to several individuals of a like class are distinguished by Vossius into *partitives*, such as "either," "neither," "other;" and *distributives*, such as "any," "some," "every." The distributives again might be distinguished into general and numeral; but these latter form an important class, which I shall have occasion to consider apart.

Subjunctive. 243. Of the *relative* pronouns adjective, those which relate to a preceding sentence are commonly called *subjunctive;* those which relate to a future sentence are called *interrogative.* I say those which relate to a sentence, and not those which relate to a person or thing; because in truth all but the pronouns of the first and second person must refer to some person or thing previously indicated. When we say, "*he* reigned," or "*she* lived," we presume that the persons included by *he* and *she* are previously known. These pronouns, however, may introduce or lead sentences which do not depend on any previous sentence in point of construction. But it is not so with the subjunctives. They cannot introduce an original sentence, but only serve to subjoin one to some other which has preceded it. The principal subjunctive pronouns in English are *who* and *which*, and sometimes *that*. It does not seem essential to the constitution of a language, however convenient, that there should be such pronouns as these; for they may be resolved into another pronoun and a conjunction; and consequently by such other pronoun and conjunction their place may always be supplied. Let us

take the example given by Harris. I will suppose that it is desired to combine into one sentence the two following propositions:—

1. "Light is a body."
2. "Light moves rapidly."

Here it is obvious that the use of the noun *light*, in the second proposition, may be supplied by the pronoun *it*, as thus:—

"Light is a body:
It moves rapidly."

This slight change, however, leaves the two propositions still distinct; let us then connect them by the conjunction *and;* thus:—

"Light is a body;
And it moves rapidly."

Here is a connection of the two propositions, yet still not so much dependence of the latter on the former, (not so intimate a union of the parts,) as if, for the words "and it," we substitute the subjunctive pronoun *which;* thus:—

"Light is a body, *which* moves rapidly."

Accordingly, we see that in the punctuation, which most accurately represents the proper mode of reading the passage, we gradually diminish the interval between the two propositions, from a period to a comma.

Interrogative.

244. Of the nature of the subjunctive pronoun is the *interrogative*: and therefore we very commonly find the same word performing these two functions. Thus, in English, the subjunctives *who* and *which*, are used as interrogatives, though with a remarkable difference in their application. As subjunctives, in modern use at least, *who* is applied to persons, and *which* to things. As interrogatives, they are both applied to persons, but *who* indefinitely, and *which* definitely. Thus, the question, "Who will go up with me to Ramoth-gilead?" is indefinitely proposed to all who may hear the question: but when our Saviour says, "*Which of you*, with taking thought, can add to his stature one cubit?" the interrogation is individual, as appears from the *partitive* form of the words "which *of you;*" that is to say, "what one among you all." These applications of particular words are indeed matters of peculiar idiom; but the distinctions of signification to which they relate properly belong to the science of which we are treating. Interrogative pronouns are necessarily of a relative nature, and on that account were ranked by the Stoics under the head of the *article;* but as they do in fact stand for, and represent nouns, they are properly called pronouns. On interrogatives in general, Vossius has the following just observation:—"It appears to me, that the matter stands thus: there are two principal classes of words, the noun and the verb; and, therefore, to one or other of these every interrogation must refer. For, if I ask *who*, *which*, *what*, *how many*, I inquire concerning some noun; but if I ask *where*, *whence*, *whither*, *when*, *how often*, I inquire concerning some verb. As, therefore, the

words which are subsidiary to the verbs are called adverbs, so the words which refer to the noun should be called pronouns."

Transition. 245. The number and variety of classes into which pronouns may be distributed in any one language must, in a great measure, depend on the classification of conceptions, which had become habitual among the early formers of that particular language. Thus we cannot in English express, without periphrasis, the Latin pronouns *qualis*, *quantus*, &c., any more than we can the adverbs *quoties*, *qualiter*, &c. Nor must it be forgotten, that many of these pronouns pass into different classes, according as they are used in particular passages. "*Sunt ex istis*," says Vossius, "*quæ pro diverso, vel usu vel respectu, ad diversas pertineant classes.*"

Of Numerals. 246. This remark applies with peculiar force to the *Numerals*, which, according to the different modes in which they are employed, may be regarded either as nouns substantive, or else as pronouns substantive or adjective, as the case may be. I have heretofore shown the fundamental importance of the conceptions of number. These conceptions must have names, and when the names are used to express the mere *ideas* of number, as when we say, "*one* and *one* are *two*," they may be considered as nouns substantive; in the same manner as the words *line*, *point*, *angle*, which are also names of ideas, are considered. But when these nouns are used with an express or tacit reference to some other noun, they become pronouns, either substantive or adjective. When we say, "*two* men are wiser than one," or "*many* men are wiser than one," the numeral "two" is as much a pronoun adjective as the word "many" is a noun adjective. But if we say, generally, "two are more than one," the word two is a pronoun substantive. Numerals are commonly divided into *cardinal* and *ordinal*: I have hitherto spoken of the former, that is to say, of the names given to our distinct ideas of number, simply as distinguishing them from each other, as one, two, three, &c.; but these same conceptions, viewed with reference to order, form in the mind a class of secondary conceptions, which are treated as qualities of the substances to which they belong. Hence originate such words as *first*, *second*, *third*, *fourth*, &c. These may be called pronominal adjectives. The ordinal numbers are in general derived from the cardinal numbers, but not necessarily so; for in many, perhaps in most languages, the words *first* and *second* have no similarity to the words *one* and *two*. Professor Bopp has observed "that whilst in the Indo-European class of languages the greatest variety obtains in designating the cardinal number *one*, they are almost unanimous in their designation of the ordinal *first*, which none of those languages derives from the corresponding cardinal."* Thus from the Sancrit *prâ* comes *prathama* (first), and from the Greek πρό comes πρῶτος. So from the Saxon *fore* comes fore-est, first; from the Latin *sequor* comes *secundus*, second, &c.

* Bopp, Comp. Gram. i., 321.

247. Almost all pronouns, except the first and second personals, are adjectives in origin; but they do not continue to be such when they stand by themselves, or as Lowth rather singularly expresses it, "seem to stand by themselves." It is true, that in such cases, they often have "some substantive belonging to them, either referred to or understood;" but this only proves that they are pronouns. Whether we say "*this* is good," "*it* is good," or "*he* is good," there is always some noun referred to, or understood: and the words *it* and *he* "seem to stand by themselves," just as much as the word "*this*" does. So in the phrases "*one* is apt to think," and "*I* am apt to think," the words *one* and *I* equally "seem to stand alone," that is to say, they equally do stand alone. They perform the function of *naming* an object, so far as it is necessary to be named; and they name it not as a quality of another object, but as possessing a substantive existence. The words *this*, *that*, *who*, *which*, *all*, *none*, and many of a similar kind, are (in this view of them) substantive pronouns when they stand alone, but adjective pronouns when they are joined to a noun substantive. When Antony says— Other transitions.

> *This—this* was the unkindest cut of all,

I consider the word *this* to be a substantive pronoun. It may, indeed, be explained by transposition, as if it were, "this cut was the unkindest of all;" but such is not the order of the thoughts: and, in fact, the particular wound inflicted by Brutus had been before described at some length, but the noun *cut* had not been used: and supposing that, for dramatic effect, the line had been broken off at the word "was," it would have been impossible to say that the pronoun *this* had any specific reference to this particular noun *cut*, as we may easily perceive by so reading the passage:—

> See, what a rent the envious Casca made!
> Through this the well-beloved Brutus stabb'd;
> And as he pluck'd his cursed steel away,
> Mark how the blood of Cæsar followed it,
> As rushing out of doors, to be resolv'd
> If Brutus so unkindly knock'd, or no:
> For Brutus, as you know, was Cæsar's angel.
> Judge, O ye gods, how dearly Cæsar lov'd him!
> This—this was ———

If the passage had thus broken off, the pronoun *this* would have rather seemed to refer to the whole narrative of the share which Brutus had taken in the transaction; that narrative presenting to the mind one complete and definite conception.

A passage in Othello will further illustrate my meaning. Iago pretends to caution Othello against suffering his mind to encourage any suspicion against his wife's honour:—

> ——— O, beware, my lord, of jealousy!
> It is a green-eyed monster which doth make
> The meat it feeds on.

After he has pursued this strain of reasoning for some time, Othello, interrupting him, exclaims with surprise—

——— Why, why is *this?*

Evidently meaning, Why do you act thus? Why do you talk of jealousy to me, who am not at all disposed to be jealous? The word *this* cannot here be said to refer to any one noun that precedes, or to any one noun that follows it; and it is therefore most manifestly used with the force and effect of a substantive. On the contrary, it is clearly used as an adjective, in a subsequent passage, where Othello, speaking of Iago, says:—

——— *This* honest creature, doubtless,
Sees and knows more, much more than he unfolds.

Idioms.

248. Whether the same or different words shall be employed to express the substantival and adjectival form of pronouns is matter of idiom. Thus, a language may, or may not, have different forms for the personal and possessive pronouns. Lowth considers the word *mine* as the possessive case of the personal I; but the English word mine answers to the Latin *meus*, which is certainly an adjective. On the other hand, the Latin *mi*, which is commonly called the vocative singular of *meus*, seems to be the same word with *mihi*, the dative case of *Ego;* for it is used in connection with plurals as well as singulars, and with masculines, feminines, and neuters indiscriminately. Thus we have in Plautus, *mi homines;* and in Petronius, *mi hospites;* and in Apuleius, *mi sidus*, *mi parens*, *mi herilis* (sc. *filia*), *mi conjux*, &c.; and in a passage of Tibullus, the different manuscripts have, some *mi dulcis anus*, and some *mihi dulcis anus;* in all which instances, the dative *mihi* seems to be intended to be used in that manner which grammarians often, though incorrectly, call redundant; and describe, as adopted, *nullâ necessitatis, sed potius festivitatis causâ.* There are many other idioms relative to the use of pronouns which it is not here necessary to consider, such as the combination of the adjective *own* and the substantive *self* with the pronouns *my*, *thy*, &c., in English; and the subjoining the syllables *met*, *cunque*, &c., to certain pronouns in Latin, as *ipsemet*, *quicunque*, &c., which are usually accompanied with some corresponding change in the force of the original pronouns.

Number.

249. To the essential distinction of pronouns as substantive and adjective, must be added the accidental distinctions to which, like the nouns which they represent, they are liable, of number, gender, and case. Since the pronoun stands in the place of a noun, and since *number* is a conception which may be combined in general with nouns, it follows that the pronoun may have the distinctions of number; nor, indeed, is it easy to conceive a language so constructed as to have pronouns without such a distinction. As to the first person, it is clear that there may be many speakers at once of the same sentiment, or, what comes to the same thing, one may deliver the common sentiment of many, and in their name; for the same reason, therefore,

that the pronoun *I* is necessary, the pronoun *we* is so too. Again, the singular *thou* has the plural *you*, because a speech may be spoken to many, as well as to one: and the singular *he* has the plural *they*, because the subject of discourse often includes many things or persons at once.

250. The pronoun is also susceptible of the distinction of *Gender*, because the noun which it represents is so. A difference, however, has been said to exist in this respect between the pronouns of different persons: and the reasoning thereon is plausible. It is certainly true that the pronouns of the first and second person, both in the dead and living languages, have no distinct inflection expressing their gender; and the reason for this is alleged to be that the speaker and hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have marked a distinction by art, which from nature, and even dress, was commonly apparent on both sides. "*Demonstratio ipsa*," says Priscian, "*secum genus ostendit.*" However, it is by no means true that the pronouns of the first and second person have no gender. They have not, indeed, in any known language, inflections distinguishing them in point of gender, but they always take, in construction, the gender of the noun which they represent. Thus Dido— Gender.

——— cui *me moribundam* deseris hospes?

And Mercury addressing Æneas—

——— *Tu* nunc Carthaginis altæ
Fundamenta locas, pulchramque *uxorius* urbem
Exstruis?

It is agreed on all hands that the pronouns of the third person must almost of necessity receive the distinctions of gender in all languages. These pronouns are called in Arabic the pronoun of the absentee, and, in fact, they usually refer to persons or things which being absent require to be distinguished, as to gender, &c., by some expression in the discourse. It is further to be observed, that the pronouns of the first and second person each apply only to certain known and present individuals; whereas, the pronouns of the third person may, in the course of one and the same speech, refer to a great diversity of objects, requiring to be distinguished by their respective genders. "The utility of this distinction," says Harris, "may be better found in supposing it away." Suppose, for example, we should read in history these words: *he caused him to destroy him*—and that we were to be informed that the *he*, which is here thrice repeated, stood each time for something different, that is to say, for a man, for a woman, and for a city, whose names were *Alexander*, *Thais*, and *Persepolis*. Taking the pronoun in this manner, divested of its gender, how would it appear which was destroyed, which was the destroyer, and which was the cause of the destruction? But there are no such doubts when we hear the genders distinguished; when, instead of the ambiguous sentence, "*He* caused *him* to destroy *him*," we are told,

with the proper distinction, that "*She* caused *him* to destroy *it*." Then we know with certainty what before we knew not, viz., that the promoter was a woman; that her instrument was the hero; and that the subject of their cruelty was the unfortunate city.

Case. 251. *Case* is another distinction, not essential to the noun, but accidental. It is therefore to be ranked among the accidents of the pronoun; yet, so frequent is the occasion to use pronouns, that many of them, especially those which are particularly denominated personal, have the variations of case, even in languages which vary their nouns in this respect very little or not at all. When a person speaks of himself as the performer of any action, he seems naturally led to adopt a different phraseology from that which he employs in speaking of the action as done toward him; and hence the difference between *I* and *me*, *thou* and *thee*, runs throughout far the greater number of known languages. After all, Universal Grammar only furnishes the reason for this difference when it exists, but does not prove its existence to be necessary. There may be languages of which the pronouns have no cases; but where they have cases, the same function is performed by each case in the pronoun as in the noun.

CHAPTER IX.

OF VERBS.

252. A VERB is a part of speech, so called from the Latin *verbum*, which seems to have been intended to correspond to the Greek Ῥῆμα; though the latter word was used by different Grecian writers in very different senses. Aristotle defines Ῥῆμα, "a complex word, significant, with time, of which no part is significant by itself;"* but this definition, which differs from that which he had before given of the noun, only in the words "with time," is manifestly referable to the Greek language, and not to Universal Grammar. Some philologists understand Aristotle in one instance to apply the designation Ῥῆμα to the adjective λευκὸς, white; but this seems to be a misapprehension. It however led Ammonius to maintain that every word which forms the predicate in a logical proposition is a Ῥῆμα.† Some of the Stoics contended that the only genuine Ῥῆμα was the infinitive mood of a verb. Others, again, disputed whether or not the copula, in a logical proposition, should be deemed a Ῥῆμα. Words answering this purpose were called by most Greek writers Ῥήματα ὑπαρκτικὰ, verbs of existence; by Latin authors, *verba substantiva;* and in English grammars, "verbs substantive:" but Aristotle seems, in his Poetics, to refuse to them the title of Ῥήματα, considering them, perhaps, as mere Σύνδεσμοι, connectives. He defines the Σύνδεσμος "a word not significant, which is fitted to make of several significant words one significant word"‡ (or rather sentence). And further on he says, "not every sentence consists of Ῥήματα and nouns;"§ "but it is possible that there may be a sentence without a Ῥῆμα,"‖ as an instance of which (it seems) he refers to "the definition of man."¶ The passage is rather obscure, but it would seem from the context that he means this:—If we say "man is an animal," the sentence is perfect, but there is no Ῥῆμα in it; for the word "is" serves merely as a connective to make of two nouns, "man" and "animal," one significant sentence; but in itself it signifies neither substance nor at- **Aristotle's definition.**

* Φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ, μετὰ χρόνου, ἧς οὐδὲν μέρος σημαίνει καθ' αὑτό. Poetic., s. 34.

† Πᾶσαν φωνὴν κατηγορουμένην ὅρον ἐν προτάσει ποιοῦσαν Ῥῆμα καλεῖσθαι. Ad Arist., De Interp.

‡ Φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς, σημαντικῶν δὲ, ποιεῖν περὶ ὑπα μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνήν. Poetic., s. 34.

§ Οὐ γὰρ ἅπας λόγος ἐκ ῥημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται. Ibid.
Αλλ' ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον. Ibid.
Οἷον ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμός. Ibid.

tribute, neither does it mark time, and for these reasons it is not to be deemed a Ῥῆμα.

Tooke's statements.

253. If these explanations of the nature of a verb are not very satisfactory, still less so is the manner in which this part of speech was treated by Mr. Tooke. So early as the year 1778, he published a letter to Mr. Dunning, in which he advanced some propositions concerning language, which were thought at the time rather paradoxical. These were amplified and extended in 1786, in the first volume of his "Diversions of Purley." He there laid it down that "in English, and in all languages, there are only two sorts of words which are *necessary* for the communication of our thoughts, viz., the noun *and the verb*."* He said, "he was inclined to allow the rank of *parts of speech* only to these necessary words;"† that "a consideration of ideas, or of the mind, or of things, would lead us no farther than to *nouns*;"‡ and that "the other part of speech, the *verb*, must be accounted for from the necessary use of it in communication; that it is in fact the communication itself, and therefore well denominated Ῥῆμα, dictum; for the verb is QUOD *loquimur*, the noun DE QUO."§ And with this mysterious hint the readers of the first volume were obliged, so far as regarded the verb, to be content. In that volume, and also in the second, which was published in 1805, he asserted many words to be moods, tenses, or participles of certain verbs (remarking, however, incidentally, that mood, tense, number, and person, are no parts of the verb),‖ but still the verb itself he neither defined nor explained, further than by saying that it was "the noun and something more."¶ At the close of the second volume his supposed colloquial friend asks this very pertinent question, "What *is* the verb? What is that peculiar differential circumstance, which, added to the definition of a noun, constitutes the verb?" Is the verb—

1. Dictio variabilis, quæ significat actionem vel passionem?
2. Or, dictio variabilis per modos?
3. Or, quod adsignat tempus sine casu?
4. Or, quod agere, pati, vel esse significat?
5. Or, nota rei sub tempore?
6. Or, pars orationis præcipua sine casu?
7. Or, an assertion?
8. Or, nihil significans, et quasi nexus et copula, ut verba alia quasi animaret?
9. Or, un mot declinable indeterminatif?
10. Or, un mot, qui presente à l'esprit un être indeterminé, designé seulement par l'idée générale de l'éxistence sous une relation à une modification?"

To all this Mr. Tooke replies—"A truce! a truce! I know yon are not serious in laying this *trash* before me.—No, no, *We will leave*

* Div. Parl., v. i. p. 65. † Ibid., p. 67. ‡ Ibid., p. 70.
§ Ibid., p. 71. ‖ Ibid., v. ii, p. 473. ¶ Ibid., p. 514.

off here for the present!" And so he did; but never resumed the discussion.

254. Surely, if the verb was one of the only two necessary parts of speech; if it was one of the two main pillars supporting the whole edifice of language; if Mr. Tooke himself had it constantly in view, and referred to it in his three successive publications; he might have found time, between 1778 and his death in 1812, to have given the disciples of his new school, which was to sweep away all the old grammatical doctrines as "trash," a little more distinct information on the nature of the verb, than that it was a noun, "and something more," and that both it and the noun being equally necessary for the communication of thought, the verb was distinguished from the noun by the "necessity of its use in communication." A "something more," of which we know nothing, is to common capacities just equal to nothing: and to distinguish one of two necessary things from the other, by the common attribute of necessity, is a mode of division no less ungrammatical than illogical. Inconclusive.

255. The verb has been differently defined (as we have seen) by different grammarians; and indeed when we reflect on the variety of conceptions, which it often combines in one word, we must allow, that this circumstance, "throws considerable difficulties in the way of any person who attempts to analyse the verb, and ascertain its nature."* The first step in such an analysis is to distinguish those properties of the verb, which are *essential* to it, and are therefore necessarily to be found in all verbs, from those which are *accidental*, and form different combinations in different languages. I consider as essential properties of the verb, its power— Analysis.

1st. To signify an *attribute* of some substance.
2ndly. To *connect* such attribute with its proper substance.
3rdly. To *assert*, directly or indirectly, the existence or non-existence of the connection.

I consider as accidental properties, those which grammarians have commonly designated by some such terms as kind, voice, mood, tense, person, number, gender, &c.

256. The definition of a verb, so far as regards Universal Grammar, should be confined to the *essential* properties of this part of speech. Before I attempt to define it, therefore, I shall examine those properties: and first, as to signifying an *attribute*. Here the term "attribute" is to be taken largely, so as to include every conception, which can be predicated of another in a simple proposition. Therefore, the genus is to be deemed an attribute of the species, and the species of the individual. Existence, too, whether absolute or qualified, is to be deemed an attribute of the existing substance—absolute, as when we say, "God is," or when God says, "I am;" qualified, as when we say "God is almighty," "man is mortal;" in both which cases, Attribute.

* Encycl. Britan., art. *Grammar*.

the word "is," forms a verb substantive. The attributes of qualified existence are numberless. We may, however, divide them into those which are qualified by conceptions of action, and those of which the qualifying conception does not relate to action. Conceptions of action are spiritual, as, to love; mental, as, to know; or corporeal, as, to touch; and they may be of a positive or negative character, as, to live or die, to move or stop, to wake or sleep. Conceptions unconnected with action are such as to be wise or foolish, to be hot or cold, to be honest or dishonest, tall or short, beautiful or ugly. Now, the signification of an attribute belongs to a verb in one of two ways: it is either added to the verb substantive as a necessary adjunct, or it is involved in the form of a different verb. Propositions, in which the attribute is a necessary adjunct to the verb, are such as, "Socrates is wise," "Cicero is speaking." These necessarily contain three words, and have therefore been called, by some logicians, propositions *tertii adjacentis*. Propositions, in which the attribute is involved in the form of the verb itself, require but two words, as "Cicero speaks," "Victoria reigns," and have been said to be *secundi adjacentis*. In the former class, the attribute is absolutely necessary as an adjunct to the verb; for if we stop at "Socrates is," or "Cicero is," the sentence is so imperfect as to be unintelligible. In the latter class, the attribute is involved in the form of the verb, as in "speaks" or "reigns." From what has been said, it is clear that the property of signifying an attribute belongs essentially to the verb. Nevertheless this property is not the peculiar and distinguishing characteristic of a verb, for it equally belongs to adjectives and participles.

Connection.

257. The next essential property of the verb is that of *connecting* the conception of an attribute with the substance to which it belongs; for it may have been observed in the instances above noticed, that when an attribute was signified, it was signified not alone, but in conjunction with the subject to which it belonged. If we say, "is" or "is almighty," or "is speaking," or "speaks," or "reigns," without showing to whom or to what these attributes belong, we utter no intelligible sentence. And this is so obvious, that no one ever denied connection to be a property of the verb. Nay, some able philologists have gone so far as to maintain that connection is the characteristic peculiarity of this part of speech.* From that opinion, however, I must dissent. The verb not only connects, but it does more; it declares that the connected conceptions coexist as parts of one assertion. The conjunction also connects, but it does not predicate one thing of another, or make up one proposition of two distinct terms. Thus, if we say, "he is good," the conceptions expressed by the words *he* and *good*, that is to say, the conceptions of a particular man and of goodness, are not only connected, but the one is asserted to exist in the other, and to be a quality belonging to it. Otherwise is it in the

* Rees, Cycl. Grammar.

speech of the duke of Buckingham wishing happiness and honour to his sovereign Henry VIII.

——————— May he live
Longer than I have time to tell his years!
Ever belov'd, and loving may his rule be!
And when old Time shall lead him to his end,
Goodness and *he* fill up one monument!

Here the same conceptions, viz., those of a particular man and goodness are connected, but the one is not asserted of the other, and they make up no intelligible meaning when taken together, without the further aid of a verb. We cannot assert without connecting our thoughts; for to assert is to declare some one thing of some other thing, which cannot be done without connecting those things together in the mind; and therefore it is that connection is always one characteristic of the verb; but it is a secondary characteristic, being involved in the more important property of asserting, declaring, or manifesting real existence.

Assertion.

258. This brings me to that property of the verb which is not only essential to it, but is its peculiar and exclusive characteristic, and which, I agree with Messieurs de Port Royal and other eminent grammarians, is the power of signifying *Assertion*. It often happens in language, that the very same identical word, the same in orthography, in pronunciation, and in accent, is both noun and verb. How then can we determine when it is the one, and when it is the other? Very simply, and very infallibly. When it directly or indirectly involves an assertion, it is a verb; when it does not it is a noun. The word *love*, in English, is one of the words which I have just described. It is impossible to tell, *à priori*, whether it will be a noun or a verb in any particular discourse. We must wait to see how it is used, and then all doubt will vanish. Thus, it is a noun in these exquisite lines:—

——————— *Love* is not *love*,
Which alters when it alteration finds,
Or bends, with the remover to remove;
Oh no! It is an ever-fixed mark,
That looks on tempests and is never shaken.

And again, it is a verb, in the speech of the crafty Richard, alluding to his unsuspecting brother:—

——— I do *love* thee so,
That I will shortly send thy soul to heaven.

Direct or indirect.

259. When I say, that assertion is involved in the verb, either directly or indirectly, I mean the word assertion to be taken largely, in contradistinction to nomination. The noun *names* a conception; the verb implicitly or explicitly *asserts* its existence or non-existence; and this it may do affirmatively or negatively, positively or hypothetically, by way of question, command, request, desire, or by any of the other indirect modes of implying existence, on which moods of verbs in different languages depend. For instance, when the shepherd Claius, in

Sir Philip Sidney's Arcadia, says of Urania "her breath *is* more sweet than a gentle south-west wind, which comes creeping over flowery fields, and shadowed waters in the extreme heat of summer," the assertion contained in the verb *is* (however figurative or poetical) is direct and positive. But when, a little afterwards, he asks, "*hath not* the only love of her made us, being silly ignorant shepherds, raise up our thoughts above the ordinary level of the world?" the question negatively expressed in the words "hath not," indirectly asserts that the love of her *has* had that effect. So when the other shepherd, Strephon, exclaims, "O Urania! blessed *be* thou Urania! the fairest sweetness, and sweetest fairness!" There is an implied assertion in the verb "be," that she ought to be blessed. Again, when the author thus relates the preservation of Musidorus from drowning—"so drew they up a young man of so goodly shape, and well-pleasing favour, that one would think Death *had* in him a lovely countenance," there is an assertion contained in the verb "had;" but it is clearly hypothetical, and not positive. Other variations of the mode of assertion will be noticed when I come to speak more particularly of the moods of verbs. If it should be objected that to some of these modifications the term "assertion" is, in strictness of speech, inapplicable, I might answer that I contend not for the fitness of the term, but only for the accuracy and importance of the distinction between the noun, which merely *names* a conception, and the verb, which by affirming, asking, commanding, or otherwise, gives to that conception life and animation, and so forms a sentence enunciative or passionate.

Objection.

260. It has been objected that assertion cannot be an essential property of verbs; because we can assert without the express use of that part of speech. True, we can do so in certain languages; for in such a case the assertion is an act of the mind, not expressed, but, as grammarians say, *understood*. The verb is wanting; but its place is not supplied by any other part of speech, nor is it to be collected from a change of inflection, or accentuation, or from any other mode of *express* signification. Thus the verbs "is," "were," and "was," are intentionally omitted, in Milton's beautiful description of our first parents:—

> ———— In their looks divine
> The image of their glorious Maker shone,
> Truth, wisdom, sanctitude severe and pure,
> Severe but in true filial freedom placed;
> Whence true authority in men; though both
> Not equal, as their sex not equal seem'd;
> For contemplation he, and valour form'd;
> For softness she, and sweet attractive grace.

i. e. whence true authority *is* in men: both *were* not equal; he *was* form'd for contemplation; she *was* form'd for softness, &c. Now, in all these cases, the mind performs the act of asserting; in the words of Plato, it manifests some action, and declares that something exists; and this manifestation or declaration is not contained in the

nouns themselves, which do nothing more than name the conception; thus, when we say "nemo bonus," the assertion is neither included in *nemo*, nor in *bonus*, for these are mere *names* of conceptions. *Nemo* is the subject, *bonus* is the predicate; but neither of them includes the copula. The two terms are not connected by anything which either of them contains, but their connection is inferred by the mind from their juxtaposition. But the question to be here considered, does not relate to verbs not expressed, but to verbs expressed; and universally where the verb is expressed, it imports assertion, either simple or modified, direct or implied.

Definition.

261. From this view of its essential properties, the verb may be defined, *a part of speech which signifies an attribute of some substance, connects the attribute and substance together, and asserts the existence or non-existence of the connection.* To all verbs in all languages this definition is alike applicable; but there are properties belonging in various modes and degrees to different verbs in different languages; and these, which I have termed *accidental* properties, I shall consider, first in so far as they apply to a whole verb, and then as they apply to its separate parts.

Verb substantive.

262. A verb, taken as a whole, may be distinguished from other verbs, by certain properties which grammarians have generally considered as marking its *kind*, either simply, or as modified by some other conception. The first and simplest distinction of kind (as stated by Messieurs de Port Royal) is into *substantive* and *adjective*. I have already alluded to the nature of the verb substantive, or verb of existence; but the following remarks of Harris will place it in a clearer light:—"Previously to every other possible attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must first of necessity *exist*, before it can possibly be anything else; for existence may be considered as an universal genus, to which all things are at all times to be referred. The verbs, therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every proposition in which they may still be found either exprest or by implication; exprest, as when we say 'the sun *is* bright;' by implication, as when we say 'the sun rises,' which means when resolved, 'the sun is rising.' Now, all existence is either absolute or qualified. The verb *is* can by itself express absolute existence, but never the qualified without subjoining the particular form; because the forms of existence being in number infinite, if the particular form be not exprest, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when *is* only serves to subjoin some such form, it has little more force than that of a mere assertion. 'Tis under the same character that it becomes a latent part in every other verb by expressing that assertion, which is one of their essentials."* So far Harris is right; but when he mentions the verbs *is*, *groweth*, *becometh*, *est*, *fit*, ὑπάρχει, ἐςὶ, πέλει,

* Hermes, i. 6.

γίγνεται, as equally verbs substantive, he does not advert to the fact, that several of these words combine in their signification other conceptions than that of mere existence; for to grow, or to become, usually implies something more than merely to be. Still, if the idiom of a particular language allows it, any verb of this kind may occasionally be employed as a mere verb of existence.

Verbs transitive.

263. All other verbs are comprehended by Messrs. de Port Royal under the designation of verbs *adjective*, a term which seems reasonable, as contradistinguishing them from the verb substantive. All verbs assert existence; the verb substantive asserts nothing more; but the verb adjective includes in one word the assertion and some attribute. Now those attributes are either of such a nature that we can be aware of their passing from one substance to another, and the verb expressing them is then said to be *transitive;* or we only perceive the existence of the attribute, and the verb is then said to be *intransitive.* This distinction forms what some grammarians call the *voice* of a verb. As the conception of *cause* is one of the primary ideas of the human mind, and not a mere inference (as Hume and others absurdly fancied) from an observed similarity in the succession of events; a verb transitive implies an agent as the cause of transition, and a patient as receiving its effect. Generally the agent and patient are two different beings, and this gives occasion to the active voice, and the passive voice of a verb. Where the agent is first considered, the verb is said to be in the active voice, as "John beats James;" where the patient is first considered, the verb is in the passive voice, as "James is beaten by John." But in some cases the same substance is both agent and patient, which in human beings arises from their double nature. Thus the *Heautontimorumenos*, of Terence, was a man in whom the attribute of suffering was caused by himself, and reflected back on himself. All languages have some mode, more or less direct or circuitous, of expressing this reflected action: in the Greek language it gave occasion to a form usually called the middle voice.* The Turkish language goes a step further. It expresses in one word an attribute in which the agent and patient are reciprocally cause and effect, as *sevmek* to love, *sevichmek* to love mutually.† How far these distinctions are marked by peculiar forms in different languages will be considered in a future treatise; but even where such forms exist, it often happens that in practice they are confounded: thus the Greek middle verb is often used with an active signification; and in Latin there is a large class of verbs called *Deponents*, having a passive termination, with a sense in general active; though some of these are also used passively, and therefore called by certain writers *common*—as *adulari*, which though in form a passive verb, is generally used actively, but sometimes passively. Thus Cicero says, in an active sense, "neque ita *adulatus* fortunam

* Vide Kuster, De vero usu verborum mediorum.

† Davids, Gram. Turque, p. 34.

sum alterius, ut me meæ pæniteret.* But elsewhere, in a passive sense, " ne assentatoribus patefaciamus aures, nec *adulari* nos sinamus."†

Verbs neuter.

264. Where the existence of the attribute is alone expressed by the verb, without reference to its transition from an agent to a patient, the verb involving such expression of existence and attribute, is called intransitive, or (with reference to action and passion) *neuter;* and it may be either personal, as " he sings," " the tree blossoms," &c.; or impersonal, as " it rains," " it lightens," it grieves me." Harris, following the authority of Priscian, Sanctius, Vossius, and others, rejects the doctrine of impersonal verbs, on the ground that " every energy respects an energizor or a passive subject."‡ Thus he would explain the instances above given by supplying a nominative understood, as " the *rain* rains," the *lightning* lightens," " the *event* grieves me." These forms of speech are to a certain degree idiomatical; but I would observe, that in the proper impersonals there is usually in the mind of the speaker some doubt at least as to the energizor; and the fact is meant to be asserted simply, without reference to its cause; or else the cause is to be otherwise collected from the context. Vossius explains *pluit* to mean *aqua pluvia pluit;* but the Roman peasant, when he said *pluit*, though he did not perhaps contemplate any distinct cause of the showers, would have been far from disputing the poet's animated description of that cause:—

> Tum *Pater Omnipotens*, fœcundis imbribus, *Æther*
> Conjugis in gremium lætæ descendit.

And again, when the same great poet says of the unhappy Dido,—

> Mortem orat, *tædet* cœli convexa tueri.

No nominative understood (such as *res* or *eventus*) can serve to imply the cause of the tedium; but the context shows that to behold the very sky was the cause of tedium to the forsaken queen. The same confusion which I noticed between the middle and active voice of a verb, often occurs between its transitive or intransitive character; or, to speak more correctly, the same word is used sometimes as an active verb and sometimes as a neuter. Thus in Greek we may say, *εἰς γῆν σπέρματα πίπτειν*,§ to *fall* seed into the earth, *i. e.* to drop it. So in Latin, auxit rempublicam, actively, or *auxit morbus* neutrally. And so in English, " to *beat* the air," or " the pulse *beats;*" but these are matters dependent on the idiom of each particular language.

Other kinds of verbs.

265. I have spoken of those distinctions of *kind* in verbs which are most simple; but there are others which result from modifying the signification of a verb by some additional conception. In all languages, such modifications may be effected by separate words; but in some

* De Divinat., ii. 2.
† De Offic., i. 26.
‡ Hermes, i. 9.
§ Plato, Politic., c. 16.

languages the same end is attained by the addition of certain particles or letters. The modifications which it may suffice to notice are either of a positive or negative character; to the former are owing verbs desiderative, causative, inceptive, and frequentative; to the latter, verbs implying either simple negation or impossibility. "There is a species of verbs" (says Harris) "called in Greek ἐφετικα, in Latin *desiderativa*, the desideratives or *meditatives;* such are πολεμησείω, *bellaturio*, I have a desire to make war; βρωσείω, *esurio*, I long to eat. So *prensare brachium*, according to Turnebus, was not "to take by the arm frequently," but "to catch at the arm, to desire to take hold of it," as Horace did when he wished Aristius to rid him of his troublesome companion :—

——————— vellere cæpi,
Et *prensare* manu lentissima brachia, nutans,
Distorquens oculos, ut me eriperet.

The Turkish language, which is very rich in modifications of the verb, has a *causative* form, as *aldatmak*, to cause to deceive, from *aldamak* to deceive. In Latin the termination in *sco* usually marks an *inceptive* form, as

Fluctus uti primo cæpit cùm *albescere* vento,

where *albesco* is to begin to be white, from *albeo* to be white; but some of these verbs are rather thought to express continuation, as where Virgil says of Dido, dwelling on the contemplation of the beauty of the fictitious Iulus,

Expleri mentem nequit, *ardescitque* tuendo.

The *frequentative*, or, as some call it, the *iterative* character, has several forms in Latin, as *vendito*, *adjuto*, *pulso*, *facesso;* though many of these have rather an augmentative, and some a diminuent force. The simply negative form is common in most languages, as in English, "will he *nill* he," *i. e.*, "*ne will* he;" so in Latin "*nolo*," i. e., "*ne volo*." We had also, in Old English, *nuste* for *ne wist*, I did not know :—

In al this wurhliche won,
A burde of blod and of bon,
Never yete y *nuste* non,
Lussomore in londe.

M.S. Harl. 2253, A.D. 1200.

The Turkish language has not only a form of simple negation in its verbs, but also a form of impossibility. In English we have a form expressive of counteraction, as to *undo*, which, in old Izaak Walton's amusing book on angling, gives occasion to a dispute among the gipsies on the difference between *ripping* a cloak and *unripping* it. Many other forms, expressing modifications of the signification of the verb, occur in different languages, and will be noticed in the second part of this treatise.

Moods. 266. Having thus enumerated the accidental properties which

belong to a verb considered as a whole, I come to those which affect it as consisting of different parts. These I shall examine as they arise out of the essential properties of the verb; for from the property of assertion is derived the mood, from that of connection the tense, and from that of attribute the person, number, and (where it exists) the gender. First, then, as assertion is not only an essential, but the peculiar property of this part of speech, there must be certain portions of every verb showing how assertion may be directly or indirectly expressed. These portions we call, in English, the *moods* of a verb. Grammarians differ widely as to the number, and no less as to the names of the moods. SCALIGER says that mood is not necessary to verbs; and SANCTIUS contends that it does not relate to the nature of the verb, and therefore is not an attribute of verbs: *non attingit verbi naturam, ideo verborum attributum non est;* on which passage PERIZONIUS very justly observes, that great as the merit of Sanctius was in many parts of his work, yet he had in others, particularly in what regarded the moods of verbs, been misled by an excessive desire of novelty and change. It is very true, as observed by Sanctius, that the great mass of grammatical writers are so extremely discordant in their opinions respecting this part of the science of which they treat, that they have left us scarcely anything on it which can be said to be established by general consent. Some make only three moods, others four, five, six, and even eight. Again, some call these affections of the verb moods; others call them divisions, qualities, states, species, &c.; and as to the various appellations of each mood, we have the personative and impersonative, the indicative, declarative, definitive, modus finiendi, modus fatendi, the rogative, interrogative, requisitive, percontative, assertive, enunciative, vocative, precative, deprecative, responsive, concessive, permissive, promissive, adhortative, optative, dubitative, imperative, mandative, conjunctive, subjunctive, adjunctive, potential, participial, infinitive, and probably many others. In this confusion of terms and of notions, it is absolutely necessary to adopt some distinct principle which may guide us through the labyrinth; and that principle, I apprehend, will be easily and intelligibly supplied by adverting to the peculiar function of the verb itself, namely, assertion.

Four principal Moods.

267. It must be remembered that I use the word *assertion* in its largest sense, to express declaring, affirming, or distinctly manifesting, any perception or volition. In this sense, assertion may be said to take place either in an *enunciative* or in a *passionate* sentence. Thus, in the admirable scene between Brutus and his wife, Portia says—

> ——————— Dear, my lord,
> *Make* me acquainted with your cause of grief.

And again, she says—

> ——————— Upon my knees
> *I charge you*, by my once commended beauty,

> By all your vows of love, and that great vow
> Which did incorporate and make us one,
> *That you unfold* to me, yourself, your half,
> Why you are heavy.

In both these instances she asserts her earnest demand to be made acquainted with the secret cause of that sick offence which she perceived to exist, not in her husband's health, but in his mind. In the one instance the demand is *directly* and enunciatively expressed by the words "I *charge* you;" in the other it is *indirectly* and passionately expressed by the words "*make* me acquainted." Again, an enunciative assertion may be expressed categorically (that is, positively), or else hypothetically. Thus Cæsar, in describing Cassius, first asserts positively, by the word "has," what he had observed in his outward appearance, and then hypothetically, by the words "as if," what might be supposed to pass in his mind:—

> Yond Cassius *has* a lean and hungry look;
> Seldom he smiles, and smiles in such a sort
> *As if* he *mock'd* himself, and scorn'd his spirit,
> That could be mov'd to smile at any thing.

And so, referring to Antony's expression, "fear him not," Cæsar asserts positively, by the words "fear not," that he does not fear him, but puts a case hypothetically, by the word "if," in which he might do so:—

> ——————————— I *fear* him *not;*
> Yet *if* my name *were liable* to fear,
> I do not know the man I should avoid
> So much, as that spare Cassius.

In like manner, a passionate assertion may be distinguished according as the object of the passion is within the power or influence of the speaker, or only within his desire or aversion. Thus, in Virgil's fifth Eclogue, Mopsus addresses his brother shepherds in the way of a command, "*Spargite* humum foliis;" whereas Menelcas addressing the spirit of Daphnis, in the way of a prayer, says, "*Sis* bonus, O! felixque tuis!" These two enunciative and two passionate modes of expressing assertion, here stated, supply us with four principal moods, the *indicative*, *conjunctive*, *imperative*, and *optative*. It has been suggested that these are only a few of the many modifications of signification which might be called moods of a verb; that there might be for instance a *potential* mood expressed by "*can*," a *permissive* by "*may*," a *compulsive* by "*must*," and so forth;* but to this it has been well replied, that "the possibility of providing separate forms for so many moods is, to say the least, doubtful; and that, if possible, the additional complication introduced by so many minute distinctions into a part of speech already exceedingly complex, would render the import of the verb absolutely unintelligible to nine-tenths even of the learned."† Where any such possible moods exist in a particular

* Dr. Gregory. † Encycl. Brit.

language, they must of course be explained in the grammar of that language; but they do not require notice in this part of the present treatise: I shall therefore proceed to examine the four moods above-mentioned.

Indicative.

268. "If we simply declare or indicate something to be, or not to be, whether a perception or volition 'tis equally the same," says Harris; "this constitutes that mood called the declarative or *Indicative*." Thus, "I love," "you walk," "he died," "we shall rejoice," are all simple, or, as logicians say, categorical assertions of fact, some of which do, and some do not, relate to passions of the mind, but which do not necessarily imply any passion in the enunciation. Some of them too may in reality be contingent, or doubtful, and may be dependent on the truth or falsehood of other assertions; but as they are not so enunciated, but on the contrary are declared positively and simply, they belong to the indicative mood. It is to be observed that the indicative, from its very nature, is capable of being united with the conjunctive, as well as of standing alone. An assertion does not necessarily become the less positive for being coupled with another, although that other may be doubtful or contingent. Thus, when Milton says—

> The conquer'd also, and enslav'd by war,
> *Shall*, with their freedom lost, all virtue lose,

it is matter of contingency whether any nation ever will be conquered and enslaved; but yet the assertion that, supposing a nation to undergo that fate, it will lose all virtue, is properly expressed in the indicative mood by the word "shall."

Conjunctive.

269. When a fact is asserted not as actual but merely as possible, or contingent, the form of words by which such assertion is expressed in any particular language, may perhaps be the same as if the assertion were more positive; yet the context will show that the verb is no longer in the indicative mood. The mood adapted to such contingent assertion has received various appellations, of which I consider the *Conjunctive* to be the most appropriate, inasmuch as the contingency is usually marked by a conjunction (such as *if*, *though*, *that*, *except*, *until*, &c.) which connects the dependent sentence with its principal. There are various methods of thus connecting sentences; but they may be distinguished into two great classes. In the one class, an uncertain sentence is connected with a certain one; in the other, both sentences are uncertain: in the former case a conjunctive is dependent on an indicative; in the latter, both sentences are conjunctive. Some grammarians make this distinction the ground of a distinction of moods, calling the contingent assertion, in the first case, *subjunctive*, because it is subjoined to the indicative; and in the other case *potential*, because it states a potential, and not an actual existence. It seems, however, unadvisable thus to multiply moods; and if we were to proceed this length, there is no reason why we should not go much further, and call every possible variation of con-

tingency a separate mood. Of these I shall here notice some instances easily distinguishable in point of principle.

1. *Ut jugulent* homines surgunt de nocte latrones.

Here *jugulent* is in the conjunctive, as indicating the *end* and *object* of the rising.

2. Peter said unto him, though *I should die* with thee,
yet will I not deny thee.

Here "*I should die*" is mentioned as a *motive* to denial, but an insufficient one.

3. Si fractus *illabatur* orbis,
Impavidum ferient ruinæ.

Here, in like manner, *illabatur* is in the conjunctive, as expressing a fact which might be the *cause* of fear to ordinary minds, but which *is not* so to the just and stedfast-minded man; and the conjunction *si* in the one case is equivalent to *though* in the other, both of them having the proper force of our expression "even if."

4. Except a man *be born* of water, and of the spirit,
he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.

Here the conjunctive *be born*, is placed in opposition to the indicative "cannot enter;" so that if the one be in the negative, the other must be so too, and *vice versâ*; for the implication is, that if a man be born of water and of the spirit, he can enter into the kingdom of God. Accordingly, the Greek conjunctions in this and the preceding example would be directly opposed to each other: in No. 3, the word would be Κἂν, that is, Καὶ ἐὰν; but in No. 4 it is ἐὰν μή.

5. Cæmentis licet *occupes*
Tyrrhenum omne tuis et mare Apulicum,
——— non animum metu
Non mortis laqueis expedies caput.

Here the condition differs from that of No. 2, in being a fact of present time; and on the other hand the indicative *non expedies* differs from the indicative *ferient* in No. 3, by being in the negative.

6. The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh *come*.

Here both the facts are future, but the conditional one is the *term* or *boundary* of the other.

7. ——— tacitus pasci si posset Corvus, *haberet*
Plus dapis."

In all the preceding instances one assertion is absolute; but here it is neither asserted that the crow can feed in silence, nor that it has more food; both parts of the sentence, therefore, are contingent, and consequently, both are in the conjunctive mood.

8. *If it were done* when 'tis done, then *'twere well*
It were done quickly.

Here is also one contingent, namely, *'twere well*, depending on another

contingent, *if it were done;* and on each we see a further contingency also depends.

These eight examples are sufficient to show that the varieties of contingent assertions are too various to be considered and treated as so many distinct moods of the verb. The six first are of the kind called, by some writers, subjunctive; the two last are of the kind called, in contradistinction from the subjunctive, potential; but as they are all equally conjunctive, it suffices to give them that name: and, indeed, it is a more correct and systematic distribution of the grammatical nomenclature so to do; for the proper correlative to the term indicative is not subjunctive or potential, but some term which comprehends them both; as, for instance, the term conjunctive. The indicative asserts simply: the conjunctive asserts with modification: if the one is a mood, so is the other; but if the conjunctive is a mood, then its subdivisions cannot be properly so called; but they should rather be called sub-moods, if it were necessary to give them any peculiar denomination.

Imperative.

270. The effect of any degree of passion is *pro tanto* to interrupt and modify the processes of reasoning. Reasoning is conducted by direct assertion, absolute or conditional. Passion goes at once to its object, assuming it as the consequence of an indirect assertion. Thus, if the fact be that I desire that a person should go to any place, it is not necessary for me to state my desire in the indicative mood, and his going in the infinitive or conjunctive, "I desire you to go," or "I desire that you should go;" but by the natural impulse of my feelings—feelings which language conveys as clearly as it does the more gradual processes of thought—I say, in a mood different from either the indicative, infinitive, or conjunctive—*Go!* Now, this mood, from its frequent use in giving commands to inferiors, has been called the *Imperative*, and that name, as being the most general, I shall adopt. Some writers have distinguished from the imperative, the precative, the deprecative, the permissive, the adhortative, &c.; but, so far as language is concerned, these are but different applications of the same mood: the operation is the same in communicating the object of the passion, and implying the assertion that such passion exists. A few examples may serve to explain my meaning:—

1. *Let there be* light, said God; and forthwith light
Ethereal, first of things, quintessence pure,
Sprung from the deep, and from her native east
To journey through the airy gloom began. *Milton.*

2. ——————— Fear and piety,
Religion to the gods, peace, justice, truth,
Domestic awe, night-rest, and neighbourhood,
Instruction, manners, mysteries, and trades,
Degrees, observances, customs, and laws,
Decline to your confounding contraries!
And *let* confusion *live!* *Shakspeare.*

3. *Help* me, Lysander, help me! Do thy best
To pluck this crawling serpent from my breast!
Ah me, for pity!—what a dream was here? *Shakspeare.*

4. *Go*, but be mod'rate in your food!
A chicken too might do me good. *Gay.*

In the first of these examples we have an instance of the highest *imperative*, that which proceeds from the Almighty power, to whose command all things created and uncreated are subject; and who, in Milton's fine paraphrase of the first chapter of Genesis, is described as calling into existence the hitherto uncreated essence of light. The second example is *deprecative*, or rather *imprecative*, in which Timon calls down on his worthless fellow-citizens the natural consequences of their profligacy. The third is *precative*, in which poor deserted Hermia, waking from a terrific dream, calls for help from her faithless lover Lysander. The last is *permissive*, in which the old dying fox, after a long harangue to dissuade the younger members of his community from pursuing their usual trade of rapine, at length permits them to go out on a similar excursion. In all these varieties of the imperative mood, the grammatical process, both of thought and expression, is the same. In all of them the assertion of desire or aversion on the part of the speaker is clearly implied. The sense is, "I *command* that there be light"—"I *wish* that confusion may prevail"—"I *pray* you to help me"—"I *permit* you to go;" but it is unnecessary to express those various assertions, because they are all implied in the imperative moods, and without those moods they could not be so implied. The *imperative* animates the passionate sentence, as the *indicative* or *conjunctive* animates the enunciative sentence. It converts the name of an object of passion, or will, into a manifestation that such object exists; just as the indicative or conjunctive converts the name of an object of perception or thought into an assertion that it is really existing. The original text, "God said let there be light, and there was light," affords a plain example of this operation in both ways. The conceptions in both are two; namely, *existence* and *light*. Each of these, without the verb, would remain a mere noun. The word "light" does so remain; but "existence," by becoming a verb, exhibits itself first in the imperative as an object of volition, and then in the indicative as an object of perception. In the one case it implies an assertion of the Divine will that light should exist; in the other it expresses an assertion that light did exist. The authors of the "Port Royal Grammar" observe, that as the future tense is often taken for an imperative mood (which will be presently noticed), so the imperative is frequently used for a future; and this they ascribe to an imitation of the Hebrews. But in truth there must in all languages be a community of signification between these two portions of a verb; because, as Apollonius remarks, "we can command only in regard to the time to come." "Steal not," and "thou shall not steal," have therefore the same signification.

271. The *Optative* mood seems at first sight to imply only a minor degree of the same passion, which is more energetically expressed by the imperative: and hence I was formerly inclined to agree with those grammarians who think it unnecessary to make the former a separate mood. But the Greek and some other languages distinguish it by a peculiar form; and on reflection it appears to me, for the reasons above stated, that the distinction is well grounded. I cannot, indeed, adopt the language of Scaliger (lib. iv., c. 144), *differunt, quòd imperativus respicit personam inferiorem, optativus potentiorem:* "they differ in this, that the imperative regards an inferior person, the optative a superior;" for that difference is altogether accidental. Moreover, it makes no provision for the common case of wishes expressed between equals; and again, how are we to determine whether a request is addressed to a person in one character rather than another? Or why should we not have moods to designate the different degrees of superiority and inferiority? The fact seems to be, that the more distant and indirect influence of the will on its object, has given rise, in some languages, to a peculiar form of the verb, generally called the optative mood. Yet even this distinction does not appear to be very accurately observed in practice, for we sometimes see the optative used, where the imperative might have been more naturally expected. Thus, in the Electra of Sophocles, when Orestes is forcing Ægisthus into the palace, to kill him in the apartment where he had murdered Agamemnon, he says to his reluctant victim:— Optative.

> Χωρῶις ἂν εἴσω σὺν τάχει· λόγων γὰρ ὰ
> Νῦν ἐστιν ἀγών, ἀλλὰ σῆς ψυχῆς πέρι.
> Go in, without delay, for now the strife
> Is not for useless words, but for thy life:

where the optative χωρῶις undoubtedly expresses a strong volition that Ægisthus should do what he was unwilling to perform. The common distinction between the optative and the imperative is nearly expressed by the English use of the auxiliaries "may" and "let." Thus, the following passage in the hymn to Sabrina is an example of the optative, expressed by *may*:—

> Virgin daughter of Locrine,
> Sprung of old Anchises' line,
> *May* thy brimmed waves, for this,
> Their full tribute never miss,
> From a thousand petty rills
> That tumble down the snowy hills!
> Summer drouth, or singed air,
> Never scorch thy tresses fair!
> Nor wet October's torrent flood
> Thy molten crystal fill with mud!
> *May* thy billows roll ashore
> The beryl, and the golden ore!
> *May* thy lofty head be crown'd
> With many a tow'r and terras round?

The tribute from the rills, the beryls rolled ashore, and the crown of towers and terraces were matters not within the power or control of the speaker, and which he, therefore, could only wish for. On the contrary, when the speaker can command the execution of his wishes, he uses the word *let*, as the king, in Hamlet:—

> *Let* all the battlements their ord'nance fire.
> ——————— Give me the cups,
> And *let* the kettle to the trumpet speak,
> The trumpet to the cannoneer without,
> The cannon to the heavens.

It is observed by Vossius, that the Latin optative is no other than the conjunctive—and, indeed, the form is the same in both; for we say, *utinam amem*, or *cùm amem; utinam amarem*, or *cùm amarem; utinam amaverim*, or *cùm amaverim; utinam amavissem*, or *cùm amavissem*. And so, in the passive voice, *utinam amarer*, or *cùm amarer; utinam amer*, or *cùm amer; utinam amatus sim*, or *cùm amatus sim*, &c. The mood, however, is not to be determined by the form, but by the signification; for it often happens that particular languages do not possess distinct forms for the different moods; and where they do, the form of one mood is frequently used with the force of another. This even takes place in the Greek language, which possesses the richest abundance of inflections in its verbs. The Greek indicative is often used for the subjunctive and optative, and *that* through almost all its tenses, as VIGER has shown at large in his celebrated treatise on Greek idioms: and in return, the optative, especially in the Attic dialect, is used for the indicative.

Interrogative.

272. Besides the four moods which I have reckoned as principal, some grammarians hold that there are two others of equal importance, namely, the *Interrogative* and the *Infinitive;* these therefore I shall proceed to examine. And first, as to the interrogative: Varro speaks of the mode of interrogating as different from that of answering. No doubt the state of the mind in these two acts is widely different; but as both acts must, of course, relate to the same conception, and to the same direct assertion, categorical or hypothetical, it is not surprising that the grammatical forms expressive of those acts should nearly approach each other, or be sometimes the very same; and hence that some grammarians should deny the necessity of an interrogative mood. "In written language" (says an able writer), "take away the mark of interrogation, and in spoken language the peculiar tone of voice, and the interrogative and indicative modes appear precisely the same." * Of this there is a remarkable instance in the speech of Venus, in the 10th book of the Æneid:—

> *Cernis*, ut insultent Rutuli, Turnusque feratur
> Per medios insignis equis, tumidusque secundo
> Marte ruat,†

where, if read without the accent of interrogation, the word "cernis"

* Encycl. Brit., art. Grammar. † Virg. Æn., 10, 20.

is in the indicative mood, "you see;" but if read (as it certainly ought to be) with that accent, it is clearly in the interrogative, and should be translated "do you not see?" In like manner, the beauty of the following lines of Catullus would be lost, if read without the interrogative accentuation, though the form is simply indicative:—

Jam te nil miseret, dure, tui dulcis amiculi?
Jam me prodere; jam non dubitas fallere perfide?*

Of a question put in the form of an assertion (says the same learned person) we have a remarkable instance in the Gospel of St. Matthew. When Christ stood before Pilate, the governor asked him, saying, "Συ ει ὁ βασιλευς των Ιουδαιων." † Now this is literally "*Thou art* the king of the Jews;" but pronounced in an interrogative tone, it must have signified, "*Art thou* the king of the Jews?" And so it seems to have been understood. Indeed, in colloquial English, nothing is more common than to use the indicative form interrogatively, and with the interrogative intonation, as "you *took* a ride this morning?" meaning "*did you* [or rather did you not] take a ride?" On these grounds the writer alluded to concludes, that "the [so called] interrogative mood is a useless distinction," and one which (he says) is "not found in any language." I confess that at one time these reasons appeared to me to have much weight; but when I reflect that the mental energy exercised by an interrogator is altogether different from that exercised by a respondent or a narrator; and that it is marked in all languages either by a change of the arrangement or accentuation of the words, or by some additional word or particle, or perhaps even by a peculiar inflection, I cannot but agree with those who add an interrogative mood to the four above-mentioned.

Its mixed nature.

273. This mood may be said to partake both of the enunciative and of the passionate character. On the one hand, it requires from the party interrogated a *direct assertion*, affirmative or negative, either of the existence of some fact, the precise nature of which is presumably unknown to the interrogator, or else of some unknown circumstance of person, place, time, or the like, relating to the fact in question; and, on the other hand, it implies in the interrogator the *indirect assertion* of some sort of passion, varying from the simple desire of information, the height of pleasure, or to that tumult of painful feelings, which renders thought itself a chaos of doubt and confusion.

Thus, Ismene, ignorant of the nature of the *act*, in which Antigone wishes her to take part, asks—

What is the act? *What* danger? *What* intent?‡

So Creon, ignorant of the *person* who had buried Polynices, asks—

Who was the man, that dared to do this deed?§

* Catull. 30. † Encycl. Brit., ut sup.
‡ Ποῖόν; τι κινδύνευμα; ποῦ γνώμης ποτ' ἰι. Soph. Antig., 42.
§ —— τίς ἀνδρῶν ἦν, ὁ τολμήσας τάδε. Ibid., 248.

So Æneas, ignorant of the *place* whence the ghost of Hector came asks—

——— O! Hector, from *what coast*,
Long-wished for, dost thou come?*

So Lady Macbeth, when her husband says to her, "Duncan comes here to night," significantly asks, as if ignorant of the intended *time* of his departure—

——— And *when* goes hence?†

In all these instances, there is expressed on the part of the interrogator a simple desire of information; and the verb, though interrogative in effect, is in form indicative. But when Catullus would express perfect delight, he does it in the form of a question—

What is more joyful or more happy than I?‡

And again—

O! what is happier than to live free from cares?§

On the other hand, so painful were the feelings of the unhappy queen of Carthage, when abandoned by her lover, that she scarcely knew what she said, or where she was, or what was the state of her own mind. Yet all this she expresses interrogatively, though the verbs retain the indicative form—

What do I say? Where am I? And what rage
Transforms my mind?‖

Simple and complex.

274. The ancients (as Harris observes) distinguished two kinds of interrogations, the *simple*, called Ἐρώτημα, *interrogatio*, and the *complex*, called Πύσμα, *percontatio*.¶ The simple present a question, the answer to which may be given in the same words by converting them into a sentence affirmative or negative: *ex. gr.* Qu. "Are these verses of Homer?" Answer. "These are verses of Homer," or "These are not verses of Homer," or, still more shortly, by the adverbs *Yes* or *No*. The complex interrogations are either definitely or indefinitely such. A definitely complex interrogation, such as, "Is this a verse of Horace or of Virgil?" or, "Is this a verse of Horace, of Virgil, or of Ovid?" admits of two possible answers to each separate interrogation which it involves, and also of one general negative; as, "It is Horace's"—"It is not Horace's" (and so of Virgil and Ovid); or, "It is of neither." The indefinite may be answered by a whole sentence, or elliptically by a single essential word in such sentence: *ex. gr.*—"How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle?" Answer. "Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle." But as this repetition of the eight last words of the question would be tedious,

* ——— *Quibus*, Hector, ab *oris*
Exspectate venis? *Virg. Æn.*, 2, 282.

† Shaksp. Macbeth.

‡ Quid me lætius est, beatiusve? Catull., 9.

§ O! quid solutis est beatius curis? Catull., 31.

‖ Quid loquor? Aut ubi sum? Quæ mentem insania mutat?

¶ Hermes, b. i., c. 8.

the question may be elliptically answered by the essential word "Two," corresponding to the interrogative "How many?"

275. Of the so-called *Infinitive* Mood, the following is the account given by Harris:—"Through all the above modes (indicative, &c.) the verb, being considered as denoting an attribute, has always reference to some person or substance."* "But there is a mode or form, under which verbs sometimes appear, where they have no reference at all to persons or substances. For example, 'to eat is pleasant, but to fast is wholesome.' Here the verbs *to eat* and *to fast* stand alone by themselves, nor is it requisite, or even practicable, to prefix a person or substance. Hence the Latin and modern grammarians have called verbs under this mode, from this their indefinite nature, *infinitives*."† "These infinitives go farther: they not only *lay aside the character of attributives*, but they assume that of substantives."‡ So far Harris. Now, as he had before said that "those attributives which have the complex power of denoting both an *attribute* and an *assertion* make that species of words which grammarians call *verbs*;"§ and as he here denies that the infinitives retain the character of attributives, and nowhere pretends that they have the power of denoting an assertion, it would seem strange that he should still consider them as verbs, were it not that this inconsistency has been shared, as Vossius observed, not only by the *semidoctum vulgus*, but even by some of the *scientissimi*. For my own part, far from ranking the infinitive among the moods of a verb, I agree entirely, for reasons which will presently appear, with those who call it a verbal noun substantive. Infinitive Mood.

276. Whether we call infinitives nouns or verbs, the propriety of the name infinitive is very evident from the observation of Vossius: *Ut finitum est nomen, tum philosophus, tum plurativus philosophi; quippe illo unus, hoc multi significantur: at contra infinitum est sui, quia utriusque est numeri, item Græcum* δεινα, *quo et ille et illi denotatur; sic finitum verbum est audio, ac facio, ut quo certus numerus designatur; infinita autem sunt audire, agere, ut quæ deficiant numeris ac personis, et undique sunt indefinita ac indeterminatur.* "As the noun *philosophus* is finite, both in the singular and in the plural *philosophi*, since the former signifies one person, and the other many; but on the other hand the word *sui* is infinitive, because it is both singular and plural; and in like manner the Greek word δεινα is infinitive, because it denotes both *him* and *them;* so the verbs *audio* and *facio* are finite, as designating a certain number; but *audire* and *agere*, which express no certain number or person, and are in every way indefinite and indeterminate, are called infinitives." Why so called.

277. That the class of words in question, however, are not verbs but nouns substantive, results from the following considerations:— Is a noun substantive.

1. There are, as I have often repeated, only two principal modes

* Hermes, b. 1, c. 8. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. § Ibid.

of enunciating thought by speech, that is to say, *naming* our conceptions, and *asserting*, or manifesting their existence. Now the infinitives, "to love," *aimer*, *amare*, "to have loved," *avoir aimé*, *amavisse*, assert nothing by themselves, either as to the conception of love, or as to the conception of time in which the action of loving took place. they express both only in the way of notation, or naming, and not in the way of declaration; and therefore, in so far as either conception is concerned, the infinitive must remain in the class of nouns.

2. Harris admits that if you take away the assertion from any mood of a verb, "there remains nothing more than the mere infinitive, which, as Priscian says, significat ipsam *rem* quam continet verbum."* And by the word *rem* it is clear that nothing can be here meant but the noun involved in the verb.
3. That this noun must be a substantive is manifest, since it may be the subject of a proposition, of which the predicate is one of its attributes. Thus Cicero says, "Cum vivere ipsum turpe sit nobis,"† which might equally be rendered in English "*to live* is disgraceful to me," or, "*life* is disgraceful to me."
4. The infinitives (according to the idiom of most cultivated languages) answer to the distinctions of case in other nouns substantive. Thus *tempus abire* answers to the genitive, "time *of* departure;" *celer irasci*, to the dative, "swift *to* anger;" and *dignus amari*, to the ablative, *dignus amore*.
5. Hence the latter of two verbs, which, when not connected with the preceding by a conjunction, must, according to the trite rule, be in the infinitive mood, is in effect the accusative case of a noun governed by the first verb: *ex. gr.*:

———— God will not long *defer*
To vindicate the glory of his name:‡

where "defer to vindicate" is equivalent to "defer the vindication."

Is verbal.

278. These nouns, however, though not verbs, are properly designated as *verbal;* for though they do not possess the peculiar characteristic of verbs, namely assertion, they possess several of the properties of verbs. They can express existence, action, passion, and consequently time. *Esse* expresses existence; *amare*, action; *amari*, passion; and, again, *amare* expresses time indefinite or present; *amavisse*, time past, *fore*, time future. "Scripsit Cæsar nondum te sibi satis esse familiarem, sed certè *fore*."§ Moreover, like verbs, they may govern nouns, with or without a preposition; as "to excel

* Hermes, b. i. c. 8.
† Cicero, Attic., 13, 28.
‡ Milton, Sams. Agon., 474.
§ Cicero, Ep. Fam.

in wisdom," " to acquire *fame* :" and like verbs they admit of modification by adverbs, as " to live *well*," " to die *gloriously*." As some of these incidents depend on the construction of different languages, they will be noticed more particularly hereafter; but it may here be proper to observe that there are various classes of nouns, both substantive and adjective, which are connected with verbs, that is to say, which express, with certain modifications, the same conception which is expressed as an attribute by the verb. These nouns may be thus classed:—

1. Verbal adjectives (commonly so called), which express the conception in the form of an attribute, as the Latin verbals in *bilis*, &c., of which Mr. Tooke makes a class of participles, and which do not involve the notion of time.
2. Participles (commonly so called), which agree with the former, except that they involve the notion of time,
3. Abstract nouns (commonly so called), which express the conception in the form of a substantive, as the Latin nouns in *io*, &c., which do not involve the notion of time.
4. Infinitives (commonly called infinitive moods), which agree with the former, except that they may involve the notion of time.

It happens, indeed, in most languages, that distinct forms are wanting for some of these four classes of nouns, or that the forms are reciprocally used for each other. Thus, " he learns *to sing*," or " he learns *singing*," are used in English indifferently; and so " he *learns* singing," and " he *is* singing," are equally consistent with our idiom.

Different opinions.

279. I have thought it necessary to dwell the longer on the consideration of the infinitive, because, in excluding it not only from the moods but from the verbs, I certainly deviate, more than I am generally disposed to do, from the path pursued by the great majority of grammatical writers. Yet this deviation is justified by high authority; for many of the ancients (and those, as Harris says, " the best grammarians") have called the infinitive ὀνομα ῥηματικὸν, or ὄνομα ῥήματος: and with these agrees Priscian, in the following passage, " *a constructione quoque vim* REI *verborum, id est*, NOMINIS, *quod significat ipsam rem, habere* INFINITIVUM *possumus dignoscere*." " From the construction, too, we may perceive, that the infinitive has the force of the *thing*, of the verb, that is to say of the *noun*, which signifies the thing itself." What is here called the thing, of the verb, is what I have called the conception of an attribute, the mere name of which is a noun. Thus, " I die" expresses the conception of dying, but it not only names that conception, it asserts the thing to exist, with reference to a certain person; whereas " to die" expresses the conception, that is to say, names the thing, and does nothing more: it does not manifest the existence of the thing as an object either of perception or volition; it does not assert that any person is dying, or

has died, or will die, or may die; neither does it evince any desire that such an event should occur, or the contrary, either positively or conditionally. "Take away the assertion, the command, or whatever else gives a character to any one of the other modes," says Harris, "and there remains nothing more than the infinitive." So, I say, take away from the other modes whatever gives them the verbal character, and there remains the noun. Whether we call this noun a verbal noun, or a participial noun, or simply an infinitive, is immaterial; provided we clearly understand, that it belongs not to the class of verbs, but to that of nouns, and that its nature does not depend on its form; since, in English, the words *death*, *to die*, and *dying*, may all be used as infinitives; and, when so used, are generally convertible into each other, with little or no change of meaning.

Tense.

280. As I consider moods to arise out of the most essential property of the verb, namely assertion, so I consider *Tenses* to arise out of the next essential property of the verb, namely *connection*. The English word *tense* is merely a corrupt pronunciation of the old French *temps*, as that was of the Latin *tempus*, time. Now, if a word be meant expressly to assert the connection of a substance with its attribute, or of a species with its genus, that word must implicitly assert the existence of the things connected. In order, therefore, to understand the connection, we must begin, as Harris judiciously does, by considering *existence* according as it is mutable or immutable. I am well aware that certain self-styled philosophers hold that there is no such thing as immutable existence. They conceive that men's minds are made up, as their bodies are, of a sort of small dust, which is perpetually whirling about, and taking various forms and arrangements, some of which it may please a man to call true, and others false; that this distinction, however, is a mere delusion of the individual's mind, *mentis gratissimus error;* that when the man dies, his notions, their truth and their falsehood, their wisdom and their folly, all die with him; and though some truths wear better than others, and keep in fashion for twenty or thirty centuries, while the greater part of our notions do not last longer than the small ephemeral insects of the Nile, yet that in the end they all sink into one common Lethe:—

> ——— animæ quibus altera fato
> Corpora debentur.

The opposite philosophy to this, although stigmatized as "a metaphysical jargon and a false morality, which can only be dissipated by etymology," I feel myself constrained to adopt, from the utter repugnance of the former to my faculty of reason. I cannot conceive that the objects of intellection and science are mutable in any possible number of years, or in any imaginable conjuncture of circumstances. I cannot, for instance, believe that in a square the diagonal ever was, or will be, or can be, commensurable with one of the sides. These two magnitudes are not incommensurable because Euclid happened to


think so, or because his doctrine on the subject has prevailed for above two thousand years. Their incommensurability is a truth as independent of that lapse of time, as any two things can possibly be of each other. The opposite to it cannot be conceived by the human mind. The existence of this truth, therefore, is justly styled immutable.

281. Of such immutable existence the *Present* tense is usually considered the proper exponent, because, in most languages, it is among the simplest forms of the verb, and in particular has no distinct mark of time about it. There is no reason, *à priori*, that there should not be a separate inflection of the verb to distinguish perpetual, absolute, immutable existence, from that which is predicated with reference to some certain time; but as no language, that I know of, has adopted any such form, and as absolute existence is naturally contemplated under the form of a time perpetually present, I regard the expression of immutable existence as one of the uses of the present tense. **Present.**

The other use of the present tense depends on the nature of mutable existence. Now, mutable objects exist in time. When, therefore, we declare them to exist, that is, whenever we employ a verb active, or passive, or neuter, we must declare them to exist in some time. But time is distinguishable as to its periods into present, past, and future; and as to its continuity into perfect or imperfect: and though the present, from its nature, must be definite and positive, yet the other two periods may be stated indefinitely and with relation to some different time. From these sources, and from the differences of mood already noticed, may be derived all the tenses, which appear in use, in different languages. And first, as to the present, considered as marking a certain portion of time; it is manifest that we may consider as present to us a greater or less portion of time. Time flows on continuously, and has in itself no stops or periods; but the mind dwells on certain portions, and gives them a distinct expression in language. The *names* of these portions are various, as an age, a year, a day, an hour, a moment; but it has been well shown by Mr. Harris that the present time, strictly speaking, is not cognizable by any human faculty; for it is

> —— Like the lightning, which doth cease to be,
> Ere one can say it lightens.


"Let us suppose," says he, "for example, the lines AB—— BC——."



"I say, that the point B, is the end of the line AB, and the beginning of the line BC. In the same manner let us suppose AB BC to represent certain times, and let B be a *now*, or instant, which they include; the first of them is necessarily past time, as being previous to it; the other is necessarily future, as being subsequent." Hence he concludes, that time present has at best but a shadowy and imaginative existence; and, of course, as sensation refers only to time present, that sensible existence is itself altogether imperceptible, eluding the steady grasp of thought, and approaching to absolute nonentity. This will, doubtless, appear strange to the modern philosophers, who hold that sensible existence is the only existence; but let them meditate on what they mean by the words *now*, or *instant*, or *moment;* let them consider how difficult it is to arrest the fleeting progress of time, and fasten it down to the periods indicated by those terms; and they will, perhaps, perceive that their notions are not quite so clear as they have hitherto fondly imagined.

We will assume, that in the above diagram the *perfect* present is correctly indicated by the point B. At that moment, I open my eyes and I contemplate, at one view, a large theatre crowded with numerous happy faces, with splendour and beauty, with the diversities of age, and sex, and condition, with mirth and gravity, and all the passions, which, though not meant to be brought into public, could not entirely be thrown off and left at home, like an unvalued garment. Or, perchance, I am on a proud hill-top, from whence, at one glimpse, I behold mountains and valleys spread in rich perspective before me, with the near cottages, and the distant town, and, beyond all, the remote and hazy ocean. I see the variegated foliage, and the ripening corn, the clouds of heaven sailing high in air, the rustics at their labour, and the little vagrant boy picking daisies at my feet, and delighting in his idleness. Without any time for reflection, without a thought of the successive action of the machinery in this grand landscape, I say, "*I see*" all this, at the present moment, and I enunciate it in the present tense perfect.

But if I wish to express a continuous action, if, for instance, I mean to describe myself as remaining for some time in contemplation of the scenes just described, I am compelled to change my expression, and to adopt the present tense *imperfect*. In that case, I say "I am contemplating," "I am beholding:" and the diagram before drawn will not then so well express the time intended to be described as the following one:—



Here, the present time, designated by the letter B, extends indefinitely toward A and C, embracing a segment, the whole of which is viewed by the mind as being at once present to its contemplation, though without any definite boundary on either side. The English language easily distinguishes this sort of present tense from the other, by the use of the verb *to be* and the participle present; but in most other languages the present perfect and the present imperfect have one and the same form, and can only be distinguished by the context.

Past. 282. We have seen that the present imperfect implies something of the past, and something of the future. Modern philosophy is very well satisfied to pass over all the difficulties which occur in regard to the nature of time. We are told, "that we have our notion of succession and duration from this original, viz., from reflection on the train of ideas which we find to appear one after another in our own minds," and that "time is duration set out by measures." This is surely anything but reasoning. First, it is assumed that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed each other in every man's understanding. Each of these ideas, then, must either occupy an indivisible point of time, or it must have some distinguishable duration. In the former case I cannot at all understand how reflection on many indivisible points should afford me the notion of any continuous quantity. In the latter case there would be no occasion to reflect on a train; for the reflection on a single idea would present to me the notion of duration in itself. But what are these ideas; and how do they march in train? Are they all of equal duration? If so, or if not, what is it that determines the duration of each? Is it not the voluntary act of the mind?—Again: is there no interval in the train? On the hypothesis above stated, it would seem that before a man could have any notion of duration, and consequently of time, he must have formed in his own mind thoughts of a certain duration; these thoughts must have succeeded each other in a distinguishable order, he must have been fully aware of that succession, and he must afterwards have made it the subject of reflection. But this statement is absurd; for on what is he to reflect? On a succession which would not present any notion of duration unless it involved that notion in the first instance; nor would the succession of any two or more ideas produce a notion of duration if the thoughts themselves, or the interval between them, did not involve it. The truth is, that the idea of duration, or time, is not to be made up out of any other elements, but is an original law, and first element of thought in the human mind. We perceive duration of time just as we perceive extension of space, because it is one of the necessary forms under which alone we can contemplate existence. Whilst we are contemplating the indivisible moment which constitutes the perfect present it has already melted into the imperfect present; and if we attempt to seize it again, it has already become the past: its distinction is then fully

marked; for the past is presented to us by memory, as the present is by sensation.

The past has its perfect and its imperfect, its definite and its indefinite, its positive and its relative. We may speak of an action which was performed on a given day, at a given hour, and a given minute; as of Cæsar's leaping into the Rubicon, or of the first shot which was fired at the commencement of the thirty years' war: or we may speak of an action in which a person was occupied, and which was going on at the time to which we refer. Thus the ancient artists inscribed their works with the word *faciebat*, to indicate that they did not put them out of hand, as finished and perfect, but that they had been for some time engaged in making them, and would have carried further their attempts toward perfection, had time and circumstances permitted. Thus, too, Syrus, in the Heautontimorumenos, describing the work on which he found Antiphila and her servants employed, says—

> Texentem telam studiosè ipsam offendimus:
> ——————————— Anus
> Subtemen *nebat:* præterea una ancillula
> Erat: ea *texebat* unà.

Again, we may speak of the past time *definitely*, fixing the epoch when it happened, as—

> That day he *overcame* the Nervii.

Or *indefinitely*, declaring that the act of which we are speaking is past, but not ascertaining whether the time of its performance was near or distant; as—

> Thou art the ruins of the noblest man
> That ever *lived* in the tide of times.

Lastly, the past time may be mentioned simply as past at the present moment, or as past at some time preceding the present; and these two tenses may be reciprocally distinguished as *positive* and *relative*. Thus, in the positive, Macbeth says—

> I *have liv'd* long enough: my way of life
> Is fallen into the sere, the yellow leaf.

In the relative, Thyrsis (the attendant spirit), in the Masque of Comus, says—

> This ev'ning late, by then the chewing flocks
> *Had ta'en* their supper on the sav'ry herb
> Of knot-grass dew-besprent, and were in fold,
> I sate me down to watch.

Future.

283. As the past time exists in memory, so the *Future* exists in imagination. Such is the nature of man, or he would be unable to attain "that large discourse, looking *before* and *after*," which the poet truly assigns to him. The conception of duration may be supposed to exist in a being which had only the perception of the present and the past; but to render that conception operative and useful, to con-

vert it it into an accurate idea of *time*, it is necessary that the notion of futurity should be superadded. It is a mistake to say that the present impression is distinguished from the memory of what is past by superior vividness and strength. It often happens that things present

> ——— Pass by us, like the idle wind
> Which we regard not;

whilst objects of memory so fully occupy our attention, that, like Hamlet, we think we see them "in the mind's eye." Still we see them (whilst we possess our reasoning faculties) not as present, but as past, with a specific difference of perception. The perception of the future, as such, is also specifically different from either of the others. Reason and reflection alone could not explain to us the necessity of such a distinction, because it is an element of reason, so far as that faculty applies to events occurring in time. It would be as correct to say, that by reasoning on the nature of light and colours, we come to discover the sensations of red and green, as to say, that by reasoning on duration, we come to discover that there is a past, a present, and a future. When we treat of these portions of time, we treat of them with reference to some particular moment; for as time is perpetually flowing on, that which was future yesterday is to-day present, and that which was present yesterday is to-day past. The particular moment which thus characterises the time, is that in which the speaker or writer is addressing himself to his hearers or readers. We have seen, however, that that moment is not always referred to as indivisible, but sometimes as capable of extension and indefinite continuance. So it was observed to be in the present and past; and so it is in the future. A person may say, "I *shall mount* my horse;" and he may say, "I *shall be* an hour *riding* from London to Richmond." In the former instance the tense may be called the future *perfect;* in the latter the future *imperfect.* Again, the future may be *definite;* as, "I shall mount at six o'clock;" or, *indefinite*, as "I shall ride some time in the course of the day."* Lastly, the act may be *positive*, that is, it may be considered only as future at the moment of speaking (which is the case with all the preceding examples), or it may be *relative*, considering the act as not to take place till after some other which is also future. Thus, a person may say, "I *shall have mounted* my horse before the clock has struck;" or "I *shall have been riding* an hour when I reach the next milestone."

284. These distinctions refer properly to time. There are others which refer to the contingency of the act, or to its frequency and habitual performance; these seem to draw their distinctive character

Other distinctions.

* In our English idiom, the verbs "I shall mount," and "I shall ride," appear, in these instances, to be equally definite, and the indefinite character of the latter is only to be collected from the context; but possibly in some other languages there may be a formal as well as a substantial difference of tense, answering to this distinction.

from the mood, or kind of verb, and, therefore, may be deemed not so much tenses as modifications of the tenses already named. Somewhat more of doubt may, perhaps, be allowable with respect to those forms of speech which imply either the immediate intention to begin an act, or its recent completion. Of the first class are "I am about to write," "I was beginning to write," "I shall begin to write:" and of the second class *Je viens d'ecrire*, "I have just written;" *Je venois d'ecrire*, "I had just written;" Ἔσομαι γεγραφώς, "I shall have done writing." Yet though these forms of speech serve to mark given periods of time, and therefore may be called tenses, they also seem to go somewhat further, by including other notions not strictly referable to time. At all events, there must be a limit to the combinations, which are distinguished as tenses. Time is capable of endless divisions, and language would be infinitely minute in all its ramifications, if it provided a separate inflection for all those separate modifications of thought. It is true, that idioms vary in nothing more than in the varieties of tense for which they provide. Some languages are very meagre in this respect, others luxuriant; some are strictly confined to differences of time, others mix up, with these, a variety of other considerations. Thus the English language marks a distinction unknown, I believe, to any other language, between the future of choice and the future of necessity: and what is remarkable, that distinction varies with the different persons of the tense. "I shall go" implies no particular volition, nor indeed anything but the certainty of the event. "I will go" implies absolute volition. On the other hand, "you will go" implies no volition of any person, but "you shall go" implies the volition of the speaker. It is a striking proof how much nicety and difficulty there is in the peculiar use of the tenses of verbs, that scarcely a single Scottish writer, however eminent, will be found to have accurately observed the distinctions of "shall" and "will" throughout all his compositions. The reason is, that the writers in question have from infancy become accustomed to the Scottish idiom, and idiom is much less a matter of reasoning than of habit. A critical examination of the idioms regarded as most elegant, will show them to abound with the same pleonasms and ellipses, which are commonly considered as marks of rusticity in the language of the common people. The English idiom above-mentioned, however, is of very simple explication. It refers primarily to *the will of the speaker*. If, therefore, he says "I will," it is to be understood that, so far as his power extends, the action is to be performed; but if he says "I shall," inasmuch as he indicates no volition of his own, nothing further is to be inferred but the futurity of the action. Again, if he says "you shall go," he "shall go," he intimates a necessity; for the original meaning of *shall* is that which is necessary, and must, or at least, ought to be done, from the Mæso-Gothic *skal*.* But this

* See Junius *ad vocem*. Also Wachter, *schuld, schuldig*.

necessity, being declared by the speaker, relates to his will alone. Thus, in Coriolanus:—

Sicinius. ———— It is a mind
That *shall remain* a poison where it is,
Not poison any further.
Coriolanus. Shall remain?
Hear you this Triton of the minnows? Mark you
His absolute *shall*?

On the other hand, when the speaker says "you *will* go," "he *will* go," he intimates no will of his own; and, therefore, nothing is understood but the futurity of the action. The proper force and effect, therefore, of the two English futures may be thus expressed:—

1. Future compulsory. "I will go," *i. e.*, it is *my will* to go. "Thou shalt go," *i. e.*, it is *my will* to compel thee to go. "He shall go," *i. e.*, it is *my will* to compel him to go.

2. Future not compulsory. "I shall go," *i. e.*, there is some cause compelling me to go, *independently of my will.* "Thou wilt go," *i. e.*, there is some cause compelling thee to go, *independently of my will.* "He will go," *i. e.*, there is some cause compelling him to go, *independently of my will.* The same reasoning applies to the plural number as to the singular; and, consequently, "we will go," "ye shall go," "they shall go," belong to the first kind of future; and "we shall go," "ye will go," "they will go," belong to the second. What I have here called the future compulsory has sometimes a merely permissive force, sometimes a promissive, and sometimes it is used in the manner of an imperative mood, as "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt do no murder," for "steal not," "murder not;" and this idiom is found both in the Greek and Latin: Ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι, Ye shall be therefore perfect, *i. e.*, Be ye therefore perfect, St. Matt. ch. v. v. 48. And so Horace: Inter cuncta, *leges*, et *percunctabere* doctos. Lib. i. Epist. 18. But though various circumstances, of the nature of those which have been already pointed out, do, in fact, enter into the composition of tenses in various languages; yet they do not properly belong to the scientific division of tenses in Universal Grammar, which ought to regard only distinctions of time, and not these beyond a certain degree of minuteness and complexity. Where the divisions of time are very minute or complex, their expression rather forms a sentence than a word. It is something more than the mind can easily grasp or communicate in one combined form; and which, therefore, to be understood, requires to be analysed into different words.

In a subject which has undergone such various treatment by grammarians, as the distribution of tenses, I am far from arrogating to my own method any very superior merit; still less do I recommend the name which I have given to each tense as the best calculated to express its distinctive character. Instead of the perfect and imperfect, some writers use the terms *absolute* and *continuous;* and those tenses which I

have called positive and relative, correspond nearly with the *perfectum* and the *plusquam perfectum*, the *futurum*, and *paulo-post futurum*.

Harris's scheme.

285. The arrangement proposed by the learned Mr. Harris, though differing considerably from that which I have suggested, is, I must acknowledge, entitled to great attention: and, therefore, without going into all his reasonings in favour of it (contained in the 7th chapter of the 1st book of Hermes), I think it right to state its general outline.

"Tenses," he observes, "are used to mark present, past, and future time, either *indefinitely*, without reference to any beginning, middle, or end; or else *definitely*, in reference to such distinctions.

"If indefinitely, then have we three tenses, called *aorists* (so called from the Greek ἀορίστον, undefined, or unlimited), viz., an aorist of the present, an aorist of the past, and an aorist of the future.

"If definitely, then have we nine other tenses, viz., three to mark the beginnings of the present, past, and future respectively, three to denote their middles, and three to denote their ends.

"The three first of these nine tenses we call the inceptive present, the inceptive past, and the inceptive future: the three next the middle present, the middle past, and the middle future; and the three last the completive present, the completive past, and the completive future.

"And thus there are in all twelve tenses, of which three denote time absolutely, and nine denote time under its respective distinctions."

1. Denoting time absolutely and indefinitely:—
    1. Aorist of the present, γράφω, *scribo*, I write;
    2. Aorist of the past, ἔγραψα, *scripsi*, I wrote;
    3. Aorist of the future, γράψω, *scribam*, I shall write.
2. Denoting time under the respective distinctions of inception, continuity, and completion.
    1. Denoting inception:—
        1. Inceptive present, μέλλω γράφειν, *scripturus sum*, I am about to write;
        2. Inceptive past, ἔμελλον γράφειν, *scripturus eram*, I was beginning to write;
        3. Inceptive future, μελλήσω γράφειν, *scripturus ero*, I shall be beginning to write.
    2. Denoting continuance:—
        1. Extended present, τυγχάνω γράφων, *scribo*, or *scribens sum*, I am writing;
        2. Extended past, ἔγραφον, or ἐτύγχανον γράφων, *scribebam*, I was writing;
        3. Extended future, ἔσομαι γράφων, *scribens ero*, I shall be writing.
    3. Denoting completion:—
        1. Completive present, γέγραφα, *scripsi*, I have written;

2. Completive past, *ἐγεγράφειν*, *scripseram*, I had done writing;
3. Completive future, *ἔσομαι γεγραφώς*, *scripsero*, I shall have done writing.

Whatever arrangement we adopt, we shall certainly not find it fully followed out in many languages; for while some have great varieties of inflection or construction to express the different times, others have fewer; and yet it may happen that the idiom, which upon the whole is the least rich in tenses, is more minute than all the others in some one particular distinction.

Connection of Tense with Mood.

286. On the combination of tense with mood, much judicious criticism is to be found in various grammarians, and particularly in the work last quoted, the Hermes of Mr. Harris, who has collected not only his own observations, but those of the philosophers of successive ages: for the pure science of Universal Grammar rests on a knowledge of the operations of the human mind; which (so far at least as regards the intellectual powers) were profoundly investigated, and ably explained, both by Greek and Roman grammarians. Those learned men were not only conversant with the intellectual philosophy of their time, but were themselves philosophers of no mean rank. Such a person was APOLLONIUS of Alexandria, surnamed **Δυσκόλος**, or "the difficult," whose four books *περι* **Συντάξεως**, "on Syntax," are considered to be the most philosophical of any extant on the Greek language. He himself says he composed them, *μετα πάσης ἀκριβείας*, "with all possible accuracy." PRISCIAN, who professes to make him his chief guide, says of his dissertations, *Quid Apollonii scrupulosis quæstionibus enucleatius possit inveniri?* The celebrated THEODORE GAZA confesses that he owes to him almost everything. The learned THOMAS LINACER follows him, as it were step by step. And lastly, Harris, who quotes him liberally throughout the whole of Hermes, declares him to be "one of the acutest authors that ever wrote on the subject of Grammar." In thus tracing the literary genealogy of grammatical authorities, I at once prove their present title to respect, and show that it could not have subsisted through so many centuries, if it had not been originally founded on superior talent and ability. When, therefore, I find an author like Apollonius employing much learning on the illustration of the tenses, and their combination with the different moods, I cannot be persuaded that such speculations are wholly trifling or useless to those who would obtain a perfect acquaintance with the science of Grammar. Now Apollonius, observing on the connection above noticed between the future tense and the imperative mood, satisfactorily explains why in most languages there is not a distinct form for the future tense of that mood. The reason is that all imperatives are in their nature futures; for thus argues Apollonius:—*Ἐπὶ γὰρ μὴ γινομένοις ἢ μὴ γεγονόσιν ἡ Πρόσταξις· τὰ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ἢ μὴ γεγονότα, ἐπιτηδειότητα δε ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ ἔσεσθαι,* **Μελλοντος** *ἐστι.* "A *command* has respect to those things

which either are not doing or have not yet been done. But those things which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be properly said to appertain to the *future*." And again, he says, *Ἅπαντα τὰ προστακτικὰ ἐγκειμένην ἔχει τὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος διάθεσιν—σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐν ἴσῳ ἐστὶ τὸ, ὁ τυραννοκτόνησας τιμάσθω, τῷ τιμηθησεται, κατὰ τὴν χρόνου ἔννοιαν· τῇ ἐκκλίσει διηλλαχὸς, καθὸ τὸ μὲν προστακτικὸν, τὸ δὲ ὁριστικόν.* " All *imperatives* have a disposition within them which regards the *future*. With regard to time, therefore, it is the same thing to say, *Let him that kills a tyrant be honoured*, as to say, *He that kills a tyrant shall be honoured;* the difference being only in the mood, inasmuch as the one is *imperative*, the other *indicative*." So Priscian shows the connection of the imperative with the future.—"*Imperativus verò præsens, et futurum (tempus) naturali quâdam necessitate videtur posse accipere. Ea enim imperamus, quæ vel in præsenti statim volumus fieri, sine aliquâ dilatione, vel in futuro.*" " The imperative (mood) seems to receive the present and future (tenses) by a certain natural necessity; for, we command those things which we wish to be done, either immediately at present, without any delay, or in future." From this reasoning, it is plain that the present tense of the imperative mood is a present inceptive, looking necessarily to a continuance or completion in futurity. It expresses on the part of the speaker a present will; but on the part of the person addressed a future act: and that futurity may either begin from the moment of speaking, or at a more distant period.

Thus, when Lear cautions Kent not to interfere between him and his anger to Cordelia, the will and the act are closely conjoined:—

> *Come* not between the dragon and his wrath!

But when he imprecates curses on his unnatural and cruel daughters, the object of his prayer is one which cannot take effect till long afterwards, and which may continue for a course of years:—

> ——————— If she must teem,
> *Create* her child of spleen, that it may live
> And be a thwart, disnatur'd torment to her;
> *Let* it *stamp* wrinkles on her brow of youth,
> With cadent tears *fret* channels in her cheeks,
> *Turn* all her mother's pains and benefits
> To laughter and contempt.

Nor is it only the imperative mood which may be connected with a future time. Vossius has observed, that what is commonly called the present conjunctive has in some instances a future import; as, when Cicero says, in one of his epistles to Atticus, "*Est mihi præcipua causa manendi; de qua utinam aliquando tecum loquar.*" " I have a particular reason for staying here, concerning which I hope I may some time or other talk to you;" where *utinam loquar*, " I hope I may talk," relates entirely to a future time. It is needless here to follow the numerous and minute remarks of many learned critics on

the mixed or variable times which are expressed by all the conjunctive tenses. Suffice it to say, that the combination of any mood which implies contingency or futurity, with a tense, referring to present or past time, must necessarily affect the expression of time, and, consequently, that in this respect, the tenses of the indicative must differ from the analogous tenses in any other mood. As, therefore, in nouns, the term gender, originally used to express the mere distinction of sex, has been applied in use to distinguish large classes of words from each other, with reference only to their terminations; so in verbs the word Tense, originally meaning the expression of time alone, has been also used in most grammars to express that conception in combination with the others above noticed.

Person.

287. From the remaining essential property of the verb, namely, the expression of *Attribute*, arises the necessity for a distinction of *Person;* for every attribute must relate to a subject of the first, second, or third person, as above distinguished. The form of the verb may or may not be altered on this account. We may say in Latin *amo, amamus, amatis, amant*, or in English "I love," "we love," "ye love," "they love;" but it is manifest that though in the examples cited from the latter language the form remains unchanged, the signification is alike varied in both languages. The difference of person, therefore, in point of form, is merely accidental to the verb: it peculiarly belongs to the pronoun, and has been sufficiently explained in treating of that part of speech. In many languages, the person of the verb is necessarily expressed by a separate pronoun. This is universally the case in the Chinese, for the verb being alike in all the persons, it would be impossible to distinguish one from the other without the addition of some other word. The three persons singular of the present tense run thus:—

Ngo Ngai, I love;
Ni Ngai, Thou lovest;
Ta Ngai, He loves.

And the same occurs in the other tenses, and in the plural number.

In English we find it partially the case; for though in the singular we have three distinctions of person in the present, as "I love," "thou lovest," "he loves," and two in the past, as "I loved," "thou lovedst," yet in all other parts (with the exception of the irregular *to be*) the verb remains unaltered. Nor does this arise from any peculiarity in the original genius of our language, for the more ancient dialects, from which it is derived, abounded with personal terminations. Now these terminations, as will be shown hereafter, were, in their origin, nothing more than the pronouns themselves, which, in process of time, coalesced with the expression of attribute, connection, assertion, and time, and so formed words, signifying at once all these different circumstances, together with the additional distinction of person.

Impersonals.

288. Some verbs are called *impersonal*, a name which only seems

to mean that they are not usually conjugated with distinction of persons, but remain always in the form of the third person. If they had no other peculiarity than that from which their name is derived, it might not be necessary to notice them in a treatise on Universal Grammar; but, in truth, they are constructed on a principle different from that which has been already explained in reference to person. The impersonals are of two kinds, active and neuter. By active I mean those which require an object, as "it grieves me," "it becomes me," *miseret me*, *decet me*, &c.; by neuter I mean those verbs of which the action terminates in itself, as "it rains," "it snows," "it is hot," "it is cold;" the Latin *pluit*, the French *il fait chaud*, the Italian *fa freddo*, the German *es donnert*, *es friert*, &c. In all these instances the verb contains a mere assertion of the existence of the conception; but does not indicate any agent. These verbs have been sometimes explained as agreeing with a nominative implied in them: thus *pudet* is said to be a verb agreeing with the implied nominative *pudor*, as if the meaning were, "shame shames me;" but this is rather a formal than a substantial explanation. *Pudet* in reality *contains*, and does not merely *imply* the noun *pudor*: it expresses the same conception as the noun, and asserts its existence. It is therefore rather of the nature of a verb substantive, than of a verb active; and though, in some idioms, a nominative is expressed, yet in reality that nominative is superfluous, or, at most, is only introduced to keep up the general analogy of the language. The nominative *it* in the English language, and *il* in French, have no distinct reference to any conception. They are pronouns, which do not stand for any noun. If any one should say, "It rains," we cannot, as in the common case, where a distinct nominative is expressed, ask "what rains?" for the answer would only be *it;* and if we were then to ask, "what is *it?*" we must be left without any answer. Hence, in translation, the nominative *it* is often lost. We do not say in Latin, Hoc *pluit;* nor in Greek, ΤΟΥΤΟ χρὴ. The proper notion of an impersonal verb, therefore, is, that it asserts the existence of an action, without reference to any particular agent.

Number. 289. The expression of *Number* is another accidental property of the verb; and belongs to it only in so far as the verb may be combined with the expression of person. It is, therefore, like the same property in the adjective, a mere method of connecting it in construction with the noun substantive, or pronoun, which forms its nominative. Accordingly, it applies to verbs in the same manner as it does to nouns and pronouns. When they admit a dual number, as in Sanscrit, Arabic, and Greek, the verb admits the same; when they do not, it has only a singular and a plural. Indeed, the matter could not well be otherwise, if, as has been already stated, the personal terminations of the verb be really the pronouns themselves coalescing with it. The verb is equally said to be in the singular or plural, whether it has or has not distinct terminations appropriated to those different numbers;

we call "I love" singular, and "we love" plural; but it is manifest, that in all such instances the expression of number exists only in the pronoun. These are questions of Particular Grammar: all that can be laid down on the subject, as a rule of Universal Grammar, is, that as on the one hand there is nothing in the peculiar nature of the verb which involves the idea of number, so there is nothing in the idea of number which can prevent it from being combined with the verb, where the genius of the language permits such a union.

Gender. 290. Since the verb, by means of its connection with the pronoun, admits person and number, there is no reason why it should not also admit *Gender;* and, in fact, this distinction obtains in the Arabic, the Ethiopic, and some other languages. It is, however, rare; and as gender properly belongs only to nouns, or pronouns substantive, with respect to which it has been already discussed, we need not here pursue the investigation.

Comparison. 291. Some writers contend, that the verb, as expressing an attribute, is capable of Comparison; nor does it appear that this can be gainsaid, if we regard only the *attributive* nature of the verb. There are, indeed, certain attributes, as has been already observed, which are not intensive; and these of course cannot admit degrees of comparison; neither can the assertive power be compared: for the verb must assert a thing either to exist, or not to exist. On the other hand, verbs may be compounded with conceptions implying comparison, as "to *out*do," "to *over*take," *subesse*, *superesse*, &c. They may too, in general, be compared by means of the adverbs of comparison, *more*, *most*, *less*, *least*, &c.; but I am not aware that it has been attempted, in any language, to combine in one and the same word the *assertive* power with the comparative. It is not easy to conceive any form of verb which in itself would express the degrees of comparison; and the reason probably is, that though the mere qualities of substance may be simply intensive, yet actions are intensive in various modes, as well as in various degrees. Of different substances, concerning which whiteness can be predicated, some may be more and some less white; but of different beings concerning which the act of walking may be predicated, all equally walk, though one walks more, another less; one faster, another slower, &c.: and so of mental action, several persons love, but one loves more warmly, another more violently, another more purely; so that there is not in actions, as there is in qualities, a simple scale of elevation and depression; and, consequently, the mere comparison of more and less would not answer all the purposes of language, as applied to the verb, though it does as applied to the adjective. For this reason participles, when they are compared, lose their participial power; for *sàpientior* and *potentior* do not express acts, but habits, or fixed qualities, and therefore answer to the English adjectives "wiser," and "more powerful."

Conclusion. 292. Thus have we seen, that though the proper force and effect of the verb—that on which its peculiar character depends—is assertion,

yet it is capable of combining therewith, and in fact it does so combine, not only the conception of attribute which Priscian calls the *res* of the verb, but the expression of mood, tense, person, number, and even gender. "Observe," says the President DES BROSSES, "how, in one single word, so loaded with accessory notions, everything is marked, every notion has its member, and the analogical formulas are preserved throughout on the plan first laid down." Elsewhere he adds, "All this composition is the work, not of a deeply-meditated combination, nor of a well-reasoned philosophy, but of the metaphysics of instinct." The Goths, the Saxons, the Greeks, and the Latins, in forming the schemes of conjugation above noticed, were probably impelled by principles in the human mind, the very existence of which they hardly suspected. Similar principles have operated, but with endless diversity of application, in the formation of all the various dialects which have been spoken in ancient and modern times, by nations the most barbarous and the most civilized; and it is the development and explication of these ever-operative *principles* which forms the proper object of the science of Universal Grammar.

CHAPTER X.

OF ARTICLES.

293. HAVING explained the uses of the *principal* parts of speech employed in enunciative sentences, I come now to the *accessories*. The principal parts, as has been fully stated, are those which are necessary for communicating thought in a simple sentence: and the communication of thought requires the *naming* of some conception, and the *assertion* of its existence as an object either of perception or of volition. Conceptions are named by the *noun*: they are asserted to exist by the *verb*; but it often becomes desirable to modify either the name, or the assertion, or the union of both. How is this to be done? Certain modifications may be incorporated with the noun by its cases, and numbers, and genders; with the verb by its moods, tenses, and persons; with the adjective by its degrees of comparison; and with the participle, gerund, supine, and infinitive, by their marks of time, relation, &c. The same, or similar effects, may be produced by separate words; and what must those separate words be? Nouns, or verbs, which, appearing in subordinate characters, are no longer to be considered such as they were formerly. Accessory parts of speech.

294. We wish to modify a conception; how can we do it but by another conception? We wish to modify an assertion; how can we do it but by another assertion? It is therefore plain that the accessory words must have had originally the character of principals; that is to say, they must have been either nouns or verbs. This is a truth extremely obvious in itself, and of which many grammarians have been fully aware; but there is another truth, which seems to have been less apprehended, namely, that these subordinate and accessory words act as such a very different part from that which they sustained as principals in a sentence. The mind dwells on them more slightly; *they express a more transient operation of the intellect.* In process of time some of them come to lose their original meaning, and to be only significant as modifying other nouns and verbs. It cannot be denied that the words *and*, *the*, *with*, and the like, have no distinct meaning, at present, in our language, except that which depends on their association and connection with other words. The etymologist may succeed, or he may not succeed, in his attempts to trace these non-significant words to the significant words from which they are derived; but whether he be successful or unsuccessful, the fact will be no less certain, that in their secondary use they lose their primary character and signification; they are no longer nouns or verbs, but inferior parts of speech, commonly termed articles, prepositions, con- How modifying other words.

junctions, and adverbs, each of which classes I shall examine in its order.

How designated.

295. These inferior parts of speech have been called *particles*: and, as such, are sometimes distinguished from *words*, and sometimes treated only as separate classes of words. To explain and account for them seems to have given much trouble to many grammatical and philosophical writers: and after all, the subject has been often left in a state of great confusion. Mr. LOCKE, in his second volume, has a vague chapter on particles, from which it may be inferred that he considered nouns to be the names of thoughts, or, as he expresses it, of ideas. All other words serve, according to him, to connect ideas. The principal of these (which I call the verb) he calls the mark of affirming or denying; and he says, "the words whereby the mind signifies what connection it gives to the several affirmations and negations that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration are called *particles*." Elsewhere he says of these particles, "they are not truly by themselves names of any ideas;" and again, "they are all marks of some *action or intimation of the mind*, and *therefore*, to understand them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and several other *thoughts* of the mind, for which we have either none or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied." The confusion which occurs in these passages between "ideas," "thoughts," and "actions or intimations of the mind," shows that Locke attached no distinct meaning to any of these words; but so far as they lead to a grammatical doctrine, it would seem that he conceived particles *not* to be derived from nouns. HOOGEVEEN speaks much more intelligibly. He says, "*particulas in suâ infantiâ fuisse vel verba, vel nomina, vel ex nominibus formata adverbia.*" "The particles were, in their infancy, either verbs or nouns, or adverbs formed from nouns." "*Ipsæ verò*, QUANTENUS PARTICULÆ, *per se solæ spectatæ, nihil significant.*" "They themselves, *as particles*, considered alone, signify nothing." And again, in defining the particle, he says, "*particulam esse voculam, ex nomine vel verbo natam.*" "The particle is a small word derived from a noun or a verb." Had Mr. Tooke properly reflected on these passages, which he quotes from Hoogeveen, he would have found them to contain all that was valuable in his own system, without the errors into which he has fallen. The term particle, indeed, is not well chosen, to include the inferior parts of speech; nor do grammarians agree as to the extent of its signification. Locke only describes it as including "prepositions and conjunctions, &c.;" leaving it to his reader's judgment to determine what classes of words fall under the *et cætera*: SCALIGER says, "*ut omittam particulas minores, cujusmodi sunt præpositiones, conjunctiones, interjectiones*:" and Hoogeveen, as is seen above, seems to distinguish the particle from the adverb; whilst other grammarians include in it all indeclinable words, and even the article, which in Greek is declinable. It is unnecessary to adopt any generic term as designating

all the accessorial parts of speech; nor do I deem it advisable to distribute them as Harris has done into two classes, which he names definitives and connectives. I shall, however, begin with the article, which he arranges under the definitives.

Use of the Article.

296. The *Article* is *a part of speech serving to reduce a noun substantive from a general to a particular signification.* I have already observed, in speaking of nouns, that by far the greater part of them must be what Mr. Locke calls general terms, that is to say, names common to many conceptions. We cannot give a distinct name to every distinct object that we perceive, nor to every distinct thought which passes through the mind; nor are these thoughts, or even these objects, so entirely distinct to human conception as many persons are apt to imagine. If I see a horse to-day, and another horse to-morrow, the conceptions which I form of these different objects are indeed different in some respects; but in others they agree. The one horse may be black, and the other white; but they are both quadrupeds, both have hoofs, &c. The word *horse* is a noun, expressing the conception which I form of all the points in which I perceive them to agree. This word, therefore, applies to a class of conceptions; but it is necessary that I should possess some means of expressing the individuals of that class. Now those means are afforded by adding the article to the noun. To illustrate what I mean, let us take a general term; for instance, the word *man.* The conception expressed by this word alone is one which exists in several other conceptions, as in that which is formed of "Peter," or of "James," or of "John." *Peter*, therefore, is a word expressing the general conception, "man," together with something peculiar to a certain individual; and the same may be said of James and John; but it must frequently happen that the proper name Peter, or James, or John, is unknown to us. How, then, are we to express our conception of either of them? To each the term "man" belongs; but it belongs to each equally; and therefore it does not distinguish the individual from his class, nor one individual from another. If, therefore, we use this term "man," we must also employ some other means of showing that we mean by it *this* or *that* man; or at least some *one* man, as distinguished from the conception of "man" in general. Now, these means are afforded by the article; and they are afforded in two different ways: we either speak of the general term simply, as applicable to a general notion of individuality, or else with relation to some particular circumstance which we know belongs only to a certain individual. In the former case we may be said to enumerate, in the latter to demonstrate, the person or thing intended. In the one we say positively "*a* man," in the other we say relatively "*the* man."

Two classes.

297. Hence arise two classes of articles. They have been called the *indefinite* and the *definite;* but it has been justly observed by HARRIS that they both define, only the latter defines more perfectly

than the former. It would, perhaps, be more appropriate to call the one *positive*, and the other *relative*, or the one *numeral*, and the other *demonstrative*. I shall adopt the two first of these designations, merely for convenience; but I consider the names by which it may be thought fit to designate the different classes of words, as comparatively unimportant. The most material object is to establish the classification itself on clear and intelligible principles.

Whether necessary.

298. Grammarians have disputed whether the article be, or be not, a *necessary* part of speech. Before this question can be properly answered, it must be clearly stated. Mr. Tooke says, "in all languages there are only two sorts of words which are necessary for the communication of our thoughts; and these are, 1. noun, and 2. verb;" and he adds, that he uses the words noun and verb "in their common acceptation." It would seem from this, that he meant to describe the article as unnecessary; for in common acceptation it is certainly not considered to be identical, either with the noun, or with the verb. However, he afterwards describes it as "necessary for the communication of thought," and even "denies its absence from the Latin, or from any other language." Those ancient writers who considered the noun and the verb as the only, or, at least, as the principal and more distinguished parts of speech, either included the article among the *syncatagoremata*, that is, consignificant words, or else denied its necessity, and even its existence, in some languages, particularly in the Latin. *Noster sermo*, says QUINCTILIAN, *Articulos non desiderat. Articulos*, says PRISCIAN, *quibus nos caremus—Articulos integros in nostrâ non invenimus Linguâ.* And so SCALIGER, *Articulus nobis nullus, et Græcis superfluus.* And VOSSIUS, *Articulum, quem Fabio teste Latinus sermo non desiderat, imò, me judice, planè ignorat.* From these authorities, and indeed from a very slight inspection of the language itself, it is clear that the Latin had no separate words answering to the articles of the English and other languages; nor is it less clear, that the Greek had only the relative article ὁ, ἡ, τὸ, and was entirely destitute of our positive article. Mr. Tooke is undoubtedly right in inferring, from the necessity of general terms, the necessity of the article; if we thereby understand the necessity of some means to apply general terms to their individual instances. He is, however, wrong in supposing that this purpose is always effected either by a distinct word, or by some prefix or termination added to words: nor is the ingenious but fanciful COUR DE GEBELIN less erroneous in asserting that the article was supplied in Latin by the termination; for the termination in no manner whatsoever defined whether the word was to be taken in a more or less general acceptation. It indicated the case, the number, and the grammatical gender; but it did nothing else. *Homo* signified "Man" in general, or "a man," or "the man" before spoken of; and the termination afforded no help toward determining in which of these three senses the word was to be taken in any particular passage. This was to be discovered in

Latin, as in some other languages, merely by the context. If, therefore, the question, whether the article be necessary, mean whether a separate class of words performing the function of the article be necessary, it must be resolved in the negative; because no such class is to be found in the Latin and some other languages. If, on the other hand, it mean whether in all languages there must be some mode of performing the function of the article, it must be answered affirmatively; and this is a question which, as it relates to the operations of the Mind, properly falls within the scope of pure Grammatical Science.

Distinguishes general from individual.

299. Even though a particular language may have no class of words called articles, the persons speaking that language must certainly distinguish, in their conceptions, the general from the individual. In treating of the noun, I have already spoken of the different gradations of conception; but it is necessary to advert again to the grounds of this distinction. The inattentive observer of external objects believes that their forms are always impressed distinctly on the eye; and that every superficies is bounded by a visible outline. A more reflecting and more accurate philosophy teaches us, that even in contemplating the objects which we most admire, imagination does more than mere sensible impression toward supplying us with a knowledge of their forms; and that, in a sense not merely poetical,

> We half create the wondrous world we see.

In like manner, the inattentive observer of the operations of Mind, as they relate to language, is apt to suppose that all his thoughts or conceptions are definite and distinct; and, consequently, that the words which serve to name these thoughts are so too; but this is far from being the case. Let us consider each of the three classes of conception before noticed, *viz.*, the conception of a *particular* object, that of a *general* notion applicable to many particulars, and that of an *idea* or *universal* truth. The first and last of these are in themselves perfectly definite. No man can have two distinct ideas of "virtue," considered absolutely and in the primary signification of the word: and the same may be said of "squareness," "power," "duration," "space," "wisdom," &c., &c. In like manner we cannot have two distinct conceptions of a particular person or thing, and, therefore, when we know its proper name, as "George," "Louis," "London," "Paris," "Alexander," "Bucephalus," "Europe," "Guildhall," &c., &c., it is unnecessary to prefix thereto any other word for the sake of more clearly showing the individuality of our conception. Hence we see the reason why neither *proper names* nor *universal terms* do of necessity require to be used with an article, either positive or relative. The idiom of a particular language may, indeed, sanction such a construction; but this depends on separate considerations, to which I shall hereafter advert. Generally speaking, such idioms as the following cannot be necessary to intelligibility in any language: "*the*

George reigns in *the* England," or "*a* Guildhall is situated in *a* London:" or, "*the* virtue produces *a* happiness;" or "*an* Alexander aimed at *the* glory;" and the reason is obvious, because it is not necessary to define or distinguish, in such sentences, one George from another George, one England from another England, one virtue from another virtue, &c.

General terms.

300. But the remaining class of conceptions, though general in their nature, serve to communicate the greater part of our knowledge respecting particular objects. We have often no other conception of the individual than that he belongs to such or such a species. We know the man only by his profession, the soldier only by his regiment, the officer only by his rank. Hence the great use of *general terms* in all languages; and hence, too, the necessity for individualizing them, either tacitly in the mind, or expressly in language. When this process of individualization is effected by a separate word, we call that word an article; and thus we say, that it is necessary, in English, to add the article "a" or "the" to the general term "man," in order to designate an individual of the human species.

Universals.

301. It is to be observed, that, in a secondary sense, all words of the other two classes may be considered and treated as *general terms;* and, consequently, may require the use of the article to individualize them. For, first, the idea expressed by an *universal term*, such as "virtue," "truth," and the like, may be considered as existing separately in each subordinate conception of quality, action, &c., in which it is involved. If we speak of virtue simply, as opposed to vice, or in any other manner which regards the pure idea of virtue, without any modification, it is an universal term which needs not the aid of an article; but if we speak of those subordinate ideas, such as justice, prudence, temperance, fortitude, in each of which the higher idea of virtue is involved, as the conception of man is in the conception of Peter or John, we may consider the word virtue, in a secondary sense, as applicable to each of them separately, and therefore may call each "*a* virtue," or "*the* virtue." And not only does this apply to subordinate conceptions of the same kind and nature as their superior, but sometimes to others, in which that superior is equally involved. The conception of injustice is of the same kind and nature as the conception of vice. They are both *ideas*, both universal, both regard *qualities* of the mind; but the conception of an unjust *action* partakes, though in a remoter degree, of both these ideas, and therefore it is sometimes called "an injustice," or "a vice." Thus Hamlet, on Horatio's saying that he is not acquainted with Osric, replies, "Thy state is the more gracious, for 'tis *a vice* to know him." And so Bassanio, urging the Duke to wrest the law to his authority, exclaims—

To do *a great right*, do *a little wrong*.

It is only in this secondary sense that such words as virtue and vice, right and wrong, can be employed in the plural number; and hence

arises in all languages a vast class of general terms, which unhappily are but too often perverted in use. The idea of *crime* does not always agree with our conceptions of *crimes:* and we often find an opposition between the notions of *right* and *rights*, *honour* and *honours*.

Proper names.

302. Secondly, a *proper name*, which, in its primary sense, designates only an individual man, may be made to stand for a conception common to many other individuals; because we can suppose, however contrary it may be to fact, that there is a class of men, each possessing those qualities and powers which make up all that we know of a certain individual. Thus the word SHAKSPEARE primarily means that wonderful poet who wrote *Hamlet* and the *Midsummer Night's Dream*, who could portray the characters of *Othello* and *Falstaff*, *Richard II.* and *Richard III.*, and who as much excelled every writer of his day in the sweetness and facility of his language, as he did in richness of imagination and in profound knowledge of the human heart. It is in vain to *expect* another being so endowed to arise before the return of the fancied Platonic year; and yet we may *suppose* a whole club of such dramatists, like the "cluster of wits" in Queen Anne's time; we may imagine one from every country under heaven; and therefore we may talk of "a French Shakspeare," or "a German Shakspeare," "the Shakspeare of Tennessee," or "the Shak speare of Timbuctoo."

Articles whence derived.

303. The words which answer the purpose of individualizing general terms, in the two modes above described, were originally pronominal adjectives. In some instances they have undergone a change of form, by becoming articles; in others, they remain unchanged. The French *le* and *un*, are the Latin *ille* and *unus;* the English *the* and *a* are the Anglo-Saxon *thæt* and *ane*. Hence, it is not surprising, that many grammarians comprehend, under a common designation, the demonstrative pronoun and the article. Such was the doctrine of the Stoics, some of whom gave to both these kinds of words the common name of *article*, calling our pronoun the definite article; and our article, the indefinite article; whilst others considered both as *pronouns*, and only denominated our articles, articular pronouns. "*Articulis autem pronomina connumerantes*," says Priscian, "*finitos, et articulos appellabant; ipsos autem articulos, infinitos articulos dicebant; vel ut alii dicunt, articulos connumerabant pronominibus, et articularia eos pronomina vocabant.*"

Difference from a pronoun.

304. There are, however, some marked differences between the pronominal adjective and the article, which may justify us in considering the latter as a separate part of speech. In our own language, the same words which act as pronominal adjectives may also be used substantively; and, in particular, the words *that* and *one*, are sometimes to be considered as substantive pronouns, as when we say, "*that* which I love," "*one* whom I respect;" but we cannot, in like manner, say, "*the* which I love," "*a* whom I respect." This distinction, however, depends on the idiom of the English language,

and, therefore, will not afford a discriminating characteristic between the separate parts of speech in Universal Grammar. But the case is different, when we consider the manner in which the pronominal adjective and the article respectively affect the meaning of a general term. They both individualize it: but the article performs this function simply; the pronominal adjective does more; it marks some special opposition between different individuals. When we say, "the man is good," there is no opposition implied in the word "the," although there may be in each of the other words. We may say, for instance,

1. "The *man* is good; but the *boy* is bad."
2. "The man *is* good; but he *was* bad."
3. "The man is *good;* but he is not *wise.*"

On the contrary, when we say "*that* man is good," we imply no opposition to the other words in the sentence, but only to the word "that." We intimate not only that there is a particular individual who is good, but also that there is some *other*, who is not good. This distinction is strongly marked in Latin by the pronominal adjectives *hic* and *ille;* as when Ovid says,

——— dissimiles HIC vir, et ILLE puer.

Where the English article *the* is used, the Latins, who have no such article, do not supply its place by the pronominal adjective, but use the noun alone, as

Blessed is *the* man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly.

Beatus vir, qui non abiit in consilio impiorum; and not *Beatus* ILLE *vir.*

It is manifest, that the act of the Mind is very different in the two cases here spoken of. Simply to individualize, is a more *transient* operation than to individualize and at the same time to contrast. Hence, the word *the* is less susceptible of accentuation than the word *that.* It resembles, in this respect, those Greek pronouns which are called *enclitic.* When the oblique cases of the personal pronouns, in that language, were used by way of contradistinction, they were strongly accented, and were called by Grammarians ὀρθοτονουμέναι, *uprightly accented;* but when they were merely subjoined to verbs, without any emphasis being placed on them, they were called Ἐγκλιτικαὶ, that is, *leaning*, or *inclining.* Thus the Greeks had, in the first person, Ἐμοῦ, Ἐμοὶ, Ἐμὲ, for contradistinction, and Μοῦ, Μοὶ, Μὲ, for enclitics; whence Apollonius proposes, instead of the common reading, in the beginning of the *Iliad*—

Παῖδα δὲ μοὶ λύσαιτε—

to read

Παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λύσαιτε.

For it is plain, argues he, that a distinction is intended by the Poet between the words Ὑμῖν and Ἐμοὶ; and therefore the enclitic μοὶ is improper. The principle in the human mind, which converts the

contradistinctive pronoun into an enclitic, is no other than the eager desire of hastening toward the object of its wishes—

Semper ad eventum festinat;

and the same principle it is, which converts the demonstrative pronoun into an article. Instead of "thīs horse," or "thāt horse," we say "thĕ horse:" shortening the article in pronunciation, because we dwell but little upon it in thought. In the Anglo-Saxon language, the word *thæt* appears to have been shortened into *the;* and we have retained the longer word for our pronoun, whilst we use the shorter for our article.

Not superfluous.

305. Since it has appeared that some languages do not employ separate words to perform the office of the article, it may be thought that those words when so employed in any language are superfluous; but this would be a great error. Articles add much to the clearness, the strength, and the beauty of a language: and to be perfectly furnished with them it is necessary to possess both positive and relative articles. The Latin language had neither: the Greek had only the latter of the two; but most of the modern European languages have both. It follows, that in this respect the Latin was less perfect than the Greek, and the Greek than either the French or the English; and Scaliger was, therefore, wrong in denying the use of this part of speech altogether: *Articulus*, says he, *nobis nullus, et Græcis superfluus;* and his sarcasm on the French nation was somewhat misapplied, when he called the article *otiosum loquacissimæ gentis instrumentum.*

Sometimes so used.

306. Yet it must be allowed, that in many European languages, and in none more frequently than in the French, instances occur in which the article is employed superfluously. This circumstance is, for the most part, attributable to an elliptical mode of speech, which is sufficiently capricious. In English, we generally prefix the relative article to the names of our rivers, but seldom to those of our mountains. We say, "*the* Thames," "*the* Tweed;" i. e. the *river* Thames, the *river* Tweed; but we never say *a* Thames, *a* Tweed: nor do we say *the* Snowdon, *the* Skiddaw; or, *a* Snowdon, *a* Skiddaw. In French, the superfluous use of the relative article is very frequent; but it is to be explained on the same principle of ellipsis. "*Il seroit à souhaiter,*" says Condillac, "*qu'on supprimât l'article, toutes les fois que les noms sont suffisamment determinés par la nature de la chose, ou par les circonstances; le discours en seroit plus vif. Mais la grande habitude, que nous nous en sommes faite, ne le permet pas: et ce n'est que dans des proverbes plus anciens que cette habitude, que nous nous faissons un loi de le supprimer. On dit: Pauvreté n'est pas vice, au lieu de dire, La pauvreté n'est pas un vice.*" "It is to be wished that the article were suppressed whenever the noun is sufficiently determined by the nature of the thing, or by the circumstances; the style would thereby be rendered the more lively. But the great habit that we have ac-

quired of using it, does not permit this change; and it is only in old proverbs, more ancient than this habit, that we make a rule of suppressing it. We say, *Pauvreté n'est pas vice*, instead of saying, *La pauvreté n'est pas un vice.*" It is here to be observed, that the proverbial expression, which Condillac seems to recommend, is as much defective as the common expression which he blames is redundant. The article *la* before *pauvretê* is superfluous, and originates in an ellipsis of some word answering to "state" or "condition;" so that "the poverty," means "the condition of poverty:" but, on the other hand, the word "*vice*," properly demands the article *un;* for it is not meant to deny that poverty is the *idea* of vice, which nobody would have asserted; but to deny that poverty is *one* of those states which necessarily include the idea of vice. The most accurate and philosophical mode of expressing this sentence would therefore be, if the idiom of the language permitted it,

Pauvreté n'est pas un vice;

answering exactly to the English idiom in such phrases.

As the French often employ the article redundantly with an universal term, and with the names of places, so the Italians employ it with the names of persons: "Il Tasso," "La Catalani," meaning "the famous poet Tasso," "the celebrated singer Catalani." It is obvious that these expressions are to be accounted for on the same principle of ellipsis already explained. The article in all such cases does not in reality serve to modify the proper name expressed, but the general term understood.

Special effect. 307. There is a particular use of the relative article, with a general term, to which I have before alluded, but which, as it tends to individualize a general term in a peculiar manner, I must here more particularly notice. Certain individuals, having obtained celebrity for their peculiar excellences, have been denominated from this circumstance, as ὁ ποιητὴς, the poet, means Homer; ὁ ῥήτωρ, the orator, Demosthenes; ὁ θεολογος, the theologian, St. Gregory Nazianzen; ὁ γεωγράφος, the geographer, Strabo; ὁ Δειπνοσοφιστης, Athenæus, author of the work entitled "The Feast of the Sophists;" but this is no more than we daily practise, when we speak of "the king," "the queen," "the prince regent," meaning the king of England, the queen of England, and the prince regent of England; just as we hear in private families and narrow circles of society, of "the captain," "the doctor," "the parson," "the squire," &c., the particular application of which general terms is settled, as it were, by a common understanding among the parties; since each of the individuals thus honourably distinguished has his little sphere of celebrity. "*Plurima ejusdem farinæ*" (says Viger) "*ubique obvia.*"

Positive article. 308. I have before observed that the *Numerals* may be employed as nouns substantive, as pronouns substantive, or as pronouns adjective; but the numeral *one*, when used as a pronoun adjective,

approaches in signification so nearly to a positive article, that in languages which have no such article, it supplies the vacant place; and in other languages the positive article is the numeral itself, only varied, and most commonly abbreviated, in pronunciation. In French, the numeral *un*, "one," is spelt in the same way as the article *un*, "a," or "an," but in the latter it is pronounced more slightly. In English the word has been not only abbreviated in point of quantity, but changed in articulation, from "one" to "a." The mental operation, however, is nearly the same in both instances. The conception of *one* is expressed by the article *a*, not in opposition to that of *two*, *three*, or any other conception of number, but as distinguished from *all* the other individuals of the same class. In the Scottish dialect, *ane* was retained as an article to a late period; thus NICOL BURNE, in his "Disputation," A. D. 1581, says, "Tertullian provis, that Christ had *ane* treu body, and treu blude." And on the other hand, in the old English, the numeral pronoun *one* was sometimes abbreviated to *o*, as we read in Chaucer—

Sithe thus of two contraries is *o* lore;

and so in the more ancient MS. Poem of the *Man in the Moon*—

He hath his *o* foot his other to foren;

but it was still accented as a separate word; whereas the article *a* (as was before observed of the other article *the*) is passed over hastily in pronunciation, as a mere prefix to the general term, which it serves to individualize. Again, the numeral *one* (like the relative *that*) is capable of being used alone, which the article *a* or *an* is not. We may say, "*one* seeks fame, another riches, and a third, the wisest of the three, content;" but if we use the article, we must add its substantive, as "*a man* should seek content, rather than fame, or riches."

Other distinctions.

309. It is unnecessary to enter into those distinctions of the article, which do not coincide with the definition above given of this part of speech. Such is the distinction often found in the Greek grammarians between the prepositive and subjunctive articles. The prepositive, viz. ὁ, ἡ, τὸ, is what I have called the relative article: the subjunctive, viz. ὅς, ἥ, ὅ, is what I have called the subjunctive pronoun. The latter, it is manifest, has no effect whatever in individualizing a general term; because it is only employed in a dependent sentence, with reference to a term which must have been individualized in the prior or leading sentence. The learned HICKES, in that valuable work the *Thesaurus linguarum Septentrionalium*, suggests that the Anglo-Saxon *sum*, which answers nearly to the Latin *quidam*, should be considered as an indefinite article. It appears to me rather to belong to the class of pronouns; yet in this and some other instances, the two classes of words approach very nearly together,

And thin partitions do their bounds divide.

CHAPTER XI.

OF PREPOSITIONS.

Connectives. 310. FROM the consideration of the Article, which Harris ranks among the Definitives, I proceed to the Prepositions and Conjunctions, which together form his class of Connectives. His reasons for adopting such a class are these. As in nature a substantive coalesces at once with its attribute, an action with its agent, a passion with its patient, and even a primary attribute with a secondary, so in grammar, the substantive may coalesce at once with its adjective, as "a *wise* man," a "*fierce* lion;" the verb transitive may coalesce at once with its nominative and accusative, as "Alexander *vanquished* Darius;" and the adverb with the verb or adjective which it modifies, as "he fought *bravely*," "he was *completely* victorious." But when it is necessary to make any other union of conceptions, it can only be done either by a combination of words; by a change in the word which requires to be modified; or by a separate word, which, as it serves to connect the others, may be called a connective. Omitting for the present the two first methods, let us observe how connectives may be used. If in addition to the assertion that Alexander vanquished Darius, I wish to assert that he also vanquished Porus, I can effect this purpose by the connective "and," as "Alexander vanquished Darius *and* Porus." If I wish to state the motive of Alexander's fighting, I may say "he fought *for* fame." The word "and" is commonly called a conjunction; the word "for," a preposition: and it is true that they are both employed to connect words which would otherwise remain unconnected; but there is this important difference between them—the conjunction *connects*, and does nothing more; the preposition introduces a further conception, namely that of the particular *relation* in which the connected conceptions stand to each other. In the example given, I do not merely connect, in the mind of the hearer, the conceptions of Alexander, or of fighting, with the conception of fame; for they would be equally connected if fame had been the unexpected and unthought-of *consequence* of his fighting; but I show that fame stood towards the action in the particular relation of a *motive*. I therefore consider that the word which thus shows a distinct relation between two conceptions may be justly deemed a separate part of speech.

Preposition. 311. This part of speech has been called a *Preposition*, because in the Greek and Latin languages the words so employed were commonly (though with some exceptions) *præposita*, placed immediately

before the substantives to which they referred. In those languages, too, the words in question were subject to few variations in point of form. These circumstances, though merely accidental, were unfortunately selected by some grammarians as essential properties of the part of speech under consideration; and hence originated the well-known definition, *Præpositio est pars orationis invariabilis, quæ præponitur aliis dictionibus.* The Greek grammarians, whom Harris followed, ranked both the preposition and conjunction under the common head of Σύνδεσμος, or the *connective;* and the Stoics, adding this circumstance to the ordinary position of the preposition in a sentence, called this part of speech Σύνδεσμος Πρόθετικος, the "*prepositive* connective." Another accidental peculiarity of most of the words which were used as prepositions in Greek and Latin, as well as in some modern languages, was that their original and peculiar meaning had, in process of time, become obscure; and from hence some persons were led to think that these words had no signification of their own. The learned HARRIS gives the following definition, "*A preposition is a part of speech devoid itself of signification, but so formed as to unite two words that are significant, and that refuse to coalesce or unite of themselves.*" CAMPANELLA also says of the preposition, *Per se non significat;* and HOOGEVEEN says, "*Per se posita et solitaria nihil significat.*" Under the same impression, the Port Royal grammarians say, "*On a eu recours, dans toutes les langues, à une autre invention, qui a été d'inventer de petits mots pour être mis avant les noms, ce qui les a fait appeller prépositions.*" And M. de BROSSES says, "*Je n'ai pas trouvé qu'il fut possible d'assigner la cause de leur origine; tellement que j'en crois la formation purement arbitraire.*"

312. Now in all this there was much inaccuracy of reasoning, as applied to Universal Grammar. The position of this sort of words in a sentence, had the fact been so in all known languages, must have been owing to accidental causes; but the fact is otherwise. Even in Latin the preposition *tenus* was always placed *after* the noun which it governed; so Plautus uses *erga* after a pronoun, as in *mederga*, for *erga me;* and *cum* is employed in like manner in the common expressions *mecum, tecum, nobiscum, vobiscum.* These and other examples of a like kind induced some authors to make a class of *postpositive prepositions.* "Dantur etiam," says CARAMUEL, "*Postpositiones*, quæ *præpositiones postpositivæ* solent dici;" but I shall elsewhere show that there are languages in which all the prepositions, so to speak, are postpositive. Some writers, who for this and similar reasons reject the word preposition, have adopted in its stead that of *adnomen*, adnoun; but as their example has been seldom followed, and as it is my object to change as little as possible received modes of expression, I shall adhere to the ordinary grammatical term, preposition, only reminding the reader that it is not to be taken as expressing an essential property of the part of speech in question. That prepositions are indeclinable may be the case in most languages,

Errors rejected.

but is certainly no necessary part of their definition. That they signify nothing of themselves, if it were true in any degree, would be only part of their history, and would throw no light whatever on the grammatical principles which regulate their use. It is not surprising that Mr. TOOKE should ridicule these *postpositive* prepositions, and *nonsignificant* words which communicate signification to other words; but unfortunately he only substitutes worse errors of his own, when he asserts that prepositions are always names of real objects, and do not show different operations of the mind.

Definition.

313. The real character and office of the preposition have been stated with a nearer approach to accuracy by Bishop WILKINS and VOSSIUS; but neither of them seems to have given a full and satisfactory definition of this part of speech. WILKINS says, "Prepositions are such *particles* whose proper office it is to join integral with integral on the *same side* of the copula, signifying some respect of cause, place, time, or other circumstance, either positively or privatively." VOSSIUS says, *Præpositio* est vox per quam adjungitur *verbo* nomen, locum, tempus, aut caussam significans, seu positivè seu privativè." It suited Wilkins's scheme of universal grammar to call the preposition a *particle;* but however appropriate this may be to a theoretical view of language, such as it never did, and probably never will exist, it is inconsistent with those philosophical principles on which the actual use of speech among men depends; neither is it material on *which side* of the copula a preposition may be placed by the idiom of any particular language. On the other hand, as Wilkins includes under the term *integral* both the noun and the verb, he is in this respect more accurate than Vossius, for the preposition does not merely join a noun to a verb, but sometimes to another noun. I therefore, with that diffidence which becomes all persons who endeavour in any degree to clear the path of science, shall propose the following definition:— *A preposition is a part of speech employed in a complex sentence, and serving to express the relation in which the conception named by a noun substantive stands to that named by another noun substantive, or asserted by a verb.*

Examples.

314. Thus, if I say, "he hired a house *with* a garden," "Solomon was the son *of* David," the words *with* and *of* are prepositions, the former expressing the relation of *contiguity* between the substantives "house" and "garden," and the latter expressing the relation of *filial descent* between the substantives "son" and "David." Again, if I say, "he spoke *concerning* the law," "he marched *from* Capua *to* Rome," the words *concerning*, *from*, and *to* are prepositions, the first expressing the relation of *subjectivity* in which the noun "law" stands to the verb "spoke," and the two others expressing the different relations of *locality* in which the nouns "Capua" and "Rome" stand to the verb "marched."

Sentence complex.

315. In developing the above definition, I first observe that the sentence in which a preposition is employed must be a complex one:

and this is evident; for, in addition to the assertion of a connection between a subject and its attribute (which together forms a simple sentence, as "John walks," or "John is walking"), the preposition expresses a conception of relation, which conception, if added to the attribute and assertion in the verb, forms another simple sentence. If I say, "John walks before Peter," I, in effect, make two assertions, first, that John is walking, and, secondly, that the walking is before Peter. In the language of lawyers, I present two issues; for it may be admitted that John walks, and denied that the walking is *before* Peter; and this latter may chance to become an important question affecting rights not only of precedence and station in society, but also of property, and not only between individuals or families, but between nations. In the secondary question, the relation of *locality* is expressed by the preposition *before*, which is necessary to connect the assertion "walks" with the name "Peter;" for if it were omitted, and I should say, "John walks Peter," the sentence would be unintelligible. In like manner, if the conception of relation be added to one of two connected substantives, as "Solomon was the son *of* David," the sentence involves two assertions, viz., that Solomon stood in the relation of a son, and that that relation connected him with David; and the word expressing the connection is the preposition "of."

Verb neuter.

316. It follows, from the nature of connectives, as stated by Mr. Harris, that where a verb is neuter it may be connected immediately with a following substantive by means of a preposition. Thus the neuter verb "walks" is immediately connected with the following substantive "Peter" by means of the preposition "before;" but if the verb be transitive it cannot be immediately connected with a substantive by means of a preposition, but must first be followed by its proper accusative, that is to say, by the substantive expressing the recipient of the action, *ex. gr.*:—

> Now *with* strong pray'r, and now *with* stern reproach,
> He stirs their valour.

Here the sense would have been wholly lost if the accusative "valour" had been omitted: and the same rule applies where the relation is marked by an inflection of the substantive, as in the original of the passage just quoted—

> Nunc *prece*, nunc *verbis* virtutem accendit *amaris*, *

where the ablatives *prece* and *verbis amaris* show the relation of *instrumentality*, in which the conceptions expressed by them stand to the verb *accendit*; but those ablatives would have been unmeaning had not the verb been followed by its proper accusative, *virtutem*.

Compound verb.

317. In languages which admit of compounding a verb with a preposition, there may be differences of idiom. The verb, if neuter,

* Virg. Æn. 10, 368.

usually assumes a transitive character, as when Satan, who is described as forcing his way into Paradise,

——— at one slight bound, high *overleap'd* all bound. *

If the verb be transitive, then (according to the idiom of the language) the related substantive may be either inflected in accordance with the preposition in the verb or else accompanied with a separate preposition. When inflected, it adopts a case which is said by grammarians to be governed by the preposition in composition, as—

Nam *tibi* Thymbre caput Evandrius abstulit ensis; †

where the preposition *abs* (though governing an ablative when alone) may be said, as forming part of the verb *abstulit*, to govern the dative *tibi;* and where both the preposition and the dative inflection express the relation of *objectivity*, in which the person (Thymbrus) stood to the act signified by the verb *abstulit* and its accusative *caput*, as if the phrase had been "abstulit caput abs te."

Relation.

318. The next point to be considered in the definition of a preposition above given is the nature of the relations which it serves to express. Now, *Relation*, which is the fourth of the logical predicaments, supposes three things, the *subject*, or thing related, the *object*, or correlative, and the relation itself, or circumstance existing in the subject by means of which it is related to the object, and which logicians call the *foundation*. When we say, "John is *before* Peter," "John" is the subject, "Peter" is the correlative, and "*before*" is the foundation, or, as I have been accustomed to speak, the conception of a particular relation, expressed prepositionally.

Its foundation.

319. It is manifest, that the circumstance, whatever it be, that forms the *foundation* of a logical relation, or (which is the same thing) that constitutes (when expressed in language together with its subject and object) a *preposition*, may either be common to the two *terms* (as they are called) of the relation, or it may belong to one of them exclusively. If I say, "John is *with* Peter," the relation expressed by the preposition *with* belongs equally to Peter and to John; but if I say John is *before* Peter, the relation expressed by the preposition *before* belongs exclusively to John. In the first case it is perfectly indifferent whether I say "John is with Peter," or "Peter is with John;" it is perfectly indifferent which I make the subject and which the object of the relation: but in the other case, if I were to say "Peter is *before* John," I should not only vary the assertion, but I should directly contradict it. Still the foundation of the relation would be the same; for, as a great philologist has observed, "at the bottom of every preposition, in its original sense, there exists a relation between two opposite conceptions."‡ Thus *before* implies *behind*, and *over* implies *under*. We may illustrate this with the trivial comparison of two children playing at see-saw. If John and

* Milton, P. L. 4, 181. † Virg. Æn. 10, 394.

‡ Bopp, Comp. Gram. 1. 377.

Peter be equally balanced at the opposite ends of a plank, John is level *with* Peter, and Peter is level *with* John, and the plank is the measure or standard of the *level;* but if John be lighter than Peter, John at once rises *above* Peter, and Peter sinks *below* John, and the same plank measures the *elevation* of one and the *depression* of the other. What the supposed plank is to the boys, the preposition is to the substantives related; and hence we may easily explain not only certain diversities in the idioms of different languages, but some apparent contradictions in the same idiom. Thus Mr. TOOKE makes the following just observation on the Dutch preposition *van*:—"The Dutch," says he, "are supposed to use VAN in two meanings, because it supplies indifferently the places both of our *of* and *from*. Notwithstanding which, VAN has always one and the same single meaning. And its use, both for *of* and *from*, is to be explained by its different *apposition*. When it supplies the place of *from*, VAN is put in *apposition* to the same term to which *from* is put in *apposition*. But when it supplies the place of OF, it is not put in *apposition* to the same term to which *of* is put in *apposition*, but to its correlative. The same observation may be made on the prepositions *at* and *to*, which in correct modern English express different relations of place, though they both answer to the Latin *ad*, the French *à*, and the German *zu*, e. gr.: "Verres *ad* Messanam venit," Verres came *to* Messina: "Mihi quoque est *ad* portum negotium," I also have business *at* the port: "Il reste *à* la maison;" "Il est allé *à* la campagne;"—"He remains *at* home;" "He is gone *to* the country:" "Komm *zu* mir," Come *to* me;" "*zu* Windsor," *at* Windsor. In Anglo-Saxon, *æt*, at, was also used where we employ *from*; as "animath that pund *æt* him,"* take the talent *from him*. In Old English, we find it employed where we should use *to*—

> The sext maister rase vp onane.
> Sir, he said, if thi will were,
> Tak thi son to me, *at* lere.†

i. e., Put thy son *to* me *to* learn, "ad discendum." And still in the Devonshire dialect, we hear "he lives *to* Exmouth" for "*at* Exmouth."

320. Nor is it only the different use of prepositions in the same or different languages which is thus to be explained, but even apparent contradictions. The prepositions *for* and *after* are of directly contrary origin and signification, being (as will hereafter be fully shown) the same as the words *fore* and *aft*. Nevertheless we say, "to seek *for* that which is lost," and "to seek *after* that which is lost." The thing sought is considered as *before* the mind of the seeker, and consequently the seeker is considered as *after*, or behind the thing sought; when, therefore, we use the word *before*, we specify the relation of which the thing sought is the subject; but when we use

Apparent contradiction.

* Matt. c. 25, v. 28. † Romance of the Seuyn Sages.

the word *after*, we specify a relation of which the subject is the seeker: or, to use Mr. TOOKE's phraseology, we put *before* in *apposition* with the thing sought, and *after* in *apposition* with the seeker. From this statement it appears that the *subject* of the *relation* specified may or may not be the logical *subject* of the *preposition* enunciated in the sentence. In the sentences, "John seeks *for* Peter," and "John seeks *after* Peter," John is the logical subject; but the former sentence involves the expression of a relation of which Peter is the subject, the latter of one the subject of which is John. The relation of *foreness* exists in Peter; the relation of *afterness* exists in John.

An act of the mind.

321. M. CONDILLAC says, as we have seen, that the relation between two sensations is not a direct sensation; and thence he infers that a *relation* cannot be expressed in our mind, unless by an artificial sign.* What he means by "expressed in our mind" I do not pretend to understand; but he is certainly right in saying, that a relation is not a direct sensation, for it is no sensation at all. "Every kind of relation," as Lord MONBODDO justly observes, "is a pure idea of *intellect*, which can never be apprehended by *sense*:" and when Mr. HORNE TOOKE denies this proposition, he shows strange ignorance of the human mind. Sense, taking that term in its widest acceptation, can only apprehend an external object; it can apprehend the *thing* which is before another, or the *thing* before which another is: but the *relation* of place, time, order, causation, or the like, which we express by the word *before*, is discerned not by a simple operation of sense, but by means of an exercise of our comparing and judging faculties. It is most extraordinary that Tooke, who asserts universally that "prepositions are the names of *real objects*," should say of the preposition *for*, "I believe it to be no other than the Gothic substantive *fairina*, CAUSE." What *real object* is CAUSE? How is causation to be apprehended by sense? That we have a conception of cause is certain; but it is equally certain that we come at it by means of our mind, and that it is in truth "a pure idea of intellect,' which sense alone never did and never can give.

Classification.

322. To suppose that the prepositions necessary to any language could be enumerated *à priori* would certainly be absurd. TOOKE has ridiculed the grammarians who have attempted to enumerate them, as matter of fact and history. It has been said, that the Greeks had eighteen prepositions, the Latins, forty-nine; and the French (according to different authors) thirty-two, forty-eight, and seventy-five. It is certainly possible to ascertain what words *have been* used as prepositions in a dead language; but in a living language it is quite impracticable to determine how many *should be* so used; for every day may enhance their number, by new combinations of thought and expression. A preposition is not like a piece of money stamped to pass for a certain sum, and which cannot change its denomination or value. It is a word to which a transient function is assigned, and

* Supra, s. 55.

which, as soon as it has discharged that office, becomes available again for its former purposes, as a noun, verb, or other part of speech. But although it be not possible to enumerate prepositions, yet they may be subjected to a general classification, according to the great distinctions of relation in human conceptions. M. COUR DE GEBELIN has attempted something of this kind, and Bishop WILKINS has also given an arrangement of thirty-six prepositions, "which," he says, "may, with much less equivocalness than is found in instituted languages, suffice to express those various respects, which are to be signified by this kind of particle." It may be doubted whether either of these schemes be sufficiently comprehensive, or perfectly philosophical. Prepositions must be classed, if at all, by their signification, according as the relation which they express is of a corporeal or mental nature.

Corporeal.

323. It has been already seen that the relation of attribute to substance, that of secondary attribute to primary, and that of action to the agent doing and the object suffering the act, are sufficiently shown by the words expressing the related conceptions, without the need of any connecting link: and that all other relations require a separate word or words to connect the subject and object of relation. For the sake of distinction, I shall call relations of the former kind primary, and those of the latter secondary. The secondary, again, are either corporeal or mental. In considering them grammatically, I will notice first the nature of the relations in question, and then the different modes of expressing them. The *corporeal* demand our first attention; for as in the opening of our faculties the earliest *conceptions* which we form are those of bodily existence, so the earliest *relations* which we perceive are those of bodily substance. But bodily substances exist only in place and time; relations of place and time therefore are the earliest of which we become conscious: and of these (as far as we can speak with certainty on so obscure a subject) we may not unreasonably believe the relations of place to be first perceived by the infant mind; inasmuch as they originate in mere present *Sensation*, whereas the very conception of Time necessarily involves also *Memory* of the past and *Imagination* of the future.

Place.

324. By the word *Place*, I mean a portion of that space which to our finite apprehension appears to be infinitely extended in the three several dimensions of Length, Breadth, and Depth; and in which all bodies either move or are at rest. The place of a body may be contemplated by the mind with more or less extent of limits. Thus I may say, that a student is *at* his desk, or *at* his rooms, or *at* his college, or *at* the university; that he has just risen *from* or is going *to* his desk; or is coming *from* or going *to* his rooms, or his college, or the university. In short, we may illustrate the conceptions of place as to its limits, by the same diagrams which were applied in paragraph 281 to illustrate those of time; considering the place to which the relation applies either as the mere point B of the angle

A B C in the first diagram, or as the whole or any part of the segment A B C in the second. Relations of place are either positive or comparative. The *positive* either imply rest, as *at;* or motion, as *from* and *to;* and in forming these conceptions we contemplate a single body: for instance, the sun, which we may regard as issuing *from* the east, blazing *at* the meridian, or declining *to* the west. The *comparative* are formed when we contemplate the position or movement of one or more bodies with reference to that of one or more others. Hence prepositions of place have been ingeniously illustrated by a sort of diagram in which a central human figure is alternately the *subject* and *object* of relation; and lines drawn from it in different directions indicate the relations of place which it bears to various other bodies *over* and *under* it, *before*, *behind*, and *beside* it, &c. &c. It is manifest that the relations of place, both positive and comparative, may admit of numerous modifications; as I may be *near* a place though not *at* it; or going *toward* thought not to *it;* so one object, though not directly *over* another, may be *above* it; or though not directly *under*, may be *below* it. Again, one body may be moving *along* another, or *around* it, or *about* it, or standing or moving *with* it, or passing *through* it, or *between* two, or *among* several: it may be *in* or *out* of a definite space, *beyond* a certain point, on *this* or *that* side of it, or *against* it. Various languages have brought into common use, as prepositions, words expressing still more specific relations of place; as the French *chez* in "*chez* moi" *at* my house, the English *aboard* in "*aboard* ship;" and it is manifestly impossible to lay down rules beforehand, either extending or limiting the number of words, which may be so employed.

Time. 325. Though the relations of place seem, on a careful observation of the development of our faculties, to be of a more simple nature than those of *Time*, yet there is always either a striking analogy, or an exact coincidence between relations of these two classes. *At* any given moment of time, a given body must necessarily be *at* some certain point of space: and if it has moved, or is to move, the motion must be *from* some instant of time *to* some other instant of time, as well as *from* some point of space *to* some other point of space. Indeed, space is our only measure of time. Ages, years, days, minutes, seconds are measured by the space, which the earth passes over in its equal and unremitting course. *At* the instant of my uttering a syllable the earth is *at* a certain point in its orbit; *before* that instant the same point was *before* the globe; *after* the instant of utterance, the point first taken as a term of measurement will have fallen behind (that is, *after*) the globe: and thus three instants of time are found exactly to coincide with three points of space, and are therefore marked by the same prepositions, "at," "before," and "after." By a less strict analogy, a man is said to be *beyond* his time, to be *near* the appointed time, &c. &c.

Mental. 326. The secondary *mental* relations between our conceptions are

numerous. It may suffice to mention the relation of cause to effect, of means to end, genus to species, and whole to part: and to remark that the conceptions, to which these relations apply, may be corporeal, mental, or spiritual. The slightest knowledge of human nature will convince us that mankind do not become aware of any mental relations till long after the relations of place and time have been familiar to them. Yet between the corporeal and mental relations, there will be found to exist the same sort of coincidence or analogy, as has been already observed between the relations of place and time. First, let us consider the relation of *cause*, as applied to a corporeal effect, in the ordinary instance of a billiard ball set in motion, on being struck by a mace. Here the motion begins *from* a certain point of space, and *from* a certain instant of time; what more natural than to say that the motion results, as an effect, *from* the stroke, as a cause? Again, considering the motion as an end produced by some instrument as the means, we perceive that when the motion began, the body close *by* the ball was the mace: it is natural then to infer that the motion was produced *by* the mace as an instrument. Let us next apply the relation of cause to a mental effect—for instance, learning. As this effect began to be produced *from* the time that the learner applied himself to study, the reasonable inference is that the learning resulted *from* study, as a cause. Or let us consider the relation of cause as applied to a spiritual effect. "Every good gift" (says St. James) "and every perfect gift is *from* above, and cometh down *from* the Father of lights." * Hence we may say, that as corporeal motion proceeds *from* a corporeal cause, and as the mental acquisition of learning proceeds *from* a mental cause, so all spiritual excellence proceeds *from* a spiritual cause, namely, God: and thus have I traced the analogies between the secondary relations, corporeal and mental, in their several gradations.

Expression by phrases.

327. There are three modes of expressing these secondary relations; first by a combination of words, secondly by a separate word, and thirdly by a variation in the form of a word. The separate words used for this purpose are those called prepositions; but to understand them fully we must compare their use with the two other modes. I shall begin with an example of the first mode:—

> Mark what radiant state she spreads
> *In circle round* her shining throne,
> Sitting like a goddess bright
> *In the center* of her light. †

Here the corporeal relation of *place* is set forth by two combinations of words, viz., "in circle round," and "in the centre of." Again, in the letter which Hotspur reads—"I could be well contented to be there *in respect of* the love I bear your house," ‡ the mental relation of *cause* is set forth by a combination of the words "in respect of."

* St. James, i. 17. † Milton, Arcades. ‡ Shaksp., Hen. IV. Part i.

The love which the writer alleges himself to bear to the house of Percy is the *cause* of the contentment which he says he might feel in repairing to the proposed meeting of the insurgents. Now, such a combination of words constitutes a *phrase*, or clause, in a complex sentence, introduced solely to express some secondary relation of a substantive to a verb, or to another substantive. As these phrases serve the purpose of prepositions, they may be termed *prepositional phrases;* and their place may for the most part be supplied by prepositions in the same, or a different language. Thus, for the phrases "in circle round" and "in the center of," we may substitute (though less poetically) the prepositions "around" and "amidst:" and for the phrase "in respect of," we may substitute in English the preposition "for," and in Latin the preposition *propter*.

Substantival and adjectival.

328. Prepositional phrases may be further distinguished as substantival or adjectival, according as the word expressing the relation is in the form of a substantive or adjective. It is true that these combinations are merely idiomatical, and will be noticed more particularly hereafter; yet it may be proper here to illustrate my meaning by a few short examples.

i. Under the head of *substantival* phrases, we may place the above-mentioned combinations, in which the relations are expressed by the substantives "circles," "centre," and "respect." So the Greek phrase *πρὸς βίαν ἐμου*, answers to the English phrase "in spite of me," and to the Italian phrase *à mio mal grado;* the words *βία*, spite, and *grado*, being all substantives.

ii. Those prepositional phrases may be called *adjectival*, in which the relations are expressed by words elsewhere used as adjectives, such as "contrary to," "in contrar," "*en contre*" "counter to," &c. Milton, in his *Essay on the Reason of Church Government*," says, "If the course of judicature to a political censorship seem either tedious or too contentious, much more may it to the discipline of the church, whose definitive decrees are to be speedy, but the execution of rigour slow, *contrary to* what in legal proceedings is most usual." We find the adjective *contrar* used prepositionally in the Scottish acts of parliament, in the phrase "*in contrar* the command." In old French there was also the prepositional phrase *en contre*, which now exists only as a substantive, signifying an adventure: nor is the verb *encontre* at present in use, though the substantive *rencontre*, and the verb *rencontre* both are so; and though in English we retain *encounter* and *rencounter*, both as substantives and as verbs. It is probably from *rencounter* that we originally took the expression of *running counter to;* as in LOCKE—

> He thinks it brave at his first setting out to signalize himself in *running counter* to all the rules of virtue.

Where, as the words *counter to*, perform the function of a prepo-

sition, they may justly be described as a prepositional phrase, of the adjectival class.

329. The next mode of expressing secondary relations is by a separate word. Some prepositional phrases occurring frequently in conversation naturally lead to abbreviations and ellipses in their expression, and thus ultimately leave but a single word which constitutes the part of speech called a *Preposition*. The words so retained are those expressing the particular relation contemplated. They may be divided into two classes, of which the first continue to be used with little or no difference of meaning in the same languages as nouns substantive, nouns adjective, verbs, particles, or prepositions; but, in the second class, the original nouns or verbs, from which they are derived, have become obsolete, or can only be traced by analogy and the skilful comparison of kindred dialects. Expression by prepositions.

330. Among words of the first class we have few substantives in modern English that are employed alone and without some small inflection, as prepositions. Dryden, indeed, uses the substantive *cross* in this manner:— Substantival.

> Betwixt the midst and these, the gods assign'd
> Two habitable seats to human kind;
> And *cross* their limits cut a sloping way." *

But with the prefix, a, we have *across*, *aboard*, and some others. In German, *statt*, which is our substantive *stead*, is used prepositionally *statt meiner*, "instead of me:" and in a manner not very dissimilar we use the Latin substantive *vice*, in the official notices of appointments to office; as "X. Y. to be captain by purchase *vice* T. B. promoted." In French the substantive *gré* is explained "bonne, franche volonté, qu'on a de faire quelque chose;" as "il y est allé de son *gré*, de son plein *gré*;" "ils ont contracté ensemble de *gré* à *gré*;" "il le fera bon gré, *mal gré*. *Savoir gré* is "to be satisfied with" a person's conduct, to be obliged to him for it: *lui savoir un gré infini*, "to be infinitely obliged to him." Thus, in a letter written by order of the king of France, in 1814, to the author of certain political works, it is said, "Sa majesté vous *sachant un gré infini* de la manière dont vous avez pris, dans des temps difficiles, la défense de ses justes droits," &c., and this same substantive, with the adjective *mal* prefixed to it, forms the preposition *malgré*, as in the old French song—

> *Malgré* la bataille,
> Qu'on donne demain,
> Çà, faisons ripaille,
> Charmante Catin!

331. We use many adjectives prepositionally, either without, or Adjectival.

* Has inter mediamque, duæ mortalibus ægris
Munere concessæ Divom, via secta *per* ambas,
Obliquus quà se signorum verteret ordo."
Virg. Georg. i. 237.

with the prefix *a*, *ex. gr.* round, as in "all friends *round* the Wrekin," a phrase well known to Shropshire men. So—

> ——— merely to officiate light
> *Round* this opacous earth, this punctual spot.*

But in modern usage *around* is the more prevalent form, as in the song—

> Ere *around* the huge oak which o'ershadows yon mill
> The fond ivy had dared to entwine. †

The adjective *near* is used prepositionally both in its positive and comparative degree:—

> No grief did ever come so *near* thy heart.‡
> He is not one jot *nearer* the end. §

Verbal. 332. We have many verbs, which the generality of grammarians admit to be occasionally used as prepositions: *e. g.*, "*save*," and "*except*." Dr. Johnson (by oversight, I presume) calls the word *save* an adverb. Mr. Tooke, in his chapter on Prepositions, more correctly mentions it thus:—

"SAVE. The imperative of the verb. This prepositive manner of using the imperative of the verb *to save* afforded Chaucer's Sompnour no bad *equivoque* against his adversary the Friar:—

> God *save* you all, SAVE this cursed Frere.

Here the construction is "Save (set aside or except) this Friar; and then I hope that God will save (deliver from evil) all the rest of you."

So in the *Squire's Tale*,—

> This strange Knight that came thus sodenly
> All armed, *saue* his hedde.

That is, the Knight was entirely armed, but when you say entirely, you must save (or except) his head.

The words "save and except" are often used synonymously in many of our legal instruments: we shall not therefore be surprised to find *except* reckoned by Dr. Johnson among prepositions—

"EXCEPT, *preposit.* [from the verb.] This word, long taken as a preposition or conjunction, is originally the participle passive of the verb, which, like most others, had for its participle two terminations, *except* or *excepted*. *All* except *one*, is *all*, *one* excepted. Except may be according to the *Teutonic* idiom, the imperative mood: *all*, except *one*; that is, all but one, which you must except."

"i. Exclusively of; without inclusion of.

> Richard *except*, those, whom we fight against,
> Had rather have us win than him they follow.
> *Shakspeare, Rich. III.*

Participial. 333. *Participles* being merely adjectives, with the additional ex-

* Milton, P. L. viii. 22.
‡ Shakspeare.
† Opera of The Farmer.
§ Locke.

pression of action superadded, we cannot be surprised to find them used, as the pure adjectives have been shown to be, in performing the function of a preposition. Such is the case with our participles *saving*, *barring*, *during*, &c. In old Scottish statutes "saving" is written *saufande*. Thus, in the act of 1455, we find "*saufande* the poynts quhilks ar neidful for the conservacion of the treaty." So we say in colloquial language "*barring* accidents." In the Scottish Act of 1456, the participle *belangande* occurs with the same prepositional construction. "As to the thirde artikill, *belangande* the sending to France." In the Act of 1524 we meet with the expression "*enduring* the time of his office;" where, in modern English, we should use *during*. In legal phraseology, the ablative absolute *durante* vitâ, is rendered "*for* and *during* the term of his natural life;" where, as the word *during* and the word *for* are used with exactly the same force in the sentence, it is plain, that if *for* be a preposition, *during* is one also. It happens that our lexicographers have only acknowledged those participles to be prepositions which are most frequently so employed; such as *touching* and *concerning*, which are thus noticed by Dr. JOHNSON:—

"TOUCHING, *prep.* [This word is originally a participle of *touch.*] With respect, regard, or relation to."

> *Touching* things which belong to discipline, the church hath authority to make canons and decrees, even as we read in the apostles' times it did. *Hooker*, book iii.

"CONCERNING, *prep.* [from *concern*: this word, originally a participle, has before a noun the force of a preposition.] *Relating* to, with relation to."

> There is not anything more subject to errour, than the true judgment *concerning* the power and forces of an estate. *Bacon.*

Many other participles, however, might be pointed out in various languages, which are plainly used as prepositions, and some of them so recognised by grammarians. Thus COUR DE GEBELIN ranks among prepositions the present participles *pendant*, *durant*, *touchant*, *moyennant*, *nonobstant*, *suivant*, and the past participles, *attendu*, *vû*, and *hormis*. So we use *pending*, *during*, *hanging*, *living*, *failing*, *considering*, *omitting*, *regarding*, *respecting*, and anciently *moiening*.

> At whose instigacion and stirring, I have me applied, *moiening* the helpe of God, to reduce and translate it. *R. Copland.*

The participle *hanging* is used, in one of our earliest English statutes, as we now use *pending*, and the French *pendant;* and corresponding to the ablative absolute *pendente lite*. "The said accompt to be ij or iij yere *hanging*," Stat. 1. Rich. III. c. 14.

Less obvious.

334. Hitherto I have spoken of those single words used as prepositions, and also as other parts of speech, in which the identity of meaning is more or less obvious. There is no absolute line to be drawn in matters of this kind between that which is discoverable at first sight, or on a short reflection, and that which it requires some

study to make out; because the different capacities, and the different experience, of different men, must influence the degrees in this scale. But we may proceed by almost imperceptible degrees from that which almost all men think clear and self evident, to that which almost all will admit to be involved in obscurity, and yet the analogical principle, discreetly used, will give us scarcely less confidence in the latter than in the earlier stages of this progress.

With. 335. Following this clue, I come to the preposition *with*, which will probably be deemed more obscure in its derivation than any of the words hitherto examined. There are no less than three etymologies, to which it has been thought necessary to resort, in order to account for the different uses of this one preposition :—

1. The Gothic verb *withan*, to bind, or join together.
2. The Gothic preposition *withra*, toward, or against.
3. The Anglo-Saxon verb *wyrthan* (or rather the Gothic *wisan*), to be.

I am inclined to regard the first and second of these etymologies, though at first sight so widely different in signification, as originally the same. When any two visible objects are nearly *connected*, in local situation, they must appear to be placed in *apposition* to each other, if both be viewed from a distant point; but if one be viewed from the other, it will appear to be placed in *opposition*. Now, the preposition *with*, both in Anglo-Saxon and in English, expresses these different relations of *apposition* and *opposition*: it is therefore probable, that the original radix of the word, (so far as these two significations are concerned,) expressed the idea common to both, namely, the idea of *connection*. To exemplify this observation, let us suppose that John and Andrew are seen at the distance of half a mile by Peter; they appear to be close together, to be *joined* with, or bound to each other; but on approaching them he finds that there is a considerable interval between them, and the one either stands *opposite to* the other, or comes *toward* him, or stands *against* him resisting, or draws *back* from him. Now all these conceptions of being joined with, standing opposite to, coming toward, resisting, and drawing back from, with others of a like kind, will be found to be expressed in different Teutonic dialects by words obviously related to our preposition *with*. This will appear more at large as we separately examine the above-stated etymologies.

Withan. 336. The idea of *connection*, or joining together, was expressed by the Mæso-Gothic verb, *withan*, of which the past tense, *gawath*, occurs in the following passage of the *Codex Argenteus*. *Thata Goth gawath, Manna ni skaidai*, "What God hath *joined together*, let not man put asunder." (St. Mark, x. 9.) Hence, as a particular kind of weed is called *bind*weed, because it twists round and binds together other plants; so a particular kind of tree (the willow) was called the *with*-tree, or *withy*-tree (in old German, *weide*-baum, or *wette*-baum); because its tender twigs were used to *with*, (that is, to bind together,)

many objects in rustic economy. The twigs so used for binding were also called *withs*, or wythes; and a *with* or *wythe* was a term given to anything that bound either the body or the mind.

MORTIMER, in his *Husbandry*, speaks of the tree:—

> Birch is of use for ox-yoaks, hoops, screws; *wythes* for faggots.

Lord BACON uses this word to signify the twig:—

> An Irish rebel put up a petition, that he might be hanged in a *with*, and not a halter; because it had been so used with former rebels.

The two words *with* and *halter* are simply *binder* and *holder;* but use, it appears, had appropriated the former, to a binder made of willow twigs; and the latter, to a holder made of hemp.

King CHARLES employs the same word metaphorically:—

> These cords and *wythes* will hold men's consciences, when force attends and twists them.

In different Anglo-Saxon glossaries, we find *withig*, the willow; *withthe*, a hoop, or band; *cynewiththe*, the diadem, the king's band, or "golden round," as Shakspeare calls it.

In an Alamannic glossary, "Ubi recensentur res pistrini atque horrei," says JUNIUS, "*with* exponitur *torta*."

"Danis quoque," says the same author, "*widde* est *copula viminea;* potissimum tamen, ut videtur, copula ex salignis viminibus contexta, contortave."

In Dutch, the willow is called *wiede*, *wiide*, *weyde*, *wiie*.

Our word *willow* itself originally conveyed the same notion of binding; it being derived from the Anglo-Saxon *wilig*, which came from the verb *wilan*, as *withig* did from the verb *withan;* and both *withan* and *wilan* signified to bind. WACHTER derives the German *weide*, and Frankish *wida*, a willow, from the old verb *wetten*, to bind; "Ab usu, quem arbor officiosa præbet colonis et hortulanis in jungendis et alligandis rebus;" and he suggests, that the Latin *vitis*, a vine, is so named from its binding round other trees. *Weiden* also he explains, to bind, and *weid*, *wied*, *wette*, a bond. The Frankish *languuid*, is a waggon-rope. *Wette* also signifies, metaphorically, the law, which *binds;* and this in Dutch is *wet*, whence *wet-boek* is a law-book; *wet-steller*, *wetmaaker*, *wet-geever*, a legislator; *wethouders*, magistrates; *wetgeleerde*, a lawyer; *wetbreker*, a lawbreaker; *wetloos*, an outlaw; *wettig*, legitimate, &c. The verb *wetten* is not only to bind, but to bind in *wedlock*. "Oritur," says WACHTER, "a *wette*, vinculum, copula, ligamen, unde reliqua, tam verba, quam substantiva, tanquam ex matrice prodierunt."

From all these authorities we may safely conclude, that we have ascertained the proper origin of our common preposition *with*, in the sense of association, *e. gr.*:—

> In all thy humours, whether grave or mellow,
> Thou'rt such a touchy, testy, pleasing fellow;
> Hast so much wit and mirth, and spleen about thee,
> There is no living *with* thee, nor without thee. *Tatler.*

ii. It is obvious that in several of the other uses of this preposition, which Dr. JOHNSON points out, it really expresses no more than the same conception of joining or binding together, modified by the nature of the objects spoken of. Such are the following:—"in company," —"in partnership,"—"in appendage,"—"in mutual dealing,"—for I am *joined* with those with whom I am in company;—I am *bound* to one with whom I am in partnership;—a thing is *joined* to that of which it is an appendage; two persons, who mutually deal together, are *bound* by the laws of honesty to each other; and so of similar cases. It is remarkable that Johnson himself gives the two following senses of this preposition, in immediate succession.

4. On the side of; for—

> ——————— O madness of discourse!
> That cause sets up *with*, and against thyself. *Shakspeare.*

5. In opposition to; in competition, or contest—

> ——————— I do contest
> As hotly and as nobly *with* thy love,
> As ever against thy valour. *Shakspeare.*

Withra. 337. This illustrates the transition before mentioned, from *withan* to *withra*, i.e. *apposition* to *opposition;* and hence Johnson says, "*With*, in composition, signifies opposition or privation." Instances of this use of the word in modern English are, *withdraw*, *withhold*, and *withstand*.

BARBOUR uses *withsay*—

> With richt or wrang it have would thay;
> And if anie would thame *withsay*,
> Thay would sa do, that thay suld tine
> Eyther land or lyfe, or live in pine.

This is in German *widersagen:* as in the old baptismal formula, "*Widersagestu dem Teufel und allen seinen werken?*" "Dost thou renounce the devil and all his works?" And in this sense *absagen* is also used.

It is observable that the modern German, which does not use *with*, or any similar preposition in the sense of association, has *wider* to signify opposition, both in the simple form, and in a great number of compounds,—as *wiederhalten*, to resist; *widerlegen*, to refute; *widerreden*, to reply; *wider-sprechen*, to contradict, &c.; and so *widerschein*, a reflected light; *widersinn*, an absurdity; *widerschall*, an echo, &c.

In the Anglo-Saxon, *with* and *wither* are both used in the sense of opposition, or reflecting back from; as *withstandian*, to resist; *with-coren*, *wither-coren*, cursed; *with-secyian*, *withersecyian*, to contradict; *with-lædan*, to lead back; *with-scufian*, to repel. In the laws of Canute we find *witersacan*, apostates. In the old English laws we have *withernam*, in the barbarous Latin of that day, *withernamium*, a reseizure. This last word is said to have given an easy victory to an English lawyer in Italy, at an epoch when it was the custom for

scholars to offer public challenges for disputation on any given subject. As the party who accepted the challenge had the choice of a subject, our lawyer proposed, as his question, *An averia capta in withernamio replegiari possint;* to which his antagonist, as he did not understand what *withernamium* meant, was unable to give any reply.

In the Icelandic, we find both *vid* and *vidur* signifying against. In the Frankish, *wid* and *with* are "against," as *with thenne Divvel*, "against the Devil." But in most of the other Teutonic dialects, when the sense is *contra*, or *retro*, the letter *r* is found in the word. In the Gothic of Ulfila *withra* signifies both toward and against, as *alla so baurgs usiddya withra Jaisu*, "all the city went out *toward* Jesus." *Saei nist withra izwis, faur izwis ist;* "He that is not *against* us, is for us:" and so in the compounds *withrawairthan*, "opposite," "over against;" *withraidya*, "he met;" *withragamotyan*, "to meet." In the Frankish, *uuidrunpiotan*, is to write in reply. In the Alamannic, *uuidartragan*, is to carry back. In the old Salic laws, *widredo* is a repeater of his oath, from *eid*, an oath. In the Lombard laws, *widerboran* is a manumitted slave. This last word is also written *guiderbora*, as in the laws of Luitprand (circ. A.D. 720), "Si quis aldiam alienam aut suam ad uxorem tollere volluerit, faciat eam *guiderboram*." Another remarkable instance of the use of *wider* in composition, is in *widrigildum*, which some writers confound with *wergeldum;* but ECCARDUS accurately distinguishes these words, observing that the latter properly signifies the price, ransom, or value of a *man;* the former, any composition by which a loss is paid *back*, or compensated. *Weregelt* is well known to the old English and Scottish law; (see Fleta, and the *Regiam Majestatem*). *Weregeltthef*, according to Fleta, is "Latro, qui redimi potest." Hence SOMNER derives *wer-geld* from *wer*, a man, and *gelt*, price. On the other hand, GROTIUS (in the preface to the Gothic writers) defines *wedrigeldium* "quod pro talione datur;" and this word is properly derived by WENDELINUS from the Teutonic *weder* contra, vicissim, and *gelt*, æstimatio. It is differently written, *widrigilth*, *widrigildum*, *guidrigild*, *wedrigildum*, *wedrigeldum*, *widrigild*.

> *Widrigilth* secundum quod appretiatus fuerit.
> *Decr. Childeb. II.* (A.D. 711.)
>
> Suum *widrigildum* omninò componat.
> *Decr. Ludov. II.* (A.D. 879.)
>
> Si stupri crimine detectæ fuerit componat *guidrigild* suum.
> *Capitul. Arech. Princ. Benevent.*
>
> Juxta quod *widrigild* illius est.
> *Capit. Lotharii, Imp.* (A.D. 824.)

338. Perhaps the most remarkable derivation from the word *wither*, or *wider*, now remaining in our language, is *guerdon;* and the more so, as the English etymologists in general have entirely mistaken its origin. **Guerdon.**

The English word *guerdon* is a mere adoption of the French

guerdon, of which MENAGE thus speaks:—"Je croy qu'il vient de *werdung* qui signifie *pretii æstimatio*, et dont les escrivains de la basse Latinité ont fait aussi *werdunia* pour dire la mesme chose. De *guerdon* les Espagnols ont fait *galardon*, et les Italiens *guiderdone*." SKINNER cites this; but prefers the derivation of *guerdon* by MYLIUS from the Dutch *weerderen*, *waerderen*, æstimare, censere; and this from *weerd*, *waerd* dignus, et weerde, valor, pretium. JUNIUS cites the French *guerdon*, Italin *guiderdone*, Spanish *galardon*, and Welsh *wherth*; "quæ omnia," says he, "valde affinia sunt Teutonico *weerde weerdiie*." What is meant by *galardon* being "*valde affine*," to *weerde*, I cannot guess; any more that I can tell how the Italians formed *guiderdone* out of *guerdon*: and as to the base Latin *werdunia*, I never happened to meet with that word. The real history of the word *guerdon*, however, may, I apprehend, be very satisfactorily traced, as follows:—

i. *Widerdonum.* This word is correctly explained by DU CANGE, "Vox ibrida, a *widar* Teutonico, contra, et *donum* Latino, munus." This mixture of Teutonic participles with Latin substantives or verbs, is a fact, which, properly considered, may cast some light on the true principles of etymology. Thus we find our word *miscreant* to be compounded of the Teutonic *mis* (our verb, to *miss*,) and the Latin *credere*: and the French have many such compounds, e. gr. *mécompte*, *méconnoitre*, *mécontent*, *mésaventure*, *mésoffrir*, *mésestimer*, *médire*, *méfaire*, &c. *Widerdonum* occurs in the *Tabularium Casauriense*, (A. D. 876).

> Quia tu dedisti mihi, pro memoratâ convenientiâ, *widerdonum*, caballum unum et argentum solidos centum.

ii. *Guiderdone*, or *guidardone.* This is merely the word *widerdonum* with the Italian articulation *gui* for *wi*, as in *guidrigild* and *guiderbora* above noticed, for *widergild* and *widerbora.* The Latin termination *um* was universally changed into *o* by the elder Italians; and in modern writing it is softened still more into *e*; whence we find in the *Vocabolario della Crusca*, *guiderdone* and *guidardone*, with their derivatives, *guiderdonare*, *guidardonare*, *guiderdonato*, *guiderdonatrice*, *guidardonatrice*, *guiderdonamento*, *guidardonamento*, &c.

> E come i falli meritan punizione, cosí i benefici meritan *guiderdone*.
> *Boccaccio*, (*circ.* A.D. 1350.)
>
> E per *guidardone* del vincitore apparecchiò Ghirlande. *Idem.*

iii. *Guizardonum.* This is evidently a mere provincial corruption of pronunciation from *guidardonum.*

> Item quod nullum munus, *guizardonum*, vel xenia aliqua recipiet.
> *Statut. Massil.* (*circ.* A.D. 1220.

iv. *Guiardonum.*

> Non currant aliquæ pænæ, usuræ, *guiardona*, vel expensæ.
> *Statut. Vercel.*

This word is thus explained in an old glossary:—"*Guiardonum*, re-

muneratio; Ital. *guidardone*, nostris *guerredon*. (Vide *Glossar. Provinc. Lat. ex cod. Reg. Paris*, No. 7657.)

v. *Guiardon*, in the Provençal dialect, præmium.

vi. *Guerredon*. The old French word above alluded to, which is also found in the *verbal* form, *guerredonner*.

> Se Dieu sauve le baron,
> Ils en auront bon *guerredon*. *Roman D'Athis.*

> Voulons, pour ce, yceulx *guerredonner*, et poursuir de faveur especial.
> *Chart. Phil. VI.* (A.D. 1330.)

vii. *Guerdon*. In the old French translation of the passage above-cited from the Statutes of Marseilles, the words "*Guizardonum* vel xenia," are rendered "*guerdon*, ou estrenne."

In English, *guerdon* is used to signify a just recompense either for good or bad deeds.

> He shall by thy revenging hand at once receive the just *guerdon* of all his former villainies. *Knolles, Hist. Turk.*

> Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise,
> (That last infirmity of noble mind)
> To scorn delights, and live laborious days;
> But the fair *guerdon* when we hope to find,
> Comes the blind Fury, with th' abhorred sheers,
> And slits the thin-spun life. *Milton.*

339. Having examined two derivations of our modern preposition *with*, I come to the third, which is thus stated by Mr. HORNE TOOKE. Wyrthan.

"WITH is also sometimes the imperative of *wyrthan*, to be. Mr. Tyrwhit, in his glossary, (art. BUT,) has observed truly, that 'BY and WITH are often synonymous.' They are always so, when WITH is the imperative of *wyrthan*: for BY is the imperative of *beon*, to be. He has also in his glossary (art. WITH) said truly, that 'WITH *meschance*, WITH *misadventure*, WITH *sorwe*: 5316, 7797, 6916, 4410, 5890, 5922, are to be considered as parenthetical curses.' For the literal meaning of those phrases is (not God *yeve*, but) BE *mischance*, BE *misadventure*, BE *sorrow*, to him or them, concerning whom these words are spoken. But Mr. Tyrwhit is mistaken when he supposes—'WITH *evil prefe*, 5829; WITH *harde grace*, 7810; WITH *sory grace*, 12810;' to have the same meaning; for in those three instances, WITH is the imperative of *withan*; nor is any parenthetical curse or wish contained in either of those instances."

There is something ingenious in connecting *with* and *wyrthan*; and it was probably suggested to Mr. Tooke by the analogy which *with*-out and *with*-in bear to the Scottish "*but* and *ben*;" i. e. *be*-out and *be*-in. The Anglo-Saxons also used *with*-yeondan, for *be*-yond; and indeed they employed the separate preposition *with* so loosely, as to afford room for supposing that it was only equivalent to the general expression of existence, *be*: for HICKES, in his *Grammatica Anglo-Saxonica*, explains *with* by the Latin words, *juxta*, *cum*, *contra*, *adversus*, *pro*, *circa*, *circiter*, *erga*, *a*, *ab*; and one of his examples is

remarkable, as using *with* for *by* in the sense of *near to.* "*With tha sæ Adriaticum, juxta* mare Adriaticum."

Still it may be doubted whether the Anglo-Saxon *wyrthan* affords the proper solution of this question; since we do not find the *r* ever introduced before the *th* into either the Anglo-Saxon or English preposition: in other words, we do not find *wyrth* used as a preposition in Saxon, or *worth* in English; and though *worth* is certainly used for *be* in the parenthetical curse *wo worth!* and in the parenthetical blessing *well worth!* it is not quite so clear that *with* is thus used in the expressions "*with* meschance, *with* misaventure, or *with* sorwe."

In the vision of *Piers Plowman* we have the verb *worth*, to be. In CHAUCER we have *wo worth*, and in *Piers Plowman*, *well worth*, and *much wo worth.*

> And said, Mercy, madam, your man shall I *worth.*
>
> *Piers Plowman.*

> *Wo worth* the faire gemme vertulesse!
> *Wo worth* that hearbe also that doth no bote!
> *Wo worth* the beauty that is routhlesse!
> *Wo worth* that might that trede ech under fote!
>
> *Chaucer.*

> *Much wo worth* the man that misruleth his inwitte!
> And *well worth* Piers Plowman that pursueth God in his going!
>
> *Piers Plowman.*

The Anglo-Saxon *wyrthan*, *wurthan*, or *weorthan*, and the English *worth*, are from the Gothic *wairthan;* but perhaps the Anglo-Saxon and English *with*, used synonymously with *be*, are rather from the other Gothic verb substantive, *wisan:* for the different Teutonic tribes used three verbs substantive, (as they are called,) viz. *beon*, *wisan*, and *wurthan;* of which we retain traces in the different tenses of our verb, to be; namely, *be*, *was*, and *were.*

Other prepositions.

340. These etymological disquisitions on the word *with* belong properly to the History of Language. I use them in this place merely to illustrate the principles before stated, viz., first, that even in the less obvious instances, words used as prepositions are *significant* of certain relations between our conceptions corporeal, mental, or spiritual; and secondly, that though signifying the same relations as when used in the form of nouns or verbs, their force and effect in the construction of a sentence are so different as justly to entitle them to the character of a separate part of speech. It will be seen in another part of this work, that the same inference is to be drawn from the etymological investigation of our other ordinary prepositions, *by*, *for*, *out*, *in*, *of*, *to*, *at*, *from*, *through*, *before*, *behind*, *after*, &c.; from the obsolete and foreign prepositions *mid*, *emb*, *anent*, *ohne*, *wegen*, *von*, *van*, &c.; and, in short, from all prepositions in all languages, so far as they can with any confidence be traced, in the history of speech.

Expression by variation.

341. I have said, that the third mode of expressing the secondary relations of substantive to substantive, or of substantive to verb, is by

a *variation* in the form of a word, as *foresee* is varied from *see*, and *Cæsaris* from *Cæsar*. Here are obviously two kinds of variation, which may be distinguished as *composition* and *inflection*. The term composition may be applied to those instances in which a preposition (that is, a word capable of being used separately as a connective expressing relation), or, at least, a particle (or portion of a word), having a like signification, is added to a simple noun substantive or verb, as the particle *fore* is added to the simple verb *see;* and these variations in most known languages are usually made by way of *prefix*. The term inflection may be applied to those instances in which a particle, incapable (at least in the same language) of being used as a preposition, is added to a simple or complex noun, constituting a *case* thereof, as the particle *is* is added to *Cæsar*. These variations are generally made by way of *suffix*, or termination. Possibly, however, by future etymological researches, all inflections may be resolved into compositions.

Prepositions in composition.

342. With those compound words which signify primary relation I have at present no concern. Those which signify secondary relations, whether nouns or verbs, are for the most part compounded (as I have said) with prepositions; for instance, the noun "*over*seer," and the verb "*over*take," are compounded with the preposition *over*, the noun *superstitio*, and the verb *supervenio*, with the preposition *super*, and the like. In some cases, however, they are compounded with a particle, the separate use of which, though it may perhaps be discoverable in some kindred dialect, is either wholly wanting in the language in which the compound is used, or at least is wanting in the signification which it bears in the compound. *Pré* is not used at all as a preposition in French, but enters into many compound verbs, as *prévoir*, *prédire*, &c. *Ver* does not seem to be used in modern German as a preposition, but is frequent in compounds, as *verstehen*, *verloren*, &c.; and we have seen that *with* is not used in the sense of opposition as a modern English preposition, though it is in the verbs *withstand*, *withhold*, &c. These are indeed matters of idiom, but a mistaken view of them might tend to mislead the grammarian, in point of principle; and the same may be said of an erroneous view of the effect of "a preposition in composition," which, when united with a verb, is commonly said to "govern" the same case which it does alone; whereas, in truth, this notion of government is equally erroneous in both instances. The rule of the Latin grammar on this point, as laid down by Messrs. de Port Royal is, that "the preposition preserves its force even in composition; so that the verbs with which it is compounded take the case which belongs to the preposition;"* but, before I examine this rule, it will be necessary to say something more of cases.

Case.

343. We are told, that "the Indian grammarians take up the

* P. Royal L. G., b. v. r. 22.

declinable word in its primary form, *i. e.*, in the state when it is destitute of all case termination;" and that "this bare form of the word is given also in their dictionaries."* In other words, they fix their first attention on the root, or simple radical sound, and consider all inflections, whether of verb or noun, to be so many off-shoots or branches from the parent stock. This method of investigating languages and forming dictionaries is certainly more philosophical than any method pursued by either Greek or Latin grammarians. Applying it to the inflections of nouns, it will at once be seen that, as well in Greek and Latin as in the Sanscrit, Zend, Lithuanian, and other languages of a like construction and origin, there are case terminations expressing both the primary and secondary relations. Thus, if we suppose the root *man* in Latin to signify "hand," it may be combined with *us* and *um*, signifying the primary relations of agent and object, and the inflections *manus* and *manum* will respectively form the nominative and accusative case singular; and again, it may be combined with *u* or *ibus*, signifying (*inter alia*) the secondary relation of instrumentality, and will form the ablatives singular and plural. So, in Sanscrit, the root *sûnu*, son, gives primary relations in the nominative and accusative, *sûnus* and *sûnum*; and secondary relations in the instrumental singular *sûnunâ*, dual *sûnubhyâm*, and plural *sûnubhis*.†

Combined modes.

344. But though a preposition alone, or a preposition in composition with a verb, or the case inflection of a noun, may each separately express a secondary relation, we find sometimes two, and sometimes all three of these modes employed together to signify one and the same relation. We may say, for instance, in Latin, with only a case inflection (*ine*), *damnari crimine*, to be convicted of a crime; or, with a case inflection (*ate*), and a separate preposition (*de*), *damnatus de majestate*, convicted of treason; or, with a case inflection (*ibus*), and a preposition in composition (*ad*), *accusari criminibus*, to be accused of crimes; or, with a case inflection (*e*), a separate preposition (*ex*), and a preposition in composition (*ex*), *excessit ex urbe*, he went out of the city. It may perhaps be asked, in all but the first of these examples, why such various expressions are employed to express a single relation. To this, different answers may be given. In the first place, the case inflection does not always express a definite relation. The termination *ibus*, for instance, in the word *criminibus*, may be that of the dative or ablative plural, and, in both cases, it may signify several relations. The particular relation intended may in some instances be sufficiently shown by the signification of the verb, as *feci manibus meis*, "I made it *with* my hands," where the relation intended by the case termination *ibus* is shown by the verb *feci* to be that of instrumentality. But, in other instances, the particular relation intended may not be quite clear without the

* Bopp, Comp. Gram. 1, 112. † Ibid., 1, 254.

aid of a preposition, as *effugit è manibus meis*, "he escaped out of my hands," where, without the preposition *è*, it would not be clear that the relation intended was *not* that of instrumentality. Secondly, a different reason may sometimes be assigned for the apparent redundancy of prepositions; for they may be employed to add greater intensity of feeling to the expression. It is manifest, that to repeat and dwell upon expressions, often gives energy and weight to discourse, whatever may be the part of speech reiterated. Thus Shakspeare reiterates the adverb *too* in those exquisite lines of Hamlet:—

> O! that this *too too* solid flesh would melt,
> Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew!

And frigid indeed is the criticism of Dr. Johnson, that this reduplication is *harsh!* Increase of feeling naturally prompts additional emphasis of expression; and this is true not only of vehement passion, but of the finer shades of emotion. Thus may we understand why a preposition in composition is followed by the same preposition separate. In the *Andria* of TERENCE, we find—"Quid tibi videtur? *adeon' ad* eum?" So CICERO says "Nihil non consideratum *exibat ex* ore;" in both which instances it is impossible not to see that the repetition of the preposition is a great beauty. Nor is this observation to be confined to the repetition of the *same* preposition; for it applies substantially to all prepositions, and even adverbs, of *similar* meaning: as in TERENCE—"Nonne oportuit *præscisse* me *ante?*"—"Multa *concurrunt simul.*" So in VIRGIL—"*Retrò* sublapsa *referri.*" Grammarians of repute, it must be allowed, have censured these redundancies of expression, which may perhaps be regarded as exceptions from a general rule, and ought not to enter into the ordinary construction of a sentence. But the censure, when directed against such passages as I have cited, rather shows an acquaintance with technicalities than a nice feeling of the higher powers of language. Whether a particular language will or will not admit of such combinations is a matter of idiom; and accordingly, we often find that they cannot be transferred from one language to another by a strictly literal translation. We cannot, for instance, render into English the lines

> ——— ——— quum frigidus olim
> Jam cadit, extremoque *inrorat* Aquarius *anno*,*

by translating inrorat *ondews*, or *overdews*; because we have no such verbs, any more than we can translate *anno* by the word *year* with any case termination.

345. The omission of a preposition arises sometimes from a defective construction; but it has been often supposed by grammarians to exist where there was no necessity for such an hypothesis. Omission.

* Virgil, Georg. 3, 303.

The omission of the preposition *of* is undoubtedly awkward in the following instances:—

That every person cōmyng to suche feires shulde have lawefull remed of *all maner contractes.* *Stat.* 1 *Ric. III.* c. vi. M.S.

But God that is of maist poustê
Reserued to his majestie;
For to knaw in his prescience,
Of *all kind time* the first movence. *Barbour.*

The kyng Robert wist he was there
And *what kind chiftains* with him were. *Idem.*

Then should they full enforcedly
Right *in mids the kirk* assail
The Englishmen. *Idem.*

So, in old French, the preposition *de* is often awkwardly omitted:—

Wrepoch ab Edenauct, &c. oveke tot le orgoyl de Gales—descendirent a *la terrenostre seigneurs* le rei.
Let. P. De Mounfort, A.D. 1256.

Qui *la maison son voisin* ardoir voit,
De la sienne douter se doit.

Faut noter—*la maison son voisin* estre dict à la façon ancienne; au lieu de dire "la maison *de* son voisin." *H. Estienne.*

So, also, in Italian, the authors of the *Vocabolario della Crusca* observe, on the word *casa*: "Nome, dopo di cui vien lasciato talvolta dagli autori, per proprietà di linguaggio, l'articolo, o il segnacaso."

E sì sen' andaron di concordia a *casa i prestatori.* *Boccaccio.*

Cominciano a chiedere il Gonfalone che stava *in casa Germanica.*—"Vexillum *in domo Germanici* situm flagitare occipiunt."
Davanzati, Tacit. Ann.

On the other hand, though in the construction of the Latin language, some grammarians contend, that where a noun is commonly said to be *governed* by another noun, or by a verb, it is proper to consider that a preposition has been suppressed; as, "Cicero fuit eloquentior (præ) fratre;" yet this seems an unnecessary refinement in grammar; for the particle *or* in eloquentior, and the termination *e* in fratre, sufficiently show the *relation* between *eloquence* and *frater*, which is all the effect that a preposition could produce.

The same observation may be made on the expression *ire rus, domum, Romam, Hierosolymam*, where Vossius supposes, unnecessarily, an omission of *ad* or *in;* but he adds, "Latinis tam usitata est hæc ellipsis, in exemplis allatis, ut vulgò naturalis sermo existimetur."

It may, however, be doubted whether such constructions as *alias res improbus, cætera lætus*, and the like, are not to be ranked among the negligences of composition, though sanctioned by names of high repute in Roman literature:—

——— Ille eam rem adeò sobriè et frugaliter
Accuravit, ut *alias res* est impensè *improbus.*
Plaut. Epid. iv. 1.

Excepto quòd non simul esses, *cætera lætus.*
Horat. Ep. i. 10.

Similar observations may be made on the Greek writers, who are often censured for the omission of prepositions; and the remark is sometimes just, though in general the *relation* is sufficiently expressed, and the preposition would therefore be superfluous. The learned LAMBERTUS BOS says, "Præpositionum ellipsin tantopere amant scriptores Græci ut interdum duæ præpositiones in unâ orationis parte omittantur. Aristoph. *Nub.* v. 1083. Ἦν τοῦτο νικηθῇς ἐμοῦ: *Si* (in) *hoc* (a) *me victus fueris.* Plenè: ἢν εἰς τοῦτο νικηθῇς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ." In this instance it would perhaps have been better, had the rhythm allowed it, to express the first of the two prepositions; but the relation of ἐμοῦ to νικηθῇς is sufficiently denoted by their respective terminations.

346. We sometimes find prepositions accumulated together, either as separate words or as compounds, and, of course, modifying each other. In the earlier, and less cultivated periods of a language, such cumulations of words may be expected to be more common; but as grammatical accuracy and elegance of style prevail, the prepositions (considered as distinct words), are confined more strictly to their separate use. We find, even in MILTON, the combination *at under*, as "some trifles composed *at under* twenty;" but, in the present day, such a construction would hardly be tolerated by the critics. In more ancient times this sort of construction was still more prevalent; and we find numberless such expressions as "of beyond," "for against," and the like:— Accumulation.

> Artifycers and other straungiers, from the parties *of beyonde* the see. *Stat.* 1 *Ric. III.* c. ix.
>
> The shiref of the seid countie of Northumbreland, or wardeyn of the est and middell marchees *for ayenst* Scotlond. *Stat.* 11 *Hen. VII.* c. ix.

Where the combination has been such as to present to the mind the ready conception of a new relation, it has generally been received in language as a new preposition, as *throughout*, *into*, *overthwart*; and so perhaps the Latin *intra*, *extra*, &c. Custom, too, has sometimes given a distinct force to compounds, which appear originally to have had no signification different from that of the simple preposition which formed their basis. Thus we have in English distinguished *within* from *in*, *without* from *out*; and more slightly *unto* from *to*, *untill* from *till*, &c. So in French we find *en* and *dans*, *avant* and *devant*, *vers* and *devers*, *près* and *auprès*, with more or less of distinction in their modern use and application; and, in like manner, the Italians, from the Latin *ante*, have formed *innanzi*, formerly *inanti*, and *dianzi*; as, from *pressus*, they have formed *appresso* and *d'appresso*:—

> L'alma Ciprignia *inanti* i primi albori
> Ridendo empia d'amor la terra e'l mare. *Annibal Caro.*
>
> Torna amore a l'aratro, e i sette colli,
> Ou 'era *dianzi* il seggio tuo maggiore. *F. M. Molza.*

Io pur doueua il mio bel sole, io stesso
Seguir col piè, come segu'hor col core;
E le fredde Alpi, e'l Rhen, ch'aspro rigore,
Mai sempre agghiaccia rimir *d'appresso.* *F. M. Molza.*

When used indifferently.

347. There is one circumstance in the use of prepositions, which, though really dependent on usage in every language, must not here be overlooked; since it seems, at first sight, contradictory to the notion that this part of speech can correctly express the actual relations which it is supposed to signify. We see, in fact, that various prepositions are sometimes used indifferently in a sentence; and at other times a particular preposition is absolutely essential to the sense. This circumstance depends on the nature of the relation intended to be expressed. In general, the external and physical relations of objects must be expressed by their own proper and peculiar words. Thus we cannot substitute *in* for *out*, or *after* for *before*, in speaking of visible objects and bodily actions: but the case is different when we come to speak of the mind; for, as the analogy of its states and operations to those of the material world are very loose and general, so we may adopt almost any external relation of things as a symbol whereby to explain mental relations. Thus we may say that a person did a certain act *in* envy, or *out of* envy, or *through* envy, or *from* envy, or *for* envy, or *with* envy; but we cannot say of the same man, under the same circumstances, that he was *in* his house, and *out of* his house, passing *through* the town, and distant *from* the town, walking *with* another person, or a mile *before* him. Still there are limits, fixed by custom, to the use of each preposition; but these limits vary much in different languages; and hence a translation, correct in substance, often appears literally inaccurate. Thus the French "*sous* peine," answers to our "*on* pain," and to the old English "*up* peine."

No more *up* peine of lesing of your hed. *Chaucer.*

How a particular preposition may be employed, in this respect, is mere matter of idiom, and depends solely on custom:—

Quem penes arbitrium est, et jus, et norma loquendi.

But it will generally be found that the prepositions of most frequent use are employed with the greatest latitude, in the earlier stages of a language, and so continue, until their equivocal signification gives rise to inconveniences which are only to be remedied by confining them to certain forms of construction.

Custom also varies in the course of time; as may be seen in many examples which have now become obsolete, as "to learn *at*," "to accuse *for*," &c. But it must not always be supposed that the force of a preposition is varied, because the application is different; for the difference may arise from the other words in the sentence: thus the French *ôter à*, and *donner à*, are our "take *from*," and "give *to*;"

but in both cases *à* retains its primary force, and the apparent opposition depends on the contrariety between *ôter* and *donner*.

348. From all that has here been said of prepositions, the necessity, and even beauty, of such a part of speech in all cultivated languages is sufficiently manifest. "Though the original use of prepositions," says Harris, "was to denote the *relations of place*, they could not be confined to this office only. They, by degrees, extended themselves to subjects *incorporeal*, and came to denote relations, as well *intellectual* as *local*." "But how," says COUR DE GEBELIN, "can such words introduce into the pictures of speech so much harmony and clearness, and become so necessary, that without them, language would present but an imperfect delineation? How can these words produce such powerful effects, and diffuse throughout discourse so much warmth and delicacy?" The reason, he adds, is simple: "There is no object which does not suppose the existence of some other object to which it is bound, with which it is connected, to which it in some way or other bears *relation*. A valley supposes the existence of a mountain, a mountain that of less elevated lands: smoke implies fire, and there is 'no rose without a thorn.' It is of necessity, then, that different objects should be bound together in speech as they are in nature; and that we should have words to express the *relations* which exist among things." Conclusion.

After this, it may be unnecessary to remark on Mr. Tooke's sweeping censure of the philosophers, that "though they have pretended to teach others, they have none of them known themselves *what the* nature of a preposition is."

CHAPTER XII.

OF CONJUNCTIONS.

Why so called.

349. A SIMPLE sentence, as we have seen, may be formed by a noun and a verb alone, as "John walks." The sentence may be complicated by the introduction of an adverb, which modifies the verb, as "John walks *foremost*;" and it may be rendered still more complex, by substituting for the adverb a preposition, which shows the relation of the noun or verb to another noun, as "John walks *before* Peter." But in the communication of thought, sentences, whether simple or complex, must be connected together. When the connexion is effected by a single word, such word belongs to the part of speech, which is usually denominated a *conjunction*. Thus, if I say "John walks *and* Peter rides," the word *and* is a conjunction; or if I say John walks *but* Peter rides, the word *but* is a conjunction.

Objection to the name.

350. Mr. Tooke objected, but most illogically, to this designation. "Conjunctions" (said he), "it seems, are to have their denomination and definition from the use to which they are applied, *per accidens essentiam!*" What he meant by the essence of a part of speech, apart from its use, it is not easy to conjecture. To conjoin is the essence of a conjunction and not an accident of it. *Accidens essentiæ junctum contingenter*. Take away the accident, and the essence still remains; but if we take away from a conjunction its use in conjoining, the essence of the conjunction is gone. Besides, this objection involves Mr. Tooke in a gross inconsistency. He admits that a noun differs from a verb; but how does it differ, if not in use? How does the noun *love* differ from the verb *love*, or the noun *whip* from the verb *whip*, but in use? And if a noun differs from a verb in its use alone, why should not a conjunction differ from both, in the same manner? Parts of speech are distinguished essentially by their use alone; any other distinctions which they may happen to have, are *accidents*, which vary in different languages and at different times and places, without altering their grammatical character. The English conjunction, *and*, is essentially the same as the Greek καὶ, and the Latin *et*, though it differs from them in the accidents of sound; but there is no more reason for calling the sound of a word its essence, than for giving that appellation to the colour of the ink with which it is printed.

Are a part of speech.

351. Mr. Tooke's objections to conjunctions, however, lay deeper than to their mere name. "I deny them" (said he) "to be a separate sort of words, or part of speech by themselves." Such were the bold, but absurd or unmeaning propositions which obtained for this

etymologist the reputation not merely of a grammarian, but of an absolute inventor of the science of grammar! He himself told us, that "he meant to discard all *mystery*." Why, what greater mystery can there possibly be, what greater confusion in the mind of a student of grammar, than to be told that there is no order, no classification, among words,—that *if* is derived from *give*, and therefore *if* and *give* are words of the same sort, nay identically the same in all their uses—that they do not indicate by their use, any different "turns, stands, postures, &c., of the mind?" The mystery here discarded is the mystery of learning. The student is stopped on the very threshold of his studies, by being assured that there is nothing for him to learn. And the sage who gives him this precious information, sets up for the great illuminator of mankind in this very branch of learning! "I believe I differ from *all* the accounts which have hitherto been given of language," said Mr. TOOKE. Very true: and every patient in Bedlam differs from all other persons who give any account of his state of mind. It is somewhat strange, that in support of his title to absolute originality and exclusive knowledge of grammar, this writer should quote the following (among other) expressions of LORD BACON:— "*Quæ in naturâ fundata sunt, crescunt et* AUGENTUR; *quæ autem in opinione* VARIANTUR, *non augentur*." The science of grammar, which is "founded in nature," was taught, as has been shown above, by PLATO and ARISTOTLE. Since their time it has "grown and been increased" by the labours of grammarians in a great variety of languages down to the present day; and now we see it illustrated by application to languages dead and living, polished and barbarous, to the Sanskrit, Hebrew, Latin, and Gothic, as well as to the English and French, the Soosoo, and the Chinese: and we find certain great leading principles operating on them all. Why? Because language is the expression of human thoughts and feelings; and there are certain main channels in which human thoughts and feelings have throughout all ages necessarily flowed. When, therefore, at the close of the eighteenth century of the Christian era, an individual professed to set aside every trace and vestige of the knowledge which preceded him, his doctrine was not an *augmentation*, but a *variation*, and we may be well assured that it was "founded" not in nature, but in the mere *opinion* of its pretended inventor.

Opinion different from science.

352. It was Mr. Tooke's *opinion*, and nothing more, that a conjunction is not a separate part of speech. Now, what is opinion? Mr. Tooke presumed to ridicule Lord Monboddo's account of it, derived from the Platonic philosophy, simply because Mr. Tooke could not or would not understand that philosophy. Plato says that the subject of opinion is neither τὸ ὄν nor τὸ μὴ ὄν, but a medium between both.* Now this, however paradoxical it may appear to any person who will not take the trouble to reflect upon it, will be found extremely clear, with the help of a slight degree of attention.

* Repub. l. 5.

By *τὸ ὄν* Plato meant that which *is*, in the absolute sense of the word—that which *is*, always, and certainly, and without any variation. By *τὸ μὴ ὄν* he meant that which *is not* at any time, or in any manner, and cannot be conceived to be. Thus it is always and certainly true that in our *idea* of a circle all the radii are equal; and it is not at any time or in any manner true that we can form an idea of a circle with unequal radii. But there is a third case which is continually occurring to us, namely, that an *object* is presented to our observation which may correspond more or less accurately with a given idea. We may see, for instance, a coach-wheel, or the dome of St. Paul's church, but we can only form an *opinion* how nearly either of these approaches to our idea of a perfect circle; for the life of man would not suffice to prove such coincidence beyond the possibility of a doubt. Now, Plato distinguished this class of objects by the expression *τὸ γιγνόμενον*, which he opposed to *τὸ ὄν*, as in the following celebrated passage of the *Timæus*—*Εστιν οὖν δὴ κατ' ἐμην δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί το ΟΝ μὲν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δε οὐχ ἔχον· καὶ τί τὸ ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ μὲν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε· τὸ μὲν δὴ ΝΟΗΣΕΙ, μετα λόγου περιληπτὸν, ἀεὶ κατα ταυτὰ ὄν. τὸ δ' αὖ ΔΟΞΗ, μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, δοξαστὸν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν*—which passage CICERO has thus freely rendered:—"Quid est, quod semper *sit*, neque ullum habet ortum? et quid est, quod *gignatur*, nec unquam sit? Quorum alterum *intelligentiâ* et ratione comprehenditur, quod unum semper atque idem est: alterum quod affert *opinionem* per sensus rationis expertes, quod totum opinabile est; id gignitur et interit, nec unquam esse vere potest." And the general sense of both these great writers is, that *science* is founded on that which *is*; *opinion* on that which *seems*: science relates to that which is distinctly apprehended, because it is permanent, immutable, and consonant to the necessary laws of human existence; opinion to that which is vague and indistinct, arising from sensible impressions, and the casual accidents of time and place. What Mr. Tooke called his "general doctrine," was of this latter kind: it was an *opinion* derived from comparing the *sound* of words, not only without regarding, but often in direct opposition to their *sense*. Should any one for a moment conceive that I am speaking without due respect to the literary reputation of Mr. Tooke, I beg to remind him that I speak of a passage in which Mr. Tooke himself treated the profound wisdom of a PLATO and a CICERO with the most sovereign contempt, and even represented Lord Monboddo as an idiot, for quoting their very words. Elsewhere he said that the learned Lord was "incapable of writing a sentence of common English;" but this is nothing to his abuse of one of his critics, the late Mr. WINDHAM, an accomplished scholar, and as honourable a man as ever existed, whom Mr. Tooke called in his chapter on conjunctions, a "cannibal," and "a cowardly assassin."

Derivation. 353. Mr. Tooke rested his opinion respecting conjunctions on their

derivation. "There is not such a thing" (said he) "as a conjunction in any language, which may not, by a skilful herald, be traced home to its own family and origin." This may, or may not, be the case; but it is part of the *history* of language, and has nothing to do with the *science* of grammar. Mr. Tooke has accurately "traced home" some conjunctions: in regard to others, he has been mistaken; but whether right or wrong in the particular instances, his "general doctrine" can derive no benefit from them. To prove that a word performs one function at one time, does not disprove its performing another function at another time. Many of Mr. Tooke's etymologies in this part of his work are borrowed from former writers; but those writers never conceived anything so absurd, as that derivation was the whole of grammar.

Definition.

354. Having disposed of these preliminary objections, I come to the definitions which have been given by different authors of this part of speech. It has been seen that the early Greek grammarians included what we call prepositions and conjunctions in the class of Σύνδεσμοι (connectives). Subsequent writers observed, that while the preposition expressed a relation of word to word, the conjunction expressed a connection of sentence with sentence. Hence ALDUS MANUTIUS, a very able grammarian of the fifteenth century defines a conjunction, "Pars orationis indeclinabilis adnectens ordinansque *sententiam*." SCALIGER, in the sixteenth century, says, "Conjunctio est quæ conjungit *orationes* plures." SANCTIUS, towards the end of that century, more briefly, "Conjunctio *orationes* inter se conjungit." VOSSIUS, in the seventeenth century, "Conjunctio est quæ *sententiam* sententiæ conjungit:" HARRIS, in the eighteenth, "The conjunction connects not words but SENTENCES;" and some years after him, COUR DE GEBELIN, in his figurative manner, says, "Une conjonction est un mot, qui de plusieurs *tableaux* de la parole fait un tout," meaning by the word *tableau* not a single object, or word, but such a combination as is properly called a sentence. Agreeing with all these authorities in their common principle, I would suggest, as the definition of a conjunction, *a part of speech serving to show the particular mode in which one sentence is connected with another sentence.* I designedly omit to notice, as characteristics of the conjunction, its being "indeclinable," as stated by Manutius; or "void of signification," as stated by Harris. Nor do I think it proper to say with Frischlin and others, quoted by Vossius, "that it conjoins verbs and sentences, actually or potentially." According to the definition of a sentence above given, it is clear that the conjoining of verbs must be the conjoining of sentences. And as to the words "actually or potentially," they seem merely to have relation to those constructions of speech, which are explainable by the figure commonly called Ellipsis. On the other hand the expression "adnectens *ordinansque* sententias," which was adopted by Manutius from the old grammarians, Comminianus and Palæmon, appears very material, and suggests the propriety of noticing that sentences are

connected by conjunctions not simply and in an uniform manner, but diversely according to their particular modes of connection.

Do not connect mere words.

355. Here again Mr. Tooke objected that there were cases in which the words, commonly called conjunctions, did not connect sentences, or show any relation between them. "*You, and I, and Peter, rode to London*, is one sentence made up of three. Well!" (said he) "So far, matters seem to go on very smoothly. It is, *You rode, I rode, Peter rode.* But let us now change the instance, and try some others, which are full as common, though not altogether so convenient. *Two* AND *two make four;* AB AND BC AND CA *form a triangle; John and Jane are a handsome couple.* Does AB form a triangle, BC form a triangle? &c. Is John a couple? Is Jane a couple? Are two, four?" This objection of Mr. Tooke's seems to have induced Mr. Lindley Murray, after defining a conjunction as "a part of speech *chiefly* used to connect sentences," to add, "it *sometimes* connects only words." Now, if it could be shown that the word *and*, or any other word generally used as a conjunction, was occasionally used with a different force and effect, that circumstance would not make it less a conjunction, when used conjunctionally. In the instances cited, however, by Tooke, the word *and* serves merely *to distribute the whole into its parts*, all which bear relation to the verb: and it is observable, that though the verb be not twice expressed, yet it is expressed differently from what it would have been, had there been only a single nominative. We say, "John *is* handsome,"—"Jane *is* handsome;" but we say John and Jane *are* a handsome couple. In this particular, the use of the conjunction differs from that of the preposition: it varies the assertion, and thus does in effect combine different sentences; for though AB does not *form* a triangle, yet AB *forms* one part of a triangle, and BC *forms* another part, and CA the remaining part; and these three parts are the whole. So, when PERIZONIUS says, "Emi librum x drachmis *et* iv. obolis," although the *buying* was not wholly effected by the ten drachmas, nor by the four oboli; yet the purchaser did employ ten drachmas in *buying*, and he did also employ four oboli in *buying*. The meaning, therefore, if fully developed, would exhibit two *sentences* connected by the conjunction *and*. Since the first publication of the passages immediately preceding, I have been glad to see the view here taken confirmed by the authority of Dr. Latham, in one of his valuable grammatical works.* He says, "Although the statement that conjunctions connect not words but propositions, and that exclusively, is nearly coeval with the study of grammar, it is not yet sufficiently either believed or acted upon. 'What,' I have been frequently asked, 'are we to do with such expressions as John and Thomas carry a sack to market, three and three make six, &c.? Surely this does not mean that John carries one sack and Thomas another; that one three makes one sum

* Latham, First Outlines, p. 21.

of six, and another three makes another sum of six, &c.' The answer to this lies in giving the proper limitation to the predicates. It is not true that John and Thomas each carry *a sack;* but it is true that they each of them *carry*. It is not true that each three makes *six;* but it is true that each three *makes* (*i. e.* contributes to the making). As far then as the essential parts of the predicate are concerned, there are two propositions; and it is upon the essential parts only that a grammarian rests his definition of a conjunction." It may perhaps be asked what is here meant by the *essential* part of a predicate; for instance, what is the essential part of the predicate in the proposition AB, and BC, and CA form a triangle? I apprehend that the learned author last quoted would consider the essential part of the predicate to be expressed by the word *form;* for it is meant to assert first that the line AB essentially *forms* some part of a figure, say the base; and that BC essentially *forms* another part, say the perpendicular; and that CA essentially *forms* a third part, say the hypothenuse: and the result of these three propositions is, that the three lines *form* a triangle; but this is a result which cannot be obtained, but by expressly or tacitly assuming the three first propositions to be true. So, when I say John and James are a handsome couple, I mean to assert that John is handsome and also that Jane is handsome, which two assertions are both implied by the conjunction *and*.

Sentences connected.

356. The view which I have here taken of conjunctions leads me to consider first the nature of connected sentences; secondly, the different modes of connecting them in point of signification; and thirdly, the expression of such connection by phrases or separate words. And first as to the sentences connected. These it has been shown must be either enunciative or passionate: in the former the verb, in the latter the interjection which stands in the place of a verb, is to be taken as the hinge on which all the rest of the sentence turns. By means of this we form an unity of thought, a distinct perception of some fact, or a feeling of some sentiment, connected with a distinct object. But thoughts and sentiments do not always succeed each other in the mind as detached and perfectly separate things, but more commonly with associations of similarity or contrast, with relations of cause and effect, and with a thousand other modifications and mutual dependencies. Hence these first and elementary unities become parts of larger unities: the simple sentence forms only a phrase or paragraph in a more comprehensive sentence; and the longest sentence is more or less closely connected with what precedes or follows it, in a long discourse or poem. Nor are the enunciative capable of being connected with enunciative only, or the passionate with the passionate; but we pass naturally from a strong feeling to contemplate its consequence, as in the beautiful anthem, "O that I had wings like a dove! *Then* would I flee away, and be at rest;" *

* From Psalm lv. 6.

where *then*, though adverbial in form, acts as a conjunction, by showing the dependence of the second sentence on the first.

Length of passages.

357. How far these connections may go, that is to say, how many conjunctions may be admitted into one comprehensive sentence, is a matter not to be determined by any grammatical rule, but must depend on the taste and judgment of the writer; and great writers, more particularly great poets and orators, often seem to indulge in a more than common degree of continuity. Thus MILTON—

> *Now*, Morn, her rosy steps in th' eastern clime
> Advancing, sow'd the earth with orient pearl,
> *When* Adam wak'd, so custom'd; *for* his sleep
> Was airy, light, from pure digestion bred,
> *And* temp'rate vapours bland, *which* th' only sound
> Of leaves and fuming rills, Aurora's fan,
> Lightly dispers'd, *and* the shrill, matin song
> Of birds on ev'ry bough.

Thus, too, CICERO—

> Potestne tibi hujus vitæ lux, Catilina, *aut* hujus cœli spiritus esse jucundus, *cum* scias, horum esse neminem qui nesciat, te pridie Kalendas Januarias, Lepido et Tullo Consulibus, stetisse in comitio cum telo; manum consulum *et* principum Civitatis interficiendorum causâ paravisse; sceleri *ac* furori tuo non mentem aliquam aut timorem tuum, *sed* fortunam Populi Romani obstitisse?

And it is to be observed that, after each of these instances, the next following sentence begins with a distinct expression of relation to that which preceded it. Milton, having described Adam's sleep as light, goes on to say, "so much the *more* his wonder was" to find that the rest of Eve had been unquiet: and Cicero having briefly alluded to the former atrocities of Catiline, proceeds, "*ac* jam illa omitto." Indeed there are some writers whose sentences, for whole pages together, are connected, and it is difficult to detach a short passage so as to show its whole force and effect, without referring to the previous and subsequent parts of the discourse. For instances of this continuous style, I may particularly refer to the *Sermons on the Creed* by the celebrated Dr. ISAAC BARROW; who, it must be confessed, carried this method to an excess; for even in a continued argument the mind seems to require some short pauses, and resting places, as it were, to enable it to pursue its steps with regularity and firmness.

Modes of connection.

358. A slight degree of reflection must teach any one, that the modes of connecting sentences, in point of signification, must be very various, and consequently that conjunctions may in this view be classed under several different heads. It is clear, too, that the grounds of distinction between the classes ought to be adopted with care, and explained with perspicuity; so as to prevent the student from employing one conjunction, when a very different one may be required by the context. Accordingly, the best grammarians have philosophically investigated the different modes in which one sentence can be said to depend on, or be related to another; and the result of

their labours has been to throw great light on the proper use of conjunctions. Mr. Tooke, unable to estimate, or unwilling to acknowledge the value of these researches, thus endeavoured to depreciate them.—"We shall get rid of that farrago of useless distinctions into *conjunctive*, *adjunctive*, *disjunctive*, *subdisjunctive*, *copulative*, *negative-copulative*, *continuative*, *subcontinuative*, *positive*, *suppositive*, *causal*, *collective*, *effective*, *approbative*, *discretive*, *ablative*, *presumptive*, *abnegative*, *completive*, *augmentative*, *alternative*, *hypothetical*, *extensive*, *periodical*, *motival*, *conclusive*, *explicative*, *transitive*, *interrogative*, *comparative*, *diminutive*, *preventive*, *adequate-preventive*, *adversative*, *conditional*, *suspensive*, *illative*, *conductive*, *declarative*, &c. &c., which explain nothing; and (as most other technical terms are abused) serve only to throw a veil over the ignorance of those who employ them." As this mode of treating a scientific subject is extremely flattering to the indolence of mankind in general, the above passage may not improbably have produced an injurious effect, in deterring the grammatical student from investigations which it falsely describes as unprofitable: and I therefore think it proper to examine a declamation, which in any other point of view would be totally beneath notice. In the first place, there is a manifest want of good faith in heaping together a number of words, "*conjunctive*, *adjunctive*," &c. &c. &c., which are not to be found in any one grammatical writer, and presenting the whole as a "farrago" common to such writers. This is a mere trick, and a trick extremely unworthy of any man with the least pretension to literary reputation. The thirty-nine terms above cited are indeed a "farrago;" they have no meaning as they stand, they are placed in no order, and they have no relation to each other; but whose fault is that? Undoubtedly Mr. Tooke's, for he was the sole author and inventor of the "farrago" which he pretended to ridicule. "Most other technical terms," says he, "serve only to throw a veil over the ignorance of those who employ them." A profound remark! So, the geometrician must not tell us of a *parallelogram*, or of a *rhomboid;* a surgeon must not speak of the *metacarpal* bone, or of the *arterial* tube; nor an engineer of a *counterscarp*, or a *ravelin*, because these are all technical terms; and technical terms are a mere veil for ignorance! Mr. Tooke, however, was not original, in applying this sort of reasoning to grammar. That philosophic statesman, JACK CADE, thus reproaches his prisoner LORD SAY, "It will be proved to thy face, that thou hast men about thee, that usually talk of a *noun* and a *verb*, and such *abominable words*, as no Christian ear can endure to hear." Admitting, however, that some technical terms may be properly employed, Mr. Tooke asserted that the terms applied to classify conjunctions form only a "farrago of *useless* distinctions." Now, this it would have been better for him to prove than to assert: only assertion was the easier process of the two, and presented the shorter road to celebrity as a grammatical reformer! If Mr. Tooke had submitted to the labour of attempting this proof, he would have

found that some, at least, of the terms which he has specified, serve to mark *useful* distinctions; and that that utility had been in many points well marked out by Mr. HARRIS, an author whom Mr. Tooke affected to hold in so much, but such undeserved, contempt; for whatever may have been the errors of Harris, they were not a thousandth part so gross, or so injurious to the science of grammar, as those into which Tooke himself had fallen.

Harris's scheme.

359. The following is a comprehensive view of Mr. Harris's scheme for an arrangement of the species of conjunctions, according to their signification :—

1. Connexive
   - 1. copulative
   - 2. continuative
     - 1. suppositive
     - 2. positive
       - 1. causal
       - 2. collective.

2. Disjunctive
   - 1. simple
   - 2. adversative
     - 1. absolute, or comparative
     - 2. adequate, or inadequate.

Connexives.

360. This scheme, it will be observed, is confined to enunciative sentences. The first distinction (though not clearly so stated by Harris) is substantially into *connexive* and *disjunctive* conjunctions. Conjunctions (says he), while they connect sentences, either connect also their meanings, or not." And so says SCALIGER, " Aut sensum conjungunt ac verba, aut verba tantùm conjungunt, sensum verò disjungunt." VOSSIUS, recognising the same distinction in principle, applies to the first class the designation of *copulatives*. " Aliæ" (says he) " sunt *copulativæ*, ut, *et*, *que*, *ac* ; aliæ sunt *disjunctivæ* ut *vel*, *aut*." The former of these terms, he adds, is used in a strict sense, " Nam omnis quidem conjunctio copulat; sed hæ simpliciter id præstant citra disjunctionem sententiæ, aut caussalitatem, vel ratiocinationem." On the other hand he defends the expression of *disjunctive conjunctions*, because by them " conjunguntur voces materialiter, disjunguntur formaliter." And BOETHIUS gives the same reason in different words, where he says, " Conjunctionem ea quæ conjungit inter se, disjungere in tertio." " I do not cite these expressions of Vossius and Boethius as most happily chosen to illustrate the distinction in question; yet that distinction is no less obvious than fundamental. Every one must perceive at first sight, the marked difference between these two passages :—

1. Cæsar was ambitious, *and* Rome was enslaved.
2. Cæsar was ambitious, *or* Rome was enslaved.

In each passage, there are two propositions joined together by a word, which we call a conjunction, and which does not enter into the construction of either proposition. In the first passage, the joining word (*and*) is a *connexive* conjunction: it merely adds the one proposition to the other, in the flow of discourse, without intimating that the facts asserted in them relate at all to each other. In the second

passage, the joining word (*or*) is a *disjunctive* conjunction: whilst it joins the one proposition to the other, as successive parts of the same argument, it disjoins the facts asserted in them, as standing on different though indefinite grounds of belief; for the meaning is, I do not assert positively that Cæsar was ambitious, nor do I assert that Rome was enslaved; but I assert that if Cæsar was not ambitious, then Rome was enslaved, and *vice versâ*. GELLIUS uses the word *connexiva* for that sort of conjunction, which VOSSIUS calls *copulativa;* and the former term seems better suited than the latter to the scheme adopted by Harris, who divides "the conjunctions, which conjoin both sentences and their meanings," (i. e. those which I call *connexives*,) into *copulatives* and *continuatives*. The copulative conjunction "does no more," according to him, "than barely couple sentences; and is therefore applicable to all subjects whose natures are not incompatible. *Continuatives*, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate sentences into one continuous whole; and are therefore applicable only to subjects which have an essential coincidence. To explain by examples,—'Tis no way improper to say *Lysippus was a statuary*, AND *Priscian was a grammarian—The sun shineth*, AND *the sky is clear*. But 'twould be absurd to say *Lysippus was a statuary* BECAUSE *Priscian was a grammarian*—though not to say *the sun shineth* BECAUSE *the sky is clear*. The reason is, that, with respect to the first, the coincidence is merely accidental; with respect to the last, 'tis essential and founded in nature." The Greek name for the copulative (in this sense) was Σύνδεσμος συμπλεκτικός; for the continuative συναπτικός, or παρασυναπτικὸς.

Continuatives.

361. The continuatives are subdivided by Harris into *suppositive* and *positive*. The suppositives are such as *if;* the positives, such as *because*, *therefore*, *as*, &c. The former denote (necessary) connection, but do not assert existence; the latter imply both the one and the other. The Greek term συναπτικός and the Latin *continuativa* was applied to the suppositive conjunctions, which extend not only to possible but even to impossible suppositions, as, "*if* the sky fall, we shall catch larks; the positives were called παρασυναπτικοὶ or *subcontinuativæ*, and assumed the actual existence of the primary fact; and this either where the connection is strictly and logically necessary, or where it is mere matter of analogy, the former case being expressed by *because*, &c., the latter by *as*, &c. Of the suppositives, GAZA says, ὕπαρξιν μεν ου', ἀκολουθίαν δέ τινα, καὶ τάξιν δηλουσιν: PRISCIAN says they signify to us "qualis est ordinatio et natura rerum, cum *dubitatione* aliquâ essentiæ rerum." And SCALIGER says, they conjoin "sine subsistentiâ *necessariâ;* potest enim subsistere, et non subsistere, utrumque enim admittunt." The positives are either *causal* or *collective*. The causals are such as *because*, *since*, &c., which subjoin causes to effects; e. gr. *the sun is in eclipse*, BECAUSE *the moon intervenes*. The collectives are such as subjoin effects to causes; e. gr. *the moon intervenes*, THEREFORE *the sun is in eclipse*. The causals

were called in Greek Αἰτιολογικὸι, and in Latin *causales* or *causativæ;* the collectives were called in Greek Συλλογιστικὸι, and in Latin collectivæ or illativæ.

Disjunctives. 362. The *disjunctive* conjunctions are in like manner divisible into various classes. Their first distinction is into *simple* and *adversative.* A simple disjunctive conjunction, disjoins and opposes indefinitely as *either it is day,* OR *it is night.* An adversative disjoins with a positive and definite opposition, asserting the one alternative and denying the other; as *it is not day,* BUT *it is night.* Again, the adversatives, according to Harris, admit of two distinctions, first as they are either *absolute* or *comparative,* and secondly as they are either *adequate* or *inadequate.* The absolute adversative is where there is a simple opposition of the same attribute in different subjects, or of different attributes in the same subject, or of different attributes in different subjects; as 1. *Achilles was brave,* BUT *Thersites was not;* 2. *Gorgias was a sophist,* BUT *not a philosopher;* 3. *Plato was a philosopher,* BUT *Hippias was a sophist.* The comparative adversative marks the *equality* or *excess* of the same attribute in different subjects, as *Nireus was more beautiful* THAN *Achilles*— *Virgil was* AS *great a poet* AS *Cicero was an orator.* These relate to substances and their qualities, but the other sort of adversatives relate to events, and their causes or consequences. Mr. Harris applies to these latter the terms *adequate* and *inadequate;* he however confesses that this is a distinction referring only to common opinion, and the form of language consonant thereto; for in strict metaphysical truth no cause that is not adequate is any cause at all. Thus we may say, *Troy will be taken* UNLESS *the Palladium be preserved;* where the word unless implies as matter of opinion, that the preservation of the Palladium will be an adequate preventive of the capture of Troy. On the other hand, when we say, *Troy will be taken* ALTHOUGH *Hector defend it,* we intimate an opinion that Hector's defending it, though employed to prevent the capture, will be an inadequate preventive.

Subdisjunctive. 363. PRISCIAN introduces a distinction which he calls *subdisjunctiva,* and in which he is followed by SCALIGER and VOSSIUS. According to these authorities, the Latin *sive,* answering nearly to the Greek ἔιτ' οὖν, is a subdisjunctive conjunction, inasmuch as it disjoins not the meaning of any sentence, but merely different *names* given to a conception involved in a sentence. Thus "Alexander *sive* Paris" signifies the same person who is sometimes called Alexander, and sometimes Paris. "A globe *or* sphere" means the same figure, which some call a globe, and some a sphere. "John Brown *alias* Thomas Webb" means the same individual who has gone at different times by these different names. But if the words *sive, or,* and *alias* are here to be deemed conjunctions, it must be by a very different ellipsis from that employed in the case of a disjunctive. When we say disjunctively "every number is even *or* odd," the ellipsis if filled up would be "every particular number *is* either an even number, or

else it *is* an odd number." But when we say "Alexander *or* Paris fled from the field of battle," the ellipsis if filled up would be a person fled from the field of battle, who was *called* Alexander, or else he was *called* Paris. Unfortunately we employ our English word *or* in both characters, disjunctive and subdisjunctive, which sometimes occasions no small obscurity, especially in narratives. It were to be wished that we had two different words for these two different purposes; but since that is not the case, it becomes the more necessary to distinguish the different functions of the same word by appropriate designations.

Other schemes.

364. It must be observed that many old grammarians not only classify conjunctions differently from the scheme above adopted, and give other names to the different species than those here employed; but when they use the same terms, it is sometimes with a different force and effect. Thus Apollonius divided causal conjunctions into five species, viz., continuatives, subcontinuatives, proper causals, adjunctives, and effectives, and in this he was followed by Manutius. It would be endless, however, to note all these diversities of arrangement; and as Mr. Harris's scheme is one of the simplest, I have chosen to follow it, with some small correction.

Conjunctional phrases.

365. Having thus seen how sentences may be connected together in point of signification, I come now to consider how they may be connected in expression. Now it is manifest, that one sentence may, and generally speaking, in a long discourse, the majority of sentences must, serve to lead the mind from what precedes to what follows. It would, however, be endless to attempt to point out all the means by which this is effected; nor would such an explanation, if practicable, properly fall within the scope of grammar. The remark nevertheless is important; for a sentence is in this respect only the development of an operation of the mind more briefly effected by a *word* or a *phrase*. In treating of prepositions, I first considered prepositional phrases, and then showed how those phrases were gradually compressed into words constituting that class to which the name of preposition is usually assigned. In like manner, I here think it advisable to examine first the *Conjunctional phrases*, and then the separate words called *Conjunctions*. It seems probable that in the early attempts to form a connected discourse, the junction of sentences, which is now performed by a single word, could not easily be effected by unpractised speakers, except by the more circuitous mode of whole sentences, or phrases. In process of time these were contracted by means of ellipses, that is, by dropping out those portions of the sentence or phrase which were easily supplied by the intelligence of the hearer, and retaining only the word which most distinctly marked in the one sentence the sort of dependence on or relation which it bore to the other. Hence it is, that even at this day there are certain conjunctional forms, concerning which it is not always easy to determine whether they should be regarded as words or phrases. Thus

R. STEPHANUS says of *quamobrem*, that it is "unica dictio, quibusdam etiam tres:" and VOSSIUS says "*quamobrem*, *quasobres*, *propterea*, *quare*, et similia, non videntur hujus esse classis (sc. conjunctionum) quia non tam vox unica sunt, eaque composita, quàm plures." And again, "Vix caussa apparet cur *quamobrem* magis sit vox unica, quàm *eam ob rem*: vel *quare* quàm *eâ re*; ut illo Tulliano, *Eâ re ad te statim Aristocritum misi.*"* So Lucretius:—

> *Quas ob res*, ubi viderimus nil posse creari
> A nihilo.†

In our own language several of the conjunctions now considered as single *words*, were formerly *phrases*; such are *because*, *therefore*, *wherefore*; and such too are the following in Old English, Scottish, and French, *Howe be it—for als moche—at least waye—not forcing whether—contrariwise—insafer as—pur ceo que—cest asavoir—and over that—coment que—how often, so often—no the less—neuerthelas—not for thi—nought gaynstandand—forfered that—set in cais—put the cais—forseing that*, &c. &c.

> *Howe be it*, the kynge held styll his siege. *Berners' Froissart.*

> Bot *for als moche* as sum micht think or seyne
> Quhat nedis me apoun so lytill evyn
> To writt all this; I ansuere thus ageyne. *The King's Quair.*

This geare lacketh wethering; *at least waye* it is not for me to plough. *Bishop Latimer.*

These words goe generally to all the king's tenants—*not forcing whether* he haue the reuersion by dyscent. *Sir W. Staunford*, A.D. 1590.

Contrariwise, certain Laodiceans and lukewarm persons think they may accommodate points of religion by middle ways. *Bacon. Essays.*

And decernis the saidis actis and euery ane of thame to be abolishit and extinct for euer, *insafer as* ony of the saidis actis ar repugnant and contrarie to the confessioun and word of God foirsaidis. *Scot. Act. Parl.* A.D. 1567.

E *pur ceo qe* aucunes gentz de nre Roiaume se doutent qe les aides &c. pussent turner en servage a eus e a leurs heirs avoms graunte pur nous et pur nos heires qe mes tieles aides &c. ne treroms a custume. *Stat.* 25 *Edw. I.* c. 1, A.D. 1297.

Meismes les chartres en toutz leur pointz en ples devaunt eus e en jugementz les facent alower, *cest asavoir* la grand chartre des franchises come ley commune, e la chartre de la forest solom l'assise de la forest. *Ibid.*

That—the same fyne be openly and solemply rad and proclaymed in the same court—*And* in the same tyme that it is so redd and proclaymed all plees cesse; *and over that* a transcript of the same fyne be sent by the seid justices unto the justices of assisez. *Stat.* 1 *Ric. III.* c. 7, *MS.*

Il de common droit poit distreiner pur le rent aderere, *coment que* tiel done fuit fait sauns fait. *Littleton*, sect. 214.

How often his eye turned to his attractiue adamant, *so often* did an vnspeakeable horrour strike his noble heart. *Sir P. Sidney's Arcadia.*

> What ansuere thei bare the sothe can I not say
> *No the les* of fele this was the comon sawe. *R. De Brunne.*

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* Epist. ad Fam. 14, 3. † De Rer. Nat. 1, 155.

Youe knowe, Lordes Syracusans, that we haue hytherto done in thys warre, as men of honestie: *neuerthelas*, leste there be anny that vnderstandeth not fullye the affayre, I wolle well declare yt vnto hym. *Nicolls's Thucydides*, fo. 191.

Was mad another statute, that non erle no baroun
No other lorde stoute ne fraunkeleyn of toun
Tille holy kirke salle gyue tenement rent no lond.
Not for thi he wille that alie religioun
Haf and hold in skille that gyuen is at resoun.
R. De Brunne.

Item it is ordanyt that all craftis &c. be distroyit *nought gaynstandand* ony priuilegis or fredome geifyn in the contrare. *Scot. Act. Parl.* A.D. 1424.

He slogh him sone that ilk day
Forfered that he sold oght say. *The Seuyn Sages.*

With stout curage agane him wend I will
Thocht he in proues pas the grete Achill,
Or *set in cais* sic armour he weris as he,
Wrocht be the handis of God Vulcanus sle. *Gawin Douglas.*

And *put the cais* that I may not optene
From Latyne land thaim to expell all clene,
Yit at leist thare may fall stop or delay. *Idem.*

It may be ordered that ii or iii of our owne shippes do see the sayde Frenche soldiers wafted to the coast of France; *forseing that* our sayd shippes entre no hauen there. *Q. Elizabeth to Sir W. Cecil.*

It is plain, that these phrases operate, with relation to the sentences between which they show a relation, exactly in the same manner as the words do, which we call conjunctions. A phrase is first abbreviated into its principal words, and these are again contracted into one short word. Thus the French *c'est asavoir* above quoted was probably first translated into English, "it is to know," or "it is to wit," whence we now have in our legal documents the abbreviated phrase, "*to wit*;" as from the Latin *videre licet* comes *videlicet*, which we have adopted into the English language. These abbreviations and contractions are very arbitrary in their use; and the longer sometimes supersedes the shorter. Our ancestors in the fifteenth century used to say *where*, for that conjunction which we now express by *whereas*, i. e. *where that.*

Wher in a statute made in the xvij yere of the reign of King Edward the iiijth hit was ordeigned, &c. &c. Please it *therefore* youre highnesse &c. to ordeign.
Stat. 1 *Ric. III.* c. 6, *MS.*

366. I have before observed on the erroneous notion entertained by some grammarians, that men at any period of history set to work "to invent little words" (*d'inventer des petits mots*), to be employed merely as prepositions: and the same remark is applicable to conjunctions. It is true, that of some few conjunctions we cannot trace the origin with perfect certainty; but even these are manifestly connected more or less closely with significant words in different languages or dialects: and the far greater number are distinctly seen to have been used as nouns or verbs, somewhat differing perhaps in form, but showing a clear analogy in signification. This will be **Conjunctions.**

rendered sufficiently clear, by tracing the etymology of two or three of the principal conjunctions; the others being reserved for their appropriate place in a future part of this treatise.

And. 367. "The principal copulative," says HARRIS, "is *and*," which answers to the Greek καὶ and the Latin *et*, and is found substantially in all cultivated languages. VOSSIUS considers the Latin *et* to be derived *per apocopen* from the Greek ἔτι, *præterea*, *insuper*; or, more properly speaking, to be the very word ἔτι, only pronounced more briefly by the Latins. It is remarkable that in the most ancient remains that we have of the Latin language, the fragments of the laws of the Twelve Tables, *et* rarely if ever occurs, but its place is supplied by the enclitic *que*, which is probably of the same origin as the Greek καὶ. The force and effect of all these words, as simply coupling together sentences, will be fully understood from what has been already said of the copulative conjunctions. Mr. TOOKE derives our common word *and* from *An-ad*, which he says in Anglo-Saxon signifies *dare congeriem*. This etymology is altogether obscure. It has even been doubted whether *Anan*, which he expounds *dare*, to give or grant, had any such meaning; and as to the syllable *ad*, which he translates *congeriem*, it signified a funeral pile. However, with his usual confidence in his own judgment, he elsewhere says, "I have already given the derivation which I believe will alone stand examination." SKINNER, more modestly, but with at least as much plausibility, says, "AND—nescio an a Lat. *addere*, q. d. *add*, interjectâ per epenthesin *n*, ut in *render*, a reddendo." A word of this very ancient use can only be guessed at with much doubt, and may possibly be itself one of the original roots of language. We find terms of some analogy to it in the early Gothic dialects. In the Frankish and Alamannic it is written *indi*, *inti*, *enti*, *unte*, *unde*; in the modern German *und*; in Icelandic *end*, in Lower Saxon *un*. ADELUNG, considering (like Skinner) that the letter *n* is often inserted in one dialect, while it is omitted in another, is of opinion that the Latin *et*, and Greek ἔτι are identical in origin with the Teutonic *enti*, *unte*, &c. It is possible too, that our word *and* may have a connection with the Mæso-Gothic *and*, which is used as a preposition answering to the Greek ἐν, εἰς, ἐπὶ, κατά; or with the word *andar*, which in the same language means "other." Upon the whole, Skinner's suggestion is probably not very remote from the truth; for the meaning of *and* is clearly *add*; nay, in separate sentences we may always substitute the imperative *add* for the conjunction *and*, with little if any difference in the force or intelligibility of the sentence. Thus, "John rode, *add* Peter walked, *add* James sailed," will not only convey the same notions, but will connect them nearly in the same manner, as if it had been more elegantly written, "John rode, *and* Peter walked, *and* James sailed."

If. 368. I come now to the *continuative* conjunctions, that is to say, those which not only connect sentences and their meanings by coupling them together, but mark a dependence of one on the other; and this,

first as suppositives—IF is called by Mr. Harris a *suppositive* conjunction: some other grammarians term it a *conditional;* but however it may be designated, the general force and effect of such a conjunction is obvious in most languages. It serves to mark the certain dependence of one event on another, without asserting the absolute existence of either. We therefore intimate, that if the one *be*, the other must necessarily result from it; that *when* we are sure of the one, then we may reckon upon the other also; or that the former being *given* as a datum, the latter follows by the power of reasoning. Hence the Greek εἰ, and the Latin *si* merely expressed *being;* for εἰ is part of the verb ἐω or εἰμι, and *si* is part of *siet* or *sit*. The power of the conjunction εἰ is thus elegantly illustrated by Plutarch, according to the free translation of the old English folio: "In logike, this conjunction EI (that is to say *if*, which is so apt to continue a speech and proposition) hath a great force, as being that which giveth forme unto that proposition, which is most agreeable to discourse of reason and argumentation. And who can deny it? considering that the very brute beasts themselves have in some sort a certeine knowledge and true intelligence of the subsistence of things; but nature hath given to man alone the notice of *consequence*, and the judgement for to know how to discerne that which followeth upon every thing. For that it *is* day, and that it *is* light, the very woolves, dogs, and cocks perceive; but that *if* it be day, of necessitie it *must* make the aire light, there is no creature, save onely man that knoweth." The Greek or Latin construction, therefore, is "*be it* that there is day there must be light." Again, the German conjunction answering to our *if* is *wenn*, which also signifies *when*. Hence the expression, "*Wenn* man dich fragt, so antworte," which signifies "*if* any one asks you, answer thus," may be rendered with little difference of meaning, "*when* any one asks you, answer thus." The etymology of our English conjunction *if* has of late been matter of dispute. Skinner first traced a connection between it and the Anglo-Saxon verb *gifan*, to give. *Gif*, the Anglo-Saxon conjunction, he says, was used in his time in Lincolnshire for *if*. Tooke, it seems, was struck with this suggestion of Skinner's; insomuch that (as has been well observed) "this word was probably the foundation of his whole system."* Believing that *if* was the imperative of *give*, "he naturally enough concluded that other particles might be accounted for by the same process. Accordingly he expended a profusion of labour and perverse ingenuity in detecting imperatives where none ever existed, or possibly could."† Dr. Jamieson conceives that neither the Gothic *jabai* (as he writes it), nor the Alamannic *ibu*, *ob*, *oba*, nor the Icelandic *if* or *ef*, can be formed from the verbs denoting *to give*, in those languages.‡ Elsewhere it has been remarked, "that the great variety of ancient forms makes it difficult to determine the precise etymon. Some are not

* Quart. Rev., No. 108, p. 316. † Ibid.

‡ Scottish Dict., art. *Gif*.

unlike the Sanscrit *iva*—(sicut)—others have the form of nouns. The old German *ibu*, *ipu*, may be resolved into the ablative or instrumental of *ipa*, *iba*, (dubium): and the Icelandic *ef*, (if,) appears to be connected with the substantive *efi*, a doubt, and *efa*, to doubt, in that language."* With all due deference to the learned authors of these arguments, it appears to me that they are not quite conclusive. It surely does not follow that because a suppositive conjunction in one language is not connected with a verb of a particular signification in that language, a similar conjunction cannot possibly be connected with a verb of like signification in another language. It does not follow, that because *ἐι* is not connected with *δίδωμι* in Greek, nor *si* with *dare* in Latin, there can be no connection in Mæso-Gothic between the conjunction *jabai* or *yabai*, and the verbs and nouns *gibai*, *giba*, *atgiban*, *gaft*, *atgaft*; nor in Anglo-Saxon, between the conjunction *gif* or *gyf*, and the imperative *gif* or *gyf*, the infinitive *gifan* or *gyfan*, the preterite *gaf* or *geaf*, or the substantives *gifa* or *gyfa*, *gift* or *gyft*, &c.; nor again in English between the conjunction *if* (written or pronounced in old or provincial English and Scotch, *yf*, *yiff*, *yiffe*, *yef*, *yive*, *geve*, *gef*, *gyff*, *giff*, *gif*, *gin*), and the verbs, nouns, and participles *geve*, *yeve*, *gyff*, *gaff*, *giftys*, *yave*, *yevyth*, *yeftys*, *yeft*, *yiftis*, *yevours*, *yevers*, *given*, *geven*, *yeven*, *yeoven*. It is to be remarked that whatever may be the origin of the various Teutonic words signifying to give, they have manifestly undergone many changes of pronunciation both in the consonants and vowels; and the same is observable in the Scandinavian dialects. Of the German verb *geben*, the two first persons present are ich *gebe*, du *gibst*, the past indicative is ich *gab*, the conjunctive ich *gäbe*, and the imperative *gib*; and the noun (gift) is *gabe*. In the Frankish and Alamannic, we find as nouns or verbs *gaba*, *geba*, *keba*, *kib*, *gheban*, *ghibu*, *gibu*. In the Icelandic, Swedish, and Danish, *gafwa*, *gifwa*, *gifva*, *gofwa*, *gaf*, *gave*, *give*. It is also to be remarked that this variety has been increased by the different force and effect given to the Gothic letter Ꝿ and the Anglo-Saxon ȝ, of which the first was taken from one form of the Roman G, of the lower empire, and the other from another form of the same letter. The different powers of these letters have been expressed in different dialects by g, j, y, and z. Hence the Anglo-Saxon *geboren* (born) answers to the modern German *geboren*, and old English *yborn*; the Anglo-Saxon *daeg* to the modern English *day*, the Frisiac *jern* to the Anglo-Saxon *georn* and English *yearn*, and the Anglo-Saxon *gear* to the English *year*, and the old Scottish word written (if not pronounced) *zeir*. A third remark is also material, namely, that it is not only the imperative of the verb to *give*, which has been used with a conjunctional force, but also the past participle *given* of the same verb. Keeping in view these remarks, I proceed to the following examples of the connection between the nouns, verbs, and participles, alluded to, with the different forms of the conjunction in question.

* Quart. Rev. ut. sup.

i. *Mœso-Gothic.*—Here the conjunction which Dr. Jamieson reads *jabai* (if) being spelt with Ȝ, would more agreeably to our pronunciation be read *yabai*, and is connected with *gibai*, *giba*, *gaft*, &c., just as our provincial word *yate* is with the ordinary word *gate*.

Yabai afletith mannam missadedins ize.—*If* you pardon men their misdeeds. *Matt.* vi. 14.

Gibai izai afstassis boros.—Let him *give* her a bill of divorce. *Matt.* v. 31.

Atbair tho *giba* theina.—Present thy gift. *Matt.* v. 24.

Wato mis ana fotuns meinans ni *gaft*.—Water to me for my feet thou *gavest* not. *Luke*, vii. 44.

Atgaf siponyam seinaim.—He gave to his disciples. *Mark*, viii. 6.

Hlaif unsaruna thena sinteinan *gif* uns himmadaga.—Our constant bread *give* us this day. *Matt.* vi. 11.

ii. *Anglo-Saxon.*—Here the z is equally used for words which answer to our g and y:—

Zif ze that secan willeth.—If (prov. *gif*) *ye* will seek that. *Alfred's Bede*, l. 1. c. 1.

Se cÿning his *zife* sealde.—The king presented his *gifts*. *Ibid.* l. 2, c. 3.

He for*geaf* thone anweald his apostolon.—He *gave* the power to his apostles. *Ibid.* l. 3, c. 7.

iii. *Old English* and *Scotch*:—

Hartely myght thei warry me,
That of ther gud had ben so fre,
To *gyffe* me and to sende. *Sir Amadas.*

Sir Amis answerd tho
Sir, therof *yive* Y nought a slo
Do al that thou may. *Amis and Amiloun.*

Not Avarice the foule caytyfe
Was halfe to grype so ententyfe,
As Largesse is to *yeue* & spende. *Chaucer.*

And with hys hevy mase of stele
There he *gaff* the kyng hys dele. *Richard Coer de Lion.*

And truely in the blustring of her looke, shee *yaue* gladnes & comforte sodainly to all my wittes. *Chaucer, Test. Lov.*

The remedy by the seid estatutes is not verray perfite nor *yevyth* certeyn ne hasty remedy. *Stat.* 11 *Hen. VII.* c. 22, *MS.*

He *gaf gyftys* largelyche
Gold & syluer & clodes ryche. *Launfal Miles.*

For gret *yeftys* that she gan bede,
To londe the schypmen gonne her lede.
Octouian Imperator.

Every astate, feoffement, *yeft*, relesse, graunte, lesis and confirmacions of landys. *Stat.* 1 *Rich. III.* c. 1. *MS.*

Provided that this acte—extend not—to any graunte or grauntes, *yeft* or *yiftis*, had or made by the kinges letres patentes to the same Anthony. *Stat.* 11 *Hen. VII.* c. 31. *MS.*

Ayenst the sellers, feffours, *yevours* or grauntours, and his or their heires. *Stat.* 1 *Rich. III.* c. 1. *MS.*

That no artificer ne laborer herafter named take no more ne gretter wagis then in this estatute is lymytted, upon the payne assessed as well unto the taker as to the *yever*. *Stat.* 11 *Hen. VII.* c. 22. *MS.*

Which lawe by negligence ys disused, and therby grete boldnes ys *goven* to sleers and murdrers. *Stat.* 3 *Hen. VII.* c. 2. *MS.*

Yeoven under our signet. *Q. Elizabeth, Let. to Sir W. Cecil.*

If the seid lessee or lesses within viii daies warnyng to theym *yeven* by any of the seid justices of the peas. *Stat.* 11 *Hen. VII.* c. 9, *MS.*

Or yit *gewe* Virgil stude well before. *Gawin Douglas.*

Eorthliche knyght, or eorthliche kyng
Nis so swete in no thyng;
Gef he is God, he is mylde. *Kyng Alisaunder.*

He askyd at all the route,
Gyff ony durste com and prove
A cours for hys lemannes love. *Richard Coer de Lion.*

For *giff* he be of so grete excellence,
That he of every wight hath cure & charge,
Quhat have I gilt to him, or doon offense?
K. James I. The King's Quair.

The domes and law pronouncis sche to thaym then,
The feis of thare laubouris equalye
Gart distribute. *Gif* dout fallis thareby
Be cut or cavill that plede sone partid was. *Gawin Douglas.*

Ich am comen hider to day,
For to sauen hem, *yiue* Y may. *Amis and Amiloun.*

Yef thou me louest ase mon says,
Lemmon as y wene;
Ant *yef* hit thi wille be
Thou loke that hit be sene.
MS. Harl. No. 2253, fol. 80.

Wurthe we never for men telde,
Sith he hath don us thys despyte,
Yiffe he agayn passe quyte. *Richard Coer de Lion.*

He thought *yif* ich com hir to,
More than ichaue ydo,
The abbesse wil souchy gile. *Lay Le Freine.*

The lawe of the land ys that *yf* eny man be slayne in the day, and the felon not taken, the townshipp wher the deth or murder is done shal be amerced. *Stat.* 3 *Hen. VII.* c. 2, *MS.*

Gin living worth cou'd win my heart,
You wou'd na speak in vain. *Scots Song.*

It can hardly be doubted but that these words *geve*, *gef*, *gyff*, *giff*, *gif*, *yive*, *yef*, *yiffe*, *yiff*, *yif*, *yf*, which in the last eleven examples are conjunctions, are the same in origin with the preceding verbs *geve*, *yeve*, *gyffe*, *gaff*, *yave*, *yevyth*, and the nouns *giftys*, *yeftys*, *yeft*, *yiftis*, *yevours*, *yevers;* and it seems still plainer that the conjunction *gi'n* is merely a different application of the participle *goven*, *yeoven*, or *yeven*, which is the modern *given*. But this change in the use of the words *if*, *gif*, *g'in*, &c. causes them to express a new "posture, stand, turn,

or thought of mind" (as Mr. Locke speaks), and thus to perform a different function in language, or become a different "part of speech," namely, a conjunction. Mr. Tooke, therefore, is right so far as he follows SKINNER, who first showed the connection between *if* and *give:* but he is wrong, when, trusting to his own theory, he says, "our corrupted *if* has always the signification of the English imperative *give*, and *no other*." In short he is right where he is not original, and original only where he is not right. Nor is his "additional proof" of much relevancy. "As an additional proof," says he, "we may observe, that whenever the *datum* upon which any conclusion depends, is a sentence, the article *that* if not expressed is always understood, and may be inserted after *if:* as in the instance—

> ——————— My largesse
> Hath lotted her to be your brother's mistresse,
> *Gif* shee can be reclam'd; *gif* not, his prey.
> *Sad Shepherd*, act 2, sc. 1.

The poet might have said,

> *Gif that* she can be reclam'd, &c.

But the article *that* is not understood, and cannot be inserted after *if*, where the *datum* is not a sentence but some noun governed by the verb *if* or *give*. Exam. 'How will the weather dispose of you tomorrow?' '*If* fair, it will send me abroad, &c.'" So far Tooke. Now the whole of this observation turns on the peculiar idiom of the English language, which admits one form of ellipsis and not another; for all these constructions are elliptical; and the word *that*, which is a conjunction as well as *if*, has not the least pretension in such sentences to be called an article. I shall have occasion hereafter to notice some other uses of this conjunction, when I speak of the phrases *O! si—O! gi'n, an if, as if*, &c.

369. Of the disjunctive conjunctions, I will here only instance *Though*, a word of the class which Harris calls inadequate adversatives; that is to say, conjunctions uniting two sentences, one of which states an event or circumstance, and the other states another event or circumstance as inadequate to prevent the former: ex. gr. "*Troy will be taken* ALTHOUGH Hector defend it," where the conjunction *although* serves to show that Hector defends Troy with a view to prevent its being taken; but that this preventive is inadequate to produce the intended effect. We may, however, observe that the same conjunction is used, and by a just analogy to mark an apparent incongruity of qualities, where the possession of the one does not, in fact, preclude the existence of the other, as, "*though* brave, yet pious;" *though* learned, yet polite." But a more forcible illustration of the true nature of our adversative conjunction, *though*, cannot be given than in the daring speech of Macbeth— Though. Although.

> *Though* Birnam wood be come to Dunsinane,
> And thou oppos'd being of no woman born,
> *Yet* will I try the last.

If we examine the real force of the word *though* in these and similar passages (and *although* is merely an intensive form of the same conjunction), we shall find that it does not imply an absolute inadequacy to produce a given effect, but such an inadequacy as may be *thought* to exist. It might have been *thought*, for instance, that Troy could not fall, if it was defended by Hector. It might have been *thought*, that a particular individual distinguished for bravery was therefore unlikely to be very pious; or that one absorbed in the pursuit of learning would pay little attention to the minutiæ of politeness. Above all it might have been *thought*, that when events apparently miraculous, and on whose impossibility a man of strong feelings like Macbeth had staked his rank, his honour, and his life, did really come to pass, he would have been utterly prostrated with terror, and unable to strike a blow in his own defence. Judging from the ordinary course of human affairs, such thoughts would not have been unreasonable. The conjunction *though*, therefore, merely indicated an unexpected difference between truth and probability: and being directly connected with the probable, it required another conjunction, such as *yet*, or *nevertheless*, to denote the true. Mr. Tooke says, "Tho' or though is the imperative *thaf* or *thafig*, from the verb thafian, or *thafigan* to allow." This is one of the few instances in which he ventured on an original etymology: it appears indeed at first sight plausible, but I fear it will scarcely bear examination. The proper meaning of the verb *thafigan*, *thafian*, or *gethafian* is to permit, as by a superior to an inferior. In a charter of William the Conqueror we find, "Ic nelle *gethafian* thæt ænig man this abrecan;" which in the ancient Latin version is thus rendered, "Ego nolo *consentire* ut aliquis istud frangat:" and the same clause occurs in two other charters, one of Henry I., the other of Henry II., in the latter of which the verb is spelt *gethauian*, i. e., *gethavian*. If this had been the origin of our conjunction, we should find an Anglo-Saxon conjunction *thafig*, or *thaf;* but there is no such conjunction in that language; the correspondent Anglo-Saxon conjunction is *theah*, a word plainly connected with the Anglo-Saxon substantive *theaht*, as our conjunction *though* is with our corresponding substantive *thought*. Neither do we find the *f*, or *v*, of *thafian* or *thavian*, in the analogous conjunctions of any of the other German dialects, Teutonic or Scandinavian. ADELUNG, under the German word *doch*, says, "In Low Saxon this particle is sounded *doch* and *dog*, by Ulphila *thau*, by Ottfried *thoh*, by Willeram *doh*, in Anglo-Saxon *theah*, in Dutch *doch*, in English *though*, in Danish *dog*, in Swedish *dock*."

In old English and Scottish we find it written very variously, *thah*, *thau*, *thaugh*, *thoffe*, *thof*, *thocht*, and *thought*:—

> Richard *thah* thou be euer trichard
> Tricchen shalt thou neuer more.
>
> *Song on Battle of Lewes.*

Ant for ir feirnesse, *thau* ho be comen of threlle,
Hire wedlac ne scal ho nout lesen all.
Vita Sanctæ Margaretæ.

Thaugh me slowe feole of heom,
They slowe mo of the kyngis men. *Kyng Alisaunder.*

Thoffe Y owe syche too. *Sir Amadas.*

Thof men wolde alle the londe seche.
MS. Harl. 7333, *fol.* 125.

Bot *thocht* I failyeit of rhyming,
Forgif me for my will was gude.
Scottish Rom. of Alexander.

Thocht be na reson persaue I mycht but fale
Quhat than the force of armis coud auale. *Gawin Douglas.*

Thocht he remission
Haif for prodission,
Schame and suspission
Ay with him dwells. *Dunbar.*

The king—woll—that suche possession—veste and be—holy in the other persone—in like wise as *thought* he had never be enfeoffed.
Stat. 1 *Ric. III.* c. 5, *MS.*

It is to be observed that Gawin Douglas and other Scottish writers spell *thocht*, the past tense of the verb, to *think*, exactly as they do this conjunction :—

So that we *thocht* maist semelye, in ane field,
To de fechtand ennarmed vnder schield. *Gawin Douglas.*

But said they sould sound thair retreit,
Because they *thocht* them nae ways meit
Conducters unto me. *Alex. Montgomery.*

Add to this that the Anglo-Saxon *athoht*, or *gethoht*, the Dutch *gedocht*, and the German *gedacht*, all answer to our substantive *thought;* and upon the whole it may be reasonably concluded that our present conjunction *though*, is not derived from the Anglo-Saxon verb *thafigan*, or *thafian;* but comes to us, through various modifications, from the Anglo-Saxon conjunction *theah*, connected with the Anglo-Saxon substantive *theaht*, which we have in like manner modified into *thought*.

In confirmation of this etymology, it may be observed, that the word *suppose* is often used in the Scotch dialect for *though* :—

Yone slae, *suppose* thou think it sour,
May satisfie to slokkin
Thy drouth now. *Alex. Montgomery.*

Stories to rede ar delectabil
Suppois that they be nocht but fabil. *Barbour.*

370. The instances here given of *and*, *if*, and *though*, may suffice to show how the part of speech called a conjunction, has arisen, in the development of the powers of language, out of more circuitous modes of expression, by whole sentences or phrases. In another part of this work, the same principle will be illustrated by tracing histo- Ordinatives.

rically the growth of our other conjunctions. There is a class of words, however, which demands notice here, and which Mr. HARRIS says "may be properly called *adverbial conjunctions*, because they participate the nature both of adverbs and conjunctions—of conjunctions as they join sentences; of adverbs as they denote the attributes of time and place." Such are *when*, *where*, *whence*, *whither*, *whenever*, *wherever*, &c. Upon the principle which I have adopted, these are to be called conjunctions when they conjoin sentences; but the name adverbial is not at all distinctive, because many other conjunctions have occasionally an adverbial use; and many prepositions when used conjunctionally serve to mark time or place. The scheme of arrangement which Harris has followed, is principally directed to the logical connection of sentences; but the connections of *time* and *place* are merely physical, and should therefore form a class apart. The term *ordinative*, which VOSSIUS applies to *deinde*, *postea*, &c., may not improperly designate the whole of this class.

Thus, among *ordinatives of time* we should reckon *whiles*, *till*, *o that*, *or*, *be*:—

His Lord nold he neuer forsake
Whiles he ware oliue. *Amis and Amiloun.*

Full ofte drinkes shee,
Till ye may see
The teares run down her cheeke.
Gammer Gurton's Needle.

Al the day and al the nyht
O that sprong the day lyht. *Geste of Kyng Horn.*

Sathanas Y bynde the, her shalt thou lay,
O that come Domesday. *Christ's Descent to Hell.*

He it is my dedly foo;
He schal abeyen it *or* he goo. *Richard Coer de Lion.*

Your madynis than sall haue your geir
Put in gude ordour and effeir
Ilk morning *or* yow ryse. *Philotus.*

The supper done than vp ye ryse,
To gang ane quhyle as is the gyse;
Be ye haue rowmit ane alley thryse
It is ane myle almaist. *Ibid.*

So, *where* is an *ordinative of place* in the following passage:—

——————— He rails
Even there, *where* merchants most do congregate. *Shakspeare.*

The *ordinals*, which I have included in the class of pronominal adjectives, such as *first*, *second*, &c., necessarily imply connection, and consequently the adverbs formed from them, are easily employed with a conjunctional force, as *primò*, *secundò*, *tertiò*, when placed at the beginning of sentences. The same also is to be observed of the adverbs used as relatives to these antecedents, such as *deinde*, *item*, *puis*, *next*, *syne*, *lastly*, &c. "*Deinde*," says VOSSIUS, "cùm verbo

jungitur, ad circumstantiam temporis indicandum, adverbium est: conjunctio autem, cùm tantùm ad orationis juncturum pertinet."

Accepit conditionem; *dein* quæstum occipit.	*Terentius.*
Pergratum mihi feceris; spero *item* Scævolæ, &c.	*Cicero.*
Ils font estat d'aller à Orleans, à Blois, *puis* à Tours.	*Dict. de l'Academie.*
First ae caper, *syne* anither.	*Burns.*

Redupli-cated.

371. It remains to be observed, that some conjunctions are used singly, and others in a succession of two or more. Thus we may say, "John *and* William came," or "*both* John *and* William came," or *both* John *and* William, and *also* James came.—"It is ordained that proclamation be made, *and* that the judgment be recorded, *and furthermore* that the record be transmitted." Where two or more succeed each other with a mutual relation, there is sometimes a fixed order in the succession; ex. gr. "*as—so;*" "*so—that:*" "*when—then,*" &c. On this subject VOSSIUS thus speaks—"Conjunctioni etiam accidit ordo; secundum quem aliæ sunt *præpositivæ*, ut *et*, *nam;* aliæ *postpositivæ*, ut *quoque*, *autem;* aliæ communes, ut *equidem*, *itaque*. *Igitur* sæpiùs postponitur. *Enim* etiam est particula præpositiva, Terent. *Phor.* act v. sc. viii. *Enim nequeo solus.*" Ad postpositivas etiam pertinent encliticæ. Ex his, *que* interdum alteri verbo jungitur quàm nativus verborum ordo exigebat: ut apud HORAT. lib. ii. od. 19:—

——— Ore pedes tetigitque crura.

Pro *cruraque tetigit.* These however are matters depending on the particular idiom of each language, and not governed by the philosophy of general grammar.

Cumulations.

372. The case is different with the pleonasms and cumulations of conjunctions. These occur in all languages, and they therefore clearly arise out of principles common to the human mind in different countries. Hence VOSSIUS speaks of *expletive* conjunctions—"*Expletivæ* sunt, quæ nullâ necessitate sententiæ, sed explendi tantùm gratiâ usurpantur. Ut quæ metri vel ornatûs caussâ inseruntur. SALLUST in *Catil. Verùm enimverò is demum mihi vivere, et frui animâ videtur;* ubi *verùm* redundat." VIRGIL in xii:—

——— *Equidem merui nec deprecor inquit.*

Plena fuerit sententia, licet *equidem* tollas." To this head are to be referred such expressions as "*an if:*"—

——— Well I know
The clerk will ne'er wear hair on's face that had it.
——— He will *an' if* he live to be a man:

where either *an* or *if* is redundant; for they both signify the same, and Johnson is wrong in supposing that *an'* in this instance is a contraction of *and.* VOSSIUS refers these redundancies to the custom of ancient writers, "Nempe is *veterum* mos fuit, ut interdum conjungerent voces idem significantes." But they are not peculiar to any age

or nation: they are the result of hasty and inconsiderate habits of speech, which, it is true, are more common in the first formation of a language, than in more cultivated and civilized periods of history. Cumulation, however, is not always redundancy. When we find a sentence beginning thus—"*but nevertheless if*," the conjunction *but* connects it with what goes before, and *if* with some subsequent sentence, and the word *nevertheless* alone may be called redundant, and yet not strictly so, since it adds a great force and emphasis to the word *but*. In the Greek language, this cumulation of conjunctions is frequent; and it is sometimes explained by an ellipsis. Thus HOOGEVEN says—"Hoc modo ἀλλὰ νῦνγε redditur *nunc maximè*, suppressâ per ellipsin voculâ ἔιποτε. Ita SOPHOCL. in *Electr.* v. 413:—

Ὦ Θεοὶ πατρῶοι συγγένεσθέ γ' ἀλλὰ νῦν!

O Dii patrii, adeste nunc maximè, vel *nunc saltem!*

Plenior structura est Ὦ Θεοὶ πατρῶοι, ἔιποτε συγγένεσθέ μοι, ἀλλὰ νῦνγε συγγένεσθε!—*O Dii patrii, si unquam aliàs mihi adfuistis, at nunc adeste saltem!*

And so much for the conjunction, which receives its grammatical character neither from the form nor position of the word, but from its office in connecting sentences with each other, enunciative or passionate, according to their different modes of relation.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF ADVERBS.

373. DIFFERENT grammarians have arranged the Adverb in different parts of their systems. APOLLONIUS, followed by PRISCIAN, treats of it after the preposition and before the conjunction and interjection. SCALIGER also places it after the preposition. MANUTIUS places it between the verb and the participle; HARRIS after the participle and before the article. Most of the ancient grammarians, however, rank it as next preceding the preposition, conjunction, and interjection. In this order they are followed by VOSSIUS: and I am not sure that it may not be the best arrangement; but in our own language, and perhaps in others, there are many words used as adverbs, the explanation of which may appear more obvious and intelligible, when they are employed as prepositions or conjunctions. In this view, therefore, it may not be amiss that the consideration of the adverb should be postponed to that of the other two classes; but as there is no absolute dependence of any one of these classes on either of the two others, the order of their arrangement is comparatively unimportant. Order of treating them.

374. Mr. Tooke advanced a far more serious objection against the prevalent doctrines concerning this part of speech, when he asserted, "that neither Harris, *nor any other grammarian*, seemed to have any clear notion of the nature and character of the adverb." After this he proceeded to give his own notions, not of the adverb in general, but of a number of adverbs in particular, from which, and from what he had before said of the conjunctions and prepositions, he left his readers to collect that knowledge which, in his opinion, no grammarian beside himself had ever acquired. As this does not appear to be a very fair way of treating the grammatical student, I shall endeavour to pursue a more satisfactory method, even at the hazard of adopting, from the ancient grammarians, some of those notions which appeared to Mr. Tooke so obscure, Tooke's objection.

375. The adverb was originally so called, because it was added to the verb, to modify its force and meaning; hence the Greek writers defined it thus: Ἐπιῤῥημα ἔστι μέρος λόγου ἄκλιτον, ἐπὶ τὸ ῥῆμα τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχον.—"The adverb is an indeclinable part of speech, having relation to the verb." The question of its being indeclinable or not, is unimportant in the present investigation, since this circumstance depends on the idiom of a particular language; but the relation which the adverb bears to the verb depends on the Science of Universal Grammar: and this relation is stated by most of the ancient grammarians as the peculiar property of the adverb. DONATUS makes it Definition.

the only characteristic of this part of speech: *Adverbium est pars orationis, quæ adjecta verbo significationem ejus aut complet, aut mutat, aut minuit.* "The adverb is a part of speech, which being added to a verb, either completes, or diminishes, or alters its signification." VOSSIUS, however, observes, that the adverb is added not only to verbs, but to nouns and participles; and, consequently, that its name must be understood to have been given to it, not from the use to which it is always applied, but from that for which it most generally serves. *Non solis adjicitur verbis, sed etiam nominibus et participiis: nomen igitur accepit non ex eo quod semper, sed quod plurimum fit.* By the word nouns, Vossius, as he afterwards explains it, means adjectives, both nominal, pronominal, and participial. "We say," adds he, "*benè disserens*, as well as *bène dicere*, and *benè doctus*." And so we may say, *prorsùs meus, propemodùm suus, et magis nostras*, as well as, *prorsùs amicus, propemodùm liber, magis Romanus*, &c. For want of a clear and intelligible definition of the adverb, some writers have undoubtedly exposed themselves to the sarcasm of Tooke, who thus translates a sentence of SERVIUS: *Omnis pars orationis*, "every word," *quando desinit esse quod est*, "when a grammarian knows not what to make of it," *migrat in adverbium*, "he calls an adverb." It is impossible to avoid these errors, unless we first establish a definition of the adverb, to which, as a test, the various classes of words properly comprehended by different grammarians under this common designation may be applied. I venture therefore, with all becoming diffidence, to propose the following:—*An adverb is a part of speech added to a perfect sentence, for the purpose of modifying primarily the conception expressed by a verb, an adjective nominal or pronominal, or a participle; or secondarily, that expressed by another adverb.* In explicating this definition, I shall consider, first, the sort of sentence to which an adverb may be added; secondly, the modifications which it may effect; and, thirdly, the modes by which such modifications may be expressed.

Sentences to which added.

376. I.—First, I say, the adverb is added to a perfect sentence, converting it, if categorical, from a pure into a modal one: and by a perfect sentence I here mean one which either enunciates some truth, or expresses some passion with its object. Therefore, even to a simple imperative the adverb may be added, since a perfect sense is expressed without it, and its addition only serves to modify the verb. Thus the word "fly!" is, in effect, a perfect sentence, for it implies an agent and an act, and it couples the conception of the act of flying with the conception of the person addressed, if not in the perception of the speaker, at least in his volition. To this sentence, therefore, an adverb may be added consistently with my definition, and we may say, "fly quickly!" After this explanation of the passionate sentence, it is scarcely necessary to explain the enunciative. When the verb expresses action or passion, there can be no difficulty: thus when Macbeth says:—

> After life's fitful fever he sleeps *well*,

there can be no difficulty in understanding that the adverb *well* modifies the verb *sleeps*. A question, however, may arise, where the verb merely expresses existence; as, in the line just quoted, if the expression had been "he *is* well," it might be questioned whether *well* was an adverb or an adjective. A similar remark may be made on such expressions as "he is *asleep*," "he is *awake*," &c. It is true that in the English language these and many other such words have an adverbial form, and cannot be employed in immediate connection with substantives, as "a well man," an "asleep man," or an "awake man;" yet where they thus form the predicates of verbs, they are, in effect, adjectives. "He is well" corresponds exactly with "he is healthy"—"he is asleep" with "he is sleeping"—"he is awake" with, "he is waking:" and in a question of Universal Grammar, the idiomatic form of the words cannot at all decide the question. When I say the sentence must be perfect, I mean it must be perfect in the mind; in expression, a part or even the whole of it may be understood. A *part* is understood when the mind evidently supplies what is necessary to complete the sentence, as in the animated lines of Sir WALTER SCOTT:—

> ——— On Stanley!—On!—
> Were the last words of Marmion.

Here the adverb *on* manifestly refers to some verb understood in the mind, such as "march," "drive," "rush," or the like. The verb is suppressed, because it is indifferent to the speaker; the adverb is expressed, because it is of the utmost importance; because to the thoughts and feelings of the dying hero the mode of getting at the enemy was immaterial; but to get at them by some means or other was his most eager wish. The *whole* of the sentence is understood, when the adverb is responsive: as, "Will you come?—Yes." "When will you come?—Presently." "How often did he come?—Once." For these answers mean, "I will come *certainly*"—"I will come *presently*"—"He came *once*." And consequently the adverbs, *yes*, *presently*, and *once*, are to be taken as modifying the verbs "will come" and "did come," respectively.

377. II.—The adverb, I say, is used to modify primarily a verb, an adjective nominal or pronominal, or a participle; or secondarily, another adverb. As Harris calls the verb, adjective, and participle, "attributives of the first order," he, by parity of reason, denominates the adverb "an attributive of a secondary order," or "an attributive of an attributive." Harris, indeed, justly argues that the word Ἐπιῤῥήμα is of the same force and meaning as these phrases; for I have already shown that the word Ῥῆμα is used by many writers to signify not only what is commonly called a verb, but also what are called adjectives and participles. Thus AMMONIUS says, κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ σημαινόμενον, τό μὲν ΚΑΛΟΣ, καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ΡΗΜΑΤΑ λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΑ.—"According to this signification" (that is, of denoting the attributes of substance and the predicates in propositions), "the Modification.

words, *fair*, *just*, and the like, are called *verbs* and not *nouns*." And so PRISCIAN, speaking of the Stoics, says, "*Participium connumerantes verbis*, PARTICIPIALE VERBUM *vocant*." "Reckoning the participle among verbs, they call it a *participial verb*." Whatever may be thought of this reasoning, it at least agrees with the proposition, that the adverb is employed to modify the participle, the adjective, and the verb. On the other hand, the adverb is not employed to modify the substantive; because that is the function of the adjective, or of the article. Let us then consider the parts of speech which are primarily modified by the adverb, viz.: the verb and the adjective, taking the latter term in its widest sense.

Of the verb.

378. The *verb*, it must be remembered, asserts or manifests existence, either simply or together with some attribute of action or passion. The adverb, therefore, may either modify the attribute involved in the verb, or it may modify the mere assertion of existence. When it modifies the attribute, its operation is exactly similar to what will presently be described in regard to the adjective. The conception of *running* is modified by the adverb *swiftly*, in the proposition "he runs *swiftly*," precisely as it is by the adjective *swift* in the proposition "he is a *swift* runner." The case is somewhat different when the adverb is considered as modifying the assertion of existence. If this be done with reference to the corporeal conceptions of *place* and *time*, we have, as to place, such positive conceptions as those marked by the adverbs *here* and *there*; and such relative conceptions as those marked by the adverbs *where* and *whence*. If I say that a given event happened *here*, my assertion is positive and is limited to a certain point of space, and by necessary implication contradicts the assertion not only that it did not happen at all, but that it happened at any other place than the one indicated. So with regard to time: if I say that a certain event is happening *now*, my assertion is positive and is limited to the present time; if I say it happened *yesterday*, it is equally positive and limited to a certain time past. Again, if I say the event in question happened *where* some other event had occurred, the local adverb *where* is relative; and if I say it happened *when* some other did, the temporal adverb *when* is also relative. It is scarcely necessary to add that local and temporal conceptions may be adverbially expressed under an endless variety of circumstances. The event in question may occur *aboard*, or *ashore*, *aloft*, or *below*, *abroad*, or *at home*; the ship may be cut *adrift*; the army may be marching *homewards*; the battle may cease *awhile*, it may be begun *anew*, it may terminate *suddenly*, &c. &c. &c. So, the assertion of existence contained in a verb may be modified by various mental conceptions, and these also may be expressed adverbially. Thus, in a proposition, the assertion if not simply affirmative (which of course needs no modification) may be modified by a negative as *not*, *ne*, *nec*; or it may be modified as to certainty, if clear, by the adverbs *indeed*, *certainly*, and if doubtful by the adverbs *perhaps*, *forsan*, &c.; or, as to mode, by the adverbs *thus*, *so*, *as*, &c.: or the

assertion may be put interrogatively by the adverbs *how*, *why*, *where*, *when;* or responsively by the adverbs *yes* or *no*. The connection of propositions in an argument, and particularly of the premises with the conclusion, may be marked by such words as *ergo*, *consequently*, *therefore*, which some grammarians treat as adverbs, though others (and perhaps more accurately) hold to be conjunctions; a remark which applies generally to the adverbs called relative.

Of the Adjective.

379. The term *adjective*, as I have said, is here to be taken in its widest sense, as including not only the adjective simple, or proper, but also the participle, or participial adjective, and the pronominal adjective. It is manifest that all the attributes which these various classes of words express are capable of modification. Thus, a house which is "lofty," may be "*surprisingly* lofty," or "*very* lofty," or "*moderately* lofty." And in like manner we may speak of "a *remarkably* intelligent youth," an "*over* indulgent parent," "a *truly* affectionate friend." So, when we use a participle, or a pronominal adjective, we may modify it by the aid of an adverb, as "*much* obliged," "*greatly* indebted," "*wholly* yours," "*absolutely* mine," "*nobly* born," "*well* bred," "*highly* gifted," "*universally* respected," "*little* moved," "*less* affected," "not *so* energetic," "*equally* judicious," "*how* admirable!" "*thus* far," "*no* further." In all these instances, it is obvious, that the attribute expressed by the adjective undergoes some modification from the adverb. In truth, we form a double conception, as, first, a conception of *loftiness* with reference to the house, and, secondly, a conception of *surprise* with reference to the loftiness; so that the sentence "the house is surprisingly lofty" resolves itself into these other two sentences, "the house is lofty," and "the loftiness is surprising." Mr. Harris, therefore, had great reason to call the adverb an attributive of an attributive; for, in the latter of these two sentences, we find the word "surprising" represents an attribute of that loftiness, which, in the prior sentence, was considered as an attribute of the house. It is not the house altogether which excites surprise, but only its quality of loftiness. A house may be both lofty and surprising, without being surprisingly lofty. These modifications of an attribute may regard either its quantity or its quality. Its quantity may be modified positively, that is, simply; or relatively, that is, comparatively. The adverbs thus used positively in regard to quantity continuous, are such as, *much*, *little*, *sufficiently*, *parùm*, *satis*, &c.; in regard to quantity discrete, such as *twice*, *thrice*, *semel*, *decies*, &c. Those used relatively, if by way of intension, are such as *more*, *nimis*, *valdè*, &c.; if by way of remission, such as *less*, *vix*, &c. The quality of an attribute may be modified positively by such adverbs as *well*, *ill*, *nobly*, *benè*, *malè*, *fortiter*, &c.; or relatively, in regard to degree, by such as *rather*, *potius*, *excessively*, &c.; and in regard to similitude, by *as*, *so*, *adeò*, &c.

Secondary use.

380. Such being the primary uses of the adverb, it is easy to conceive that the secondary use is similar. As the adjective modifies the substantive, and the adverb modifies the adjective, so may a second

adverb be applied to the former with the same power of modification. As the word *admirably* may be prefixed to *good*, so may *very* be prefixed to them both together; and we may say "a *very admirably* good discourse;" in which, and the like instances, the analysis is similar to what I have before stated. The discourse is good, the goodness is admirable, the admiration is extreme.

Improper Adverbs.

381. To the classes of words which have been properly comprehended under the title of adverbs, some grammarians have added others which have no legitimate title to that appellation. Hence among the twenty-eight classes enumerated by Hickes, the twenty-seven by Manutius, the twenty-one by Charisius, and those of other writers, we find enough to justify the sarcasm of Tooke, and to explain, if not to justify, the grave designation of the Stoics, who called this part of speech Παυδέκτην; because, as Charisius says, "Omnia in se capit, quasi collata per satiram concessâ sibi rerum varietate." Thus some reckon as adverbs, the nouns substantive *Romæ*, *domi*, *casu*, and the like; some the nouns adjective *vili*, *caro;* some the pronouns *mecum*, *tecum*, *nobiscum*, *vobiscum;* some the verbs used interjectionally, *age*, *amabo*, *quæso*, and some the mere interjections *heus! utinam! ecce!* &c. These aberrations from grammatical principle may perhaps be accounted for, in part from the want of a clear and intelligible definition of the part of speech called an adverb, and in part from a mistaken impression of some writers, that adverbs and interjections are words of too insignificant a character to deserve serious attention. "Interjectio" (says Caramuel) "posset ad adverbium reduci, sed quia majoribus nostris placuit illam distinguere, non est cur *in re tam tenui* hæreamus." "The interjection might be reckoned among adverbs, but since our predecessors have been pleased to distinguish it from them, we need not hesitate about *so trifling a matter*." However these errors may have arisen, it must be confessed that they have been shared by writers of no mean reputation. Vossius says, "Interjectiones a Græcis ad adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius." Ben Jonson says, "Prepositions are a peculiar kind of adverbs, and ought to be referred thither;" and Bishop Wilkins says, that "the difference between prepositions and adverbs is so nice, that it is hard in some cases to distinguish them." Yet it is manifest that a preposition can no more be considered as a peculiar kind of adverb, than a substantive can be considered as a peculiar kind of adjective or verb: for the proper function of the preposition is to modify a conception of substance; and the proper function of the adverb is to modify a conception of attribute, either alone, or combined with an assertion: but the part of speech which names a conception of substance is the noun substantive; the part of speech which names a conception of attribute is a noun adjective; and the part of speech which asserts is the verb. Again, as to *interjections*, they do not serve to modify either noun or verb; but are interjected, as it were, between different nouns or verbs, and as Vossius says, "Citra verbi opem, sententiam complent;"

for though, in certain instances, the interjection may, both in signification and construction, supply the place of a verb, yet this, in no respect, modifies the signification of the following verb, but merely affects its construction in the sentence. Those authors, too, who do not differ in regard to the characteristics of whole classes, often seem to err strangely in allotting a particular word to its proper class. Dr. Johnson, a scholar certainly of great acquirements, designates as nouns substantive the words *pell-mell*, *ding-dong*, *handy-dandy*, *pit-a-pat*, and *see-saw*, when in the very examples which he quotes they are used as adverbs; and this is the more remarkable because he designates other words, of the very same formation and use, adverbs; ex. gr. *helter-skelter*, which certainly approaches as nearly to *pell-mell*, in its grammatical use, as it does in the mode of its formation, and in its general import. The acute and ingenious De Brosses calls the French *chez* an adverb, which is most manifestly a preposition, for *chez moi*, and *apud me*, are phrases exactly similar in construction. Even the learned Vossius calls the Latin *mecastor* an adverb, and R. Stephanus terms it "*jurandi adverbium.*" Now *mecastor* is either from the Greek μα, and *Castor*, the name of a deity, and then it is literally, "No, by Castor!" or else it is "*Me Castor adjuvet!*" So help me Castor! and in either case it is an interjectional oath, used as a common expletive in conversation. Thus we find in Terence, "Salve, *mecastor*, Parmeno;" where *mecastor* cannot by any ingenuity be made to modify the verb *salve*, or indeed any other word; but is truly and properly an interjection, which all words of the same kind must be, such as *Gadso!* which though Mr. Tooke distinctly calls an oath, yet he preposterously reckons among the adverbs. *Gadso!* and *'Odso!* were abbreviations of "by God it is so!" or "is it so, by God?" for men happily shrink from their own profaneness, and rather reduce their words to unmeaning exclamations, than advert seriously to their original import. As to the obscene Italian expression to which Tooke alludes, it had probably nothing to do with the interjection Gadso, however it may have furnished a hint to the unpolished satire of Ben Jonson, in the passage quoted from one of his plays.

382. III.—Having thus considered the various modifications of an attributive, which adverbs are calculated to effect, I come to examine the different modes by which such modifications may be expressed; and as I have spoken of prepositional and conjunctional phrases, so I think it advisable here to notice certain adverbial phrases, which in process of time have become, or may become adverbs. By an adverbial phrase, I mean any combination of words, which in a complex sentence may stand in the place of an adverb. Thus we may say "this happened *afterwards*," or "this happened *long* afterwards," or "this happened *many days* afterwards," or "this happened *not many days* afterwards." In the first case the adverb *afterwards* modifies the verb "happened;" in all the other cases the same adverb *afterwards* is modified, first by the adjective *long* used adverbially, then by the adjective and substantive *many days* forming an adverbial phrase, or

Adverbial phrases.

standing in the place of an adverb; and lastly by the adverb, adjective, and substantive, *not many days*, which in like manner may be said to form an adverbial phrase, or to stand in the place of an adverb. So in Lord BERNERS' translation of FROISSART, executed by command of King Henry VIII., and printed in his reign, the following passage occurs, fol. cxcix. b. "Nowe the Duke of Berrey commaundeth me the contrary; for he chargeth me *incontynent his letters sene*, that I shulde reyse the syege." In this passage *incontynent* is an adverb modifying the verb *reyse;* and *the letters sene* is a phrase, (similar in construction to the Latin ablative absolute, as it is termed, *visis epistolis*,) which modifies the adverb *incontynent*, a word at that time used where we should say *immediately*.

Thus, in the romance of *The Foure Sonnes of Aimon*, printed in 1554, we find—

Now up Ogyer, and you Duke Naymes, light on horseback *incontinent.*

Adverbial phrases are in another point of view material to the consideration of adverbs properly so called. By comparing different languages, we not only find that a certain phrase in one language corresponds to a different phrase in another language; but that phrases in the one correspond to words in the other. Thus in comparing the French with the Italian we not only find such expressions as *à chaudes larmes*, answering to *a dirotte lagrime;* or *à gorge deployée*, to *alla smascellata;* but we also find *à tatons* rendered by *tentone*, *à peu près* by *quasi*, &c., &c. The variety of phrases which may be found in different languages corresponding to one and the same adverb, is truly remarkable; of which those answering to our adverb *suddenly* afford a pregnant example. The striking expressions of St. Paul, Ἐν ἀτόμῳ, ἐν ῥιπῇ ὀφθαλμου—"in momento," "*in ictu oculi*,"* have, of course, been imitated in most European languages; as the English "*in a moment*"—"*in the twinkling of an eye;*" the French, "*en un clin d'œil;*" the Italian "*in un batter d'occhio;*" and to these may be added many analogous expressions, as the Spanish "*de repente;*" the Italian "*di primo lancio*," and "*tutto ad un tratto;*" the French "*tout d'un coup*," "*en un tourne main*," "*sur le champ;*" the Latin "*e vestigio;*" the old English "*in a trice*," "*as who saith treis*," "*at a thought*," "*in the space of a luke*," "*all anone*," "*all at once*," &c. &c., of which I shall hereafter give examples.

Compound words.

383. The first step towards expressing more briefly the modification of an attributive, may be observed in certain compound words, which unite the principal conceptions expressed in a phrase. Of such our old English writers present some examples which have now become obsolete, such as *foot-hot*, *sothfast*, and others still in use, as *forthwith*, *peradventure*, &c.

The maister hunte anon, *fotehote*,
With his horne blewe three mote. *Chaucer's Dream.*

* 1 Corinth. xv. 52.

"*Foothot*," says Mr. Tooke, "means *immediately, instantaneously*," and so far he is undoubtedly right; but whether *hot*, means, as he supposes, *heated*, or as WARTON suggests, *hit* against the ground, that is, *stamped*, may be matter of doubt. "In the twinkling of an eye," "in the space of a look," are expressions used to express the shortest possible lapse of time: and "a stamp of the foot," may well be supposed to convey a similar idea of brief duration.

DUNBAR, in his *Goldin Terge*, has the following lines:—

> And suddenlie, *in the space of a luke*,
> All was hyne went, ther was but wilderness;
> Ther was nae mair but bird, and bank, and bruke.
>
> *In twinckling of an ee*, to schip they went.

Sothfast is the substantive *sooth*, compounded (as in the word *stedfast*) with *fast*, *i. e.* firm, and so means truthful, or as sure as truth. In a sort of dramatic poem, probably of the thirteenth or fourteenth century, on *Christ's Descent into Hell* (Harl. MSS. 2253, f. 55. b.), are these lines, in which it is used adverbially:—

> And so wes seyde to Habraham,
> That wes *sothfast* holy man.

In the *Pricke of Conscience* (see Warton, v. i. p. 258), it is used adjectivally:—

> Thou mercyfull and gracious God is,
> Thou rightwis, and thou *sothfast*.

Adverbs may be compounded of two or more words. "Ut in aliis classibus," says Vossius, "ita quoque in adverbiis, compositorum alia fiunt è duobus, ut *perdiu*, *abhinc*, alia è pluribus ut *forsitan*. Nam, ut *forsit* ex *fors* et *sit*, quasi *forte sit*; ac *forsan* ex fors et *an*, quod et in *fortassean*; ita forsitan ex tribus istis *fors*, *sit*, *an*. And thus it is in English. We have *together* formed of *to* and *gather*; and we have *altogether* formed of *all*, *to*, and *gather*. So in French *tout à fait*, "altogether," from *tout*, *à*, and *fait*; in Italian *nondimeno*, "nevertheless," from *non*, *di*, and *meno*, &c.; in German *vielleicht*, "perhaps," from *viel*, much; and *leicht*, easily; *nimmermehr*, "nevermore," from *nie*, *immer*, and *mehr*, &c.

In forming compounds of this nature, all parts of speech (except interjections) are employed. "*Nulla est vocum classis*," says Vossius, "*ex quâ non adverbium componatur*." Thus a composite adverb may be formed in any of the following ways:—

i. From a pronoun and substantive, as *quare*, from *quâ* and *re*.

ii. From an adjective and substantive, as *postridie*, from *postero* and *die*.

iii. From an adverb, substantive, and adjective, as *nudiustertius*, from *nunc*, *dies*, and *tertius*

iv. From a substantive and verb, as *pedetentim*, from *pede* and *tentare*.

v. From a participle and substantive, as *perendie*, from *peremptâ* and *die*.

vi. From an adverb and adjective, as *nimirum*, from *ne* and *mirum*.
vii. From a preposition and substantive, as *obviam*, from *ob* and *viam*.
viii. From a pronoun and adverb, as *alibi*, from *alio* and *ibi*.
ix. From a pronoun and preposition, as *adhuc*, from *ad* and *hoc*.
x. From two verbs, as *scilicet*, from *scire* and *licet*.
xi. From two adverbs, as *etiamnum*, from *etiam* and *nunc*.
xii. From an adverb and a verb, as *deinceps*, from *dein* and *capio*.
xiii. From a preposition and adverb, as *abhinc*, from *ab* and *hinc*.
xiv. From a conjunction and adverb, as *etiam*, from *et* and *jam*.

Vossius ranks among compound adverbs those which might otherwise be said to be inflected, that is, formed from other words, by the addition of an adverbial particle, like our prefix *a*, or termination *ly*; as *tantisper*, from *tantus* and *per*; *quandoque*, from *quando* and *que*, &c. So we find not only *scienter*, from *sciens* and *ter*, but even *Catiliniter*, from *Catilina*; not only *jucundè*, from *jucundus*, but *Tullianè*, from *Tullius*.

Words employed. Adjectives.

384. Thus by degrees we arrive at those single words which, whether compound or simple, are called *adverbs*, and constitute, as such, a distinct part of speech. If it be asked what sorts of words may be employed, as adverbs, to modify other attributives, the proper answer is—all sorts. For the expression of Servius, though ridiculed by Tooke, is literally true: "*Omnis pars orationis migrat in adverbium.*" "Every part of speech is capable of being converted into an adverb."

From what has already been said, it is manifest that an *adjective* may be used adverbially. Let us suppose that it is necessary to enunciate these three propositions successively:—

i. A certain quantity exists.
ii. The quantity is large.
iii. The largeness is sufficient.

We have here three conceptions, viz., *quantity*, *largeness*, and *sufficiency*. The first is only considered as a substance; the second is considered as an attribute in one instance, and as a substance in the other; and the third is only considered as an attribute. Now, if we unite these three sentences in one, and say there is "a sufficiently large quantity," we, in fact, convert the adjective "sufficient" into an adverb. In some instances this difference in the employment of the word, is attended with a correspondent inflection or change in the form—as in English the adjective *sufficient* is inflected or changed into the adverb *sufficiently*; but this neither prevails in all languages nor in all adverbs of the same language: and is, indeed, a circumstance often appearing to be perfectly accidental or capricious. Again, the adjectives thus employed sometimes remain unchanged in form, but lose in practice their adjectival use, either partially or altogether. These circumstances, it is true, depend on the idioms of particular languages; but it is not the less important to notice some of them, because there is no more common source of error among grammarians than the confounding of what is universal in language with what is particular, the

scientific rule with the accidental exception. This will appear from many instances in the class of words now under consideration, namely, the adjectives proper, when used as adverbs; and in order to consider them the more distinctly, I shall notice first the simple uninflected adjectives, then those which have been inflected or changed in form, and lastly those adverbs formerly employed as adjectives, but which at present have wholly or partially lost that character. In the first class may be reckoned such words as *much*, *full*, *right*, *scarce*, &c.; in the second such as *aloud*, *around*, *along*, *wisely*, *prudenter*, *male*, &c.; and in the last such as *very*, *well*, &c. Many of these will hereafter receive particular notice: at present it may suffice to consider one of each class.

385. *Much*, which in old and provincial English and Scotch appears under the forms of *moch*, *muche*, *moche*, *mochell*, *mochil*, *muchele*, *mychel*, *meikill*, *mickle*, *muckle*, received, in those dialects, a larger adjectival construction than is the modern authorised usage, as may be seen in some of the following examples:— Much.

Whan the Abbot seeth ham flee,
That he holt for *moch* glee. *Descript. of Cokaygne.*

With *muche* Ost he is comyng. *Rom. of Kyng Alisaunder.*

Hye and low louyd hym alle,
Moche honoure to hym was falle. *Lyfe of Ipomydon.*

Ther nas nother old neyynge
So *mochell* of strength. *Rom. of Octovian Imperator.*

Undir heuen nis lond iwisse
Of so *mochil* ioi ant blisse. *Descript. of Cokaygne.*

And yeld here servise ofte, mid *muchele* wowe.
Life of St. Margaret.

Dieu mercy, to *mychel* harme
Many knighth there gan hym wime.
Rom. of Kyng Alisaunder.

And gif ye will gif me richt nocht,
The *meikill* devill gang wi' you. *Peblis to the Play.*

Mony a little maks a *mickle*. *North Country Proverb.*

The *muckle* devil blaw ye south,
If ye dissemble. *Burns. Earnest Cry.*

In the present use of the word *much*, it has considerable analogy to the Latin *multus* and *multŭm*, the Italian *molto* and *molti*, the old French *moult*, the Portuguese *muito* and *muita;* but though they may all flow from one common source, yet, if so, the channels have manifestly been divided at an early period: the *ch*, which distinguishes our *much* and the Spanish *mucho*, marking one branch, as distinctly as the *lt*, which characterises the other. Hence it happens that our idiomatic use of *much* differs in many points from the use of *multus* or *multŭm*. Though we use *much* as an adjective, in connection with an ideal conception, such as "*much* honour," "*much* glee," "*much* joy," "*much* money," we cannot so employ it with a collective term, such as "a

much army," "a *much* sum;" nor with a word designating an individual object, as "the *much* Devil;" neither can we translate the Latin "multò manè,"* "*much* morning," or "multâ nocte,"† "*much* night;" nor can we employ it adjectivally with a plural substantive, as "multi ignes,"‡ "*much* fires." The adverbial use in English seems somewhat capricious. Though much may be always combined with adjectives in the comparative or superlative degree, as "*much* wiser," "*much* the bravest," and also with some in the positive, as "*much* like," "*much* unlike," we cannot say "*much* brave" or "*much* wise." In regard to position, too, there are some differences. The adverb *much* is placed before a present or past participle, but generally (though with some few exceptions) after a verb:—

> Sad, from my natal hour, my days have ran,
> A *much afflicted, much enduring* man. *Pope.*
>
> It grieveth me *much*, for your sakes. *Ruth*, i. 13.
>
> He doth *much* keep the statutes of Omri. *Micah*, vi. 16, marg.

Mr. Tooke, who says that this word *much* has "exceedingly gravelled all our etymologists," derives it from the Anglo-Saxon verb *mawan*, "to mow," of which, he says, the regular præterperfect is *mow*, and the past participle *mowen*. "Omit the participial termination *en*," continues he, "and there will remain *mow*, which means simply that which is mown; and, as the hay, &c., which was mown, was put together in a heap, hence, figuratively, *mowe* was used in Anglo-Saxon to denote any heap; and this participle, or substantive, call it which you please—for however classed, it is still the same word, and has the same signification—was pronounced, and therefore written *ma*, *mo*, &c., which, being regularly compared, gave *ma*, *maer*, *maest*, *mo*, *more*, *most*, &c.; and *much* is merely the diminutive of *mo*, passing through the gradual changes of *mokel*, *mykel*, *mochill*, *muchell*, *moche*, *much*." Such is the substance of an etymological disquisition, in the course of which Mr. Tooke takes upon him to speak with great contempt of Junius, Wormius, Skinner, and Johnson, and pretends to remove all those difficulties which have so "exceedingly gravelled" other etymologists! The leading principle in this disquisition is an extraordinary one. It assumes that in the formation of language, the conceptions of distinct action must necessarily have obtained a name before those of quality. Indeed, it is not very clear that Mr. Tooke conceives mankind ever to have acquired conceptions of quality at all. However that may be, the basis of his argument in the present instance is a mere arbitrary assumption, neither confirmed by history, nor supported by any rational system of philosophy. The reasoning relative to the words more and most would be at least equally satisfactory if its order were exactly reversed, and the premises made the

* Alteras (epistolas) Furius *multo* mane mihi dedit. *Cicer. Att.* 5, 4.
† *Multâ* nocte veni ad Pompeium. *Cicer. Quint.* 2, 8.
‡ Hi tanti ignes, tamque *multi* (sc. sidera). *Cicer. N. D.* 2. 36.

conclusion. It is probably true that *more* is the comparative and *most* the superlative of an old word *ma* or *mo*, which we may admit to have been used as an adjective signifying *much*. We might argue, therefore, that when much of anything was heaped together it was adjectivally said to be *mo;* and thence a heap was substantively called a *mowe;* but as hay, when it is cut down, is, in the very act of cutting, heaped together, to cut hay was called to *mow*, and the hay that was cut was said to be *mowed*. These opposite trains of reasoning agree in this, that all names must necessarily be supposed to have been given to the conceptions of the human mind, in some one certain order—that is to say, either proceeding from the more general to the more particular, or the contrary. I do not know that this can be positively asserted; but, if it may be so, still I should incline against Mr. Tooke's etymology. According to him, our rude ancestors could not have informed each other whether a thing was much or little, until after they had invented the art of making hay, had regularly conjugated their verbs, added the participial termination *en*, taken it away again, and compounded the word (thus unnecessarily prolonged and curtailed) with a syllable implying diminution, which was subsequently dropt; and after all, they could never alter the signification of the word; but if they talked of much money, or much wisdom, much acuteness, or much absurdity, the word *much* would only signify the cutting of hay! Such is his theory: as to his facts, it would be difficult to discover where or when *ma* was used for a hay-mow, or a barley-mow; and when we come to derive *mokel*, *muchel*, or *michil*, from *mo*, we shall be "exceedingly gravelled" to account for the unlucky *k* and *ch* which happen to be inserted before the syllable said to be expressive of diminution. That there may be some affinity between *mo* and *much* is probable; but it is not probable that *much* is an abbreviation of *muchel*. On the contrary *muchil* has the appearance of being derived from *much*. At least, it is certain, that we find *much*, or *mich*, as early as we do *muchil*. WACHTER, speaking of these words, says, *Simplicissimum est* MICH *quod in antiquissimis dialectis ponitur pro magno et multo.* "The most simple is *mich*, which, in the most *ancient* dialects, signifies great and much." Thus, in the old Persian, *mih* was great, *mihter* greater, *mihtras* greatest; whence the sun was called *Mithras*. The aspirate *h* was easily converted into the guttural *ch*, and the palatine *k* or *g*. Hence the Greek *μεγ*, in *μέγας*; and the Latin *mag*, in *magnus*, *magister*, &c.; and as that which is great is usually powerful, we have an infinite number of words from this radical, signifying power, as the Mæso-Gothic and Anglo-Saxon *magan*, to be able, which supplies our auxiliaries *may* and *might*, the old German *machen*, and Anglo-Saxon *makan*, to make, &c., &c. Again Wachter, speaking of the ancient word *mich*, says *postea invaluit* MICHEL, *eodem sensu.* "Afterwards *michel* came into use, in the same sense." Hence the Gothic *mikils*, the Anglo-Saxon *micel*, the Alamannic *mihhil*, the Icelandic *mikill*, and, possibly, the Greek *μεγάλη*. There is no ground for supposing that

the final syllable *el* or *le* is meant, in any of these words, to express diminution; *muchel* is no more the dimininutive of "much," in signification, than *handle* of "hand," or *spindle* of "spin;" but *much* and *muchel* are used *eodem sensu*, and so were anciently *lite* and *litel*. I have at least shown, that *much* is to be found in English as early as *muchel*, and that these two words were used indifferently by our most ancient writers. And upon the whole, it is clear, from these authorities, that *much* is the name of a conception of greatness in quantity, quality, or power; and that when this conception is viewed as the attribute of any substance, the word *much* is an adjective; when as the modification of an act or quality, it is an adverb.

Inflected.

386. Certain adjectives are found in our own and other languages, which when combined with or varied by a particle, as our prefix *a*, our termination *ly*, the Latin termination *ter*, or *è*, or the Italian *mente*, lose their adjectival, and receive an exclusive adverbial character. Vossius ranks these among compounds, and perhaps (as I have before observed of inflections in general) further research into the origin of the particles so employed may show that all such adverbs are true compounds: for the present, however, I shall consider them as inflected; and of these the class formed by our termination in *ly* may afford a sufficient illustration. The particle *ly* is an abbreviation of the adjective *like;* and the words wisely, gratefully, judiciously, &c., were originally the compound adjectives wiselike, gratefullike, judiciouslike, &c. The termination *lyk* or *lich* is common in old English. Thus, in *Kyng Alisaunder*, we have the adjectives *eorthliche* (earthly, mortal), *ferliche* (strange, wonderful), and the adverbs *gentiliche* (gently), *sikerlyk* (securely, certainly), *theofliche* (like a thief), *quykliche* (quickly), *stilliche* (quietly), *skarschliche* (scarcely), *aperteliche* (openly).

So, in *Syr Launfal*,

> He gaf gyftys *largelyche*,
> Gold, and siluer, and clodes ryche.

And again, in the same poem—

> The lady was brygt as blosme on brere,
> With eyen gray, with *louelych* chere.

This word *louelych* is the identical word *leflich* which occurs in one of the most ancient love-songs now existing in English, composed probably about the year 1200. The song begins, "Blow, Northerne Wynd," and the lover describes his mistress

> With lokkes *lefliche* and longe.

Chaucer writes our word, "early," *erliche;* as in the *Knight's Tale*,

> And tellin her *erliche* and late.

In the Description of Cokaygne occurs the adverb *meklich* (meekly). In the *Geste of Kyng Horn* we find *evenliche* (evenly, straightly) used as an adverb:—

> Thou art fair & eke strong,
> & eke *euenliche* long.

This termination, therefore, is not less distinguishable in the old English than it is, as Mr. Tooke observes, in the sister languages—German, Dutch, Danish, and Swedish. The connection of meanings seems to be this: first a substantive conception of the *body*, then an adjectival or attributive conception of *likeness* to the body, and lastly an adverbial use of the conception of *likeness* applied adverbially to another attributive. The body (particularly the corpse) is in Mæso-Gothic *leik;* ex. gr. "usnemun *leik* is"—"they took away his body."* In the Anglo-Saxon version of the same text it is *lic*, "hys *lic* namon." In Frankish and Alamannic a dead body is *lîhe;* and *lih;* in Icelandic *lîjk;* in German *leiche;* in Dutch *lyk;* in Swedish *lik;* and in old Scotch *lyke*, whence *lykewake*, now corrupted to *late wake*, the watching of a corpse. The German adjective *gleich* (like) is, as Wachter observes, the old compound *ge-leich*, abbreviated; in old German it is *lich, gelich;* in Anglo-Saxon *lic, gelic;* in Swedish *lik;* in Danish *lig;* in Icelandic *likr, glikr;* in Dutch *lyk*. The adjectival or adverbial termination is in German *lich*, as *lieblich;* in Dutch *lyk*, as *lieflyk;* in Swedish and Danish *lig*, as *liuflig, liflig;* in Icelandic *legr* and *ligt*, as *lieuflegr, frithsamlegt*. That the name of the conception which we have of "body" should be transferred to the conception of "likeness," is not at all surprising; for what is so like any person or thing as the very body of that thing, or of that person? Hence, Shakspeare, meaning to intimate that the use of the drama is to represent the exact likeness of living manners, says, it is "to show the very age and *body* of the time, its form, and pressure;" as if he had said, "the drama holds up a mirror to the present time, exhibits its age of manhood or decrepitude, represents its very *body*, the shape which it bears, and the impression which it produces on the mind of the observer, as a seal does on wax, or a statue on the plaster from which a cast is to be taken." Neither is it surprising that the adjective "like" should enter into composition with a great number of other adjectives; for if any attribute could not be exactly predicated of a particular substance, something like that attribute might be so; if a person or thing could not be said to possess exactly a certain quality, it might be said to possess a quality similar, or nearly the same; if it was not great it might be greatlike; if not good, godlike, &c. In the Anglo-Saxon we find the termination *lic* used both adjectively and adverbially, as in the translation of Bede's Ecclesiastical History (book iii. c. 3), "tha lifigendan stanas thære cyricean, of *eorthlicum* setlum, to tham *heofonlicum* timbre, gebær!" "the living stones of the church, from *earthly* seats, to the *heavenly* building, it bore." And again (*loc. cit.*), "tha cyricean *wundorlice* heold & rihte:" "the church he *wondrously* held and ruled. The use of this termination extends indeed much further; for it contributes to the formation of our pronominal adjectives *such*, *each*, and *which;* the original signification of these being *so-like*, *one-like*, and *what-like;* as I shall briefly show:—

* Mark, vi. 29.

i. In the Mæso-Gothic *swa* is "so," and *swa leik* is "such." In the Anglo-Saxon it is contracted to *swylc*, in the old English to *swylke* and *swiche*, and thence to *sich* and *such*. And the same is found in the cognate languages: in the old English and Alamannic, it is *solich*, *sulich*; in the Dutch *zulk*; in the Swedish *slyk*; and in the modern German *solche*.

In the romance of *Richard Coer de Lion*, we have:—

Kyng Alysaundre ne Charlemayn
Hadde neuer *swylke* a route.

And Chaucer says:—

In *swiche* a gise as I you tellen shal.

ii. The words *ilk* and *ilka* are to be found in our old writers, and still exist in the Scottish dialect. *Ilk* was sometimes written *iliche*, and has been abbreviated to *each*. The following lines occur in a satirical poem entitled *Syr Peni*; or, *Narracio de Domino Denario* (MSS. Cotton. Galb. E. 9):—

Dukes, erles, and *ilk* barowne
To serue him er thai ful boune
Both biday and nyght.

In another part of the same poem are these lines:—

He may by both heuyn and hell
And *ilka* thing that es to sell
In erth has he *swilk* grace;

where we see *swilk* used for "such," and *ilka* for "every," as it is by BURNS, in his "Twa Dogs:"—

His honest, sonsie, baws'nt face
Aye gat him friends in *ilka* place.

iii. *Which* is, in the Anglo-Saxon, *hwilc*; in the Mæso-Gothic *hweleiks*, from *hwas*, or *hwe*, "whom," and *leiks*, "like." In the Alamannic it is *huuielich*; in the Danish *hvilk*; in the Dutch *welke*; in the German *welche*. The word *whilk*, anciently written *quhilk*, was common in Scotland to a late period, and perhaps still exists in some remote parts of the country. It is uniformly used in the "Disputation" of NICOL BURNE, A. D. 1581: as, "I micht produce monie siclyk places, *quhilk* I never hard zit cited be zou;" that is, "I might produce many such places (of Scripture), which I never heard yet cited by you."

iv. Agreeing with these is the old English *thilke*, still retained in the Wiltshire dialect, and pronounced *thik*, for "that." Thus SPENSER, in his "May," says:—

Our blonket liveries been all too sad,
For *thilke* same season, when all is yclad
In pleasance.

Chaucer, in his translation of Boethius, says, "Certes yet liveth in good point *thilk* precious honour of mankind."

And in the poem on *Christ's Descent into Hell* are these lines:—

The smale fendes that bueth nout stronge
He shulen among men yonge
Thilke that nulleth ageyne hem stonde
Ichulle he habben hem in honde.

That is, "the small fiends that are not strong shall go among mankind, and *those* persons who will not stand against them, I am willing they should have in hand."

Thus have I traced a substantive (signifying *body*) through its transitions, first into an adjective proper (*like*), thence as part of the compound adjectives proper and pronominal (*lovelike* and *solike*), and, lastly, into the termination (*ly*), which is still used both in adjectives and adverbs, though with idiomatic differences in respect to particular words, some being only considered as belonging to the one class, and some to the other. *Goodly*, for instance, though not much used in the present day, and rather as an adverb than an adjective, is employed by Shakspeare in the latter character, through all its degrees of comparison:—

i. In *Hamlet*:—

I saw him once, he was a *goodly* king.

ii. In *All's Well that Ends Well*:—

If he were honester he were much *goodlier*.

iii. In *King Henry VIII.*:—

She is the *goodliest* woman that ever lay by man.

So the word *kindly* is commonly considered to be an adverb, but Burns uses it as an adjective in *Poor Mailie's Elegy*:—

Thro' a' the toun she trotted by him;
A lang half-mile she cou'd descry him;
Wi' *kindly* bleat, when she did spy him,
She ran wi' speed.

On the other hand, the word *lonely* is treated in the English dialect as an adjective; but Burns, in the same poem, employs it adverbially:—

Our bardie, *lanely*, keeps the spence
Sin' Mailie's dead.

Godly, *lovely*, *portly*, and some other such words, are for the most part employed in modern times, as adjectives; but it is observable that *godly* has obtained by custom a different meaning from the identical adjective *godlike*. We have, too, some of these words in one form of composition, and not in its correspondent compound. Thus we say *ungainly* for awkward; though the word *gainly*, formerly in use, has become obsolete. Dr. HENRY MORE, a very learned writer of the seventeenth century, says, "She laid her child as *gainly* as she could, in some fresh leaves and grass." (Conj. Cabal.)

387. Of the words formerly in common use as adjectives, but now employed almost exclusively as adverbs, the word *very* is an obvious instance. *Very* is correctly stated by Mr. Tooke to be the Latin Very.

adjective *verus*, and Italian *vero*, "true," changed, in old French and old English, into *veray*, which, in modern French, is *vrai*. The adjectival use of this word still remains in the Nicene Creed as rendered in the Liturgy of the Church of England, "*very* God of *very* God." Chaucer uses it as an adjective both in the positive and comparative degree. In his translation of Boethius, *On the Consolation of Philosophy* (b. iv.), "It is clere and open that thilke sentence of Plato is *very* and sothe." And again (b. iii.), "which that is a *more verie* thinge." In these instances it retains the signification of mere *truth;* but in a secondary sense it expresses *eminence* in degree, and is even in this respect employed as an adjective positively, comparatively and superlatively.

My faithfulness shalt thou establish in the *very* heavens. *Psalm* lxxxix. 2.

——— Was not my love
The *verier* wag o' the two? *Shakspeare.*
Were he the *veriest* antick in the world. *Ibid.*

The secondary sense alone of the adjective survives in the modern use of the adverb; nor is it surprising, that an adjective primarily signifying "true," should, in a secondary sense, form an adverb expressing eminence of degree, as applied to all other qualities; for a thing that is *very* good or bad, *i. e.*, good or bad in an eminent degree, may be said, κατ' ἐξοχήν, to be *truly* good or bad. The Italians express the same modification of qualities by *molto*, "much," the French by *fort*, "strong," the Latins by *multum*, "much," and *valdé*, from *validus*, "strong:" and our ancestors by a variety of attributives, as *swythe*, *sothfast*, *right*, *full*, *strong*, *well*, &c. From the old adjective *veray* we have also our inflected adverb *verily*, and the obsolete *verrament* (the modern French *vraiment*), as in the above-quoted romance of *Kyng Alisaunder*:—

By the steorres and by the firmament
He him taughte *verrament*.

And again:—

Ther ros soche cry *verrement*,
No scholde mon yhere the thonder dent.

Participles. 388. It is not only the adjective proper which serves to modify other adjectives, or verbs. The *participle* performs the same office, and in the same manner; and this (in English) either by a participle of present or of past time. Of the former class we have "*scalding* hot," "*staring* mad," "*roaring* drunk," and, in Shakspeare, more elegantly, "*loving* jealous."

Warm cataplasms may discuss, but *scalding* hot may confirm the tumour. *Arbuthnot.*

In came Squire South, stark, *staring* mad. *Ibid.*

——— I would have thee gone,
And yet no further than a wanton's bird,
Who lets it hop a little from her hand,
Like a poor prisoner in his twisted gyves,
And with a silk thread pulls it back again,
So *loving* jealous of his liberty. *Shakspeare.*

Of the past participles some are used without, but more with the prefix *a*, answering to the Anglo-Saxon and German *ge*. Burns thus employs *brent*, from the the Scotch *bren* to burn:—

Nae cotillons *brent-new* frae France.

Milton has *adrift* from *drive;* Ben Jonson, *agone* (now written *ago*) from *go;* Chaucer, *afret*, either from the verb *freight*, or, more probably, from the verb *fret*:—

——————— Then shall this Mount
Of Paradise, by might of waves, be mov'd,
With all his verdure spoil'd, and trees, *adrift*
Down the great river. *Milton.*

Is he such a princely one
As you speak him long *agone?* *B. Jonson.*

For round environ her crounet
Was fulle of rich stonys *afret.* *Chaucer.*

In all these and the like cases, however, the notion of time which specifically characterises the participle does not attach to the same word when it becomes an adverb; because it either modifies a verb, and then the time is expressed by the verb itself; or else it modifies an adjective, and then no expression of time is necessary.

Pronouns demonstrative, &c.

389. The pronouns adjective supply, either with or without some slight change of form, many adverbs of frequent use; especially those pronouns which I have called demonstratives, partitives, distributives, general and numeral, subjunctives, and interrogatives; but as the words constituting these several classes are in all languages among the simplest and most ancient that exist, we must not be surprised to find some difficulty in tracing the pronominal adverbs to their proper origin. In this respect, very great praise is due to several recent German philologists, particularly to Professors BOPP, POTT, and JACOB GRIMM; who have thrown important light on a part of the science of language previously quite dark, and still involved in considerable obscurity. I shall consider together the classes just specified, reserving only the numerals for a separate notice. With this exception, the words in question furnish, in most languages, a number of adverbs connected together by various relations, and for the most part of an elliptical construction. The words *here* and *there*, *hence* and *thence*, *hic* and *illic*, *hinc* and *illinc*, for instance, are manifestly in their origin demonstrative pronouns, equivalent to the words *this* and *that;* but, by use, they have come to signify "at *this* place," "at *that* place;" "from *this* place," "from *that* place;" the substantive "place" being clearly understood by the mind. Neither can it be doubted that the Latin adverbs *quum* and *quo* are the subjunctive pronoun *qui*, with the terminations of the accusative and ablative case; which word *qui* is probably the same in origin with the Gothic *hwo*, the Saxon *hwa*, the Scottish *quha*, and the English *who*.

It happens, that the English language is not perfectly systematic in

regard to the pronouns which it has adopted for adverbial purposes; and the same may be said of most other languages. We have the simple adverbs just mentioned, which form three distinct classes, with reference to place, distinguishing the place where we are, from another definite place, and supplying an interrogative for the place which we know not, which interrogative is also a subjunctive.

The first of these is *here*, the second *there*, and the third *where*. It happens too, with regard to place, that each of these three forms has three varieties to express "at a place," "from a place," and "to a place;" and all these are variously compounded with several other words or particles, *fore*, *ever*, *soever*, &c. Some of the verbs which form adverbs of place, also become adverbs of time, manner, cause, &c.; but these latter ideas have a few adverbs which are peculiar to themselves, agreeing nevertheless, in principle and derivation, with the adverbs of place. Hence may be formed the following table of the simple adverbs of this kind:—

Place	here	there	where?
	hence	thence	whence?
	hither	thither	whither?
Time		then	when?
Manner		thus	how?
Cause			why?

The three classes into which I have distributed these adverbs, have not always been thus accurately distinguished. In our old language, we shall find the prepositive forms *here* and *there* often interchanged with the subjunctive or interrogative form *where;* yet it is clearly evident that these distinctions must have always existed in point of signification, however inaccurately or imperfectly expressed.

Here. 390. The word *here* is not only used in its simple form, but in a variety of compounds, as, *hereafter*, *hereabout*, *hereat*, *hereby*, *herein*, *hereinto*, *hereof*, *hereon*, *hereupon*, *hereto*, *hereunto*, *heretofore*, *herewith*, *heirfoir*, *heirintill*, &c. In the simple form it is principally confined to the signification of "this place;" whereas, in the compounds, it generally signifies "this time," "this thing," "this event," or the like. The cognate word *hier*, in German, does not follow exactly the same variations of meaning. Both in its simple and compound forms it principally refers to place, as *hieran*, *hieraus*, *hierdurch*, *hierein*, *hierinnen*, *hierober*, *hierunter*, &c.; and so, *heran*, *herebey*, *herein*, &c; though some compounds are more general in their application, as, *hierum*, *hiervon*, *hierzu*. In both languages, however, it is manifest that the word *here*, *hier*, or *her*, intrinsically signifies no more than the word *this;* and that the other significations, such as "place," "time," "event," "reason," or the like, are supplied by the mind, according to the context. It can hardly be doubted but that the elements of the word *here* are to be discovered in *he* and *er*, which occur in many of the Northern languages, as signifying this person or these persons, this thing or these things; so that the radical conception is what we express

by the word *this*. The element *he* occurs, in Anglo-Saxon and old English, in the words signifying he, she, they, and their respective cases. The Anglo-Saxon pronoun personal is *he*, *heo*, *hi*, he, she, they; and the very word *here* occurs for the genitive plural, as *heom* does for them. The same or similar words are frequent in old English writers. In the *Vision of Piers Plouhman*—

> Hermets on a heape with hoked staues
> Wenten to Walsingham, and *her* wenches after.
> * * * * * *
> Cokes and *her* knaues cryden, hote pyes, hote:

that is, "*their* wenches," and "*their* knaves," or "boys."

In Chaucer's *Parson's Tale*, "Certes this vertue makith folk vndertake hard and greuous things by *her* own will;" that is, "*their* own." In an ancient ballad, probably of the thirteenth century, beginning "In May, *hit* muryeth," (Harl. MSS. 2253. fol. 71)—

> Ynot non so freoh flour
> Ase ledies that beth bryht in bour,
> With loue who mihte *hem* bynde:

That is, "I know no flower so fresh as ladies who are bright in bowers, to those who may bind *them* with love." In a dialogue between a body and a spirit, of the same date (ibid. fol. 57), "*he* wolleth" occurs for "they will." This word was sometimes written *heo*, as, in a satirical poem against the ecclesiastical lawyers, (ibid. fol. 71)—

> *Heo* shulen in helle on an hok
> Honge there fore.

And sometimes *hi*, as in another manuscript in the Harleian collection (No. 2277, fol. 195)—

> Tho *hi* dude *here* pelrynage in holie stedes faste,
> So that among the Sarazyns ynome *hi* were atte laste:

that is "*they* did *their* pilgrimage, so that *they* were taken at last."

In the *Lai le frain*, which is a translation from the Norman-French of the celebrated poetess Marie, we have *he* and *hye* for "she;" and *him* for "her:"—

> The maiden abode no lengore,
> Bot yede hir to the chirche dore;
> * * * *
> O Lord, *he* seyd, Jesu Crist, &c.
> * * * *
> *Hye* loked vp, and by hir seighe
> An asche, by hir, fair and heighe.
> * * * *
> A litel maiden childe ich founde,
> In the holwe assche therout,
> And a pel *him* about.

The other element, *er*, is found in the modern German *er*, he, and in the Icelandic *er*, am, is, and who; as in the *Edda* of Snorro, "*Feyma heiter su kona* ER *ofram* ER *svo sem ungar meyar eru.*" "Feyma is called the woman *who* modest *is*, as the young maidens are." In the

Frankish and Alamannic, the demonstrative and relative pronouns of the third person are *er*, *her*, and *ir*. Thus, in the Frankish of Otfrid the Monk, "ER *gibot then uuinton*," "*He* commanded the winds;" in that of Tatian, "ER *quam in sin eigan*," "*He* came to his own." In the Alamannic of Isidore, "*Dhaz* IR *Jhesus uuardh chinennt*," "That *he* Jesus was named." These two elements, then, viz., *he* and *er*, are identical in signification; and are only redoubled for the sake of emphasis, which is a habit common to barbarous nations, and to the illiterate in all countries. Hence it is, that the French have their *ce-ci* and *ce-la*, and even *ce-lui-ci* and *ce-lui-la;* and that our own rustics commonly say *this here*, *that there*, *thick there*, &c. From this source undoubtedly come the Gothic, Anglo-Saxon, Danish, and Icelandic *her*, the Frankish and Alamannic *hier*, *hiar*, *hiera*, the modern German and Dutch *hier*, and the English *here*, all used to signify, "at *this* place," although the simple and radical meaning of them all is simply "*this*." The various explanations which are given of the adverb *here* by Dr. Johnson only serve to show that the conception of a distinct and particular place is no necessary constituent in the meaning of the word. Thus *here* is opposed to a future time, as well as to a different place, by Bacon, in his advice to Villiers: "You shall be happy *here* and more happy *hereafter:*" which might be paraphrased "in *this* life and in a life after *this*"—"in *this* world, and in a world after *this*"—"in *this* state of existence, and in a state of existence after *this*," always retaining, however, the conception expressed by the word *this*. So when the words *here* and *there* are explained by Johnson "dispersedly; in one place and another;" as in another extract from Bacon: "I would have in the heath some thickets made only of sweet-briar, and honeysuckle, and some wild vine amongst; and the ground set with violets; for these are sweet, and prosper in the shade; and these to be in the heath *here* and *there*, not in order." The words *here* and *there* are still to be explained *this* and *that;* for the imagination forms conceptions of places separate from each other, although quite indeterminately as to any specific external situation, and even as to number, except that the place signified by the word *here* is in imagination separate from that expressed by the word *there*. The indistinct process of the imagination, therefore, in the passage above cited, may be explained by supposing an individual carelessly wandering over the ground which is to be ornamented, and occasionally stopping to say, I will have a thicket planted in *this* place and another in *that* place. The same expression occurs in a beautiful sonnet of Shakspeare—

> Alas! 'tis true, I have gone *here* and *there;*

which corresponds with the expression "ranged," in the preceding verses—

> As easie might I from my selfe depart,
> As from my soule, which in thy brest doth lye:
> That is my home of loue. If I haue *rang'd*,
> Like him that trauels, I returne againe.

Here and *there* are doubtless used indefinitely in such phrases; but not more indefinitely than the pronouns *this* and *that* might themselves be used, as in the song—

This way, or *that* way, or which way you will;

and in Drayton's pleasing description of a winter evening's chat with his friend—

Now talk'd of *this*, and then discours'd of *that*,
Spoke our own verses, 'twixt ourselves, &c.

Nay, even the pronoun personal is sometimes used with the same uncertainty of application; as in Chaucer's spirited description of a tournament, in the *Knyght's Tale*—

He rolleth under foote, as dothe a ball,
He foyneth on his feet with a tronchoun,
And *he* hurleth with his horse adoun,
He through the body is hvrt and sith ytake.

In none of which instances is there any certain antecedent to the word *he;* and yet it stands first for one man, then for another, then for a third, and lastly for a fourth.

Hence and *hither* may be considered as cases of the word *here;* but perhaps it would be more accurate to treat these three words as different compounds of the element *he*, with *er*, *an*, and *der*. *Hence* is the Anglo-Saxon *heonan*, and the Frankish *hina*. It seems to be connected with the Icelandic *han*, he, and *hin*, it; and with the syllable *hin*, which, in various German compounds, signifies "from *this* place," "from *this* time," "at *this* time," "to that place," &c.; and which is used alone to signify anything that is "gone *hence;*" "lost," or "annihilated;" as in the *Leonore* of Burger—

O mutter, mutter, hin *ist* hin!
Verlohren ist verlohren!

So they say *er ist hin* for "he is dead:" *hinrichten* is to execute justice on any one, to put him to death; *hindag* is "this day;" *hinfort*, "henceforth," "from this time forth;" which is also expressed *forthin*. *Immerhin* is an exclamation answering to our "let it go," and meaning "be it ever *thus*, I care not;" as, *er mag immerhin schreyen*, "he may bawl as long as he likes." So *hinauf* and *hinab*, "above and below;" *hinein* and *hinaus*, "within and without," mean respectively above *this* place, below *this* place, within *this* place, out of *this* place. *Hinfahren* is to go away, to go from *this* place; and, in the Frankish, *hinafahrt* is "death." Our English word hence, in old writings, is *hen*, *han*, *hin*, *hennes*. In the romance of *The Seuyn Sages*, we find—

A fend he is, in kinde of man;
Binde him, sire, and lede *han*.

Chaucer, in the *Knyght's Tale*, says—

The fires whiche on min auter brenne
Shal declaren er that thou go *henne*
This auenture of loue.

So in *Christ's Descent into Hell*—

Bring vs of this lothe lond
Louerd *henne* into thyn hond.

In the Scottish Act of Parliament, A. D. 1438, "that all the kinge's liegis be vnharmyt & vnscaithit of the said house & of thaim that inhabits theirin fra *hyn* furth."

Hither is the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic *hidre*. In the old English too it was often written with a *d;* as in Chaucer's *Monk's Tale*—

And if you list to herken *hiderward*.

So in two manuscript poems in the British Museum (Harl. MSS. 2253, fol. 64 and fol. 124)—

Herketh *hideward*, and beoth stille.
* * * *
Herkneth *hideward* horsmen
A tidyng ichou telle.

And, in the poem on *Christ's Descent into Hell*, Satan says—

Ne may non me worse do,
Then ich haue had *hiderto*.

There. 391. *There*, *thence*, *thither*, are manifestly constructed on the same principles, and applied in the same manner as here, hence, and hither; and as we suppose the first element of *here* to be *he*, so we suppose the first element of *there* to be *the*, which, in the Anglo-Saxon, was prefixed as an article to substantives in all cases, and in both numbers; and which appears in various dialects under the forms of *thei*, *thy*, *tho*, *tha*, all relating to the pronoun *that*. *Thei* is the Gothic conjunction "that." *Thy*, in the old English compound *forthy*, signifies "for that," *viz.* cause. *Tho* is explained by Junius, *qui*, *illi*, and *tunc*, viz. "that person," in the plural; and "that place" used adverbially; and he adds, that the Anglo-Saxon *tha* admits all these significations.

Tho for "then" (see Warton, vol. i. p. 161)—

The messengers *tho* home went.

Tho for "when" (Harl. MSS. 2253, fol. 37)—

Tho Jhesu was to hell ygan.

Tha for "those" (*The Seuyn Sages*, v. 3901)—

Al *tha* wordes ful well he knew,
He was so ferd him changed hew.

Thae for "those." See the second volume of *The Antiquary*, (one of the novels which so accurately delineate the manners and language of Scotland,) p. 297—

Thae's your landward and burrowstown notions.

Tho for "those" (Harl. MSS. 2253, fol. 55, 56)—

Parmafey ich hold myne
All *tho* that bueth her ynne.

There seems to be compounded of *the* and *er;* as *here* of *he* and *er;* but however this may be, *there* manifestly agrees with the German *der*, which is a demonstrative and relative pronoun, as well as an article, and consequently answers to our *the*, *this*, and *who*. In like manner, the Anglo-Saxon *thære* or *thær* formed the genitive of the article, and also the demonstrative and relative adverb; as in the 4th chapter of *Joshua*, "Nyman twelf stanas on middan *thære* ea, *thær* tha sacerdas stodon, & habban forth mid eow, to eowre wicstowe, & wurpan hig *thær*." "Take twelve stones from [the] midst [of] *the* water, *where* the priests stood; and have [them] forth with you, to your abiding-place, and cast them [down] *there;*" in which passage we see *thære* and *thær*, answering to *the*, *where*, and *there*, successively. So in the old English, *there* is often used in two connected sentences, for *there* and *where;* as in Chaucer's *Wife of Bath's Tale*—

> *There* as wont to walken was an elfe,
> *There* walketh now the limitour himself.

It might not unreasonably be surmised, that where the operations of the mind are so distinct, as those indicated by a demonstrative and a subjunctive pronoun or adverb are, they would necessarily require expressions equally different; but a careful attention to the history of language will show us that it differs very widely in this respect from its philosophy. It is for want of having sufficiently considered this circumstance that we find grammarians so often at a loss to account for different idioms, and giving reasons for them which are purely imaginary, not to say absurd. It is, no doubt, a great excellence in a language to mark, by distinct expressions, the distinct operations of the mind, and the more nicely this is done, the more accurate and expressive does a language become; but this is generally the result of time and of an undefinable sense of inconvenience, which induces men to inflect and vary words, as it were, insensibly, and to assign to the various inflections, though of similar origin, different effects. In no language, however, has this principle been carried into full operation; and hence we see the different meanings of a word, and the different parts of speech which it constitutes, passing into each other by gradations, which, at first sight, it is not always easy to explain. Thus, in Greek, the subjunctive pronoun, or, as some call it, the subjunctive article, ὃς, is sometimes said to be used for the prepositive ὁ; sometimes for τίς interrogatively; and sometimes for ἀυτός. Again, Ὅστις sometimes answers to the Latin relative *quis*, and sometimes to *quisquis*. The adverb Ὅπου, besides the common signification "where," answers to "whither;" and, in argument, to "since;" and in description, to "in this place," or "in that place." So, ὅτε, "when," signifies also "since," like the Latin *cum:* and the examples of this kind are infinite. We shall not, therefore, be surprised to find considerable diversity from the modern idiom in the following, and many similar instances:—

Ther is used for *the*, *that*, or *them;* as, in *The Seuyn Sages*, *therwhile* for *the* while:—

> *Therwhile*, sire, that I tolde this tale,
> Thi sone mighte tholie dethes bale.

Gawin Douglas has "*thare aboue*" for "above *that;*" and "*tharon*" for "on *them.*"

In the old Scottish dialect *thir* was used for *these* or *them;* as in the act of 1424, "*thir* ar taxis ordaynt throu the counsaile of Parliament." So in Dunbar's *Goldin Terge*, written about a century afterward—

> Full lustiely *thir* ladyis all in feir
> Enterit into this park of maist pleseir.
> * * * * *
> And every ane of *thir* in grene arrayt
> And harp and lute full mirreyly they playt.

In the same dialect we find *thairto* and *thairfra*, *thairfoir* and *thairefter*, *tharapone*, *thairuntill*, &c.

Chaucer uses *therto* in the sense of "moreover," or "in addition to *that*," as in the *Rime of Sir Thopas*—

> He couthe hunt at the wilde dere
> And ride an hauking forby the riuere
> With grey goshauke on honde:
> *Therto* he was a good archere.

Therefore, which, in modern times, is commonly used conjunctively, occurs in a rude old English poem before quoted (Harl. MSS. 2253, fol. 71), as signifying *for that*—

> Heo shulen in helle on an hok
> Honge *there fore.*

In short, comparing the different authorities, ancient and modern, we find that the word *there*, however variously spelt, did not originally relate to place exclusively, but was equally applied to time, to persons, and to events: and the same may be said of *thence* and *thither*. *Thenceforth*, which we use with reference to time, agrees with the old Scottish phrase *fra thin* furth, as in the following passage in the Act of 1503, which is, on many accounts, worthy of notice:—

> It is statute and ordanit that *fra thin furth* na baroun, frehaldar, nor vassal, quhilkis ar within ane hundreth merks of this extent that now is, be compellit to cum personaly to the parliament, bot gif it be that our souerane Lord write speciale for thame. And sa (sal) not be unlawit for thair persons, and thai send thair procuratours to answer for thame, with the baronis of the schire, or the maist famous personis. And all that ar aboue the extent of ane hundreth merks to cum to the parliament, vnder the pane of the auld vnlaw.

Thither was, in the Anglo-Saxon and old English, *thider*, as in the poem often quoted (Harl. MSS. 2253, fol. 55)—

> God for is moder loue,
> Let us neuer *thider* come.

And as they had *hideward* for "hitherward," or "toward this place,"

so they had *thederwart* for "thitherward," or "toward that place:" as in the ludicrous poem called "*The Huntyng of the Hare:*"—

Thei toke no hede *thederwart*,
But euery dogge on oder start.

392. *Where, whence,* and *whither.* These words have also a similar analogy, together with this further peculiarity, that they serve indifferently for interrogatives and subjunctives. Thus in the interrogative:— Where.

They continually say unto me, *where* is thy God? *Psa.* xlii. 3.

And he said, Hagar, Sarai's maid, *whence* camest thou; and *whither* wilt thou go? *Gen.* xvi. 8.

And again in the subjunctive—

Let no man know *where* ye be. *Jer.* xxxvi. 19.

I wist not *whence* they were. *Josh.* ii. 4.

He went out, not knowing *whither* he went. *Heb.* xi. 8.

We have already seen that the subjunctive force of the word *where* was not peculiar to it, but was sometimes expressed by the word *there.* We do not find this to be the case in English with the interrogative force of the same word; but in Greek the relative pronoun τίς is also an interrogative; as in St. Mark's gospel, c. ii. v. 6, 7: Ἦσαν δέ ΤΙΝΕΣ τῶν γραμματέων ἐκεῖ καθήμενοι καὶ διαλογιζόμενοι ἐν ταις καρδίαις ἀυτῶν· ΤΙ οὗτος οὕτω λαλεῖ βλασφημίας; ΤΙΣ δύναται ἀφιέναι ἁμαρτίας, εἰ μὴ ἷς ὁ Θεός;—"But there were *certain* of the scribes sitting there, and reasoning in their hearts, *why* doth this man thus speak blasphemies? *Who* can forgive sins, but God only?"—Hence it is clear, that the interrogative effect of a word does not require a peculiar form, any more than the subjunctive. So the Latin *quidam,* which means "a certain person," and "*aliquis,*" which means "some one," are reciprocally connected with the interrogative *quis,* and the subjunctive *qui.* Scaliger was of opinion that the Latin *quis* and *qui* were the Greek καὶ ὅς and καὶ ὁ; and Tooke, probably thinking to improve on this etymology, has only gone further in error. He says, "As *ut* (originally written *uti*) is nothing but ὁτι; so is *quod* (anciently written *quodde*) merely καὶ ὁτὶ:—

Quodde, *tuas laudes culpas nil proficis hilum.* *Lucilius.*

"*Qu* in Latin being sounded not as the English, but as the French pronounce *qu,* that is, as the Greek K; καὶ, by a change of the character, not of the sound, became the Latin *que,* used only enclitically indeed in modern Latin. Hence καὶ ὁτὶ became in Latin *qu'otti, quoddi, quodde, quod.*"—The only foundation for all these conjectures seems to be, that in the very nature of a subjunctive pronoun something equivalent to a conjunction is implied; and as to the assertions respecting the Roman pronunciation they are perfectly gratuitous. It is not very probable that the ancient pronunciation of *qu* was the same as of K; on the contrary, it more probably resembled that of

χ, or rather of the Gothic ⊙, which our Anglo-Saxon ancestors expressed by *hw*, the old Scottish writers by *quh*, and we by *wh*. Scaliger and Tooke forgot, that if their explanation might be thought to account for the subjunctive pronoun, or conjunction, it left the interrogative pronouns and adverbs quite unexplained; and the fact seems to be, that the Latin language originally agreed with the Gothic and other northern languages in employing the articulation marked by the Æolic digamma, where the softer Greek dialects omitted that articulation; thus the Greek ϝῖνος was the Latin *vinum* and Gothic *wein;* the Greek ϝοί was the Latin *vœ* and Gothic *wai;* and lastly, the Greek aspirated pronouns ἡ, ὁ, were the Latin *quæ*, *quo*, and the Gothic *hwa*, *hwo*.

It is manifest that *where* did not originally refer to *place* alone, any more than *here* or *there* did; but, like those words, was originally a pronoun signifying *this* or *that;* for in its composite forms it often signifies no more than those pronouns, the substantive to which it refers being usually expressed, but sometimes understood. Thus we have *whereabout*, for "about *which* business"—

> Let no man know any thing of the business *whereabout* I send thee. 1 *Sam.* xxi. 2.

Whereto, for "to *which* thing"—

> It shall prosper in the thing *whereto* I sent it. *Isaiah* lv. 11.

Whereby, for "by *which* name"—

> There is none other name under heaven given among men *whereby* we must be saved. *Acts* iv. 12.

Wherefore, for "for *which* cause"—

> What is the cause *wherefore* ye are come? *Acts* x. 21.

All these compounds may be employed interrogatively, (and indeed the subjunctive use of some of them has at present become rather obsolete,) but in this form also they are not necessarily significant of "place."—Thus *whereby* is used for "by *what* means?"—

> Zacharias said unto the angel, *whereby* shall I know this? *Luke* i. 18.

Wherefore, for "for *what* reason?"—

> Now he is dead *wherefore* should I fast? 2 *Sam.* xii. 23.

It is to be observed, however, that there are certain adverbs compounded with *where*, which cannot be used interrogatively, such as *whereas*, *wherever*, *wheresoever;* but the reason is, that in these, as well as in *whensoever*, *whithersoever*, &c., the pronoun *as* and *so*, and the word *ever*, necessarily give them a relative force and effect:—

> Have ye not spoken a lying divination, *whereas* ye say, The Lord saith it? *Ezek.* xiii. 7.

> Ye have the poor with you always: and *whensoever* ye will ye may do them good. *Mark* xiv. 7.

> The Lord preserved David *whithersoever* he went. 2 *Sam.* viii. 6.

It would be impossible to express these passages interrogatively,

"whereas say ye?" "whensoever will ye?" "whithersoever did he go?" not on account of the meaning of the words "where," "when," or "whither," but of the others with which they are compounded.

From what has been said, it is abundantly clear that the adverbs *here*, *there*, *where*, *hence*, *thence*, *whence*, *hither*, *thither*, and *whither*, although in their modern and uncompounded use they principally express a conception of "place," yet did not really include the name of any such conception in their original signification, but were the mere pronouns *he*, *this*, and *what*, diversely compounded, and assigned by use to separate and distinct significations.

393. The very same is to be observed of the adverbs *Then* and *When*, which have been above noted, as principally signifying time. We have not, indeed, the word *Hen* for "at this time," though it occurs in old English for *hence*, i. e., from this place. Thus, in the scoffing ballad made on the defeat of Henry III. at *Lewes*, in 1264, and which, from its tenor, must have been composed very soon after the event, we find the following lines— Then. When.

He hath robbed Engelond the mores ant the fenne
The gold ant the selver ant yboren *henne*.

Hann, in the Icelandic, is "he," and *hun* is "she;" and STIERNHELM (Gloss. Ulph. Goth., p. 85), speaking of the Gothic word *hana*, as in *hana hrukida*, "the cock crew," (Matth. xxvi. 74,) says, *Omnis avis mascula dicitur* HANA, *ab* HAN, *ille*, *et fœmina* HÖNA, *ab* HON, *illa;* "every male bird is called *hana*, from *han*, he; and every female bird *höna*, from *hon*, she." Hence we may infer, that the element *en* was compounded in some of the northern dialects, as we have already seen that *er* was, viz., with *he*, *the*, and *who*, producing *hen*, *then*, and *when*, as well as *here*, *there*, and *where*, all of them originally pronouns, and all used in a restricted sense by an ellipsis of the words time, place, &c., as adverbs.

In the Gothic, *Than* is both "then" and "when," and *yuthan* is used for "now." *Than* is also used for *autem*, δέ, "but;" and it is manifestly nothing more than the article or pronoun *thana*, or *thanei*, answering to the Greek τὸν, or ὃν, as *Seimon* THANA *haitanan Zeloten*, Σίμωνα ΤΟ'Ν καλούμενον Ζηλωτήν, "Simon, *who* (was) called Zelotes," (Luke vi. 15); THANEI *wildedun*, ΤΟΝ ἤθελον, "*whom* they would," (Matth. xxvii. 15). *Thon*, for "those," is still used in many parts of Scotland; *thynfurth* we have seen in the old dialect of that country, for "thenceforth," which, in the parliamentary articles of 1461 above quoted, is written "thensforth:" and as *henne* was used, in old English, for "hence," so *thenne* was used for *thence*, i. e., from that place; as in *Christ's Descent into Hell*—

Nas non so holy prophete,
Seththe Adam & Eue the appel ete,
Ant he were at this worldes syne,
That he ne moste to helle pyne:
Ne shulde he neuer *thenne* come,
Nere Jesu Crist Godes sone.

When is the Gothic *hwan*, which is used for the Latin *quando*, *quoniam*, *quantum*, *quam*, and is manifestly the same as *hwana*, *quem*, "whom;" as HWANA *sokeith*, "*whom* seek ye?" (John xviii. 4.) As the Gothic *than* and *hwan*, and the old English *there* and *where* were often used convertibly, so were *then* and *when;* and in the Harleian MSS. (No. 2253, fol. 55, b.) we find *the* for when—

The he com there, tho seide he.

Why. 394. It will not be necessary to use much argument in proof of the identity of origin between *Why* and the words before mentioned, *where*, *when*, &c.; it is manifestly only another form of the pronoun *who*. In modern usage we do not oppose *thy* (in the sense of *this cause*) to *why;* but this mode of expression occurs in the old words *forthy* and *withthy*. *Forthy* occurs in the Scottish Act of 1424, in the two senses of "because" and "therefore." So in Barbour's *Bruce*—

But God that most is of all might
Preserved thame in his forsight
To venge the harm and the contrair
That those fell folk and pantener
Did to simple folk and worthy,
That couth not help themselven; *forthy*
They were like to the Maccabeis.

The same author seems to use *nought for thy* in the sense of "nevertheless," as—

And *nought for thy*, thocht they be feil,
God may richt weil our werdes deil.
* * * * *
And *not for thy* thair faes then were
Ay twa for ane that they had there.

So he uses *with thy* for "provided," or "on this condition"—

And I sal be in your helping
With thy ye give me all the lond
That ye have nou into your hond.

In all which instances *thy* is simply *this*, viz., cause, reason, or condition, those substantives being understood by the sort of ellipsis already explained.

How. 395. *How* is simply the pronoun *who*, or *hwa*, sometimes written in old English *ho;* as in the Harleian MS. 2277, fol. 1—

Seinte Marie day in Leynte, among
Alle other dayes gode
Is ryt forto holde heghe
Ho so him vnderstode.

And as we have seen the pronoun *that*, and the adverb *as*, used convertibly, so we find *hou* in the old Scottish dialect used where we should employ *so*, or *as;* e. g. *housone*, for "so soon as"—

That *housone* ony truble, questioun, or causis happynnis to be movit—than incontinent it salbe lesum, &c.

Scottish Acts, A.D. 1554.

396. I have thus traced, at some length, the English adverbs of place, time, &c., have shown them to be no other than the demonstrative and subjunctive pronouns, appropriated by custom to certain distinct significations; but though the particular applications are matter of mere idiom, and vary, as has been seen, considerably in the same country at different periods; yet in most, if not all languages, the same general principle is to be traced. In most, if not all, the words which are employed as adverbs of time, place, manner, and cause, are pronouns with little or no variation of form. General inference.

In Latin, from the pronouns *is*, *ea*, *id*, come the adverbs *ibi*, *alibi*, *ibidem*, *inde*, *proinde*, *ita*, *itaque*, *ideo*, *iccirco*, *eo*, *adeo*, *eorsum*, *uspiam*, *nusquam*, &c. From *hic*, *hæc*, *hoc*, come *hinc*, *huc*, *adhuc*, *huccine*, *horsum*, *hodie*, *antehac*, *posthac*, *hacpropter*, &c. From *ille*, *illa*, *illud*, come *illic*, *illico*, *illuc*, *illinc*, *olim*, &c. From *qui*, *quæ*, *quod*, come *quo*, *quoque*, *quam*, *quando*, *quia*, *quamvis*, *quare*, *quin*, *quidem*, *cum*, *cur*, and probably *ubi*, *ubivis*, *alicubi*, &c.

It is needless to trace the pronominal adverbs in Greek; but it may be somewhat curious to observe the same principle in the Persian language, in which the pronouns are *een*, this; *aun*, that; *ke*, who; *che*, which.

From *een*, "this," are derived *eenjá*, "here," *eensú*, "hither."

From *aun*, "that;" *ânjá*, "there;" *ánsú*, "thither;" *angáh*, "then."

From *ke*, "who;" *cu* or *cujâ*, "where," "whither."

From *che*, "which;" *chun*, "how, or when?" *chend*, "how many?" *chera*, "wherefore?" *hemchun*, "so as," &c. (See Sir William Jones's Persian Grammar; and compare pages 32 and 33, with 93, 94, 95, and 96.)

397. The *numeral* pronouns supply a class of adverbs, which are not very numerous in any language. Verbs of action represent conceptions which may be often repeated. If it be meant to limit the action to a single instance, the conception of the number *one* must be expressed, and so of any other number, and to this is added, either expressly, or, at least, in the mind, the conception of time. Thus we say "he marched *six times* through Spain;" he conquered more than *twenty times* in pitched battles;" "he was *twelve times* crowned with laurel." In most languages it is unnecessary to express the conception of time in connection with the lower numbers, the numerals themselves supplying an inflection, by which that conception is perfectly understood. Thus are produced our adverbs *once*, *twice*, *thrice*, which are no other than the old genitives *onis*, *twyis*, *threyis*. The Latin language is more felicitous in this respect; it has *decies*, *vicies*, *centies*, and *millies*, to express ten times, twenty times, a hundred times, and a thousand times. Numerals.

In a poem of the time of Henry VI., entitled, "*How the wyse man taght hys son*" (Harl. MSS. 1596), is the line—

For and thy wyfe may *onys* aspye.

In *Kyng Alisaunder*—

> *Twyes* is somer in that londe.
> * * * *
> Ye haveth him *twyes* overcome.

With respect to the adverb *once*, however, it is to be noted, that as *one* is not always opposed to *two* or *three*, or any specific number, but sometimes merely to *many;* so *once* does not always signify "at one time," as opposed to two, three, or any other number of times, but merely "at some time" different from the present. Thus, when the poet Wordsworth says of Venice,

> *Once* did she hold the gorgeous East in fee,

he means to contrast the greatness of a former time with the degradation of the present. As if he had said, although at this present time she lies so low, there was *one* other period, at least, in her history, which presented a far different picture. At *that* time she was rich and great, famous and powerful—

> ———— *Now* lies she there,
> And none so poor to do her reverence.

Nor is this signification confined to the time past. *Once* equally means some uncertain time as applied to the future. Thus, in the *Merry Wives of Windsor*—

> I pray thee, *once* to night, give my sweet Nan this ring.

Nearly the same effect is given in Latin to the adverb *olim*, which means some one point of time, either past or future; and seems to have the same connection with the relative article, as our word *once* has with the positive; for *olim* appears to be derived from *olle*, which the early Romans used for *ille*, and which, in the plural, was written *oloe*, as in the Royal Law: *Si parentis puer verberit, ast* OLOE *plorassint.* The numerals here spoken of are those called cardinal; but the ordinals also supply a certain class of adverbs, as *thirdly*, *fourthly*, *fifthly*, &c., which are formed from the adjectives *third*, *fourth*, *fifth*, &c., by adding the termination *ly*, before explained. In the Latin language, the correspondent words *tertiò*, *quartò*, &c., are manifestly the adjectives *tertius*, *quartus*, &c., with the termination of the ablative case. In English, too, we use the adjective *first*, adverbially, without any alteration. It has been observed above that the first two of the ordinal numbers generally appear not to be taken from the names of the cardinal numbers; thus we do not say in English the *oneth*, the *twoeth*, nor in Latin *unitus*, *duitus*, nor in Greek ἑνοτὸς, δυιτὸς; but in these languages respectively, *first*, *second*, *primus*, *secundus*, πρῶτος, δεῦτερος: and when we look to the etymology of these words, we shall be inclined to suspect that they are in their origin simpler, and therefore, perhaps, earlier than the adjectives taken from the ordinal numbers. The word *first* is manifestly the superlative of *fore*, the first, being, of course, the *for-est*, or that which is *before* all

others. The Latin *primus* is in like manner the superlative of the old word *pri*. Scaliger, speaking of the word *primus*, says, *Superlativum est; nam* PRI *vetus vox fuit*, sicut NI: postea latiore vocali fusæ sunt NE, PRÆ, *unde Adverbium*, PRIDEM; *comparativum*, PRIUS; *superlativum*, PRIMUM. So the Greek πρῶτος is the superlative of the preposition πρὸ, being formed thus, πρὸτατος, πρὸατος, and (the ὸα shown by the circumflex accent to be contracted into ῶ) πρῶτος. As to the preposition πρὸ, it answers exactly to the Latin *præ*, before, primarily with regard to time or place, and secondarily to order, or what we call *pre*ference. The word πρῶ, indeed, is used for the *first* dawn of day; but this appears to be merely a contraction from πρωΐ, which, however, is undoubtedly connected with πρὸ; nor can there be much doubt that the three radicals to which I have alluded, viz., *pri*, *pro*, and *for*, have all one common origin.

Verbs.

398. If there be a doubt whether any one particular class of words can be used adverbially, that doubt must apply to the *Verbs*. In English, the words to which this doubt applies are either of uncertain etymology; or else their use is rather conjunctional or interjectional than adverbial. The adverb *Yet* has been considered to be the imperative mood of the Anglo-Saxon verb *gytan*, or *getan*, to *get;* but it is not very evident how this imperative can be applied to the different senses in which the word *yet* is used. The adverbs *ado* and *together* have an obvious affinity with the verbs *do* and *gather;* but it is not easy to trace them directly to any particular part of those verbs. *Ado* is well known in English from the name of the popular drama, *Much Ado about Nothing*. In the Scottish dialect too it is very ancient. In the preface to Gawin Douglas's translation of the Æneid we find the expression "it has nathing *ado* therewith." The adverb *Together* has a manifest relation to the verb *gather*, which, however, we now use with some diversity of meaning. The adverb and the verb rather seem to refer to some common origin, which does not exist in English, but appears in a more simple form in Dutch, in which *gade* is a consort, as *een duyf en haare gade*, "a dove and her mate;" *gadeloos*, matchless; *gadelyk*, sortable, &c.

Affirmative and Negative.

399. *Yes* and *No* may be referred to the class of *verbal* adverbs, if they properly belong to this part of speech, which I am inclined to think they do; though a very able philologist considers them as "referable to none of the current parts of speech," but requiring by accurate grammar to be placed "in a class by themselves."* Doubtless they stand alone in construction, and are equivalent, each of them, to a whole sentence; but that sentence is elliptical, and, I apprehend, that the verb understood in it is modified by the adverb expressed. In the language of gesture nothing can be more simple, more universal, or more frequent than the expressions of assent or dissent, the former by a nod of the head, the latter by a shake of the head. In the words

* Latham, Eng. Lang. § 259.

of our Saviour, too, the verbal expressions are as short and distinct as possible: Ἔςω δὲ ὁ λόγος ὑμῶν Ναὶ, ναὶ, Οὐ, οὔ. "*Sit autem sermo vester, Est, est, Non, non.* "Let your communication be Yea, yea, Nay, nay." In the Gothic, "*Siyai than waurda izwar Ya, ya, Ne, ne.*" Yet it is remarkable, that in classical literature generally such simple expressions of assent or dissent seldom or never occur, at least in the plain and direct mode in which we constantly employ them. One would expect to find frequent use of them, if anywhere, in Plato's Dialogues, where the reasoning of Socrates is so generally carried on by interrogation. But, on the contrary, the answers are for the most part given in such terms as Ἔστι ταῦτα, "These things are so;" Οὐκ ἔστιν, "it is not;" Πῶς δ'οὐ, "how not;" τὶ μήν, "what else?" Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, "wholly so;" Ἦ ν λέγεις, "you say well;" ὕντως, "just so;" ὀυδαμῶς, "by no means;" Ἔοικε γε πῶς, "at least 'tis rather probable;" ὀυκ ἔοικεν, "'tis not probable;" φασὶ γοῦν, "so at least they say;" Ἔχει γὰρ λόγον, "why, 'tis reasonable." Sometimes, indeed, the answer is by the short word Ναί; but this, though translated "yea," in the text above quoted, conveys to a classical ear, somewhat of a less positive assertion; implying, when used responsively, rather a submission to the person addressed than a confident assertion of the party using it: ex. gr. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς ἔφην ὦ Ἀδείμαντε; Ναὶ, ἦ δ' ὅς, "'Was I not right,' said I, 'O Adimantus?' 'Certainly,' said he."* To understand the nature of the responsive words *yes* and *no*, we must advert to what has before been said of interrogative sentences, and the interrogative mood of verbs. The interrogator states a fact as unknown to or doubted by himself, in its general existence, or in some of its circumstances; and he requires from the respondent an assertion affirming or denying that which he has stated as doubtful or unknown. The question proposed is simple or complex. If simple, the answer may be in the same words, *mutatis mutandis*, as the question: if complex it cannot. The Greeks and Romans called the simple question Ἐρώτημα, *interrogatio*, and the complex, Πύσμα, *percontatio;* which distinction may be illustrated by comparing the proceedings on a criminal trial by jury with those on a coroner's inquest. The simple question put to the jury in the former case is an Ἐρώτημα, "*Is* the prisoner guilty?" and the answer may be given in the very same words transposed, "The prisoner is guilty." The complex question in the other case is a Πυσμα. *How* did the person, whose body you are to examine, come by his death? Which may branch into many simple questions, as did he die by the act of God? or by his own hands? or by the hands of another? If by his own hands, was he at the time sane, or insane? If by the hands of another, is that person known or unknown? If known, was it A., B., or C., &c., all, or which of them? And whatever the state of the facts may be, the complex question first proposed cannot be answered by transposing its terms, nor by any other simple response. With

* Plato, Rep. l. 4.

complex questions, the words *yes* and *no* have nothing to do; but supposing a simple question to be put, and answered affirmatively, by transposing its terms, as "Is there peace at present between France and England?"—"*There is* peace at present between France and England,"—it must immediately occur to any one that the answer would be perfectly intelligible, if all the words after "*there is*" were dropt as superfluous; and equally so if the answer were "*there is not.*" So, if it were asked, "*Is it* true that A. B. is guilty of the felony of which he stands indicted?" the full answer would be, "It is true that A. B. is guilty of the felony of which he stands indicted," but it would be equally intelligible to say briefly "*it is*," or "*it is not.*" The superfluous words then would not long be retained in use; and the brief answers given would be exactly equivalent to *yes* or *no*: hence it is probable that these two words may have had some connection, historically, with the assertions "there is" and "there is not," or "it is" and "it is not."

Yes. Yea. Ay.

400. We have in modern English three forms of the affirmative word in question, viz., *Yes*, *Yea*, and *Ay;* which last, from its immemorially exclusive use in Parliamentary voting, may probably have been at an early period of our history the most prevalent form. Be this as it may, I shall first examine certain explanations which have been given of *yes*, the word at present used on all ordinary occasions, for affirmation. Mr. Tooke labours to derive *yes* from the French *ayez*, "have it," "enjoy it." This is not the happiest of his etymologies, at least it is not one of the best supported; for he quotes Chaucer's *Romaunt of the Rose* very much at random, in support of his conjecture:—

> And after, on the daunce went
> LARGESSE, that set al her entent
> For to ben honorable and fre;
> Of Alexander's kynne was she;
> Her most joye was ywis,
> Whan that she yafe, and sayd HAUE THIS.

Where Mr. Tooke says, "Which might, with equal propriety, have been translated:—

> When she gave, and said YES."

The most frigid critic could not well have missed the spirit of his author more completely. *Largesse*, or liberality, is personified, like Timon, scattering her gifts on all sides, and not waiting for any demand, to which she might answer, "yes." So we find, from the admirable scenes with Lucullus and Lucius, that Timon had been in the habit of surprising them with unexpected presents:—

> LUCULLUS. One of Lord Timon's men?—A gift, I warrant. Why, this hits right: I dreamt of a silver bason and ewer to-night. Flaminius, honest Flaminius, you are very respectively welcome, sir. (Fill me some wine.) And how does that honorable, complete, and free-hearted gentleman of Athens, thy very bountiful good lord and master?

FLAM. His health is well, sir.

LUCUL. I am right glad his health is well, sir—and what hast thou there, under thy cloak, pretty Flaminius?

* * * * * *

SERV. May it please your honor, my lord hath sent—

LUCIUS. Ha! What hath he sent? I am so much endeared to that lord: he is ever a sending. How shall I thank him, thinkst thou?—And what hath he sent now?

In like manner, Largesse set all her pleasure in free, spontaneous, and unexpected acts of bounty, with the munificence of a mighty monarch, another Alexander, surprising those whom she benefited by the sudden exclamation, "Have this!" If our *yes* were derived from *ayez*, we should find the latter word used in that sense in some of the French dialects; but this circumstance nowhere occurs. Nor is it very clear, that the word *ayez* was used in French before *yes* was used in English; since it appears to be a corruption of *avez;* which was taken from *havez*, or *habez*, part of the very ancient verb *haben*, of which the radical *hab*, in the sense of our word *have*, was common to the Latin with all the Gothic languages; for the Latin verb was *habere*, the Mæso-Gothic *haban*, the Anglo-Saxon *habban* and *hæbban*, the Frankish, Alamannic, and modern German *haben*, the Icelandic *hafa*, the Danish *haffne*, the Swedish *hafwa*, the Dutch *hebben;* and it even seems to have been used in one dialect of the Greek language; for Hesychius and Phavorinus prove that ἄβεις was used for ἔχεις, particularly by the Pamphylians, and from this root an infinity of nouns are derived in the northern languages, as well as in the Semitic from the Hebrew חוה *havah*. It would therefore require some diligence of investigation, to discover at what period in the history of the Frankish or French language, the distinctive *b* or *v* of the radical word was dropped in the imperative *ayez;* and it could not have been long after that period, if at all, that the imperative was converted, by common use, into an adverb among the French; and again, at a much later period, that this adverb was adopted from the Norman-French into the Norman-Saxon, from whence it must have descended to the modern English; not one of the steps in which supposed progress has Mr. Tooke attempted to verify; nor is it probable that the attempt, if made, would have led to any confirmation of his conjectural etymology of the word *yes*. Dr. Johnson derives *yes* from the Anglo-Saxon *yise*, and indeed the word is found in that language written *yise*, *yese*, *yyse*, with the Saxon ȝ. Supposing then that our *yes* may be immediately derived from *yese*, it remains to be seen whether the latter word can be traced to a higher source; and here I should be disposed to avail myself of the suggestion of Junius (who explains *yes* as a contraction of *yea is*), so far at least as to derive the Saxon *yese* from *yea*, which seems to have been a very ancient affirmative in that language, and is identical with our present *yea*. Mr. Tooke indeed suggests that *yes* and *yea* are of very different origin, the one being from the French verb *avoir*, the other from some northern verb (he

does not exactly determine which) that signifies "to own." Now, verbs of this signification are also very numerous, as well as the adjectives and substantives derived from them. Thus the Gothic verb is *aigan*, the Anglo-Saxon *agan*, whence our verb to *owe* is derived; the Icelandic *eiga*, the Swedish *æga*, the Alamannic *eigan*, and with these probably the Greek ἔχειν has some affinity. Nor is the adjective less general, with the sense of *own*, proprius. In Gothic it is *aigin*, in Anglo-Saxon *agen*, whence the old Scottish *awin*, and old English *owen*, the Alamannic *eigan*, the Danish *eget*, the Icelandic *eyga*, and the Dutch *eygen*. It does not, however, happen in these languages generally, that the affirmative adverb, or interjection, has the form of any part of the verb, or indeed much resemblance to it. Our *yea* is undoubtedly the Mæso-Gothic *ya*, *yai*, old German *ya*, *yo*, Anglo-Saxon *ya*, *yea*, Icelandic, Swedish, Danish, German, and Dutch, *ya*; from which various words are derived in several of those languages, as the Gothic *yaithan*, to approve, and *frayethan*, to disapprove; the Icelandic *yaord*, consent, *beyahen*, to affirm; the Swedish *beyaka*, to affirm; the German *yaher*, a complyer; *yawort*, a consent, &c. It seems also to be connected with the Sanscrit affirmative particle (as it has been called) *ya*, *yai*.* Some grammarians derive it from the Hebrew *jah* (or *yah*) Jehovah; but this can hardly be taken in its plain and literal sense. The Hebrews surely would not have profaned the name of the Almighty by introducing it into common and trivial discourse; and the heathens, who could learn the sacred appellation only through the Hebrews, can less probably be supposed to have adopted it. The only way in which it seems that this etymology can be at all supported is by reference to the verb היה *hayah*, to be, with which the name of the great "I Am" has no doubt a connection, as the Being of Beings, He who alone *is* of himself, and the cause of being to all things that exist. In the Mæso-Gothic there is an evident connection between *ya* and the pronouns and adverbs of pronominal origin, *so*, *it*, *this*, and *that*:—

Ya-ins——(ille)	"*this* man,"
Ya-ind——(illuc)	"to *that* place,"
Ya-thau——(forsan)	"it may be *so*,"
Ya-u——(si)	"be *it*, that,"
Yu——(jam)	"at *this* time."

In point of signification *ya* or *yea* agrees with the Greek ὄντως, and the Latin *sic;* both which are connected with pronouns, and both employed as words of responsive affirmation. Thus Socrates, arguing with Alcibiades that the soul, and not the body, is the true *self*, says, Ὅστις ἄρα τῶν τοῦ σώματος γινώσκει, τὰ ἄυτου, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀυτὸν ἔγνωκεν—"Whosoever then knows his body, knows what belongs to himself; but does not know himself:"† to which Alcibiades replies Οὕτως; as if he had said, "it is *so;*" "it is *as* you say." The Latin

* Bopp, Comp. Gram. §§ 371, 385.

† Plato, First Alcib.

sic, like the modern Italian *si*, was used as we employ *yes*. The gradations by which it reached this power of expression, may be collected, from the following passages in Terence, to be *sic est factum—sic est —sic.*

i. "Quid narras? SIC *est factum.*"—What (tale) do you tell? *The fact is* so.*

ii. "Datur illa Pamphilo hodie nuptum? SIC est." Is she given to Pamphilus to be married? *It is* so.†

iii. "Itane ais—Phanium relictam solam? SIC." What do you say—that Phanium was left by herself?—So (*i. e.* yes, I say so).‡

The Greek ὅυτως is a mere adverbial form of the pronominal ὅυτος, "*this* person:" and the Latin *sic* is in like manner connected with the pronoun *se*, which in the dative is *si-bi*, and with the verb *sit*, which was anciently written *si-et*.

Besides the mere expression of acquiescence in a question or demand, *yea* has, in its modern use, a particular force which answers to the Latin *imò;* and *imò*, it is to be observed, is really the pronoun *im*, which occurs constantly for *eum* in the remaining fragments of the Laws of the Twelve Tables; as, "*si* IM *aliquis occisit, joure cæsus esto*," where Macrobius says: *ab eo quod est* IS, *non* EUM, *casu accusativo, sed* IM *dixerunt.* In this sense of the word *yea*, MILTON says,

——— ——— They durst abide
Jehovah thund'ring out of Sion, thron'd
Between the cherubim—*yea*, often plac'd
Within his sanctuary itself their shrines.

It is somewhat remarkable, in the English idiom, that the word *nay* (the antipodes, as one would think, of *yea*) is used in the very same sense as that which we have just described. Thus Dryden says, "This allay of Ovid's writings is sufficiently recompensed by his other excellences; *nay*, this very fault is not without its beauties." What is still more singular, Ben Jonson uses both *yea* and *nay* with the same augmentative force in one and the same sentence: "A good man always profits by his endeavour; *yea*, when he is absent; *nay*, when dead, by his example and memory." In all these passages, *yea* seems still to bear its relation to the pronoun *this*; for the meaning is, "they durst abide Jehovah thundering out of Sion; *this* they did and often more." "A good man profits by his endeavours; *this* he does when present, and even when absent:" and the word *nay* only serves still further to complete the same sense; for, in the instances above quoted, the meaning is, "the allay of Ovid's writings is recompensed by other excellences: *this* is the case, and *not* only *this*, but the very fault has its beauties." "A good man profits us by his endeavours when absent: *this* he does, and *not* only this, but even when he is dead, we profit by his example and his memory."

* Adelphi, a. 3, sc. 4. † And., a. 2, sc. 1. ‡ Phorm., a. 2, sc. 2.

There is still one more use of *yea*, which confirms the view here taken of its import; as in the third chapter of Genesis—"*Yea?* Hath God said, ye shall not eat of every tree in the garden?"* Here the word *yea* has an interrogative force; and means "is this *so?*" Do you say *this*—namely, that God hath forbidden you to eat of every tree?

In fine, the conception always expressed by *yea* is that of true and affirmative existence. Hence Dr. HAMMOND, explaining the passage "all the promises of God in him are *yea* and amen" (2 Cor. i. 20), says, "that is, they are VERIFIED, *which is the importance of yea;* and confirmed, which is meant by amen." Now, the conception of positive existence, as applied to a particular thing or event, is expressed by the words "it is," or "this is;" and if there be an ellipsis of either word, the same conception may be expressed by the other word. In this view of the subject, it seems not unreasonable to conclude that the word *ya* may have been originally used either as a pronoun, or as a part of the verb of existence; and it is to be remembered, that in many, perhaps in all languages, the verb of existence is merely expressed by a pronoun.

Ay appears to be merely *yea*, a little varied in pronunciation, Dr. Johnson, indeed, suggests that it may be derived from the Latin *aio;* but it is more probable that the Latin *aio* and *nego*, and the English *ay* and *nay*, are derived from some more ancient common origin. *Ay* has some slight differences of application from *yea*, as *yea* has from *yes;* but this is no more remarkable than the different force and effect which, as we have already seen, is given in different cases to the same word, *yea*. In the following passage from Shakspeare's Henry VI. *ay* expresses somewhat more of passionate and proud reproof, than if the word *yea* were employed:—

> Remember it; and let it make thee crest-fall'n;
> *Ay*, and abate this thy abortive pride.

As *yea* appears to have been a variation of *ay*, so was *ay* varied into *I;* but without any change of meaning:—

> Hath Romeo slain himself? Say thou but *I;*
> And that bare *vowel*, *I*, shall poison more
> Than the death-darting *eye* of cockatrice. *Romeo and Juliet.*

With respect to the other adverb *aye*, always (for it is a totally different word), we shall have occasion to consider it hereafter.

401. Our *No* and *Nay* belong to a very large class of negatives, which are found in almost all the languages which have been called Indo-European, ex. gr. the Sanskrit and Zend *na*, Persian *ne*, Latin *ne*, *ni*, *non*, Russian, Polish, and Bohemian *ne*, *nie*, *neni*, Gothic and old German *ne*, Anglo-Saxon *na*, *ne*, *no*, Low Saxon *neh*, Icelandic, Danish, and Swedish, *ney*, Dutch *neen*, German *nein*, *nie*, Italian *no*, *non*, French *non*, *nenni*, Spanish *ne*, &c., with all their compounds and derivatives. The conception which enters into the signification of all No. Nay.

* Genes. iii. 1.

these words is an universal and primary one in the human mind; being, as it were, the bound and limit of all other conceptions. The following are the remarks of the President De Brosses on this subject: "Man, in order to communicate his perceptions, has occasion to express, not only existing objects, and the manner of their existence, but also in what manner they do *not* exist. And so with regard to feelings, he has occasion to make known whether they are agreeable to his will, or *not* agreeable to it. It is necessary then, that besides the different radicals serving to express positive ideas, and different classes of objects, he should have another radical, which may serve to express a negative idea; appropriated merely to indicate that what he describes is not in what he wishes to describe. One single radical will always suffice for that effect, to whatever object it may be applied. Negation being an absolute and privative sensation, a mere counter-assertion, it is quite enough that we have *one vocal sign*, one organic articulation, to advertise the hearer, that what we say is not in the subject of which we speak." Having already adverted to the conception of negation generally, it is sufficient here to observe, that every child, in the first glimmering of reason, must necessarily form such a conception, and that it does in fact acquire, among its first articulate sounds, the sound which expresses that conception. The child has as distinct a conception that its nurse is *not* present, or that its food is *not* agreeable to its palate, as it has of the opposite circumstances. It may perhaps be urged, that this negative conception is in its very nature adjectival; that it can only be applied in the manner of an attribute to some other conception which is of a substantive nature. "*Il est impossible*," says De Brosses, "*de former un Nom absolument privatif; c'est à dire, une locution, qui ne contienne pas une idée vraiment positive.*" "It is impossible to form a noun (substantive) absolutely privative; that is to say, an expression which does not contain an idea really positive." Be it so; but at least the adjectival conception may be applied, in the manner of all other conceptions of the same class, to modify substantives, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs: thus we may apply the negative words or particles *no*, *not*, and *un*, to modify the substantive *man*, the verb *is*, the adjective *wise*, or the adverb *always*, in the following phrases:—

No man is always wise.
Man *is not* wise always.
Man is always *unwise*.
Man is *never* wise (i.e. at *no* time wise).

The different forms of negation are confounded in most languages or dialects. The Latin *ne*, *non*, and *nec* were in early times used indifferently, and so were the English *ne*, *no*, *not*, *nor*. In a fragment of the Laws of Numa Pompilius, preserved by Fulvius Ursinus, we find *nei* for *ne*:—

Sei Hominum folminis occisit, im sopera genua NEI *tolito.*

Again, in a fragment of the first Tribunitian Law, *nec* is used for *ne*—

Sei quis aliuta faxsit cum pequnia familiaq sacer estod: sei quis im oxcisit paricida NEC *estod.*

Again, in the Laws of the Twelve Tables—

Patris familias quei en do testato moritor quoique souos heres NEC *escit.*

In old English *ne* was used for *not* and for *nor*.

i. For *not* in the Harleian MS. 2253, fol. 70, b.—

Ne mai no lewed lued libben in londe.

ii. For *not* in the Prophecy of *Thomas De Essedoune*, in the same volume, fol. 127—

Whenne shal this be?
Nouther in thine tyme, *ne* in myn.

No was used in the same two senses.

i. For *not* in the romance of *Alisaunder*—

Alisaunder and his folk alle
No had noght passed theo halvendall.

ii. For *nor*, in the *Description of Cokaygne*—

Ther nis halle, bure, *no* bench.

In the Scottish dialect *nae* or *no* is used for *not*, and *nor* for *than*—

They're *nae* sae wretched's ane wad think.
Burns. Twa Dogs.

Compleitly, mair sweitly
Scho fridound flat and schairp,
Nor muses, that uses
To pin Apollo's harp. *Alex. Montgomery*, circ. 1597.

The particle *ne*, which forms part of our modern words none, never, &c. was anciently incorporated with many verbs, as, *I not*, for "I ne wot," or "know not;" *I nabbe*, for "I ne have;" *I nulle*, for "I ne will;" *I nolde*, for "I ne would;" *it nis*, *it nas*, *it nere*, for "it ne is," "it ne was," "it ne were:"—

The hors vanisheth I *not* in what manere.
Chaucer. Sq. Tale.

I *nul* soffre that no more. *Ibid.* fol. 55, b.

Uch a srewe wol hire shrude
Tha he *nabbe* nout a smok, &c. *Ibid.* fol. 61, b.

Whil God wes on erthe
And wandrede wyde,
What was the reson
Why he *nolde* ryde?
For he *nolde* no grome
To go by ys syde. *Harl. MS.* 2253, fol. 124, b.

Ther *nis* londe vnder heuenriche. *Harl. MS.* 913.

——— that he *nas* wenemyd anon. *Lyf of Seint Patrik.*

Wymmen were the best thing
That shup our heye heune kyng
Yef feolc false *nere*. *Harl. MS.* 2253, fol. 71.

402. It is sufficient for the general purposes of communicating

Double Negative.

thought, that the negative conception should be once expressed in a simple sentence; but we generally find it redoubled in old English, a circumstance derived from the Anglo-Saxon idiom, as, *Ne om ic na Crist*, "I am not the Christ" (John i. 20). The same idiom prevails in the modern French, although it was not always observed in that language at an earlier period. In the sixteenth century they said, "*l'habit* NE *faict le moyne*:" at present the same proverb is expressed thus, "*l'habit* NE *fait* PAS *le moine*." It is difficult to account for the reduplication of the negative upon any other principle than that of the eager desire, which we commonly see in barbarous and ignorant people, to give utterance to their strong feelings and imperfect conceptions, and which usually leads to much tautology in their discourse. This genuine result of barbarism, however, has been sometimes mistaken for a proof of extraordinary learning; and critics have dignified it with the title of an *Archaism*, a *Hellenism*, or some such pompous appellation. "The editor of Chaucer," says Hickes, "knowing nothing of antiquity, asserts that the poet imitated the *Greeks* in using two negatives to express negation more vehemently; whereas Chaucer was entirely ignorant of the Greek language, and only used the two negatives according to the prevailing custom of his own times, when the language had not yet lost its Saxonisms, as, "I *ne* said *none* ill." In the Saxon writers, indeed, *three* and even *four* successive negatives are sometimes to be found, as, "NE *yeseah* NÆFRE NAN *man God*:" "*no* man ever saw God" (John i. 18). And again, "NE NAN NE *dorste of tham dæge hyne* NAN thing mare *axiyean*;" "and no man durst from that day forth ask him any more questions" (Matth. xxii. 46). It is to be observed, however, that some of the best of these writers, and particularly the royal translator of Bede's Ecclesiastical History, generally employ but a single negative; and such also is the uniform style of that venerable monument of Gothic literature the *Codex Argenteus*.

Substantive.

403. The last class of separate words, which I shall notice as used adverbially, are nouns substantive. It is manifest that substantives may be used in the formation of compound words to express the attributes of attributes. Thus *stone*, in its primary sense, is a substantive, and *blind* is an adjective; but in the compound *stone-blind*, the former part of the word modifies the latter, as much as if we were to say, "a *stony*, or *stonelike* blindness." In like manner, substantives standing alone may be taken adverbially, as modifying either a verb or an adjective. The latter mode is the less common in modern English, but it occurs not unfrequently in the older dialects: the former mode is common in most languages. The adverbial use of the substantive to modify a verb, somewhat resembles the *ablative absolute* of the Latin grammarians. It expresses a conception simply, without asserting it to exist or not to exist. The construction is consequently elliptical, and the sense may always be more fully expressed by adding the assertion. I shall illustrate this by a single example.

404. *While* is the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon *hwila*, and Alamannic *uuila*, time, or a certain space of time, which seems to be of the same origin as our *wheel*, in the Anglo-Saxon *hweol*, Danish and Swedish *hiul*, Icelandic *hiool*, and Dutch *wiel*, which are derived, by J. Davies, from the Welsh *chwyl*, turning, and seem to have some affinity with the Latin *volvo*, and Gothic *walwyan*, to roll; nor is there any more apt or more common symbol of time than the continual rolling of a wheel. Be this as it may, the word *while* in English and *weile* in German is used substantively for a space of time, as in German *es ist eine gute weile*, "it is a good while," or "a long time." So in the relation of the meeting of Joseph with his father Jacob (Gen. xlvi. 29), "he fell on his neck, and wept on his neck *a good while*." We find the English adverb *while* used to modify verbs with reference to various portions of time, ex. gr.:— While.

i. During the whole continuance of a given time.
ii. During a certain time to be terminated in future.
iii. At different intervals of time.
iv. For a short space of time.

"I will sing praises unto my God, *while* I have any being," (*i. e.* during the whole *time* that I exist), Psalm cxlvi. v. 2.

In the Scottish Act of Parliament, 1587, the enactment is ordained to last "Ay, and *quhil* His Hienes nixt parliament." So in Alexander Montgomery:—

> Cum se now, in me now
> The butterflie and candill
> And as scho flies *quhyl* scho be fyrt.

In this sense, which at present exists only in provincial usage, *while* states a time with a definite future termination, ex. gr. *until* the meeting of the Parliament, or until the insect be burnt.

The third use is also provincial, and answers to our word "sometimes," as in the well-known anecdote of an English traveller, who had been confined at a village in Scotland several days together by the rain, and who, at length, losing his patience, asked the landlord pettishly, "What! does it rain here always?" To which the other replied with a smile, "Hoot, na! it snaws *whyles*."

The fourth use occurs often in our translation of the Scriptures, as when Samuel said to Saul, "Stand thou still *awhile* that I may show thee the word of God" (1 Sam. ix. 27). The same idiom occurs in the *Goldin Terge* of Dunbar:—

> Acquentance new embrasit me *a quhyle*,
> And favourt me till men micht gae a myle,
> Syne tuk hir lief, I saw hir nevir mair.

In a very ancient English love-song, *whyle* is used in this sense without the article. (Harl. MSS. 2253, fol. 63, b.)

> Betere is tholien *whyle* sore
> Then mournen euermore.

It is somewhat remarkable that though in the German language the substantive *weile* is not used adverbially in the same senses as *while* is in English, yet it has the same adverbial, or rather conjunctional sense, that we give in matters of reasoning to *since*. Thus the German *weil* implies the consequence or dependence of one fact on another, as WEIL *ers verlanget, so soll ers haben*: "*since* he desires it he shall have it." The word *since* has the primary signification of time, from the Anglo-Saxon *sith*, and old English *sithe*, as in Chaucer—

> And such he was iproved *ofte sithes.*

The word *season* is also used by old authors to signify time, as is the obsolete word *stound.*

In the *Morale Proverbes of Crystyne*, printed by Caxton, A.D. 1478, we find the expressien *long saison* for "a long while," or "a long time:"—

> A temperat man cold from hast asseured
> May not lightly *long saison* be miseured.

So in the *Dictes and Sayings of Philosophers*, printed 1477, "There was *that season* in my company a worshipful gentleman called Lewis de Bretaylles."

Stound occurs adverbially in *Octouian Imperator*—

> Men blamede the bochere *oft stoundys*
> For his sone.

The compounds of *while* still in use such as *meanwhile*, *erewhile*, require no explanation. They plainly express the conception of time, and signify "in the mean*time*," "some*time* before," &c. Erewhile was anciently written *whilere*, and so we find in the different old dialects *whilom* and *umquhill*, which both agree with the old word *sometime* for "formerly."

Recapitulation.

405. Thus are the considerations exhausted, which arise out of the definition of an adverb, as above proposed. I have shown that an adverb is properly to be reckoned among the parts of speech; that it is a word added to a sentence perfect in the expression or mind of the speaker; and that it serves to modify an attributive—that is to say, primarily a verb or an adjective (taking the latter term in its widest sense), and secondarily another adverb. I have endeavoured to reduce those modifications systematically to certain classes (a task hitherto but little thought of) referring the modifications of verbs first to the corporeal relations of place and time, positive and relative, and then to the mental relations propositional or argumentative; the former applying either to affirmation or negation, clear or doubtful, or else to interrogation and response; and the latter to the connection of propositions, particularly of the premises with the conclusion. The modifications of the adjective I have considered as affecting either their quantity or their quality. The positive quantity is either continuous or discrete; the relative admits of intension or remission: modifications of quality are also positive or relative, and the latter

regard either similitude or degree. The secondary modifications (viz., those of adverbs by adverbs) follow the course of the primary: and I have here noticed certain classes of words, which, as effecting no modification of an attribute, are in my opinion improperly admitted into the class of adverbs. I have next considered the methods by which the expression of the modification of attributives is effected in language, viz., by an adverbial phrase, a compound word, or a single word, which constitutes the part of speech we call an adverb. And lastly, I have shown by examples, that the words which may be employed to perform the function of adverbs, with or without inflection, are such as have been or may be employed to perform the function of any of the necessary parts of speech, viz., adjectives proper, participial and pronominal, verbs (particularly as to the responsives *Yes* and *No*), and even nouns substantive. And so much for the adverb, which, with the parts of speech before examined, completes the list of those necessary or accessorial to the formation of enunciative sentences.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF INTERJECTIONS.

The Intersection is a part of speech.

406. CERTAIN words or sounds are generally known by the name of *Interjections*; but in proposing to examine them with reference to the science of language, we are met with an objection *in limine*, that they are not parts of speech, and therefore do not deserve the attention of a grammarian. The learned Sanctius says:—"Interjectionem non esse partem orationis sic ostendo: quod naturale est idem est apud omnes: sed gemitus et signa lætitiæ idem sunt apud omnes: sunt igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non sunt partes orationis. Nam eæ partes, secundum Aristotelem, ex instituto, non naturâ debent constare." The error here arises from giving too great a latitude to a proposition which within certain limits is true; viz., that words are significant *ex instituto;* for in truth this proposition applies only to *nouns* (*i. e.*, names of distinct conceptions) and to words derived from them. But in the nature of the human mind, intellect is mixed up with feeling, the will is often confounded with the reason; and our desires, or fears, unconsciously modify our conceptions or assertions. We express in speech the transitions and mixed states of the mind, as well as its clear, fixed, and determinate distinctions; and hence the interjection rises, as will presently be seen, from a scarcely articulate sound to a passionate, and almost to an enunciative sentence. What we learn from Mr. Tooke on this part of our subject is as inconsistent, as it is vague and declamatory. "The brutish, inarticulate interjection" (says he), "which has nothing to do with speech, and is only the miserable refuge of the speechless, has been permitted, because beautiful and gaudy, to usurp a place among words." How can any modes of utterance be at once *beautiful*, *gaudy*, *brutish*, and *inarticulate?* And what is meant by saying that the interjection, which somehow or other has been enabled to occupy a place among *words*, has nothing to do with *speech*, and is only the miserable refuge of the *speechless?*

Is universally used.

407. Mr. Tooke himself uses such expressions as "Oh!" "Oh, Sir!" "Oh, my dear Sir!" "Oh, Sir, your humble servant!" Well! Why! Come! &c., which assert nothing, and have no connection either with the preceding or following sentences; but are mere interjections, or interjectional phrases, παρεμβολαὶ as the Greeks calls them, thrown in between the main parts of the discourse. Yet he says "where speech can be employed, they are totally useless; and are always insufficient for the purpose of communicating our thoughts." "And indeed," adds he, "where will you look for the interjection? Will you find it amongst laws, or in books of civil institutions, in

history, or in any treatise of useful arts or sciences? No: you must seek for it in rhetoric and poetry, in novels, plays, and romances." Mr. Tooke has forgotten one book, in which interjections abound, and fill the mind with impressions of the highest sublimity and pathos—that book is the BIBLE. But if the interjection had *only* to do with "rhetoric and poetry," surely its sphere would not be narrow. If a knowledge of it *only* led us properly to appreciate the lofty mind of Demosthenes or Cicero, to read with true relish the immortal verses of Homer, Virgil, Tasso, Milton—if it were *only* to be met with in the "plays" of Sophocles, Plautus, Molière, Shakspeare; or in the "romances and novels" of Sidney, Cervantes, Le Sage, Fielding, or Scott, how lamentable must be the taste, how blind the philosophy, which would decline the examination of this interesting part of speech! And is the interjection confined to books? No, it is heard in private and in public, from each sex and every age, in tones of the tenderest love or the most malignant hate, in shouts of joy, in ecstacies of pious rapture, in deep anguish, remorse, despair; in short, from the impulse of every human feeling. Nay, we are taught to believe, that it exists in the *Hallelujahs* of angels, and in the continual *Holy! Holy! Holy!* of the cherubim and seraphim. Now, as a botanist would but imperfectly teach his science, if he were to tell his scholars that certain large portions of the vegetable world were beneath their notice, as *weeds;* or as he would be a poor mineralogist who should disdain to cast an eye on *pebbles;* so he is a miserable grammarian who affects to disregard the numerous *interjections* and *interjectional phrases* which give such force, tenderness, variety, and truth to the works of the rhetorician and poet, and contribute so much toward rendering language an exact picture of the human mind.

Definition.

408. Assuming, then, that there are many sounds or words, more or less perfectly articulated, which occur in human speech, evincing actual feeling, but not reducible to any of the parts of speech above discussed, I say, they form the part of speech called an *Interjection.* Its definition, indeed, is differently given by different grammarians. According to Charisius, Comminianus briefly defines the interjection thus, "Pars orationis significans adfectum animi."—Caius Julius Romanus thus, "Pars orationis motum animi significans;" and Palæmon thus, "Interjectiones sunt quæ nihil docibile habent, significant tamen adfectum animi." Diomedes gives the following definition—"Pars orationis adfectum mentis adsignificans voce inconditâ." Vossius, however, observes that *apage! euge!* and many others, are not *voces inconditæ;* nor is the signifying an affection of the mind peculiar to the interjection, for even adverbs do this, as *iracunde, irridenter, timidè,* &c. He also censures the following definition, *Dictio invariabilis quæ interjicitur orationi ad declarandum animi affectum;* for, says he, "interjections are not always *thrown in between* the parts of a sentence; since we may properly begin a sentence with an interjection." His own definition is, "Vox affectum mentis significans, ac

citra verbi opem sententiam complens." This definition agrees in the main with that which is to be gathered from the works of that excellent old grammarian, Priscian; viz., "Vox quæ alicuju spassionis animi pulsu, per exclamationem, interjicitur:" and on a full consideration of all these authorities, I would propose the following definition—*An interjection is a part of speech showing forth any human feeling, without asserting its existence.*

Feelings.

409. To illustrate this definition, it may be necessary to explain the import here given to the term "human feeling," and to state the different modes in which such a feeling may be shown forth in language without asserting its existence. First, then, it is to be observed, that I use the term "human feeling," as comprehending all those impressions, pleasurable or painful, which we receive through our bodily frame, our intellectual faculties, or our spiritual constitution: and these in their several degrees and modifications. In this view, so far is the interjection from being a "brutish" thing, that the nice and philosophical examination of it, as it has been practised in the different languages and ages of the world, would furnish matter for a better treatise than was ever yet written on the sensibilities and sympathies of human nature. Mr. Tooke declares that "the dominion of speech is erected upon the downfal of interjections." If so, the dominion of speech never was erected, nor ever will be, till the minds of all men are "a standing pool," incapable of being moved or incited to action even by the naked calculations of a cold, exclusive, hateful selfishness.

Their arrangement.

410. I do not pretend to reduce the infinite variety of human feelings to a systematic arrangement. The only attempt of the kind in relation to grammar, which deserves attention, is that of the very ingenious Bishop Wilkins; but it is a mere outline, and is meant to include only "rude, incondite sounds," the "natural signs of our mental notions or passions," and "several of which are common with us to brute creatures." It is as follows:—

I. *Solitary*, the result of a surprised
- 1. *judgment*, denoting
  - i. *admiration*, heigh!
  - ii. *doubt* or consideration, hem! hm! hy!
  - iii. *contempt*, pish! shy! tysh!
- II. *affection* moved by apprehension of good or evil,
  - i. *past* — *mirth*, ha! ha! he! / *sorrow*, hoi! oh! oh! ah!
  - ii. *present* — *love* and pity, alï! alack! alas! / *hate* and anger, vauh! hau!
  - iii. *future* — *desire*, O! O that! / *aversion*, phy!

II. *Social*,
- 1. *preceding* discourse,
  - i. *exclaiming*, oh! soho!
  - ii. *silencing*, 'st! hush!

II. *beginning* discourse,
  i. to dispose the *senses* of the hearer,
    1. *bespeaking* attention, ho! oh!
    2. *expressing* attention, ha!
  ii. to dispose the *affections* of the hearer,
    1. by way of *insinuation*, eja! now!
    2. by way of *threatening*, væ! wo!

Though this scheme in its primary distinctions refers to the different *uses* of interjections, its ramifications are determined by the *sound* of the words employed for this purpose. These considerations should be kept apart, as their intermixture leads only to confusion. Therefore, before I examine the different methods which men have followed in giving utterance to their feelings, otherwise than in enunciative sentences, I deem it proper to say something of the feelings themselves; though, for the reason already intimated, my notice of them must be brief. I have already observed, that in the opening of our faculties, the earliest *conceptions* which we form are those of bodily existence; but even our conceptions are preceded by bodily *feelings*, each sense is pleasurably or painfully affected by external impressions, and these are soon distinguished from each other, and their existence signified to other persons by different modes of expression. When the mental faculties begin to expand, they connect feelings with conceptions, and so with external objects, at first by present sensation making us joyful or sad; afterwards by memory causing regret or pleasing recollection; and lastly, by foresight, creating in us hope or fear, desire or aversion. As we advance in the exercises of reason, we feel doubt or confidence, we are surprised at anything new or strange. Again, the social nature of man opens to him new trains of feeling, affectionate fondness, rivalry, enmity; we approve or disapprove the conduct of others, we applaud or censure, admire or despise them. Every such state of mind is evinced by a peculiar interjection, distinguished not so much by articulation as by tone, by length or shortness of utterance, or by the look or gesture with which it is accompanied; by the abruptness of violent and sudden passion, or the prolonged and gentle murmur of tender affection. Such feelings belong to mankind by their general constitution: others are of a local or temporary nature, and connected with particular objects or events, with religious doctrines and practices, with military ardour, with political party, or personal attachment; and these add to the boundless variety of interjectional cries, and words, and phrases.

411. It remains to be seen what modes of expression, independently of sentences clearly and fully enunciative, language affords for those different feelings; and these will be found to rise by imperceptible gradation from sounds scarcely articulate to clearer articulations, thence to words formed from these incondite sounds, so to broken phrases, and, lastly, to short sentences interjected without direct relation to those by which they are preceded or followed. **Modes of expression.**

Incondite Consonants.

412. We may observe among the interjections noticed by Bishop Wilkins some which not only are not words, but not even syllables, being designated by consonants alone, such as *hm!* which he states as expressive of doubt or consideration, and *'st!* which he calls an interjection of silencing. For my part, I own I should scarcely rank such half-uttered sounds among parts of speech; but if they come to be more clearly pronounced so as to be audibly distinguishable, and when we find the one written in Latin *hem!* and the other in French *chut!* or in Italian *zitto!* I think they may be fairly called (as they are by most philologists) interjections. The mere orthography, however, will help us but little as to the feeling meant to be expressed by these, or indeed any other, truly incondite interjections. *Hem!* it is true, may be sometimes taken as expressing doubt or consideration—

> Occæpi mecum cogitare, *hem!* biduum hic manendum est soli sine illâ? *Terentius, Eun.* 4, 28.

But it is as often taken to express surprise, or exhortation, or commiseration, or perturbation of mind, or joy, or anger, or other feelings which can only be collected from the context if in writing, or from the look, tone, gesture, or manner, if delivered *vivâ voce.* Of the imperfect articulation *'st*, R. Stephanus says "ST [στ] vox est silentium indicentis. Ter. *Phorm.* v. 1. 16. Quid? Non is, obsecro, es, quem semper te esse dictitasti?—C. *'st*—S. Quid has metuis fores?" The Italians use the word *zitto!* and the French say *chut!* Varchi, in his *Ercolano*, or *Dialogo sopra le lingue*, printed at Florence in 1570, says of this word, "Il quale *zitto*, credo che sia tolto da' Latini, i quali, quando volevano, che alcuno stesse cheto, usavano profferire verso quel tale, queste due consonanti *'st*, quasi come diciamo noi *zitto!*" It is used substantively for the slightest sound possible. Thus Boccaccio says, "Senza far motto, o *zitto* alcuno;" "without uttering a word, or sound, the slightest possible." It is also used adjectively, with the variation of gender and number, ex. gr.:—

> E i buon soldati, in campo, o in citadella,
> Si stanno *zitti* in far la sentinella. *Allegri.*

Of the French *chut!* the *Dictionnaire de l'Academie* merely says, "*Chut*, particule dont on se pert pour imposer silence."

Vowels.

413. Where the incondite sound is that of a vowel, the articulation is somewhat more distinct; but, on the other hand, it may be the more easily adapted by the flexible organs of the voice to express different states of the mind: a slight degree of elevation or depression, of length or shortness, of weakness or force, serves to mark a very sensible difference in the emotion meant to be expressed. Hence Cinonio thus speaks of the Italian *ah* and *ahi*:—"I varj affetti cui serve questa interiezzione *ah* ed *ahi* sono più di venti; ma v'abbisogna d'un avvertimento; che nell' esprimerli sempre diversificano il suono, e vagliono quel tanto che, presso i Latini, *ah! proh! oh! væ! hei!*

papæ! &c. Ma questa è parte spettante a chi pronunzia, che sappia dar loro l'accento di quell' affettto cui servono; e sono—d'esclamazione—di dolersi—di svillaveggiare—di pregare—di gridare minacciando—di minacciare—di sospirare—di sgarare—di maravigliarsi—d'incitare—di dsegno—di desiderare—di reprendere—di vendicarsi—di raccomandazione—di commovimento per allegrezza—di lamentarsi—di beffare—ed altri varj." Vossius observes of the Latin *ah*, that in ancient books it is often written *a* without the aspiration; as *pro* is also written for *proh;* and indeed the Greeks write ἃ without the breathing. Thus the 739th and the 746th lines of the *Philoctetes* are both written ᾽A, ἃ, ἃ, ἃ. So in the *Plutus* of Aristophanes, the old woman, alarmed lest her face should be burnt, cries—

——————————᾽A, ἃ,
Τὴν δᾷδα μή μοι πρόσφερ ——

Oh! oh! Don't put the torch near me!

Priscian, too, says that *a* is the name of a letter, and a preposition, and also an interjection. I need scarcely observe that both *ah!* and *oh!* are used by English writers as interjections of pain and sorrow.

In youth alone unhappy mortals live,
But *ah!* the mighty bliss is fugitive. *Dryden.*

Oh! this will make my mother die with grief. *Shakspeare.*

Dr. Johnson says "*Ah*, interjection—a word noting sometimes dislike and censure—sometimes contempt and exultation—sometimes, and most frequently, compassion and complaint." He also says "*Oh*, interjection—an exclamation denoting pain, sorrow, or surprise." The Greek Ἰὼ and Latin *Io*, varying but little in sound from O, were also sometimes used to denote pain or sorrow. Thus Philoctetes, in the agony of his bodily torture, cries ἰὼ, ἰὼ; and Polymestor, in the *Hecuba* of Euripides, uses the same exclamation. Thus Tibullus says—

Uror, *io!* remove, sæva Puella faces! *Lib.* ii. *Eleg.* 4.

And in Claudian, *Io* seems to express the agony of grief:—

Mater *io!* seu te Phrygiis in vallibus Ida
Mygdonio buxus circumsonat horrida cantu;
Seu tu sanguineis ululantia Dindyma, Gallis
Incolis. *De Rapt. Proserp.*

The tender and affecting force of the interjection *oh!* as an expression of deep-seated grief, was never more strikingly shown than in those lines of my old and ever-honoured friend, Wordsworth:—

She lived unknown, and few could know
When Lucy ceased to be;
But she is in her grave—and *oh!*
The difference to me.

Yet *ah*, and *oh*, aspirated and unaspirated, are constantly occurring as marks of slight and transient feeling; sometimes of contemptuous irony, as in the interjectional phrases of Mr. Tooke, above quoted;

and sometimes of grave remonstrance, as in Sidrophel's indignant reply to Hudibras:—

> ——————— *Oh!* sir,
> Agrippa was no conjuror,
> Nor Paracelsus; no, nor Behmen;
> Nor was the dog a Cacodæmon.

Words formed.

414. The transition from these mere incondite consonants and vowels to words formed from them is simple and easily to be accounted for, since it is natural to name the cause from the effect. Of this we have an obvious example in the Latin *væ*, used only as a mere vocal interjection in that language, but found in many others, both as an interjection and also as the root of a numerous train of nouns substantive and adjective, verbs, &c. Thus we find as interjections, the Greek *Οvaὶ*; the Mæso-Gothic *wai;* the Welsh *gwae;* the Anglo-Saxon *wa;* the German *weh!* And in most of these languages the same sound becomes an interjectional noun, as in German, "*wehe* den gottlosen!" woe to the ungodly! Frankish, "*uue* themo man!" woe to the man! in English, *woe* is me! Hickes reckons *wa is me!* and *wam me!* among the Anglo-Saxon interjections of grief. In old English we find "wo the be!"—"woe worth!" &c.; and in Scottish "wae's me!" and "wae's my heart:"—

> Wales *wo the be!* the fende the confound! *R. De Brunne.*
>
> Where ar those worldlyngs now? *Wo worth* them, that euer they were about any kyng! *Latimer.*
>
> Ah, *wae* be to you Gregory,
> An ill death may you dee! *Ballad of Lord Gregory.*
>
> *Wae's* my heart that we shou'd sunder! *Scottish Song.*

From *wae* it is probable came the verb *wail*, and from *waile wa* came *waileway*, *welaway*, and corruptly *welladay*.

Hickes expounds the Anglo-Saxon *wala wa!* heu! proh dolor! and he adds, in a note, "hæc interjectio frequenter tropicè ponitur pro dolore, præcipuè in scriptis Satyrographi, ut:—

> Wote no wyght what war is ther that peace reineth
> Ne what is witerly weale till *welaweye* him teache."

We find it written variously, *weylaway*, *wayleway*, *waileway*, *wel awaie*:—

> Betere hem were at home in huere londe,
> Than forte seche Flemmyssh by the see stronde,
> Whare routh moni Frensh wyf wryngeth hire honde,
> Ant singeth *weylaway.*
> *Battle of Bruges.*
>
> Sche seyd *wayleway,*
> When hye herd it was so:
> To her maistresse sche gan say,
> That hye was boun to go. *Sir Tristrem.*
>
> Biclept him in his armes twain,
> And oft allas he gan sain,
> His song was *waileway.* *Amis and Amiloun.*

I set hem so a worke, by my faie,
That many a night they songen *wel awaie.* *Chaucer.*

Connected with *wae* and *wail* is the verb *waiment*, which Chaucer uses for *lament*:—

The swalow Proigne with a sorrowful lay
Whan morow come gan make her *waimenting.*
Troilus, book ii.

Lastly, the Anglo-Saxon *wala* (in *wala wa*) seems to be still retained in the Scottish interjection *waly*:—

O waly! waly! up the bank,
And waly! waly! down the brae! *Scottish Song.*

Of the numerous other nouns and verbs flowing from the ancient and simple interjection *vae*, with their derivatives, and the changes of signification they have undergone, there will be a fitter opportunity to speak hereafter.

Fragments of sentences.

415. A different class of interjections is formed from fragments of sentences. Of this kind, *alas!* which Wilkins, ignorant of its true origin, ranks among "rude incondite sounds, the natural signs of our mental notions or passions," will afford an illustration. This word was manifestly adopted into the English language from the French *helas!* which is only a corruption of the Italian *ahi lasso*, "ah! weary!" It does not appear to have been known in England much before the time of Chaucer, who frequently uses it:—

How shall I doen? whan shall she come againe?
I note *alas!* why let I her go. *Troilus*, book v.

So in the early romances:—

Thurch the bodi him pight,
With gile:
To deth he him dight
Allas that ich while! *Sir Tristrem.*

Allas that he no hadde ywite,
Er the forward were ysmite,
That hye ond his leman also
Sostren were and tvinnes to. *Lay Le Fraine.*

Quhat sall I think? *Allace* quhat reverence
Sall I mester to your excellence? *The King's Quair.*

Evir *allace!* than said scho,
Am I nocht cleirlie tynt? *Peblis to the Play.*

The sensation of *weariness*, expressed in *ahi lasso*, is also to be found in the Scottish interjectional phrase "weary fa' you:"—

Weary fa' you Duncan Gray! *Old Scottish Song.*

Sentences condensed.

416. Some interjections result from the abbreviation of whole sentences, by condensing them into a single word. Thus the perfect sentence, "I pray thee to do this or that," or "not to do it," or "I pray thee to tell me," is condensed into the single interjection, *prithee!*

Tooke ranks *prithee!* among adverbs. Johnson does not decide what part of speech it is, but merely calls it "a familiar corruption of *pray thee.*" This corruption, however, becomes in use a real interjection. In the following instance the request is merely contemptuous:—

> Poh! *prithee!* ne'er trouble thy head with such fancies;
> But rely on the aid thou shalt have from St. Francis.
>
> *Old Song.*

In the next, the request is more serious, but still the abbreviation of the phrase marks a degree of familiarity:—

> Alas! why comest thou, at this dreadful moment,
> To shock the peace of my departing soul?
> *Away!* I *prithee* leave me! *Rowe.*

Again, in these well-known lines, it marks the good-humoured sarcasm of a friendly adviser:—

> Why so pale and wan, fond lover?
> *Prithee*, why so pale? *Suckling.*

where it is manifest, that the full sentence "I pray thee to tell me" entirely loses its grave and formal character by being converted into an interjection.

Interjectional phrases.

417. Lastly, a short sentence, or clause of a sentence, is often thrown into discourse in the manner which the Greeks call παρεμβολή, and Quintilian and others *interjectio*, and which may be called an interjectional phrase, and often answers to a real interjection in another language or dialect. Thus, in old English, the sentence afterwards furnishing the interjection *forsooth* was inserted at full length (but parenthetically) "for sothe ywis," *i. e.* "I know it for a truth:"—

> The pauyloun was wrouth, *for sothe ywis*,
> All of werk of sarsynys. *Syr Launfal.*

So the Latin *amabo*, the future tense of the verb *amo*, I love, is often introduced interjectionally as an exclamation of fondness:—

> Vide, *amabo*, si non cum adspicias os impudens
> Videtur. *Terentius.*

Eugraphius, an old commentator on this passage, says that *amabo* is used by the poets without any meaning; but on this Vossius justly remarks, "Si blandientis est, otiosum esse nequit, cum multùm blanditiæ et preces valeant."

No absolute distinction.

418. From this review of the different modes of expression by which feelings are signified in language, we at once perceive that no precise line can be drawn between interjections consisting of "incondite sounds," the "*natural* signs" of mental emotion, and exclamations derived from a partial exercise of the reasoning faculty; for among the sounds enumerated by Wilkins we find *alas!* (i. e. *ahi lasso!*) derived from the regular Latin adjective *lassus*—*alack!* from the English verb *to lack*, and Dutch *laecken*—*hush!* from the Gothic verb *hausyan*—and *væ!* identical with the English noun *woe*. That the

noun and the mere incondite sound are used as equivalents, and with the same sort of grammatical construction, we see in the following lines of Butler :—

> Intrust it under solemn vows
> Of *mum!* and *silence*, and the *rose*. *Hudibras.*

And these are necessary consequences of the fact, on which I have often dwelt, that in the constitution of our human nature the active and passive principles, the feelings and perceptions, are closely intertwined, and pass into each other by gradations too fine to be perceptible. The expressions of mere sensible pleasure or pain, or of passion or emotion, as such, are either effected with some degree of volition, or they are extorted by a physical necessity; but on the one hand it may be doubted whether pure physical necessity can operate so as to produce speech properly so called, that is, with any the slightest degree of articulation. To take a striking instance, that of the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles: we find him at one time exclaiming ᾽Α, ᾶ̔, ᾶ̔, ᾶ̔, at another Αἶ, αἶ, αἶ, αἶ, and again Παπᾶ, παπᾶ, παπαῖ; but it is manifest that some power, beyond that of mere mechanical impulse, must intervene to give even the slightest of these articulations its difference from the rest. On the other hand, if we admit that some degree of thought enters into all those "voices," which express the emotions of the human mind, then it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for us to arrange them grammatically in classes each marked by distinctness of conception—to distinguish, for instance, in this respect, between O! ἰὼ! euge! evax! papæ! fie! harrow! pax! hush! hurrah! alas! bravo! &c. &c.; for such words may form an ascending gradation from that which is but just above mechanical impulse to that which is but just below the assertion of a proposition. Where, indeed, such an assertion takes place, that is (speaking as a grammarian) where a verb is connected with a noun, there is formed a sentence, which may be resolved grammatically into its separate parts of speech. But this is not all—the same difficulty which is found in the ascending scale of expression, occurs in the descending scale. A whole sentence is sometimes suddenly interposed in a discourse, by the mere effect of passion or strong feeling, without any direct connection with what goes before, or with what follows. Some such sentences become popular and common, they constitute *interjectional phrases*, expletive parts of the daily conversation of particular sects, parties, or classes of men; they become habitual; and then again they are abbreviated, contracted, corrupted; and so remain in language as *words*, sometimes with little more articulation or distinct meaning than those other sounds which are ascribed to the effect of mere natural impulse. Here then is a wide field for *interjectional forms* in speech, comprehending the almost involuntary *exclamation*, the *word* more or less significant, and the *phrase* more or less imperfect and obscure.

419. Hence, too, the grounds of that relation, to which I have before adverted, between the interjection, the imperative mood, and

Relation to Mood and Case.

the vocative case, may be easily perceived. The interjection, indeed, as such, neither *asserts*, like the verb, nor *names* a conception, like the noun. It manifests the existence of a feeling to the sympathies of mankind, but it does not declare that existence as a fact addressed to their judgment. In this respect, therefore, it differs generally from the verb. Again, it shows *actual* feeling: it does not merely name the conception of a feeling, but gives to that conception a vital energy as it were; it shows the speaker to be affected by its impulse, and is thus distinguished from a noun. The limits between an interjection and a noun or verb, however, are not always very easy to be observed in practice. The *imperative* mood, and the *interrogative* form of a verb have so much of animation about them, that they easily pass into mere interjections, and the same may be said of the *vocative* case of nouns. In practice, I should be inclined to say, that so long as a noun or verb (distinguishable as such) enters into construction with other parts of a sentence, or admits of grammatical inflection, according to its particular application, it is to be considered as not having assumed the character of a mere interjection; whilst, on the other hand, the simply articulated exclamation, or the noun or verb which has lost somewhat of its original form and signification, is entitled, so long as it shows forth an actual feeling, to be called an interjection. Wilkins's scheme, short as it is, helps to illustrate the connection between these parts of speech. *Wo!* which he properly ranks among interjections, is also used as the vocative case of a noun.—*Hush!* (like hark! lo! oyez! &c.) is also the imperative mood of a verb. The interrogative is in some degree implied by *hem!* or *hm!* which he considers as interjections of doubt. It is more distinctly marked in French by the word *puis*, as explained in the *Dictionnaire de l'Academie.* "On dit, par ellipse, et par interrogation, *et puis!* pour dire, eh bien! qu'en arrivera-t-il? que s'ensuivra-t-il? que fera-t-on apres? Ou bien, qu'en arriva-t-il? que s'ensuivit-il?"

Coupled with an assertion.

420. Though the interjection itself does not assert, it may be coupled with an assertion, as one subordinate sentence is coupled with another in a larger sentence. This I have already exemplified in the passages —"O! that I had wings like a dove!"—"Oh! that this too solid flesh would melt!"—in both which, the verbs (had, and would melt) are put in the subjunctive mood, as dependent on the interjection O! —just as they would have been had the place of O! been supplied by a verb, such as, "I wish," "I desire," or the like. In a union of this kind the interjection precedes the sentence with which it is connected; for it has been observed by Vossius, that though the name interjection is given on account of its being *thrown in between* the parts of a sentence, yet this is not essential to the character of an interjection. It is so named, not because it is always, but because it is generally so placed. "Interjectiones dictæ sunt quia sæpe interseruntur orationi, non quòd id perpetuum sit."—"Interjectio non semper interjicitur; quia ab eâ quoque rectè auspicamur."—"Nec tamen de οὐσία ejus

est, ut interjiciatur; cum per se compleat sententiam, nec rarò ab eâ incipiat oratio."

421. The learned Wallis was in error, when he said there were but few interjections in the English language. True it is, that with various contexts and accompaniments, the same interjection may express very different emotions. We find Wilkins describing *oh!* as an expression of sorrow, as an exclamation preceding discourse, and as bespeaking attention in discourse. These variations depend not on the articulation, but on the intonation; that is, not on the letters which go to form the word, but on the elevation or depression of voice in pronouncing it: but this is not peculiar to the interjection *oh!* or to the "incondite" interjections generally; for the same may be observed of any nouns or verbs used interjectionally. Thus we say, impatiently, "*well!* and what of that?"—or, with patient acquiescence, "*well!* never mind: it can't be helped." So there is great difference between the affected gravity of Falstaff's imprecation, *plague!* and the same imprecation seriously uttered against Apemantus:— Interjections not few.

FALST. A *plague* of sighing and grief! It blows a man up, like a bladder. *First Part Henry IV.*

CAPH. Stay, stay, here comes the fool, with Apemantus.
SERV. Hang him! He'll abuse us.
ISID. ——— A *plague* upon him! Dog! *Timon.*

422. Thus have I shown the propriety of ranking the interjection as a separate part of speech, not "brutish and inarticulate," but employed by all mankind in all ages to express feelings, from the most slight and evanescent to the deepest and most overpowering. I have proposed a definition of this part of speech, and in developing it have proved that it shows forth and expresses feelings, without asserting their existence. I have given a short view of those nice shades and gradations, by which our various feelings pass into distinct conceptions and assertions, and of a corresponding gradation in the modes of their expression, from incondite sounds, consonantal or vocal, to words either growing out of those sounds, or adopted from mere fragments of sentences, and finally to interjectional phrases, approximating in part, or whole, to sentences purely enunciative; whence we may easily comprehend how the interjection rises to a noun, a verb, or a phrase, and the phrase, verb, or noun sinks into an interjection. And with this discussion I conclude the survey of words, as distributed into those, which are named by grammarians, from their respective *uses* in the communication of thought and feeling, the Parts of Speech.

CHAPTER XV.

OF PARTICLES.

Parts of words.

423. HAVING treated of sentences and words, it remains to be seen whether the grammatical analysis cannot be carried still further, by examining the constituent parts of words. It has been stated above, that words, as to their sound, may, for the most part, be divided into syllables, and syllables into articulations; but these divisions having no necessary relation to their signification are not here to be considered. The question is, whether, and to what extent, words, taken as significant integers, may not, in certain instances, admit of fractions (so to speak) which go to make up those integers, and are also themselves significant? and this question is to be resolved, as I shall presently show, in the affirmative.

Why called Particles.

424. The science of grammar, as hitherto cultivated, has, like most other sciences, obtained as yet but an imperfect nomenclature. We have seen that even the appellations "noun" and "verb," which are on all hands admitted to be applicable to the most necessary parts of speech, are differently understood by grammarians of note. It is not surprising, therefore, that the term *Particle* should be misapplied, as I think it is, when intended to signify those words which are at the same time recognized as accessorial parts of speech. To say, "there are eight *parts* of speech, but four of them are *particles*," is much like saying, there are eight *planets*, but four of them are *satellites*, or eight *commissioned* officers, but four of them are *non-commissioned*. The word particle, according to all analogies of derivation, ought to mean something less than the word part, a subdivision of a division, a part of a part: and as words have been called parts of speech, particles should be deemed parts of words, in which sense, with reference to signification, I shall here use the term *particle*.

How far significant.

425. When I speak of a divisible word as an *integer*, in point of signification, I speak of it with reference to its possible effect in the construction of a sentence; but when I speak of a portion of that word as a *particle*, I allude to its effect in modifying the signification or character of the integral word in language generally; and some such effect it must necessarily have, whether or not it has any known signification when used separately. Thus each of the sentences, "Johnson was learned," "Friendship is delightful," contains, as a sentence, three, and only three significant integers, viz., a subject, a copula, and a predicate, each of which integers is a word; but if we take any one of the four divisible words in these sentences, and inquire into its signification in the English language generally, we shall find that this depends on the way in which its primary portion is modified

by the other portion. In "Johnson," for instance, the primary portion *John* is modified by *son:* each portion has a known signification, and the union of both produces a third signification relating to the two former. Again, in the word *friendship* there are two portions, *friend* and *ship*, and the relation of the word *friend* to *friendship* is very obvious; but the relation of *ship* to *friendship* is not equally so at first sight, though it may be discovered by study and reflection, as will hereafter be shown. The word *learned* may, in like manner, be divided into two portions, *learn* and *ed*, of which the former has a clear meaning of its own; but the latter, if it ever had a distinct and separate meaning, has long since lost it, and serves only to mark that *learned* is a participle of the verb to *learn*. The word *delightful* may be divided into *delight* and *ful*, both which are intelligible enough in English, or into *de*, *light*, and *ful*, of which the two former cannot be separately understood without reference to the Latin. The words *Johnson*, *delightful*, *friendship*, and *learned*, therefore, are in effect compounds, each consisting of a primary part, which is modified by a secondary part. *John* is modified by *son*, *friend* by *ship*, *learn* by *ed*, and *delight* by *ful*. The primary parts in such compounds are *words*, that is, when used separately, they have a plain and distinct signification of their own. The secondary parts may or may not have such separate signification in present usage; and their signification, if any, may be more or less obvious. These secondary parts I call *particles*, when so used in composition. Thus, I say that, in the word Johnson, *son* is a particle; in the word friendship, *ship* is a particle; in the word delightful, *ful* is a particle; and in the word learned, *ed* is a particle.

426. Particles modify words in three different ways, and with three different effects:— **Three kinds.**

i. In the ordinary compounds, such as *Johnson*, *overtake*, *forewarn*, *erewhile*, *elsewhere*, there is no alteration of the principal word, either by changing the grammatical class to which it belongs, or by varying the grammatical construction of the sentence in which it is used.

ii. In such compounds as *friendship*, *bisyhed*, *avette*, *masterless*, *blaunchard*, *sweetly*, &c., the grammatical class of the word is more or less altered; thus, from the personal substantive, *friend*, we form the ideal substantive, *friendship;* from the Latin appellative *apis*, was formed the French diminutive *avette;* from the common adjective *blanche*, was formed the diminutive adjective *blaunchard;* from the adjective *busy*, was formed the old English substantive *bisyhed;* from the substantive *master*, we form the adjective *masterless;* from the adjective *sweet*, we form the adverb *sweetly*, and so forth.

iii. In such compounds as *growen*, *beon*, *makede*, *walked*, *monethes*, *children*, &c., the principal word is varied in its construction by the particles *en*, *on*, *ede*, *ed*, *es*, &c.; and thus are formed those inflections which grammarians call declensions and conjugations. Of each of these kinds I shall give one or more examples.

Class and construction unaltered.

427. The class and construction of the word *John* remain unaltered in *Johnson*, which was manifestly in its origin nothing more than *John's son*. Thus in all languages have been formed *patronymics*, the most ancient of all family names. The Greeks did this in several instances, whence such names as *Æacides*, *Pelides*, *Atrides*, &c.; but the Romans adopted it generally at a very early period of their history. "Remarquons sur les noms propres des familles Romaines," (says M. de Brosses), "qu'il n'y en a *pas un seul* chez eux, qui ne soit terminè en *ius*, desinence fort semblable à l' υἱὸς des Grecs, c'est-à-dire *filius*—par où on pourrait conjecturer que les noms des familles, du moins ceux des anciennes maisons, seraient du genre patronimique." Thus Cæcilius was *Cæculæ* υἱὸς, *Julius*, *Juli* υἱὸς, *Æmilius*, Æmili υἱὸς, &c. Mr. Tooke says, "I think it not unworthy of remark that, whilst the old patronymical termination of our northern ancestors was *son*, the Sclavonic and Russian patronymic was *of*. Thus whom the English and Swedes named *Peterson*, the Russians called *Peterhof*. And as a polite and foreign affectation afterwards induced some of our ancestors to assume *Fitz* (i. e. *fils* or *filius*) instead of *son*, so the Russian affectation, in more modern times, changed *of* to *vitch* (i. e. fitz, fils, or filius), and *Peterhof* became *Petrovitch*, or *Petrowitz*." The Irish patronymic *O'* may possibly be of the same origin as the Russian *of*. The Welsh *'P* is well known to be *ap*, an abbreviation of *mab*, a son, as *Price* for Ap Rhys, *Powell* for Ap Hoël, &c. The Scottish Highlanders use the cognate word *mac*, a son, for their patronymical prefix, as in *Mac Donald* (i. e. the son of Donald), *Mac Kenzie* (i. e. the son of Kenneth), &c.; while the Lowland Scotch used still a different mode of expressing the same thing, by prefixing to the son's name the genitive case of the father's, as *Watt's Robin*, for Robert the son of Walter; *Sim's Will*, for William the son of Simon, whence arose such family names as *Watts*, *Sims*, and the like: and so much for the particles *son*, *ius*, *fitz*, *of*, *vich*, *mac*, *O'*, *'P*, and *'S*. The proper name, *Johnson*, is no less obviously a compound than *watchman*, *spearman*, *boat-hook*, and thousands of similar words in common use. There are also many that have fallen into disuse, though still perfectly intelligible; ex. gr. *nonemete*, a meal formerly eaten by artificers at noon, but which seems to be distinguished from dinner:—

> Divers artificers and laborers reteyned to werke and serve, waste moch part of the day, and deserve not their wagis, summe tyme in late commyng unto their werke, erly departing therfro, longe sitting at ther brekfast, at ther dyner, and *nonemete*, and long tyme of sleping at after none.
>
> *Stat.* 2 *Hen. VII.* c. xxii. M.S.

And as we had the word *nonemete*, i. e. *noonmeat*, so we have the words *noontide*, *noonday*, *midday*, *midnight*, *forenoon*, *afternoon*, &c., all nouns compounded on similar principles; for as *noon* modifies *meat*, so *mid* modifies *night*, and *fore* modifies *noon*: and thus *noon*, *mid*, and *fore*, are equally to be considered in these three instances

respectively as particles. So, in the compound verb *overtake*, *over* is a particle modifying take; and in the compound noun *overseer*, *over* is a particle modifying *seer;* and this particle, *over*, is sometimes corrupted into *or*, as in the word *orlop*, which is a platform of planks laid *over* the beams in the hold of a ship-of-war, so named from the Dutch *overloopen*, to run over, and anciently written in English *overlopps*:—

> Somuche as they shall put greater nomber of people in the castelles and *ouerlopps* of their shypps they shalbe the more oppressed.
> *Nicolls's Thucydides*, fol. 191, a.

In Danish also this same preposition *over*, written *ober*, is used as a particle in compound nouns, as *öberdommer*, the chief justice.

Class altered.

428. The grammatical class to which the word *friend* belongs is that of a *general* appellative, and it expresses a person possessing a certain moral quality; but the grammatical class to which the word *friendship* belongs is that of an *universal*, and expresses the ideal conception of that quality. In compounding the primary word *friend*, then, with the particle *ship*, an alteration of the grammatical class is effected. In some such compounds the particle retains a signification analogous to that which it has when used separately; but in this particular instance, the particle *ship* signifies something very different from the ordinary English substantive *ship*. To understand its modifying power, therefore, we must have recourse to those cognate languages in which a particle of similar origin occurs. The Germans use the termination *schaft*, the Dutch *schap*, and the Swedes *skap*: and these are manifestly from the Gothic *skapan*, Anglo-Saxon *scapan*, or *scyppan*, Frankish and Alamannic *scaffen*, Dutch *scheppen*, Icelandic *skapa* and *skipa*, Danish *skaber*, and old English to *shup*, i. e. to shape, make, or do:—

> The *shuppare* that huem *shupte*
> To shome he huem shadde. *Satire on Horsemen.*
>
> Wymmen were the beste thing
> That *shup* our heye heuene kyng.
> *MS. Harl.* 2253, fol. 71, b.

Friendship, therefore, is the action, the work, of a friend: Chaucer uses *gladshipe*:—

> That *gladshipe* he hath al forsake.

In Danish we find *selkskab*, a fellowship; in Anglo-Saxon *ealdorscipe*, *cynescipe*, *sib-scipe*, &c. In German *herrschaft*, *eigenschaft*, *gesellschaft*, &c. &c.

The particle *scape*, in *landscape*, is the same as *ship;* for we find in Anglo-Saxon *landscipe*, in Dutch *landschup*, and in German *landschafft*.

Many other particles altering the class of words are to be found in our own and other languages, which will be more appropriately noticed in a future part of this work.

Construction altered.

429. The third mode in which particles modify words is, by altering their effect in the construction of a sentence. This use of particles,

which seems to have been little thought of, and scarcely suspected till of late years, has recently opened an immense field for the study of that important branch of ethnography, the connection of languages. Mr. Tooke, in the second volume of his Diversions of Purley, says, "All those common terminations, in any language, of which all nouns or verbs in that language equally partake, under the notion of declension or conjugation, *are* themselves separate words with distinct meanings." On the strength of this assertion, credit has been given to him as the *discoverer* of a great and incontrovertible principle in the science of language; but his real and only merit (if merit it be) was in boldly stating as a general truth what more cautious grammarians had shown, with great probability, to be true in a few particular instances. As in his first volume he had built his whole theory of conjunctions on Skinner's derivation of the conjunction *if* from the imperative *gif*, so in his second volume, published several years after, he, in the above brief and oracular manner, asserted all terminations not merely to *have originally been*, but still to *be*, separate words; because Dr. Gregory Sharpe and others had suggested, "that the personal pronouns are contained in the Greek and Latin terminations of their verbs." Mr. Tooke adds, "These terms are *all* explicable, and ought to be explained;" but he made not the slightest attempt himself to prove in detail what he had asserted as universally true. The productions of the illustrious German philologists, and especially of Grimm, Pott, and Bopp, show the result of long years of labour, in comparing not merely the terminations, but the particles in general, whether prefixed, subjoined, or inserted, of whole families of languages, especially those called Indo-European. We now clearly perceive the operation of one and the same great principle in languages so widely distant from each other in time and place, as the Zend, the Sanscrit, the Mæso-Gothic, the Sclavonian, the Frankish, German, Anglo-Saxon, and English. We find in these and other dialects, not only that the personal pronouns supply particles by which nouns are declined and verbs conjugated, but that certain particles distinguish pronouns personal, relative, and demonstrative; that they convert adjectives into adverbs; give to verbs a negative, intensitive, inceptive, or frequentative character; and, in short, enable the same radical word to pass through all the modifications of every separate part of speech. And, moreover, we perceive that the same particle, varied in articulation according to definite laws, performs the same function in many different languages, showing a connection between nations, of which, in many instances, history affords no other trace.

Induction. 430. The method by which Mr. Tooke arrived at his supposed discoveries, was certainly not "the Baconian Induction;" for it consisted in that very "leap or flight from particulars to the remote and most general axioms,"* which Bacon so much and so often repro-

* Neque permittendum est, ut Intellectus a particularibus ad axiomata remota et quasi generalissima saliat et volet. *Org. Nov. aph.* 104.

bates, as "a rash and premature anticipation,"* and in that "induction by simple enumeration," which he describes as "a puerile thing leading to precarious conclusions, and exposed to hazard from contradictory proofs:"† whilst, on the other hand, the zealous and persevering philologists above mentioned, and their fellow-labourers of perhaps equal ability, have pursued that which Bacon calls "the true way,"‡ and "from which we may augur well for science;" viz., "when by a just scale, and by continuous, uninterrupted, and unbroken degrees, we ascend from particulars to the minor axioms, thence to the intermediate, each successively superior to that which it precedes, and so at last to the most general."§ They have shown, that what is done in some languages by *particles*, is done in other languages by separate *words*: and as it is abundantly clear that all separate words may have been wholly or partially employed to signify either conceptions or emotions, it is reasonable to infer that the particles which stand in their place are significant also. Accordingly, these eminent men have explained the signification of almost all the particles employed in the above-mentioned languages to modify nouns substantive or adjective, participles, pronouns, verbs, or prepositions; and the result may be illustrated by the analysis of a trivial sentence: ex. gr. "The shepherdess says that she plainly saw those soldiers mounted on able and handsome horses, driving the farmer's two largest oxen over the height." I will, therefore, briefly notice the effect of the particles here employed, in modifying the different parts of speech; reserving a fuller examination of them to a future period.

Modifying substantives.

431. First, as to substantives—the particles *er* and *ess*, in "soldier," "farmer," and "shepherdess," mark gender; *en*, *es*, and *s* in "oxen," "horses," and "soldiers" mark number; and *'s* in "farmer's," marks case. In some languages, the gender of a noun substantive is shown by a separate word; in others, by a termination. The English masculine termination *er* manifestly corresponds with the German personal (or as Dr. Latham calls it demonstrative) pronoun, *er*, "he:" with the Latin masculine termination *or*, and substantive *vir*, "man," and various words and particles in other languages, as will be shown hereafter. The Latins expressed children of the two sexes by the words puer and puella. *Puer* signifies what we mean by a *man-child*. We have therefore reason to believe, that as *man* is a word significant of a male of the human kind, so *er* when standing alone had a similar

* Anticipationes naturæ—res temeraria et præmatura. *Org. Nov. aph.* 26.

† Inductio quæ procedit per enumerationem simplicem, res puerilis est, et precariò concludit, et periculo exponitur ab instantiâ contradictoriâ. *Ib. aph.* 105.

‡ Altera (via) a sensu et particularibus excitat axiomata, ascendendo continenter, et gradatim, ut ultimo loco perveniatur ad maximè generalia, quæ *Via vera est. Aph.* 19.

§ De scientiis tum demùm benè sperandum est, quando per scalam veram, et per gradus continuos, et non intermissos, aut hiulcos, a particularibus ascendetur ad axiomata minora, et deinde ad media, alia aliis superiora, et postremò demùm ad generalissima. *Aph.* 104.

signification. *Puella* signifies a girl; if we call *pu-er* a *he-child*, we may call *pu-ella* a *she-child*: and in fact, *illa* is the Latin feminine pronoun *she*. In like manner our feminine particle *ess*, as in *shepherdess*, agrees with the Latin termination *ix*, and the Greek ις, as προφῆτις, a prophetess, and is found in the Italian pronoun *essa*, she. Our plural termination *en*, which we retain in a few words only, is the ordinary plural termination in German, as it was in old English. Its connection with any existing noun, however, requires to be more fully investigated. On the other hand, our plural termination *es*, of which *s*, (as in the above word soldiers) is a mere abbreviation, is found in the Latin and French plural termination *es*, the old Scotch *is*, as in *cryis* and *clappis*,* the Greek plural termination εσ, as Τιτᾶνες, the Doric plural pronoun ἄμες, "we," &c., and is perhaps connected with the Latin pronoun singular, *is*. Our *'s* (as in the above word, farmer's) is an abbreviation of the Anglo-Saxon genitive termination *es*, or *is*, as *Godes*, "of God," *skipis*, "of a ship;" which long prevailed in old English and Scotch, and has been erroneously supposed to be a contraction of *his*.

Adjectives. 432. As to adjectives, the particles *ble* and *some*, in "able" and "handsome," are connected with adjectival terminations in other languages; the former being derived from the Latin *bilis*, as in *amabilis*, (which is doubtless connected with the pronouns *ille* and *is*), and the latter with the German *sam*, as in *langsam*, the Frankish *leidsame*, "loathsome," the Icelandic *sam*, as in *samborgari*, "fellow-citizen," and with our own pronoun *same*.

Participles. 433. Our participle of present time is formed by the participle *ing*, as in "driving," and that of past time by the particle *ed*, as in "mounted." *Ing* is the Scottish *and*, as in *glowand* (glowing), and the Frankish *enti*, as in *scinenti* (shining), both which seem to be connected with the Latin *ens*, *entis*, as in the genitive *placentis*, and with *endi*, as in the gerund *placendi*: and as *ens* is a participle of the verb *esse*, "to be," *ing* has probably a similar origin. Of this termination *ing*, however, it must be observed, that in English it does not exclusively signify time present, much less is it confined to a time momentarily present. We use the infinitive noun *singing*, as we do the infinitive *to sing*; for we may equally say "*singing* is a genteel accomplishment," or "*to sing* is a mark of a mind at ease." So, while the act of building a house is going on, we say "this house is *building*," more properly than "this house *is being built*." In like manner, we say of the builder, "he has been a long time *building* this house." And again, a participle with this termination often passes into an adjective proper, as "this is a person of a *pleasing* address;" and the same occurs in the Latin idiom—

> Linquenda tellus, et domus, et *placens*
> Uxor.—— *Horat. Car.* 2, 14, 21.

* Christis Kirk, stanza 14.

Nor is this usage of a participle confined to the participle present; for we speak of "an *aged* man," as we do of an *old* man, without reference to any particular time. And so does the poet—

——neque harum, quas colis, arborum
Te præter *invisas* cupressos
Ulla brevem dominum sequetur. *Horat.* ut sup.

Pronouns.

434. The participle which modifies the pronoun *those* in the sentence above given, is simply a broad vowel exchanged for one of weaker pronunciation. The singular *this*, becomes the plural *those*. This sort of modification is common in all languages. It was carried much further in the Anglo-Saxon pronouns, than it is in the modern English; for the pronoun answering to our *this*, was in the singular masculine *thes*, *thises*, *thisum*, *thisne*, *thise*; feminine, *theos*, *thisse*, *thas*; neuter, *this*, *thises*, *thisum*, *thise*, and in the plural *thas*, *thissa*, *thissam*.

Verbs.

435. The modifications of the verb by particles are in most languages of the Indo-European branch, except our own, very numerous. A short specimen of them may here suffice:—

English.	Latin.	Greek.	Gothic.	Sanscrit.	Zend.
I stand	sto	ἵστημι	stam	t'istami	histami
Thou standest	stas	ἵστης	stas	t'istasi	histasi
He standeth	stat	ἵστατι	stat	t'istati	histati
We stand	stamus	ἵσταμεν	stames	t'istamas	
Ye stand	statis	ἵστατε	stat	t'istata	histatha
They stand	stant	ἵσταντι	stant	t'istanti	histenti

It is impossible, in many of these words, not to recognise the pronouns me, σὺ, it, ἡμεῖς, &c. In all the moods and tenses, the pronouns have been most carefully, and in a great measure successfully traced, in Bopp's *Comparative Grammar*. In many instances, the modification is by a mere change of letter, as was observed above of the pronoun; and this seems to be natural to mankind, because we find it in different languages, and in very various ways, as τὸπτω, τύπω, *capio*, *cepi*—*sing*, *sang*—*man*, *men*, &c., and in the above sentence, "*saw*," the past tense of *see*. The word "says," in the same sentence, differs only from *say* by the addition of a consonant; but this is in reality a modern abbreviation of the word *sayeth*. M. de Brosses, after following the radical sound *cap* through all its developments in the verb *capio*, concludes with a just observation:—"Toute cette composition est l'ouvrage non d'une combinaison reflechie, ni d'une philosophie raisonnée mais d'une metaphysique d'instinct." Now, instinct could never have led men to form a complicated and beautiful system out of sounds altogether unmeaning; but it might easily lead to the gradual combination of known elements, until they formed at length the complete structure of a language.

Adverbs, &c.

436. Of the adverbial termination *ly*, as in the above word "plainly," I have already observed that it is the adjective "*like*"

abbreviated, and agrees with the Gothic *leik*, and many other Teutonic words signifying a body. In the preposition *over*, the particle *er* again appears with a different power; but in all probability derived, as in the former instances, from a pronoun. The same may be said of the terminations *est* in "largest," and *ht* in *height*, the former serving to mark the superlative degree, and the other the idea of *high* applied by a natural transition of meaning to a high land.

Anomalies. 437. There are numerous causes of anomaly in language, which render it more particularly difficult to systematise and explain the minor portions of speech, such as the prepositions, auxiliary verbs, and particles. One of these causes is a mistaken notion of analogies between particular words, where no such analogy exists. Thus our word *further*, which was the comparative of *forth*, has been supposed by many persons to be the comparative of *far*, and has therefore been erroneously written *farther*. A still more striking instance is that of the word *coud*, which we always pronounce properly, but spell *could*, inserting the *l*, without any reason whatever, but that there is an *l* in *would* and *should*. The two latter words are from the Anglo-Saxon *wille* and *sceal*, the former is from the Anglo-Saxon *cwethan;* and was always written in old English *couthe*, *cowthe*, or *coude* :—

That though he had me bete on every bone,
He *couthe* winne agen my love anone. *Chaucer.*

He thowght to taste if he *cowthe*,
And on he put in his mowth. *Sir Cleges.*

Sir, quod this knyght myld of speche,
Wold God I *cowthe* your sonne teche! *Lyfe of Ipomydon.*

Ac he no *couthe* neuer mo
Chese the better of hem to. *Amis and Amiloun.*

Whiche was right displesant to the kyng, but he *coude* nat amende it.
Berners' Froissart, fol. 43.

Another and a more effective cause of anomaly is the love of euphony, or easy pronunciation, which leads the ignorant especially to corrupt words by abbreviations and changes, as *Godild!* for God yelde, *i. e.*, reward him. *Gossip* for god-sib, &c.

Conclusion. 438. Allowing for the obscurities which these and other causes spread over the minor portions of speech, it may fairly be said, that in regard to *particles*, as well as to *words*, the great principle of *transition*, by which significant sounds pass from one class and description of signs into another, has been here established. The noun or verb becoming a particle, and the particle coalescing with another verb or noun, serve to modify their signification, and determine their grammatical use. And finally, we may conclude, that language is throughout a combination of significant sounds, fitted to express thoughts and emotions, as they exist interchangeably in the human mind.

CHAPTER XVI.

OF THE MECHANISM OF SPEECH.

Subject of inquiry.

439. An observation of the late M. Frederick Cuvier, on the actions of animals generally, is in an especial manner applicable to the exercise of the faculty of speech:—"The actions of animals," says he, "are composed of physical acts and intellectual acts, which imply the existence of corresponding faculties. Now since the physical faculties are essentially passive, and depend immediately on the intellectual, and since the former would not manifest themselves to us unless the latter communicated to them their activity, we may conclude that, in order to study animal nature, we should begin with the active faculties, and should endeavour, from a knowledge of these, to appreciate the physical actions."* Such is the course of proceeding which I have adopted. I have hitherto considered the science of language with reference to the faculties of intellect and will, which direct mankind in communicating to each other their thoughts and feelings: it remains to be inquired what are the bodily organs or instruments with which they are furnished by an all-wise Creator for the purpose of such communication, and how these may be used. I intend not here to discuss the effect of looks or gestures, for though they are often more expressive than words, yet as the present treatise has hitherto been confined to the consideration of spoken language, I shall now inquire only into the forms and uses of the organs of speech.

Mode of inquiry.

440. As the subject of inquiry in this part is different from that previously considered, so the mode of conducting that inquiry must be different. I have not now to proceed by deduction from ideas (that is, universal conceptions) to general conceptions, and so to particulars; but I must now proceed by induction from particulars to the less general, and so to the more general, in the manner commonly called Baconian, to which I before alluded. The reader, therefore, is not to expect that he will find in the following pages any conclusions so absolutely certain as those which constitute spiritual or intellectual truths; such, for instance, as the spiritual truth resulting from the beautiful and striking parable of the Pharisee and the Publican, or as the intellectual truth resulting from the 47th proposition of the first book of Euclid. These, when once embraced by an individual mind, can neither be obliterated nor altered: they admit of no confusion or doubt; they impress on the human mind the same conviction now that they did when the one fell from the lips of Christ, and the other was committed to writing by Euclid. It is otherwise with our conceptions of bodily existence; they are at best what Bacon calls

* Annales des Sciences Naturelles, 1839, vol. 12, p. 145.

"axiomata *quasi* generalissima,"* and all that they can promise is the result of a cautious consideration of those particulars which our age, country, and other circumstances, enable us to observe. What doctrines of Aratus or Hipparchus do the astronomers of the present day recognise as adequate explanations of the movements of the heavenly bodies? Strabo was the most eminent geographer of his time; but he did not so much as guess the existence of America, Australasia, or Polynesia. What notion had Dioscorides of the generation of plants; or the acute and perspicacious Hippocrates of the different action of the sensitive and motor nerves?

Inquiry difficult.

441. Not only was a knowledge of the mechanism of speech almost unknown to the ancients, but even in our own day its acquisition is beset with difficulties. The particulars from which its inductions are to be drawn occupy a sphere of vast but uncertain extent. All nations and tribes of men speak articulately, all are μεροπες ανθρωποι; but how far they are capable of uttering the same articulations it is not yet within the compass of probable conjecture to determine. The *Hottentots* and other African tribes are said by Lichtenstein and Salt to produce certain smacking sounds in the mouth, which Europeans cannot imitate; and the Chinese are unable to pronounce our letters *b*, *g*, *d*, *j*, *z*, or *r*; but whether these facts result from a peculiarity in the formation either of the vocal or auditory organs, or whether it be the mere result of a habit acquired in early infancy, our present state of knowledge does not enable us to ascertain.

Observation limited.

442. The range of observations actually made on articulation has been comparatively narrow. Various governments, ancient and modern, have reckoned among their subjects tribes and nations speaking great diversities of language: yet neither Egypt, Assyria, nor Rome, in the height of their power; nor Spain, when she ruled over numerous American tribes; nor Russia, with her long list of Sclavonian, Tartar, and Finnish provinces; nor even England, on whose colonial empire the sun never sets, has attempted to ascertain the diversities of articulation which have been or could be practised within the limits of their respective dominions. In 1815 a singular opportunity presented itself for comparing the articulate sounds used in all parts of Europe, and in a large portion of Asia; for then were assembled in Paris, Cossacks of the Wolga and the Don, Russians and Poles, the Scandinavian Swedes and Danes, Celts of Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and Brittany, Teutons of Northern and Southern Germany, Bohemians and Hungarians, Basques, Catalonians, Castilians and Lusitanians, Greeks from Corfu, Maltese speaking a dialect of Arabic, Jews retaining their ancient Hebrew, Italians, French, and English:—

> Such forces met not, nor so wide a camp,
> When Agrican with all his northern pow'rs
> Besieged Albracia, as romances tell,
> The city of Galaphron——

* Nov. Org. L. 1, aph. 104.

Never before could so many different articulations be compared in sound, and traced to the operation of the organs by which they were respectively produced; and that in the centre of Europe, by the greatest physiologists then existing. But the opportunity was lost, and may never again occur in the history of the world!

Framers of alphabets.

443. Attempts have no doubt been frequently made to reduce the knowledge which men possessed on this subject to system, but hitherto with very partial success. At some period of unknown antiquity alphabetic writing was invented, and it might be supposed that its first inventors had carefully studied the organic powers of human utterance; but their ignorance on this subject is demonstrable. Not only was no alphabet ever invented which expressed all the powers of articulation common to mankind in general; but *there never yet was a perfect alphabet of any language.* As to our own alphabetic system, it is the very worst, in practical application, that ever existed. What can be more absurd than to allot to the combination of the four letters, *o*, *u*, *g*, *h*, the different sounds which we give it in *through*, *dough*, *plough*, *rough*, and *cough*, in no one of which are the proper powers of the single letters retained?

Philologists.

444. If we appeal to the authority of philologists, we obtain but slight and indistinct information. "This subject," says Bishop Wilkins, "has been largely debated by several authors of great name and reputation for learning. Besides those famous Emperors, Caius Cæsar and Octavius Augustus, who both writ on this subject, Varro likewise, and Apion, and Quintilian, and Priscian did bestow much pains upon the same inquiry concerning the just number of letters. And in later times it hath been treated of *with great variety of opinions*, by Erasmus, both the Scaligers, Lipsius, Salmasius, Vossius, J. Matthias, A. Metherchus, B. Malinchot, &c.: besides several of our own countrymen, Sir T. Smith, Bulloker, Alexander Gill, and Dr. Wallis."* Since Wilkins's time many learned men, both here and on the Continent, have pursued the like investigation; but their disputes on the Digamma, the Greek accents, the Masoretic points, and many other such topics, sufficiently show the obscurity still involving all these subjects.

Mechanists.

445. Mechanists of great ingenuity have devoted the labour of years to the production of machines which might imitate the sounds of the human voice; and so far as they have succeeded, they have thrown considerable light on the operations of the natural organs of speech. They have indeed been but little sustained in their exertions either by pecuniary rewards, or by what perhaps they would have estimated more highly, the well-deserved applause of their fellow-men. A machine of this kind, which I much regret to have been prevented by illness and other causes from seeing, but which (as I have heard) evinced in its fabricator great talent, was not long ago

* Real Char. P. 3, c. 10.

exhibited in London, in the same building with a deception called "the Mysterious Lady;" but whilst one person attended the former exhibition, at least twenty flocked to the latter. "Experiments relative to the artificial production of the articulate sounds," says Müller, "have been made by Kratzenstein,† Kempelen,‡ and Mr. R. Willis.§ They have succeeded in imitating a great part of the sounds used in speech; but *these speaking machines are always to a certain extent imperfect*, since every simple and independent sound requires a special apparatus; and the combination of the different kinds of apparatus with a common tube for the supply of air, so as to form words, is exceedingly difficult."§ "Kratzenstein," says Mr. Mayo, "found that by using little tubes of different shapes adapted to an instrument that could produce sound, he could determine different vowel tones. De Kempelen produced vowel sounds by means of an Indian rubber bell similarly adapted, the shape and size of which he altered by the hand. But Mr. Willis's recent investigations are the most satisfactory. He attached to a free reed a tube which was capable, if immediately excited, of producing a determinate note. By altering the length of this tube, the original sound was made to assume the character of different vowels."‖ "De Kempelen succeeded in constructing a speaking machine, which was capable of uttering entire phrases, some of which were, *Vous êtes mon ami—Je vous aime de tout mon coeur—Leopoldus Secundus—Romanorum Imperator*, &c. Mr. Wheatstone has reconstructed this instrument from De Kempelen's description: and I have heard it articulate the words *mamma*, *papa*, *thumb*, *rum*, *summer*, with great precision."¶

Organs of sound.

446. Though a knowledge of the physical faculty of speech has been in no small degree advanced by the labours of the ingenious persons just mentioned, the most accurate information on this subject can only be attained by examination of the vocal organs themselves. Accordingly we find that such examination has been carefully made as well by those who have treated of voice or sound as a branch of natural philosophy, or with particular relation to music, as by those who have considered it as part of the science of physiology. Among the cultivators of natural philosophy who have directed their particular attention to the vocal organs may be reckoned Biot, Caignard de la Tour, Müncke, Savart, &c.: among the writers on music Chladni, and Gottfr. Weber; and among physiologists Haller, Cuvier, Majendie, Mayo, and Müller. When we come to examine the writings of these and other eminent persons who have treated of the vocal organs, we shall perceive not only that they differ in arrangement, and

* Tentamen resolvendi problema ab Acad. Sci. Petropol. 1780.
† Mechanismus der menschlichen Sprache. Vienna, 1791.
‡ Transact. Philos. Soc. Camb. vol. 3.
§ Müller (J.), Elements of Physiol., transl. by W. Baly, 1837, p. 1053.
‖ Mayo, Outlines of Hum. Physiol., 4th ed. 1837, p. 376.
¶ Ibid. p. 378.

in the use of terms, but that there are many important points of fact, on which they are by no means unanimous, and others which they confess require further examination.

Organs of hearing.

447. There is another difficulty which must not be overlooked. Speech is spoken to be heard. The state of the organs of hearing is therefore to be taken into account, as well as that of the organs of speech. It is possible, though perhaps not very probable, that one race of men may be so constituted by nature, as to distinguish by the ear nice shades of articulate sound, which to others are imperceptible. But whether it be owing to this or other causes, certain it is that the inhabitants of whole districts fail to perceive differences of pronunciation, which those of other countries readily observe. In some parts of England individuals confound the aspirated vowels with the unaspirated. In some parts of Germany *b* is confounded with *p*, and *v* with *f*. In Tuscany, the lower classes, and some of superior rank, pronounce *ca* gutturally, as if written χα. These and many like defects of utterance may perhaps be caused either by a malconformation of the ear, or by an habitual inattention to certain minute distinctions of sound, which inattention at length incapacitates the individual for exercising in a correspondent manner his organs of speech. Even the ingenious, and generally accurate Cour de Gebelin describes the English *th* as identical in sound with the French *z*. This must certainly have arisen in him from a natural or habitual inability to perceive a difference, which to English ears, is most obvious.

Written characters.

448. In civilised life another circumstance occurs, which tends to disturb our views of the mechanism of speech. All persons who learn to read, otherwise than as the Chinese or Mantchous do, get the habit of arranging their notions of articulation according to the alphabetic system of their own country. It is only on this ground that I can account for so admirable a physiologist as Professor Müller reckoning the vowel articulations at only five. This was indeed the number of the Latin alphabet; in the English language six are recognised; in the Greek seven; but no one of these divisions rests on any rational foundation. Again, the English differ from all other nations in giving to the vowel character *i* a sound which is really that of a diphthong; and they call *y* a vowel, though it is a mere repetition of *i*, and therefore an entirely superfluous letter. This latter circumstance may indeed be accounted for by events in the history of our written language; but it nevertheless causes great confusion in the science of language; and yet, perhaps, even well-educated persons in England seldom think of the long sound of *i* or *y*, but as of that of a single vowel.


Form of organs.

449. Trusting that the reader will make due allowance for the obstacles which render it difficult to obtain an accurate knowledge of the mechanism of speech, I proceed shortly to state the result of such investigations as I have been able to make on that subject. *Speech* is the human voice rendered more or less articulate; and *voice* is a

species of *sound* produced and modified by certain *organs* of the human frame, usually designated the vocal organs. It will be necessary, therefore, to consider the form and uses of the organs in question, the general laws of sound in relation to them, and those modifications of the voice which we call articulations. In describing the organs, I pretend not to any practical knowledge of anatomy; but I have collected the little information which I possess on that subject from a careful perusal of the accounts given by the authors above mentioned, and especially by Majendie, Mayo, and Muller, assisted, as I have most kindly been, by the suggestions of my old and dearly-valued friend Sir Benjamin Brodie, of whose opinion on a similar subject it has been recently and most truly said, that "from his natural acuteness, his philosophical habits, and his vast experience, no opinion can be more entitled to weight." * Among the numberless instances in which our weak and imperfect intellect is enabled faintly to trace the marks of infinite wisdom in the works of creation, we cannot but be struck with the remark, that whilst contrivances of wonderful art are shown in the formation of organs for the inspiration and expiration of that air which is continually necessary to our vital existence, and for the swallowing of that food which from time to time is no less necessary for our bodily support, several of the very organs which serve both these purposes, contribute also to the faculty of speech, by which man becomes a social being, and is fitted to be an heir of immortality.

Organs arranged.

450. The general arrangement of the principal organs may be understood from the following view of their relative positions :—



Two portions.


451. It may be convenienient to distinguish these organs into two portions; the lower, from the lungs to the lower opening of the pha-

* Quart. Rev. No. 170, p. 371.

rynx, serve principally to produce those modifications of the voice which are independent of articulation, such as time, loudness, and what has been called the *pitch* of the voice, answering to the high and low notes in music; besides which there are some other variations, distinguished partly by the French word *timbre*, and partly by the English words, *tone*, *accent*, &c. The higher organs, including the pharynx, with the nasal and oral passages, contribute to articulation. I shall begin with the lower organs. The lungs receive, by drawing in the breath, a quantity of air, which they return by expiration through the trachea and larynx to the opening called the pharynx, and thence, by the nose and mouth, to the atmosphere. The breath is inspired and expired without sound, unless it be rendered audible by causing certain fine ligaments at the upper opening of the larynx to vibrate; and then the human voice is compared by Müller to "*a musical reed instrument with a double* membranous tongue." *

452. The larynx is bounded at the upper part by the glottis, which has a moveable cover called the epiglottis. "The *sound* of the voice is generated at the glottis, and neither above nor below this point." † "By far the most valuable account of the mechanism of the human larynx which has been published," says Mayo, "is that given by Mr. Willis." ‡ From his Essay the accompanying figure has been taken, representing the cartilages and muscles of the larynx (omitting the cornua and the epiglottis) as seen after dissection, from above. The muscles are here designated by numbers, the cartilages by letters, viz.—

Larynx.



1. The crico-thyroideus (at the rima of the glottis).
2. The thyreo-arytænoideus.
3. The crico-arytænoideus posticus.
4. The crico-arytænoideus lateralis.
5. Half of the arytænoideus transversus and of the obliqui.

A. The thyreoid cartilage.
B. The cricoid.
C. The arytænoids.
F. The vocal or inferior laryngeal ligaments.
H. The ligaments which tie the arytænoids to the cricoid.

* Elem. Physiol. vol. i, p. 1023. † Ibid. p. 1003.
‡ Cambridge Philos. Trans. 1832.

Tabular view.

453. Mr. Willis's tabular view of the action of the muscles of the larynx is as follows:—

Antagonists.	Crico-thyreoidei, stretch the vocal ligaments (1).		Govern the pitch of the notes.
	Thyreo-arytæroidei, relax the vocal ligaments, and put them in vocalising position (2).		
Antagonists.	Crico-arytænoidei postici, open the glottis (3).		Govern the aperture of the glottis.
	Crico-arytænoidei laterales, compress the front part of the arytænoids (4).	Close the glottis.	
	Arytænoidei transversales and obliqui, compress the back part of ditto (5).		

Mr. Mayo thinks, "that for vocalization, the ligaments may acquire a definite tension, joined with contact for their whole length; and that to allow the air to pass without producing a laryngeal sound, the same tension being at the same time maintained, the ligaments may require to be drawn apart, and the *rima glottidis* to be opened at its posterior part." *

Sound.

454. The reed instrument (as Müller calls it), which is formed by this curious adaptation of parts, produces *sound*, according to those laws of acoustic science which have been so fully and clearly explained in Sir John Herschel's able work on that subject. In using the word "sound," however, I must observe a difference between certain words in other languages with which it is sometimes confounded. For instance, the French word *son* has, according to Chladni, three different significations: it expresses—

i. All that we perceive by the sense of hearing.
ii. What we perceive by appreciable vibrations of the air.
iii. What we perceive by the recurrence of vibrations of a definite quickness.

These three significations, says he, answer respectively to the three German words *schall*, *klang*, and *ton*.† The English word *sound*, however, includes at most only the two first of these meanings. It is derived from the Latin *sonus*, which is defined to be "quicquid auribus percipi potest." Now this perception is occasioned, as Diomede says, by a "corporalis collisio;" and every such collision causes certain vibrations of the air, distinguishable according to their duration, or to their force (that is, loudness), or else to a certain proportion of the sounds to each other, in a scale of which the relative portions are called in English high or low, and in French *grave* or *aigu*.

When perceptible.

455. Where this relation is not perceptible to the ear (though the loudness and duration of the sounds may be so in a great degree), we call the sound *noise*, answering to the French word *bruit;* but where the relation is perceptible, it may be best illustrated by the example of an elastic string or chord, stretched between two points A and C,

* Outlines Hum. Physiol. p. 370. † Traité d'Acoustique, p. 5.

thus: A B C. Now if the chord A C be drawn at D its middle point to B, it will form an arc or curve line A B C; and if then let loose, the motion which it has acquired will carry it to D, so as to form an arc A D C, and thence it will be forced back again toward B. Each of these motions is called a vibration, and every vibration giving an impulse to the air produces a sound. The successive vibrations become less and less, till the line rests in its first position. The number of vibrations which occur in a given time determines the pitch of the sound: and the frequency of the vibrations depends on the length of the arc; if short they are frequent, if long they are few. When the arc is long, the sound is what we call *low;* when the arc is short, the sound is what we call *high.* It is obvious that the length of the arc may be increased or diminished either by a minute and imperceptible gradation in the nature of a slide, or else by adding or deducting certain definite and proportional parts; and that the sounds caused by the vibration of those arcs will vary in like manner. The former of these circumstances takes place in ordinary speaking, the latter in singing and in music generally. For the sliding elevations and depressions we have no strictly accurate name, but the definite intervals we call, in music, *notes.* The late Mr. Steele, in an ingenious essay on the measure and melody of speech, endeavoured to reduce the spoken rise and fall of sounds to a sort of musical notation, but with very partial success.

Power of distinguishing.

456. The power of the human ear in distinguishing sounds by the vibrations has certain limits. "In the *gravest* (*i. e.* lowest) sounds perceptible to the human ear, says Chladni, the sonorous body makes at least *thirty* vibrations in a second; and we are able to appreciate *sharp* (*i. e.* high) sounds in which the vibrations are from 8,000 to 12,000 in a second."* Musical notes, it is known, rise by octaves, each of which is produced by double the vibrations of the preceding. "The lowest note of the violoncello has 128 vibrations, the octave next above it 256, the third 512," &c.† The range of the voice seldom exceeds two octaves and a half; Dr. Bennati says his own voice extended to three octaves; so did Zelter's; and Catalani's reached to three and a half.‡ The action of the small muscles which cause these vibrations, is clearly shown in Mr. Willis's tabular statement above quoted; and thus the quality of voice called its pitch, has been fully explained. The *time* of a vocal sound is also susceptible of measure; and the general perception of measure, or, as it is sometimes called, of rhythm, is a source of great part of the pleasure of poetry, and furnishes the rules of prosody, which are commonly deemed a part of grammar. A long or short sound, too, in most languages, serves to distinguish one part of speech from another, and

* Traité d'Acoustique, p. 6. † Ibid. p. 7.

‡ Müller, p. 1031.

one noun from another noun, or one verb from another verb; and in all these respects the *quantity* of a word (as grammarians call it) is material to the understanding of language. Independently of these latter considerations we may observe, that by the combined effect of the pitch of a vocal sound, though wholly inarticulate, with its duration and loudness, human feelings are expressed, in infancy, or in a state of barbarism, or of great excitement. Under such circumstances, the sound forms what Mr. Majendie calls a *cry*, and considers as common to man with brute animals. To connect feeling with conception, recourse must be had to the power of articulation.

Epiglottis.

457. I have stated that the glottis has a moveable cover called the epiglottis. In the act of carrying food from the mouth through the pharynx into the œsophagus for digestion, the larynx is raised, and the epiglottis brought down on it, so as to prevent the food from passing into the glottis. If any extraneous matter which is large passes into the glottis, there is danger of immediate suffocation; if small, it may pass into and lodge in some of the bronchial passages, causing eventual inflammation of the lungs, and in course of time death. If a person imprudently laugh, or attempt to speak, while he is swallowing, or holding any loose substance in his mouth, the escape of air from the lungs lifts up the epiglottis, and one or other of these pernicious consequences may ensue. To a similar cause was owing the remarkable accident of Mr. Brunel, which in a manner still more remarkable, was relieved by the skill of Sir Benjamin Brodie. A half sovereign had remained for some weeks in a part of Mr. Brunel's bronchial tube, when Sir B. Brodie, causing him to be fastened on a board which moved on its centre, reversed the position of his body; and the coin, by its own weight forcing open the glottis, passed into the mouth.

How made articulate.

458. In uttering a vocal sound, the epiglottis being raised, the air passes into the pharynx, which is a large cavity with an opening into the mouth, and another into the nose, and both of these contribute to render the sound articulate. The oral passage is the principal. Through that, the air is capable of passing directly and in an undiverted stream, producing those sounds which the ancients called *vocales*, and we call vowels, or else interrupting the stream, so as to produce what are called consonants. I shall consider these first in their simple, and then in their combined effect.

Vowels.

459. In the production of vowel sounds, the cavity of the mouth is capable of assuming different forms according as it is varied by the action of the throat, palate, tongue, teeth, or lips; and hence follows a correspondent variety in the vocal sounds, the number of which different writers estimate differently. It is true that, theoretically speaking, there can be no precise rule for fixing the possible distinction of vowels at a certain number, because the action of the organs may be indefinitely varied, according to the natural constitution of every human being, at every stage of his existence. All that can well be done in the present state of science, is to adopt such divisions of

vowel sound as are, or have been, in use among those nations whose practice in this respect we are able to ascertain. In this view I have found no statement more reasonable and practical than that of Bishop Wilkins, who says, "There are, I conceive, *eight* simple different species of vowels easily distinguishable whose powers are commonly used. I cannot deny but that some other intermediate sounds might be found, but they would, by reason of their proximity to those others, prove of so difficult distinction as would render them useless."* The eight distinctions of the learned bishop appear to be suitable to the Greek and Latin languages, and the different branches of the Teutonic, Scandinavian, and Celtic, with which I have any acquaintance; how far they may serve to express the vowel sounds of other nations, I pretend not to say. The Bishop expresses them by the following marks—*y*, *α*, a, *e*, *i*, *o*, *w*, *u*. I take them in this order, because the operation of the different organs will thus be best seen, beginning with the sound as it enters from the pharynx, and proceeding gradually to the lips; and I shall explain them (as well as the consonants hereinafter noticed) according to the Bishop's statement, corrected in some important particulars by the suggestions of Sir B. Brodie. It is to be observed that every one of these vowels may be long or short; that is, its pronunciation may occupy a greater or less portion of time, but this does not depend on articulation. The oral cavity continues to retain the same form during the whole utterance, and the time, as has already been shown, is a circumstance depending on the action of the lower organs.

i. *y* is a guttural sound, for which we have no mark in English, but which is expressed in Welsh by this character. It is produced immediately at the emission of air from the throat; the teeth are a little separated, the muscles of the tongue are relaxed, the tip of the tongue is a little below, and the posterior part of the tongue is a little above the level of the teeth; the lips in this (as in all the vowels) are of course open. The long sound is frequent in French, as in *beurre*, *meurtre;* it is less long in English, as in *bird*, *burthen*, and short, as in *but*, *nut*. Being so very simple in its formation, many of our other vowels, when short, degenerate into it; and indeed this circumstance may be almost considered as a characteristic of English pronunciation, especially in rapid speaking, for in such a case the words hon*our*, *of*, fath*er*, *sir*, are pronounced as if they were written hon*yr*, *yv*, fath*yr*, *syr*, &c.

ii. "A" (says Wilkins) "is the most apert amongst the *Lingua-palatal* vowels. 'Tis expressed by this character, because being one of the *Greek* letters it is more commonly known. It is framed by an emission of the breath betwixt the tongue and the palate, the tongue being put into a more concave posture, and removed further off from the palate." Hence the oral aperture is larger than in the preceding vowel *y;* the teeth are separated to a greater distance, the tongue is

* Real Char. P. 3, c. 11.

more depressed, and the surface of it is more flattened. The sound is long as in *all*, *bawl;* or short, as in *poll*, *folly*.

iii. a. The teeth are separated to the same distance as in *ɑ*, the tongue is rendered broader, the tip of the tongue is immediately behind the incisor teeth of the lower jaw; but the rest of the tongue is raised above the level of the grinding teeth, so that the space between the tongue and the bony palate is narrower than in *ɑ*. The sound is long in the French *mâle* and English *half;* it is short in the French *mal* and English *hat*.

iv. *e*. "This vowel" (says Wilkins) "is framed by an emission of the breath between the tongue and the concave of the palate, the upper superficies of the tongue being brought to some small degree of convexity." Add, that the teeth are less separated than in *a*, the tongue is still broader, and the whole is elevated so that it fills the space between the teeth of the upper and lower jaw, leaving only a small space between it and the bony palate. The oral aperture is consequently smaller than in any of the former instances. The sound is long in the French *prêtre*, and English *fate*, and short in the French *trompette* and English *met*. Many persons erroneously give the long sound of this vowel to the first letter in our alphabet, whereas that letter has only such a sound when weakened by *e* after an intervening consonant.

v. *i*. "The vowel" (says Wilkins) "is expressed by this character, because this letter amongst many other nations is already used and pronounced according to the sound which is here intended. It is framed by an emission of the breath betwixt the tongue and the concave of the palate, the upper superficies of the tongue being put into a more convex posture, and thrust up near the palate." Consequently the oral aperture is diminished to its least vocal extent, and the lips and teeth are more nearly closed than in any other vowel. The sound is long in the English *bleed* and French *gîte*, and short in the English *bit*, but seldom so short in any French word.

vi. *o*. This and the two following vowels receive their power principally from the position of the lips. In *o* the tongue and teeth are in the same state as in the pronunciation of *ɑ*; but the lips are contracted into a circle, or nearly so. The sound is long in the English *bone*, and French *trône;* it is short in the French *noble* and English *nobility*.

vii. *w*. "This" (says Wilkins) "is the second of the labial vowels requiring a greater contraction of the lips." Their opening is, in fact, rather elliptical than circular. The tip of the tongue is more elevated and brought a little more forward than in the preceding vowel; the teeth are nearly at the same distance as in *o* and *ɑ*. The sound is long in the English *moon* and French *poule;* and short in the English *pull* and French *voulez*. The character *w* is adopted by me because we have no English character for a sound so common in our own and most other languages; our letter *u* being properly a diphthong.

viii. *u*. This is what Wilkins calls "the *u Gallicum* or whistling *u*."

He says that it cannot be denied to be a distinct simple vowel, but that it is of a laborious and difficult pronunciation to the English and other nations amongst whom it is not used. The sound in French is long in *buse*, and short in *but*. It is quite unknown in English, but the difficulty of acquiring it seems to be exaggerated by Wilkins. The lips must be brought into contact on each side, leaving only a very small aperture in the centre, the tongue and teeth remaining as in the preceding vowel *w*.

In pronouncing any of the vowels, the soft palate is elevated so as to increase the posterior oral, and diminish the posterior nasal aperture. The vowels therefore are always oral sounds; but the nasal sound may be added to any of them by depressing the soft palate, and raising the root of the tongue either before or after the vowel itself is uttered.

460. The consonants are properly to be considered as expressing not different vocal sounds, but merely modifications of vocal sound. Several of the distinctions applied to them by recent writers of eminence appear to me to rest on erroneous principles in this respect; for instance, that of the *strepitus æqualis*, and *strepitus explosivus* of Amman, which is recognised as valid by Müller. The *strepitus æqualis* or continuous sound, ascribed to h, m, n, ng, f, ch, gh, sh, s, r, and l, is merely a continuance of the vowel sound with which these letters happen to be connected; for instance, in "*Rule* Britannia" the continuous sound in *rule* is not that of *R* but of *u*. In "God *save* the King," the continuous sound in save is not that of *s* but of *a*. Other distinctions appear to me liable to other objections; and upon the whole I think the best arrangement of consonants is to take them in the order of the organs by which they are formed, beginning, as I did in the case of the vowels, with those which are formed nearest to the pharynx, and uttered through the oral cavity. Consonants.

In this point of view, the first which presents itself is H, which Müller describes as "a continuous oral sound, with the whole oral canal open." It has been disputed indeed whether it should be called a consonant, or a breathing; but as it really modifies all the vowels, I think it belongs to the class of consonants. Muller's account of it, however, is not satisfactory; or at least it should be added that *h* receives an impulse from the larynx. In the Italian language it formerly prevailed much more than at present. In English it acts an important part, though in some dialects it is often misapplied. H

The next is χ.* "*Gh* and its correspondent *ch*," says Wilkins, "are both of them framed by a vibration of the root or middle of the tongue against the palate, the former being vocal and the other mute. They are each of them of difficult pronunciation; the first is now used by the Irish, and was perhaps heretofore intended by the spelling of those English words right, daughter, &c. Though this kind of sound be now by disuse lost amongst us, the latter of them (ch) is now used among the Welsh, and was perhaps heretofore intended by the Greek χ

* Real Char. P. 3, c. 12.

letter χ."* The account given of it by Professor Müller is more diffuse. He says, the sound which this consonant (*ch*, the Greek χ) has in the German language does not exist in the French, nor in the English, but some of its modifications are met with in the Scotch and Irish dialects. For its production the tongue is applied closely to the palate, and the air is pressed through the small space left between them. There are three modifications of the sound, according to the part of the palate to which the tongue is applied:—

i. In the first modification, the forepart of the tongue is applied to the forepart of the palate, as in pronouncing the German words *lieblich* and *selig*.

ii. In the second the dorsum of the tongue is approximated to the middle of the palate: this sound is very different from the preceding, it is heard in the German words *Tag*, *suchen*, *ach*, &c.

iii. The third modification of this sound is used by the Swiss, Tyrolese, and Dutch: to produce it the dorsum of the tongue approaches the back part of the palate, or the soft palate. The sound exists as *chet* (Hebr.), *cha* (Arab.), and, according to Purkinje, in the Bohemian language.

It would ill become me to dispute the learned Professor's account of these three modifications of a sound, with which he must be so well and I am so little acquainted practically; otherwise I should be inclined to suppose that they might be reduced to two, expressed by *gh* and *ch*, and differing in the manner that I shall consider under G and K.

G K The consonantal powers expressed by G and K in our language are produced, as Wilkins says, "more inwardly by an interception of the breath towards the throat by the middle or root of the tongue."‡ In fact, the tongue is rendered convex and narrow, and the middle of the convex surface is placed in contact with the bony palate, so as completely to interrupt the passage of the air. This position of the organs is the same in both cases, but the former is sounded as g in *gold*, the latter as c in *cold*, which difference is variously described by various writers; some calling g the hard, and c the soft sound, whilst others reverse these designations. Be this as it may, the fact is that there is a certain impulse given by a movement of the larynx to several consonantal positions of the oral organs, which produces a very distinguishable difference in their sound. Hence are produced the several pairs of consonantal positions, as

G C, gold and cold.
D T, do and to.
B P, ball and pall.

* Real Char. P. 3, c. 12. † Elem. Physiol. vol. i, p. 1048.
‡ Real Char. *ut sup.*

V F, vile and file.
S Z, seal and zeal.
Θ and ð, thing and this.
C and J, nation and confusion.

This effect being allowed for, the common position of D and T is as follows, viz.: an appulse or collision of the top of the tongue against the teeth or upper gums, the lips and teeth are a little separated, the voice passing through the mouth is completely interrupted by the margin of the tongue being applied to the inside of the teeth of the upper jaw and margin of the bony palate. D T

In B and P, the breath is intercepted by the complete closure of the lips. B P

V and F. "These letters," says Wilkins, "are formed by a kind of straining or percolation of the breath through a chink between the lower lip and upper teeth with some kind of murmur." The breath is driven with considerable force through the mouth, and the soft palate is elevated. V F

S and Z are framed by an appulse of the tongue toward the upper teeth or gums, and then forcing out the breath with a vocal sound: the tongue, however, is not in actual contact with the incisor teeth. S Z

The Greek Θ is here used for the common *th* in *thing*: and the Saxon ð for the common *th* in *this*. The sounds are produced by applying the tip of the tongue at once to the upper and lower incisor teeth, and then expelling the voice. Θ ð

C J. These characters are adopted, the former C as answering to our *sh* and the German *sch*; and the latter to the French J in *Jean*. We also give these two different sounds to *ti*, as in *nation*, and *si*, as in *confusion* above cited. The sound is produced, as Wilkins says, "by a percolation of the breath betwixt the tongue rendered concave and the teeth both upper and lower." It must be added that the surface of the tongue is raised so as to be everywhere nearly in contact with the bony palate, there being only a very small space left between them. C J

In L the tip of the tongue is loosely applied to the bony palate immediately behind the upper incisor teeth, so as not entirely to interrupt the passage, and the air is allowed to escape on both sides between the edges of the tongue and the bony palate. L

R differs from the preceding in two circumstances—the tongue is applied to the bony palate more posteriorly, and the tip of the tongue being loose, a vibratory motion is given to it. R

All the preceding consonants are oral, I come now to those in which the air passes through the nasal passages. In M the lips are closed nearly as in B; the air passes entirely through the nostrils, but the sound is partly produced by the vibration of the air in the mouth. M

In N the sound is also nasal. In producing it the lips are open, the tongue is applied to the bony palate; the greater part of the air passes through the nose, but a very small portion passes through the mouth. N

ŋ A peculiar character (ex. gr. *ŋy*) seems to be wanted for expressing the last nasal consonant, of which there are two modifications, the first as in the English *song*, the other as in the French *son*. In both the posterior part of the surface of the tongue is applied to the posterior part of the bony palate, so as to prevent the air entirely from entering the mouth; the whole of the sound, therefore, passes through the nose. And so much for the simple powers both of vowels and consonants, forming together the following arrangement:—

Vowels.—Y A a E I O W U.

Consonants,

i. Oral, H X G K D T B P V F S Z Θ ϑ C J L R.

ii. Nasal, M N *ŋy*.

Combinations of vowels.

461. I come now to the combinations, first of vowels, and then of consonants. When two vowel sounds immediately succeed each other, they are either pronounced distinctly and form separate syllables, or else they are melted as it were together, and are then called *diphthongs*, producing a mixed sound in which each vowel may, by a slow pronunciation and an attentive ear be easily distinguished. In particularising these, I must use the alphabetic characters above given, for our own alphabetic system is so extremely absurd that we express the diphthong *yi* by the single letter *i*; the diphthong *wa* by *w*, as a consonant, and *a*, as a vowel; and the single vowel *w* by two vowels *oo*. Diphthongs are most frequently (though not always) composed of such vowels as lie at a distance from each other in the organic arrangement above stated; and the stronger sounded vowel may be either prefixed or suffixed, thus we have as strong prefixes—

yi . I, try, buy.
aɪ . boy.
ai . ay (provincially).
*a*w. in German, blau.
yw. in English, owl.

As strong suffixes:—

iy . young ...*wy* . work.
i*a* . yawn ...*wa* . wall.
ia . yarrow. wa wax.
ie . yellow ...*we* . well.
ii . ye .....*wi* . we.
io . yoke ....*wo* . woe.
iw . you .....*ww* . wood.

Combined consonants.

462. On the combination of consonants some ingenious remarks are made by Dr. Latham. Having distinguished the several couples of consonants by the terms *lene* and *aspirate*, and each of these classes again into *sharp* and *flat*, he observes that certain combinations of them are incapable of being pronounced. Two or more mutes (says he) of different degrees of sharpness and flatness are incapable of coming together in the same syllable. For instance, *b*, *v*, *d*, *g*, *z*, &c., being

flat, and *p*, *f*, *t*, *k*, *s*, &c., being sharp, such combinations as *abt*, *avt*, *apd*, *afd*, *agt*, *akd*, *atz*, *ads*, &c., are unpronounceable."* Again: "Certain sounds, in combination with others, have a tendency to undergo changes."† Once more: letters are often inserted for euphony. "In English the form which the Latin word *numerus* takes is *number*, in French *nombre*. The *b* makes no part of the original word, but has been inserted for the sake of euphony."‡ I would add that different nations seem to have a taste for different combinations. In most cases where the English use *st*, the Germans, though they use it in spelling, alter it in pronunciation. Our *stand* is written by them *stehen*, but pronounced *shtehen*. These and similar remarks will be found very useful in the historical investigation of language.

Quantity

463. Words are distinguished by grammarians, not only according to articulation, but also according to quantity and accent. *Quantity* regards the time employed in utterance, and the term is generally applied to the relative time employed in uttering the different portions of words, the rules for which constitute prosody, and are more especially referable to poetry in the classical languages. These rules are well known: it is known, for instance, that a vowel followed by two consonants must form a long syllable, because the action of the muscles necessary to produce so complicated a vocal sound must require a longer time than if the movement were more simple. But the actual effect on the ear produced to a Greek or Roman hearer, as part of the pleasure of poetry, cannot be clearly perceived by a modern reader.

Accent.

464. Something of the same uncertainty hangs over the doctrine of *Accent* as applied to a comparison between the living and dead languages. The subject has been learnedly investigated, § but without leading to a very satisfactory result. The rules for the use of accents in the Greek language are well known; but the real effect of those accents on the pronunciation of vocal sounds in the classical ages is very uncertain. English poetry is said to be regulated by accent; but accent, in this sense, applies rather to the force with which a syllable is pronounced, than to that elevation or depression of voice on which the ancient accents are supposed to depend. This part of my subject, however, will be more conveniently discussed hereafter. For the present, enough has been said on the mechanism of speech.

* English language, s. 76.
† Ibid. s. 77.
‡ Ibid. s. 83.
§ Foster on Accent and Quantity.

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PURE SCIENCES.

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FORMAL SCIENCES.

Philosophy of Language.
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Rhetoric.
Mathematics:—
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- Analytical Geometry.
- Conic Sections.
- Differential and Integral Calculus.
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- Calculus of Finite Differences.
- Calculus of Functions.
- Theory of Probabilities.
- Definite Integrals.

SECTION II.

REAL SCIENCES.

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Law:—
- General Principles of Law
- Roman Law.
- English Law—
  - Laws of England.
  - Laws of Ireland.
  - Laws of Scotland.
  - Colonial Law.
- Canon Law.

Politics:—
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  - Diplomacy.
- Political Philosophy—
  - Statistics.
- Political Economy—
  - Commerce.

Theology:—
- Natural Theology.
- Evidences of Revelation.
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  - Biblical Literature.
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  - Religions and Religious Customs.

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- Numismatics.
- Poetry.
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SECTION IV.

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- Chemical Arts.

SECTION V.

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Inanimate:—
- Crystallography.
- Mineralogy.
- Geology.

Insentient:—
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Animate:—
- Zoology.
- Physiology.
- Comparative Anatomy.

Vertebrals:
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- Reptiles.
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Invertebrals:
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- Chronology.
- Chronological Tables.

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- Sacred History.
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- Greek Literature.
- Greek Philosophy and Art.
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- Roman Philosophy.
- Classical Antiquities.
- Heathen Mythology.

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- The Christian Church.
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- Ottoman Empire.
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