


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[Combat of Romans and Gauls. From the Column of Trajan.—*G. F. Sargent.*]

CHAPTER I.

ANCIENT GAUL.

FROM B.C. 600 TO B.C. 50.

B.C. 50.

Difficulties of tracing the descent of ancient nations, especially in the western world.

IN tracing the origin of ancient nations, great difficulties present themselves to the historian, not only from the want of authentic records and permanent documents in the earlier ages, but from the irregular manner in which population took place, and the erroneous maxims which have been founded upon insufficient premises and inconclusive evidence. The antiquity of many European nations has been called in question, and the existence of a prior race has been hastily assumed, on no better ground than the discovery of remains indicating a higher degree of civilization than is known to have prevailed at some subsequent period; whereas the most superficial acquaintance with the habits of colonists, exposed to the hardships and difficulties of a new settlement and an unreclaimed country, teaches us that all the luxuries and refinements, and even the useful arts of life, must, for several generations, undergo a retrograde movement, until the acquisition of plenty and security gives leisure for the cultivation of science and of mechanism. The forefathers of the tribes, which at this day inhabit the wilds of North America, brought with them, from Asia, implements and ornaments, which their descendants have never been able to imitate, and knowledge which has been nearly lost in the confusion of barbarous

B.C. 50. traditions. Nor is it less unskilful to conclude that, because the stream of population flowed westward over Europe from its primitive source, it must necessarily have proceeded in a direct and uniform course without deviations or refluxes; or that the more eastern people are always the more ancient: the fact appears to be that, in the spreading of mankind, distance is less an obstacle than barren soil, or trackless forests, or deep morasses; and that great rivers, and unbroken chains of rocky mountains, form a more insurmountable barrier than seas. And it should not be forgotten that, if the tribes which migrated from the east frequently drove onward recent settlers, and possessed themselves of their lands, they were also sometimes defeated in the attempt, and obliged to turn aside and seek a home elsewhere; and that sometimes also the dispossessed people, instead of moving westward in search of unappropriated countries, turned back toward the land of their fathers, and gained a settlement by force of arms.

Ancient Gaul peopled before Germany.

Thus it is highly probable that Ancient Gaul was peopled before Germany, and by an elder branch of that great Cushite family,[1] which has everywhere asserted its superiority over the other families of the earth. For Germany, which, from its deep and rapid rivers, subject to violent inundations, its impenetrable forests, and severe climate, offered little inducement to attempt a passage through it, appears to have been at length occupied by a colony of Sacæ, or Saxons,[2] distinguished by personal peculiarities which they still retain, and by detachments of Getæ, or Goths, who were expelled from some earlier settlement. But Gaul was, in the first instance, peopled from Italy or Sicily, and by sea; and its first inhabitants were of the more ancient race of Celts, supposed to have been Cimbri, or Cimmerii,[3] driven from their original abode by an irruption of the Scythians, and wandering over Europe in search of a new and undisputed home.

Uncertainty of chronology.

The date of this migration is extremely uncertain. Homer mentions Cimmerians, who possessed Scythia, before the irruption of the Scythæ, though of the Scythians themselves he gives no account; and this silence tends to confirm the assertion of Herodotus, that the invasion of these redoubted warriors was posterior by some centuries to the siege of Troy. Sir William Jones[4] has shown that Europe was probably not peopled at all till from twelve to fifteen centuries before the Christian era; and all traditions of an earlier date, such as that the Umbri,[5] a people of Gaul, invaded Italy in the year

[1] See Faber's *Origin of Pagan Idolatry*, vol. ii. Jones's (Sir Wm.) Works, vol. i. Camden's *Geog.* Cumberland's *Origines Gentium.* Hale's *Origin of Mankind, passim.*

[2] Σακαι γενιᾳ Σκύθαι.—Chœrilus.

[3] Herodotus, *Melpomene.* Diod. Sic. lib. ii. and *Saggio sulla storia de' antichi popoli d'Italia.*

[4] Works, vol. i.

[5] Isidor. *Orig.* ix. 2. Herodot. i. Dion Halicarn. i. 1.

B.C. 1912 (about four centuries and an half only), and that they sent colonies into Spain[1] about two hundred and fifty years later, must be considered either as erroneous in point of time, or as altogether fabulous. B.C. 50.

But whatever obscurity hangs over the route by which the Celts arrived in Gaul, or the order in which they settled themselves, there exists no doubt respecting the purity of their Celtic origin, since they were remarkably distinguished from their German neighbours by customs which bespeak another root.

It would, however, be vain to expect any thing like uniformity in the testimonies of ancient history to this faint outline of their origin. On the contrary, nothing can be more loose, and even contradictory, than the language of most authors on these subjects. The Germans, and all the nations of western Europe, are not unfrequently included under the indefinite appellation of Celts; while the Gauls and Celts are mentioned by the same writer,[2] sometimes as distinct races, and sometimes as identified with each other. But Cæsar,[3] and the Latin authorities who have followed him, all agree with Strabo[4] in affirming the Rhine to be the eastern boundary of the Celts, whom he[5] repeatedly distinguishes from the German race in the most marked manner. Celtic origin of the Gauls.

The vast and fertile country occupied by the Celts was at that time, like many other parts of Europe, subject to frequent overflowings of its rivers, apparently succeeded, in some instances, by irruptions of the sea; and many of those fine alluvial plains,[6] which now form the most beautiful, as well as the richest portion of France, were at that period either immense shallow lakes, or deep marshes, which rendered the communication between the settlers in different parts of the country often difficult and dangerous. Hence arose, in very early times, but at what precise period is not known, a division of the nation into three great heads of Aquitanian, Celtic, and Belgic Gauls, occupying respectively the southern, midland, and northern regions of France;[7] and these seem again to have been subdivided into an infinite number of small independent States, governed by their own magistrates, and united only by a species of federal union, resembling the Amphictyonic system of Greece. The form of government, in the little Republics, was strictly Aristocratical; the whole power and property of the State being lodged in the hands of the Priests and of the Nobles, among whom the Chief was dignified with the title of Divisions of ancient Gaul.

[1] Strabo, ii. iv. Plin. iii. 1. From the mixture of Celts and Iberians is said to have sprung the race of Celtiberians. Lucan, *Phars.* iv. 8.

[2] Viz. Dion Cassius, Appian, Suidas, &c.

[3] *De Bello Gallico.*

[4] Lib. iii. et iv.

[5] Lib. i. ii. et vii.

[6] Considerable tracts of country in France are to this day preserved from inundations by embankments. In Touraine the Loire is above the level of the adjoining valleys for forty miles together.

[7] Amm. Marcell. lib. xv. c. 11. Cæsar, *Bell. Gall.* lib. i. c. 1.

B.C. 50. King; and his office, which was simply that of President of the Council in peace, and General in war, was, in most instances, elective; though, in some cases, it was hereditary.[1] The practice of choosing a Chief or President extended itself throughout all the ramifications of Gallic society, and formed a feature, not only in the Constitutions of the separate Republics, but in every hamlet, and even in each family; and Cæsar[2] is probably right in supposing it to be the original or patriarchal form of government among mankind; although, in its first institution, it was necessarily hereditary, and became elective only in consequence of a supposed equality of right among several claimants. As an individual was chosen to preside over each Republic, so, in the general assembly of the States, one powerful and distinguished people, assuming to be the elder branch of the great family, was selected to take precedence of the rest; and the contest for this precedence[3] gave rise in Gaul, as in Greece, to the most mischievous jealousies and intrigues among those greater States which were ambitious of the distinction, and among the smaller Republics which espoused their cause, and depended on their protection.

Congress of the States.

The great Council or Diet of the States was not held at any stated period, but was called only in the event of a war or other public danger threatening the whole community, and consisted of deputies from each of the Republics. The assemblies, which were summoned on less important occasions, comprised all the Nobles of the States interested in the discussion; whose punctual attendance was ensured by a law inflicting death upon him who should be last at the place of meeting: they were called together by the sound of a kind of rude trumpet, and came armed to the conference. The custom of holding these assemblies in the open air was continued down to a late period.[4]

Notwithstanding the pains which some modern authors[5] have taken to make it appear that the people had great power allowed them by these institutions, it is perfectly clear that the populace, in all the States, were entirely excluded from any share in the government, and from the Councils of all kinds,[6] and that the Nobles alone formed those Parliaments which have been represented as savouring of democracy. In no country was the ascendency of the privileged orders more complete, nor the subserviency of their vassals more unqualified. The Nobles, whom Cæsar calls Knights, from their appearing generally on horseback, were distinguished by the number

[1] Cæsar, *Bell. Gall.* lib. vi. 13. [2] *Bell. Gall.* vi. 11.

[3] Ibid. i. 31. Strabo, iv.

[4] *Bell. Gall.* v. 56. vi. 13. vii. 21. Liv. xxi. 20. Strabo, iv.

[5] *Hist. des Gaulois*, vol. iii. *et passim*, &c. *Introd. to Ll. Hêm*, p. 54, &c.

[6] It is summoned to no council, and it hears nothing—*nihil audit, et nullo adhibetur consilio.* Cæs. *Bell. Gall.* vi. 13.—They have all the same powers over these that masters have over their slaves—*in hos eadem omnia sunt jura quæ dominis in servos.*

of their retainers, whom they called their clan, and who followed B.C. 50.
them to the field on foot, armed in an inferior manner; and the only check[1] to the arbitrary exercise of their power over these clients was the facility which they enjoyed of gaining admission into the train of some other Chief, whenever they became discontented with their own. The devotion of the retainers to their patron[2] was, however, generally such as to warrant the conclusion that their rights were respected, and that their happiness was consulted; for many instances are on record of an attachment to the feudal Chieftain, which surpasses the most superstitious sense of duty.

But the most remarkable part of the Celtic constitution was the Ecclesiastical Nobility (generally known by the name of Druids, derived from the Celtic *dĕru*,[3] an oak), who were held in the highest veneration, and enjoyed the most ample power and privileges. They were divided, like all ancient hierarchies, into three distinct orders, and bore a resemblance, universally acknowledged though variously accounted for, to the Persian magi, and to the other forms of Oriental priesthood, which emanated from the same source. The highest order, which had the government and superintendence of the rest, were styled, by way of eminence, the Druids; the second class were called the Bards, and were principally employed in the task of public instruction, which, to assist the memory, was, for the most part, conveyed in verse, and consisted of a Genesis,[4] or account of the origin of gods and men; moral and religious doctrines and traditions; and histories. The lowest description of divines were called Euvates, or Battics, whose office it was to deliver the responses of the oracles, and to attend upon the people who consulted them. These are the original divisions of Druidism, as said to have been instituted by Samothes, or Semnothes, brother to Gomer, the son of Japhet, to whom some authors[5] have endeavoured to trace the Celtic



[Druids. After Fairholt.—*G. F. Sargent.*]

Origin of

[1] *Plebes péne servorum loco habetur*—the common people are considered in the light of slaves. Cæsar, ibid.

[2] Polyb. ii. Nichol. Damasc. *apud Athen.* vi. 13.

[3] The *e* is pronounced very short like the Hebrew letter *Sceva*. Gr. Δρῦς.

[4] All ancient nations appear to have had their Genesis in verse. Herodotus mentions that the ancient Persians used to chant a Theogony at their sacrifices. *Clio* 132. And the *Theogony* of Hesiod is evidently a compilation from older poems of the same kind.


[5] Camden, *Geog.*

B.C. 50. family; the other distinctions which prevailed among them were of a later date, and arose from their intercourse with the Greeks and Romans.[1]

"The *first* order of the Nobility, according to Cæsar,[2] was that of Priesthood; the Military Nobles occupying the second rank."[3] To the Druids was intrusted, not merely the whole dispensation of religious rites and ceremonies, but the education of youth and the administration of justice, which they enforced by holding over the laity the tremendous power of excommunication, by which the offender was excluded from all society, and deprived of the protection of the laws.

Druidical Orders.

The highest order of Druids enjoyed vast revenues, and are said to have lived in great splendour; "their palaces exceeded in magnificence and extent those of the Kings themselves, and they received the homage of the people seated on golden thrones."[4] They



[Druidical Ornaments.]

1. Ivory Bracelet.
2. Incense Cup.
3. Amber Necklace.
4. Gold Boxes.
5. Gold Armlet.
6. Bronze Breast Ornament.
7. Hook for the Mistletoe.

were exempt from all personal service in war, as well as from any share in the public burdens; and their sanction was requisite to every undertaking, civil or military.[5] They formed a Cabinet Council, without whose advice the King could not conclude either peace or war; nor was his election complete till he had received consecration at their hands. Their Supreme Court of Appeal, the *jus ultimum* of the Celts, was held in a spot between the Seine and the Loire, where those rivers approach nearest to each other, which was supposed to be the centre of Gaul; and the President had the title of Arch-Druid, with many important rights and powers relating to the regulation of ecclesiastical affairs.

Female Druids.

The female Druids were also divided into three classes, differing in the degrees of their supposed sanctity. The most austere bound

[1] *Rel. des Gaul.* p. 388. [2] *Loc. cit.*

[3] The Royal Family wore seven stripes in their robes, the Druids six, the secular Nobles five. Toland, *Hist.*

[4] This description seems as if borrowed from some of their own poetry. Dion Chrysostem, *de Recus.*

[5] Tacit. *Ann.* xiv. 30.

themselves to a life of strict celibacy, and devoted themselves entirely to divine services; those of the second order were permitted to enter into the state of matrimony, but simply with a view to raising up children; they met their husbands only once in the year, and spent the rest of their time in attendance at the temples; the last sort, who were not held in any high estimation, lived wholly with their families, and are not distinguishable from other women. It was from the first class only that the *Fatidicæ*, or inspired prophetesses, were selected.[1] B.C. 50.

The education of youth consisted of two distinct branches. The Druids kept public schools for the instruction of all the children of the nobility, and the course of learning there taught was considered an indispensable qualification for every public station. But the education for those who were designed to become members of the order, was conducted with the greatest pains and secrecy. The disciples were kept apart from all other society for twenty years, and were compelled every year to learn a thousand verses from the lips of their teacher (for they were not permitted to be written), so that, at the end of their term, they were required to repeat perfectly the whole twenty thousand: the discipline was extremely severe; and, during the whole course of their education, all intercourse with their parents was strictly forbidden.[2] Education.

Of the extent of knowledge among the Druids it is difficult to form any very satisfactory conjecture, since few records remain of their early literature. But there seems reason to conclude that, previous to their intercourse with the Greeks, whose alphabet they adopted, their science was confined within the limits which it had attained in the East before their emigration. Their computation of time and their knowledge of astronomy[3] were purely Chaldean; their botany was merely experimental, and mixed up with superstitious opinions, strongly resembling those which are so beautifully recorded in the *Georgics* of Virgil, and which may be traced through Sicily and Greece to the same Oriental origin. Much has been said of their skill in anatomy, which their human sacrifices gave them an opportunity of studying to singular advantage;[4] but if it be true that they attained some theoretical knowledge of the human frame, it did not produce any considerable skill in the practice of surgery. Learning.

Their moral doctrines were such as generally prevail in a barbarous state of society: they taught their disciples to be faithful, obedient, honourable, just, and brave; but they permitted them, at the same time, to be rapacious, sensual, and cruel; they preserved peace and good order within the pale of their own clan, but added the most savage horrors to the miseries of war. They held, most devotedly, the Morality and doctrine.

[1] Borlase, *Antiq. Corn.* xi.
[2] Gollut, *Mem.* xxviii.
[3] See Livy, lib. xliv. 37. Cæsar, *Bell. Gall.* lib. vi. Pomp. Mela, iii. 2.
[4] Galtruch, *Poet. Hist.* iii. 4.

B.C. 50. immortality of the soul; and they seem also to have entertained a belief of the reappearance of distinguished persons after a certain period,[1] similar to the doctrine of the Budhists,[2] which has been mistaken by several writers for the Pythagorean transmigration;[3] but the great mass of mankind were thought to depart, after life, into an intermediate state, a sort of *Crepusculum Deorum*,[4] in which they were to continue till the general conflagration of the universe; from the ruins of which a new creation was to arise out of the sea, when the brave and the virtuous should enjoy perfect bliss, and the wicked and fearful should undergo eternal punishment. But although this simple belief prevailed among the Druids themselves, especially before their intercourse with the Romans, yet, in delivering their doctrines to the laity, they involved them in that mysterious veil of allegorical mythology to which Pagan idolatry and superstition have been uniformly indebted for their origin.

Their Gods. The Deities which they worshipped were, as Cæsar has remarked, much the same with those venerated by other heathen nations;[5] that is to say, they had, in common with the rest of mankind, exaggerated the reverence in which they held their ancestors, till it had become idolatry; and they had, at the same time, deified the heavenly host, and particularly the sun and moon. These gods had so many names, and appeared in so many characters, that the best authors are not perfectly agreed in the accounts which they give of them; and the difficulty is greatly increased by the gradual, but not uniform, progress of superstition, which has occasioned numerous contradictions among the Druids themselves, in different ages and countries. Cæsar, who, from his intimacy with the Archdruid Divitiacus, possessed the most authentic and ample information on this subject, represents the religion of Gaul as existing in a more ripened state of Polytheism than we find it to have been in Britain at a later period; and it is not probable that the tenets of the early settlers in Gaul should be gathered more accurately from other sources than from his luminous *Commentaries*. The names most celebrated among them were Teutates,[6] the Taautes, Thaut, or Theut, of eastern Europe, sometimes called Mercurius-Teutates, Hesus,[7] Belenus,[8] Taranis,[9] Minerva,[10] Dis,[11] and Hercules.[12] They had, beside these, a vast number of inferior divinities, things as well as persons, which they regarded with a religious veneration. They worshipped, or at least paid

[1] Faber, *Origin Pagan Idol.* vol. iii. [2] Maurice, *Ind. Ant.* &c.
[3] Twilight of the Gods.
[4] Val. Max. ii. 6. Cæsar, *Bell. Gall.* vi. Diod. Sic. v.
[5] *De his (Dis majoribus) eandem* feré *quam reliquæ gentes habent opinionem.* Cæsar, *ibid.*
[6] Cæsar, *Bell. Gall.* vi. 17. Lactantius, i. 21. Lucan, *Phars.* i. 445.
[7] Cæs. ibid. Flor. ii. 4. [8] Cæs. ibid.
[9] Id. Ibid. [10] Polyb. ii.
[11] Cæs. vi. 18. Tacitus, *German.* ii. Strabo, iii. *et* x.
[12] Amm. Marcell. xv. 9.

extraordinary honours to, lakes and mountains.[1] Groves of oaks are supposed to have been their first temples. Indeed, many learned writers[2] have maintained an opinion that the early Druids in Gaul had no other places of worship than the sacred groves, and the lakes in which they administered the initiatory rite of immersion. But however the Druids might have contented themselves with natural temples for a few years, whilst they had no settled residence, it has been shown[3] that, even during this period, they carried with them portable arks or tabernacles enclosing the arcana of their religion; and no sooner had they obtained a permanent establishment than they incurred incalculable labour and expense in the erection of those vast masses of rock, which have raised the admiration of all succeeding ages, and which have been distinctly ranged in three classes.[4] The simple round or octagonal temples of *unhewn* stone;[5] B.C. 50. Their places of worship.



[Stonehenge.—*G. F. Sargent.*]

those which were enclosed in the form of a serpent, and have received the technical appellation of *Dracontia;* and those which are called alate temples. These, and all other Celtic places of worship, were, by the principles of their superstition, open at top to the view of the heavens.

Among their religious rites, we read of the expressive ceremony of baptism; a sacrament of bread and wine;[6] an extraordinary reverence paid to the egg of the serpent, to the leaves and acorns of the oak,[7] and, above all, to the mistletoe, which was cut off from the parent tree with a golden knife, never used for any other purpose, received by a Druid with his hand covered and his face averted, and Their worship.

[1] Borlase, *Antiq. Corn.* c. 16.
[2] Keysler, *Antiq. Septent.*
[3] Faber, *Origin of Pagan Idolatry*, vol. ii.
[4] See Dr. Stukely's *Abery.* pp. 8, 9, 97, *et passim.*
[5] βάθρον τοὐ' ἀσπίσαρνον. *Œd. Col.* 101. cf. Exod. xx. 25.
[6] Plin. xxiv. 11.
[7] Ibid. xvi. 44.

B.C. 50. conveyed to the temple, with great rejoicings, in a car drawn by two white heifers which had never been yoked;[1] an opinion that bloody sacrifices were essential to the expiation of offences,[2] and a custom of sprinkling them with salt, flour, and incense;[3] the horrid practice of human sacrifices, and of sprinkling the blood of the victims to atone for the shedding of blood:[4] of these, with many other rites and doctrines, a full detail and examination would belong more properly to an express treatise on the subject than to the present brief outline of the early History of Gaul.

General character of the Gauls.

The people in general, of all classes, were distinguished by the loftiness and symmetry of their figures[5] (which Cæsar attributes to their simple but nourishing diet, and to their active life in the open air), as well as by their strength, hardihood, and courage;[6] nor were the women excluded from those pursuits which tend to harden the frame and brace the animal spirits. The beauty of their complexions has been celebrated by poets as well as by historians,[7] and has, in all ages, formed a striking characteristic of the Celtic race, who are everywhere recognised by their white skins,[8] auburn or red hair,[9] blue but fiery eyes, and harsh loud voices.[10] But though the Gauls were undoubtedly robust and brave, they were deficient in that patient endurance of fatigue and danger which constitutes good soldiers; they were, according to Cæsar,[11] lazy and desultory in their labours, and much addicted to sleep; in consequence of which they were inclined to obesity, though corpulency was held disgraceful among them. Their first onset is described as furious, and almost irresistible; but if the enemy happened to sustain or elude it, they could with difficulty be brought to renew the charge, and were easily defeated.[12] Like all savages, they were immoderately fond of fermented liquors, and would barter their most valued possessions to gratify their passion for drunkenness;[13] they appear to have indulged in vainglorious boasting,[14] in violence, cruelty, rapacity, and superstition.

Among their virtues have been reckoned that faithful hospitality and lavish generosity which mark the earlier stages of society, and the address with which they conducted themselves in their negotiations with the most polished nations. But their most celebrated excellence

[1] Numb. xix. 2. Deut. xxi. 3. 1 Sam. vi. 7. [2] Heb. ix. 22.
[3] Toland, *Alex. ab Alex.* xvii. 4.
[4] Numb. xxxv. 33. Strabo, iv. Diod. Sic. Tacit. *Annat.* xiv.
[5] Cæsar, *Bell. Gall.* ii. 30. i. 1. vi. 21. Diod. Sic. iv. v.
[6] Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* liii. Amm. Mercellin. xv. 12.
[7] Virg. *Æn.* viii. 660. Sill. It. iv. 151. Diod. Sic. v. Liv. xxxviii. 17. 21.
[8] Virg. *Æn.* viii. 659. Claudian, *passim.* [9] Lucan, *Phars.* vii. 231.
[10] Livy, v. 37, 38. Diod. Sic. v.
[11] *Bell. Gall.* iii. 19, *et passim.*
[12] Florus, ii. 4. Oros. v. 16. Polyb. iii. Plutarch, *in Crasso.*
[13] Diod. Sic. v. Pliny, xiv. 22.
[14] Dion Cassius, *passim.* Aulus Gellius, ix. 11, 13.

was courage, in which even the softer sex emulated the dauntless intrepidity of the men; and neither extreme youth nor age[1] were considered as exemptions from the toils and dangers of arms. War was indeed their business and their pleasure, the scope of their education, the employment of their lives, the theme of their conversation, their consolation and hope in death; and the right of conquest was by them looked upon as the only title to their lands and possessions of every kind. B.C. 50.

Habits of life among the people.

Their habits of life were extremely simple. Their ordinary habitations, before the founding of Marseilles opened a connection with more polished nations, were little more than rude improvements on, or ruder imitations of, the natural shelter afforded by caves and woods; and even down to a late period they were remarkable for the inartificial construction of their dwellings. Diodorus Siculus,[2] indeed, has asserted that there existed in Gaul cities of a more ancient date than Marseilles; but though there was probably some real foundation for the mythological story, that Hercules built Alisia[3] when he defeated the robber Tauriscus, these early cities must be understood as mere collections of temporary cabins, like the booths of the Scythian Nomades, deserving of mention only as marking the first population of the country. But a greater degree of ingenuity was exercised in the construction of those vast subterranean pits[4] in which they concealed the produce of their precarious agriculture, and which occasionally served as places of retreat for themselves and their families when pressed by a powerful enemy. The care with which air and moisture were excluded, and the art with which the entrances were contrived, rendered them excellent granaries as well as secure hiding-places: some of them are said to exist at the present day,[5] and to be used by the peasants, in certain parts of France, instead of barns, to house the harvest. The Gauls are also thought to have been the inventors of water-mills, which certainly existed in their



[Houses of the Gauls. From the Column of Antonine. *G. F. Sargent.*]

[1] Cæs. *Bell. Gall.* vi. 11. Hirt. *de Bell Gall.* viii. 15 Amm. Marcell. xv. 12.
[2] Lib. iv.
[3] *Al.* Alexia.
[4] Varro, *de re rust.* lvii. lxiii. Columella, i. 6.
[5] *Hist. des Gaulois*, tom. ii. c. 4. p. 289.

B.C. 50. country[1] long before their general introduction into Greece and Italy; but in the early ages of the settlements they were content, like other wild nations, to bruise their corn between two stones rubbed together with the hand. The meal thus produced, together with an abundant supply of milk, game, and fish,[2] rendered the means of life plentiful and easy of attainment, and occasioned that dislike to labour and impatience of privation for which all the Gallic tribes were noted. Instead of salt they made use of charcoal steeped in sea water,[3] with which they cured the flesh of the wild boar and other provisions. They took their meals seated upon the hides of wild beasts[4] stretched along the floor, in the same apartment in which the victuals were dressed, in order that the guests might inspect the process; and it was customary for the younger members of the family to wait at table. The board was raised a little from the ground, and the dishes were of costly materials. The workmanship of the carved wooden drinking bowls is said to have displayed the same sort of curious ingenuity which still distinguishes those in use among the peasants of Norway; but the Gauls who had performed any achievement in war, or in hunting, drank out of the skulls of the slain, or the horns of the Urus, the most formidable object of the chase in their country. The nobles entertained at their tables the second order of Druids, called Bards, who sang, during the repast, Celtic verses in honour of their lineage, and celebrated their warlike exploits. In their public festivities, which appear to have been of frequent occurrence,[5] great attention was paid to place the guests according to their rank; the King, or, in his absence, the first Noble presiding at the board, and every one being served by a henchman, who bore his shield as he stood behind him. The most renowned warrior was entitled to the first cut;[6] and if more than one claimed this honour, the dispute was adjusted on the spot by an appeal to arms. Excessive drinking commonly followed; after which they slept in the open air, or under the shelter of their cabins, with no other bed than a shakedown of straw or of hides. The latter



[Costumes of the Gauls.
From Roman Statues in the Louvre.
G. F. Sargent.]

[1] Ausonius, *Mosell.* 362.

[2] Plin. ix. x. xi. according to whom (ix. 18) they were dainty in their choice of food.

[3] Varro, i. 7. Plin. xxxi. 7.

[4] Diod. Sic. v. Strabo. iv. Livy, xxxiii. 24. Athenæus, iv. 13.

[5] Athenæus, iv. 13.

[6] Ibid. iv. 17.

material, for several ages, formed their only habiliments, until their commerce with other nations taught them to manufacture their wool, and to cultivate both hemp and flax. The principal articles of dress were the *sagum*, or mantle, with or without sleeves, the tunic or vest which was worn under it, the large trousers or trews which came down over the feet, and a fur cap of a conical shape; but the common people went very slightly clad, and barefooted, and the children were naked, or nearly so, at all seasons. The sexes were little distinguished in their clothes; but some of the women wore a long tunic or petticoat which reached to the ankles, and a sort of apron over it, and their bonnets appear sometimes to have been formed with a view to taste and fashion. There are no traces of their having adopted the custom of smearing their skins with paint of various colours; but the women were in the habit of anointing themselves with substances much more offensive.[1] The taste for chains, bracelets, and rings, chiefly of gold, was common to them with other nations; and among the nobles of both sexes these ornaments were worn in great profusion, and were even hung upon the statues of their deities.[2] B.C. 50.

The children were brought up under the most rigid discipline, and were in a condition little better than that of servants, till the males were able to bear arms, and the females became marriageable; after which period the authority of the parents wholly ceased. In bestowing their daughters, they consulted merely the inclination of the parties: the father invited all the suitors to a banquet, to which the daughter was admitted, and he to whom she deigned to hand a cup of water was the successful candidate. Marriage.

The marriage was not celebrated with any religious ceremonies, nor were any forms considered essential to the contract: the father gave his daughter a moderate portion, which, in later ages, the bridegroom settled upon her.


Their funerals[3] were attended with more pomp and circumstance; and were preceded, in the case of persons of rank, by an inquest of the relatives, who reported the probable cause of the death before the interment was permitted to take place; when, if any suspicion arose against the widow, she was burned to death, after suffering the most cruel torments. It has been said that the widow was sometimes consigned to the pile without any verdict against her, simply from a belief that she would thus accompany her husband to the other world: for the same reason, the principal slaves, and even, occasionally, some of the free clansmen, the favourite horses, dogs, and armour, and the other most essential property of the deceased, were burnt with him, whilst the friends who attended threw into the flames such tokens as they wished him to carry with him in Funerals.

[1] *Hist. des Gaulois*, tom. ii. c. 4. p. 309.
[2] Florus, ii. 4.
[3] Cæsar, *de Bello Gall.* vi. 19.

B.C. 50. remembrance of them. The tombs of the ancient Gauls which have been discovered in France,[1] bear witness that combustion was not always thought necessary for these purposes, spurs, bracelets, and other articles having been found in them, which retain no marks of fire. These sepulchres are constructed of huge masses of unhewn rock, upon which grotesque figures of animals are rudely sculptured.

Armour and weapons.

Notwithstanding that war and the chase formed the principal employment of this brave and high-spirited people, it is remarkable that, either from defect of mechanical skill, or from bigoted attachment to the usages of ancient times, they never made any considerable improvement in the manufacture of arms, or in military discipline.[2] Their unwieldy broadswords were so badly tempered



[Weapons of the Gauls.]

1. Flint Spear-head.
2. Flint Arrow-heads.
3. Bronze Knives and Daggers.
4. Bronze Spear-heads.
5. Bronze Axe.
6. Iron Boss for a Shield.

as frequently to become bent in action, so that it was necessary to straighten them again by the foot; and their bucklers were so narrow that the Romans could take aim at the body on each side of them. Besides these, they carried a long spear, or two javelins,[3] and the inferior people were armed with the long-bow and the sling. Some of them used a barbed dart, which Cæsar calls *mataris*, and a short sword curved both ways, with two points, which inflicted a wound difficult of cure. Others carried an iron mace, such as was

[1] Montfaucon, *Ant.* v. 2, &c.

[2] Polyb. ii. *et* iii. Diod. Sic. v. Livy, xxii. 46; xxxviii. 21. Strabo, iv. &c.

[3] Virg. *Æn.* viii. 661. The *sparus* and the poisoned arrows were only used in the chase.

still used in the low countries in the time of Louis XI., and a pole-axe. But, however differing in their offensive weapons, most of the nobles wore the casque, breastplate, and broad belt, which are characteristic of the Celtic warrior. As all this class fought on horseback, the cavalry was always much better appointed than the infantry: each horseman was attended by a small retinue, whose business it was to assist him in the combat, and to carry him from the field when wounded; and so faithfully did these clansmen[1] discharge their duty, that they were frequently all slain round the corpse of their lord. In action the weaker and worse armed troops formed the front rank, in order that they might be restrained from flight by the firmer line which was drawn up in their rear; and, probably, also, that the lives of the common people, which were little valued, might be first sacrificed to the onset of the enemy. Beyond this, they appear to have possessed no tactics, and to have trusted for success to a desperate valour, which preferred death to subjection, and rushed upon danger with furious impetuosity. They bore defeat, when unavoidable, with equanimity, and triumphed in victory with intemperate revelry and riotous debauchery; but there is no fair ground for the supposition, that they ever fed upon the flesh of their enemies. B.C. 50.

Uncertainty respecting the ancient state of Gaul.

That this slight sketch of the habits and manners of the ancient Gauls contains many particulars not accurately synchronizing with each other, is highly probable; for, previous to the time of Cæsar, we have little more than occasional hints respecting the state of the country and the history of its inhabitants; and, at the time when that general became acquainted with them, considerable changes had taken place in their religion and civil polity, in consequence of their intercourse with several neighbouring nations; and these changes, which were effected principally in the southern provinces, and spread gradually into the interior, occasioned differences among the various tribes which are by no means satisfactorily recorded.

Early Emigrations.

But though we have no very distinct information respecting the earliest ages of Gaul, it may be gathered, from intimations scattered through a multitude of authors, that its population increased with more than usual rapidity, and soon began to vent its redundancies in numerous colonies, which established themselves in the north of Spain and Italy, as well as in Germany and in Britain. This last country, according to Camden, they originally peopled; but his opinion is contradicted by the testimony of Cæsar and of Tacitus, and is rendered improbable by the well known fact, that the priests of Gaul looked up to the Druidical colleges in Britain as to their *alma mater*, and recognised the authority of their still higher antiquity. The tendency to emigration was encouraged by the com-

[1] Cæsar calls them *soldurii*, *undè Angl.* soldiers.

B.C. 50. mercial[1] intercourse which was maintained with the Phœnicians, the Etruscans, the Carthaginians, and the Sicilian Greeks, by the tribes on the coast of the Mediterranean sea, and even at a greater distance. And to the same cause may be traced the worship of Isis, as well as other observances and customs of Egyptian origin, which became intermingled with the Druidical superstitions of the southern Gauls. The coast trade was, for a long period, carried on merely by the annual arrival of mercantile vessels, when the raw produce of the country was bartered for such coarse manufactures as suited the rude state of society among the natives; but about the year 600 B.C. a colony of Phocæans,[2] from the shores of Asia Minor, under the conduct of Protis and Simus, landed near the mouth of the Rhone, with the design of settling in Gaul. It happened that, at the moment of their arrival, Nannus, king of the Salii,[3] was about to dispose of his daughter in marriage, and, according to the custom of the country, he had invited to a banquet all who were desirous of his alliance. The strangers were of course admitted to share in his hospitality; and the Princess Gyptis,[4] most unexpectedly, bestowed the cup of water, which was to indicate her preference, upon Protis,[5] who is said to have been remarkably handsome. The king, however unwillingly, adhered to the ancient habits of his race, and bestowed the hand of his daughter upon the adventurous Greek, who soon afterwards built the celebrated city Massilia, (Marseilles,) and made it the emporium of Gallic commerce, and the seat of its early literature and civilization.[6]

Foundation of Marseilles.

The Gauls attempt to destroy it.

B.C. 600. But although Nannus himself remained, as long as he lived, the faithful ally of the new settlers, the Ligures and other neighbouring tribes entertained an extreme jealousy of their designs, and eagerly watched for an opportunity of expelling them from the country. In the figurative style of savages, they declared that a too liberal shepherd[7] had permitted a suppliant wolf to make a kennel in his fold, and to deposit her whelps; but that, when the young should be grown up, the suppliant tone would be changed for menaces and robbery. These apprehensions were shared by the Salii themselves; and, upon the demise of their king, Comanus, his successor, determined to surprise and destroy Marseilles. For this purpose, under pretence of attending at a public festival, a considerable party of Salian warriors introduced themselves into the town, armed after the custom of their country; whilst the king, with a formidable army, lay concealed behind an eminence at a short distance, till night and the confusion and carelessness usual on such occasions,

[1] Polyb. ii. [2] Justin, xliii. *al.* 539 B.C.
[3] *Al.* Salvii vel Salluvii, Gr. Σαλύες, &c.
[4] *Al.* Petta. [5] *Al.* Euxenus.
[6] See *Histoire Littéraire de la France par les Religieux Bénédictins. Dissert. Prélim.* p. 42, &c.
[7] Justin, *loc. cit.*

should favour the attempt. It happened, however, that a young female Gaul, to whom the plot was communicated, had an intrigue with an officer in the Grecian service, and, in order to save her lover from the general massacre which was intended, she acquainted him with the secret. By this timely information the city was saved, the intruders were seized and put to death, and an ambuscade being prepared, Comanus was decoyed into it and slain, with about seven thousand of his troops. B.C. 600.

This narrow escape proved a salutary warning to the Greeks that they must depend for their safety upon their own courage and vigilance; and they immediately set about strengthening their fortifications and improving their armoury: they established a strict police, and rigidly examined all aliens who entered the city; and they applied themselves with great diligence to augment their navy and to extend their commerce. By these means Marseilles soon became a flourishing and powerful colony; and not only repelled repeated attacks of the Gauls, but was also enabled to wrest from them a considerable territory, and to erect several fortified places in its neighbourhood. In a war which ensued with Carthage, the Massilians gained several naval victories, and concluded peace on terms highly favourable to themselves; and they maintained a close alliance with Rome, as well as with the commercial cities in Spain.

Second attempt to destroy Marseilles.

The increasing riches and power of the colony, which had for some time overawed the neighbouring states, no less excited their cupidity, and tempted them to form an extensive confederacy to seize and plunder it, about the same time that a similar attempt was successful under Brennus against Rome.[1] But Catumandus, the chief whom they elected to command the expedition, was unworthy of their choice. The Greeks, alarmed by the formidable force assembled against them, contrived to tamper with him; and he was induced to declare that Minerva had warned him in a dream to desist from the enterprise. The superstitious Gauls immediately offered conditions of peace to the Massilians; and when the ambassadors were admitted into the city, Catumandus affected to recognise in the statue of Minerva the figure who had appeared to him by night. The peace concluded under these auspices appears to have led to something like a friendly intercourse between the parties; and the Gauls, however slowly, began from this period to imbibe something of the civilization of their neighbours, which in process of time spread itself throughout their country, and occasioned that admixture of Grecian arts and superstitions, with Celtic rudeness and Druidical simplicity, which is observable in the description left us by Cæsar. B.C. 588.

At the period of the foundation of Marseilles by the Phocæans,

[1] Justin, *loc cit.*

B.C. 588. Expeditions of the Gauls.

that portion of Gaul[1] particularly called Celtic was united under the powerful tribe of the Bituriges, whose king, Ambigatus,[2] was considered the most warlike and politic of the feudal sovereigns of his time. But, in his old age, finding his numerous and factious nobles averse to the quiet which suited his years, and apprehensive that their discontents might produce serious consequences to his government, he proposed that those who were desirous of a more active life should volunteer to go in search of adventures under his two spirited and enterprising nephews, Bellovesus and Sigovesus. An hundred thousand Celts of various tribes joyfully accepted the proposal, and were divided into two armies under the command of the princes, who, according to the prevalent custom of the age, were determined, respecting the course to be taken, by the flight of birds.[3] Sigovesus, marching towards the Rhine, forced his way through Germany, penetrated the vast Hercinian forests, and finally settling in Hungary, laid the foundation of a power which became in aftertimes so formidable in that part of Europe. But Bellovesus, more fortunate in the lot assigned him by the augurs, assembling the hardy tribes who inhabited the northern part of Gaul,[4] directed his march towards the Alps, of which the tremendous precipices, at first sight, discouraged the equestrian warriors of Normandy, accustomed to rely upon the strength and fleetness of their horses. But while they wandered at the foot of this immense ridge of rocks, they became acquainted with the romantic history of the Phocæans, and learnt their success in repelling the attack of Comanus.[5] This event Bellovesus artfully converted into an omen of future fortune to themselves, and induced his followers to pass the Alps by way of Turin. A battle ensued with the Etruscans near the river Ticinus,[6] in which the Gauls were victorious, and made themselves masters of Insubria, where they founded the city of Mediolanum.[7] The key of Italy was now gained; and a fresh army under the conduct of Elitovius followed the footsteps of Bellovesus, and by his assistance,[8] driving out the Etruscans and the Umbri, (themselves said to be of Gallic origin,) occupied all the north of Italy, which thence obtained the name of Cisalpine Gaul.[9] Other adventurers followed and com-

[1] *Al.* 600, *nonnulli* 622. [2] Vide Liv. v. 34.

[3] Justin. xxiv. 4. Other authorities say 300,000.

[4] Livy states these to have been the Bituriges, Arverni, Senones, Ædui, Ambarri, Carnutes, and Aulerci, v. 34, the greater part of whom disdained to march on foot, and were consequently ill-adapted for crossing the Alps.

[5] Some authors assert that Bellovesus assisted the Greeks; and Plutarch will have it, that the taste which the Gauls obtained of the wines and fruits of Italy, determined them to invade it. (*In Camillo.*) Pliny, xii. 1, hints at something of the same kind. [6] The Tesino. [7] Milan.

[8] The people who followed Elitovius were the Cenomani; the Salluvii, Boii, and Lingones succeeded. Livy, v. 35.

[9] Justin speaks of the numerous cities founded by the Gauls in Italy, xx. 5. But from the account of Livy, *loc. cit.* and from Pliny, iii. 5, and Florus, i. 13, it may rather be inferred that they took them from the Etrurians.

pleted the expulsion of the Italian inhabitants, extending their ravages as far as Clusium, and eventually to Rome itself.[1] For nearly two centuries, however, they appear to have occupied this fine tract of country without profiting by the advantages which it held out for acquiring the arts and habits of civilized life; they retained the wild manners which they brought from their native land, and were only known to their southern neighbours as formidable freebooters, who frequently infested all the states between the Alps and the Apennines, (which latter boundary they do not appear to have crossed,[2]) and whose incursions it was both difficult and dangerous to repel.[3] But about the year B.C. 388, they again began to find their territories too narrow for their still increasing population, and they invaded the demesne of the Clusians, advancing to the walls of the city[4] in great numbers, under the command of a chief whom the Latin writers call Brennus.[5] Their success in this expedition, their capture of Rome, and their final expulsion by Camillus, are related in our History of the Roman Republic.[6]

B.C. 588.

Attack of the Gauls upon Clusium.

B.C. 388.

In that portion of our biography, we have adopted the commonly received account; but in what manner the Gauls really retired from Rome, whether driven away with great slaughter by Camillus whilst debating upon the amount of the ransom,[7] or treacherously massacred by the Romans in a state of intoxication,[8] or whether they returned peaceably with the fruits of their conquest into their own country,[9] are points as yet undecided by any conclusive evidence,[10] and more material to the character of the Romans than to the history of Cisalpine Gaul. It seems probable that the Gauls did not arrive at home in full force; for, excepting a trifling campaign against the Veneti, in which little worthy of notice occurred, we hear nothing of them for twenty years,[11] till their sudden, and, it would appear, unprovoked march upon Rome, B.C. 367, when they were again defeated by the venerable Dictator Camillus with severe loss, and driven into Apulia, in which country they formed an inconsiderable settlement. From this time they continued almost every year to infest Rome, and repeatedly maintained doubtful combats under its very walls with the whole army of the enemy; but at length, having sustained several important defeats, they concluded a treaty, which was observed with little interruption for fifty years; and, during that period, they turned their marauding enterprises against the Venetians and other northern states.

Second attack upon Rome.

B.C. 367.

B.C. 349.

[1] Livy, *loc. cit.*
[2] Ibid.
[3] Florus, i. 13.
[4] Chiusi.
[5] *Brenn* is a Celtic word signifying "*the general.*"
[6] See Life of Camillus, p. 102.
[7] Liv. v. 48, 49.
[8] Polyæn. *Stratag.* viii. 25.
[9] Orosius, ii. 19. Polyb. i. and ii.
[10] See this subject fully and ably discussed in *Hist. des Gaulois*, tom. i. c. 6.
[11] Appian, *de Bello Gallico.* It was in this interval that they entered into an alliance with Dionysius I. of Sicily. Florus. xx. 5.

B.C. 295. Renewal of hostilities.

The riches of Etruria, however, drew them again nearer to Rome; and the Etrurians, an unwarlike race, consented to be plundered both of land and money to purchase an alliance with the invaders; who having, in like manner, engaged the Samnites and the Umbri to make common cause with them, once more declared war against the Romans, and opened the campaign by cutting in pieces a Roman legion near Clusium. So complete was the slaughter, that the consuls were only apprized of their loss on seeing the Senones, who had achieved the exploit, with the heads of the soldiers dangling at their saddle-bows, according to the barbarous mode of triumph usual among the Celtic tribes. The consuls, having manœuvred so as to detach the Etruscan and Umbrian troops, marched to avenge the insult; and a bloody battle ensued with the Gauls and Samnites, in which the impetuosity of Celtic valour appeared once more likely to destroy the rising power of Rome; but the celebrated self-devotion of the Consul Decius turned the fortune of the day, and the invaders were so entirely routed that they made no attempt to renew the contest for more than ten years.



[An Etruscan Priest.—*Winckelmann.*]

Defeat of the Romans. B.C. 284.

After this period they again marched into Tuscany, and laid siege to Aretinum,[1] a colony of Rome. A large army was sent to its relief; but the Senones, taking advantage of an error of the general, fell suddenly upon them, and thirteen thousand Romans, among whom was the consul himself, were left dead upon the field: the number of prisoners also was considerable, and the senate sent legates to treat for their ransom; but the Gauls, declaring that the Romans had too often broken the law of nations to be entitled to its protection, put the legates to death. But the power and the resources of Rome were no longer to be defied with impunity: the Consul Dolabella was despatched to meet the victorious Senones, who were advancing upon Rome, and he not only defeated them in a pitched battle, but pursued them into their own territory, and there built, in the heart of their possessions, the city of Sena, the

[1] Arezzo.

first Roman colony in Cisalpine Gaul. The Boii, alarmed by this encroachment, formed an extensive confederacy of the Celtic tribes to resist the growing dominion of Rome; they were defeated, with their Etruscan allies, near the Vadimonian lake, and compelled to retire. The attempt was renewed in the succeeding year; but the spirit of the Celts was broken, and the Italians had become accustomed to brave their savage arts of intimidation; they were again beaten, and obliged to sue for peace, which fear and necessity, rather than inclination, preserved inviolate for nearly half a century. B.C. 283.

From this period we may date the decline of the Cisalpine Gauls, who were gradually driven to greater distances from the limits of the Roman republic, and forced to retire towards the foot of the Alps; nor had they, for many years, sufficient courage to unite with the various nations who courted their assistance, until the year B.C. 237, when the arrival of a numerous army from Transalpine Gaul infused fresh spirits into their increasing population, and once more tempted them to invade the Roman territory. Whilst they were engaged in the siege of a border town, the two parties quarrelled respecting the division of the expected booty, and the Roman legions which had been sent to oppose them remained quiet spectators of a furious combat between the Italian and Gallic Celts, which ended in the retreat of both to the foot of the Alps.[1] It is probable that this disaster might have produced a longer suspension of hostilities, had not Rome herself provoked a renewal of the war by decreeing to divide the Picene district, which had belonged to the Senones, among the disbanded veterans of her own army. The Cisalpine Gauls were all alarmed at this arbitrary violation of their boundary,[2] and they formed a league to repel it; in which were included two powerful tribes of the Gessatæ, under their respective kings, Congolitanus and Anerastus. The preparations on both sides were made on the largest scale, and the most serious apprehensions were entertained for the fate of Rome, although defended by an army of three hundred thousand men.[3] The Cenomani alone, forgetting their origin, and irritated by the recent dissensions among the Gauls, followed the Roman standard. Reinforcement of Transalpine Gauls. B.C. 237. B.C. 232.

At length the gathered storm moved slowly onwards and advanced into Etruria, where, meeting with no opposition, the Gauls plundered the country and marched upon Clusium. Here they learned that the Roman legions had passed them by another route, and were already far in their rear; upon which they hastily faced about, and returned towards their own country to meet the enemy. The two armies met about sunset, and each prepared for a decisive engagement next morning; but the Gauls, under the able manage- B.C. 225.

[1] Eutropius, iii.

[2] Polyb. ii. Orosius, iv. 13. Diod. Sic. xxv. 3.

[3] *Epitome Livii*, xx.

B.C. 225. ment of Anerastus,[1] deceived the Roman prætor, and, drawing him into an incautious and hasty pursuit, defeated him near Fæsulæ with the loss of six thousand men. Satisfied with this advantage, and with the immense plunder which they had collected, they prudently resolved to march home; and, though the Consul Æmilius hovered on their rear and harassed their foragers, they must have effected their purpose had not the other consul unexpectedly landed on the coast of Pisæ, and thus placed them between two enemies. In the first instance, the fierce courage of the Gauls prevailed over the disadvantage of their situation, and, making head against both armies, they repelled the newly-landed forces, and slew the consul, whose head decorated the saddle-bows of Anerastus; but the steady discipline and superior armour of the Romans was finally successful, and the Gauls were totally routed: the King Congolitanus fell in the battle, and forty thousand Gauls lay dead on the field, ten thousand yielded themselves to the conquerors, and Anerastus himself, disdaining to fall into their hands, having escaped with great difficulty from the scene of action, threw himself upon his own sword. The Roman army, though it had suffered severely from the desperate fierceness of the Celtic cavalry, laid waste the country of the Boii, and returned home laden with spoils.

The strength of the Gauls broken.

The victorious republic determined to pursue its advantages; and, early in the next year, both consuls crossed the Po for the first
B.C. 224. time, and obliged the Boii to submit to the Roman yoke. In the succeeding campaign, the Insubrians and Gessatæ were defeated with a great loss, particularly of prisoners, and were compelled to sue for peace, which was denied them; and Marcellus, in the beginning of the following spring, completed the overthrow of the Cisalpine Gauls at Clastidium, where the king, Viridomarus, fell by the hand of the Roman commander,[2] and Milan itself became the prize of the victor.

B.C. 222. But though the power of resistance was broken, the animosity of the Celts was by no means subdued, and the Romans found it necessary to bridle their incursions by erecting strong fortresses upon the border, and within the territory of the Boii. These measures led to frequent revolts, in which, though occasionally successful, the Gauls continued to lose ground, until the arrival of Hannibal in Italy afforded them a brief respite from Roman encroachments, and an opportunity of avenging themselves upon their ancient enemy the Consul Flaminius, who fell by the hand of Ducarius, an Insubrian nobleman,[3] at the famous battle of Thrasymene.

B.C. 202. Their hopes fell with those of Carthage, in whose disasters they

[1] *Al.* Aneriestes.
[2] Plutarch, *in Marcello.* Val. Max. iii. 2. Virg. *Æn.* vi. *fin.*
[3] Liv. xxii. 6. Silius Italicus calls him a Boian, v. 644.

shared; but, however weakened, they persisted in their system of hostility to the Romans, and took every opportunity of harassing their marches and counteracting their movements, till the more turbulent tribes were either cut off or driven out of Italy; and the others, after being for some years deprived of their arms, became incorporated with the neighbouring states, and entirely subjected to Rome. Some time after this was effected, the Transalpine Gauls made one or two unsuccessful efforts to establish colonies in the north of Italy; but the attempt served only to prove that the time was past for contending with the overwhelming power of Rome. B.C. 202. B.C. 190.

In the meanwhile, during upwards of four hundred years that the Celtic warriors thus maintained themselves in Italy, the descendants of that numerous party who followed Sigovesus through Germany established themselves on the banks of the Danube, and founded the formidable though uncivilized States of Pannonia, which became the scourge of all the neighbouring nations, from their marauding habits, impenetrable fastnesses, and bloody ferocity. They were in some measure repressed by the energetic measures of Philip of Macedon, and were even compelled to sue for terms of accommodation to his son Alexander the Great;[1] but their humiliation was merely temporary; and, in less than thirty years afterwards, we find them invading Greece in two formidable bodies, and spreading terror wherever they marched. The only potentate who showed any disposition to resist the payment of the well-known *black-mail* (demanded by the predatory tribes of Celts, in all parts of the world, and for so many ages), was Ptolemy Ceraunus[2] of Macedon, who fell a victim to the contempt which he evinced for his barbarous enemies, and lost both his army and his life. Sosthenes, who succeeded to his military command, acted with greater prudence; and collecting all the forces which could be mustered in Macedon, obliged the Gauls to retire. But they returned the ensuing year in much greater numbers, and led by a more spirited chief;[3] and, after defeating Sosthenes, who fell in the action, they plundered the whole kingdom of Macedon. Stimulated rather than sated with booty, they advanced into Phocis, their general having a design to seize the immense wealth contained in the temple at Delphi. To animate his troops to so audacious an undertaking, he turned their superstitious scruples into ridicule; and he obviated their more substantial apprehensions by displaying to them the Greek prisoners whom he had taken, and pointing out the disproportion between their slightly-formed limbs, and the lofty stature and personal prowess of the Celt; above all, he painted in glowing colours the accumulated treasures which would enrich all who should share in the enterprise. Notwithstanding these B.C. 324. They invade Greece B.C. 279.

[1] Diod. Sic. xvii. [2] Id. xxii. 3. Justin. xxiv. 4. Polyb. ix.

[3] Belgius and Brennus, which are considered by the Greek and Roman writers as proper names of men, appear rather to be local or official denominations.

B.C. 279. encouragements, twenty thousand of his army refused to march under his command, and, choosing other leaders, sought their fortune in less hazardous exploits. But the main body, eagerly anticipating the rich reward of sacrilege, crossed the Sperchius, where a vain endeavour was made by the Greeks to oppose their progress, and advanced to Heraclea, burning and pillaging every place in their way; but, failing in their attempt upon that town, they marched for the pass of Thermopylæ, in order to pass into Greece. The name of Thermopylæ, however, the scene of their ancient glories, animated the Grecian troops who defended the pass, and the Gauls were repulsed with considerable loss. A similar result attended their efforts, a few days afterwards, to force the passage by Mount Œta; and their general was obliged to detach a division, with orders to ravage, in the most bloody and barbarous manner,[1] the country of the brave defenders of Greece. The scheme perfectly succeeded. The Callian troops, shocked and enraged at the horrors which were passing in Ætolia, left Thermopylæ, to avenge themselves on the marauders, and fought with such desperate and reckless rage, that they fell victims to their own violence. The army of defence being thus weakened, the Gauls, partly by treachery and partly by force, passed into Greece by Mount Œta.

Though ferocious, and sometimes brutal, the Gauls were a religious people; and Apollo was only another name for Belenus,[2] or Belis, the object of their peculiar veneration. Hence, as the siege of Delphi was protracted by the valiant efforts of its small corps of defenders, every trifling incident appalled the courage and smote the conscience of the besiegers: thunder seemed to speak the indignation of heaven; wind and rain appeared weapons of Divine vengeance; the stones rolled down from the heights by the garrison were supposed to be hurled by no human hand; and the Greeks were not slow to take advantage of these frequent panics, which rendered their sallies at once secure to themselves and destructive to the Gauls. At length the general himself was severely wounded, and it was resolved to raise the siege. Such of the sick and wounded as could not be removed preferred death to captivity, and, according to the general practice of their nation, obtained it from the hands of their comrades; the wounded chief himself requested the same boon, but his strength, his courage, and his talents, had proved so serviceable, that his men resolved, at all risks, to carry him with them. He was, however, too proud to survive the complete disappointment of his schemes, and he chose to fall upon his own sword.

Total destruction of the Gauls.

The army, destitute of a leader competent to meet the dangers and difficulties which surrounded them, were harassed and intercepted B.C. 278. on every side by the indignant Greeks, till, of that vast multitude,

[1] Pausanius, *in Phociâ.*

[2] Borlase, *Antiq.* ii. p. 104.

scarce ten thousand reached the camp which they had left near the banks of the Sperchius; and, in their attempt to cross the river, this miserable remnant was cut off to a man.[1] B.C. 278.

The army, which had been left at home by the prudent precaution of their late chief, was no sooner informed of the slaughter of their countrymen than a hasty resolution was taken to avenge their loss. With this intention eighteen thousand men marched into Macedonia, and sent a message to Antigonus Gonatas demanding the payment of tribute. The wily monarch received the heralds with a wanton display of wealth and luxury, and took care that no appearance of vigilance or discipline should be observed in his camp. The cupidity of the Gauls rendered them the easy dupes of this stratagem. They advanced the very next night, expecting to surprise the convivial Greeks, and to carry off all their treasure. They found the camp unguarded, and were proceeding in all the disorder of successful spoil, when the Macedonian troops, drawn up in order of battle, suddenly appeared, and gave them so severe a lesson that they were glad to sue for peace on any terms: and we find them afterwards engaged as mercenaries in the wars which ensued between Pyrrhus king of Epirus and the sovereigns of Macedon and Sparta, until they disgusted their employer by violating the tombs of the ancient kings of Macedon in search of concealed treasures. The Gauls invade Macedonia. B.C. 277. B.C. 272.

It has been considered incredible that, after so many losses, the Gauls should still have had a redundant population, and have been enabled to send out numerous armies. But the wonder, in a great measure, ceases, when it is recollected that this wandering people had no local attachments and few peaceable occupations, and that war and plunder were their business and their pleasure. Their habits of life, too, were such as tended to a rapid increase of numbers, and the destruction of a few thousands was easily replaced by reinforcements from more distant tribes. Colonies of the Gauls.

It was during the period of the severe losses sustained in Macedon and in Greece, that the Gauls planted several of their most flourishing colonies. One division of those who refused to participate in the siege of Delphi are supposed to have settled near the confluence of the Savus with the Danube, where they became formidable under the name of Galli Scordiscæ.[2] Another party, about twenty thousand strong, having chosen Comontorius for their general, marched into Thrace, and, after a variety of successful adventures, made themselves masters of the Propontis, plundered Byzantium, and founded the kingdom of Tylis, so long the oppressor of Thrace. Nor were the

[1] Doubts have been expressed respecting the accuracy of this statement, on the ground that the remnant of the army of Brennus afterwards made a conspicuous figure both in Thrace and in Asia. But the Gauls, who so distinguished themselves, had quitted the main army immediately *before* the attempt upon Delphi, in which they refused to participate. Livy, xxxviii. 16. Polyb. iv.

[2] Livy, xli. 19. Strabo, 7. Florus, iii. 4.

B.C. 272. Found the kingdom of Galatia.

bounds of Europe large enough for their ambition: being invited into Asia in a civil war between two brothers, each of whom pretended to the throne of Bithynia, the ancient race of Celts once more passed into the land of their remote ancestors, and, taking possession of a considerable tract of country between Phrygia and the Euxine sea, became the founders of a kingdom called by the Greeks, in common with the mother country of Gaul, Galatia;[1] which grew, by means of its bold and hardy mercenaries, to be the arbiter of all the neighbouring states, and the disposer of the diadems of Asia: even the monarchs of Syria did not disdain to purchase their protection by the payment of tribute. The first Asiatic prince who resisted these Celtic exactions was Attalus, king of Pergamus. This spirited monarch deprived them of a claim hitherto undisputed, and at the same time of their reputation for invincibility; but his example had little effect upon the effeminate people of the East, over whom Galatia still continued to exercise its accustomed oppressions, when the Romans defeated Antiochus King of Syria in the year B.C. 189. Manlius the Roman general defeated them in several severe actions, and drove them beyond the Halys; but, upon their submission, he restored them their independence, under a stipulation that they should entirely relinquish their marauding habits. This condition, though not long strictly observed, contributed to introduce among them a greater degree of civilization than had hitherto existed in any purely Celtic colony; and in the time of Deiotarus, the well-known ally of Mithridates (B.C. 86), and afterwards of Pompey (B.C. 63), and the client of Cicero, they could no longer be called a barbarous people.



[Attalus I. King of Pergamus.—*Visconti Icon. Grec.*]

B.C. 86.

B.C. 25. Galatia became a Roman province under Augustus (B.C. 25), but long retained many of its national peculiarities, and its Celtic tongue. A variety of smaller colonies sprang up in various parts of Europe, especially along the course of the Danube, and everywhere maintained the same character for courage and ferocity. Their habits of plunder, and promptitude to slaughter, rendered them objects of terror even to the Romans; and their irritability and violence caused

[1] Strabo, xii. Livy, xxxviii. 12. 40. The principal tribes of Galatia, otherwise called Gallogræcia, were the Tectosagæ, the Tolistoboii, and the Trocmi. Smaller divisions of four other tribes joined the colony.

them to be regarded with suspicion and dread whenever they were engaged as mercenaries; nor was their power finally extinguished in Germany till towards the close of the third century. B.C. 25.

Affairs of Gaul.

Whilst the Gauls thus spread the terror of their name throughout Europe, and even in the East, their efforts at home to defend themselves from the ambition of Rome, though displaying at least equal bravery, were not attended with the same good fortune. In the first rencontres which they had with the Roman arms upon their own ground, the tribes which inhabited the Alps sustained three several defeats in defending the gold mines of their native mountains;[1] but, though the Romans succeeded in their immediate object, they effected no permanent settlement in the Gallic territory.

B.C. 166–118.

That important object was first attained in consequence of an embassy from the Massilian Phocæans, who were reduced to the greatest danger by the persevering hostility of the Salii and the Ligures, assisted by some of the neighbouring tribes.[2] The Consul Opimius was immediately despatched into Gaul, where he totally defeated the Salian allies, disarmed the most formidable among them, and assigned a large portion of their territory to the rescued Massilians. Having thus once opened a way for themselves into Transalpine Gaul, the senate only waited for a decent pretext to secure a strong station within it, with a view to more extensive conquests. The next application for relief from the Massilians was eagerly embraced, and two consuls successively avenged their cause by the complete subjugation of the Salii, and at the same time fulfilled the politic views of the senate, by founding a Roman colony at Aquæ Sextiæ,[3] from which they might begin their future operations.

Roman stations in Gaul.

B.C. 123.

No time was lost in availing themselves of the opportunity thus afforded. In the very same year, another consul arrived in Gaul, and finding the Ædui engaged in a feudal war with the Allobroges and the Avernians,[4] he artfully fomented this intestine contest, and, with the genuine policy of his country, contrived to weaken both parties, whilst he affected to espouse the cause of the Ædui. In a battle which ensued with the allies near Vandalium,[5] the Romans boast of having defeated them, with the loss of twenty thousand killed and three thousand prisoners; but in this, as in other cases, considerable allowance should doubtless be made, in the numbers of the slain, for the exaggeration of the conquerors.

The Avernians had given great offence to the senate, by their presumption in sending an ambassador to Rome to intercede for the Salii, nearly the whole of whose territory had been arbitrarily assigned to the Massilians. This personage arrived with a retinue

[1] Livy *Epit.* xlvi. liii. Dion Cass. *Excerpt.* Strabo, iv. Orosius, v. 4, 14.
[2] Polyb. *Excerpt.* cxxxi. cxxxiv. Livy, *Epit.* xlvii.
[3] Aix.
[4] The country is still called Auvergne.
[5] *Hodie* Avignon.

B.C. 121. Expedition of Fabius.

of bards and feudal dependents, and with a pack of hounds in his train; but he found Republican Rome already beginning to arrogate to itself the right of distributing, at pleasure, the dominions of states and princes; and his embassy served only as an excuse, such as it was, to the senate for sending the Consul Q. Fabius Maximus, with thirty thousand men, against Bituitus king of Auvergne, whom he totally defeated; and whom, by means of the basest treachery,[1] he made his prisoner, and exposed in his triumph. Congentiatus, the son of this prince, who shared his captivity, was carefully educated at Rome; and when he was supposed to have entirely lost all his native spirit of royalty, and to have imbibed a slavish submission to Rome, he was sent home to be nominally restored to his father's throne, but to become, in effect, the agent of the senate.

The States of Gaul reduced to Provinces. B.C. 118.

The Romans, meanwhile, had thought fit to grant peace,[2] as they termed it, to the Allobroges, Avernians, and other states in the neighbourhood; in plain language, they had reduced them to the form of a Roman province, which they entitled Gallia Narbonensis,[3] from the metropolis which they erected in it.

Twelve years afterwards, the province was enlarged by the addition of Tolosa,[4] which Cæpio took from the Tectosagæ with a vast treasure, the greater part of which, being in the temple of Minerva, brought upon the consul the guilt and penalty of sacrilege; the vengeance of the goddess, or rather his own conscience, pursued him through life, and "the gold of Tolosa" became a proverb expressive of the disastrous consequences of ill-gotten wealth.[5]

Invasion of the Northern Celts. B. C. 113–109.

The progress of the Romans in reducing Gaul was for a time arrested by a formidable irruption of the Cimmerii or Cimbri and Teutones, families of the purest and most ancient Celtic origin, from the northern regions of Europe. These wild warriors, after defeating the Roman armies with tremendous slaughter in other provinces, turned their victorious arms against Narbonian Gaul, and being eagerly joined by several of the independent Gallic nations,[6] they reduced the province to extreme distress, accumulated an immense booty, routed several Roman armies with prodigious slaughter, encouraged the Gauls to rise upon the republican garrisons, and, for upwards of eleven years, ravaged the whole country without meeting with any effectual resistance, except from the Belgæ, who bravely

[1] Val. Max. ix. 6. The details of the action are so ridiculously exaggerated as to be altogether unworthy of notice. According to the Roman accounts the loss of the victors was *fifteen men*, and that of the vanquished from 120,000 to 200,000! the other particulars mentioned are equally gross.

[2] "*Solitâ clementiâ!*"

[3] Comprehending Provence, Dauphiné, Savoy, and great part of Languedoc. *Narbo Cæsaribus ferax creandis.*

[4] *Hodie* Toulouse.

[5] The amount of the plunder is variously reported; the lowest computation is more than two millions of English money.

[6] The Ambrones, Tigurini, and Tugini.

defended their frontier, and the Celtiberi, who drove them back out of Spain.

At length, however, the senate found a general capable of over- B.C. 50.
coming the invaders in the field, who was restrained by no feelings of humanity from the full execution of their vindictive purposes. Marius defeated, in several bloody battles, the independent Gauls who had joined with the Cimbri, and subsequently the Cimbri themselves; and he followed up his victories by massacres so merciless that several tribes of Gaul became utterly extinct. The numbers thus murdered in cold blood are, as is usual with the Romans, reckoned among the killed in battle; and they were so vast, according to some authors, as to have perceptibly enriched the soil with human blood, and occasioned a great increase of produce. Gaul, thus enfeebled, offered little resistance to the ambition of the Roman Senate. A trifling insurrection of the Salii, ten years after the destruction of the northern hordes, was easily quelled, and answered no better purpose than to afford the conquerors a pretext for farther encroachments, which were still more extended by Pompey during the short period of his command in that country. But, though suppressed, the people were by no means reconciled to their servitude, and were anxiously on the watch for every opportunity of throwing off the yoke. The Servile and Catilinarian wars excited the most lively interest, and for a time gave them some hopes of their emancipation; but the assistance which they ventured to afford the rebels, though it served to prolong the struggle, produced no advantage to themselves.



[Caius Marius.—
Bottari, Museo Capitolino.]

All these circumstances had effected so great a change in the B.C. 76.
relations of Gaul, had so weakened and disorganised the system, and broken the spirit of the native inhabitants, that they were more ready to join with a foreign army to avenge themselves upon each other than to unite in the common cause against the enemies of their independence. This disunion had, in a great measure, been brought about by the intrigues of Rome; and a man was at this juncture sent into Gaul every way qualified to take advantage of it. Cæsar was artful, bold, enterprising, and cautious, of unbounded ambition, restless activity, and unmixed selfishness; restrained by no fear of gods or men, bound by no principles, and subject to no prejudices, his whole powers and all his feelings were concentrated upon one point—his own aggrandizement.

Cæsar takes the command in Gaul.

At the period of his taking the command in Gaul, the Helvetians had for some months been maturing a scheme, first suggested by an

B.C. 59. ambitious but treacherous chief among them, named[1] Orgetorix, who became the victim of his own perfidy, for extending their power by that sort of armed emigration to which the Celts have always manifested a strong propensity. From Helvetia there were only two practicable roads—the one by the bridge of Geneva, through the country of the Allobroges, which presented considerable difficulties; the other a more safe and easy march through the territories of the Sequani. The Helvetians, having burnt their own houses and destroyed their granaries, to leave themselves no hope in the abandonment of their wild enterprise, victualled themselves for three months, and trusting that their movements had escaped observation, took the road to Geneva; but Cæsar had full information of their plans, and had not only destroyed the bridge, but had also fortified the western bank of the Rhone,[2] so that they found it impracticable to force the passage. Disappointed on this side, they turned their course northwards, and, by the intercession of Dumnorix, chief of the Ædui,[3] they with some difficulty obtained permission to pass through the country of the Sequani;[4] and the first use which they made of this indulgence was to plunder the territory of the Ædui, by whose influence they had procured it. Arrived on the banks of the Arar,[5] they consumed three weeks in constructing canoes to cross that deep and sluggish stream, and only three of the four Helvetian clans had passed it when Cæsar suddenly fell upon their rear, and, profiting by their situation, cut to pieces the Tigurini[6] who remained behind. The consternation of the surviving clans was complete, when the next day Cæsar threw a bridge over the stream, and in a few hours performed that which they had failed to complete in so many days.

B.C. 58. But the ancient courage of the Celtic nobility was not extinguished. The whole body of the Roman cavalry was charged and put to the rout by five hundred Helvetian cavaliers; and though Cæsar affects to sneer at the arrogance which they assumed on the occasion, it is clearly to be inferred from his own narrative that he found it prudent to avoid an engagement on equal terms, and to wait for some favourable occasion. Such an opportunity was not long wanted: after a bloody combat, in which skill and science at length prevailed over all the efforts of fierce impetuosity, the Helvetians were defeated with horrible carnage, and the survivors were glad to be permitted to return to their deserted homes as the reputed allies of Rome. The Boii who served in their army were suffered to remain among the Ædui, who willingly recruited their exhausted population with these brave and hardy warriors.

Cæsar profited by his victory to sow jealousy and dissatisfaction

[1] Cæsar, *Bell. Gall.* i. 2, *et seq.*
[2] The remains of these works are still discernible.
[3] Autunois.
[4] Franche Comté.
[5] Saône.
[6] People of Zurich.

among all the most powerful tribes of Gaul; and so artfully did he contrive to tame this haughty and intrepid race, that they began to solicit his assistance against each other, as well as his protection against foreign invaders; and the rest of the summer was employed in repelling a powerful body of German marauders, who, under the conduct of Ariovistus, had spread terror and desolation among the Sequani. B.C. 58. The Helvetians and Ariovistus conquered.

But, though the southern part of Gaul was thus subjugated, the Romans were as yet but little known and less feared among the ruder and more ferocious tribes of the north; and Cæsar was seriously alarmed by the intelligence of an extensive confederacy formed among the Belgians to maintain their independence. These wild tribes, inhabiting vast and nearly trackless forests, had conveyed their families and their property to the small inaccessible islands with which their immense morasses abounded, and were resolved to oppose the progress of the Roman armies to the last man. Nor, though several ages behind southern Gaul in luxury and learning, were they deficient in military skill; Cæsar found all the passes either fortified or broken up, and every obstacle thrown in his way which the most determined resolution, directed by an enlightened uniformity of design, could suggest. But the discipline and the tactics of the Romans had at this period attained their highest perfection; and the only effect of the intrepidity of the Belgians was a slaughter almost incredible. The success of the invaders, however, was by no means unvaried: the Suessones repulsed them in an attempt to storm Noviodunum; and the Nervii,[1] the most savage and formidable of the Belgian clans, fought so desperately, that, on one occasion, the Roman cavalry was totally routed, the legions were exposed to the most imminent hazard, and the star of Cæsar had well nigh set for ever. But, with his usual presence of mind and good fortune, he retrieved the day, and (to adopt his own favourite vaunt), "with his usual clemency," he avenged himself by a massacre of the Nervians, which almost amounted to extermination. Belgic war. B.C. 57.

While Cæsar thus destroyed rather than subdued the unoffending people of Belgium, the various independent tribes, who inhabited the country adjoining the western coast, were, in a similar manner, reduced by his lieutenants; so that, in the short space of two campaigns, he had overrun nearly the whole of Gaul, and so crippled its powers of resistance, that every tribe within the Rhine had submitted, for the present, to the terms which he was pleased to dictate; and even some nations, who lay beyond that river, were induced to avert the dreaded storm by soliciting the alliance of Rome. Some symptoms of independence, however, still lingered among the maritime people of the western coast, whom commerce Subjugation of the northern and western tribes of Gauls. B.C. 57.

[1] People of Cambray.

B.C. 56. had rendered skilful in navigation, and who possessed strong fortresses
Cæsar defeats the Veneti. and a powerful navy. Accordingly, early in the next summer, Cæsar directed his operations against the Veneti, the principal of these tribes, and finding it too arduous an undertaking to reduce them on shore, he resolved to engage them at sea: his usual fortune attending him, a sudden calm, accompanied by a heavy swell, rendered their ships so unmanageable that the Romans destroyed them one by one. He then extended his ravages again into the north, where he met with little effectual opposition, whilst his officers suppressed, without difficulty, the risings of a few malecontents in the south and east, and the conquest of the country appeared so complete that
B.C. 55. Cæsar, after repressing the incursions of the Germans, crossed the sea into Britain.



[Cæsar's Camp at Folkeston.—*From an Original Sketch by G. F. Sargent.*]

From this period the history of the Gauls, as a distinct people, ceases, and Gaul itself becomes a limb of the gigantic Roman Empire. But though subdued, the natives still wore their chains indignantly, and eagerly seized every delusive appearance of an opportunity to burst them. The most audacious of these insurrections was headed by Ambiorix, a chief among the Belgians, who surprised and cut to pieces two divisions of the Roman army, induced the Nervians to join him, and had nearly effected the destruction of the troops under the command of Q. Cicero, when Cæsar, by forced marches, opportunely arrived to their relief. But a much more extensive conspiracy was formed two years afterwards

under Vercingetorix, who seduced into it not only those nations who were alone kept in subjection by force of arms, but several others also, and amongst them the Ædui, who had hitherto submitted with apparent willingness, and had even assisted in extending the conquests of Rome. The extraordinary talents and dauntless intrepidity of Vercingetorix revived for a time the ancient spirit of the Celts, and the fortune of Cæsar himself seemed obscured in the brilliancy of their achievements. The Roman army was compelled to retreat, after sustaining severe losses; and, had the senate then recalled Cæsar, Gaul would have recovered her independence: but that great commander, ever fertile in resources, and accustomed to extricate himself from the most difficult embarrassments, drew his legions with astonishing rapidity out of Germany, marched to meet the insurgents, and, after an obstinately-contested battle, in which he is said to have lost his sword,[1] defeated and drove them into Alisia, the ancient capital of Celtic Gaul.[2] In this strong place Vercingetorix, still at the head of seventy thousand men, defended himself till famine compelled him to surrender. Reduced to the last extremity, the high-minded Celt, arrayed in his gorgeous panoply, and, mounted upon a high-mettled charger, whose port and stature were as lofty as his own, rode out to throw himself upon the boasted clemency and generosity of Cæsar, with whom he had formerly lived on terms of intimacy. So striking was this last exhibition of Gallic military splendour, that Cæsar is said to have trembled at his approach; but, if he felt momentary terror, he avenged himself by ordering Vercingetorix to be seized and ironed, and after dragging him behind his triumphal car at Rome, he caused him to be privately put to death.

B.C. 52. Revolt of Vercingetorix.

Cæsar remained during the ensuing winter in Gaul, and in a short time completed the reduction of the remaining tribes who

End of the revolt B.C. 50.



[Druidical Grove.]

[1] Plutarch, *in Vitâ Cæsaris.*

[2] Burgundy.

B.C. 50 continued in arms after the surrender of Alisia; the dominion of Rome became permanently and peaceably established; and the wealth of Gaul, plundered without remorse and appropriated without scruple, enabled the conqueror to overturn the constitution of his own country.[1]

Having thus taken a preliminary view of ancient Gaul, its various tribes, and their warlike achievements, both in the early ages of Rome and in the subsequent consolidation of the power of that ambitious state, we are now to survey the Gallic tribes, sinking, one after the other, beneath the warlike legions of Cæsar, and the whole region of Gallia reduced to a Roman province. These important events fall strictly under the life of C. Julius Cæsar, whose history, political and military, we now proceed to relate.

[1] It is worthy of notice, that the barbarous hordes of the Celtic race, who inhabited the fastnesses of the Alps, were not subdued by Cæsar. Most of them, however, submitted to Augustus; but a few retained their independence in the time of Nero. *Hist. des Gaules*, tom. i. c. 10.



[British Coracle.]



[Julius Cæsar.—*Visconti Icon. Rom.*]

CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR.

PART I.

CONTAINING A VIEW OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

FROM B.C. 78 TO B.C. 59.

THE nobility of the Julian family was so ancient and so illustrious that, even after it obtained the imperial dignity, it needed not the exaggeration of flatterers to exalt it. Within thirty years after the commencement of the Republic we find the name of C. Julius on the list of consuls; and the same person, or a relation of the same name, is said to have been one of the Decemviri, by whom the laws of the Twelve Tables were compiled. During the Punic wars, and the whole of the sixth century of Rome, the family produced indeed no individuals of distinguished character; but there is a Sex. Julius Cæsar among the prætors of the year B.C. 209, a L. Julius among those of the year B.C. 184, and a Sextus Julius, who appears as consul in the year B.C. 157, seven years before the third Punic war. In the seventh century, we have already had occasion to mention

B.C. 59. The Julian family.


B.C. 59. three of the Cæsars—namely, Sextus Julius Cæsar, who was consul with L. Philippus, B.C. 91, during the famous year of the tribuneship of Drusus; L. Julius Cæsar, who was consul in the year following, who distinguished himself in the Italian war by a great victory over the Samnites, and who was afterwards murdered by the order of Marius; and C. Julius Cæsar, the brother of Lucius, eminent, as an orator, for his wit and pleasantry, whose irregular offer of himself for the consulship, in the year B.C. 88, first led P. Sulpicius to act the part of a popular tribune in opposing him, and who perished, together with his brother, when Marius and Cinna first usurped the government. But the individual to whom the name of Cæsar owes its renown with posterity was cousin in the second degree to these two brothers, and nephew to Sex. Cæsar, the colleague of L. Philippus in the consulship. His father was C. Julius Cæsar, a man of prætorian rank, and who is recorded by Pliny as a remarkable instance of sudden death[1]—he having expired suddenly one morning at Pisa, while dressing himself. C. Cæsar married Aurelia,[2] of the family of Aurelius Cotta; and of these parents was born the famous Caius Julius Cæsar, about the year of Rome B.C. 100, in the consulship of C. Marius and L. Valerius Flaccus.

Of the early life of Cæsar.

Some of the incidents of his early life, his marriage with the daughter of Cinna, and his narrow escape from the proscription of Sylla, have been already related.[3] But although there are numerous anecdotes to be found of him in the stories of his two biographers, Suetonius and Plutarch, yet the authority of both these writers is so low, and their accounts are at such variance with one another, that it is useless to repeat that which we have such imperfect grounds for believing. Without pretending to arrange the order of the several events, it will be enough to say, that he commenced his military service at an early age in Asia, and was present at the reduction of Mitylene,[4] the only town which remained in arms against Rome after the end of the first war with Mithridates. He studied eloquence for some time at Rhodes,[5] under Apollonius Molo, from whom Cicero about the same period was also receiving instructions. On one occasion he was taken by some of those pirates who were then so formidable on all the coasts of Greece[6] and Asia, and was detained by them till he collected from some of the neighbouring cities fifty talents for his ransom. No sooner was he released than he procured a small naval force, and set out on his own sole authority in pursuit of the pirates. He overtook them, and took some of their vessels, which he brought back to the coast of Asia, with a number of

[1] Pliny, *Histor. Natur.* lib. vii. c. 53.
[2] Suetonius, *in C. Jul. Cæsare*, c. 74.
[3] History of the Roman Republic, page 23.
[4] Suetonius, *in C. Jul. Cæsare*, c. 2. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. lxxxix.
[5] Suetonius, c. 4. Cicero, *de Claris Oratoribus*, c. 91.
[6] Vell. Paterculus lib. ii. c. 67. Suetonius, c. 4.

prisoners. He then sent word of his success to the proconsul of Asia, requesting him to order the execution of the captives; but that officer being more inclined to have them sold for slaves, Cæsar crucified them all without loss of time before the proconsul's pleasure was officially known. Such conduct was not likely to recommend him to those in authority; and we are told that on several other occasions B.C. 59.



[Rhodes.]

he wished to act for himself,[1] and even to take part in the war which was now renewed with Mithridates, without any commission from the government, and without submitting himself to any of the regular officers of the Republic. These early instances of his lawless spirit are recorded with admiration by some of his historians, as affording proofs of vigour and greatness of mind.

His first public appearance at Rome, where he espouses the popular party.

He first brought himself into notice at Rome by bringing a charge of corruption in his province against Cn. Dolabella,[2] who had been consul with M. Tullius Decula, under the dictatorship of Sylla, and had since been appointed to the province of Macedonia, and had obtained a triumph for some victories over the neighbouring barbarians. Dolabella, however, was defended by Cotta and Hortentius, two of the most famous orators of that period, and was acquitted. Whatever may have been the merits of this case, Cæsar probably was glad to seize any opportunity of annoying the partizans of Sylla; and, even in his early youth, he made no secret of his enmity to the aristocratical party, and obtained the credit of boldly supporting the weaker cause, by an ostentation of his regard for the memory of Marius and Cinna.

[1] Vell. Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 67. Suetonius, c. 4.
[2] Suetonius, c. 4. Cicero, *de Claris Oratoribus*, c. 92.

B.C. 59. He lost during his quæstorship both his own wife,[1] Cornelia, the daughter of Cinna, and his aunt, Julia, who had been the wife of the elder Marius. He pronounced an oration in honour of each of them; and, at the funeral of his aunt, he ordered that the images of her husband, Marius, should be exhibited amongst those of her other deceased relations and ancestors; which, according to the custom of the Romans, were always carried in the procession on such occasions. Marius having been adjudged a traitor, the sight of his statues produced a great surprise among the people; and the lower populace, looking upon them as a pledge of the revival of the popular party, welcomed them as they passed with the loudest acclamations. But whilst Cæsar was thus giving tokens of the danger which the aristocracy had to apprehend from his political career, he almost lulled their fears by the unbounded infamy of his personal character. We will not and cannot repeat the picture which ancient writers,[2] little scrupulous on such points, have drawn of his debaucheries: it will be sufficient to say that he was stained with numerous adulteries committed with women of the noblest families; that his profligacies in other points drew upon him general disgrace, even amidst the lax morality of his own contemporaries, and are such that their very flagitiousness has in part saved them from the abhorrence of posterity, because modern writers cannot pollute their pages with the mention of them.

State of the Roman Empire about the year B.C. 73.

With such an outline of the family and the early life of C. Cæsar, we shall close his personal history for the present. According to the plan which we have pursued on former occasions, we shall attempt to describe the state of the Roman empire immediately before that period at which his ambition openly aspired to enslave it; and we trust to be forgiven if we sacrifice to this object some details of particular facts, which are either little worthy of attention, or, from their great notoriety, are already familiar to every reader.

B.C. 73. If a merchant of Alexandria had traversed the Mediterranean in the year of Rome 680; if he had been bound, in the first instance, to Spain; if thence he had been led by circumstances to visit the coasts of Italy, and to pass a short time at Rome itself; if then, while pursuing his voyage homewards, he had met with the fate which at that period was most likely to befall him—that of falling into the hands of pirates; and, finally, if he had touched at some places on the coasts of Greece and Asia Minor, while his captors were returning with their prize to their strongholds in Cilicia; and if, having effected his ransom, he had at last been happy enough to reach Egypt in safety, and had there recorded the story of his eventful voyage, and of the various scenes which he had witnessed;

[1] Suetonius, c. 6. Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 5.
[2] Suetonius, c. 49, *et seq. et Auctores ibi citati.*

with what delight should we have welcomed such a treasure, and how thankful should we feel to that African traveller whose researches should procure for us so valuable a fund of information! The thought, indeed, of the knowledge of antiquity which we desire, is enough to make us discontented with that which we possess. But, in imagining the case of the Egyptian merchant, our object is to bring before our readers, at one view, the state of the different extremities of the Mediterranean; and to enable them to judge of the condition of the times, by describing the scenes which would have presented themselves to the eyes of an individual in whatever quarter of the Roman empire his fortune might have placed him. B.C. 73.

Of Spain.

If a trading vessel had approached the more southern parts of Spain, she might have found every thing tranquil; but if her course had been directed towards the mouths of the Sucro or the Ebro, she would have probably been stopped by the light cruisers of Sertorius,[1] which covered the whole coast, in order to intercept any supplies coming by sea for the armies of Pompey and Metellus. On shore the country was suffering under the miseries of a long and dubious warfare. We have already slightly mentioned the beginnings of Sertorius's career, and we shall have occasion to speak of him hereafter more at length. He had at first been opposed in Spain by Q. Metellus Pius; but when that officer was found unable to bring the war to a conclusion, and Sertorius had been greatly reinforced by the troops which had followed Lepidus in his attempt to revive the popular cause, and which, after his defeat, M. Perpenna had led into Spain,[2] the senate deemed it necessary to intrust the command to a general of the highest reputation, and accordingly fixed their choice upon Pompey. Sertorius, however, withstood the united efforts of his two antagonists with great ability and success: he availed himself of the activity and ingenuity of the Spaniards, who were warmly attached to him, and who became most excellent soldiers when they had received from him some portion of discipline and military skill in addition to their natural excellencies. The war, which had begun before the death of Sylla, was still, in the year B.C. 73, maintained with unabated vigour; nor was it terminated till two years afterwards, when, Sertorius having been assassinated by some of his officers, who were jealous of his talents but very unable to supply his place, Pompey obtained an easy victory, reduced the whole of Spain to a state of obedience, and returned to Rome to enjoy the honours of a triumph, and to enter upon the office of consul. In the meantime we find that his army,[3] for a considerable portion of the time that it had served in Spain, was very irregularly paid, and was obliged to support itself at the B.C. 71.

[1] Plutarch, *in Sertorio*, c. 21. Strabo, lib. iii. p. 167, edit. Xyland.
[2] Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. i. c. 108.
[3] *Epistola Cn. Pompeii, apud Fragm.* Sallust.

B.C. 71. expense of the country which was the seat of war. This was also the case with the army of Sertorius; so that the whole north-east of Spain, as may readily be imagined, was reduced to a state of the greatest poverty and desolation.

Of Gaul. Pursuing a coasting navigation from Spain towards Italy, a vessel would naturally stop at some of the ports of the province of Gaul. It appears that the Gauls on both sides of the Alps had taken up arms in the cause of Lepidus; and Pompey, when marching into Spain, had inflicted on them a severe chastisement,[1] and had expelled many of the Transalpine Gauls in particular from their cities and territories. During the war with Sertorius, the province of Gaul was obliged to contribute largely to the necessities of the Roman armies; and both Metellus and Pompey, on two several occasions, wintered there,[2] when the country to the south of the Pyrenees was too much exhausted to maintain them. Manius Fonteius was about this time governor of the province, and he made himself very odious to the natives, not only by the rigour with which he exacted supplies of horses, corn, and money, for the troops in Spain, but by the duties which he levied on their wines,[3] and, as they alleged, by the partial and corrupt manner in which he demanded their services in making roads.[4] Fonteius was afterwards brought to trial at Rome for his conduct in his province; and while Cicero, in his defence of him, denies strongly the charge of corruption, he admits the severity, or, as he calls it, the vigour with which he maintained the authority of Rome amongst a people always turbulent and disaffected, and who were so lately in open rebellion.

Of Italy. From Gaul a short passage would transport the voyager to the mouth of the Tiber, and would place him amongst all the various rumours, and interests, and speculations which abound in the seat of government of a great empire. At the period of which we are now speaking, he would have found the public attention seriously excited by an insurrection of gladiators, which had broken out a short time before. About seventy persons of this class,[5] mostly natives of Gaul and Thrace, who had been either taken prisoners in war, or carried off by slave-traders from their own country, had effected their escape from the place where they were kept in training at Capua. Having fallen in with some waggons on the road, which were carrying a quantity of arms for the use of the gladiators in a neighbouring city, they seized the whole supply, and retired to Mount Vesuvius, as to a post which they might maintain with advantage. Here they chose three leaders, Spartacus, Crixus, and

Insurrection of the gladiators under Spartacus.

[1] Cicero, *pro Fonteio*, c. 2. *pro Lege Manilià*, c. 10.
[2] *Epistola Cn. Pompeii, apud* Sallust. Cicero, *pro Fonteio*, c. 3.
[3] Cicero, *pro Fonteio*, c. 5. [4] Ibid. c. 4.
[5] Livy, *Epitome*, lib. xcv. Plutarch, *in Crasso*, c. 8. Appian, *de Bell. Civili*, lib. i. c. 116.

Ænomaus; and, having repulsed the first attempts which were made to reduce them, their numbers were rapidly swelled by the concourse of fugitive slaves from all quarters, and by many of the poorest class of freemen, who were allured by the prospect of plunder. They were attacked by a regular force commanded by a Roman prætor; and, having completely defeated it, they quitted their asylum of Mount Vesuvius, and receiving daily large additions to their numbers, they plundered several of the principal cities in Campania, intending, when satiated with plunder, to march towards the Alps, and thus to effect their escape in safety to their own countries, carrying with them the spoils of Italy. B.C. 71.



[Combat of Gladiators.]

State of parties in Rome.

An intelligent and curious traveller would naturally have wished to gain some insight into the state of parties in the capital, and into the views and feelings of the people with respect to public affairs. Five years had elapsed since the death of Sylla, and the laws which he had enacted were still almost wholly in force, and the depression of the popular interest was consequently almost the same as after his victory. Since the defeat of Lepidus, one or two tribunes had attempted to restore their office to its former powers and dignities; but their efforts had been ineffectual, and one of them, Cn. Sicinius, is said to have lost his life through the violence of his opponents.[1] C. Cotta, however, who was consul in the year 678, finding the people in a condition of great distress, owing to the disturbed state of many of the provinces which used to supply the B.C. 75.

[1] *Oratio C. Licinii Macri, apud Fragm. Sallust.*

B.C. 75. capital with corn, and to the extensive depredations committed by the Cilician pirates, deemed it expedient to try some means of conciliating them. Accordingly he procured the repeal of that law of Sylla,[1] by which those who had been tribunes of the people had been declared ineligible to any of the higher magistracies; and he was empowered by the senate to sell the tithes of wine and oil, which the Sicilians always paid in kind,[2] not in Sicily, as had hitherto been the practice, but at Rome, in order somewhat to lower the price of provisions in the Roman markets. A certain distribution of corn was also made among the poorer citizens,[3] by which each man received five pecks at a very low price. But these were only temporary experiments; and we find C. Macer Licinius, one of the tribunes for the year B.C. 73, lamenting the humbled and dispirited state of the people, who, so soon as they left the forum, forgot all their political interests, and were desirous only of gaining, undisturbed, a subsistence for themselves and their families. These are the circumstances which are, above all others, most unfavourable to the cause of true liberty; and they are the natural result of bloody civil dissensions, which generally leave behind them a disgust for political business, attended with a large portion of individual distress. In order to rouse the people from their apathy, the popular leaders are then tempted to apply stimulants of the most violent nature; to exaggerate the public grievances, and to misrepresent and traduce the party of their antagonists, thinking that nothing less than an excessive indignation can repair the evils of an excessive indifference. At Rome, however, during the period of which we are now speaking, the moderation and the popular virtues of many of the principal individuals of the aristocracy obviated, in a great measure, the mischief of these invectives. The people were taught to feel their own power, and to exercise it; but they respected the senate, and continued for some time to submit to its regulated influence and authority, till the efforts of some worthless individuals again excited jealousies and dissensions, in the course of which the senate and the people were opposed to one another in a quarrel which was not their own; and a war, in which no national nor public interests were properly involved, enabled one profligate adventurer to overturn the whole constitution, and to overwhelm all ranks of the commonwealth together under his own despotism.

Origin and progress of the Pirates of Cilicia.

We have said that a merchant vessel bound from Rome to the eastern part of the Mediterranean in the year B.C. 73 would, in all probability, have fallen into the power of some of the pirates by whom the sea was at this time infested. At no other period in the

[1] Asconius, *in Ciceron, pro Cornelio Oration.* 1.
[2] Cicero, *in Verrem*, lib iii. c. 7.
[3] *Oratio C. Macri, apud Fragm.* Sallust.

history of the world has piracy been carried to such a formidable height; and even the exploits of the famous Buccaneers in America are less wonderful, when we consider that the pirates of Asia did not confine their ravages to a distant quarter of the Roman empire, where the arm of the government would necessarily act with less vigour, but that they insulted and annoyed the neighbourhood of the capital itself. We possess only imperfect accounts of their origin; but we learn that in the wars between Greece and Persia,[1] the Cilicians usually formed a considerable part of the king's navies, and that the nature of their country disposed them to maritime affairs. The chain of Mount Taurus,[2] in its course from the western coast of Asia Minor, approaches nearly to the Mediterranean, towards the south-eastern extremity of the Peninsula, leaving between itself and the sea a district of unequal breadth and dissimilar character, which was divided into two parts, the mountainous and the plain Cilicia. Of these, the mountainous Cilicia presented a number of strongholds, built on high and steep cliffs overhanging the sea, and each, for the most part, commanding either a small harbour or a smooth and sheltered beach, which, for the purposes of ancient navigation, was hardly less convenient. With these facilities of access to the sea, and of escape from its violence or from the pursuit of an enemy, were combined the advantages of an inexhaustible store of timber in the cedar forests of Taurus, and the stimulus afforded by the natural poverty of a mountain region, which inclined its inhabitants to a life of plunder. A people of this description can only be civilized by the systematic efforts of a powerful government; but the Cilicians had first been included in the empire of Persia, and, after the conquests and early death of Alexander, they formed a part of the kingdom of Syria. But neither the kings of Persia nor of Syria were likely to employ themselves in civilizing their barbarian subjects; and the character and habits of the Cilicians remained unchanged, till, in the seventh century of Rome, the increasing weakness and the constant family dissensions of their sovereigns enabled them to indulge their inclinations with less restraint. The chiefs of the several strongholds along the coast, despising the authority of the Syrian government,[3] commenced a system of plunder; and the circumstances of the times determined them to follow peculiarly the occupation of man-stealers. The demand for slaves among the great land proprietors of Italy so far exceeded the occasional supply produced by the conquests of the Republic, that the slave trade was become a most lucrative branch of commerce; and the Cilicians, being bold and able seamen, carried it on with success, by making descents on various parts of the neighbouring coast, and surprising the persons of the inhabitants.

B.C. 75.

Nature of the slave trade.

[1] Herodotus, *Polymn.* c. 91. *Urania*, c. 68. Thucydides, lib. i. c. 112.
[2] Strabo, lib. xiv. p. 766, *et seq.* edit. Xyland. [3] Ibid.

B.C. 75. They then carried their captives to Delos, which was so great a mart for this traffic that many thousands of slaves might be landed there, sold, and exported again on the same day. Doubtless the well-known horrors of the "middle passage" were experienced often by the unhappy wretches who were crowded together in narrow vessels, built far more for swiftness than for the reception of passengers, and who were exposed to the cruelty and merciless avarice of a crew of barbarian pirates; whilst they themselves would frequently be persons of some fortune and education, torn away, with their wives and children, from the enjoyment of all the comforts of civilized life. Nor did the neighbouring states of Cyprus and Egypt attempt to prevent these atrocities; but they are said to have witnessed them with pleasure through jealousy of the Syrians, who were the chief sufferers. But both they who neglected to crush the evil, and the Romans who had first given occasion to it, began soon to feel its effects themselves. Gain and impunity encouraged the pirates to extend their robberies; property and merchandize of every kind, and belonging to every nation, were attacked without scruple, insomuch that the Romans were obliged to notice these piracies as early as the year B.C. 102, and M. Antonius, the orator, who was then prætor, received Cilicia as his province,[1] and there obtained some victories, which were held sufficient to entitle him to the honour of the smaller triumph or ovation. The war with Mithridates followed in about fourteen years; and during that war the Cilician pirates offered their services to the king of Pontus against the Romans,[2] and infested the Ægean so much with their light squadrons that Sylla often felt considerable annoyance from them. But after the regular war was at an end, the pirates became more formidable than ever: they were joined by many individuals who had been ruined during the late contest; and now, no longer wearing the semblance of auxiliaries to a regular government, they extended their cruises to all parts of the Mediterranean; and not only made partial descents, but attacked, and often made themselves masters of, fortified towns situated on the coast. Under these circumstances, P. Servilius Vatia, who had been consul in the year B.C. 79, was in the year following sent to repress the piracies;[3] and he appears to have held the command during some years, in the course of which he defeated them at sea, and also stormed so many of their fortresses in Pamphylia and the neighbouring country of Isauria, that he received the surname of *Isauricus*, and was considered to have put an end altogether to the evil. These hopes, however, were soon disappointed. The trade of piracy had been found so profitable that many others of the maritime

Formidable position of the Pirates.

[1] Cicero, *de Oratore*, lib. i. c. 18. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. 68.
[2] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 24. Appian, *de Bell. Mithridat.* c. 92.
[3] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 3. Strabo, lib. xii. p. 668, edit. Xyland.

states of Asia Minor were engaged in it as well as the Cilicians;[1] and no partial losses could put a stop to a system carried on on so extensive a scale. A more vigorous attempt to repress it had been made indeed about the year B.C. 75, when M. Antonius, the son of the orator, and father of the triumvir, received an extraordinary command,[2] extending over all the sea coasts of the Mediterranean, that he might be enabled to check the enemy at once in every quarter. But Antonius seems to have distinguished himself by nothing but his oppression and his exactions from the allies of Rome, and his injustice towards neutral states; and the conduct of his subordinate officers greatly resembled his own. The robberies of the pirates continued unabated, and the behaviour of the Roman commanders only added to the general misery. It is, however, by some particular facts that we may best convey a notion of the extent of the public losses and dishonour. In the year B.C. 73, the notorious C. Verres was appointed to command the province of Sicily as proprætor; and during his administration a piratical chief named Heracleo,[3] with a light squadron of four vessels, appeared on the coasts of the island, defeated and burnt an ill-provided fleet which had attempted to oppose him, and entered, in a bravado, into the very harbour of Syracuse, which, having surveyed at his leisure, he again put to sea without molestation. The communication between Italy and Greece was intercepted during the whole summer;[4] several officers going abroad, with commissions from the senate, on the public service, were taken, and released for a ransom; and two prætors, with their lictors, while going abroad to take the command of their provinces, fell into the hands of the pirates. Descents were made on both coasts of Italy; the harbour of Caieta, which was full of Roman vessels, was entered before the eyes of a Roman prætor, and everything in it was taken or destroyed; the children of M. Antonius, the orator, at the very time apparently that their brother was commanding against the pirates, were carried off from the house of their family at Misenum, and were ransomed for a large sum of money. Nay, the mouth of the Tiber itself was not secure from insult; and a fleet, which one of the consuls had been appointed to command, was surprised and taken at Ostia, within twenty miles of

B.C. 75.



[From a Painting on a Tomb at Pompeii.]

Heracleo, the Pirate Chief. B.C. 73.

[1] Appian, *de Bell. Mithridat.* c. 92.
[2] Cicero, *in Verrem*, lib. ii. c. 3, lib. iii. c. 91.
[3] Ibid. lib. v. c. 34, 35, 37.
[4] Ibid. *pro Lege Manilia*, c. 11, 12.

B.C. 73. Rome. While such were the affronts sustained so near the seat of government itself, it will excite no surprise to hear that Cnidus, Samos, and Colophon, with four hundred other cities, were taken at different times by this daring enemy,[1] and that some of the richest and most famous temples—those of Juno at Samos, at Argos, and at Lacinium in Italy; those of Apollo at Leucas and Actium; those of Neptune at the Isthmus of Corinth and at Tænarus; and that of Ceres and Proserpine in Samothrace—were violated and ransacked. The revenues and the commerce of Rome were alike intercepted or suspended; and the power of the Republic was, for a while, baffled or despised by enemies without a country and without a government, who possessed no other resources than the plunder which they had acquired by their piracies.

Oppression of Roman Governors in the Provinces.

In describing the progress of the pirates, we have anticipated the mention of the scenes which would have presented themselves to the eyes of a voyager in the seas and on the coasts of Greece and Asia Minor. If any accident had led him to visit the interior of those countries, he would have found the violences of the pirates almost equalled by the tyranny of the Roman governors and officers. It appears that, for several years after the triumph of the aristocratical party under Sylla, the crimes of the Roman magistrates and generals, and the excesses which their examples encouraged their soldiers to commit, were unusually great,[2] and that the corrupt state of the tribunals at Rome, where the judicial power was vested entirely in the hands of senators, ensured a frequent impunity to such offenders. When Cicero accused Verres, B.C. 70, he did not hesitate to declare that it was the wish of the provinces that the laws against the maladministration of Roman officers might be repealed;[3] for, whilst they existed, corrupt governors increased their extortions that they might have wherewithal to reward their advocates and to bribe their judges, in case they should be brought to trial; and the most respectable of the Romans, and the warmest supporters of the cause of the nobility, Q. Catulus and Cn. Pompey, confessed and deplored the truth of this statement. History has preserved to us the names of Cn. Dolabella, who was tried for his misgovernment of Macedonia; of another Cn. Dolabella, who was accused of corruption and cruelty in Cilicia;[4] of M. Antonius, who has been already mentioned as infamous for his general misconduct in the extensive command which had been intrusted to him; of his brother C. Antonius, who was brought to trial for his exactions in Greece;[5] of Q. Calidius, who was charged with oppression in Spain;[6] of Manius Fonteius, whom

Corruptions of the Roman Governors.

[1] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 24.
[2] Cicero, *pro Lege Manilià*, c. 13, 22.
[3] Cicero, *in Verrem*, actio i. c. 14, 15.
[4] Ibid. lib. i. c. 38.
[5] Q. Cicero, *de Petitione Consulatûs*, c. 2.
[6] Cicero, *in Verrem*, act. i. c. 13, lib. iii. c. 25, *et* Asconius, *in* act. i. *in Verrem*.

Cicero defended against the complaints of the Gauls; and, above all, of C. Verres, who for three years practised every kind of cruelty and corruption in Sicily. Besides these were officers who are charged with no personal corruption, yet whose conduct towards foreign states was harsh and unjust. P. Servilius has been already mentioned as having gained several victories over the pirates in Pamphylia and Isauria. Amongst other places, they had occupied Olympus, a city of Lycia; and Servilius besieged and took the town from them. The Lycians, to whom it of right belonged, had carefully abstained from imitating the example of their neighbours,[1] and had taken no part in the depredations of the pirates; yet the ornaments of the city were carried off as spoils to Rome, and the people of Olympus were deprived of a portion of their territory. B.C. 73.

A Gaulish chief, while exhorting his countrymen to maintain their independence against the arms of Rome, is represented by Cæsar as describing, in two words, the degraded condition of that part of Gaul which was already a Roman province.[2] He called it "*subjecta securibus*," "subject to the lictor's axe;" and although the last extremities of tyranny might have been comparatively rare, yet, in fact, the lives of the provincials were subject to the arbitrary will of the governors, without any immediate protection, and too often with only a feeble prospect of retribution upon their oppressor. When Verres was in Asia,[3] as quæstor to Cn. Dolabella, he was sent by him on a mission to Nicomedes king of Bithynia, and on his way he passed through Lampsacus. He was there informed that Philodamus, one of the principal citizens, had an unmarried daughter of extraordinary beauty; and, in order to effect the infamous design which he instantly entertained, he caused one of his creatures to be lodged at the house of Philodamus. This man, whose name was Rubrius, was entertained with the greatest hospitality, and was desired to name the persons whom he wished to form the company—Philodamus sending even his own son to sup at the house of a friend that he might have room for a greater number of Roman officers. Towards the close of the evening, Rubrius called upon Philodamus to introduce his daughter to their party—a proposal which, according to the manners of the Greeks, was one of the utmost insult and indelicacy. The father refused, and his guests, assisted by their slaves and by some of the lictors of Verres, proceeded to assault him in his own house, and to threaten the honour of his daughter. He contrived to inform his son of his danger, and the young man instantly flew to the house, followed by a crowd of the people of Lampsacus, who were roused by the report of so gross an outrage. In the scuffle that

Infamous conduct of Verres.

[1] Strabo, lib. xiv. p. 762, edit. Xyland. Cicero, *in Verrem*, lib. i. c. 21, *de Lege Agrar.* i. c. 2.

[2] *De Bello Gallico*, lib. vii. c. 71.

[3] Cicero, *in Verrem*, lib. i. c. 24, *et seq.*

B.C. 73. ensued, Rubrius and some of his slaves were wounded, and a lictor was killed; and on the next day, when it was known who was the original author of the attempt, the people crowded to the house where Verres lodged, and were with difficulty prevented from exercising on him a summary vengeance. He escaped, however, and Philodamus and his son were brought to trial before C. Nero, the governor of the province of Asia, for the death of the lictor. At the earnest request of Verres, Dolabella left his own province of Cilicia to assist at the trial; Verres himself was present also; and he and Dolabella used all their influence, both by vehemence and supplication, to procure the condemnation of the prisoners. Nero, a weak and timid man, yielded to their instances, and Philodamus and his son were beheaded in the market-place of Lampsacus. Dolabella was afterwards accused, as we have seen, of corruption in his own province, and was condemned to exile, which he underwent; but Verres was elected prætor, and exercised jurisdiction both in Rome and in Sicily; nor was he ever questioned for his conduct at Lampsacus till after the perpetration of numberless additional crimes, when Cicero, his accuser, mentioned his early enormity as preparatory to the series of his greater and more recent offences. Nero, it should be observed, by whose sentence Philodamus and his son were put to death, was never brought to trial at all. It is not possible that actions so dreadful as this should have been of very frequent occurrence; still the circumstances which we have related were far from singular; and every province in the empire could probably at some time have produced instances of equal, or even of greater, enormity. But that one such act should have been committed with impunity shows how wretched was the condition of those countries that were subject to the yoke of the Roman government.

Conclusion of the war with the Gladiators.

In tracing the course of events, from the year B.C. 73 to B.C. 63, the only wars which will here demand our attention are those with Spartacus and with the pirates. The beginnings of both have been already noticed; and we have seen that in the year B.C. 72, Spartacus was carrying devastation over some of the finest districts of Italy. In the following year a part of his forces was destroyed by Q. Arrius, one of the prætors;[1] but he himself, intending to carry into execution his plan of escaping over the Alps into Germany, was encountered by Cn. Lentulus, one of the consuls, over whom he gained a complete victory; after which he engaged and defeated another army commanded by the other consul, L. Gellius, and the lately victorious prætor, Q. Arrius. All obstacles to his march being thus removed, he continued his course as far as Cisalpine Gaul, where he found himself again opposed by a third army, under the command of C. Cassius, one of the consuls of the former

[1] Livy, *Epitom.* lib. xcvi. Plutarch, *in Crasso*, c. 9. Florus, lib. iii. c. 20.

year, and Cn. Manlius, one of the prætors. He attacked this new enemy near Mutina, and gained a third complete victory; but it appears that these repeated successes intoxicated him or his followers, and instead of continuing their march to the Alps, which they might have effected with perfect safety, they returned towards the south, dazzled by fantastic hopes of the conquest and plunder of Rome itself. But finding, probably, that any attempt upon the capital was impracticable, Spartacus passed the winter without venturing on any exploit of importance, maintaining his soldiers, we may suppose, upon the plunder of the country. Dissensions, meanwhile, crept in amongst his followers, which proved his ruin. The Gauls and Germans still wished to return to their own country,[1] and, finding that they could not prevail on the majority of the army to join them, they separated from Spartacus, and commenced their march to the northward by themselves. The senate, on their part, had committed the conduct of the war to M. Crassus, who was the prætor; and the new general, according to the practice which we have before noticed among the Roman commanders after a series of disasters, began his career by severe executions upon the soldiers of the defeated armies; and, having thus taught them to dread him more than the enemy, he first assaulted the division of the Gauls and Germans and put the greatest part of them to the sword. He then engaged with the main army under Spartacus, and having won a second victory, obliged him to retreat to the southern extremity of Italy. It was the wish of the gladiators to effect their passage into Sicily, in the hope of reviving the insurrections of the slaves, which had raged with such violence in that island not many years before. To accomplish their purpose, they entered into a treaty with some of the Cilician pirates who chanced to be cruising in the neighbourhood; but the pirates are said to have first secured the money for their transport,[2] and then to have sailed away without fulfilling their part of the engagement. Spartacus then endeavoured to construct rafts on the Italian shore;[3] but the active pursuit of Crassus rendered this impracticable, and he was soon blockaded in a small peninsula near Rhegium, in which he had taken refuge. He effected his escape, however, by passing unobserved, in a dark and stormy night, through the enemy's lines, and with the troops that still remained to him he directed his march towards the mountains of Petilia in Lucania.[4] Here the tidings of the return of Pompey from Spain, made both Crassus and Spartacus anxious to risk a battle before that dreaded general could take a part in the contest. Accordingly a desperate action ensued, in which Spartacus was defeated and slain, and his army dispersed or destroyed; but

B.C. 71.

The Gauls and Germans put to the sword.

[1] Livy, *Epitom.* lib. xcvii. Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. i. c. 118.
[2] Plutarch, *in Crasso*, c. 10. [3] Cicero, *in Verrem*, lib. v. c. 2.
[4] Plutarch, *in Crasso*, c. 11. Appian, lib. i. c. 120.

B.C. 70. Pompey laid a claim to a share in the victory, because he fell in with some parties of fugitives who had escaped from the battle, and cut them to pieces. A considerable number of prisoners were taken, who were crucified along the road from Rome to Capua, and their bodies extended at intervals along the whole of the distance.

Consulship of Pompey and Crassus.

The war with the pirates was not concluded till four years afterwards; and some events occurred in the intervening period which will require our notice. Pompey, although we have so often had occasion to mention his name, had as yet held no public magistracy, and was therefore precluded, by one of Sylla's laws, from offering himself as a candidate for the consulship. But the extraordinary circumstances attending his career, and the services he had rendered to the aristocratical party on so many occasions, disposed the senate to regard him with unusual favour; while, on the other hand, he had always possessed the affection of the people, who seem to have excepted him from the general aversion which they entertained towards the partisans of Sylla. At this time his return from Spain was looked forward to by the popular party with an anxious hope that he would become their leader, and enable them to repeal some of those laws which, as they thought, had so greatly encroached upon their liberties. Their chief wish was for the complete restoration of the tribunitian power; not only for its own sake, but as preparatory to effecting a reform in the constitution of the courts of justice.[1] The natural feelings of the people at large were shocked by the long series of crimes which their officers were continually committing in the provinces with impunity; and so long as the judges were taken only from among the men who had enjoyed, or were expecting to succeed to the commands in which these excesses were perpetrated, it was not likely that the evil would be effectually remedied. Looking, then, upon Pompey as on a young man of popular qualities, who would be glad to acquire a claim to the lasting gratitude of the majority of his countrymen, the people welcomed his appearance with joy; and a decree of the senate being passed,[2] allowing him to be a candidate for the consulship, although he had not held the previous offices of quæstor and prætor, he was elected consul, together with M. Licinius Crassus, who had distinguished himself by his recent victory over the gladiators. Pompey did not disappoint the hopes which were formed of him. After his election,[3] when he made his first speech to the people before entering on his office, he promised to restore the tribunitian power, and to endeavour to remedy the grievances of the provinces, and the corrupt state of the courts of justice. His first declaration was received with murmurs of delight; but, when he spoke of reforming the courts of justice, he was interrupted by a loud and general

Promises of Pompey to the Commons.

[1] Cicero, *in Verrem*, actio i. c. 15. [2] Ibid. *pro Lege Manilia*, c. 21.
[3] Ibid. *in Verrem*, actio i. c. 15.

shout of applause. Accordingly his consulship is memorable for B.C. 70.
the repeal of Sylla's laws respecting the tribuneship,[1] and the restoration of that office to its original privileges; and also for the law of L. Aurelius Cotta, one of the prætors, which was passed with the sanction of Pompey, and which provided that the judges should hereafter be chosen partly from among the senators, partly from the equestrian order, and partly from the tribuni ærarii.[2] These last, as far as appears, were plebeians, possessed of a certain property,[3] and on that account were appointed to act as agents for the payment of the legions—it being their office to receive the money for that purpose from the quæstors of the city, and to negociate the business of transmitting it to the provincial quæstors, that it might by them be issued to the troops. The object of the law in adding this additional class to those of the senate and the knights, was to establish the courts of justice on a less exclusive system than before, while it endeavoured to obviate the evil of corruption amongst the judges, by providing that they should only be chosen from among men of competent fortune. At the conclusion of the year which had been marked by such welcome acts, Pompey increased his popularity still more by declaring that he would not accept the government of any province;[4] and, accordingly, when his consulship was expired, he continued to reside at Rome as a private individual.

The Censorship revived after some years' discontinuance of it.

The extreme disorders of the times had filled men, according to the usual course of opinions, with the desire of seeing the arm of authority strengthened; and thus the censorial power,[5] which was on many accounts justly obnoxious, and which had been discontinued since the beginning of the late civil wars, was now revived agreeably to the general wish of the people. It was exercised with great severity by the censors Cn. Lentulus and L. Gellius, who removed sixty-four persons from the lists of the senate,[6] and probably gratified the public feeling by stigmatizing so large a portion of the nobility. They are charged, indeed, with having listened too lightly to popular reports,[7] and with having affixed their censure on some characters without any sufficient knowledge of their demerits. Instances, too, occur of their disagreement with one another,[8] and of one of them disapproving and acting in opposition to the sentence of his colleague. But, on the whole, it is probable that the revival of the censorship was beneficial; and, faulty as were the old institutions of the commonwealth, they were far better than the general lawlessness, and tyranny, and corruption, which had of late superseded them.

[1] Cicero, *de Legibus*, lib. iii. c. 11. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. xcvii.
[2] Asconius, *in Ciceronis pro Cornelio Oration.* i. Cicero, *ad Quintum Fratrem*, lib. ii. epist. vi. Cicero, *Philippica*, i. c. 8.
[3] *Facciolati Lexicon, in Voce "Tribunus."*
[4] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 55.
[5] Cicero, *in Q. Cæcilium*, c. 3.
[6] Livy, *Epitome*, lib. xcviii.
[7] Cicero, *pro Cluentio*, c. 47.
[8] Ibid.

B.C. 67. The war with the Pirates.

The evils of the piratical war still continued; nor did the consuls of the two following years do anything effectual to remove them. We have seen that the experiment had been already tried of appointing one man, with supreme command, to act in every quarter of the Mediterranean; but the misconduct of the individual selected, M. Antonius, had disappointed the hopes which had been entertained of its success. There was, however, another person in the commonwealth whose personal character was likely to add weight to whatever authority was intrusted to him, whose high military talents fitted him to combat with the enemies of the State, while his integrity and humanity would protect and conciliate its subjects and allies. Accordingly, in the consulship of C. Piso and Manius Acilius Glabrio, Aulus Gabinius,[1] one of the tribunes, proposed to the people that the management of the war with the pirates should be committed to a single person for the term of three years, and that the power of the officer thus chosen should extend over every part of the empire, with authority to raise such supplies of men and money as he should think proper, and that he should have under him a certain number of lieutenants of senatorian rank, nominated by the senate. Gabinius was known to be a partisan of Pompey, and his character is said to have been bad; his own motives, therefore, in proposing this measure, may well be suspected; but the measure itself, if stript of some of its clauses, seems not to have been justly blameable. The people took it up with eagerness, and immediately fixed upon Pompey as the individual to be appointed to this extraordinary command. But the high aristocratical party now began to pause in lavishing upon him unusual honours. His late conduct, during his consulship, had shown that he was not insensible to the welfare of the people at large, nor indifferent to the charms of popularity. He could not, therefore, be considered as an undoubted supporter of the nobility on all occasions; and his personal renown seemed to raise him above their level. The motion of Gabinius was, therefore, generally opposed in the senate, and especially by Q. Catulus and Q. Hortentius;[2] and the negative of two of the tribunes, L. Trebellius and L. Roscius, was secured, according to the old practice of the aristocracy, to stop the progress of the law. Both parties, as usual, had, at the very outset of the dispute, resorted to violence: the person of Gabinius, we are told, was threatened in the senate when he first announced there his intended law; and the mob, in return, beset the senate-house, and, having laid hold on C. Piso, the consul, were with difficulty persuaded by Gabinius to let him go without injury. But a more mischievous step was taken by the proposer of the measure, when he proceeded to imitate the conduct of Tiberius Gracchus,[3] and

Law of A. Gabinius, granting an extraordinary commission to Pompey.

[1] Cicero, *pro Lege Manilià*, c. 18. Dion Cassius, lib. iii. p. 10, edit. Leunclavii.
[2] Ibid. c. 18. Dion Cassius, *ubi supra*. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii.
[3] Cicero, *pro Cornelio, et* Asconii *Commentarius*.

finding Trebellius obstinate in his opposition, submitted to the assembly the question of his degradation from his office. Trebellius, however, was less resolute than Octavius; and, before the eighteenth tribe was called on to vote, he withdrew his negative upon the law. Yet the people listened with respect to Q. Catulus when he, having been expressly called upon by Gabinius to deliver his sentiments, endeavoured, in manly and temperate language, to prove to them the mischiefs of the intended measure. That he should have prevailed, indeed, was not to be expected: but the aristocracy disappointed any personal views which Gabinius might have had in procuring so extensive a command for Pompey; for, although Pompey himself made application in his behalf, the senate refused to insert the name of Gabinius amongst those of the fifteen lieutenants who were to act under his orders.[1] B.C. 67.

It was late in the year when the law of Gabinius was carried;[2] but Pompey employed the winter most diligently in making immense preparations for the war. He divided the care of the different parts of the Mediterranean among his several lieutenants, resolving himself to superintend their proceedings in every quarter, and to bestow his peculiar attention wherever it should be most needed. Before the winter was well ended, he put to sea, and, deeming it important to open, as soon as possible, the communication between the capital and those countries from which it was usually supplied with corn, he sailed first to Sicily, thence crossed over to Africa, and, having carefully scoured the coasts there, he returned to Sardinia, stationing a sufficient fleet off the island, and strong guards on different points along the shore, as he had done in the two provinces which he had previously visited. These operations were completed, according to Plutarch,[3] in less than six weeks; and he then returned to Italy, where he remained for a short time, disposing his forces for the protection of both coasts of that peninsula, and sending squadrons and land forces to secure the provinces of Spain, Gaul, and Illyricum. The effect of all these measures was to hunt out the pirates from all their haunts in the western quarters of the Mediterranean, and to drive them gradually back to the seat of their main power in Cilicia. Thither, accordingly, Pompey sailed in pursuit of them,[4] and, expecting to meet with a long and obstinate resistance in the strongholds on that coast, he provided himself with everything necessary for a succession of sieges. But the fame of his personal character went before him; and the vigour of his military operations, combined with the humanity which he had shown to those of the pirates who first fell into his hands, at once deterred the enemy from

Pompey reduces the Pirates to submission.

[1] Cicero, *pro Lege Manilià*, c. 19. [2] Ibid. c. 12.
[3] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 26.
[4] Cicero, *pro Lege Manilià*, c. 12. Florus, lib. iii. c. 6. Appian, *de Bello Mithridatico*, c. 96.

B.C. 67. continuing to oppose him, and encouraged them to trust themselves to his mercy. On his arrival off the coasts of Cilicia, fortresses and ships were successively surrendered to him without a blow. Nor did he deceive the confidence thus reposed in him; but, after receiving the submissions of the pirates, after delivering the prisoners whom he found in their hands, and becoming master of all their resources, he took measures for reclaiming the inhabitants of those countries from that rude and wretched state of life which tempted them to robbery. The town of Soli, with some others in the neighbourhood,[1] had been lately deprived of their citizens by Tigranes, king of Armenia, who had transplanted them into Upper Asia to people his new capital Tigranocerta. Into the towns thus deserted Pompey brought some of the pirates who had surrendered, and settled them in a situation where they might naturally be led to taste and to value the blessings of peace and civilization; while he removed others into some of the districts in the interior,[2] (which, perhaps, their own incursions, on former occasions, had reduced to desolation,) and placed them where the constant sight of the sea might not tempt them to resume their former occupation of piracy. By this admirable conduct, Pompey obtained a glory very different from that usually gained by Roman generals; and in seven weeks, from the time of his leaving Italy for the East,[3] he had cleared every corner of the sea from the enemy, and had provided for the stability of his victory by those measures of wisdom and goodness which alone, in public as well as in private conduct, can permanently ensure a happy result.

His plans for reclaiming them.


Whilst he was thus employed in Cilicia, he received a deputation from the people of Crete,[4] who were at this time attacked by Q. Metellus, a Roman proconsul, and who, refusing to submit to him, were willing to trust themselves to the mercy of Pompey. It appears that M. Antonius,[5] amongst various other acts of injustice which had signalized his command, had commenced hostilities against the Cretans without any just provocation, from the mere ambition to conquer that famous island which had thus long preserved its independence. He failed, however, in his attempt, and had himself died whilst engaged in it. But the Romans, little solicitous about the origin of their wars, finding that one of their officers had engaged them in a quarrel with the Cretans, resolved to continue it; and Q. Metellus, who had been consul in the year B.C. 69, was sent, after his consulship, into Crete as his province. He carried on his operations very successfully, and was looking forward to the speedy reduction of the whole island, when the Cretans, hearing of the extraordinary powers committed to Pompey, and of his merciful treatment of those

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxv. p. 2, lib. xxxvi. p. 18. Appian, c. 96.
[2] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 57.
[3] Cicero, *pro Lege Manilià*, c. 12.
[4] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvi. p. 8.
[5] Florus, lib. iii. c. 7. Asconius, *in Ciceron. Divinat. in Cæcilium.*

whom he had conquered, sent a deputation to him in Pamphylia,[1] requesting him to receive their submission. Crete, with every other island in the Mediterranean, was included within the limits of Pompey's authority; he sent, therefore, to Metellus, desiring him to abstain from further hostilities, and at the same despatched Octavius, an officer of his own, to receive the offered surrender. Metellus treated the message with contempt;[2] and when Octavius threw himself into the town of Lappa, trusting that his character as a Roman officer would protect the inhabitants, Metellus besieged and took the place, and put the Cilicians, who formed the garrison, to death. Octavius then employed a part of the force under Pompey's command, which L. Sisenna, one of his lieutenants, had brought over

B.C. 67.

War of Crete. Conquest of that island by Q. Metellus.



[Crete.]


from Greece, in defending some of the remaining cities of Crete against Metellus; but being too weak to act with effect in their behalf, he was obliged at last to quit the island, and Metellus then soon completed the conquest of every part of it. His conduct was marked with the usual cruelty of the Romans, embittered, in this instance, by personal irritation at the preference which the Cretans had shown for Pompey. After the ordinary succession of executions and exactions,[3] Crete was reduced to the form of a Roman province, and Metellus arranged the affairs of the island as he thought proper. But the dispute, which arose from his disobedience to Pompey's authority, was for some time an obstacle to his enjoying the honour of a triumph, till, some years afterwards, the senate,

Cruelty of Metellus.

[1] Cicero, *pro Lege Manilia*, c. 12.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvi. p. 8.
[3] Florus, lib. iii. c. 7. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. c.

B.C. 67. being more and more alienated from Pompey, thought proper to grant it.[1]

In this part of the history of the internal state of Rome, we must again remind the reader of the necessary imperfection of our account. The varying objects, pursued by parties and by individuals at different times, can only be explained by so full a knowledge of the circumstances and characters as should either remove or account for that which apparently was inconsistent; and the same knowledge could alone enable us to judge correctly of the merits of several measures which, otherwise, we might approve or condemn presumptuously and erroneously. Such a knowledge, however, cannot now be obtained; and the conjectures by which we have endeavoured to supply it we wish always to propose with a full consciousness of their uncertainty; for it may happen that some detached passage of an ancient author may have escaped our researches, which, had we known it, would have obliged us to alter, or to qualify, the theory which we had ventured to offer. With this caution we proceed to trace the disorders from which henceforward scarcely a year, during the existence of the commonwealth, was exempt.



[Sepulchre of Cecilia Metella, daughter of Metellus Creticus. *Venuti Antichita di Roma.*]

Tribuneship of C. Cornelius.

Amongst the evils by which the State was beset, that of obtaining public offices by undue means was at this time severely felt.[2] Like many other grievances, it was loudly complained of by the people,

[1] The conduct of Pompey in this transaction is represented in a very different light by some modern writers, who have echoed the sentiments of Plutarch. They impute Pompey's behaviour to a mean desire of robbing Metellus of the glory of his conquest; and Plutarch dwells upon the extravagance of his actually supporting pirates against the power that was employed in punishing them. It is probable that his vanity was flattered by the preference which the Cretans showed for him; but it is also likely that he, who was acting in Cilicia on such wise and merciful views, was eager to stop the cruelties of Metellus, and to give the Cretans, a people unjustly attacked by the Romans in the outset, the benefit of his own humane policy. Be this as it may, as Pompey's commission certainly extended to Crete, Metellus was guilty of an act of rebellion in resisting his authority, and became himself the robber and the outlaw, in persisting to attack places protected by a superior officer of his government. It may be a question whether it was owing to the mildness of Pompey's temper, or to the strength of the aristocratical faction, that Metellus was never brought to trial and punished as he deserved for his disobedience.

[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvi. p. 18, edit. Leunclavii.

and some measure was called for that might remove or lessen it. B.C. 67. C. Cornelius, who was one of the tribunes for the year, B.C. 67, resolved to take up the subject, and proposed to bring in a law which should punish all bribery or undue influence in elections in the severest manner. The senate, wishing the measure to proceed from themselves, rather than from one of the tribunes, directed C. Calpurnius Piso, who was then consul, to prepare a law to the same effect with that of Cornelius, except that its penalties were somewhat less severe. Cornelius, on his side, regarded this interference of the senate with jealousy and suspicion, and the people, in general, violently opposed the law of Piso,[1] as if its only object were to baffle and disappoint their wish for an effective check to the evil complained of. Some serious tumults appear to have arisen; and the consul, provoked at the opposition with which he met, called upon every citizen, who was a wellwisher to his country, to assist in procuring the enactment of the law. This was deemed equivalent to summoning them to support the consular authority by force, as was usual in cases of extreme danger; but even this appeal failing of its effect, and the election for the ensuing year drawing on,[2] and being preceded by the usual scenes of violence and corruption during the canvas, the senate, by their own sole authority, decreed that the law should be enacted, and voted a guard to the consuls for the maintenance of the public peace. It had happened that Cornelius had been already disgusted with the conduct of the senate on another occasion during his tribuneship. The provinces and allies of the commonwealth were in the habit of often sending deputies to Rome,[3] sometimes to compliment the officers who had exercised the government amongst them, sometimes to complain of their tyranny, and sometimes to make interest among their friends at Rome to procure some measure which they deemed expedient for their country. It often happened that the deputies were detained at Rome for a considerable period; and, in the want of those resources which modern commerce has devised to facilitate the obtaining money in foreign countries, they were obliged to borrow the sums they wanted of wealthy individuals, and could only procure them by engaging to pay an exorbitant interest. Many of the provincial cities were thus burdened with a debt; and their creditors were not unfrequently employed under the proconsul or prætor of the province,[4] and were then ready to abet him in all his proceedings, in order to purchase the aid of his authority in recovering, by a summary process, the money that was due to them. The evils and the scandal of this system were equally great, and C. Cornelius had moved the senate to repress them, by

Provincial Deputies at Rome.

[1] Cicero, *pro Cornelio*, i. *Fragm.*
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvi. p. 19.
[3] Asconius, *Argumentum in Ciceron. pro Cornelio*, i.
[4] Cicero, *in Verrem*, lib. i. c. 29.

B.C. 67. forbidding any Roman citizen to lend money to the deputies of foreign states or countries. But the senate did not second his wishes; and this had already given him a handle for inveighing against that body in the assemblies of the people. When, therefore, they had again thwarted his projects of reform,[1] by substituting a weaker measure in the place of his proposed law against bribery, he determined to attack one of the privileges which they had gradually usurped in later times, and which had degenerated into an abuse of a flagrant nature. This was no other than a power of dispensing with the laws in particular cases; such, for example, as that of Pompey, who had been allowed, by a decree of the senate, to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship before he had been prætor or quæstor, in direct violation of the existing laws. In former times these dispensations, after they had passed the senate, had, in theory at least if not in practice, required the sanction of the people to give them validity; but by degrees this sanction became so merely a form that it was neglected altogether; and the usual expression in the degrees of the senate, "that the matter should be submitted to the approval of the people," was at last omitted as superfluous. This, perhaps, might have been a change well suited to the altered circumstances of the commonwealth; but it was accompanied by another which was nothing but an abuse. These dispensations were often granted by some of those members who took an active part in public business, when none but themselves were present in the senate-house; and thus the privilege was engrossed, in fact, by a few individuals of the highest rank and consideration, who availed themselves of it as of a valuable store of patronage. To correct this system, C. Cornelius proposed to revive and enforce the old principle of the constitution, that no one should be exempted from the observance of any law except by the authority of the people. The aristocratical party, resisting this alteration, procured the negative of one of the tribunes, P. Servilius Globulus, to stop the progress of the proposed law. When, therefore, the day arrived on which the question was to come before the people, and the crier began to repeat aloud the terms of the law, with a clerk standing behind to prompt him, Globulus forbade both the clerk and the crier to proceed. Cornelius then took the law from the hands of the clerk and read it himself, not intending, as his friends declared, to propose it to the people in defiance of his colleague's negative, but merely to satisfy himself what the provisions were which he was not allowed to submit to their decision.[2] However the consul, C. Piso, who witnessed the

He proposes a law to regulate the dispensing power of the Senate.

It is negatived.

[1] Asconius, *Argumentum in Ciceron. pro Cornelio*, i.

[2] Cicero, *in Vatinium*, c. 2. *Defendebatur non recitandi causâ legisse sed recognoscendi.* It seems that persons were in the habit of reading aloud, even when reading by themselves alone, and thus the action of Cornelius might have had no other motive than that which his friends represented. In the Acts of the Apostles, when the Ethiopian eunuch was reading the Scriptures to himself, as he

fact, interpreted it in a different manner, and loudly exclaimed that Cornelius was destroying the very essence of the tribunitian power. The multitude received this speech with violent expressions of displeasure; and when Piso sent his lictors to arrest some of those whom he observed as most outrageous, the lictors were resisted, their fasces were broken, and stones were thrown by some persons at the extremity of the crowd against the consul himself. But Cornelius, far from abetting these disorders, immediately broke up the assembly, and relinquished his law; and, in order to show his willingness to conciliate his opponents, he brought it forward again without its obnoxious clauses, proposing merely that no dispensation from the laws should be considered as valid unless two hundred members had been present in the senate when it was granted; and that, although the sanction of the people was necessary as a point of form, yet that it should not be lawful for any tribune to negative a dispensation which had regularly passed the senate.[1] In this amended state the law was too reasonable to be openly opposed; but the leading senators were greatly offended that their particular influence should be at all diminished. Another salutary measure was brought forward and carried by Cornelius, which appears to have been entirely free from any factious design or tendency. It seems that the prætors had a large discretionary power in the administration of justice, and that it was usual for every prætor,[2] when he entered upon his office, to publish a proclamation, declaring, generally, the principles on which his decisions would be founded during the year. But from these principles the prætors continually deviated, alleging, we may suppose, that the equity of particular cases required them to depart from their general rule. Whatever may be the advantages or disadvantages of leaving much to the discretion of judges in well-ordered governments, and in a tolerably pure state of public morals, we may well conceive that, with such officers as the Roman prætors are described to have been at this period, whatever discretionary power they possessed was likely to be abused for their own purposes. Accordingly, Cornelius was listened to with general approbation when he proposed a law obliging the prætors to conform in all cases to the principles laid down in their own proclamations; and this measure also was carried without any open resistance. It is said that he brought forward several other laws during his tribuneship, which were negatived by some of his colleagues; but the particulars are not mentioned. The resentment, however, which

B.C. 67.

But passed in an amended shape.

Law to abridge the discretionary powers of the Prætors.

travelled in his chariot, he evidently pronounced the words aloud; for it is said that "Philip *heard*" him reading; whereas now, the natural expression would be, that a man reading alone in a carriage was *seen* reading.

[1] *Ne quis in senatu legibus solveretur, nisi* CC *adfuissent, neve quis, quum solutus esset, intercederet, quum de eâ re ad populum ferretur.* Asconius, *Argumentum in Ciceron. pro Cornelio*, i.

[2] Asconius, *ubi supra.* *Conf.* Dion Cass. lib. xxxvi. p. 19.

B.C. 66. Cornelius is brought to trial.

his conduct had excited, broke out as soon as his year of office was expired. He was accused of what, perhaps, may best be expressed in English by the general term of "high crimes and misdemeanours;"[1] but, on the day appointed for the trial, P. Cassius, the prætor, who was to act as judge, did not appear; and a mob assembling at the instigation, as it is said, of Manilius, one of the tribunes, assaulted the accusers, threatening them with death if they did not abandon their accusation, and, finally, obliged them to fly for their lives. Cornelius appears to have had no share in this riot; but his trial was again resumed in the year following, and he was arraigned chiefly for having read aloud his law to the people after another tribune had interposed his negative against it. On this point, Q. Catulus, Q. Hortensius, Q. Metellus Pius, and L. Lucullus, all came forward to give their evidence with a strong leading against him; while, on the other hand, Cicero undertook his defence, and is said to have conducted it with the greatest ability in two speeches, of which, unfortunately, only a few fragments remain to us. His eloquence was received with bursts of applause from the assembled people,[2] and Cornelius, as far as we can learn, was acquitted.[3]

The trial broken off by a riot.

He is tried again and acquitted.

B.C. 65.

Tribuneship of C. Manilius.

We have dwelt the longer upon the tribuneship and laws of Cornelius, because he appears to have been one of the few men of his time who advocated firmly and temperately the real interests of the people; and because the opposition which he met with from the aristocracy shows how much they were inclined to resist not only the seditious, but even the fairest and most moderate supporters of reform, as if every thing were mischievous which did not tend to maintain their exclusive ascendency. At a crisis such as that in which Rome was now placed, there were few popular leaders who were disposed to imitate the temper and judgment of Cornelius, and the treatment which he met with was likely still more to diminish the number. Men of real sense and patriotism were deterred from the task of redressing grievances, when they found that they could only succeed at the price of provoking a strong resistance on the part of the nobility, and, perhaps, dangerously exciting the passions of the multitude. But profligate adventurers, to whom sedition was in itself an end, instead of being regarded with aversion even as the means of obtaining some real good, were rejoiced to find the senate so selfish and short-sighted. They could then say, with more plausibility, that the aristocracy were habitually the enemies and oppressors of the poor, and that nothing could effectually benefit the commonwealth but a total revolution in the state of society.

In the year B.C. 66, C. Manilius, one of the tribunes,[4] proposed a renewal of one of the laws which had been passed during the

[1] "*De Majestate.*"
[2] Quintilian, lib. viii. c. 3.
[3] Ibid. lib. vi. c. 5, "*ut Cornelium ipsa confessionis fiducia eripuerit.*"
[4] Asconius, *in Ciceron. Orat. pro Milone*, c. 8. and Cicero, *Orat. pro Cornelio*, i.

triumph of the popular party under Carbo, and which had subsequently, we may suppose, been annulled by Sylla. By this law the freedmen had been enrolled promiscuously in all the tribes, instead of being confined, as before, to the four city tribes only. Manilius procured its revival, by proposing it suddenly at a late hour of the day when the majority of respectable citizens had left the forum;[1] but it was instantly annulled by the senate, as having been illegally passed, and Manilius himself was induced to abandon any further mention of it.[2] But, finding that he was still threatened with the resentment of the aristocracy, he resolved to secure himself by courting more assiduously the favour of the people, and by gaining the protection of an individual, whose friends it might not be politic for the senate to attack. This is said to have been the origin of the famous Manilian law, by which it was proposed to commit the sole management of the war with Mithridates and Tigranes to Pompey, and to continue to him a large portion of the extraordinary powers with which he was already invested to act against the pirates. The aristocratical party, as may be supposed, warmly opposed the law, but it was supported by Cæsar and by Cicero, and finally carried.[3] It is probable that the mere military part of the command might have been safely intrusted to other hands; but, with the peculiar temptations which the East offered to plunder and extortion, no officer could have been so well chosen as Pompey to retrieve the lost character of Roman magistrates, to conciliate the affections of the people of the provinces, and to administer his extensive command with justice, humanity, and wisdom. Nor would the measure, in strictness, have been dangerous, even as a precedent; for, as Pompey was appointed to wield such unusual powers on account of his tried moderation and integrity, there was little probability that officers would often be found with similar qualities to entitle them to a similar honour.

B.C. 65.

The Manilian law.

Towards the close of the year, P. Cornelius Sylla,[4] a relation of the late dictator, and P. Autronius, were elected consuls for the year following; but, being shortly after accused of bribery, and being found guilty, the election was declared null and void, and L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Manlius Torquatus were chosen in their room. The famous L. Sergius Catiline had intended to offer himself as a candidate, but he was also at this time under accusation for misconduct in his late province of Africa,[5] and the senate resolved that under such circumstances he could not be elected. Irritated at his disappointment, he entered into a conspiracy with P. Autro-

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvi. p. 20. edit. Leunclav.
[2] Cicero, *pro Cornelio*, i. *Fragm.* [3] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvi. p. 20.
[4] Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 18. Cicero, *pro P. Syllâ*, c. 17. 32.
[5] Q. Cicero, *de Petitione Consulatûs*, c. iiii. Cicero, *Fragm. Orationis in Toga Candida.* Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 18.

B.C. 65. First conspiracy of Catiline, Autronius, and Piso.

nius and Cn. Piso, a young man of noble birth, but needy and profligate; and it was resolved that the two consuls elect, Cotta and Manlius, should be murdered in the Capitol on the first of January, when they would first enter upon their office; that Catiline and Autronius should then seize upon the consulship, and Piso should be sent with an army to secure the important province of Spain. The design was suspected, and its execution was therefore postponed to the fifth of February, when it was intended to assassinate not the consuls only, but a great number of the senators, when assembled in the senate-house. Catiline, however, gave the signal for the massacre before the armed men whom he had hired to execute it were collected in sufficient force; and after this second disappointment the attempt was relinquished. But, although this conspiracy is mentioned by Cicero and Sallust as a matter perfectly notorious, yet the authors of it were suffered to remain unquestioned, and Catiline ventured, two years afterwards, to offer himself again as a candidate for the highest office in the commonwealth.

The year which had begun with such alarming circumstances was marked in its progress with little that is remarkable. Catiline's trial for misconduct in his province came on, but he was acquitted; an escape which he is said to have owed to the corruption of his judges and of his accuser, P. Clodius,[1] who suffered himself to be bribed by Catiline to weaken purposely the force of his own accusation.

Censorship of M. Crassus and Q. Catulus.

At this time, also, M. Crassus and Q. Catulus were acting as censors; but they were warmly at variance with each other on an important question relating to the inhabitants of Cisalpine Gaul to the north of the Po.[2] Crassus wished to extend the privileges of Roman citizenship to them as to all the other people within the Alps; but Catulus, according to the usual policy of the aristocratical party, was adverse to the measure, and, both persisting in their respective opinions, resigned the censorship. It was thought by many, that the streets of Rome were thronged too much already, without swelling the number of citizens still more; and C. Papius,[3]

The Papian Law.

one of the tribunes, proposed and carried a law, by which all foreigners were ordered to depart from Rome. This measure occasioned, probably, great inconvenience and distress to individuals, without any important benefits to the public peace. While the number of needy and profligate citizens was so great, and whilst such multitudes of slaves and gladiators were kept in the city, ready at all times to serve the purposes of riot and violence, it was of little avail to drive away the small proportion of free foreigners who might possibly have strengthened the cause of any sedition.

In the year following, L. Julius Cæsar and C. Marcius Figulus

[1] Cicero, *de Haruspicum Responsis*, c. 20. *Fragm. Orat. in Toga Candida.*
[2] Plutarch, *in Crasso*, c. 13. Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvii. p. 33.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvii. p. 33. Cicero, *de Officiis*, lib. iii. c. 11.

were chosen consuls. Catiline was now preparing to renew his canvas for the consulship, and to combine it with the plan of a second conspiracy. This man must not be classed among the ordinary leaders of the popular party who opposed the authority of the senate; nor with such men as the Gracchi, who, although their meditated changes threatened to affect the tenure of property, yet proposed no more than that which an unrepealed law of the republic had already sanctioned, and who, with all their rashness and violence, would have shrunk from the thought of shedding the blood of the noblest of their countrymen. But Catiline, from his early youth, had been stained with crimes: in the proscription of Sylla he had distinguished himself by peculiar cruelty and rapacity;[1] and since that period the free indulgence of his profligate desires had reduced him to indigence, which he had again repaired by his extortions in his province, but which was returning upon him afresh from the usual tenor of his life in Rome. He was of a patrician family, and found many others amongst the nobility who resembled him in profligacy and neediness, and who were willing to share with him all his projects of revolution:[2] to these were added a multitude of worthless and desperate men from the lower classes of society. Whoever disliked a life of labour, whoever wished to be relieved from the restraints of law, whoever were involved in debts which they could only hope to wipe off by the murder of their creditors—the envious, the rapacious, and the revengeful, who form so large a portion of mankind—all were ready to embrace a scheme which promised them plunder, and license, and bloodshed. Political circumstances added others to the number of the conspirators. The inhabitants of Tuscany,[3] who had been deprived of their lands by Sylla's confiscations, were eager to recover their property; many of the soldiers who had received these lands as settlements had since become involved by their extravagance or ignorance of farming, and were anxious for a second civil war that they might receive fresh rewards; whilst the children of those who had been proscribed, being excluded by Sylla's laws from all the honours of the commonwealth during their lives, were anxious to raise themselves from this state of degradation. It is mentioned, too, that a great many women of birth and talents,[4] but of infamous character, who, in the decay of their youthful beauty, had no longer the means of indulging their extravagant habits, and had thus contracted considerable debts, were ready to use all their arts and influence in support of the conspiracy, and to assist it more directly by the use of poison or the dagger against their own husbands, whose rank or character might render them valuable friends to the constitution of their country.

B.C. 64.

Beginnings of the second conspiracy of Catiline.

[1] Q. Cicero, *de Petitione Consulat.* c. 2, 3.
[2] Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 17. [3] Ibid. c. 28. [4] Ibid. c. 24.

B.C. 64. Ostensible grievances of Catiline.

The chief grievance on which Catiline dwelt, when endeavouring to excite his associates to overthrow the existing government, was the monopoly of honours and riches amongst a few great families,[1] by which the bulk of the people were kept in a degraded and impoverished condition. This complaint was utterly groundless in his own mouth, or in the mouths of all the patrician conspirators of his party: they certainly were not excluded by any aristocratical jealousy from office; nor is it possible to trace, in the lists of consuls and prætors about this period, any signs of a predominant influence exercised either by a few individuals, or by a few particular families of the aristocracy. But it is true that the nobility, as a body, were unwilling to see the highest posts in the commonwealth occupied by men of inferior birth and fortune, and wished to make the constitution too nearly resemble an oligarchy. The same C. Piso who was consul when C. Cornelius was tribune, and who had been so strongly opposed to him, is said to have declared to the assembled people,[2] when, in his quality of consul, he was presiding at the election of consuls for the ensuing year, that if M. Palicanus, a man of humble origin and a popular tribune, should be chosen by the votes of the comitia, he never would return him as duly elected. This, no doubt, was an extreme case; yet the lists of consuls sufficiently prove that no one could easily attain that dignity, unless he were of noble blood and distinguished connections; and at the time of Catiline's conspiracy, Cicero's pretensions to the consulship, for which he was now a candidate, were much discouraged by the high aristocratical party.[3] His character, however, was so pure, his eloquence so popular, and his political principles so much inclined to support the senate, that these merits atoned for his want of family; and as Catiline's projects excited considerable alarm, the nobility perceived the necessity of having a consul able and willing to check them, and thus M. Cicero and C. Antonius were elected to fill the consulship for the following year.

Election of M. Cicero to the Consulship.

Thus disappointed in his hopes of obtaining a place of lawful power, Catiline turned more zealously to his schemes of revolution; and, whilst he was increasing the number of his partisans at Rome, he provided depots of arms in different parts of Italy; and, having found means to borrow money on his own credit, and that of his friends, he transmitted it to Fæsulæ in Tuscany, to the care of one C. Manlius, who was to commence the intended insurrection in the country. At the same time he contrived repeated attempts against the life of Cicero; and in the midst of these designs he actually proposed to offer himself once more, at the ensuing elections, as a candidate for the consulship. His plans, however, had been constantly communicated to different persons, and from a very early

[1] Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 20.
[2] Valerius Maximus, lib. iii. c. 8.
[3] Sallust *Catilina*, c. 23.

period of the conspiracy had been denounced to the consul, Cicero. B.C. 64.
One of his associates, Q. Curius,[1] had long been engaged in a criminal connection with a woman of the name of Fulvia, who resembled, in the general profligacy and extravagance of her manner of living, those females whom we have already mentioned among the accomplices of Catiline; but who, from some feelings of humanity, or private connections, or some regard for the constitution of her country, was a stranger to all the plans of the conspirators. Curius was a man of good family, but indigent; and, having no means left of gratifying Fulvia's habits of expense, he found himself a less welcome visitor to her. But as soon as he had become acquainted with the views of Catiline, and had heard the splendid allurements which he held out to his partisans, he endeavoured to regain her favour, by assuring her that in a short time he should be enabled to testify, in the amplest manner, the affection which he bore her. Some doubts expressed by Fulvia as to his sincerity, led him in his own defence to disclose the means to which he was looking for his enrichment; and Fulvia, struck with horror at this communication, lost no time in making several persons acquainted with it. Afterwards, when Cicero became consul, he gained her over entirely to the interests of the commonwealth, and empowered her to make Curius such promises as tempted him to give regular information of all that passed at every meeting of the conspirators. Through this channel he also gained timely notice of the designs formed against his own life; and took care to keep a strong body of his friends and dependents near his person, that they might defend him either from assassination or from open violence.

The designs of Catiline communicated by Q. Curius to Cicero.

Such, however, were the imperfections of the Roman laws, that, with the fullest knowledge of the existence and constant progress of a treasonable conspiracy, the consul was obliged to wait for some overt act of rebellion, before he could venture to act officially against the guilty. In the meantime the people in general were ignorant of the dangers which threatened the State; and, whilst Catiline was carrying on his projects of revolution in secret, several other matters of far less importance successively engaged the attention of the public. P. Servilius Rullus, one of the tribunes,[2] proposed to gratify the lower orders by a new agrarian law, framed on a scale far more extensive than any that had preceded it, and conferring powers unusually great on the commissioners by whom it was to be carried into effect. The general object of the law was to provide the poorer citizens with settlements of land in Italy; and for this purpose a commission of ten persons was to be appointed, who should be enabled to sell national property of every description in every part of the empire, and, with the money arising from the

Events of the early part of Cicero's Consulship.

The Agrarian law of P. Rullus.

[1] Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 23.

[2] Cicero, *Orationes de Lege Agraria*.

B.C. 64. sale, should purchase lands in Italy, and settle upon them colonies of Roman citizens. With something more than the usual arbitrary jurisdiction intrusted to commissions of this nature, the commissioners were constituted sole judges of what was national property, and were authorized to fix the place of sale wherever they should think proper—a door being thus opened on the one hand to the greatest oppression, and on the other to the most shameful corruption. The commission, moreover, was to exist for five years, and during its existence none of its members could be subjected to trial for misconduct;[1] two hundred of the equestrian order were to be chosen yearly as a sort of guard of honour, that the commissioners might travel every where with kingly state, and with more than kingly power; for, it seems, they were empowered every where to enforce their authority by punishments, inflicted at their own discretion, while there was no other power which could protect from their jurisdiction, or reverse their sentences. It was proposed further that these sovereign magistrates should be chosen by a majority out of seventeen tribes only; that the tribes who were to elect should be chosen by lot, and the comitia should be held by the framer of the law, that is, by Rullus himself; so that, according to the well-known influence exercised over the result of an election at Rome by the officer who presided at it and received the votes, Rullus might calculate fairly on being placed himself on the commission. This agrarian law is not the only instance in history in which a popular party has incurred general odium by attempting, under the colour of an extraordinary commission, to confer immoderate powers upon its own leaders. Cicero instantly perceived the advantage which was afforded him; and, whilst he professed to approve the principle of agrarian laws, he attacked this particular measure as a mere device to invest ten persons with absolute sovereignty over the whole empire; and as Rullus had not acquired such an ascendancy over the people as to make them deaf to all insinuations against the purity of his views, the eloquence of Cicero was listened to with delight; one of the other tribunes promised to negative the law if it should be submitted to the votes of the people;[2] and Rullus, thus finding the popular feeling turned against him, abandoned his measure without further trial.

The aristocratical party were contented with having exposed the folly of their adversaries' scheme, and with having completely defeated their attempt. It is ever the case in party warfare that the public good is sacrificed, while the contending factions appeal almost exclusively to the most contemptible of all arguments,—those which derive their force from the weakness or contradictions of an opponent. The proposed law of Rullus was extravagant and absurd; but was

[1] Cicero, *Orationes de Lege Agrariâ*, ii. c. 13.
[2] Ibid. ii. c. 7.

there no other practicable plan, for the relief of the poor, which Cicero, the professed friend of the principle of agrarian laws, might have most seasonably devised, to remove some portion of the really existing sufferings of the lower orders and to conciliate their affections to the nobility, at a period so fraught with danger to the commonwealth? When the temptations of the capital, and the distressed state of the country, had drawn to Rome so large a portion of the free population of Italy—when Samnium and some of the neighbouring districts were almost a wilderness, and Etruria was overrun with banditti;—above all, when a conspiracy was known to exist, which struck at the very foundation of the present order of things, sound policy surely demanded that the chief magistrates of the State should themselves propose some expedient which, by relieving the indigent, and restoring Italy in general to a more healthful condition, might deprive the enemies of society of their principal resources. A severe but necessary tax, levied upon all establishments of slaves above a certain number, might have gradually re-supplied the country with a population of free labourers; or, as the agrarian laws were the ordinary method of providing for the poor at Rome, the product of such a tax might have been employed in the purchase or rent of lands to be distributed among the poorer citizens; and such a step, abhorrent as it may be to our notions, might perhaps have alleviated the public distresses, and certainly would have enabled the nobility to resist the attacks of seditious adventurers with a greater consciousness of innocence, and a better claim to the support of the people at large.

B.C. 64. Extravagance of the law of Rullus.

After the defeat of the proposed agrarian law, an attempt was made by some of the popular party to procure the restoration of the children of those whom Sylla had proscribed to the common rights and dignities of citizens, by rendering them eligible to public offices. On this occasion Cicero again displayed his eloquence with success in opposing the law. He alleged that the existing order of things was so much built upon the laws of Sylla,[1] that the sons of those who had suffered under his government could not, without danger, be relieved from the disabilities under which they laboured. Of the justice of this argument we have no adequate means of judging; it admitted, at least, that the exclusion of so many innocent individuals was an evil; but whether their influence, could they have exerted it, would have tended to reform or to revolutionize the actual order of things, we cannot easily determine. From the general profligacy of the times, however, we may conjecture that a depressed party, invested suddenly with power, was not likely to exercise it with moderation, or with any regard to the public welfare.

Proposal for the repeal of the law of Sylla respecting the children of the proscribed.

The next proceeding of the popular party was more clearly

[1] Quinctilian, lib. xi. c. 1, s. 85.

B.C. 64. Trial of C. Rabirius.

deserving of censure. It has been already noticed, that C. Cæsar had, on one or two occasions, expressed with some ostentation his affection for the party of Marius, and he now attempted to vindicate the memory of L. Saturninus, who, having been for a long time the associate of Marius, was afterwards opposed by him as the reluctant instrument of the senate, and, having been taken in actual rebellion, had been murdered by the armed citizens, who broke into his place of confinement. Cæsar,[1] it is said, instigated T. Altius Labienus, at this time one of the tribunes, and afterwards distinguished in Gaul as one of Cæsar's lieutenants, and in the civil war as a partisan of Pompey, to accuse C. Rabirius, an aged senator, as the perpetrator of this murder. The cause was first tried before L. Cæsar and C. Cæsar,[2] who were appointed by lot to act as special commissioners in this case, by virtue of the prætor's order; and the accused was arraigned according to the old law of murder, by which, if he had been found guilty, he would have been condemned to be hanged. But this mode of proceeding was stopped by Rabirius appealing to the people, or by the interference of Cicero as consul,[3] as his speech seems to imply, and his procuring the removal of the cause before another tribunal. The people, however, it is said, were likely to condemn the accused, when Q. Metellus Celer,[4] one of the prætors, obliged the meeting to break up by tearing down the ensign, which was always flying on the Janiculum whilst the people were assembled, and without which, according to ancient custom, they could not lawfully continue their deliberations. In this manner Rabirius escaped; for Labienus or his instigators did not think proper to bring forward the business again; either despairing of finding the people equally disposed to condemn the accused, or from the fact that the progress of the conspiracy of Catiline began now to turn men's attention more entirely to a different subject.

Cicero informs the Senate of the conspiracy.

The comitia for the election of consuls were on the point of being held when Cicero acquainted the senate with some of the facts of which he was in possession relative to the conspiracy, and persuaded them to order the postponement of the elections, that the state of affairs might previously undergo a full discussion.[5] On the following day, when the senators were assembled, Cicero taxed Catiline openly with the criminal designs imputed to him, and called on him to justify himself. But when he had said, in reply, that there were two parties in the commonwealth, the one weak both in its head and its body, the other strong in body but headless, and that he was resolved to supply it with a head, the senate expressed their indignation by a general murmur, and the decree, usual in all

[1] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 12.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvii. c. 42.
[3] Cicero, *pro Rabirio*, c. 4, 5.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Cicero, *pro L. Muræná*, c. 25.

dangerous emergencies,[1] was passed, "That the consuls should provide for the safety of the republic." Cicero, however, did not avail himself as yet of the ample powers thus committed to him; he contented himself with defending his own person on the day of the election, by going down to the Campus Martius attended by a strong escort;[2] and having seen Catiline once more rejected, and D. Junius Silanus and L. Muræna chosen consuls, he continued to learn all Catiline's plans from the information of Curius, and to take the proper precautions to obviate every attempt that might be made of a nature directly hostile. B.C. 64.

The agents of Catiline take up arms in Etruria.

In the meantime C. Manlius, according to the instructions of Catiline, had taken up arms in Etruria,[3] and two others of the conspirators had been despatched to excite insurrections in Picenum and Apulia. To oppose these movements, two of the prætors and two proconsuls, who had lately returned from their provinces, and who, having claimed the honour of a triumph, were both waiting, with their armies not yet disbanded, in the neighbourhood of Rome, were sent into the different quarters where the danger was most threatening; while guards were stationed in different parts of Rome itself, and the public mind was studiously alarmed with reports of the atrocious designs of the conspirators. Catiline, finding himself the object of universal suspicion, offered successively to commit himself to the custody of several individuals of distinction, and amongst others even to that of the consul;[4] but no one would undertake such a charge—Cicero being anxious to oblige him to leave Rome, and the others being, probably, unwilling to incur so great a responsibility, and supposing, perhaps, that Catiline's accomplices in the city were numerous enough to effect his rescue, and that they who held him in custody would be the first marked out for destruction. It appears that Cicero, having full information of the extent of the conspiracy, and knowing that there were many persons engaged in it whom he could not venture to punish without driving them first into some act of open treason, was desirous that it should not merely be checked for a time, and allowed again to prosecute its plans in secret, so as to keep the country in perpetual alarm, but that it should be brought at once to its execution; for he trusted to the precautions which he had taken to ensure the commonwealth from any danger which the explosion might occasion; and after it had taken place he knew that the consular authority might be freely used, to deliver society effectually from those who had so long been plotting against it.

The measures of Catiline were greatly embarrassed by this policy; his accomplices in Rome were restrained and awed by the vigilance of the government, and could not be roused to action; so that he

[1] Cicero, *in Catilinam*, i. c. 2.
[2] Cicero, *pro Murænâ*, c. 26.
[3] Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 27, 30.
[4] Ibid. *in Catilinam*, i. c. 8.

B.C. 64. resolved to put himself at the head of the forces, already in arms in Etruria, and try his fortune in the field. He called together his principal associates,[1] late at night, at the house of M. Porcius Læca; he complained of their inactivity; proposed to them in greater detail his plans for the general insurrection in the country; and declared his own intention of joining the army of C. Manlius without delay, if Cicero could by any means be removed before his departure. Upon this two Roman knights,[2] C. Cornelius and L. Vargunteius, engaged to go early the next morning to the consul's house, to procure an interview with him, and to assassinate him in his own chamber. But Curius did not fail to give information as usual of what had been undertaken; and when the intended assassins arrived at Cicero's doors, they were refused admittance. Notwithstanding this disappointment, there were other parts of the conspirators' plans which might be avoided with greater difficulty, and Cicero assembled the senate on the following day, the eighth of November, in the temple of Jupiter Stator, on the ascent of the Palatine Hill—a place of unusual security from its situation and the nature of its buildings. It was on this occasion that Catiline ventured to appear in the senate to defend himself against the imputations under which he laboured, and was attacked by Cicero in a vehement invective, in which he was told instantly to leave Rome, where all his treasons were now fully known, and would be no longer tolerated. His attempted excuses were drowned by a general cry of indignation; he at once left the senate, and on the very same night quitted the city,[3] and hastened to join his associate Manlius in Tuscany. But on his way thither he wrote letters to several persons of high rank at Rome, still asserting his innocence, and saying that, oppressed as he was by the violence of his enemies, he was going to retire to Marseilles, and there live in banishment, rather than involve his country, on his account, in civil disorders. In the want of those regular channels of information, by which events are so speedily and so surely known in our days from one end of the country to the other, this statement might continue to be believed by a large portion of the people, long after Catiline was really at the head of an insurgent army; and might furnish his partisans with grounds for attacking the administration of Cicero, and possibly might establish a common point on which the leaders of the regular popular party would not refuse to co-operate with them.

Cicero denounces Catiline in the Senate,

and forces him to leave Rome and join his army in Etruria.

After leaving Rome, he waited for a short time in the neighbourhood of Arretium,[4] in order to organize the insurrection in that quarter, and then proceeded to the camp of Manlius near Fæsulæ,

[1] Cicero, *in Catilinam*, i. c. 4. Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 27.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid. ii. c. 1. Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 32.
[4] Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 36, 44, 56.

attended by his lictors, as if he were a lawful magistrate of the commonwealth. The better to maintain this character, he would not receive any of the slaves who offered to enlist in his army, although his agents in Apulia and Picenum were at this very time endeavouring to rekindle the war of Spartacus, by exciting the slaves every where to assert their freedom and rise in arms. But still his forces were so considerable, that the senate, after declaring him and Manlius public enemies, directed the consuls to levy soldiers, and, intrusting Cicero with the care of the city, commissioned his colleague, C. Antonius, to oppose Catiline in the field. The situation of Antonius on this occasion greatly resembled that of Marius, when he was ordered by the senate to act against his old associate, L. Saturninus. We have already mentioned that Antonius had been accused and condemned, some years before, for corruption and oppression in Greece, and that he had been expelled from the senate by the censors, L. Gellius and Cn. Lentulus, in the year B.C. 70. From that time the profligacy of his life had connected him with Catiline, and other persons of similar character, and, in the elections of the preceding year, Catiline had coalesced with him against the pretensions of Cicero; and his success was regarded by Catiline as a most favourable circumstance, even in the midst of his own disappointment.[1] Worthless as Antonius personally was, it was of importance to conciliate him to the cause of the existing constitution, whilst he held the office of consul, lest, if he openly quarrelled with his colleague, he might lend the sanction of the consular name, as Cinna had done before him, to the projects of the enemies of the government. Cicero, therefore, when the consuls, as usual, were to receive by lot the care of some province for the year following their consulship, gave up to Antonius the government of Macedonia,[2] which had fallen to him, and was contented to receive in exchange the less desirable province of Gaul; and by this attention, and by avoiding every thing that could give him offence, he induced Antonius to rest contented with the existing state of affairs, and kept him so distinct from the conspiracy that he could with the less scruple obey the senate in acting against it. The departure of Catiline had still left, however, a dangerous band of conspirators within the walls of Rome,[3] who were, agreeably to his instructions, to set fire to the city in several places on a particular day, and to murder the principal magistrates and supporters of the government during the confusion; while Catiline was to be ready with his army, in the neighbourhood, to cut off all who should escape the massacre and attempt to fly from Rome, and thus should put the finishing stroke to the revolution. Of the conspirators left behind in the capital, the principal were P.

B.C. 64.

Antonius is ordered to march against the conspirators.

[1] Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 21, 26. Asconii, *Argumentum in Ciceron. Orat. Fragm. in Togâ Candidâ.* [2] Cicero, *in L. Pisonem*, c. 2. Plutarch, *in Ciceroni*, c. 12.
[3] Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 39, 43.

B.C. 64. The principal conspirators.


Lentulus Sura, who had been consul in the year B.C. 71, and had been expelled from the senate, like C. Antonius, by the censors, in the year following; C. Cethegus, a man also of noble family, but of infamous life; L. Cassius Longinus; P. Autronius; L. Statilius; and P. Gabinius. Many other persons were connected with these; and it is said that a very large proportion of the young nobility favoured their views, and were ready to assist them by murdering their own parents, when the time fixed for the massacre should arrive. In the meantime attempts were made to throw upon Cicero the odium of the war which had just broken out; and the signal for the execution of the plot was to be given by one of their party, L. Bestia, who was then tribune of the people, and who was to inveigh against the tyranny of the consul in a speech to be delivered in the forum. But the whole conspiracy was timely and completely discovered in a very remarkable manner. There happened to be at Rome some deputies from the Allobroges, a people of Transalpine Gaul,[1] who had been, some years before, added to the Roman dominion, and who had suffered as usual from the oppression of the provincial magistrates. About six or seven years before this period they had especially complained of the exactions of Marius Fonteius, and he had been brought to trial on their accusation; and, although he was warmly defended by Cicero, yet it was admitted that his government had been rigid; and that the Allobroges were now in a state of great distress, and had incurred a heavy public debt. Their deputies were sent to Rome, in the hope of obtaining some relief from the senate; but, finding that they had little to expect from this body, they were, after a time, reduced to despair, when one of the conspirators, who had formerly traded in Gaul, and was personally known to most of the chiefs of the country, addressed them in the forum, and, learning the hopeless state of their affairs, proposed to them, by degrees, that they should join in the conspiracy, telling them its views, and the names of some of the principal members, and promising, if they could excite their countrymen to take up arms against the republic, that they should be perfectly freed from all their difficulties. The offer was tempting; but, on the other hand, the knowledge of so important a secret might enable them to purchase, without any hazard, an ample reward from the government; and they accordingly disclosed the whole transaction to Q. Fabius Sanga, to whom their countrymen usually applied to further their interests when they had any business at Rome, and who lost no time in laying the information before Cicero. The consul directed the Allobroges to keep up their correspondence with the conspirators, and to feign compliance with their wishes, that they might be able, at the proper time, to furnish him with some written proofs of the reality of the plot; for which

Attempt to corrupt the ambassadors of the Allobroges.

Q. Fabius Sanga discloses the conspiracy.

[1] Cicero, *in Catilinam*, iii. c. 2. Sallust, c. 40.

purpose they were instructed to demand that the terms of their agreement should be given them in writing, with the signatures of the principal conspirators, in order that their countrymen in Gaul might know on whom they were to depend. Not only was this request complied with, but the deputies were further desired by Lentulus to visit the camp of Catiline on their way home, and there to confirm with him the alliance which they had contracted with his associates; and T. Vulturtius, a citizen of Croton, who was to accompany them, was charged by Lentulus with a letter, without any signature, which he was to deliver to Catiline. All these things being duly reported to Cicero, he ordered two of the prætors to keep guard on the opposite sides of the Milvian bridge on the night fixed for the departure of the deputies.[1] The train of the Allobroges, B.C. 64.



Pons Milvius, now Ponte Molle.— *Overbeke les Restes de l' Ancienne Rome.*]

accompanied by Volturtius, arrived at the bridge about two or three hours after midnight, on the morning of the third of December; they were instantly stopped by the guards, and, on the appearance of the prætors, quietly surrendered themselves. All their papers were secured, and themselves, together with Volturtius, were taken to Cicero's house a little before sunrise. Messages were immediately despatched to Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, and Gabinius, to require their attendance; and they all, without any suspicion, obeyed the summons. The senate was ordered to meet in the temple of Concord; and there Volturtius, the Allobroges, and the arrested conspirators, were successively brought forward. The first was encouraged to declare freely all that he knew; and, upon his direct evidence, together with that of the Allobroges, confirmed by their own seals and handwriting, the conspirators either confessed their crime, or did not any longer venture to deny it. They were then committed

Arrest of the ambassadors

and of the chief conspirators.

[1] Cicero, *in Catilinam*, iii. c. 2.

B.C. 64. to custody, Lentulus having first resigned the office of prætor with which he was invested.

Scarcely was the meeting of the senate dissolved when Cicero assembled the people in the forum, and there related to them, in detail, the objects of the conspiracy, and the manner in which it had been fully detected. With whatever disappointment the mere profligate rabble might have heard this statement, yet the majority of the people, even of those who on ordinary occasions opposed the aristocratical interest, regarded the wickedness of the plot with horror, and felt thankful to Cicero, whose ability had discovered and destroyed it. Every one was incensed at the project of setting fire to the city,[1] which would have been as ruinous to the poor as to the rich; and, for a moment, all, but the most unprincipled of the community, sympathized with each other in the preservation of the commonwealth. A slight attempt was made by some of the dependents of Lentulus to effect his rescue, and to call on the slaves to join them, and to hire the most notorious leaders of the lower people to excite a disturbance amongst them. But Cicero's vigilance baffled these designs, and the fate of the conspirators depended on the decision of the senate, which assembled on the fifth of December, to determine on their punishment.

Feeling of the populace on the discovery of the plot.

D. Junius Silanus, who was at this time consul elect, gave it as his opinion that the conspirators should be put to death; but C. Cæsar, not pretending to extenuate their guilt, but insisting only that death was by the constitution of Rome an illegal punishment, proposed that their property should be confiscated, and that they should be condemned to perpetual imprisonment in some of the free towns of Italy. His speech is said to have produced a considerable impression; but Q. Catulus, L. Lucullus, C. Piso, and Cicero himself,[2] with most of the senators of consular dignity, still supported the opinion of Silanus. It was reserved, however, for M. Porcius Cato to move the resolution which was finally carried; and in which he combined the highest panegyrics on the conduct of the consul, with a vote that the conspirators should be put to death, according to the ancient customs of the Republic, as having been guilty of manifest treason. In compliance with this decree of the senate, Cicero ordered Lentulus and his accomplices to be carried, on the very same evening, to a secret under-ground cell in the public prison, where they were successively strangled.

Debate on the punishment of the conspirators.

On no occasion were the faults of the Roman constitution more mischievously displayed than in these proceedings. So ill framed were the laws, that the worst criminals could not legally receive that punishment which our natural sense of justice, no less than the maxims of State policy, declares to be the only adequate chastisement of the worst kinds of wickedness. Thus although justice and

Reflections on their execution.

[1] Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 48. [2] Cicero, *ad Atticum Epistolar.* lib. xii. epist. xxi.

the public safety alike demanded the execution of the conspirators, B.C. 64. yet these claims could only be satisfied by an assumption, on the part of the senate, of a power to dispense with the laws, and by another appeal to abstract principles in order to justify a departure from the ordinances of the existing constitution. The advantage thus offered to a popular leader was not lost upon Cæsar; he had now obtained a point on which the sincere but ill-judging friends of liberty might be induced to sympathize with the vilest supporters of sedition; and which might effectually terminate that short-lived harmony between honest men of all parties which had been produced by the first discovery of the conspiracy. It mattered nothing that no traces of a sanguinary or tyrannical spirit were to be found in Cicero's proceedings; that after the execution of five persons, all guilty of the most heinous crime on the clearest evidence, the justice of the government was satisfied; and that its triumph was not stained, as in the case of the Gracchi, by any after-acts of unwarrantable and disgraceful cruelty. Cæsar's ambition required that he should excite the resentment of the people against the senate; and here, as on every other occasion, he sacrificed to it the welfare of his country.

The fate of Catiline himself[1] soon followed the punishment of his associates.[2] His force had at one period amounted nearly to twelve

[1] Sallust, *Catilina*, c. 56, *et seq.*

[2] The conspiracy of Catiline, as described by Sallust and Cicero, is considered by some persons to contain many improbabilities. It is incredible, say they, that a man like Catiline, unconnected with the regular popular party, should have seriously hoped to effect a revolution; nor can it be believed that any of the nobility should have submitted themselves to the guidance of such a leader. Even if he had succeeded in setting fire to the city and destroying the principal senators, the prætor of the nearest province would presently have marched against him, and would have crushed him with little difficulty. But they who argue thus, forget that Catiline was a patrician of noble family, that he had been prætor, and that he was considered by Cicero as his most dangerous competitor for the consulship when he was a candidate for that office. He had been known in Sylla's proscriptions as a man who scrupled at nothing; and there was a large party in Rome to whom such a character was the greatest recommendation, and who would gladly follow any one who possessed it. That this party was inconsiderable in point of political power is true; and they accordingly hoped to effect their designs by fire and assassination rather than by open force. But if Catiline could have once made himself master of the city, no one can doubt but that he would have found a majority in the comitia ready, either from fear or sympathy in his projects, to elect him consul or dictator; and when thus invested with the title of a legal magistrate, and in possession of the seat of government, he would probably have persuaded a very great part of the community to remain neutral, while his own active supporters, the profligate young nobility, the needy plebeians, the discontented Italian allies, and the restless veterans of Sylla's armies, would have enabled him to defy the efforts of any neighbouring prætor who might have been disposed to attack him. He might have held the government as easily as Cinna and Carbo had done; and although Pompey might have imitated successfully the conduct of Sylla, in returning from Asia to revenge the cause of the aristocracy, yet the chance of resisting him was not so hopeless as to dismay a set of desperate conspirators, who, in their calculations, would have been well contented if the probability o their failure was only a little greater than that of their success.

B.C. 64. thousand men, but of these not more than a fourth part were regularly armed, so that he did not choose to venture a battle; but having occupied the line of the Apennines, he manœuvred his troops with considerable ability, sometimes threatening to march towards Rome, and at other times to retreat into Gaul, and never allowing the enemy to bring him to action. But the news of the detection of his accomplices in the city, soon caused a considerable desertion amongst his followers; and, despairing of success from any offensive operations, he fell back upon the neighbourhood of Pistorium, by forced marches, through mountain-roads, hoping that thence he might effect his escape into Gaul without being discovered. But finding that his retreat was cut off by the army of the prætor, Q. Metellus Celer, who, suspecting his designs, had hastened to place himself on his proposed line of march, Catiline altered his plans, and prepared to fight with the consul C. Antonius, who, with a considerable force, had been following him during his retreat. It happened that Antonius either was, or pretended to be indisposed, so that the command devolved on M. Petreius, his lieutenant, an experienced soldier, assisted by P. Sextius,[1] one of the quæstors, who was warmly attached to Cicero, and was heartily desirous of destroying the remains of the conspiracy. Accordingly the army of the Republic did its duty, and the rebels, after a desperate resistance, were totally defeated. C. Manlius, Catiline's lieutenant, was killed before the battle was decided; and Catiline himself, when he saw that the rout of his followers was complete, is said to have rushed into the ranks of the enemy, and there to have been slain. Nothing has been recorded of him to lessen the abhorrence which the general wickedness of his life, and the peculiar atrocity of his designs against his country, have justly deserved, and have ever abundantly met with.

Defeat and death of Catiline.

Cæsar Prætor, Cato Tribune. Account of the early life of Cato.

From this time forward the correspondence of Cicero with his different friends, furnishes us with so many materials for our history, that it becomes necessary, unless we would greatly exceed our limits, to notice only such as are of the greatest importance. When

B.C. 62. C. Cæsar endeavoured to save the accomplices of Catiline from their deserved fate, he was already prætor elect for the following year; and M. Cato, who so successfully opposed him, was, in like manner, about to enter on the office of tribune of the people. Of the family and early life of the former we have already spoken; and as we have now mentioned the name of his great opponent, we may take this opportunity of giving a slight sketch of his extraction also, and of the beginnings of his public career. M. Porcius Cato was the great-grandson of Cato the censor, and the son of M. Cato and Livia, the sister of M. Livius Drusus, and the divorced wife of Q.

[1] Cicero, *pro Sextio*, c. 5.

Servilius Cæpio, who perished in the war with the Italian allies. B.C. 62. His father died when he was a child, and he was brought up in the house of his uncle, M. Drusus;[1] where he is said to have given very early proofs of that resolute and even stubborn character which marked him through life. After the assassination of Drusus, he appears to have passed his time under the care of a tutor named Sarpedon; and his half-brother, Q. Cæpio, after having lost his father, seems to have been placed in the same hands. The lively affection which Cato entertained for his brother was a striking contrast to the general coldness of his nature; and even after his constitutional apathy had been confirmed by the precepts of the Stoic philosophy, he gave vent to the most violent expressions of grief at the death of Cæpio, and celebrated his funeral with a sumptuousness which was most opposite to his usual habits. But with this single sacrifice to the common feelings of humanity, he was in other respects, even in his early youth, so stern and reserved, that he is said rarely to have been seen to laugh; and so determined not to follow the vicious or absurd fashions of his age, that he ran into the opposite extreme of an indecent singularity, choosing in his dress the colour that was most unusual, and walking about with his personal appearance so neglected, as to be utterly unworthy of his rank in the commonwealth.[2] Yet he was not without feelings of anger; which he displayed towards Q. Cæcilius Metellus Scipio,[3] who had married the lady to whom he himself was engaged; and whom he attacked, in consequence, in a violently satirical poem, after he was persuaded by his friends to abandon his intention of obtaining redress in a court of law. He was carefully just in his conduct; and it is mentioned of him that, when he was travelling through Asia as a private individual,[4] he contented himself often with the entertainment of the common inns, instead of taxing the hospitality of the principal inhabitants, which, it seems, was the usual practice of the Roman nobility in their journeys through the provinces. When the inns could not accommodate him, he applied to the magistrates to receive him; but as he used no imperious or threatening language, he frequently was treated with neglect. This is an odious picture of the ordinary tyranny of the Roman government, and the debasement of character which such a system produced among those who suffered from it; nay, even Cato himself is said to have been much offended when he was not treated with attention; and to have warned the magistrates that other Romans would not imitate his forbearance, but would exact by force a better reception. It is a wretched state of society when good men are proud of themselves merely for abstaining from acts of positive injustice.

Character of Cato.

[1] Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 1, &c.

[2] Ibid. c. 7. [3] Ibid. c. 6. [4] Ibid. c. 12.

B.C. 62. In preparing himself to enter upon his political career at Rome, Cato had resolved to support the ancient constitution of his country, and to resist what he regarded as the growing corruptions of the age in which he lived. From the pursuit of this object he was never diverted by any considerations of friendship, interest, or fear: but he did not follow it always with a cool and enlightened judgment; and his personal animosities and prejudices sometimes influenced him, insensibly perhaps to himself, in opposing, with excessive vehemence, those whom he deemed the enemies of the commonwealth. The debate concerning the accomplices of Catiline was well calculated to display the predominant features of Cato's character; his moral courage and contempt of popularity, in braving the odium which was likely, owing to Cæsar's speech, to fall upon those who voted for the death of the criminals; his zealous support of the old authority of the senate, and his abhorrence of those who sought to overturn it. But a very short time before, he had given a proof of his zeal, the wisdom of which was more questionable, in joining to prosecute L. Muræna, one of the consuls elect, for bribery during his election—a charge which he could not substantiate, and which was likely to divide, unseasonably, the friends of the constitution at a moment when their close union was so necessary. On the whole, however, the senate looked forward to his services with sanguine hope during the ensuing year; and the support of one firm tribune was particularly needed, as Q. Metellus Nepos, a friend of Pompey and a warm enemy of the aristocracy, who was one of Cato's colleagues in the tribuneship, was expected to employ his year of office in promoting measures most unwelcome to the party of the senate.

Proceedings of Q. Metellus Nepos against the Aristocracy.

The first measure which was adopted, on Cato's recommendation, displayed a more politic and conciliating temper than he usually appeared to possess. Already the poorest classes of the people began to murmur at the execution of Catiline's accomplices, and to complain that the senate was prompt enough in repressing seditions, but never bestowed a thought on relieving the sufferings of the poorer citizens. Q. Metellus was disposed to support these discontents by charging Cicero with the illegal murder of Roman citizens without trial; and C. Cæsar, the idol of the populace, was ready to unite his intrigues and his eloquence to further the same purposes. Cato, therefore, advised the senate to pass a corn-law,[1] by which the sum of 1250 talents was to be annually employed in purchasing corn for the maintenance of the poor; and the thankfulness with which this bounty was received, ought to have encouraged the senate to devote their attention seriously to the discovery of some plan for the permanent improvement of the condition of the lower

[1] Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 26, *in Cæsare*, c. 8.

classes of the community. As for the attacks made by Metellus upon Cicero's consulship, they had no other immediate effect than to draw from the senate some strong resolutions,[1] by which every person who should presume to question the justice of the late executions, was declared an enemy to his country. Metellus after this did not venture to proceed any further; but he proposed a law for the recall of Pompey with his army, to remedy the existing grievances of the State; and, when this measure was frustrated by the opposition of Cato, he left Rome, and withdrew to Pompey's army,[2] as if apprehending personal danger from the violence of his opponents. At the same time C. Cæsar was suspended by a decree of the senate from the discharge of his office as prætor;[3] but, on his submitting to their authority, and refusing the proffered aid of the populace to reinstate him by force, he was soon afterwards restored by another decree, and received many compliments in the senate on his dutiful behaviour. The year then appears to have passed on in tolerable tranquillity, except that apprehensions were entertained by many lest Pompey, exasperated at the pretended affronts offered to Metellus, should be tempted to follow the example of Sylla, and cross over with his army into Italy to interfere, by force, with the government. But Pompey was greatly wronged by these suspicions. He was ambitious, indeed, of exercising a commanding influence in the commonwealth, and was gratified by seeing one of his lieutenants, M. Calpurnius Piso, elected consul, when he sent him home from the army to be a candidate for that dignity, and had avowedly exerted all his interest in his favour. This, however, was the utmost extent of his wishes; and, far from entertaining any treasonable or revengeful designs, he no sooner landed in Italy in the winter of this year,[4] than he disbanded his army, and repaired to Rome, attended only by a few of his friends. As he was not allowed to enter the city whilst laying claim to a triumph, the people, in compliment to him, were assembled without the walls, and he there addressed them for the first time after an absence of six years. All parties were waiting with anxiety to hear his sentiments on the state of the Republic, and all, according to Cicero, were alike disappointed.[5] But it may well be doubted whether it were really a just subject of blame in Pompey, that his speech did not espouse sufficiently the interests of any particular party to satisfy their expectations, or excite their applause.

B.C. 62.

Return of Pompey to Rome.

A short time before the end of the year B.C. 62, an affair had taken place which, at the moment of Pompey's arrival, was attracting

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvii. p. 49. edit. Leunclav.
[2] Ibid. Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 29.
[3] Suetonius, *in Julio Cæsare*, c. 16.
[4] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. i. epist. xiv. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 65.
[5] *Ad Atticum*, lib. i. epist. xiv.

B.C. 62. P. Clodius is detected in Cæsar's house during the celebration of the mysteries of the Bona Dea.

particularly the public attention. P. Clodius Pulcher, a young man of the highest nobility, whose father and grandfather had both been consuls, was detected in disguise in the house of C. Cæsar,[1] during the celebration of certain mysteries, which were annually performed at the houses of some of the higher magistrates, and from which every person of the male sex was most carefully excluded. Clodius was a man of infamous life, and the cause commonly alleged for this act of profanation, was an adulterous intrigue in which he was said to be engaged with Cæsar's wife.[2] The matter, however, was taken up very earnestly, and, being mentioned in the senate by Q. Cornificius, was submitted to the pontifices, and by them pronounced to be an act of sacrilegious wickedness.[3] Upon this decision, a motion was founded in the senate to bring Clodius to trial; and this gave occasion to some warm debates. The offender, from various causes, was provided with powerful supporters; his family-interest, probably, was extensive, and he had violently opposed Lucullus, and had encouraged the discontent of his soldiers against him,[4] whilst acting as that general's lieutenant in the war with Mithridates; by which conduct he had recommended himself both to the populace and the partisans of Pompey, to whom Lucullus was equally odious. Besides, there was probably a large portion of the young nobility and of the profligate citizens of all ranks, who naturally sympathized with Clodius from similarity of character, and who would regard him as an injured man when threatened with a prosecution for an act of irreligion. Accordingly, when it was proposed to the people that Clodius should be brought to trial, and that the prætor should himself select a certain number of judges to decide the cause with him,[5] M. Piso, the consul, opposed the measure, and the popular party were so clamorous against it that it was deemed advisable to withdraw it. Q. Fufius,[6] one of the tribunes, then moved that Clodius should still be tried, but that the judges, instead of being named by the prætor, should be chosen as usual by lot from the different orders in whose hands the judicial power was then placed. This proposal was approved by the people, and the trial, from thenceforward, according to Cicero, became a mere mockery. The judges, thus indiscriminately chosen, were men not inaccessible either to fear or to corruption. The rabble (by which term must be understood not the poorest but the most profligate of the people, consisting in a great degree of the young nobility) was clamorous for the acquittal of Clodius, and money was distributed so liberally by his friends, that sentence was pronounced in his favour by a majority of six votes out of fifty-six.

He is tried and acquitted. B.C. 61.

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. i. epist. xii.
[2] Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 9. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 70.
[3] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. i. epist. xiii.
[4] Plutarch, *in Lucullo*, c. 34.
[5] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. i. epist. xiv.
[6] Ibid. lib. i. epist. xvi.

The trial of Clodius came on in the spring of the year B.C. 61, and C. Cæsar about the same time set out for Spain, which was allotted to him as his province on the expiration of his prætorship. He had divorced his wife on account of the suspicion which her character had incurred from the circumstances of the late profanation of the mysteries; but, ever careful not to compromise his popularity, he had taken no part against Clodius,[1] and professed not to believe that he was guilty. His debts were so enormous[2] that he could not leave Rome till some of his friends, amongst whom M. Crassus is particularly mentioned, became his sureties with his creditors for very considerable sums. When he was thus enabled to enter upon the government of his province, he displayed the same ability, and the same unscrupulous waste of human lives, for the purposes of his ambition, which distinguished his subsequent career. In order to retrieve his fortune, to gain a military reputation, and to entitle himself to the honour of a triumph, he attacked some of the native tribes on the most frivolous pretences,[3] and thus enriched himself and his army, and gained the credit of a successful general, by the plunder and massacre of these poor barbarians. Probably, also, the spoils which he collected on this occasion enabled him to solicit and procure from the senate an abatement of the taxes paid by the province of Spain[4]—a favour which of course gained him numerous friends amongst the wealthy inhabitants of the seaports of that country. But while thus employed his eyes were constantly fixed on the state of things at Rome. The prospect appeared favourable to his ambition, and, accordingly, after an absence of about twelve months, he returned home to claim a triumph for his victories, and to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship.

B.C. 62.

Cæsar receives Spain as his Province.

His conduct during his command there.

State of affairs in Rome during his absence.

The remainder of the year B.C. 61 had passed away unmarked by anything of considerable importance, and L. Afranius and Q. Metellus Celer were chosen consuls for the year following. Metellus, although the brother of the late tribune, Metellus Nepos, had yet shown his attachment on several occasions to the aristocratical party: he had, during his prætorship, been the means of saving C. Rabirius, when tried for the murder of Saturninus; and when, after his prætorship, he was appointed to the province of Gaul, he had behaved with great zeal in supporting the government, and in opposing Catiline in the field. Afranius owed his elevation entirely to the interest of Pompey, who, according to Cicero,[5] spent a large sum of money in securing votes in his favour. He is described as a man totally destitute of political influence,[6] and so insignificant as to have been of little or no service in forwarding the views of his patron. It appears that

B.C. 61–60.

[1] Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 10.
[2] Ibid. c. 11. Suetonius, c. 18.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvii. p. 53.
[4] Hirtius, *de Bello Hispaniensi*, c. 42.
[5] *Ad Atticum*, lib. i. epist. xvi. sect. 7.
[6] Cicero, *ubi supra*. Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvii. p. 51, 52.

B.C. 60. Pompey at this time severely felt the jealousy with which he was regarded by the aristocracy. His successive appointments to the command against the pirates and against Mithridates had been carried in spite of the opposition of the nobles; and in those commands he had given the greatest offence, first to Q. Metellus, when he interfered to save the Cretans from his cruelties, and afterwards to L. Lucullus, when he deprived him of the honour of finishing a war which he had so long been engaged in conducting. But both Metellus and Lucullus were men of great influence in the senate; and, now that Pompey was returned from Asia, they exerted themselves to prevent the ratification of his various acts[1]—it being requisite that all measures adopted by a general, in settling the state of the conquered provinces after a war, should receive the sanction of the senate's authority. Mortified at this treatment, and thinking it an affront that his measures should be separately canvassed, and confirmed or annulled according to the pleasure of others, he connected himself with the party in opposition to the senate—not intending, if we may judge from his general character, to follow the steps of Marius or Cinna, but rather fancying that he might avail himself of the support of the popular party, just so far as to force the aristocracy to cease from opposing him; and that, by a dexterous management of the two contending interests in the State, he might be acknowledged by the general deference of all to be the first person in the commonwealth, without raising himself by violence to a situation of actual supremacy. Amongst other things, he was particularly desirous to procure settlements of lands for the soldiers who had served under him—a reward which, if we may trust Plutarch's report,[2] he had on former occasions procured for those who had followed him in his early campaigns, and a measure which was sure to confer on a general the highest popularity. Accordingly, L. Flavius, one of the tribunes, as early as the month of January, brought forward an agrarian law,[3] it having been judged expedient to extend the proposed grant of lands to the poorer citizens in general, as well as to the soldiers of Pompey, in order to make the resolution more acceptable to the people at large. It was intended that the lands to be thus distributed should be purchased by the revenue arising from Pompey's new conquests, which, accordingly, for the next five years, was to be appropriated to this object.[4] This law, like every other of the same nature, was warmly opposed by the aristocracy, headed by the consul Metellus; and on the other hand it was supported by Pompey, as might be imagined, with all his interest. Cicero declared himself favourable to the

Conduct of Metellus and Lucullus.

Agrarian Law of L. Flavius.

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 66. Florus, lib. iv. c. 2.
[2] *In Lucullo*, c. 34.
[3] Cicero *ad Atticum*, lib. i. epist. xviii. Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvii. p. 52.
[4] Ibid. epist. xix.

principle of it, but proposed various modifications to prevent it from injuring the rights of individuals; and these alterations, he tells us, were favourably listened to by the people. The alarm of a war in Transalpine Gaul, which threatened the State, about the beginning of March, drew off the public attention from the law; but, when the prospect of affairs cleared up abroad, the internal disputes were renewed; and it appears that they continued through a great part of the year, and that the resistance of the aristocracy was so determined that, although L. Flavius on one occasion ordered the consul, Q. Metellus, to be sent to prison for obstructing the progress of the law,[1] yet he was finally unable to gain his object; and Pompey could neither obtain settlements for his soldiers nor prevail upon the senate to pass the desired confirmation of his acts in Asia. B.C. 60.

In this state of affairs Cæsar returned from Spain about the middle of June, wishing at once to obtain a triumph, and to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship. But as the time of the elections was drawing near, and no officer was allowed to enter the city whilst waiting the permission of the senate to triumph, he petitioned that he might be admitted as a candidate in his absence.[2] This, however, being opposed in the senate, and particularly by Cato, Cæsar gave up all thoughts of his triumph, and, entering the city, immediately commenced his canvass. He had already effected that famous coalition between Pompey, Crassus, and himself, which has been distinguished by the name of the Triumvirate, or "Commission of Three"—an appellation borrowed from the usual number of persons employed by the senate as commissioners for executing any particular service, and bestowed in mockery upon the three individuals who were purposing to dispose of the whole government of the commonwealth with no authority but their own ambition. The secret conditions of this union cannot of course be otherwise known than from the subsequent conduct of the parties who formed it; but we may conjecture that Cæsar was anxious to secure a military command on an extensive scale, which he might enjoy during several years, that he too, as Pompey had done, might possess a veteran army attached to his person, and that he might employ it, as Pompey had *not* done, in procuring for himself whatever he might choose to demand. Pompey, on his part, offended with the aristocracy, seeing that he might obtain, through Cæsar's support, that ratification of his acts in Asia, and those settlements for his soldiers which had been so long denied him, and too vain to imagine that his own exploits, or his consideration among the people, could ever be rivalled;—contemplating, besides, the immediate prospect of enjoying an undivided supremacy at Rome for some years, during the absence

Cæsar returns from Spain.

The first Triumvirate.

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxvii. p. 52. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ii. epist. i.
[2] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 18. Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 13.

B.C. 60. of Cæsar, and too willing to calculate that the danger which is at a distance may be timely dispelled by some unforeseen contingencies; Pompey, for all these reasons, listened to the advances of Cæsar with readiness and without suspicion. Crassus was, like Cæsar, ambitious of obtaining a military command, and perhaps flattered himself that, while the personal character of his two associates might direct their jealousy chiefly against one another, he might be able, by his immense wealth, to secure himself in the enjoyment of his greatness hereafter, even without their co-operation. But with whatever views these confederates were actuated, their coalition was as dangerous to the State as the exorbitance of the prizes which they secured to themselves, and the violence used in order to obtain them, were actually destructive of the existing constitution of their country.

Consulship of Cæsar and Bibulus. B.C. 59. Supported by such powerful assistants in addition to his own popularity, Cæsar was elected consul without difficulty—the aristocratical party succeeding, however, in giving him as a colleague M. Calpurnius Bibulus, on whose attachment to their cause they could fully depend. But it seems that the contending interests in the republic were very unequally matched. On the aristocratical side there was neither unanimity nor vigour. Q. Catulus was lately dead, and his high character and long habits of acting as the head of a party, rendered his loss particularly severe. Those who had succeeded to his station—L. Lucullus, Q. Hortensius, and others of less renown with posterity—were mostly engrossed, if we may believe Cicero,[1] with their own private luxuries, and allowed their public duties to lie neglected. M. Cicero was in many respects so situated as to regard the dissensions of his countrymen with unusual impartiality. His birth placed a barrier between him and the high nobility which they were never able entirely to forget; while, on the other hand, the principles on which he had always acted, and which he had more particularly enforced in his consulship, rendered him an object of aversion to the violent popular party, and removed him from any participation in the ambitious schemes of the triumvirate. But, according to his own statement,[1] the impolicy of his friends, in holding a tone of unseasonable severity, had so alienated from the cause of the republic many of those whom it had been his endeavour in his public conduct to conciliate, that he considered the state of affairs utterly unpromising, and, during the eventful year which was now about to commence, he absented himself almost entirely from the business of the commonwealth. The most active defender of the aristocratical cause was M. Cato, who, although he filled no magistracy, nor enjoyed any political rank, yet, by his birth, his

[1] *Ad Atticum*, lib. ii. epist. i.
[2] Ibid. epist. i., lib. i. epist. xvii. xviii.

unshaken integrity, and his great courage, had rendered himself a person of considerable importance. Towards Cæsar he entertained a fixed animosity, which he retained to the very end of his life; and the notoriety of this feeling deprived his opposition perhaps of some of the weight to which it otherwise would have been entitled. But had Cato's influence been much greater than it was, it could have availed little against the united power of Pompey, Cæsar, and Crassus, supported as it was at present by the whole strength of the popular party, and arming itself unscrupulously with all those violent means which had been practised in former times by L. Saturninus, P. Sulpicius, Marius, or Sylla. B.C. 59.

The Agrarian Law of Cæsar.

We have said that Pompey had been unable to carry the agrarian law of L. Flavius during the preceding year. The first fruits of his coalition with Cæsar were seen in the agrarian law proposed by the new consul early in the year, and by which it was proposed to grant settlements to twenty thousand citizens in Campania[1]—one of the richest districts in Italy, which had been let out under the Roman government since the second Punic war, and which no former author of an agrarian law, except the tribune Rullus during the consulship of Cicero, had ever ventured to give up to distribution among the people. The division of these lands among the settlers was to be committed to twenty commissioners, who were to be invested with full powers to manage it as they thought proper. It appears from Dion Cassius that Cæsar had at first designed to do little more than bring forward anew the law of Flavius, and that he submitted it to the senate, endeavouring to procure their concurrence in it. But, finding that body obstinate in opposing it, on no other grounds, it is said, but because it was an innovation, he resolved to propose it to the people in a more popular form, and to carry it by their authority alone. Bibulus, his colleague, with three of the tribunes, did all in their power to oppose it, and, despairing of success by any other means, they endeavoured to break up the assembly from time to time by reporting that thunder had been heard[2]—an occurrence which, according to the law of Rome, should have immediately suspended the business of the forum. But P. Vatinius, a tribune, entirely devoted to Cæsar, had declared on entering upon his office,[3] that he would regard none of those obstructions which the augurs might throw in the way of his measures by reporting their observations on the state of the heavens; and, as he now was busily engaged in supporting the agrarian law, he provided an armed rabble to abet him in his proceedings, and thus defying the opposition of his colleagues, and ordering Bibulus on one occasion to be sent to

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 70. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ii. epist. vii. Dion Cassius, lib. xxxviii. p. 59.

[2] Cicero, *in Vatinium*, c. 7. Dion Cassius, lib. xxxviii. p. 61.

[3] Ibid. c. 6.

B.C. 59. prison, and at another time driving him out of the forum by violence, he procured by these means the enactment of the law.

It was after several similar riots, in which Bibulus found his life endangered, that he confined himself entirely to his own house,[1] and contented himself with issuing strong protests and invectives against the measures of his colleague. Cæsar, thus finding himself relieved from all opposition, proceeded to fulfil the conditions of his union with Pompey, by procuring from the people a law ratifying all his acts;[2] and he seized the opportunity of gratifying the equestrian order by another law, for the relief of the farmers of the revenue, who, having, in their eagerness to obtain the contract,[3] offered too large a sum for the rent of the taxes in the newly conquered provinces, had afterwards petitioned the senate that this agreement might be relaxed a little in their favour. Their petition had been first presented towards the end of the year B.C. 61, and had been constantly rejected, Cato on all occasions speaking against it with great vehemence. It was now granted by the people through the influence of Cæsar; and thus the affections of a powerful body of men were alienated from the aristocracy, at a time when their assistance was most needed.

Other laws of Cæsar.

These, however, were all of them measures with regard to which good and wise men might fairly differ, however much they condemned the violent means by which they were carried. It now remained that the triumvirs should provide more directly for their own aggrandizement. Accordingly, P. Vatinius moved, before the people, that the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum should be given to Cæsar for five years, with an army of three legions,[4] although the disposal of such commands was vested, by the law as it then stood, in the senate alone. The people, as may be supposed, readily agreed to the grant; and the senate, wishing perhaps to increase the weight of Cæsar's employments abroad, and to remove him farther from the city, added to his government the province of Transalpine Gaul, and voted him another legion. Meantime Pompey had connected himself more closely with Cæsar,[5] by marrying his daughter, Julia; and Cæsar, on his part, married Calpurnia, the daughter of L. Piso, intending that his father-in-law, Piso, and A. Gabinius, an old partisan of Pompey, should succeed in the following year to the consulship. At the same time the adoption of P. Claudius into a plebeian family had been effected through the influence of Pompey and Cæsar,[6] in order that he might be able to be elected tribune of


The Province of Gaul given to Cæsar.

[1] Cicero. *in Vatinium*, c. 9. *Ad Atticum*, lib. ii. epist. xix. xx. xxi.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxviii. p 62.
[3] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. i. epist. xvii. xviii. *Pro Plancio*, c. 14.
[4] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 22. Cicero, *in Vatinium*, c. 15. *De Provinciis Consular*, c. 12.
[5] Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 14.
[6] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ii. epist. xii. *Pro Domo*, c. 16. Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 20.

the people. It is probable that he was considered generally as a B.C. 59. useful instrument to keep the aristocratical party in a state of depression and alarm; and Cæsar, it is said, offended by the manner in which Cicero spoke of the triumvirate, was disposed to co-operate with Claudius in those measures which were more particularly aimed against him personally. But the transactions which led to Cicero's exile belong more properly to the subsequent year; and the story of Cæsar's consulship may be closed by observing that, after seeing Piso and Gabinius elected consuls, according to the wish of the triumvirate, and leaving Claudius in possession of the tribuneship, and bent on effecting the destruction of Cicero, he set out from Rome early in the spring of the year B.C. 58, to commence his long career of conquests in Gaul.[1]

At this point our narrative of the internal affairs of the commonwealth may be allowed to pause, while the reader's attention is directed to a further detail of the events which had previously occurred under Crassus in Parthia. The latter expedition, indeed, did not take place till a period somewhat later than that which we have now reached; but, as it is quite distinct from the course of events at Rome, it may be a little anticipated, in order that the thread of our story may not be interrupted, as we proceed from the exile of Cicero to the actual beginning of the civil war.

[1] Cæsar, *de Bello Gallico*, lib. i. c. 5, 6.



[Ruins of the Walls of Rome.—*Overbeke les Restes de l' Ancienne Rome.*]



[Kings of Parthia.— *Visconti.*]

CHAPTER III.

EARLY HISTORY OF PARTHIA.

PART I.

FROM B.C. 245 TO B.C. 53.

B.C. 245. Rise of the Parthians.

OF this country scarcely anything authentic is to be found in the page of history till after the conquests of Alexander the Great. Before that time the Parthians appear to have been in subjection, first to the Medes, and afterwards to the Persians; and, when the latter people were subdued by the arms of Macedon, their tributaries in the north likewise found themselves compelled to acknowledge the same masters, and to share in the same government.

In the division of the Macedonian empire, Parthia was included in that portion of the Asiatic territory which fell to Seleucus Nicator; and it seems to have continued, without any interruption, under the authority of Syrian kings, till about two hundred and fifty years before the Christian era, when the natives, enraged at the tyrannical conduct of a local commander, displayed the standard of revolt, and asserted their independence. Arsaces, to whom the Parthians committed the direction of the war, proved himself worthy of the confidence which his countrymen had reposed in him; for he not only defeated Seleucus Callinicus and drove him out of the province, but also, when the Syrian monarch afterwards renewed his invasion, he overthrew his army in a great battle, took the king himself prisoner, and detained him in captivity till the day of his death.[1]

Arsaces I.

The Parthians, after this, having placed their successful general on the throne, reduced Hyrcania and some other contiguous

[1] Justin, lib. xli. c. 4. Appian, *Syriac*, c. 65.

provinces, and thereby, at once, added materially to their own power, and weakened that of their former rulers. But an unfortunate battle with Ariarathes, the King of Cappadocia, shook the foundations of their new State, deprived them of their brave Prince, who fell in the action, and exposed them to the renewed hostility of Alexander's successors, who continued to resent the loss of so much territory and of so many warlike subjects. B.C. 245.

But the attention of Antiochus the Great, who had now assumed the reins of the Syrian Government, was soon diverted from the affairs of Parthia. A war with Ptolemy Evergetes employed so entirely his arms and his councils, that Arsaces the Second found himself at liberty to invade Media, and to reduce a considerable portion of that valuable country. The Parthians, however, were not allowed to retain either a long or a tranquil possession of their conquest. Arsaces was compelled to retrace his steps in the presence of an overwhelming host of Syrians; and, although he immediately thereafter brought into the field 100,000 foot and 20,000 horse, he was glad to terminate the war with a treaty, which allowed him, on certain conditions, to remain master of his paternal dominions. Arsaces II.

Priapatius was the third king of Parthia; but he has left no memorial of success or misfortune to occupy the pen of history, or to call forth the praise or reproof of the annalist. He had three sons, Phraates, Mithridates, and Artabanus; the first of whom succeeded him on the throne, and signalized his arms by a splendid victory over the Mardians, who had never yielded to any other invader but Alexander the Great. Mithridates, in like manner, added to the reputation of his kingdom by subduing the Bactrians, Elymæans, and certain other barbarous tribes which were said to inhabit the banks of the Indus, and to have witnessed the most eastern triumph of the Macedonian conqueror. The rapid progress of the Parthian chief could not fail to awaken the fears of Syria. Demetrius Nicator, accordingly, who then governed the remaining provinces of Seleucus, made an attempt to recover the ground which he had lost; but he was entirely defeated at the head of a large army, taken prisoner on the field, and thrown into a miserable captivity, from which he was only released by death. Upon this, Mithridates made himself master of Babylonia and Mesopotamia, as well as of the greater part of those more eastern provinces which border on the Indian rivers.[1] Priapatius. Phraates. Mithridates.

Phraates, the son of Mithridates, had to encounter a more unequal fortune than that which had crowned the efforts of his more active predecessors. The king of Syria, Antiochus Sidetes, raised a large army and marched against him, with the view of obtaining the liberation of his brother, Demetrius, who still groaned under Parthian Phraates II.

[1] Justin, *ut supra*. Appian, *Syriac*. Strabo, lib. xi. and xii. Justin, lib. xl. c. 6.

B.C. 245. chains. The first efforts of the invader were accompanied with singular success. He defeated Phraates in three pitched battles, stripped him of all the conquests achieved by his father, and confined him within the narrow limits of his hereditary dominions. But afterwards, either from an undue use of his victories, or from the difficulty of retaining military occupation of so extensive an empire, the Syrian fell a victim to the treachery or to the courage of the vanquished, was cut off with his numerous army, and deprived at once of his crown and his life.[1]

At this period the Scythians began to manifest no small degree of jealousy at the aggrandizement of the Parthian power; and, taking the field against Phraates, they fully avenged the quarrel of Antiochus Sidetes, by inflicting on the former a most signal defeat. Phraates fell, with nearly the whole of his troops, and was immediately

Artabanus. succeeded in the government by Artabanus, his father's brother. Nor was the success of the new king against his Scythian enemies more flattering than that of his nephew; for he, in like manner, soon after his accession, was routed in the field of battle, and put to death with the greater number of his followers. The sceptre forthwith

Pacorus I. passed into the hands of Pacorus the First, whose reign is chiefly distinguished by the alliance which he contracted with the Romans.

Phraates III. His successor, Phraates the Third, alarmed by the ambitious views of these western republicans, ventured to set their enmity at defiance, and to grant protection to the young king of Armenia, the son of Tigranes the Great. He gave him his daughter in marriage; and, advancing with a powerful armament, was determined to expel the Romans from their conquest, and reinstate the lawful heir, when the approach of Pompey effected an alteration in his measures, and induced him to renew the treaty with the Romans.[2]

Orodes. Expedition of Crassus.

Orodes, the second son of Phraates the Third, was on the throne when Crassus formed the resolution of invading Parthia. The motive to this memorable and unfortunate undertaking was not the desire of military reputation, nor even of political ascendency, on the part of this triumvir, but the mere rapacious love of wealth, which formed the leading principle of his character, and which overshadowed or perverted his brilliant talents and singular strength of mind. Unequal to Cæsar and Pompey in the art or fame of a general, he sought to obtain a balance to their power in the possession of riches, which, in the luxurious and mercenary habit of mind which then began to prevail at Rome, he regarded as a full equivalent for the glory of victories and the brilliancy of a triumph. Crassus, at the same time, was no mean soldier. On the contrary, his services under Sylla, and the success which crowned his arms in the arduous war with

[1] Josephus, lib. xiii. c. 8. Diod. *Excerp.* p. 603. Appian, *Syriac*, c. 68. Ælian, lib. x. c. 34.

[2] Justin, lib. xlii. c. 1. Strabo, lib. xi.

Spartacus, the accomplished leader of the revolted gladiators, had raised his name to an enviable place among the commanders of his day; and it was only when he fixed his eyes on the lofty station which was occupied by his two colleagues in the triumvirate that he yielded to the impression, which the current of events had already formed in his mind, that he would most effectually maintain his influence at Rome by a judicious display of wealth, and by a seasonable exercise of political skill. The invasion of Parthia, therefore, was contemplated by him with unbounded delight, rather because he hoped to fill his coffers with the treasures of the east than that he coveted the fame of returning to the city at the head of victorious legions.[1] B.C. 245.

It was not without considerable opposition from the people and the tribunes that Crassus was allowed to proceed on this expedition. All the influence of Pompey was necessary to prevent an expression of popular wrath. When the consul had reached the gate of the city the tribune Ateius attempted to stop him by force; but, failing in this, he immediately proceeded to perform a religious ceremony of the most appalling nature, by which he devoted the general himself, and all who should follow him on that service, to the wrath of the infernal gods and a speedy destruction. The Romans, according to Plutarch, were wont to maintain that these mysterious and ancient imprecations have such power that the object of them never escapes their effect; nay, they insist, the person who utters them is sure to be unhappy, so that they are seldom used, and never but upon some great occasion. Ateius, says he, was much blamed for his rash zeal. It was for his country's sake that he was an adversary to Crassus, and yet, he adds, it was his country that he laid under that terrible curse.[2] Evil omens at its commencement. B.C. 55.

Embarking at Brundusium, Crassus proceeded by Macedonia and the Hellespont into Asia. In passing through Galatia, he found Deiotarus, the sovereign of that principality, now advanced in age, devising the plan of a new city, and providing the means for an increased population, upon which he is said to have observed to the veteran chief, that "he was beginning a great work at a late hour!" "Nor do you," replied Deiotarus, "commence at a very early period the conquest of Parthia!" The youngest of these interlocutors was upwards of sixty.

As the enemy was not prepared for this unprovoked invasion, the Romans met with no resistance. At first Crassus overran the greater part of Mesopotamia, and received the subjection of all the towns, of which only one ventured to make the smallest opposition; and, had he taken advantage of the consternation into which his sudden His first successes.

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xl.
[2] Plutarch, *in Vitâ Crassi.* Appian, *de Bello Parthico.*

B.C. 55. appearance had thrown the Parthians, he might, with the greatest ease, have extended his conquest to Babylonia itself. But the season being far advanced, he did not think it expedient to proceed. On the contrary, having left, in the different towns and strongholds, a detachment of seven thousand foot and a thousand horse, he returned into Syria and took up his winter quarters. This retrograde movement has been greatly condemned; and, says Plutarch, among the many errors which Crassus committed in this war, the first, and one of the greatest, was his returning so soon into Syria. His occupations, too, during the winter, have been heavily censured, as having more of the trader in them than of the general. Instead of improving the discipline of the soldiers and keeping them in proper exercise, he spent his time in making inquiry relative to the revenues of the cities, and in weighing the treasures which he found in the temple of Hierapolis.

Treachery of Ariamnes.

In the spring the Roman commander took the field on the frontier of Syria, with seven legions, four thousand horse, and an equal number of light or irregular troops. With this force he again passed the Euphrates, when he was joined by an Arabian chief, whom Plutarch calls Ariamnes, but who is elsewhere named Acbarus or Abgarus; and in this barbarian, owing to his knowledge of the country and his warm and reiterated expressions of attachment to the Romans, Crassus unfortunately placed the most entire confidence. Here he had likewise expected to meet Artabazus, or Artavasdes, king of Armenia, who had promised a reinforcement of troops and a supply of provisions; but the vigilant Orodes had prevented the junction, by invading the kingdom of Armenia in person, while he left Surena, a young officer of great reputation, in Mesopotamia to oppose the Romans.

Military plans of Crassus.

Crassus, we are told, intended to have followed the course of the Euphrates till he should reach the point where it approaches nearest to Seleucia and Ctesiphon, the capital of the Parthian kingdom; but was dissuaded by his guide, the crafty Ariamnes, who prevailed on him to direct his march eastward on the plains, where he might easily carry the position occupied by Surena, and at once effect his entrance into the enemy's country. Some parties, too, that had been sent in advance to examine the route which the army was to take in that direction, returned with a report that they had not actually seen any enemy, but that they had observed the tracks of a large body of cavalry which appeared to be retreating. In this way was Crassus induced to quit the Euphrates, and to march through the desert towards the town of Carrhæ. Having garrisoned this inconsiderable place, he proceeded still in an easterly direction, till at length he arrived in the heart of a country covered with barren sand, and without the slightest appearance of trees, herbage, or water. At this stage of their progress, when the Romans were

already much discouraged and fatigued, a few horsemen, belonging to the advanced guard, fell back upon the main body in the greatest alarm, conveying the unwelcome intelligence that their party had been suddenly surrounded by numerous bodies of cavalry, and almost entirely cut in pieces, and, moreover, that the enemy were hastening to the attack, and must soon be in sight.[1] B.C. 55.

We are informed by Plutarch, who, in his life of Crassus, copies very closely both Appian and Dion Cassius, that, before the Romans had left Syria in the spring, a deputation from the Parthian monarch appeared in their camp to remonstrate with their consul on the injustice and impolicy of his invasion. To the proposals made by this barbarian embassy, Crassus replied that "he would give them his answer at Seleucia." Upon which Vasiges, the oldest of the envoys, laughed and said, "Here," showing him the palm of his hand, "hair will grow before thou shalt see Seleucia."[2]

Despair of the Roman army.

This threat or prediction was not forgotten when the Romans found themselves in the midst of a pathless desert, exhausted by the heat of the sun as well as by the burning sand, parched with thirst, ignorant of the dangers which they knew were thickening around them, and without confidence in their leader, who, it was now obvious, had listened to the voice of a traitor. Besides, their apprehensions were not a little excited by the report of those who had seen the Parthian horsemen, and who described them as a people whom it was impossible to escape when they pursued, or to overtake when they fled. They have, said these eye witnesses, a new and strange sort of arrows, which are swifter than lightning, and strike their mark before you can see that they are discharged. The offensive arms of their cavalry pierce through everything, and their defensive arms are so well tempered that no weapon can penetrate them. They fight equally well when they retreat and when they advance, and are not less formidable when they turn their backs than when they face their antagonists. It is victory to them if a counterfeited flight throws their pursuers into disorder; and they never cease to inflict the most painful and deadly wounds but when they are entirely out of sight.

Roman order of battle.

When it was no longer doubtful that the enemy was approaching, and that the Roman consul had been deceived by the false Arabian, a deep dismay took possession of the troops, and Crassus was the most terrified of all. In his confusion, he had scarcely understanding enough left to draw up his army in battle array. At first, in conformity with the opinion of his quæstor, Cassius, he extended the front of his infantry so as to occupy a wide space of ground, in order to prevent their being surrounded; whilst, for the same

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. x. Appian, *ut supra*. Plutarch, *in Vitâ Crassi*.
[2] Orosius, Florus, Dion and Plutarch.

B.C. 55. purpose, he distributed the cavalry in the wings. But, changing his mind immediately after, he drew up his troops in a close square, which faced every way, and had on each side twelve cohorts in front. To support the foot, and to give them at once boldness and security in making their charges, he placed by each a troop of horse; and in this way the whole army bore a greater resemblance to the compact order and phalanx of the Macedonians than to the usual legionary tactics of the Roman army. One of the wings was given to Cassius, the other to young Crassus, and the general himself took the command of the centre.[1]

Stratagem of the Parthians.

In this order they marched forward till they came to a small stream called Bulissus, the sight of which gave great pleasure to the soldiers, as well on account of their heat and thirst, as of the fatigue of marching through a sandy desert. Most of the officers were of opinion that they ought to pass the night there, and, after having procured the best possible intelligence as to the number and position of the enemy, to advance against them at break of day. But Crassus, yielding to the impetuosity of his son, and to the eagerness of the cavalry, who demanded to be led out to meet the Parthians, would not consent to halt, giving orders to those who required refreshment to take it as they stood in their ranks. Before the soldiers had finished their hasty meal, he set them once more in motion, and advanced, not in the regular and firm pace to which the legions were accustomed, but rapidly and unsteadily until they came within sight of the enemy. The troops of Surena appeared neither so numerous nor so formidable as was expected; for that commander had concealed his main body behind his advanced guard, instructing his men, at the same time, to prevent the glittering of their armour, by covering it with a piece of cloth or skin; by which means, their weapons as well as persons were hid from the eyes of the Romans.[2]

This stratagem produced the effect which was contemplated: for the Parthians no sooner received a signal from their commander, than, starting up as it were out of the earth, they advanced against the Romans with hideous shouts and the noise of barbarous instruments; and immediately throwing off the covering of their arms, they appeared in shining cuirasses and helmets of polished steel, so that, in the eyes of their intimidated foe, they looked, says Plutarch, like battalions of fire. The miserable tactics of Crassus seconded this device of Surena. The compacted mass of the Romans presented to the Parthian archers an object on which they could not fail to accomplish the most mortal execution: whilst the weapons opposed to them were, in this situation, of no avail: the shield itself afforded no protection from the arrows that showered from every quarter

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xl. Appian, *de Bello Parthico.*
[2] Plutarch, *in Vitâ Crassi.*

nd in every direction. They stood, however, in their place with B.C. 55.
me degree of courage, in the hope that the quivers of the Par-
ians would soon be exhausted, and that the enemy would then be
bliged either to engage with them in close conflict, or to have
ecourse to a speedy flight. But they found themselves deceived in
is expectation, upon observing that the enemy had in their rear a
erd of camels loaded with arrows, whence the first ranks, as soon
s they had emptied their quivers, were supplied afresh, and imme-
iately returned to the work of death.[1]

Crassus, seeing no end to this frightful attack, sent directions to his son to charge the Parthian horsemen, and prevent them, if possible, from surrounding the legions under his immediate command. The young man made haste to obey this order; and, taking thirteen hundred horse, including a thousand mounted Gauls whom he had received from Cæsar, five hundred bowmen, and eight cohorts of infantry, he instantly faced about in order to come to the charge. The Parthians, according to custom, turned their backs and fled: upon which the son of the consul encouraged his men to pursue; and, setting the example, pressed with horse and foot upon the heels of the enemy. But they had not advanced far till they found that they were once more the victims of barbarian cunning. The pretended fugitives, having drawn their pursuers to a sufficient distance from the main body, wheeled about under cover of the cloud of dust which they had raised on the plain, and renewed the attack with increased numbers and redoubled fury. The Romans suffered dreadfully from the storm of arrows with which they were assailed—many dying in the most frightful tortures, and most of those who survived being quite unfit for action. Thus, when young Crassus directed them to renew the attack, they showed him their hands nailed to their shields, and their feet pierced through and fastened to the ground; so that, observes the historian, they could neither fight nor fly.

The gallant Roman was, however, determined to dislodge the heavy horse of the Parthians; and, for this purpose, advanced at the head of his intrepid Gauls, and began again the unequal conflict. His troops, indeed, fought with incredible spirit and perseverance; for, finding that their short javelins made little impression on men covered with steel cuirasses, they rushed forward, laid hold of the pikes of the barbarians, and, closing with them, pulled them off their horses and dashed them to the ground, where they lay totally unfit either for exertion or defence, owing to the load of armour with which their persons were weighed down. The brave Gauls even dismounted from their horses, and getting under those of the Parthians, wounded them with their swords, and in this way made them

[1] Dion, Appian, and Plutarch, *ut supra*.

B.C. 55. throw their riders, who could never again recover their seats, or use their weapons. But all their efforts to repel this formidable enemy were at length found unavailing; and, accordingly, upon discovering that their gallant leader was severely wounded, and the greater part of their horses destroyed, they deemed it expedient to fall back upon the infantry, and to rejoin, if possible, the main body of the legions.

Suicide of the younger Crassus and his officers.

Being hard pressed by the Parthian light troops, young Crassus was glad to conduct the remains of his detachment to a rising ground which he perceived at some distance, hoping that he would be able to defend himself in that position until a reinforcement should be sent from his father. But in this expectation he was completely deceived. The Parthians continued the pursuit; and, surrounding the little eminence, on which the Romans were only so much the more exposed to the destructive effect of their missiles, they poured upon them such a cloud of pikes and arrows that there was hardly any possibility of escape. In this miserable predicament, the son of the consul was addressed by two Greeks, who happened to be with him, and who, having settled in the town of Carrhæ, were well acquainted with the neighbouring country. They urged him to retire with them to the city of Ischnæ, which, they assured him, was at no great distance, and which, moreover, had declared for the Romans. But the young warrior rejected the proposal with warmth; telling them, that there was no death, however dreadful, the fear of which should ever make him abandon so many brave men who were content to die for his sake. Having returned this answer, he entreated them to save their own lives by an immediate departure; whilst, as to himself, having no longer any hope of receiving succour, and seeing his friends and soldiers falling thick around him, he formed the resolution of protecting his feelings from barbarian insult by dying the death of a Roman. But his right arm being disabled by a severe wound, he was obliged to demand the assistance of an attendant, whom he ordered to strike the last blow; and in this act of questionable heroism, his example was followed by Censorinus a senator, by Megabacchus an old and valued commander, and by most of the principal officers who served under him.[1]

The attack renewed on the side of Crassus.

The detachment which had gone forth under the younger Crassus being thus entirely destroyed, the Parthians made preparations for renewing their attack on the army at large. The consul having enjoyed a short respite owing to the engagement with his son, had, in the meanwhile, withdrawn his troops to a position somewhat more advantageous than that in which he was first assailed by the enemy, and was now waiting with anxiety the result of the second conflict. The young Crassus had sent several messengers to inform

[1] Appian, *de Bello Parthico*. Plutarch, *in Vitâ Crassi*.

his father of the danger into which he had fallen: but these were B.C. 55.
all taken by the Parthians and put to death; and it was only the last, who had escaped with difficulty, who arrived with the intelligence that his son would be irrecoverably lost if he did not send an immediate and powerful reinforcement. Crassus was thrown into the greatest consternation and perplexity. Anxious to save the youth, he resolved to advance to his assistance; but unwilling to sacrifice the whole army, he delayed to give some necessary orders. In the meantime, the enemy approached with loud shouts and songs of victory—affording a painful confirmation of the worst fears which had seized the breasts of the Romans, and striking a deeper dread into the heart of the consul. At length the head of his son, which the barbarians carried on a spear, revealed to him the full amount of his misfortune; and the acuteness of his sufferings was not a little increased by the taunting language in which the enemy thought proper to address his desponding ranks. They asked for information regarding the family and parents of the young man whom they had slain; for it is not possible, said they, that so brave and gallant a youth can be the son of Crassus, the greatest dastard and the meanest wretch in the world.[1]

Death of Crassus's son.

But the Roman commander sank not under this complicated distress. On the contrary, perceiving the effect which the dismal sight had produced on the people around him, he revived for a moment the natural strength of his character; and, marching from rank to rank, endeavoured by his looks and eloquence to inspire in them a degree of confidence which he himself did not feel. "Romans," said he, "this loss is entirely mine. In you the fortunes and glory of Rome stand safe and undiminished. If you have any compassion for me, bereaved as I have just been of the bravest and best of sons, show it by your resentment against the enemy, and by the signal revenge which you will inflict on the authors of his death."

This attempt of the Consul to animate his troops was not attended with much success. Their courage was damped, and their confidence in his talents or wisdom was entirely gone. When he ordered them to shout for the battle, they scarcely lifted up their voices; whilst the Parthians, on the other hand, rent the air with clamorous defiance and triumphant exultation. The combat was thus renewed under the most unfavourable impressions on the part of the Romans. The light troops of the enemy immediately repeated their galling attack, pouring in showers of barbed arrows from either flank; whilst the heavy-armed cavalry in front charged with their pikes, compelling the legionaries to close their files, and thereby to become the object of a surer aim to the indefatigable archers, by whom they were nearly surrounded. Many of the Romans, animated by an impulse of despair,

Distress of the Romans.

[1] Plutarch, *in Vitâ Crassi.* Appian, *de Bello Parthico.*

B.C. 55. rushed upon the spears of the horsemen who approached their column—preferring death inflicted with such a weapon to the lingering pain and hopeless agony which those endured who were wounded with arrows. In this manner the fight was continued during the greater part of the day; and when, at the close of it, the Parthians were about to retire, they exclaimed that they would grant to Crassus one night to lament the loss of his son; but added, that it should be his last, if he did not, in the meantime, adopt better counsels, and consent to surrender himself to Orodes, rather than be carried by force into his presence.

The night which ensued was a dismal one to the Romans. So deeply smitten was every man with the sense of his misery and approaching fate, that the burial of the dead and the care of the wounded were equally neglected. Crassus himself, wrapped up in a military cloak, lay stretched on the ground—a sad example, says his biographer, to ordinary men, of the instability of fortune, and, to men of deeper thought, of the miserable effects of rashness and of ill-placed ambition. Octavius, one of his lieutenants, and Cassius his quæstor, endeavoured to raise him from the earth; but finding

B.C. 53. that he had entirely abandoned himself to despair, they summoned,

The Romans retire by night. on their own authority, a council of war, in which it was determined that they should instantly commence their retreat, and retire in silence to the town of Carrhæ, which was still occupied by a Roman garrison. Encumbered with the sick and wounded, the march was very slow, insomuch that Ignatius only, who commanded about three hundred horse, reached the walls of the place about midnight. In this emergency he addressed the sentinels in Latin, desiring them to inform Coponius, the governor, that Crassus had fought a great battle with the Parthians; and, without explaining himself farther, or telling them who he was, he instantly proceeded on his way to Zeugma, on the banks of the Euphrates.

The hint thus given to Coponius was of much advantage to the Romans; for this governor rightly considering that the manner in which the intelligence of a battle had been conveyed to him betokened no good, instantly ordered his men to arms, and proceeded to meet Crassus, who was now approaching the town. The Parthians did not begin the pursuit till the break of day; but, as soon as it was light, they entered the Roman camp, and put all the wounded, amounting to four thousand, to the sword, and forthwith despatched their cavalry in search of fugitives. One of the Roman officers, named Vargunteius, who had strayed in the night from the main body with four cohorts, was, in the morning, found by the enemy posted on a hill; upon which the little corps, availing themselves of the ground, maintained their defence till all were killed except twenty, who afterwards cut their way, sword in hand, through the ranks of the enemy, and arrived safe at Carrhæ.[1]

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xl. Plutarch.

The Parthian general, having received information that it was only a small part of the Roman force which had shut themselves up in that town, and that the main body, with Crassus at their head, had retreated by a different route, resolved, before he proceeded further in pursuit, to ascertain the truth of this rumour. For this purpose he sent a messenger to Carrhæ, who was instructed to give notice either to Crassus or Cassius, that Surena was desirous to enter into a treaty with them, and to demand a conference. But the Parthian had gained his whole object upon finding that the Romans were still within his grasp, and immediately ordered up his army to begin the siege, rejecting with disdain every proposal on the part of the vanquished, which did not imply the preliminary condition of surrendering both Cassius and the consul himself in chains. B.C. 53.

Finding themselves duped again by the wily barbarians, the Romans came to the resolution of immediately resuming their retreat with the utmost secrecy. But Crassus, who throughout the whole campaign had allowed himself to be deceived by traitors, made known this resolution to Andromachus, a citizen of Carrhæ, whom he also chose for his guide. This unfortunate measure completed the destruction of his army: for Andromachus, who was in correspondence with the enemy, not only informed them of the intended retreat, but likewise undertook to detain the Romans in the neighbourhood of the town till Surena could bring up his troops to attack them. With this view he led them through the most intricate paths, till at length he brought them into deep marshy grounds, where the infantry could hardly stand—a circumstance which so strongly excited the suspicions of Cassius, that he refused to follow him any longer; and, returning back to Carrhæ, he chose a different route for Syria, which he ultimately reached with five hundred horse. The lieutenant, Octavius, too, with five thousand men under his command, followed the direction of a more faithful guide than Andromachus, and was, accordingly, fortunate enough to find himself, at break of day, in the vicinity of a range of mountains, where he was perfectly secure from the arrows of the nimble Parthians. Treachery of Andromachus.

Meantime, day dawned upon Crassus, who, with only four cohorts of infantry and a small number of horse, was still struggling with the difficulties of the ground into which he had been seduced. Having at length regained the road, he proceeded towards the mountains where Octavius had intrenched himself; but as the enemy were already urging their pursuit, and pressing on his rear, he found it necessary to post his troops on a hill, at a distance of about twelve furlongs from his lieutenant, and to act on the defensive. The soldiers under Octavius, perceiving the hazard to which their general was exposed, hastened from their position to afford him succour; and, driving the Parthians from the heights which they had begun

B.C. 53. to ascend, they threw themselves around the person of Crassus, boldly declaring that no arrow should touch him so long as one of them was left alive.[1]

Treachery of Surena.

Surena now perceiving that his light troops had lost the advantages which they derived from the flat surface of the sandy plain, and afraid that the Romans, by retreating through the mountains, would, in the course of another night, be entirely out of his reach, thought it necessary to recur once more to the pretence of a treaty. He took care to pave his way for this treacherous manœuvre by dismissing a few prisoners, in whose hearing he had repeatedly declared that the object of his sovereign was to cultivate peace with the Romans, and that he was desirous to engage the friendship of that people by his generous treatment of Crassus. Taking with him a few of his principal officers, he advanced gently to the hill on which the Roman general stood; where, unstringing his bow, he courteously presented his hand to him, and invited him to a conference. The troops witnessed this conduct with delight, and urged their general to listen to the proposal of Surena; but Crassus, whose misfortunes had at length taught him caution, and who had no longer any confidence in Parthian faith, showed some reluctance to accept the invitation. He represented to his men that if they would but hold out for the remainder of the day, they might, in the course of the ensuing night, gain the strongest part of the mountain range, and set all the archers and horsemen of Parthia at defiance. But long suffering had rendered them impatient: they would not listen to the reasonable considerations which he suggested in support of his views: they insisted that he should receive the proposals of Surena, and put an end to the dreadful privations and the painful uncertainty which they had so long endured.[2]

Assassination of Crassus.

It was in vain to oppose the united wish of a whole army. Crassus, with fearful anticipation began to descend, remarking, as he passed, to Octavius and Petronius, that they were witnesses of the violence by which he was constrained to adopt so questionable a step. These officers, however, insisted upon attending him at the conference: and, when they met the Parthian chiefs, Surena exclaimed, "From this moment there shall be peace and an alliance between Orodes and the Romans. But the treaty," he added, "must be signed on the banks of the Euphrates, for you Romans remember your agreements very ill." This arrangement appears to have been acceded to by Crassus; but when he proposed to send for a horse to use on the march, the Parthian prevented him, and immediately ordered one to be brought. When the animal appeared, richly caparisoned and decked with gold, the equeries assisted the Roman general to mount; upon which they began to employ the

[1] Dion lib. xl. [2] Appian, *de Bello Parthico.*

most indecorous violence, as if they had wished to remove Crassus B.C. 53.
out of the reach of his friends, or even to displace him from his seat, and thereby expose him to the ridicule of the barbarian commanders. Octavius laid hold of the bridle—in which step he was instantly followed by Petronius, one of the legionary tribunes. A scuffle immediately ensued, and recourse was had to weapons on both sides. Octavius drew his sword and killed one of the Parthian grooms; but was himself instantly slain by another who attacked him from behind. Petronius appears to have escaped, but Crassus fell by a blow from a Parthian named Axæthres, who forthwith proceeded to cut off his head and his right hand, which were afterwards sent to Orodes.[1]

This miserable tragedy being completed, the Parthians addressed the Roman troops, who continued to retain their station on the hill, telling them that Crassus had indeed met with the recompense which his unjust invasion of the Parthian territory deserved; but that, in regard to themselves, the mere instruments of his ambition, they had nothing to fear. They were, accordingly, invited by Surena to descend boldly and place themselves under his protection. Upon this invitation some went and surrendered themselves; others attempted to escape in the night, most of whom were overtaken and put to death by the cavalry; and, on the whole, it is said that twenty thousand Romans were killed in this campaign, and ten thousand made prisoners.

In this unfortunate manner, and with effects so disastrous to the arms of Rome, terminated the expedition of Crassus; and at this epoch we conclude the history of Parthia for the present, reserving an account of the subsequent fortunes of that country for a separate article in a future part of our work. We now return to consider the effects of the fatal influences of the triumvirate of Pompey, Cæsar, and Crassus. The inglorious death of the latter we have just contemplated; and we have now to survey the struggle arising from the ambition of Cæsar, gradually rising in Gaul, and rolling towards Italy, to be finally decided on the plains of Pharsalis.

[1] Plutarch, *in Vitâ Crassi.* Dion Cassius and Appian, *ut supra.*



[Death of Julius Cæsar.—*Sargent, after a Picture by Camuerin.*]

CHAPTER IV.

CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR.

PART II.

CONTAINING A SKETCH OF THE ROMAN HISTORY FROM THE APPOINTMENT OF CÆSAR TO THE COMMAND IN GAUL TILL HIS DEATH.

FROM B.C. 59 TO B.C. 44.

B.C. 59. Coalition between the Triumvirate and the popular party.

THE proceedings of the triumvirate, and the supreme influence which its members had exercised during the consulship of Cæsar, were a sufficient proof that the effects of Sylla's victory were already lost, and that the aristocracy was unable to resist the enemies by whom it was again assailed. That coalition between the popular party and individuals of great personal distinction, which had before taken place, when Marius united himself with Sulpicius, had now been repeated; and, as there was now no Sylla to assert by arms the authority of the senate, it had been repeated with more entire success. The part of Sulpicius had been hitherto performed by Vatinius: it was now to devolve on P. Clodius, who, having entered on his tribuneship in the month of December, B.C. 59, and being supported not only by the influence of the triumvirs, but by the consuls elect, Piso and Gabinius, who would use all the authority of their office in his favour, and, by the terror of Cæsar's military

Tribuneship of P. Clodius, and his designs against Cicero.

irce, was likely to pursue his career with little impediment.[1] His B.C. 59.
chief object was to effect the ruin of Cicero; as by so doing he would at once gratify a personal enmity of his own, and would deprive the senate of the most eloquent and, with all his faults, the most popular, and one of the most upright, of their defenders.

During the earlier months of Cæsar's consulship, Cicero had absented himself from Rome;[2] but he had returned thither in June, soon after the passing of the law of Vatinius, which conferred on Cæsar the command in Gaul, and the unusual power of nominating his own lieutenants. He already apprehended the effects of the enmity of Clodius, and was at first inclined to accept the offer made him by Cæsar, that he would accompany him, as his lieutenant, into Gaul.[3] But, encouraged by the apparent popularity which he enjoyed, and receiving from Pompey the strongest assurances that Clodius would not think of attacking him, and that if he should do so he would sacrifice his own life rather than Cicero should be injured, he was persuaded to remain in Rome and abide the issue.[4] Accordingly Clodius, as we have already mentioned, entered on his tribuneship in December, and immediately professed his intention of visiting upon Cicero's head the execution of Lentulus, Cethegus, and the other accomplices of Catiline. He was sure of the support of the consuls Piso and Gabinius; and he boasted, also, that he was acting with the entire concurrence of the triumvirate. Mobs, consisting of slaves and the lowest of the people,[5] were openly armed and organized to overawe every attempt of Cicero's friends to defend him by legal means; and when the senate and the equestrian order, and, as Cicero asserts,[6] the great majority of respectable citizens put on mourning, and assumed the dress of suppliants, to testify their grief and the deep interest which they felt in his cause, the consuls ordered the senate to resume their usual habit; and Gabinius, in particular, in a speech addressed to the multitude, told them that the senate was nothing in the commonwealth, and that the equestrian order should soon be made to suffer for the part they had taken in abetting Cicero's proceedings during the late conspiracy. It is added that, by his own sole authority, Gabinius commanded L. Lamia, a citizen who had been zealous in Cicero's defence, to leave Rome, and not to come within two hundred Roman miles of the city;[7] an exercise of power which is mentioned, indeed, as illegal and tyrannical, but which still shows to what an extent the consuls could carry their orders, and enforce obedience.

[1] Cicero, *pro Sextio*, c. 17.
[2] *Epist. ad Atticum*, lib. ii. epist. iv.—xvii.
[3] Ibid. lib. ii. epist. xviii.
[4] Ibid. epist. xx.
[5] Cicero, *pro Sextio*, c. 15. *in Pisonem*, c. 15.
[6] *Pro Sextio*, c. 12.
[7] Cicero, *pro Sextio*, c. 12, 13.

B.C. 59. The Law of Clodius.

The professed measure on the part of Clodius, which filled Cicero with such lively alarm, was a law proposed by him for the punishment of all persons guilty of putting a Roman citizen to death without trial.[1] It is said that when this law was brought before the assembly of the people, (who were summoned by Clodius to meet without the city, because Cæsar could not otherwise, as commander of an army, be present at the discussion,) Cæsar spoke in favour of its principle, but wished that it should not affect any past transactions. This exception, however, would have so defeated Clodius's main object, that it was not admitted, and the law passed, in its original form, which denounced punishment against any past, as well as against any future, violation of its provisions. But still although Cicero might have been brought to trial under this Act, yet the natural prejudice against *ex post facto* laws, together with the strong considerations that might have been urged in his defence, and the popularity and interest which he possessed, might have rendered his condemnation a matter of great uncertainty. His own conduct, therefore, as he himself afterwards confessed, was the main occasion of his ruin;[2] for, by soliciting protection, by assuming the dress of a suppliant, and appealing to the compassion of the people, he, in a manner, anticipated his own accusation, and rendered the motion of bringing him to trial for the measures adopted in his consulship less startling and extravagant to others, by seeming himself fully to expect it. While he was going round the city with his friends, all wearing the same air of dejection and entreaty, he was frequently met and insulted by parties of the armed rabble which acted under Clodius's orders;[3] and he thus compromised his own dignity without any advantage to his interests. He particularly laboured to obtain the support of Pompey, from whom, indeed, both on public and private grounds, he had a right to look for it. But Pompey had entangled himself so deeply in the plans of the enemies of the aristocracy, that he could not act freely on either side. With the usual fate of those men whose principles are not firm enough to keep them steadily in the path of duty, but are yet sufficiently powerful to check them in their deviations from it, and to hinder them from ever attaining the rewards of wickedness, Pompey already, it is probable, repented of his share in the proceedings of the triumvirate, and found that the confirmation of his acts in Asia had been too dearly purchased by the loss of the good opinion of the better part of his countrymen, and the degradation to which he was reduced of being a tame spectator of the ruin of his friend, and of the outrages of a man like Clodius. Thus beset with shame and difficulties, he avoided a personal interview with Cicero, who came himself to his Alban villa to solicit his assistance;

Behaviour of Pompey towards Cicero.

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxviii. p. 67, edit. Leunclav.
[2] *Epist. ad Atticum*, lib. iii. epist. xv.
[3] Plutarch, *in Cicerone*, c. 30.

and when L. Lentulus, L. Torquatus, M. Lucullus, Q. Fabius Sanga,[1] and many other persons, applied to him to the same effect, he referred them to the consuls, saying, that he, as a private individual, did not like to enter into a contest with a tribune who had an armed force at his disposal; but if the consuls should act in defence of the commonwealth, with the authority of the senate, he would take up arms to join them. We have seen Marius, in his sixth consulship, obliged by the senate to act against his own associate Saturninus; and Pompey, it is probable, would gladly have obeyed a similar call to return to his own natural situation as defender of the commonwealth. But the call was not given: the consuls, it is said, had bound themselves, for their own private interests, to abet all the proceedings of Clodius;[2] and thus Pompey remained inactive in his villa, and Cicero, despairing of any effectual support, and unwilling, as he tells us,[3] to be the occasion of bloodshed, withdrew by night from Rome, and went into voluntary exile. His departure relieved his enemies from every difficulty; and the punishment which a judicial sentence would hardly have pronounced, was easily inflicted by a legislative attainder. Clodius proposed a law forbidding him, in the usual language, the use of fire and water within four hundred miles of Italy,[4] denouncing penalties against any person who should harbour him within those limits, and forbidding any one to move for his recall either in the senate or before the people. This was carried immediately, and not, if we may believe Cicero,[5] by the votes of the Roman people, but in an almost empty forum, by the voices of that rabble which was the mere instrument of Clodius's violence. In addition to this, the property of Cicero was ordered to be confiscated; his house on the Palatine hill was burnt to the ground, its site was consecrated to religious purposes, and a statue of liberty was erected on the place whereon it had stood.[6]

B.C. 59.

Cicero withdraws from Rome, and a decree of banishment passes against him.

It has been often remarked, that it is the natural tendency of violent measures to produce a reaction, and this effect seems to have followed from the banishment of Cicero. Scarcely had he left Italy, before the senate began to exert itself to procure his recall. Pompey, also, was at last roused by an affront offered to him by Clodius, of a nature peculiarly irritating. Tigranes, the son of the king of Armenia, was amongst the prisoners brought to Rome by Pompey on his return from Asia, and, having remained ever since in captivity, was at this time under the custody of L. Flavius, one of Pompey's old adherents, and now one of the prætors. Clodius

A change of circumstances begins to take place in his favour,

[1] Cicero, *in Pisonem*, c. 31.
[2] Ibid. *pro Sextio*, c. 10.
[3] *Pro Sextio*, c. 20, *et seq.*
[4] Cicero, *pro Domo*, c. 19, *ad Atticum*, lib. iii. epist. iv. xii. xv.
[5] *Pro Sextio*, c. 24.
[6] Ibid. c. 24. Dion Cassius, lib. xxxviii. p. 70.

B.C. 59. was bribed, as it is said, to take Tigranes out of the hands of Flavius, and to cause him to be set at liberty.[1] This happened in May, little more than a month after Cicero's retreat from Rome, and Pompey from this time began to appear in the senate, and to complain of the late proceedings of Clodius. On the first of June the senate passed a resolution in favour of Cicero's recall, without a single dissentient voice;[2] but Sextus Ælius, one of the tribunes, interposed his negative, and, for the present, prevented it from being attended with any effect.

But is checked for a time by the violence of Clodius.

Clodius, meanwhile, was not wanting, either in art or audacity, in his endeavours to rid himself of those persons whose opposition he most dreaded. About the beginning of August, one of his slaves dropt a dagger near the senate-house;[3] and on being seized and examined before the consul, Gabinius, it was said that he had received orders from his master to assassinate Pompey, who was at that time in the senate. Whether this plot was real or fictitious, Pompey took alarm at it, and, during the remainder of Clodius's tribuneship, he confined himself to his house[4]—the armed rabble which acted under Clodius rendering it unsafe for him, it is said, to appear in public.

M. Cato is sent to Cyprus.

The other individual whom Clodius most feared was M. Cato; and him he contrived to remove from Rome, by forcing him to accept a public commission which would employ him abroad for a considerable time.[5] Its nature will deserve our notice, as exemplifying the wide extent of the evils which the power of Rome at this period enabled a profligate demagogue to inflict.

Sketch of the revolutions of that island.

The island of Cyprus was early filled with Greek colonies, and was first conquered by Amasis, king of Egypt, about five hundred and forty or fifty years before the Christian era.[6] When Egypt was overrun by Cambyses, the Cyprians submitted to the Persian dominion, and remained attached to that empire, although sometimes enjoying a practical independence, till its final overthrow by the arms of Alexander. In the division of his conquests, which followed upon his untimely death, Cyprus was again united to the new Egyptian monarchy established by Ptolemy, the son of Lagus;[7] and although its possession was often disputed by the kings of Syria, yet it still continued among the dependencies of the crown of Egypt, and appears to have formed what would in modern language be called an appanage, being bestowed as a separate principality on some member of the royal family. At the time of which we are now speaking, it was ruled in this manner by a brother of the reigning king of Egypt, who himself also bore the name of Ptolemy.

[1] Dion. Cassius, lib. xxxviii. p. 78. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. iii. epist. viii.
[2] Cicero, *pro Sextio*, c. 31.
[3] Asconius, *in Oration pro Milone*.
[4] Ibid. c. 32.
[5] Ibid. c. 28.
[6] Herodotus, *Euterpe. cap. ultim.*
[7] Strabo, lib. xiv. p. 782, edit. Xyland.

It is said that Clodius, when a young man, having fallen into the power of the Cilician pirates, during the period of their greatness, applied to the king of Cyprus for money to pay his ransom,[1] and that Ptolemy sent so small a sum, that the pirates refused to accept it, and afterwards, from what motives we know not, released their prisoner gratuitously. Clodius, it is added, had long resented the behaviour of Ptolemy on this occasion, and now gladly availed himself of his present power to propose a law, declaring the island of Cyprus forfeited to the Roman republic. The only possible colour for such an act was a pretended will of the late king of Egypt, by which he was said to have assigned his dominions to the Roman people. But the reality of this instrument was so questionable, that the senate had never chosen to act upon it; and the present king of Egypt had lately been acknowledged as a lawful sovereign; so that his brother, the ruler of Cyprus, holding his crown by the same title, was, in equity, equally included in this acknowledgment. It was sufficient, however, that the island was a tempting prize, and that the power of the Romans enabled them to seize it with impunity. Its fertility, indeed, and abundant resources of every kind, were highly celebrated; and it was the boast of the inhabitants, that they could build and send to sea a ship of the largest size without applying to foreign countries for the supply of a single article required in her construction and equipment.[2] The law for the forfeiture being passed, Clodius proposed, by a separate law, to intrust M. Cato with the execution of it; and he was accordingly despatched with prætorian authority to carry into effect a measure which he is said to have abhorred for its injustice. He was, besides, ordered to procure the restoration of certain individuals who had been exiled by the government of Byzantium;[3] and these two employments were expected to detain him for a considerable time at a distance from Rome. B.C. 59.

Proceedings and behaviour of Cato in Cyprus.

They were, however, both executed without any difficulty. Ptolemy hearing of the sentence of deposition issued against him, swallowed poison in despair;[4] and Cato, being informed of his death, sent the famous M. Brutus, his nephew, immediately to Cyprus, to secure the king's property, while he himself first went to Byzantium to discharge his commission there. As soon as this was effected, he rejoined his nephew in Cyprus, and superintended the sale of the confiscated treasures with an excessive and almost ridiculous minuteness,[5] allowing nothing to be sold except in his own presence, and doing his utmost to procure a good price for every article. Whilst

[1] Strabo, lib. xiv. p. 782, edit. Xyland, *ubi supra*.
[2] Ammianus Marcellinus, lib. xiv. p. 21, edit. Vales.
[3] Cicero, *pro Sextio*, c. 26. Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 34.
[4] Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 36. Ammianus Marcellinus, *ubi supra*.
[5] Ibid. c. 37.

B.C. 59. he was thus engaged, Munatius Plancus, one of his most devoted friends, arrived in Cyprus to join him; but, happening to call on Cato when he was transacting business with his principal officer, he was refused admittance. He complained of this afterwards to Cato, and received from him a very rough answer, being told that Canidius, the officer with whom Cato had been engaged, was the person most deserving of confidence from his experience and integrity, and that Cato, therefore, preferred his company. Not content with having said this to Munatius himself, Cato with characteristic indelicacy, repeated it afterwards to Canidius; and Munatius then, feeling himself offended, absented himself from Cato's table, and did not go to him when sent for to assist him in the despatch of business. This behaviour shocked Cato's notions of discipline, and he threatened to fine him for his disobedience; but Munatius immediately quitted the island, and remained for some time in a state of alienation from his former friend. Afterwards, however, they both were invited to an entertainment at the same house, and Cato arriving after the guests had taken their places at the table, asked his host to which couch he ought to go; when, being told to choose any place that he liked, he said that he would then fix himself near Munatius; and, accordingly, he lay on the sofa next to him for the whole evening, but made no further advances towards a reconciliation. But, at the request of his wife, Marcia, he afterwards wrote to Munatius, requesting him to call at his house as on business; and Munatius coming, and being detained by Marcia till all other visitors were gone, Cato then went in to him, threw his arms around him, and embraced him with great cordiality. This story exhibits very fairly Cato's characteristic good and bad qualities;[1] and as Plutarch professes to copy it from the account of Munatius himself, it rests on sufficient authority to deserve our belief, and may therefore be readily admitted, for the well-attested personal anecdotes of eminent individuals are so rare in Roman history, that we may well be pardoned for noticing those which do present themselves to our curiosity.

Cato and Munatius.

Meanwhile the consular elections at Rome came on, and P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, and Q. Cæcilius Metellus Nepos, were elected to succeed Piso and Gabinius. Lentulus had been Ædile during Cicero's consulship, and his dispositions were known to be such, that Cicero conceived his appointment to be a favourable omen

[1] Some points in this story must remind the reader of Dr. Johnson, who is said by Boswell to have often made indirect advances towards a reconciliation, when he had offended his friends by some rudeness, expecting that they would accept such tokens of his good-will towards them, in the place of any more open apology. In fact, the natural dispositions of Cato and Johnson appear to have borne a considerable resemblance to one another; and, had Cato been a Christian, the likeness would have been more perfect. His character would have been far better than it was, had he been taught to struggle against his pride and coarseness of mind, instead of thinking it to his credit to indulge them.

for himself. Metellus, during his tribuneship, had affronted Cicero personally, and had acted uniformly against the aristocracy; but he was so much under the influence of Pompey, that nothing was to be feared from him under the present circumstances. Accordingly, on the very day on which the new consuls came into office, P. Lentulus brought the case of Cicero before the senate, and found that body almost unanimously disposed in his favour.[1] It was proposed that a law should be submitted to the people repealing his sentence of banishment; but the assembly held for this purpose was interrupted by the armed partisans of Clodius:[2] Q. Cicero was assaulted and obliged to fly for his life, the tribunes friendly to Cicero's cause were driven from the forum, and great numbers of citizens were murdered in the riot. On a subsequent occasion, P. Sextius, another tribune, zealously devoted to Cicero, was wounded and left for dead in the temple of Castor;[3] and these atrocious acts were perpetrated without receiving any check from the authority of the government. But T. Annius Milo, who was also among the tribunes of this year, and who was of a temper well fitted to render him a proper antagonist to Clodius in such times of disorder, seeing the laws utterly powerless to preserve the peace of the city, resolved to meet the rioters on their own ground; and, while on the one hand he threatened Clodius with a legal prosecution for his acts of violence,[4] he prepared, in the meantime, to restrain his outrages by force; and, having procured a body of gladiators and armed retainers, he enabled the aristocratical party to speak and act with more freedom. Then it was that the senate and people, with wonderful unanimity, passed the law for Cicero's recall; and on the fifth of August he returned once more to Italy,[5] and was received at Brundusium with a kindness which was a foretaste of the universal feeling soon after manifested towards him in every quarter. After a short stay at Brundusium, he set out on his way to the capital. Deputies from the several towns met him on the road with their congratulations; and when he approached Rome, there was not a single individual of any note, except his avowed enemies, who did not come forth to welcome him. As he entered by the Capene gate, the steps of the temples were thronged with multitudes of the poorest of the people, who expressed their joy by the loudest cheers; and, as he passed through the streets to the capitol, he was every where greeted with the same acclamations, and surrounded by a similar concourse. This was, indeed, a triumphal procession far more honourable than those of victorious generals; and on this occasion it was proved that Cicero was not only regarded by a party, but possessed, in an unusual degree, the respect and affection of the people at large. He reaped on this day the just reward of that upright and impartial

B.C. 59.

New proceedings at Rome in behalf of Cicero.

B.C. 52.

He is recalled from exile, and returns in a triumphant manner to Rome.

[1] Cicero, *pro Sextio*, c. 34. [2] Ibid. c. 35. [3] Ibid. c. 37.
[4] Ibid. c. 40, *et seq.* [5] Ibid. *Epist. ad Atticum*, lib. iv. epist. i.

B.C. 52. course which he had pursued since the commencement of his political life—supporting the moderate ascendency of the aristocratical party, yet not ashamed to advocate the rights and promote the benefit of the lower classes—the queller of a profligate insurrection, but unseduced to abuse his victory, or to gratify a spirit of animosity or ambition by shedding any blood that was not demanded by justice and the safety of the commonwealth.



[Porta Capena.—*Overbeker les Restes de l'Ancienne Rome.*]

Pompey is appointed Controller of the Markets throughout the Empire.

One of the first things which he did, after his return, was to propose a law for investing Pompey with another extraordinary commission. There had been for some time a scarcity of corn at Rome,[1] which, as was natural, disposed the multitude to tumult; and at the time of Cicero's return, a mob assembled round the senate-house, and calling aloud that Pompey should be intrusted with the control of the markets, they required Cicero by name to propose a vote to that effect. Accordingly the senate, on his suggestion, resolved that Pompey should be appointed with full powers to manage every thing relating to the supply of the corn markets in every part of the empire for five years; and a law to the same purpose was submitted to the assembly of the people. C. Messius, however, one of the tribunes, proposed another law, in which Pompey's authority was extended still more, inasmuch as it conferred on him the control of the entire revenue of the commonwealth, gave him the command

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. iv. epist. i.

of a fleet and army, and bestowed on him a power in all the provinces paramount to that of the officers by whom they were immediately governed. It does not appear whether these additions to the original propositions were approved by the people or not; but it seems most probable that they were rejected. Still the power actually committed to Pompey was exceedingly great; and the readiness with which the people conferred such great charges on individual citizens, was a sure symptom of that helplessness in themselves, and that habit of dependence for every thing upon their government, which show that a nation is fit only for despotism. B.C. 52.

The remainder of the year, B.C. 57, was marked by nothing that deserves particular notice. The senate, on the report of the pontifices,[1] before whom the question had been previously argued, resolved that the consecration of the site of Cicero's house was not valid; and that the ground should be given back to him, and a sum presented to him out of the treasury to enable him to restore the building. Smaller sums were also voted to him to repair the damage which his country houses had sustained. But the workmen, who were employed in rebuilding his house in Rome, were dispersed on the third of November by the armed rabble under the command of Clodius; the house of his brother Quintus was deliberately set on fire by the same assailants; and a few days afterwards a house belonging to Milo was attacked in the same manner. On this last occasion, however, Q. Flaccus sallied out from another of Milo's houses at the head of an armed party, and, attacking Clodius, killed a number of his most notorious followers, and obliged him to save his own life by flight. At the same time, also, Clodius, as we have before mentioned, was threatened with a prosecution by Milo; but, by the assistance of his brother-in-law, Q. Metellus the consul, and of his brother Appius Claudius, one of the prætors, he succeeded in postponing his trial till after the comitia had been held for the election of ædiles.[2] He was a candidate for that office, calculating that, if he should gain it, he should be able to shelter himself under its protection from the impeachment of his adversaries for another year; and, being in fact elected, he immediately commenced in his turn a prosecution against Milo, whom he charged with disturbing the public peace.[3] P. Sextius, who, when tribune, had been nearly murdered by the followers of Clodius, was now also himself brought to trial for the same offence; but he was defended by Cicero in one of his most eloquent orations, and was acquitted. The trial of Milo was adjourned from time to time, till it was either abandoned altogether, or may be supposed to have ended in the acquittal of the accused. B.C. 57. Riots in the streets of Rome. T. Milo supports the cause of the Aristocracy.

The consuls for the year, B.C. 56, were Cn. Cornelius Lentulus

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. iv. epist. ii. and iii.
[2] *Epist. ad Atticum*, lib. iv. epist. iii.
[3] Cicero, *pro Sextio*, c. 44, 69.

B.C. 57. Affair of Ptolemy Auletes, king of Egypt.

Marcellinus and L. Marcius Philippus; the former warmly disposed in favour of the aristocratical party—the latter a respectable and moderate man, who is known as the father-in-law of Augustus Cæsar, having married Atia his mother after the death of her first husband, C. Octavius. About this time the partisans of Pompey endeavoured to procure for him another extraordinary command. Ptolemy, king of Egypt,[1] having been expelled from his throne by his subjects, had come to Rome during the preceding year in the hope of recovering his kingdom through the assistance of the Roman government. It is said that he gained many partisans by bribery; and, be this as it may, the senate passed a vote that he should be restored, and the consul P. Lentulus Spinther, to whose lot Cilicia had fallen in the distribution of provinces, was appointed to carry the vote into execution. But in the meantime a deputation of a hundred citizens of Alexandria had been despatched from Egypt to counteract, if possible, the effect of Ptolemy's bribes and intrigues; and the king, imitating the conduct of Jugurtha on a like occasion, had caused the greater part of them to be assassinated, some on their way to Rome, and others in the city itself. Still it appears that the influence which he had gained by his money, or by the hope that his restoration would afford to many an opportunity of obtaining military commands and emoluments, was likely not only to save him from punishment, but even to secure his return to his kingdom; when it began to be whispered that a prophecy had been found in the sibyline books, warning the Romans "not to restore a king of Egypt to his throne with the aid of numbers, but that in any other way they might effect it." On the first rumour of this injunction of the sibyl, C. Cato, one of the tribunes, summoned the keepers of the mystic books before the assembly of the people, and obliged them to repeat the oracle exactly. It may be hoped that he availed himself of this expedient to baffle the intrigues of Ptolemy and his supporters, from an honest indignation at their crimes, and that it was taken up by a large party in the senate with the same feelings. But, however this may be, the subject was debated with considerable warmth.[2] Pompey's friends proposed that he should be commissioned to restore the king, since his name and authority, now that the support of an army was forbidden, were more likely to succeed than those of any other person. Cicero and Hortensius insisted that P. Lentulus should not be deprived of an office which the senate had already committed to him; but C. Cato finding that Pompey's claims were regarded with peculiar jealousy, and that the appointment would probably remain with Lentulus, brought in a law to take away that officer's command.[3] In this he does not

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxix. p. 97.
[2] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. i. epist. i. *et seq.*
[3] Ibid. *ad Q. Fratrem*, lib. ii. epist. iii.

appear to have succeeded; but his determined opposition, and the mutual jealousies of the partisans of Pompey and Lentulus, disappointed, for the present, the hopes of Ptolemy; who, despairing of his return, retired to Ephesus, and there, to avoid the vengeance to which he might be exposed from the relations of those whom he had murdered, he lived in a sort of sanctuary under the protection of the sacred precincts of the temple of Diana.[1] B.C. 57.

Cæsar at Lucca.

While these transactions were occurring, Cæsar, as usual, was passing the winter at Lucca, on the very southern extremity of his province, and regarding, with no indifferent eye, the state of affairs at Rome. He had just concluded his second campaign, which he had signalized by his famous victory over the Nervii; and for this, together with his other successes, he soon after received from the senate an unprecedented honour, in the appointment of a solemnity of thanksgiving, which was to continue for fifteen days.[2] But the aristocratical party, retaining a lively resentment against him for the seditious tenour of his consulship, and viewing his present extensive military command with a very reasonable jealousy, were resolved to avail themselves of the known sentiments of one of the consuls, and of the moderation of the other, to commence an attack upon him and his measures. Scarcely had the present consuls been elected, when P. Rutilius Lupus,[3] one of the tribunes, brought forward in the senate the question of Cæsar's agrarian law, by which the lands of Campania were assigned for division among the poorer citizens. This had been always an obnoxious measure to a large portion of the people, as it cut off one of the most valuable sources of the public revenue; for the whole of Campania having been forfeited to the Roman people after the revolt of Capua, in the second Punic war, had been since let out to individuals, and the rent arising from these estates afforded a considerable and constant income to the treasury. Thus when P. Rullus, in the agrarian law which he brought forward during Cicero's consulship, had proposed to include Campania among the districts that were to be divided, Cicero attacked this as one of the most pernicious parts of the whole scheme. No wonder, therefore, that Cæsar's law was regarded by many as a measure which ought to be rescinded as soon as possible; but as Pompey was not present when P. Lupus first laid the subject before the senate, it was judged right to postpone the discussion of a question in which the triumvirate was so nearly concerned, till he could attend to take a part in it. On the fifth of April,[4] however, after a vote had passed to grant Pompey the sum of forty millions

The Aristocratical party threaten to attack the laws passed in his Consulship.

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxix. p. 99.
[2] Cæsar, *de Bello Gallico*, lib. ii. c. 36. Cicero, *de Provinciis Consularibus*, c. 10, 11.
[3] Cicero, *ad Quintum Fratrem*, lib. ii. epist i.
[4] Ibid. lib. ii. epist v. *Ad Familiar.* lib. i. epist. ix.

B.C. 57. of Roman money, (£322,916 13s. 4d.) for the discharge of his duties as controller of the markets, the agrarian law was again mentioned; the large grant which had just been made out of the treasury made its poverty more deeply felt, and rendered the recovery of the Campanian rents more desirable; and accordingly, after a stormy debate, it was voted, on the motion of Cicero, that the question of the lands of Campania should be formally discussed, in a full senate, on the fifteenth of May. But the fifteenth of May arrived, and the lands of Campania were suffered, without dispute, to remain subject to the provisions of Cæsar's law; while, instead of commencing any attack on Cæsar's measures, Cicero, about this time, delivered a speech in the senate full of the highest praises on his conduct in Gaul,[1] and recommending that his province should still be continued to him, when some members had proposed that a new officer should be sent out to succeed him, according to the usual practice and law of the commonwealth. It appears that Cicero, ever since his return from exile, had been disgusted with the high aristocratical party; and finding that they regarded him with jealousy, according to his own account,[2] he was naturally disposed to seek the friendship, or at least to deprecate the enmity, of their opponents. Accordingly, on the trial of P. Sextius, when he attacked P. Vatinius, one of Cæsar's instruments during his consulship, with the utmost vehemence, he was careful to speak of Cæsar himself in terms of respect.[3] Still he seemed disposed to adhere to the cause which he had formerly upheld; he openly extolled the conduct of M. Bibulus,[4] Cæsar's late colleague; he supported the interests of P. Lentulus in opposition to the friends of Pompey, in the question of the king of Egypt's restoration; and above all, his motion on the fifth of April seemed to be the pledge of his determined enmity to the party of the triumvirate. It was received as such by the high aristocratical party, who displayed an evident joy at the prospect of an irreconcilable quarrel between him, and Pompey, and Cæsar. Cicero took alarm at this, and, having probably received some personal grounds of offence from the aristocratical leaders, he despatched, within five days,[5] a small work of his own composition to Cæsar, couched in language designedly complimentary, on purpose, as he himself confesses, to bind him to his reconciliation with Cæsar, and to cut off the possibility of his reuniting himself with the aristocracy. Still his conduct in the senate, on the fifth of April, had so offended and alarmed Pompey, that, leaving Rome immediately, as if to superintend the business of his office as controller of the markets, he paid a visit to Cæsar at Lucca,[6] and there consulted with him upon the

Cicero is persuaded to desert the Aristocratical party.

Conduct of Cicero.

[1] *De Provinciis Consularibus.*
[2] *Ad Familiares*, lib. i. epist. ix. *Ad Atticum*, lib. iv. epist. v.
[3] Cicero, *in Vatinium*, c. 6, 7.
[4] *Ad Familiares*, lib. i. epist. ix.
[5] *Ad Atticum*, lib. iv. epist. v.
[6] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. i. epist. ix.

steps to be taken with regard to Cicero's opposition to their measures. From Lucca Pompey crossed over into Sardinia, and had an interview with Q. Cicero, who held a public situation in that island.[1] He dwelt much on the services which he had rendered to Marcus Cicero, and reminded Quintus that he had answered to him for his brother's attachment to the interests of the triumvirate, when soliciting their concurrence in his proposed recall from banishment. Quintus, it is probable, lost no time in reporting this conversation to his brother; and it seems to have produced on him the desired effect; for he dropped, as we have seen, the prosecution of the Campanian question, and, during the greater part of the remainder of the year, he absented himself from political business altogether. B.C. 57.

Return of M. Cato to Rome.

It was in the early part of this year that M. Cato returned to Rome from Cyprus, bringing with him a considerable treasure which had belonged to the late sovereign of the island. As his vessel advanced up the Tiber,[2] the senate, headed by the two consuls, and followed by an immense crowd of private citizens, came out of the city, and descended along the banks of the river to welcome him; but he proceeded without noticing this compliment, till he reached the spot where the treasure was to be landed. Still further to testify their regard for him, the senate proposed to confer on him the office of prætor for the following year;[3] by voting that he should be appointed prætor at the next comitia, "*extra ordinem*," that is, by virtue of the senate's resolution, independently of the votes of the centuries. But Cato, disapproving of such an unusual measure, and conscious also that, if it were contested by the popular party, it would greatly prejudice his prospects of success when he became a candidate in the ordinary manner, declined the compliment thus offered him. It is said also, that he complained of the conduct of Cicero[4] in wishing to declare the tribuneship of Clodius illegal, and all the acts passed in it to be consequently invalid, and that he openly espoused the cause of Clodius on this question. In doing this, he was defending, in fact, the validity of his own proceedings in Cyprus; which, as his commission was bestowed on him by a law of Clodius, would themselves have lost their authority, if that commission were not legally conferred. But the aristocratical party in general were disposed to coalesce with Clodius at the present moment, because he was now at enmity with Pompey; and this was one of the reasons which alienated Cicero

[1] He was one of Pompey's lieutenants, in the service of superintending the markets throughout the empire. Cicero, *pro Scauro. Fragm. Orat. ab Angelo Maio editarum.*

[2] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 71. Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 39.

[3] Valerius Maximus, lib. iv. c. 1.

[4] Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 40. Dion Cassius, lib. xxxix. p. 100. edit. Leunclav.

B.C. 57. from them, and inclined him, as we have seen, to relinquish his opposition to the triumvirate.

Pompey and Crassus candidates for the Consulship.

L. Domitius Ænobarbus, by birth and by preference alike attached to the aristocracy, was preparing to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship, with the avowed intention of procuring the recall of Cæsar from his province.[1] It was not to be doubted that he would receive the zealous support of the senate; and if the comitia were held by the present Consul Marcellinus, his election was most likely to follow. To prevent it, Pompey and Crassus resolved to come forward themselves as his opponents; and that the comitia might not be held by an unfriendly person, C. Cato,[2] one of the tribunes, was prevailed on to stop the elections by his negative, till the year expired and the present consuls went out of office. Whether he had been gained over by Pompey since his opposition to the restoration of King Ptolemy, or whether he only served the triumvirate from his aversion to the aristocratical party, we cannot clearly decide; but it seems that, in forbidding the comitia, he professed only to retaliate upon the Consul Marcellinus, who, by appointing frequent holidays, had obstructed the assembling of the people on public business, and had deprived him of all opportunities of carrying some laws, of which he was the proposer. After all, the consular elections were disgraced by scenes of open violence: Domitius,[3] who persisted in trying the event, was prevented by force from reaching the Forum; M. Cato, who attended him with his usual courage, was wounded, and one of his servants killed; and in this manner, Pompey and Crassus obtained their second consulship, fifteen years after they had been for the first time elected together to the same office.

They procured their success by violence.

B.C. 55. But although Domitius was thus excluded from the consulship, M. Cato still hoped that he should himself obtain a place among the prætors, even though he had declined the irregular interference of the senate in his behalf. His character was so respected, that if no unfair arts were practised by his opponents, he was likely to be successful; but the elections were deferred, it appears, till the month of May;[4] and then the consuls rejected a proposal made by some of the senators, that sixty days should elapse between the nomination of the prætors and their entering upon their office, in order to allow time for inquiry into any corrupt practices to which they might have been indebted for their success. Bribery, indeed, is said to have been used most unscrupulously by the triumvirate;[5] yet still, on the day of the comitia, Cato obtained the votes of the first tribe —a circumstance which so alarmed his opponents that Pompey

M. Cato sues for the prætorship and is rejected.

[1] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 24.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxix. p. 103. Cicero, *ad Q. Fratrem*, lib. ii. epist. vi.
[3] Ibid. p. 105. Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 41.
[4] Cicero, *ad Q. Fratrem*, lib. ii. epist. ix.
[5] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 52. *In Catone*, c. 42.

himself came forward and declared that he had heard thunder; B.C. 55. thus procuring the adjournment of the assembly at the expense, it is said, of an open falsehood. In the interval thus gained, the party of the consuls renewed their efforts to procure votes, and, when the election again came on, Cato was rejected. The other elections were equally unfavourable to the aristocracy; and only two of their partisans, C. Ateius Capito, and P. Aquillius Gallus,[1] could find a place on the list of tribunes.

The Trebonian law.

The most memorable event of this year was the law proposed by C. Trebonius, now tribune of the people, and a partisan of the triumvirate, and afterwards more notorious as one of the assassins of Cæsar. Its object was to confer a military command, for a term of years, on each of the consuls: thus, the province of Spain was assigned to Pompey,[2] and that of Syria to Crassus, to be held for five years, with a discretionary power of raising troops, and of making peace and war. After a most resolute opposition on the part of the two aristocratical tribunes, and of M. Cato, the law was carried by absolute violence; and immediately afterwards, Pompey himself proposed and carried another,[3] prolonging Cæsar's command in Gaul for five, or, according to Dion Cassius, for three years beyond the term originally assigned to it, and adding Germany also, as it is said, to his province.

Crassus sets out from Rome on his way to Syria.

Crassus, who was eager to grasp the glory which he anticipated from an attack on the Parthians, left Rome in the month of November,[4] on his way to Syria; but his departure was attended with circumstances which were regarded, at the time, as ominous of evil, and which were remembered more carefully after the disastrous issue of his expedition. The tribunes Ateius and Aquillius,[5] at first attempted to prevent him from going, and Ateius threatened him with imprisonment, but was restrained by the negative of his colleagues: however, when Crassus was leaving the city, as we have before related, he denounced the wrath of the gods against his enterprise, and lighting a fire at the gate through which Crassus was to pass, he went through certain ceremonies of imprecation, devoting, with the most fearful curses, both the general and his army to destruction. It is said, too, that the projected war with the Parthians was so unpopular, especially when combined with the manner in which Crassus had gained his province, that he was attended by nothing of that train of citizens who were used to crowd round an officer when departing from Rome to undertake an arduous contest against a foreign enemy; but that he besought Pompey to accompany him out of the city, in

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxix. p. 105.
[2] Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cv.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxix. p. 106, 107. Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 43. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. iv. epist. xiii.
[5] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 72. Plutarch, *in Crasso*, c. 16.

B.C. 55 the hope that his presence might save him, at least, from any open expressions of ill-will on the part of the multitude. Meanwhile, Pompey himself intrusted the command of his province to his lieutenants, and continued to reside in Rome, pretending that his post of controller of the markets did not allow him to be absent from the capital;[1] but enjoying, probably, the thought, that whilst he, like Cæsar and Crassus, had a province and an army at his disposal, he was living, at the same time, at the seat of government, and exercising an influence there which was little short of sovereignty.

Consulship of L. Domitius and Appius Claudius, M. Cato prætor.

In this situation Pompey was at the utmost height of his ambition; and accordingly, from this time forwards, he abetted no acts of violence, and encouraged no parties against the aristocracy, but seemed inclined to regard the senate, as a prince would view the

B.C. 54. nobility of his kingdom, that is, as the most natural supports and ornaments of his own greatness. Thus the elections for the ensuing year appear to have passed without disturbance; and L. Domitius, who had been the unsuccessful opponent of Pompey and Crassus, was now able to gain his object, and was chosen consul, together with Appius Claudius Plucher, the brother of P. Clodius, and a partisan of Cæsar. M. Cato, also, was allowed to avail himself of the esteem which the people entertained for him, and was elected prætor without difficulty. Cicero's reconciliation with Cæsar was about this time confirmed, by the appointment of his brother, Quintus, to be one of Cæsar's lieutenants in Gaul; and P. Clodius had now somewhat declined in notoriety, and had lost much of his power, and, perhaps, of his inclination to excite disturbances. The commonwealth seemed, in short, destined to enjoy a breathing time from the perpetual tumults by which it had been assailed; but its peace rested on such slender foundations, that no intelligent observer could venture to calculate on its perpetuity.

Ptolemy king of Egypt is restored to his throne by A. Gabinius.

We have already seen that Ptolemy, king of Egypt, had left Rome in the year B.C. 65, and had retired to Ephesus, hopeless of effecting his restoration to his throne by the assistance of the Romans, although he had committed so many crimes to purchase it. But in the beginning of the year following, he found an unexpected friend in A. Gabinius, who still held the province of Syria, to which he had succeeded on the expiration of his consulship. Gabinius, instigated, as some say, by private letters from Pompey,[2] and, at any rate, trusting to his protection to save him from punishment, if he were afterwards questioned for his conduct, did not hesitate to espouse the king's cause; and, in defiance of the provisions of two recent laws of Sylla and Cæsar, marched with his army out of his province,[3] invaded Egypt, and, having defeated the Egyptians and

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxix. p. 109.
[2] Ibid. p. 115.
Cicero, *in Pisonem*, c. 21.

taken Alexandria, reinstated Ptolemy in his former power. Meantime the Syrians, during the absence of his army,[1] suffered severely from the incursions of some hordes of plunderers, by whom, as by the common scourge of that part of Asia, the wilder parts of their country were occupied. They carried their complaints to Rome, and they met with the more favourable reception, because, from the distressed state of the province, which had been ill protected even when Gabinius was present, the taxes could not be collected, and the farmers of the revenue were unable to discharge their debt to the government. But the interest of Pompey and Crassus sufficiently defended Gabinius during their consulship; and Crassus, who was going to supersede him in his province, felt himself, possibly, the more bound to secure him from molestation on his return to Rome. Now, however, the interest of the triumvirate was less predominant; and Gabinius, when he at last arrived in Italy, and entered the capital by night, on the twenty-eighth of September,[2] found himself at once beset with prosecutions. On his first trial, for a violation of the Cornelian law in leading an army out of his province, he was acquitted;[3] partly, according to Cicero, from the want of talent in his accuser, and partly from the corruption of his judges. He was tried a second time, however, on a charge of receiving bribes from King Ptolemy; and, to the surprise of every one, Cicero, who had ever been his most vehement enemy, now appeared as his advocate.[4] This change had been brought about by the earnest solicitations of Pompey,[5] to whom Cicero was unwilling to refuse any thing; but the real placability of Cicero's disposition disposed him to lay aside his animosities; and the consciousness of this feeling would make him less suspect the purity of his own motives, when he suffered himself to be won over by Cæsar to forget his enmity to Vatinius, and when he now was persuaded by Pompey to defend Gabinius. His reconciliation, however, was of no benefit to the accused, who was condemned, and went into exile.

B.C. 54.

Trials of A. Gabinius, on several charges.

He is defended by Cicero; but condemned and goes into exile.

The competition for the consulship began, as usual, about midsummer, and was carried on with great vehemence. There were four candidates,[6] Cn. Domitius Calvinus, who had been tribune in the consulship of Cæsar and Bibulus, and had distinguished himself by his steady support of the aristocracy; M. Valerius Messala, who was also attached to the same interest; C. Memmius, who had been formerly Pompey's quæstor in Spain, and who now rested his hopes, in a great measure, on the influence of Cæsar's friends in his behalf; and M. Æmilius Scaurus, the son of that Scaurus who was, during

Violent competition for the consulship.

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xxxix. p. 118.
[2] Cicero, *ad Q. Fratrem*, lib. iii. epist. i.
[3] Ibid. lib. iii. epist. iv.
[4] Valerius Maximus, lib. iv. c. 2.
[5] Cicero, *pro Rabirio Postumo*, c. 8, 12.
[6] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. iv. epist. xv. *ad Q. Fratrem*, lib. ii. epist. xv.

B.C. 54. so many years, first on the rolls of the senate, and the son-in-law of L. Sylla, who had married his mother, Metella. He was at this very time brought to trial before M. Cato, as prætor,[1] on a charge of corruption in the administration of his late province of Sardinia; but was defended by Cicero and Hortensius, and acquitted. All these candidates were guilty of bribery to such an amount as to produce a great effect on the money market; for they borrowed such large sums, to carry on their canvass,[2] that the rate of interest rose, in one day, from four to eight per cent. The senate, to repress these proceedings,[3] wished to institute an inquiry into the conduct of the candidates previously to the election; and this being prevented by one of the tribunes, Q. Scævola, another tribune in the interest of the senate, forbade the comitia to be held until this obstruction should be removed. In the meantime, C. Memmius, by the advice of Pompey,[4] disclosed a singular scene of infamy, in which he himself was a principal actor. He produced and read in the senate an agreement which had been entered into by himself and Cn. Domitius Calvinus with the present consuls—in which it was stipulated, that, if they were elected consuls, they would produce three augurs and two senators of consular dignity, who should depose to the validity of a forged act of the comitia curiata, and a forged decree of the senate—that these false instruments were to confer the command of certain provinces on the consuls of the present year, in return for the support which they were to give to Memmius and Domitius in their present contest; and if the proper witnesses could not be procured to prove what was required, the two candidates agreed to forfeit to the consuls a certain sum of money. We may suppose that Memmius was prevailed upon, by the party of the triumvirate, to make this disclosure, in order to ruin the character of L. Domitius, one of the present consuls, who, as the friend of Cato, and as the opponent of Pompey and Crassus in the preceding year, was peculiarly obnoxious to them. He trusted, besides, that, in consequence of this transaction, the elections would be postponed till after the expiration of the present year; and Pompey's friends then thought it probable that he might be named dictator; in which case, Memmius, as a partisan of the triumvirate, had every prospect of succeeding to the consulship. In fact, the year was suffered to pass away without any election taking place: L. Domitius and Appius Claudius went out of office, and the beginning of the seven hundredth year of Rome found the commonwealth in a state of anarchy, without any promise of a speedy return to any thing more regular.

Infamous agreement between the consuls and two of the candidates.

[1] Asconius, *Argumentum in Ciceron. Orat. pro Scauro.*
[2] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. iv. epist. xv.
[3] Ibid. lib. iv. epist. xvi.
[4] Ibid. lib. iv. epist. xviii.

Amongst the events of the year should be mentioned, however, the death of Julia, the daughter of Cæsar, and wife of Pompey. She died immediately after having given birth to a daughter,[1] and the child survived her only a few days. Her amiable character, and constant affection to her husband, had gained her the general regard of the people; and this they testified by insisting on celebrating her funeral in the Campus Martius—a compliment scarcely ever paid to any woman before. It is said that Pompey had always loved her tenderly, and the purity and happiness of his domestic life is one of the most delightful points in his character. Now the tie that had bound him so closely to Cæsar was broken, and no private considerations any longer existed to allay the jealousies and animosities which political disputes might enkindle between them. B.C. 54. Death of Julia, the wife of Pompey, and daughter of Cæsar.

The commonwealth remained without consuls for some months,[2] the elections being continually obstructed, as it appears, by some of the tribunes who were in the interest of Pompey, and who wished to drive the aristocracy into the necessity of appointing him dictator. Pompey, however, always professed his unwillingness to accept such a trust; and, whether he was sincere or not, he was obliged, at last, to act agreeably to his professions; and, uniting his influence to that of the senate, the comitia were at last suffered to be held, and Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala were elected consuls. But the same difficulties threatened to arise with regard to the appointment of their successors. T. Annius Milo,[3] who had borne so great a part in effecting Cicero's recall from banishment; P. Plautius Hypsæus, a partisan of Pompey, and who had served as his quæstor in the war with Mithridates; and Q. Metellus Scipio, who, being by birth a member of the family of the Scipios, had been adopted into that of the Metelli, by Q. Metellus Pius, and who had been accused of bribery seven years before,[4] were now candidates for the consulship; and, at the same time, P. Clodius was aiming at being elected prætor. The old enmity that had subsisted between Clodius and Milo now broke out afresh, with increased violence; and they opposed one another, as before, with parties of armed men, who frequently met and fought in the streets, while all the candidates were equally guilty of the most scandalous corruption. Milo had the support of the aristocratical party, and had won, moreover, a large share of popular favour, by the extreme magnificence of the games which he had lately exhibited for the entertainment of the multitude. He was thus not unlikely to gain his election, if the comitia were peaceably held; and Clodius, to

Interregnum for several months.

Consulship of Cn. Domitius and M. Messala. B.C. 53.

Milo, Scipio, and Hypsæus candidates for the consulship.

Clodius a candidate for the prætorship.

[1] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 53.
[2] Cicero, *ad Famil.* lib. vii. epist. xi. *ad Q. Fratrem*, lib. iii. epist. viii.
[3] Asconius, *in Ciceron. Orat. pro Milone.*
[4] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ii. epist. i.

B.C. 53. prevent this, occasionally interrupted the assemblies of the people by acts of violence; on one of which occasions the two consuls were assailed with stones, and wounded.[1] Three of the tribunes, also, Q. Pompeius Rufus, T. Munatius Plancus Bursa, and C. Sallustius Crispus, the historian, were determined enemies of Milo; and their negatives were probably used, as had been done in the preceding year, to stop the election in a manner more agreeable to law. Cn. Domitius and M. Messala thus resigned the consulship at the end of the year, before any persons were named to succeed them; and a period of anarchy was likely again to continue for some months, till one party or the other could gain a more decided ascendency.

Interregnum. But an event soon occurred which totally changed the face of affairs. On the twentieth of January, Milo set out from Rome to go to Lanuvium—a town of which he was the chief magistrate, or dictator, and where, by virtue of his office, he was on the following day to appoint a flamen for the performance of some of the religious ceremonies of the municipality. He travelled in a carriage, accompanied by his wife, Fausta, and by one of his friends, and attended by a strong body of his slaves, and also by some of those gladiators whose services he had occasionally employed in his contests with Clodius. It was late in the afternoon, and he had just passed the little town of Bovillæ, ascending the Alban hills, when he fell in with Clodius, who was on his way to Rome, mounted on horseback, and followed by about thirty of his slaves. Clodius, it appears, had been to Aricia, on business, and thence had returned to a villa of his own on the Alban hills, where he intended to pass the night; but, receiving intelligence of the death of one Cyrus, an architect at Rome, whose property he expected to inherit, he left his villa at a late hour, purposing to travel on with all speed to the capital. He and Milo passed one another without disturbance; but the gladiators, who were among the last of Milo's party, provoked a quarrel with the slaves of Clodius; and Clodius turning back, and interposing in an authoritative manner, Birria, one of the gladiators, ran him through the shoulder with his sword. Upon this the fray became more general. Milo's slaves hastened back in greater numbers to take part in it, while Clodius was carried into an inn at Bovillæ. Meanwhile, Milo himself was informed of what had passed, and, resolving to avail himself of the opportunity which was before him, he ordered his slaves to attack the inn, and destroy his enemy. Clodius was dragged out into the road, and there murdered—his slaves shared his fate, or saved their lives by flying to places of concealment—and his body, covered with wounds, was left on the ground in the middle of the highway.[2]

Clodius is murdered by Milo at Bovillæ.

B.C. Jan. 20th, 52.

[1] Cicero, *Fragm. de Ære alieno Milonis, ab* Angel. Maio *edit.*

[2] Asconius, *in Ciceron. Orat. pro Milone.* This account of the death of Clodius is taken from the argument prefixed by Asconius to Cicero's speech in defence of

After the perpetration of this act, Milo continued his journey towards Lanuvium. The body of Clodius was taken up soon after by a senator, who happened to be returning to Rome from the country, and was sent on by him to the capital in his own litter—he himself, (suspecting, probably, what was likely to follow,) going back to the place which he had just left, in order to be out of the way of all disturbance. It was about an hour after nightfall that the body was brought to the house of Clodius in Rome, and there deposited in the court of the building. A crowd, consisting of the lowest class of the populace and of slaves, presently gathered round it; and Fulvia, the widow of the deceased, inflamed their passions by a display of the wildest sorrow, as she pointed out the wounds with which her husband was covered. By daybreak on the following morning the crowd was greatly increased; and the tribunes, T. Munatius and Q. Pompeius, who were attached to the popular party, hastening to the spot, recommended to the people to take up the body—in its present state—to bear it into the forum, and there exhibit it on the rostra. The multitude readily followed their directions; and the two tribunes began to expatiate on the atrocity of the murder, and to inflame the public indignation against its author. As the passions of the populace were excited, they were more disposed to listen to the most violent suggestions; and presently they carried the body from the rostra into the senate-house, and there set fire to it on a pile, made at the moment out of the benches, tables, and other furniture which they found at hand. The consequence was, as might have been expected, that the senate-house itself was involved in the conflagration, and burnt to the ground; many of the populace, no doubt delighting in the accident, and pleased to see Clodius, even after his death, becoming the cause of mischief to that assembly, which, during his lifetime, he had regarded with such unceasing enmity.

B.C. 52.

The body of Clodius is carried to Rome,

And burnt by the populace in the senate-house.

These, and several other disorders committed by the multitude, somewhat turned the tide of public opinion, which had at first run strongly against Milo. He now was encouraged to return to Rome to renew his canvass for the consulship, and to make a large distribution of money among the several tribes. The other candidates continued their intrigues in the same manner,[1] and parties of armed men were employed successively on all sides to prevent the comitia from being peaceably held; insomuch, that the senate at last gave the usual solemn charge to the interrex, the tribunes of the people, and Pompey, as a proconsul holding a military command, "that they should provide for the safety of the commonwealth;" and that

Milo. In the whole of the detail, Asconius has shown great diligence, clearness, and impartiality; and his authority, on this occasion, may be followed with entire reliance on its excellence.

[1] Asconius, *in Ciceron. Orat. pro Milone.*

B.C. 52. Pompey should be commissioned to levy soldiers in every part of Italy, to assist him in maintaining the public peace. But, as it seemed desirable at once to remove the want of a supreme magistrate, and as the appointment of a dictator was a measure generally obnoxious, it was proposed in the senate by M. Bibulus, with the concurrence of M. Cato, that Pompey should forthwith be declared consul, without any colleague. This seemed a complete overture on the part of the aristocracy towards a reconciliation with Pompey; and he received it as such, and is said to have expressed, particularly to Cato, his thanks for the confidence which he had thus reposed in him.[1] He entered on his office immediately without opposition; whether it was admitted that the senate might, by its own authority, create a consul as well as a dictator on extraordinary occasions, or whether the interrex was enabled to hold the comitia, and the resolution of the senate was confirmed by the votes of the people. No sooner was he declared consul than he brought forward two laws, with the sanction of the senate[2]—one enacting that an inquiry should be instituted into the late acts of violence, and specifying particularly the murder of Clodius, and the burning of the senate house; the other providing severer penalties for the crime of bribery. In both a material improvement was introduced in the regulation of trials: the witnesses on each side were to be previously examined during three days, and on the following day both the accuser and the accused were to finish their pleadings, two hours being allowed to the former, and three to the latter. It was further enacted, that a judge should be chosen by the people from among the citizens of consular rank, to preside in the proposed inquiry. When these laws were first brought forward, M. Cælius, one of the tribunes, a man of doubtful character, and closely connected with Milo, endeavoured to obstruct their progress; but was deterred by a threatening expression of Pompey, "that he would protect the commonwealth, if necessary, by force of arms." Pompey, indeed, appeared personally to apprehend the violence of Milo. A man who had so long been accustomed to employ a band of gladiators in his political contests, and who had lately used their swords with so little scruple against his enemy, might well be suspected of venturing on some desperate measure to escape the judgment of the laws; and Pompey, therefore, surrounded his residence with a strong military guard, and, on one occasion, assembled the senate in one of the galleries of his own house, that they might be under the safeguard of his soldiers.

Pompey appointed sole consul.

Laws of Pompey.

Trial of Milo. Meantime, L. Domitius Ænobarbus, who had been consul two years before, was appointed chief judge for the approaching trials; and the other members of the court were nominated by Pompey

[1] Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 47, 48.
[2] Asconius, *ubi supra.*


with such care, that Rome had never seen a tribunal composed of B.C. 52.
citizens more distinguished, or of greater integrity. M. Cato is mentioned as having been one of their number. Before these judges Milo was accused by two of the nephews of Clodius; and the examination of witnesses, according to Pompey's new law, commenced on the fourth of April, and continued during that and the two following days. The proceedings were carried on in the forum; and on the first day when M. Marcellus, one of Milo's advocates, was beginning to question one of the witnesses for the prosecution, the rabble which filled the forum, and which consisted of the partisans of Clodius, raised so alarming a clamour, that Marcellus,



[Roman Judge.—*Bardon.*]

dreading some personal violence, was received within the place set apart for the judges, and Pompey was applied to for a guard, to enable the accused to conduct his defence with freedom. Accordingly, on the following days, the court was protected by the presence of so strong a military force that the examination of the witnesses was concluded without a second interruption. On the afternoon of the third day, after the court had adjourned till its final sitting, T. Munatius Plancus addressed the multitude, and advised them to attend on the last day of the trial with a full dis-

B.C. 52. play of their strength, to testify to the judges their own opinion of Milo's guilt, and not to suffer him to escape the punishment which he deserved. At length, on the morning of the eighth of April, the court again assembled: the shops were shut throughout the city—the forum was crowded by multitudes of the populace, and surrounded by Pompey's soldiers—Pompey himself was present, attended by a select guard—the judges, eighty-one in number, were taken, by lot, out of the larger list of persons nominated by Pompey, and the commencement of the pleadings was awaited in a silence of the the deepest interest, by the immense concourse of people that thronged the forum. The accusers were three in num-



[The Forum.—*Piranisi.*]

ber, Appius Claudius, one of Clodius's nephews; M. Antonius, who was afterwards so distinguished; and P. Valerius Nepos; and their speeches, according to Pompey's law, were limited to two hours altogether. Cicero arose to reply in defence of Milo; but it is said that he was so confused by the clamours and outcries of the populace devoted to the party of Clodius, that he did not speak with his usual force and eloquence. Before the sentence of the court was to be pronounced, fifteen judges were challenged by the accusers, and as many by Milo, so that there were left only fifty-one persons who

actually decided the cause; and out of these there were found B.C. 52.
thirteen who voted in favour of the accused, and thirty-eight who condemned him. When the event of the trial was known, he went into exile, and fixed his abode at Massilia, or Marseilles, in Gaul: he was also tried, after his departure, for three other distinct offences—for bribery, for illegal caballing and combinations, and for acts of violence; and was successively found guilty on all. But the triumph of his enemies was limited to the ruin of Milo alone; for when, shortly afterwards, M. Saufeius was accused for having headed the assault on the inn at Bovillæ, he was acquitted, although the charge was notoriously true; and this decision was owing to the universal abhorrence in which the memory of Clodius was held. On the other hand, Sex. Clodius and T. Munatius Plancus,[1] were brought to trial as the instigators of that riot in which the senate-house had been burnt; and they, together with several others of the same party, were found guilty. Thus justice seemed to be administered with unusual impartiality; and Pompey's behaviour fully justified the confidence which his countrymen had shown in conferring on him an authority so extensive and so unprecedented.

Milo is condemned, and goes into exile.

After he had held the consulship alone for some months, he chose for his colleague L. Scipio. The new consul had been one of the candidates for that office at the beginning of the year, and his daughter, Cornelia, had lately become the wife of Pompey. Several prosecutions for bribery were going on at this time, under the new law of Pompey; and another measure was either proposed by him, or was now, for the first time, carried into effect, in order still further to check that immoderate competition for public offices which had of late been so injurious to the commonwealth. It was enacted,[2] that no magistrate should be appointed to the government of a province till five years had elapsed from the expiration of his magistracy; but, at the same time, we are told, that Pompey did not hesitate to procure for himself a continuation of his command in Spain for five additional years. This act of most ill-judged ambition was attended with consequences more disastrous to his country, than Pompey could be expected to foresee. His conduct, since the beginning of his consulship, had greatly reconciled him to the aristocratical party; and the severe laws which he had brought forward to correct the public disorders, combined with the desire which he still manifested to maintain his own supremacy in reputation and dignity, gave no small alarm to all those who hoped to rise in the commonwealth by corruption or tumults; as if Pompey, having himself gained the height which he coveted, was resolved to employ his power in barring up the path against all others. Above all, Cæsar, and his immediate partisans, regarded the present course

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiar*, lib. vii. epist. ii.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xl. p. 147.

B.C. 52. of Pompey's administration with the utmost jealousy. Cæsar's own command in Gaul had now lasted for more than six years, and in less than four years more it would naturally expire; he had then the prospect of returning to Rome as a private citizen, while Pompey would still retain the command of an army, and, from his late conduct, was likely to enjoy, at least in a far greater degree than himself, the confidence and support of the aristocracy. Before his connection, then, with Pompey was disturbed by a more decided separation of their interests, and while the remembrance of his daughter, Julia, was still alive in the heart of her husband, notwithstanding his recent marriage with another, he resolved to avail himself of Pompey's influence to secure a point most essential to his future designs. He might represent, with some plausibility, that while Pompey was combining the possession of civil and military authority in his own person, he ought not himself to be debarred from pursuing his career of honours at home, because the service of the State was still detaining him in Gaul; and he proposed, accordingly, that he might be allowed to become a candidate for the consulship in his absence, without resigning the command of his army, or leaving the important duties of his province. To this Pompey not only assented, but even himself[1] applied to Cicero to obtain his concurrence in the measure; and, accordingly, a law, such as Cæsar desired, was brought forward by some of the tribunes, and was passed, in spite of the most vehement opposition on the part of Cato.[2] But when Cæsar's friends expressed a desire to obtain a still further extension of the term of his command in Gaul, Pompey was unwilling to support them; and, according to Plutarch,[3] he asserted that he had letters from Cæsar in his possession, in which Cæsar himself professed that he was tired of the labours of a military life, and that he would gladly be relieved by the appointment of a successor.

Law allowing Cæsar to become a candidate for the consulship in his absence.

While, however, Cæsar was thus affecting to be disgusted with his actual situation, he was, in reality, making it subservient, in many ways, to the designs which he entertained against the liberties of his country. During the present summer he had, in fact, completed the conquest of Gaul, by the defeat of the formidable confederacy organized by Vercingetorix, and by the capture of Alesia. By his successive victories he had amassed a treasure, which, if we judge by the effects ascribed to it, must have been enormous. He is said to have spared no expense in gaining over every person whose support at Rome might be valuable. He lent Cicero[4] a

Proceedings of Cæsar in order to gain popularity.

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. i.
[2] Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cvii.
[3] *In Pompeio*, c. 56.
[4] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. v. epist. v. vi. lib. vii. epist. iii. viii. *Ad Familiar.* lib. i. epist. ix.

large sum of money to enable him to rebuild his houses after his return from banishment; he won the favour of the populace by commencing several public works in the city,[1] by giving splendid exhibitions of gladiators, and by offering entertainments to the multitude in honour of his daughter Julia's memory. To his own army his liberalities were almost unbounded; while his camp presented a place of refuge to the needy, the profligate, the debtors, and even the criminals,[2] who found it convenient to retreat from the capital. When it is remembered that the object of all this profusion was the enslaving of his country, and that the means, which enabled him to practise it, were derived from the unprovoked pillage of the towns and temples of Gaul, and the sale of those unfortunate barbarians who, in the course of his unjust wars, became his prisoners, it may be justly doubted whether the life of any individual recorded in history was ever productive of a greater amount of human misery, or has been marked with a deeper stain of wickedness. B.C. 52

Consulship of Servius Sulpicius and M. Marcellus.

Meantime the year drew near its close, and the consular elections were again approaching. The candidates were Servius Sulpicius, a man eminent for his great knowledge as a lawyer, M. Claudius Marcellus, and M. Cato; and as Cato was generally unpopular with the multitude, from his exertions to stop that traffic in votes by which they were benefited, Sulpicius and Marcellus were elected. Marcellus was a partisan of Pompey, and as such was disposed to act against Cæsar; for although the two leaders still professed a friendship for each other, yet their respective adherents already conducted themselves as if an open quarrel had taken place between them. From this point it becomes necessary to trace minutely the progress of those disputes which so soon terminated in the civil war; and to these, indeed, our attention for the present will be chiefly confined.

Cæsar supports the claims of the people north of the Po to the rights of Roman citizenship. B.C. 51.

It may be remembered that the party of Marius and Cinna, during the former civil dissensions, derived its main strength from the support of the Italian allies, whose claim to the rights of Roman citizenship had been always opposed by the aristocracy, and favoured by the popular leaders. The event of what is called the Italian war, had procured for the Italians all that they desired; and the victory of Sylla had, as we have seen, deprived them only, in a few instances, of the advantages which they had gained. But the inhabitants of the country between the Po and the Alps had not yet been raised to an equality with the other people of the peninsula; and their cause accordingly was espoused by those who wished to gain popularity in the same manner as the privileges of the other Italians had been contended for on former occasions. We have already seen

[1] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 26.
[2] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 20. Suetonius, c. 27.

B.C. 51. that when M. Crassus was censor, in the year B.C. 65, he had wished to extend the rights of citizenship to the people beyond the Po, but was prevented by the opposition of his colleague Q. Catulus; and it is said that Cæsar[1] had even then exerted himself on the popular side of the question, and had secretly instigated the Transpadani to assert their claims by an open insurrection. The command which he had since enjoyed in the north of Italy, was likely to make him more desirous of ingratiating himself with its inhabitants; and, whilst he was disposed on the first favourable opportunity to procure for them in general the freedom of Rome, he had, in the meantime, availed himself of a power conferred on him by the Vatinian law,[2] under which he held his command, and had been bestowed on some of the towns north of the Po, the rank and title of Roman colonies; so that any of their inhabitants, who had held any public office in their own city, became, in consequence, *ipso facto* citizens of Rome.

Comum receives the right of Roman citizenship.

Among the towns thus favoured, was Comum, situated at the foot of the Lake Laris, or, as it is now called, the Lake of Como—a place which had first received an accession of inhabitants from Cn. Pompeius, the father of Pompey,[3] and secondly from Scipio, who appears to have been exiled under the dictatorship of Sylla,[4] and whose misfortune may possibly have communicated itself in part to the town which he had patronized. Cæsar had added five thousand names to the list of its citizens, amongst whom were five hundred Greeks of distinction, who did not reside at Comum, but enjoyed the privileges of the new establishment, and reflected some honour on its name. One of the citizens of Comum,[5] who had held a magistracy there, happened to go to Rome in the present year, and claimed the rights of a Roman citizen, on the ground of having filled a public office in a Roman colony. The consul, M. Marcellus, one of whose ancestors, by a curious coincidence, had first recovered Comum[6] to the Roman dominion after the second Punic war, desirous to express his animosity against Cæsar, insisted that the man's claim was ill-grounded, and, in mockery of his pretensions, ordered him to be publicly scourged, desiring him, it is said, to go and show his stripes to Cæsar. This act of unmanly cruelty was probably of considerable service to the cause of him whom it was meant to insult; and Cicero, in a letter to Atticus,[7] expressed his opinion, that it would give as great offence to Pompey as to Cæsar; for Pompey, it seems, with his usual true liberality,[8] had taken the case of the people beyond the Po into his

[1] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 8.
[2] Ibid. c. 28. Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. ii. c. 26.
[3] Strabo, lib. v. p. 236. edit Xyland.
[4] Cicero, *pro Sextio*, c. 3.
[5] Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. ii. c. 26. Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 29.
[6] Livy, lib. xxxiii. c. 36.
[7] *Ad Atticum*, lib. v. epist. xi.
[8] Ibid. lib. v. epist. ii.

consideration, and was disposed to grant them the rights of citizenship as an act of justice, and as one of those honourable means by which a government may most wisely and most effectually defeat the designs of the disaffected. B.C. 51.

Conduct Marcellus.

The conduct of the Consul Marcellus in this affair was a bad omen of his temper and judgment in the management of the main dispute between the government and Cæsar. As the war in Gaul drew more evidently towards its close, men seemed on a sudden to be awakened to a sense of their error in having allowed an officer of Cæsar's character to form and discipline a formidable army in the very position that was most dangerous to the safety of the commonwealth; and the wish was generally entertained of removing him by any means whatever from a station so threatening. But while Marcellus was anxious to effect this object at any risk, his colleague, Ser. Sulpicius,[1] endeavoured to moderate the vehemence of the senate by representing the inevitable evils of all civil wars, and by bidding them remember the natural tendency of such contests to increase in havoc and atrocity, each improving on the precedent of that which had gone before it. His moderation, and the unwillingness of Pompey to give Cæsar any just cause of offence, prevented all violent proceedings for the present. It was only resolved by the senate,[2] that the disposal of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, and of the other provinces, should be discussed early in the following year; that if any person should endeavour to stop the jurisdiction of the senate in this affair, he should be considered as acting against the good of the commonwealth; and that further, the cases of all soldiers in Cæsar's army claiming their discharge, should then be considered and determined by the senate. Several of the tribunes, who had been gained by Cæsar, interposed their negatives upon this resolution; so that it could not have the force of a decree, but was registered in the journals, under the title of the "Authority" of the senate.

Consulship of C. Marcellus and L. Paullus. B.C. 50.

Meantime C. Claudius Marcellus, a cousin of the present consul, and L. Æmilius Paullus, were elected consuls for the following year; and C. Scribonius Curio was at the same time elected one of the tribunes.[3] Curio was a man of talents, of eloquence, of a restless thirst for distinction, and impatient of slight or neglect. In the year of Cæsar's consulship, when the power of the Triumvirate was at its height, he had courted and obtained popular applause by the boldness with which he had on some occasions attacked their conduct.[4] When candidate for the tribuneship, he professed himself warmly devoted to the party of the senate; being irritated, as it is said,[5] by

Tribuneship of C. Curio.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiar.* lib. iv. epist. iii.
[2] Ibid. lib. viii. epist. viii.
[3] Ibid. lib. ii. epist. vii.
[4] Ibid. *ad Atticum*, lib. ii. epist. xviii.
[5] Ibid. *ad Familiar.* lib. viii. epist. iv.

B.C. 50. some appearance of indifference or contempt which were manifested towards him by Cæsar. But, in the very first month of his tribuneship, he was again disgusted with the aristocracy,[1] because he could not obtain the insertion of several additional days in the calendar to lengthen the term of his office—the intercalary month, which was inserted every year to make up the deficiency in the ordinary computation, being made longer or shorter at the discretion of the pontifices, according as the interests or wishes of their friends or their party might require. On this ground Curio began to espouse the cause of Cæsar; and a man so jealous of affront, so ambitious, and with so little steadiness of character, may be as naturally supposed to have acted from this motive, as from that still baser one which rumour imputed to him,[2] namely, that he was bribed by Cæsar, with a sum amounting to about £80,000 of our money.

Yet the year, B.C. 50, passed on to its close without witnessing any thing more decisive than the year which had preceded it. We are told that Curio professed to follow a course of perfect impartiality,[3] and proposed that both Cæsar and Pompey should alike resign their military commands, that so the republic might have nothing to fear from the ambition of either. When he found that the senate was disinclined to this measure, he began to attack Pompey with great freedom,[4] and to charge him with aspiring to the exercise of an absolute power over his country. Pompey's influence in Rome had long been so predominant, that language of this sort was considered a proof of extraordinary boldness; and the multitude, who always delight to hear invectives against the powerful, testified their admiration of Curio by the liveliest acclamations. He threatened, it seems,[5] to negative any decision to which the senate might come respecting Cæsar's recall; and thus the question concerning the provinces was not brought forward on the first of March, as the senate had before resolved, but was suffered to remain undetermined. It was understood to be Pompey's wish that Cæsar should now be recalled on the thirteenth of November, and that he should on no account be permitted to enjoy the consulship till he had resigned the command of his army. Two years before, it will be remembered, Pompey had interested himself in obtaining for Cæsar the very privilege which he now wished to take away; but in that interval Cæsar had shown a disposition to resist the senate's authority, which might give just suspicion of his real designs. Pompey justly considered the successive interference of the tribunes to deprive the senate of their lawful control over the provinces, as

Conduct of Curio.

[1] Cicero, lib. viii. epist. vi.
[2] Velleius Patercul. lib. ii. c. 75.
[3] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 58. Dion Cassius, lib. xl. p. 150.
[4] Cicero, *ad Familiar.* lib. viii. epist. xi. Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. ii. c. 28.
[5] Ibid. lib. viii. epist. xi.

equivalent to an actual disobedience on the part of Cæsar,[1] in whose B.C. 50. behalf, and at whose instigation, this interference was exerted; and the general attachment of all profligate and desperate citizens to the cause of Cæsar, and the resort of many persons of that description to his camp, where they were received with the utmost cordiality, seemed to warn the commonwealth of the danger of allowing the head of such a party to unite the command of an army with the highest post in the civil government. It is the opinion of Cicero,[2] that if the senate had consented, according to many former precedents, to apply officially to Curio, and request that he would not interpose his negative on their decrees, he would have yielded to their wishes. But this, though proposed by M. Marcellus,[3] was not adopted; and Curio, still further incensed at this apparent contempt of his power, persisted in his threats of preventing the execution of every thing which the senate might resolve. In this manner nothing was determined; and the final decision of the question, with its important results—a civil war on the one hand, or on the other the removal of all apprehensions of violence from Cæsar—was to be reserved for the following year, when C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus were appointed consuls; the last individuals who ever held that office by the unforced votes of the Roman people.

Illness of Pompey.

It was about the autumn of the year B.C. 51, that Pompey was seized with a dangerous fever,[4] while at his villa in the neighbourhood of Naples. No sooner was his illness known, than public prayers for his safety were offered up throughout Italy; and, when he recovered, sacrifices of thanksgiving were equally general; every town celebrated the event by a spontaneous festival; and when he was able to travel to Rome, multitudes of people thronged the road, with garlands on their heads and torches in their hands, scattering flowers around him as he passed. These signs of the attachment of his countrymen were received by Pompey with peculiar pleasure, for he had ever been more ambitious of popularity than of power; but it is said that they misled him fatally on the present occasion, by inducing him to estimate from them the real strength of his cause. So confident, indeed, did he feel in the support of the Italians, that he is said to have declared, that he could raise armies in Italy by the stamp of his foot.[5] But he was for a long time, also, lulled into security from a belief that Cæsar would not dare to make war upon his country for his own private quarrel; perhaps, also, from a persuasion that he would be restrained by his personal friendship to himself. This last hope, however, vanished towards

[1] Cicero, lib. viii. epist. viii.
[2] *Ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. vii.
[3] Cicero, *ad Familiar.* lib. viii. epist. xiii.
[4] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 57. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 74.
[5] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 57.

B.C. 50. the close of the year B.C. 50, when Hirtius,[1] one of Cæsar's most confidential officers, arrived at Rome from the army, and departed again without visiting Pompey, or holding any communication with him; and still more when M. Antonius, who had been Cæsar's quæstor in Gaul, and who had been just elected tribune to support his interests, delivered a speech full of violent invectives against Pompey,[2] and attacking the whole of his public life from its first commencement. From that time he looked forward to a war as inevitable, and professed that he dreaded such an issue less than the prospect of allowing Cæsar to enjoy any political power at Rome. His own great name, the large army held by his lieutenants in Spain, the attachment of the Italians, and the authority of the senate, seemed to ensure him an easy victory over a single rebel general and his army, however great might be the talents of the one, and the discipline of the other.

Of the supporters and resources of Pompey.

But, in fact, the mass of the people of Italy were not disposed to risk their lives and properties in the maintenance of a contest which seemed little to affect their individual interests. The landed proprietors and the monied men were anxious for peace,[3] and indifferent whether Pompey or Cæsar administered the affairs of the commonwealth: the citizens of the different towns, who had been so earnest in their prayers for Pompey's safety, were not equally ready to endure for his sake the evils of a civil war, and the devastation of their homes and families; while the men of desperate fortunes—the debtor, the profligate, and the robber—were eager, in every part of Italy, to embrace the cause of Cæsar, as that of revolution, and impunity, and plunder. If from Italy we extend our view to the provinces, we shall find them influenced by particular causes to favour one leader or the other, according as their principal inhabitants had received favours from either, or as either happened to be better known amongst them, or to possess the strongest military force in their immediate neighbourhood. But degraded and oppressed as they had been under the Roman government, it mattered little to them by what party the system under which they suffered was administered, unless there were some among them who, looking upon Cæsar as the advocate of popular and liberal principles, indulged the hope, that he would extend more generally that envied privilege of Roman citizenship, which he had already wished to impart far wider than his aristocratical opponents were willing to allow.

The authority of the senate, and the reputation of upholding the cause of law and good principles, might have conferred a greater strength on Pompey, had it not been for the selfish, and narrow,

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. iv.
[2] Ibid. lib. vii. epist. viii.
[3] Ibid. lib. viii. epist. xiii.

and profligate views and characters which marked so many of his adherents. His own private morals were remarkably pure and amiable; but his father-in-law, Metellus Scipio, had, even when consul,[1] been present at an entertainment where such a scene of debauchery was exhibited as no honest man, and far less a magistrate, should have sanctioned by his presence; and Appius Claudius, with whom he was also become connected, by the marriage of his son, Cnæus, with Appius's daughter—after having committed many acts of oppression and extortion in his province of Cilicia—after having been detected, during his consulship, in the grossest corruption, and having obtained a general character of prodigality and voluptuousness—was now invested with the office of censor,[2] and was exerting his power with the utmost severity. He expelled a number of persons from the senate, and amongst the rest C. Sallustius Crispus, the historian: he also degraded many individuals of the equestrian order; and, although we are not told that any of his censures were undeserved, yet they seemed inconsistent with the character of the censor himself, and served to alienate from the cause of the aristocracy those who had become obnoxious to them. L. Lentulus, one of the consuls for the present year, was overwhelmed with debts,[3] and is said to have eagerly anticipated a civil war, as the means of restoring his broken fortunes. To these might be added that large proportion of selfish and narrow-minded individuals who are the incumbrance and disgrace of every aristocracy—men who abhor all reform, because they think it may interfere with their comforts and privileges, and who consider their own ascendency rather as the ultimate object of Government, than as one of the means by which the general welfare of the State is promoted—men, in short, who burden a noble cause with all the weight of their pride and ignorance, who render its success a doubtful blessing, and lessen the regret with which the good regard its overthrow. This was the party which had persecuted the patriotic tribune, C. Cornelius, which had largely shared in the oppression and plunder of the provinces, and which had constantly opposed the

B.C. 50.

Conduct of Appius Claudius.



[Sallust.—*From a Marble Bust in the Farnese Palace.*]

[1] Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. 1.
[2] Cicero, *ad Familiar.* lib. viii. epist. xiv. Dion Cassius, lib. xl. p. 150.
[3] Velleius Patercul. lib. ii. c. 76. Cæsar, *de Bell. Civili*, lib. i. c. 3.

B.C. 50. extension of the right of Roman citizenship to the allied or subject States of Italy.

Of the supporters and resources of Cæsar.

On the other hand, the strength of Cæsar's cause was of a nature most likely to ensure victory in such a state of society as the Roman empire exhibited. He was at the head of an army of nine legions,[1] consisting of such veteran soldiers, that one of the legions was considered inferior to the rest in tried courage and experience, because it had not served more than eight campaigns. The people of the north of Italy were attached to him, as the supporter of their claims for a participation in the freedom of Rome; and Gaul, however ill-affected towards the man who had been at once her spoiler and enslaver, was yet forced to assist his views by the wealth which her plunder put at his disposal, and which enabled him to purchase partisans at Rome, and to bind his soldiers to his interests by the liberality of his donations. Thus amply provided with means to strike the first blow with effect, he trusted on his approach to Rome to find a numerous party ready to co-operate with him. The profligate young nobility,[2] who had conspired with Catiline in his plans of rapine and murder, and who had since abetted the vices and the riots of P. Clodius, were eager to support this new leader, who would accomplish, as they trusted, what their former chiefs had attempted in vain; and the rabble of the capital, constantly at enmity with the existing Government, was a certain ally to any one who should head a rebellion. All these were likely to be active assistants in promoting the cause which they espoused; while a large proportion of those who wished well to the Constitution, would confine their zeal to words or feelings, and would make no practical exertions in its behalf.

Of the situation of several eminent individuals at the beginning of the Civil War.

It may not be uninteresting to the reader here to mention the dispositions and the situation of some of the most eminent citizens of the commonwealth, when the civil war was now on the very eve of its commencement. We have spoken of the departure of M. Crassus from Rome in the year B.C. 55, to take possession of his province of Syria, and to attempt the conquest of Parthia; and we have shown how, in the year B.C. 53, his ambition, unaccompanied by corresponding ability, had been finally checked by his defeat and death in Mesopotamia. The wreck of his army had been led back into Syria with considerable difficulty by C. Cassius,[3] afterwards one of the assassins of Cæsar, and at this time acting as quæstor under Crassus. Cassius covered the province of Syria against the attacks of the Parthians, and maintained his ground, till, in the year B.C. 51, M. Cicero was appointed to succeed Appius Claudius in the government of Cilicia, and M. Bibulus arrived in Syria to take the

[1] Cæsar, *de Bell. Gallico*, lib. viii. c. 7, 45.
[2] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. v. vii.
[3] Velleius Patercul. lib. ii. c. 72.

command in the room of Cassius. Neither of these officers, however, B.C. 50. had much to do in their military capacity, for the Parthians were unequal to make any serious impression on the Roman empire; but Cicero [1] carried with him into his province the virtues of his private life, and preserved both himself and all his subordinate officers pure from every act of oppression or extortion; nor would he even accept from the provincials those sums for the maintenance of his personal establishment which, as the governors received no salary from the treasury at home, were considered as the ordinary allowances of their office. He resigned his command and returned to Italy about the close of the year B.C. 50, but remained at his different villas for some time; and, when he moved towards Rome early in January,[2] he did not enter the city, or take any part in the debates of the senate, as he intended to prefer his claim to a triumph, on account of some successes which he had gained over the plundering tribes of the mountain districts of Cilicia; and under these circumstances he was obliged by law to remain without the walls of Rome. M. Cato was constantly attending the senate, and, as might be supposed, gave his warm support to every resolution hostile to Cæsar. L. Lucullus and his brother, Marcus, had been some time dead; and Q. Hortensius, another of the oldest and most eloquent members of the aristocratical party, had died more recently in the summer of the year B.C. 50.[3] P. Lentulus Spinther, to whose exertions, when consul, Cicero professed himself greatly indebted for his restoration from exile, and L. Domitius, the colleague of Appius Claudius in the consulship, and implicated together with him in the corrupt agreement which they entered into with two of the candidates for the succession to their office, were both in Rome, and disposed to co-operate zealously with Pompey. L. Piso, the father-in-law of Cæsar, who had been consul with A. Gabinius in the year of Cicero's banishment, was now censor, and, although wishing to restrain the vehement proceedings of his colleague—Appius Claudius,[4] was yet by no means inclined to go all lengths with Cæsar. Of the persons who afterwards acted a principal part in the civil wars, M. Antonius was now just elected one of the tribunes, in order to further Cæsar's designs; M. Brutus was in Rome; but although known as the nephew of Cato, and as the son-in-law of Appius Claudius, and considered as a young man of promising talents,[5] he had as yet taken no conspicuous share in public affairs. C. Cassius was one of the tribunes for this year;[6] and C. Octavius, now a boy of about thirteen years of age, was living at

[1] *Ad Atticum*, lib. v. and vi. *passim*. *Ad Familiar*. lib. xv. epist. v.
[2] Cicero, *ad Familiar*. lib. xvi. epist. xi.
[3] Ibid. lib. viii. epist. xiii.
[4] Dion Cassius, lib. xl. p. 150.
[5] Cicero, *ad Familiar*. lib. iii. epist. x.
[6] Ibid *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. xxi.

B.C. 50. Rome under the care of his mother, Atia, and of his father-in-law, L. Philippus.

Cæsar dictates terms to the Senate.

On the first of January, B.C. 49,[1] when the new consuls, L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus, entered on their office, C. Curio, the late tribune, arrived in Rome from Cæsar's quarters, whither he had lately betaken himself, and presented a letter from Cæsar addressed to the senate. It was read at the earnest desire of the tribunes, Q. Cassius and M. Antonius; and contained a statement of Cæsar's services to the commonwealth, and professions of his willingness to resign his province and the command of his army, if Pompey would do the same; but otherwise, he said, it was unjust to desire him to expose himself without defence to the attempts of his enemies. This language was in itself rebellious, inasmuch as it dictated the terms on which alone he would obey the senate's orders: the consuls, therefore, refused to take the sense of the senate on the contents of the letter, but called upon the assembly to consider generally the state of the republic. A vehement debate ensued,[2] and one or two members urged that Cæsar's proposals should be accepted, but a great majority resolved, on the motion of Scipio, Pompey's father-in-law, that Cæsar should resign the command of his army by a certain day, and that if he refused to comply with this order, his conduct should be regarded as treasonable. The account of these transactions, which goes under Cæsar's name, whether it be really the work of himself or of one of his partisans, naturally represents this decision as being almost extorted from the fears of the senate by the violence of Pompey's friends, and the apprehension of the military force which he commanded in the neighbourhood of the capital; but it appears from Cicero's more impartial testimony, that although many of the more moderate senators[3] were probably hurried into resolutions more violent than they thought expedient, yet that Cæsar's pretensions were generally regarded with abhorrence; and that they doubted not of the justice, but of the policy of requiring him to give up his army. However, the decree of the senate was negatived by the tribunes, Antonius and Cassius;[4] upon which the consuls submitted to the assembly the consideration of this negative, and it was debated in what manner they should counteract it. Nothing was determined on that day; but for some days afterwards the more violent party amongst the aristocracy exerted their utmost endeavours to bring the question of Cæsar's obedience at once to an issue. The senators, as had often been practised on similar occasions, put on mourning,[5] to express their

He is ordered by the Senate to give up his army. B.C. 49.

The Senate's decree is negatived by two of the Tribunes.

[1] Appian, *de Bell. Civili*, lib. ii. c. 32. Dion Cassius, lib. xli. p. 152.
[2] Cæsar, *de Bell. Civili*, lib. i. c. 2.
[3] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xvi. epist. xi. xii. *Ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. vii. ix.
[4] Cæsar, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. i. c. 2, 3.
[5] Dion Cassius, lib. xli. p. 153.

feeling that the interests of the commonwealth were obstructed by the behaviour of the tribunes; and when this step failed to produce any effect, they had recourse to their highest prerogative, and gave their charge to the consuls, prætors, tribunes, and proconsuls, "to provide for the safety of the republic." This resolution was entered on the journals of the senate on the seventh of January; and no sooner was it passed than Antonius and Cassius, together with Curio,[1] professing to believe their lives in danger, fled in disguise from Rome, and hastened to escape to Cæsar, who was at that time at Ravenna, waiting for the result of his application to the senate. B.C. 49. Charge given to the Consuls to provide for the safety of the Commonwealth. The Tribunes fly to Cæsar. B.C. 48.

It appears from one of Cicero's letters,[2] written a few days before the first of January, that he had calculated on such an event as the flight of the tribunes, and on its affording Cæsar a pretext for commencing his rebellion. When it had actually taken place, the senate were well aware of the consequences to which it would lead, and began to make preparations for their defence. Italy was divided into several districts,[3] each of which was to be placed under the command of a separate officer; soldiers were ordered to be every where levied; money was voted from the treasury to be placed at Pompey's disposal; and the provinces were assigned to their respective governors, as proconsuls or prætors. Among these appointments, Syria was given to P. Scipio, and the two Gauls, which Cæsar had been just summoned to resign, were bestowed on L. Domitius and M. Considius Nonianus. The whole direction of the forces of the commonwealth was conferred on Pompey, whose reputation as a general was still so high, that none contemplated the probability of his meeting with an equal antagonist. The Senate prepares for War.

We have said that, when Curio, Antonius, and Cassius fled from Rome, Cæsar was at Ravenna. He had with him at this time no other troops than the thirteenth legion, which had been ordered to winter in Cisalpine Gaul:[4] the remainder of his army, amounting to eight legions, was avowedly quartered beyond the Alps; but, by the celerity with which one of these legions afterwards joined him, it may be conjectured that it had already received orders to march into Italy, and was on the Italian side of the Alps at the moment when Cæsar commenced hostilities. No sooner was he informed of the flight of the tribunes, and of the subsequent resolutions of the senate, than he assembled his soldiers, and expatiated on the violence offered to the tribunitian character, and on the attempts of his enemies to despoil him of his dignity, by forcing him to resign his province before the term of his command was expired. This much of his speech is avowed by his own party-historian: the promises Cæsar commences his Rebellion.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xvi. epist. xi. Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 31.
[2] *Ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. ix.
[3] Cicero, *ad Familiares* lib. xvi. epist. xi. xii. Cæsar, *de Bello Civili*, lib. i. c. 6.
[4] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 7.

B.C. 48. which he had made to his followers, and the prospects of spoil and settlements of lands which he held out as the price of the rebellion, it was not equally to his purpose to record, although such temptations were not likely to be omitted. He found his troops perfectly disposed to follow him; and, accordingly, having sent out some men in small parties, with orders to enter unobserved into Ariminum[1] and secure the town, he himself left his quarters at Ravenna late in the evening, and, on the following morning, on his arrival at Ariminum, found that his enterprise had succeeded, and that the place was already in his power. This was the first town of importance without the limits of his province on the road to Rome; and by thus seizing it he declared himself in open rebellion, and that from this time forward he was to follow, without reserve, that path of lawless usurpation on which he had for so many years been preparing himself to enter.

He seizes Ariminum

At Ariminum he met the fugitive tribunes,[2] whom he introduced, without delay, to his army, in the disguise in which they had fled from Rome, desiring them, at the same time, to relate the violence which they had suffered. Cæsar himself then began to speak, imploring the troops, with the most passionate expressions of grief and indignation, to revenge at once the injuries of their general, and the outrage offered to the tribunes of the people. In the vehemence of his words and gestures he frequently held up his left hand, and, pointing to the ring which he wore as the well-known badge of patrician or equestrian rank, he declared that he would sooner part with that ring, than fail to satisfy the amplest wishes of those who were now offering their aid to maintain his dignity. The action being seen at a greater distance than the words could be heard, many of the soldiers imagined that he was promising to advance all his followers to the rank and fortune of the equestrian order; and this impression tended not a little to inflame their zeal in his behalf.

Fruitless negotiation for Peace

At Ariminum,[3] also, Cæsar found L. Roscius, one of the prætors, and L. Cæsar, a distant relation of his own, who had both left Rome in the hopes of preventing an open rupture, and had both consented to be the bearers of a private communication from Pompey to Cæsar. Its substance was an exculpation of his own conduct in the part he had lately taken; in which, he said, he had been actuated by no unkindly feelings towards Cæsar, but from a sense of his paramount duty to the commonwealth; and he urged Cæsar, in like manner, to waive his personal animosities in consideration of his country, and not to seek to punish his enemies at the price of involving the republic in a civil war. Cæsar professed to be equally desirous of avoiding bloodshed; and requested L. Cæsar and Roscius

[1] Appian, *de Bello Civili*, lib. ii. c. 35.
[2] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 8. Suetonius, *Cæsare*, c. 33. Dion Cassius, lib. xli. p. 154.
[3] Ibid. lib. i. c. 8, 9. Cicero, *ad Familiares*. lib. xvi. epist. xii.

to carry back his answer to Pompey: in which, after studiously dwelling on his supposed injuries, he proposed that both Pompey and himself should give up their armies; that Pompey should go into Spain; and that all the forces in Italy should be disbanded on both sides, that the senate and people of Rome might deliberate and decide on all public questions with perfect freedom; that he himself should resign his provinces of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul to the officers appointed by the senate to succeed him; and that he should go to Rome to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship. Finally, he requested a personal conference with Pompey, that all things might be fully adjusted, and that both parties might pledge themselves by oath to fulfil the conditions of the treaty. B.C. 48.

Movements of Antonius.

With these terms L. Cæsar and L. Roscius set out on their return to Pompey. But Cæsar,[1] not waiting to see the result of the negotiation, despatched M. Antonius, who already had taken a command under him, with five cohorts, to occupy Arretium, and, at the same time, he secured, with other detachments, the towns of Ancona, Fanum, and Pisaurum. These movements excited a general consternation;[2] many of the inhabitants fled from their homes at the approach of Cæsar's troops; while men of broken fortunes, and those who had been obliged to go into exile for their crimes, welcomed his arrival as the sure forerunner of a total revolution. The alarm reached Rome, and produced there such an effect that Pompey judged it expedient to abandon the capital, as he had not yet organized a force sufficient to withstand the sudden advance of the rebel army. Accordingly, before the nineteenth of January,[3] he withdrew from Rome towards Capua, accompanied by both the consuls, the great majority of the inferior magistrates, and most of the members of the senate. The treasury was left closely locked—from the precipitation with which the capital was abandoned, or from a reluctance to carry off treasures, some of which were looked upon as almost too sacred to be invaded, and from the hope that Cæsar would in this point imitate the forbearance of his adversaries. It is said that the sight of every thing most noble in the commonwealth being now obliged to fly from their country, produced a strong effect on the public mind;[4] and that compassion for Pompey, and indignation against Cæsar, were for a time the prevailing feelings of the inhabitants of the country towns of Italy. So general was the abhorrence of Cæsar's rebellion, that his own father-in-law, L. Piso,[5] did not hesitate to accompany the senate in their retreat from Rome; and

The Senate and Consuls withdraw from Rome.

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. xi. *Ad Familiar.* lib. xvi. epist. xii. Cæsar, lib. i. c. 11.
[2] Appian, lib. ii. c. 35. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. xi.
[3] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. x. xi. xii. Appian, c. 37.
[4] Ibid. lib. vi. epist. xi.
[5] Ibid. lib. vii. epist. xiii.

B.C. 48. T. Labienus,[1] who had been one of his most favoured lieutenants in Gaul, left him immediately on the open disclosure of his designs against his country, and joined Pompey and the consuls at Theanum in Campania, on the twenty-fourth of January.

Pompey is unable to meet the enemy.

It appears certain that Pompey was taken by surprise through the suddenness with which Cæsar commenced hostilities. Trusting probably to the season of the year, he had imagined that he should have two or three months before him, in the course of which he might organize a sufficient force in Italy to prevent Cæsar from advancing, and might thus detain him in Cisalpine Gaul, till the Spanish army, under Afranius and Petreius, could cross the Pyrenees and the Alps to complete his destruction by assailing him in the rear. But when Cæsar opened the campaign, just as the winter was setting in, (for, owing to the defective state of the Roman calendar, the nominal time was nearly two months in advance of the real season of the year,) Pompey's preparations for defence were paralyzed. His actual force consisted chiefly of two legions,[2] which had been withdrawn from Cæsar's army by a decree of the senate in the preceding year, as a reinforcement for the troops of the republic in Syria; but which had been detained in Italy, when it became apparent that the commonwealth had more to fear on the side of Gaul than of Parthia. These legions had shared in Cæsar's victories for several years, and when he at last parted from them, one, or both of them, had received from him a liberal donation in money;[3] so that Pompey dared not risk a battle while those troops composed the whole or the greater part of his army.[4] His officers, it is true, were busy in levying soldiers in different parts of Italy, and particularly in Picenum; that district in which his father had acquired such great influence, and from which he had himself raised an army of three legions by his personal exertions, when he first took part in public affairs, and, though then a youth, without rank or public authority, marched at the head of fifteen thousand men to support the cause of L. Sylla. But these levies were carried on to great disadvantage under the constant alarm of the approach of the enemy.[5] Under such circumstances, men are unwilling to come forward; and those who might have rallied round any regular force which was already organized, had no inclination to take upon themselves all the dangers of an unequal resistance. Moreover, Pompey might have remembered, from the experience of the last civil war, that soldiers were easily induced to desert officers with whom they were little acquainted, and whose names bore no

[1] *Ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. xii. xiii.
[2] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. xiii. Cæsar, *de Bell. Gallico*, lib. viii. c. 54.
[3] Appian, *de Bell Civil.* lib. ii. c. 29. Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 29.
[4] *Epist. Pompey ad Domitium, apud Ciceron. ad Atticum*, lib. viii. epist. xii.
[5] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. xiii.

commanding authority; and that it was therefore most unsafe to trust generals of no reputation with untried soldiers in the presence of such an enemy as Cæsar, whose liberality was hardly less notorious than his victories. His fixed determination, accordingly, was, to avoid all engagements with the rebels, and to concentrate all the troops that his lieutenants could collect in the south of Italy; after which he would be guided by circumstances, whether still to make a stand in Italy, or to cross over into Greece, and there organize the resources of that part of the empire in which his past exploits had gained for him so many connections, and such an universal popularity. B.C. 48. His plan of operations.

Pompey was still with the consuls at Theanum,[1] when L. Cæsar arrived there on the twenty-fifth of January, with Cæsar's proposed conditions of peace. They were immediately discussed in a council composed of the principal senators: and it was agreed to accept them, provided that Cæsar would withdraw his troops from all the towns which he had occupied beyond the limits of his province. L. Cæsar was sent back with this answer; and Cicero seems for a time to have flattered himself that the war would thus be brought to a conclusion. But Cæsar had no intention of resting contented with the permission of standing for the consulship, when the sovereignty of Rome seemed within his grasp. He complained that Pompey still continued his levies of soldiers;[2] that his making no mention of a personal conference, betrayed an unwillingness to terminate the quarrel; and that he had fixed no particular day for his departure into Spain. He, meantime,[3] on his own part, was raising troops, and awaiting the arrival of the other legions of his own army; he had occupied the towns of Iguvium and Auximum,[4] which Pompey's officers had in vain attempted to defend; and Curio,[5] in his private correspondence, ridiculed the mission of L. Cæsar, as a measure from which the invader had never really anticipated any result. Pompey, still pursuing his plan of retreating, was at Luceria in Apulia, in the beginning of February; and on the seventh of that month,[6] encouraged by Cæsar's protracted absence, he sent orders to the consuls at Capua, that they should return with all haste to Rome and carry off the sacred treasures from the treasury, which he now regretted that he had left behind. But the consuls, judging the attempt too hazardous, declined to put it in execution. The disobedienee of one of his officers soon afterwards brought upon Pompey a far severer loss. P. Lentulus Spinther and L. Vibullius Rufus[7] had been employed

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. xiv. xv.
[2] Cæsar, *de Bello Civili*. lib. i. c. 11.
[3] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. xviii.
[4] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 12, 13.
[5] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. xix.
[6] *Ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. xxi.
[7] Cæsar, *Bell. Civil.* lib. i. c. 15. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. xxiii. lib. viii. ist. ii. xi.

B.C. 48. in levying soldiers in Picenum, and although, as Cæsar advanced, many of their men deserted, and went over to him, yet Vibullius was able to reach Corfinium with fourteen cohorts, amounting to about eight thousand four hundred men. At Corfinium he found L. Domitius Ænobarbus, with a force of twelve cohorts, and C. Hirrus with five more, which he had collected from the neighbourhood of Camerinum. In this manner an army was assembled of nearly nineteen thousand men; and Vibullius[1] wrote to Pompey to tell him that Domitius would put the whole in motion to join him on the ninth of February. But, instead of executing this plan, Domitius began to flatter himself that he was strong enough to arrest Cæsar's progress, or, at any rate, to threaten his rear with serious annoyance, if he should venture to pass beyond him, and advance in pursuit of Pompey. It appears, too, that private interests were allowed to influence his decision;[2] and that some individuals, who possessed property in the neighbourhood, induced him to remain, that he might protect their villas, or enable them to remove their effects with greater security. He even divided his forces, and attempted to hold the towns of Sulmo and Alba; and, instead of setting out to join Pompey on the ninth of February, he remained at Corfinium in spite of repeated orders to the contrary, till Cæsar arrived before the town, about the fifteenth or sixteenth,[3] with a force which cannot be exactly computed, as he was every day receiving reinforcements either by desertion from the enemy, or by the success of his levies, or by the arrival of detachments from the legions of his own army which he had left in Gaul. Sulmo was soon surrendered to his lieutenant, M. Antonius;[4] and the event of the siege of Corfinium was awaited with the most lively interest in every quarter. There were many persons, and Cicero himself was among the number, who expected that Pompey would march to the relief of Domitius, and considered that it would be most disgraceful if he tamely abandoned him. But Domitius had exposed himself to danger in defiance of the express orders of the commander of the armies of the commonwealth; and he had detained with him the levies from Picenum, on whose fidelity to his person Pompey relied with particular confidence, and whose presence he anxiously looked for to overawe the wavering inclinations of the two legions which he had received from Cæsar. It is possible, indeed, that a more enterprising general might have risked the attempt, and might have thought it wise to run all hazards in the hope of putting himself at the head of the soldiers of Picenum; but Pompey, misled perhaps by the example of Sylla, seems to have attached too little value to the pos-

L. Domitius attempts to defend Corfinium.

Breach of discipline by Domitius.

[1] *Epist. Pompeii ad L. Domitium, apud Ciceron. ad Atticum*, lib. viii. epist. xii.
[2] Ibid. *antea citata.*
[3] Ibid. *apud Ciceron ad Atticum*, lib. viii. c. 12.
[4] Cæsar, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. i. c. 18. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. viii. epist. iv.

session of Italy, and to have contemplated without regret the prospect of abandoning it for the present, while he was preparing in Greece sufficient resources to enable him, as he trusted, speedily to recover it. Accordingly, having written to Domitius to warn him that he must look for no relief, he continued his retreat towards Brundisium, and reached that place about the twenty-fifth of February.[1] Domitius, thus left to his own resources, soon found how unequal he was to the task of opposing Cæsar: his soldiers began to perceive his distrust of his own situation, and thought that they were now authorized to consult their own safety.[2] They immediately mutinied against their generals, secured the persons of Domitius and the principal officers who were with him, and sent to inform Cæsar that they were ready to open the gates to him, and to put his chief enemies into his power. Upon this offer he took possession of the town, and ordered Domitius, with the other leaders, to be brought before him; when, having reproached some of the number with personal ingratitude to himself, from whom they had received many favours, he dismissed them all unhurt, and even allowed Domitius to carry off with him a considerable treasure which he

B.C. 48.

His troop mutiny, and surrender the town to Cæsar.



[Brundisium.—*G. F. Sargent.*]

had brought to Corfinium for the payment of his troops. The soldiers he enlisted in his own army; and immediately set out from Corfinium, about the twenty-second of February, to prosecute his

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. viii. epist. ix. xi.
[2] Cæsar, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. i. c. 19. 23.

B.C. 48. march to Brundisium. In this manner Cæsar, like Sylla, owed his first great success to the faithlessness or weakness of his enemy's adherents; and the betrayal of Scipio, by his own soldiers in Campania, was now imitated by the troops at Corfinium, who surrendered their post and their general, and themselves joined the standard of the conquerer.

It now appeared certain that Pompey intended to abandon Italy; and when this determination became known, it necessarily drove the Italians to throw themselves into the arms of Cæsar, since they were left wholly at his mercy. His moderation at Corfinium was every where eagerly reported; and those who had at first dreaded the worst evils from the approach of his army,[1] were now grateful to him in proportion to their former fears, when they saw that he abstained, as yet, from confiscations and proscriptions. There were many senators, also, and men of rank and fortune,[2] who, considering the Roman Government inseparable from the possession of Rome, did not think themselves bound to follow Pompey into a foreign country, and looked upon his resignation of the seat of Government as a virtual acknowledgment that Cæsar might now dispose of the commonwealth with some shadow of lawful authority. P. Lentulus, having been freely spared by Cæsar at Corfinium, was unwilling to take any further part in the quarrel; and even Cicero hesitated whether he should follow Pompey into Greece or not, he having been left at Capua with the care of that part of Italy, and having afterwards been prevented from reaching Brundisium by the rapid advance of Cæsar's army into Apulia. Meanwhile the consuls, with all the troops which they had been able to raise, had effected their junction with Pompey; but some of his officers, endeavouring to join him from more distant parts of the country, found that Cæsar had intercepted them. Among these, P. Rutilius Lupus, one of the prætors, whilst trying to retreat from Taracina, with about eighteen hundred men, fell in with Cæsar's cavalry; upon which his soldiers immediately deserted to the enemy, and he himself, relinquishing the cause of Pompey as desperate, returned to Rome, and there began to perform the ordinary duties of his office in administering justice. Cæsar arrived before Brundisium on the ninth of March, with a force amounting now to six legions, four of which belonged to his own veteran army, and the other two consisted of the troops which he had levied since he entered Italy. He found that the consuls, with the greater part of the army,[3] and with a large number of senators, accompanied by their wives and children, had embarked for the opposite coast of Greece on the fourth of March; and that Pompey, with about twenty cohorts, or twelve thousand

Cæsar besieges Pompey in Brundisium.

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. viii. epist. xiii.
[2] Ibid. lib. viii. epist. xvi. lib. ix. epist i.
[3] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 25. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ix. epist. vi

men, was apparently resolved to maintain Brundisium against him. B.C. 48.
He had, a short time before, taken prisoner one of Pompey's officers,[1] whom he had sent back to Pompey, hoping, according to his own professions, that he would use his influence with his general to agree to a reconciliation. But when Pompey sent this officer to Cæsar[2] with proposals of peace, Cæsar, pretending to consider the terms unsatisfactory, prosecuted the siege of Brundisium with the utmost vigour; and, on the other hand, Pompey is said to have declined another offer on the part of Cæsar to negotiate,[3] alleging that he could enter into no treaty in the absence of the consuls. At the same time, however, that Cæsar was expressing his wish for peace, his followers, in their private reports,[4] gave a very different representation of his intentions; and declared that he talked of revenging the fates of Carbo and Brutus, and those other members of the party of Marius, whom Pompey had formerly put to death; nay, so eager was he to find grounds of complaint against his antagonist, that he pretended to consider T. Milo as the victim of Pompey's unjust persecution, and thus to espouse the cause of a man, whose only claim on his support was a turbulent and factious spirit. Meanwhile the siege of Brundisium was pressed with vigour; and Cæsar attempted to carry out two moles from the opposite sides of the harbour's mouth, with the view of blocking up the passage, and thus depriving the enemy of his means of retreat by sea. But before this work was completed, the ships, which had transported the consuls[5] and the first division of the army into Greece, returned to Brundisium; and Pompey was finally enabled to embark the remainder of his troops, and to put to sea, on the seventeenth of March, with the loss of only two transports, which ran aground at the contracted entrance of the harbour, and were in this manner taken. The citizens of Brundisium immediately opened their gates to Cæsar; and on the eighteenth he entered the town and made a public address to the inhabitants. Thence he resolved at once to move towards Rome, for he was unable to follow Pompey from the want of shipping; and he was anxious to take possession of the seat of Government, and then to carry his army into Spain, and destroy, if possible, the formidable force which was under the command of Pompey in that province.

Pompey crosses the sea to Greece with his army.

It appears that Pompey,[6] justly regarding Cæsar and his partisans as rebels, had, in all his proclamations, denounced severe punishments against every one who should abet or countenance them; and

Proclamation of Pompey.

[1] *Epist. Cæsaris ad Oppium et Balbum, apud Ciceron. ad Atticum*, lib. ix. epist. vii.
[2] Ibid. lib. ix. epist. xiii.
[3] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 26.
[4] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ix. epist. xiv.
[5] Cæsar, *de Bell. Civil.* lib i. c. 27. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ix. epist. xv.
[6] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ix. epist. x. xiii. lib. viii. epist. xi. xvi.

B.C. 48. by this language he had alarmed and alienated the minds of that large portion of the Italian people who were disposed, above all things, to consult their own private ease and safety. This feeling towards the opposite party, combined with the fame of his antagonist's moderation, had disposed the inhabitants of the different towns to favour Cæsar's interests, and, on some occasions, to afford him active assistance; but now that Pompey was retired from Italy, the evils occasioned by his rival were more keenly felt, and rendered men in turn dissatisfied with him. Cæsar, although the mere leader of a rebellious army, began to act as if he were the lawful sovereign of Italy. He sent orders to the chief magistrates of all the corporate towns to provide a certain number of ships,[1] and cause them to be sent to Brundisium, there to be in readiness to transport his army into Greece; he quartered his legions in different places, to the great vexation of the inhabitants, who were unused to such a burden in Italy; and he continued to levy soldiers, as he had done from the beginning of his rebellion, while his officers conducted themselves, in the execution of a task odious in itself, with much superfluous insolence and offensiveness. The character of his partisans was, indeed, such as would have disgraced the most honourable cause. His own personal profligacy was faithfully imitated by his lieutenants, Antonius and Curio; and the reputation of the leaders, together with the revolutionary views which they were supposed to entertain, had attracted to their standard a crowd of desperate and atrocious men,[2] whose appearance filled all respectable citizens with terror. Thus attended, Cæsar moved from Brundisium towards Rome, wishing to assemble and address the senate, or rather the small minority of senators who had not left the capital on the first of April.[3] As he was anxious to gain the sanction of every person of credit whom he could at all hope to influence, he wrote to Cicero, earnestly requesting him to meet him at Rome: Cicero, however, having no intention of complying with his wishes, had a personal interview with him on his way, about the twenty-eighth of March, at Formiæ, hoping to persuade him not to press his request any further. But Cæsar told him[4] that his absence from the senate would naturally influence others, and would be looked upon as a condemnation of his conduct. He then urged him to appear in the senate, and endeavour to bring about a negotiation; but when Cicero replied, that if he did so, he should recommend the senate to forbid the march of troops into Spain, or their transport into Greece, and should lament the condition to which Pompey had been reduced, Cæsar told him, "that he would have nothing of

Cæsar moves towards Rome.

His interview with Cicero.

[1] Cæsar, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. i. c. 30. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ix. epist. xix.
[2] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ix. epist. xviii. xix.
[3] Ibid. epist. xvii.
[4] Ibid. epist. xviii.

that sort said;" and, in conclusion, finding Cicero resolute in his refusal, he observed, "that if he were denied the benefit of Cicero's advice, he must follow such as he could procure, and should have recourse to extreme measures." On these terms they parted, and Cæsar proceeded on his way to Rome. B.C. 48.

Description of the persons who remained in Rome to receive Cæsar.

We have already stated that there were many senators who, after Pompey's departure from Italy, resolved to take no further share in the civil war. Among these were L. Volcatius Tullus and Manius Æmilius Lepidus, who had been consuls in the year B.C. 66;[1] Ser. Sulpicius, who had been consul in the year B.C. 51; and C. Sosius and P. Rutilius Lupus, who were two of the prætors for the present year. But of this number all were by no means agreed as to the propriety of countenancing Cæsar's usurpation. The two prætors, by continuing to act in their judicial character at Rome, seemed to acknowledge that the capital was still the seat of a lawful Government; but L. Tullus and Ser. Sulpicius wished to remain in perfect retirement,[2] and declined to attend the meeting of senators which Cæsar called together on his arrival. Another prætor, M. Æmilius Lepidus, afterwards the associate of Octavius and Antonius in the second triumvirate, had remained at Rome when the consuls and the majority of the senate had left it, and was considered to be a decided partisan of Cæsar. M. Cælius Rufus, at this time Curule Ædile, who had been tribune in the year B.C. 50, and had then taken an active part in behalf of Milo, was now also engaged on the side of Cæsar, and appears to have been at this period in Rome.[3] L. Cæcilius Metellus, one of the tribunes, was in Rome also,[4] but with very different intentions—it being his purpose to force Cæsar to display his real contempt for the laws of his country, and to prove how little he himself respected the sacredness of the tribunitian character, when it stood in the way of his own ambition.

Cæsar addresses the Senate.

Cæsar appears to have reached the capital about the time that he proposed to arrive there, that is, on the first of April; and having assembled as many of the senators as could be prevailed on to obey his summons, he held to them a language, in which he scarcely attempted to disguise the lawlessness of his usurpation.[5] He again repeated the story of his pretended injuries, in not having been allowed to dictate to the Government the terms on which he would obey their orders; and he inveighed against the cruelty shown to the tribunes, Antonius and Q. Cassius, a cruelty which had existed at most only in intention, and, probably, only in the counterfeited fears of those who were its imaginary objects. On such provocations he thought

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. xii. lib. viii. epist. i. ix. xv. lib. ix. epist. i.
[2] *Ad Atticum*, lib. x. epist. iii.
[3] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. viii. epist. xvi.
[4] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. x. epist. iv. Cæsar. *de Bell. Civili*, lib. i. c. 33.
[5] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 32.

B.C. 48. himself entitled to be guilty of rebellion and usurpation; and he entreated the senate to assist him in the administration of the republic, telling them plainly, at the same time, that if they were averse to the task, he would not burden them with it, but would govern the commonwealth by himself. Meanwhile, he recommended that deputies should be sent to Pompey, to endeavour to effect a peace.

This last proposal the senate, according to Cæsar's own account,[1] was not unwilling to embrace; but no one could be found to accept the office of ambassador, because they were all afraid to put themselves in Pompey's power after the threats which he had denounced against those who did not follow him out of Italy. This is probably a mere calumny of Cæsar's; and a more natural cause of the general reluctance is assigned by Plutarch,[2] and implied by Cicero,[3] that no one thought Cæsar sincere in his offer to negotiate. He attempted to carry several other measures through the concurrence of the senate; but he found even the shadow of that body, which now alone remained, decidedly averse to his interests; and L. Metellus the tribune interposed his negative on several occasions to defeat Cæsar's objects. All the opposition was nearly indifferent to him, for he was little anxious to have his power supported by law; and, as if he were already the despot of his country, he refused to let his lieutenant, C. Curio, derive his title to his command in Sicily from a decree of the senate, but told him that all commissions should proceed from himself. But when L. Metellus endeavoured, by his negative, to prevent him from breaking open the treasury, and from converting the public money to his own use, he was highly irritated, insomuch, that when Metellus,[4] as a last resource, placed himself before the door of the treasury, Cæsar threatened him with immediate death, and was disposed to have made this murder, had Metellus persisted in his resistance, the prelude to a general massacre. Thus, within the space of three months, the man, who had attacked his country under pretence of revenging the insults offered to the tribunitian power, was himself guilty of a most violent outrage upon that power, when exercised in as just a cause as could, on any occasion, have required its protection. But by this act of violence Cæsar lost much of his popularity, even with the lowest of the people;[5] and, finding that he was doing himself nothing but mischief by his stay in Rome, he set out before the middle of April on his way to Spain, without venturing to deliver a speech to the people, as he had before designed. He intrusted the command of the capital itself to M. Lepidus;[6] that of the rest of Italy to M.

Cæsar robs the treasury, and violates the sacredness of the Tribunitian office.

[1] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 33. [2] *In Cæsare*, c. 35. [3] *Ad Atticum*, lib. x. epist. i.
[4] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. x. epist. iv. Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 35.
[5] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. x. epist. iv. *Ad Familiares*, lib. viii. epist. xvi.
[6] Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 6. Appian, *de Bell. Civili*, lib. ii. c. 41.

Antonius; C. Curio, as has been before mentioned, was to occupy Sicily; Q. Valerius Orca, Sardinia; and C. Antonius, Illyricum. B.C. 48.

Sicily and Sardinia were won with little difficulty. The first of these provinces had been assigned by the senate to M. Cato on the first commencement of the rebellion; but he, judging himself more fitted for civil than for military employments, had declined to accept the command,[1] so long as there was any prospect of the speedy re-establishment of the government at Rome. When this became desperate, he went over to Sicily, and exerted himself with great vigour in building ships, in refitting such as he found in the island, and in levying soldiers, not only from among the Sicilians, but from the inhabitants of the opposite coast of Italy. These preparations, however, were in a very imperfect state, when he received the tidings of Curio's approach with an army of three legions—the troops being, indeed, actually carried over into Sicily by C. Asinius Pollio before Curio had joined them to assume the command.[2] Cato appears to have entered into the war with the same feelings that are ascribed to our own Lord Falkland, under circumstances partly similar: he deeply regretted the bloodshed which must attend the victory of either party, and he justly estimated the wickedness of bringing the miseries of war on the peaceable inhabitants of a country, without any reasonable prospect of success. Accordingly, finding himself unable to maintain possession of the island,[3] he quitted Syracuse on the twenty-fourth of April, and went to join Pompey and the army of the commonwealth in Greece. Curio thus became master of Sicily without opposition, and Q. Valerius Orca was equally fortunate in Sardinia; for M. Cotta,[4] to whom the senate had intrusted the care of that province, finding the inhabitants strongly disposed to submit to Cæsar, and being driven out of Caralis, one of the chief towns in the island, by the unassisted efforts of the citizens themselves, despaired of resisting Cæsar's officer, and, abandoning Sardinia, withdrew into Africa, where the cause of the commonwealth seemed to wear a more promising appearance.

He gains possession of Sicily and Sardinia.

We must now follow the steps of Cæsar towards Spain. On his arrival in Transalpine Gaul, he found that the citizens of Massilia refused to admit him within their walls,[5] and were making preparations to stand a siege. Massilia, a Greek colony, founded by the Ionians of Phocæa, when Ionia was first conquered by the Persians in the reign of the elder Cyrus, had been for many years the ally of

He marches into Spain. The city of Massilia refuses to acknowledge his authority.

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. xv. Cæsar, lib. i. c. 30.
[2] Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 53. Appian, lib. ii. c. 40.
[3] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. x. epist. xvi. Cæsar, lib. i. c. 30. Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 53.
[4] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 30. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. x. epist. xvi.
[5] Cicero, lib. i. c. 34, *et seq.*

B.C. 48. Rome, and had attained to a considerable height of power and prosperity. Its government deemed it inconsistent with their relations with Rome to support a rebel general, whatever might have been the success of his rebellion; and L. Domitius, whom Cæsar had taken prisoner and dismissed at Corfinium, having been since busily employed in collecting a squadron of light vessels, and manning them with his slaves and dependents from his estates near Cosa in Etruria, was expected soon in Transalpine Gaul, the command of which had been conferred on him by the senate, as we have before mentioned. According to Cæsar's account, the Massilians, after making profession of perfect neutrality, received Domitius into their city as soon as his squadron arrived, and placed all their resources at his disposal: but it seems more likely that Cæsar had insisted on their acknowledging his authority, and, from the moment they had refused to do so, had already regarded them as enemies; so that their reception of Domitius was rendered unavoidable. Be this as it may, their hostility to Cæsar soon assumed a decided shape, and he laid siege to their city with three legions. About a month was employed in the construction of a fleet of twelve ships of war, by his orders, in the neighbouring port of Arelate, and in preparing towers and other works for the attack of the walls; after which he gave the command of the army to C. Trebonius, and of the fleet to Decimus Brutus, (both of them afterwards in the number of his assassins,) and pursued his own course, according to his original intention, into Spain.

Siege of Massilia commenced.

State of the army of the Commonwealth in Spain.

Spain was at this time held by three of Pompey's lieutenants: L. Afranius, who had been consul with Q. Metellus Celer in the year B.C. 60; M. Petreius, a veteran officer, who, as lieutenant of the Consul C. Antonius, had commanded the forces of the commonwealth in the battle in which L. Catiline was defeated and killed, in the year B.C. 62; and M. Terentius Varro, a man more distinguished as a writer and philosopher than as a general. Their united force is stated by Cæsar to have amounted to seven legions;[1] two of which, under M. Varro, were occupying the southern part of Spain, while Afranius and Petreius, with the remaining five, and a numerous body of Spanish auxiliaries, had stationed themselves on the north of the Ebro, and had fixed their head-quarters at Ilerda on the Sicoris. Cæsar had already sent C. Fabius, his lieutenant, with four legions, across the Pyrenees, and others were ordered to follow without delay. A considerable auxiliary force of Gauls also accompanied the army, and the Gaulish cavalry in particular is said to have been both numerous and excellent. Meantime a report was current that Pompey, with all his own army, was on his way to Spain to join his lieutenants; and the apprehension of so formidable

[1] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 38

an accession to the strength of the enemy, induced Cæsar to attempt to bind most closely the attachment of his own soldiers to himself. For this purpose he borrowed money of the military tribunes and centurions, and with this fund he was enabled to make a donation to the troops; a step by which he not only conciliated the soldiers, but secured the fidelity of the officers, whose only hope of being repaid rested in the victory of their general. B.C. 48.

Cæsar arrives in Spain.

It is not easy to ascertain the precise amount of the numbers of Cæsar's army, when he himself arrived to take the command. They were at least equal to those of the enemy in regular infantry, and Cæsar was expecting additional reinforcements of Gauls, which might place his auxiliary force on a level with that of his opponents. However, Afranius and Petreius were unwilling to risk a general action with the veteran soldiers of Cæsar's legions; and they resolved rather to protract the contest, being abundantly provided with resources, and being in a position which they had themselves chosen as the seat of war.

Campaign on the Sicoris.

The town of Ilerda was situated on the right bank of the Sicoris, and their army was encamped before it; so that Cæsar had pitched his camp on the same side of the river, preserving also his communications with the left bank by means of two bridges,[1] distant nearly four miles from each other, which had been constructed at points higher up the Sicoris. The country which he could command on the right bank was confined within narrow limits by the river Cinga, which flows into the Sicoris just above its confluence with the Ebro, and whose course was distant from Ilerda something less than thirty miles. This district was soon exhausted; as Afranius had already conveyed the greatest part of the corn which he could find in it into Ilerda, and Cæsar's troops had quickly consumed whatever had not been thus pre-occupied. But, as large convoys of provisions were on their way from Gaul and Italy, as some of the more distant Spanish tribes had also engaged to send supplies, and as Cæsar's own plundering parties made frequent excursions on the left bank of the Sicoris, the support of the army seemed likely to be well secured.[2] It happened, however, that for some days there fell an unusual quantity of rain, which combined with the melting of the snow on the mountains to produce a great and sudden flood; insomuch, that both Cæsar's bridges were destroyed in the course of the same day.

Distress of Cæsar owing to the destruction of his bridges by a flood.

Nor did the waters soon abate; but continued so high as to baffle all attempts at repairing the bridges, and effectually to cut off all intercourse with the opposite bank of the river. Under these circumstances Cæsar's foraging parties on the left bank were unable to rejoin the army, and several large convoys of provisions, which had reached the Sicoris, found themselves suddenly intercepted. The army of the

[1] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 40.

[2] Ibid. c. 48.

B.C. 48. commonwealth, meantime, still preserved its communications uninterrupted, by means of the bridge at Ilerda; and in this manner Afranius, hearing of the detention of Cæsar's convoys, crossed the river with three legions and all his cavalry, and set out by night in the hope of surprising them. According to Cæsar's account,[1] the gallant resistance of some Gaulish horse enabled the greater part of the convoys to effect their escape to the higher grounds; some baggage, however, was taken, and the prospect of the safe arrival of the rest was rendered extremely doubtful. Great distress began to be felt in Cæsar's army; the price of corn rose to an extravagant height; the strength and spirits of the soldiers were affected by the necessary reduction in their allowance of food; whilst the legions of Afranius were abundantly supplied with every thing, and the generals themselves, full of confidence in their final success, transmitted to Rome the most favourable reports of the state of their affairs, and represented, perhaps with some exaggeration, the distress of the enemy.

His army is carried over the river in light boats

Under these circumstances Cæsar ordered his men to make a great number of boats, of a construction which, he tells us, he had learnt in Briton; and which may still be seen in the coracles used by the descendants of the Britons in the rivers and mountain lakes of Wales. A light frame or skeleton of wood was filled up with wicker work, and then covered over on the outside with hides.[2] The boats thus formed were transported in waggons about twenty miles up the river, by night, and, being then put into the water, carried over a detachment of troops immediately, who occupied a hill close to the bank. One entire legion was then ferried across in the same manner; and, the work being carried on at once from both banks, a new bridge was completed in two days. The dispersed convoys and the foraging parties, which had been detained on the left bank, now joined the army; and a large proportion of Cæsar's cavalry crossing the river as soon as the bridge was finished, attacked some of the foragers of the enemy with great success, defeated their covering party of light troops, and returned to their camp on the right bank, bringing with them a very considerable booty.

The army of the Commonwealth annoyed by Cæsar's superior cavalry.

Indeed, Cæsar's cavalry was so decidedly superior to that of Afranius, that, as soon as he had re-established his communication with the opposite bank of the Sicoris, he was enabled to retaliate on his antagonists the evils which had lately pressed upon himself. He commanded the country so as to prevent them from getting any provisions by foraging; and several of the Spanish tribes now thought it expedient to espouse his cause, and brought him abundant supplies of corn. The distance of his new bridge from his camp was still an inconvenience; to remedy which he proposed to

[1] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 51. [2] Ibid. c. 54.

render the Sicoris fordable at a point nearer to his present station, by drawing off a part of its waters into several small cuts, as the floods had, probably, by this time considerably abated. When he had made some progress in this work, the enemy's generals thought it expedient to change entirely their plan of operations. They resolved to retire behind the Ebro;[1] and, relying on the affection of those Celtiberian tribes, which had received signal favours from Pompey in return for their assistance in his contest with Sertorious, they expected to draw from them such reinforcements of cavalry as might enable them to oppose Cæsar on equal terms, and to protract the war with advantage in a friendly country, till the return of winter. On the other hand, delay would be to Cæsar hardly less fatal than defeat. Neither the character nor the resources of his lieutenant, M. Antonius, were calculated to ensure his possession of Italy, if Cæsar should be long detained in Spain; and the aristocracy might rally a sufficient force in Rome and in Italy to shake off the military usurpation by which it was enslaved, even without the aid of that formidable fleet and army which the generals of the commonwealth had already assembled in Epirus.

B.C. 48.

The generals of the Commonwealth's army propose to retire behind the Ebro.

We must suppose that Afranius and Petreius had not calculated on Cæsar's bringing with him into Spain a cavalry so decidedly superior to their own; as, otherwise, their choice of Ilerda, as the base of their operations, seems to have been originally unwise. The country, for some miles on every side of that town, is a plain, on which cavalry can act with advantage; and accordingly we find that, as soon as Cæsar had remedied the accidental inconvenience produced by the loss of his bridges, the enemy were unable to cope with him, and were driven to abandon the ground on which they had at first proposed to carry on the campaign. Measures were taken by Afranius and Petreius to secure their retreat. A bridge of boats was begun to be thrown across the Ebro, near the point of its confluence with the Sicoris, and at the distance of something less than twenty miles from their present camp;[2] all the small craft on the river were secured and brought together on this spot; and two legions of their army crossed at once from Ilerda to the left bank of the Sicoris, and there formed a camp. At length, when they were informed that Cæsar's artificial cuts had nearly rendered the river fordable for infantry, they put their whole force in motion, and, leaving only a small garrison in Ilerda, they transported all their troops to the opposite bank, and effected their junction with the two legions which, as we have mentioned, they had sent across before. From this point their course was through the plain of Ilerda, descending the left bank of the Sicoris for several miles; after which they would meet with a tract of wild and mountainous country extending as far

They retreat from Ilerda towards the Ebro.

[1] Cæsar lib. i. c. 61.

[2] Ibid. lib. i. c. 61.

B.C. 48. as the Ebro. If then they could once reach the mountains, their retreat was accomplished, for the passes might be easily secured so as to check the pursuit of an enemy; and whilst they had only to march on in a straight line, Cæsar's infantry was still detained on the right bank of the river, and if he should attempt to go round by his own bridge, the circuit, which he would be thus obliged to perform, would render his chance of overtaking them before they had passed the plain utterly desperate. With these prospects Afranius and Petreius commenced their march a little before daybreak.

They are pursued by Cæsar.

It appears, however, that Cæsar had anticipated their purpose, and had already sent his whole cavalry across the river,[1] to be prepared to harass and impede their progress from the instant that they should quit their camp. This service was performed very effectually—the army of the commonwealth having no horse or light troops of any description that could at all repel the annoyance. Meantime, as soon as it was day, Cæsar's infantry, seeing what was passing on the opposite side of the river, were impatient to join in the pursuit; and their general, availing himself of their ardour, ventured to ford the Sicoris with his whole army, leaving behind only one legion to guard his camp, together with those soldiers from the other legions whose bodily strength or courage seemed unequal to the enterprise. When he had gained the left bank, he pressed his march with such rapidity, that, although he had crossed the river some distance above Ilerda, and some delay had taken place in effecting the passage, he yet came up with the enemy three or four hours before sunset.[2] Afranius halted on a rising ground and offered battle; Cæsar halted too, not to fight, but to give his soldiers some refreshment; and when Afranius again attempted to continued his retreat, he experienced a renewal of the same annoyance as before from Cæsar's irresistible cavalry. Wearied with a long day of marching in retreat, and of fighting at continual disadvantage, the army of the commonwealth halted, and formed their camp for the night, when they were now within five miles of those friendly mountains, to reach which was certain safety.

Afranius and Petreius prepare to march.

About midnight Afranius and Petreius prepared, in silence, to recommence their march;[3] but some of their men having ventured too far to get water, were taken by Cæsar's cavalry, and their intention was thus discovered. Cæsar ordered the alarm to be instantly sounded, and the call to be given to his soldiers to commence the pursuit. The camps were so near to one another, that this note of preparation was clearly heard by the enemy's army; and the generals, dreading the confusion of a night engagement, while encumbered with their baggage on the march, changed their purpose, and kept their troops in their quarters. On the following day parties were

[1] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 63. [2] Ibid. lib. i. c. 64. [3] Ibid. lib. i. c. 66.

sent out on both sides to reconnoitre the nature of the ground over which the retreat was to be continued; and, when the report was received, Afranius and Petreius resolved to set out on the following morning, not doubting but that they should be able to gain the mountains, even if it were at the price of some partial losses. Cæsar also formed his plan; and, in pursuance of it, he put his army in motion at the very earliest dawn of the succeeding day, and, leaving his heavy baggage in his camp, set out apparently in the opposite direction from that which led to the mountains, following no road, but making the best of his way across the country. By a fatal and incomprehensible infatuation, Afranius and Petreius lost some irretrievable moments in congratulating themselves on the defeat of their enemy's plans, imagining that, having advanced beyond his resources, he was obliged to abandon the pursuit from want of provisions. They lingered in their camp,[1] till they saw the direction of this fancied retreat suddenly changed, and perceived Cæsar's army wheel round to the right, and push forward with the utmost speed to reach the mountains, and intercept their escape. Then perceiving their danger, every man at once ran to arms, and the army resumed its march with redoubled rapidity, striving to disappoint Cæsar's designs, and to gain their place of safety before they were for ever precluded from attaining it. B.C. 48.

Their efforts, however, were fruitless.[2] They were harassed by Cæsar's cavalry; and this impediment more than counterbalanced the natural difficulties of ground with which Cæsar himself had to struggle. He reached the mountains first, and there drew out his army on a commanding ridge, in front of his baffled enemy. Afranius halted with his troops on a hill, which rose in the outskirts of the mountain region, and made one last effort to secure, with his light troops, the highest point in the chain before him; hoping, if the attempt succeeded, to carry his whole army thither, and still to retreat over the high grounds, though by a somewhat different course from that which he had originally designed. But he saw the whole detachment which he had sent on this service cut to pieces before his eyes by Cæsar's cavalry; and his troops, dispirited by repeated disappointments, seemed hardly able to resist an attack, if Cæsar should now try to finish the campaign by a single battle. Cæsar, however, preferred a surer and more bloodless victory; and purposely so altered the disposition of his troops, as to allow Afranius to fall back to his camp without fear of interruption. The hill on which the army of the commonwealth was now posted, was untenable from its want of water; and no better prospect presented itself, than to return to the camp which they had left in the morning. Accordingly they did so; while Cæsar, having carefully occupied every pass in the

Their retreat cut off.

[1] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 69. [2] Ibid. c. 70. 72.

B.C. 48. mountains which led to the Ebro, again moved towards his enemy, and pitched his camp for the night as near to theirs as possible.

The issue of the campaign was now clearly decided, and the remaining faint struggles made by Afranius and Petreius to protract their fate do not require a very minute detail. They attempted to retreat to Ilerda, where they had left some supplies of corn;[1] but being harassed, as before, by Cæsar's cavalry, their progress was continually impeded, their parties sent out to get water were cut off, and at last, when they remained in their camp, as if wearied with the unceasing annoyance to which they were exposed on their march, Cæsar prepared to surround them with a line of circumvallation, and thus force them to surrender at discretion from mere famine. Before matters had come to this extremity, the soldiers on both sides had, on one occasion, begun to communicate with each other; and those of Afranius, availing themselves of the temporary absence of their generals from the camp, proposed to submit to Cæsar, if he would engage to spare the lives of their commanders. So far had this unauthorized negotiation proceeded, that several officers and soldiers from either army passed without fear into the opposite camp; and the Spanish chiefs in particular, whom Afranius kept with him as hostages for the fidelity of their tribes, were eager to commend themselves to the protection of the conqueror. But Afranius and Petreius, being informed of the subject in agitation, hastened back to their camp; and Petreius, attended by some troops especially attached to his person, appeared suddenly on the rampart, broke off the conferences between the soldiers, drove away Cæsar's men, and seized and put to the sword all of them whom he could find within his own lines. No doubt every superior officer in Cæsar's army might justly have been executed as a traitor and rebel; but justice itself, when not supported by adequate power, becomes useless cruelty; and the conduct of Petreius on this occasion, besides the barbarity of such an indiscriminate slaughter of defenceless men, was merely likely to provoke a victorious enemy to a severe retaliation. When, therefore, the army of the commonwealth was reduced to the last extremity, and the generals, if we may believe Cæsar, threw themselves entirely on his mercy,[2] he reproached them bitterly for their cruelty to his soldiers, and represented this conduct as perfectly agreeable to the general treatment which he had received from the partisans of Pompey; but he was too politic to follow their example, and agreed to spare them and their troops, on condition of their quitting Spain and disbanding their army. This last stipulation was most welcome to the vanquished soldiers, who thus, unexpected, obtained their release from service at the hands of their enemy. The natives of Spain were dismissed immediately; the rest

They endeavour to return to Ilerda.

But are obliged to surrender

and are disbanded.

[1] Cæsar, lib. i. c. 73–84.

[2] Ibid. c. 84–87.

of the troops were marched through Gaul to the frontiers of Italy, receiving rations from Cæsar on their way, and when they arrived at the river Var, they also were all disbanded. Afranius and Petreius repaired to Greece, and joined the army of Pompey. B.C. 48.

M. Varro still remained in arms in the south of Spain;[1] and, on receiving tidings of the issue of the campaign on the Sicoris, he intended to shut himself up with his army of two legions in the island of Gades, more familiar to our ears under its present appellation of the Isle of Leon. Here he had collected a fleet and considerable magazines of corn, and had also raised a large sum of money, partly by forced contributions from the Roman citizens resident in the province, and partly by seizing the treasures and sacred ornaments from the famous temple of Hercules in the neighbourhood of the town. Cæsar, with his usual activity, hastened to extinguish these last remains of hostility in Spain;[2] and, having sent before him two legions, under the command of Q. Cassius, he followed himself with six hundred horse, issuing at the same time a proclamation, by which the magistrates and chief men of all the towns of the province were required to meet him on a certain day at Corduba. The fame of his victory over Afranius and Petreius had produced so general an impression in his favour, that his proclamation was every where obeyed, and every town took an active part in his cause. The people of Gades declared for Cæsar, and expelled from their city the officer to whom Varro had intrusted the command; and one of the two Roman legions that composed Varro's army deserted him openly, and marched away to Hispalis. Upon this, Varro offered to surrender his remaining legion, together with the fleet, corn, and money that he had collected for the war. Cæsar received his submission at Corduba, where he found the principal individuals of the province, both Romans and Spaniards, assembled according to his orders. He thanked them for the zeal which they had shown in his cause, and remitted to the Roman citizens among them the contributions which Varro had demanded. He thence proceeded to Gades, where he ordered the treasures, taken from the temple of Hercules, to be restored; and having left Q. Cassius, with four legions, to command the province, he embarked on board the fleet which Varro had just surrendered to him, and arrived, after a short passage, at Tarraco. Here he received a number of deputations from the towns of the north of Spain, and having bestowed some honours on such States and individuals as had most assisted him in his late campaign, he set out from Tarraco by land, and returned to that part of his army which he had left under C. Trebonius, employed in the siege of Massilia. It is said that the complete conquest of Spain was effected in forty days from the period of his first opening the campaign on the Sicoris.[3]

Surrender of M. Varro, the last General of the Commonwealth in Spain.

All Spain submits to Cæsar.

He returns to Massilia.

[1] Cæsar, lib.ii. c. 17. [2] Ibid. c. 19–21. [3] Ibid. c. 32.

B.C. 48. Surrender of Massilia.

The citizens of Massilia were, by this time, reduced to the last extremity,[1] their naval force having been totally defeated by Decimus Brutus, a considerable breach having been made in their walls, and they themselves suffering the combined evils of scanty sustenance and disease. Accordingly, on Cæsar's arrival before the town, they offered to surrender to him, L. Domitius having already effected his escape by sea; and their submission was so far accepted, that their city was preserved from plunder, and was even allowed to retain its liberty; but they were obliged to surrender all the arms and military engines in their arsenals, to give up all their ships, to pay to Cæsar all the money in their treasury, and, at a subsequent period, to forfeit most of the dominion which they possessed beyond their own walls.

Cæsar is appointed Dictator.

Before the end of the siege, Cæsar received intelligence from Rome that he had been appointed dictator by M. Lepidus the prætor, in pursuance of a decree of the people. Nothing could be more illegal than such an appointment, made, as it was, without the authority of the senate, or the nomination of either of the consuls;[2] but it appears that the absence of the chief magistrates of the commonwealth had somewhat embarrassed Cæsar's party, and that they did not know how to procure his election as consul for the year following, without this previous measure of conferring on him the dictatorship, that he might be enabled to preside at the comitia. This could not be done by Lepidus,[3] who was only prætor, and far less by any inferior officer: there was no alternative, therefore, but to appoint Cæsar dictator, or to allow the year to expire without proceeding to any election; and then, when the present consuls should have resigned their power, to let the comitia be held, as was usual in such cases, by an interrex. But Cæsar now being invested with the title, at least, of a lawful magistrate, set out for Rome as soon as Massilia had surrendered, in order to exercise his power in the civil government with more effect than during his late visit to the capital on his way from Brundisium to Spain.


Mutiny of Cæsar's troops at Placentia.

He was unexpectedly detained, however, at Placentia by a mutiny which broke out in a part of his army,[4] owing, as it is said, to the disappointment of the soldiers in not being gratified, as they had hoped, with the plunder of Italy. Cæsar's ability displayed itself on this occasion to great advantage. He addressed the mutinous troops in the firmest tone; and, as they professed to wish to gain their discharge, he instantly dismissed from his service one entire legion, and punished with death the principal authors of the mutiny; after which, finding the legion most anxious to be again received into favour, he consented to revoke its punishment, and to

[1] Cæsar, lib. ii. c. 22. Dion Cassius, lib. xli. p. 165.
[2] Appian, *de Bello Civili*, lib. ii. c. 48.
[3] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ix. epist. ix.
[4] Dion Cassius, lib. xli. p. 165. Suetonius, *in Cæsar*, c. 69.

continue it in his service. In this manner, like Cromwell on a similar occasion, he quelled the most formidable danger that could threaten him, by appearing unmoved by it; and, whilst he was trampling on all laws himself, gave a lesson to his followers that they were not to be indulged with an equal license. From Placentia he then proceeded to Rome, and entered on the dictatorship; but not choosing at present to hold this unpopular title longer than was necessary, he held the comitia for the election of consuls, and, having procured his own nomination, together with that of P. Servilius Isauricus, he laid down his office of dictator in eleven days after he had begun to exercise it.[1] B.C. 48.

But within this short space of time there were not a few important subjects which claimed his attention. When he had set out for



[Pompeii.—*From a Model in Sir J. Soane's Museum.*]

Spain some months before, he left the command of Italy, as already mentioned, to M. Antonius. A rebel general in this manner subjected the first country in the empire to the absolute control of one of the vilest of his rebel officers. Antonius acted on no other authority than Cæsar's commission; but this empowered him to

State of Italy during the first year of the Civil War.

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 2.

B.C. 48. prevent any one from leaving Italy,[1] and to conduct himself as the master of a conquered province. He travelled about, accompanied at once by his mistress, who was carried in an open litter, by his wife, and by his mother, and attended by a train of men and women of the most abandoned description. He obliged the several towns through which he passed to send out deputations to meet him, and to offer complimentary addresses, in which his mistress, who was by profession an inferior actress, was saluted with the name of Volumnia, a name consecrated in the traditions of Rome, as having been that of the wife or mother of Coriolanus. On other occasions, when the magistrates of some of the most considerable cities were summoned to attend him,[2] he treated them with studied insult, because their towns had incurred Cæsar's displeasure from their disinclination to his cause. This behaviour tended greatly to alienate the affections of the people of Italy, and to make them anticipate the evils likely to follow from the final victory of a party, whose adherents already so boldly defied and insulted public opinion. Even the dispositions of the army began to waver; and, as far as we can learn from some hints in Cicero's letters to Atticus,[3] there were some of Cæsar's officers who were already disgusted with the party which they had chosen, and who secretly fomented the discontent of the soldiers. The centurions of three cohorts, posted at Pompeii, came to Cicero,[4] while he was residing at his villa in that neighbourhood, and offered to place themselves, their soldiers, and the town which they occupied, at his disposal. He was not disposed to commit himself by accepting their offer; but it shows how fair a prospect Pompey would have had of regaining Italy, if he had availed himself of Cæsar's absence to make a descent upon it. Meanwhile, the minds of men in general were kept in a continual ferment. We have seen, on former occasions, that the number of debtors at Rome, unable or unwilling to satisfy their creditors, was usually very considerable; and, as the habits of the times became more expensive, it was likely to be perpetually increasing. The present distracted state of Italy contributed to aggravate the difficulties of persons of this description. Money, it appears, had risen greatly in value;[5] partly, perhaps, from the sums taken out of circulation by the many wealthy individuals who followed Pompey into Greece; partly from the great demand for it to maintain such large armies as were now on foot in different parts of the empire; and partly, we may suppose, from the practice of hoarding, which is always common amongst a large proportion of the community, in times of apprehended distress and danger. On

Pecuniary position of the Romans.

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. x. epist. x. xvi. *Philippic.* ii. c. 23.
[2] Ibid. *ad Atticum*, lib. x. epist. xiii.
[3] Ibid. lib. x. epist. xii. xiv. xv. xvi.
[4] Ibid. lib. x. epist. xvi.
[5] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 1. Dion Cassius, lib. xli. p. 170, 171.

the other hand, landed property was as naturally depreciated; for B.C. 48.
no one liked to purchase that which might soon be wrested from him to furnish settlements for the veteran soldiers of the party which might finally prove victorious. In this manner, a debtor could neither readily raise money by the sale of his estates to discharge the principal of his debt, nor could he easily find means to pay the interest, which, in itself, was a great and now a permanent burden. Many, therefore, were looking forward with hope to a total revolution, by which all debts would at once be cancelled; many derived encouragement from the assurance of Antonius,[1] that all exiles would soon be allowed to return to their country; while others, again, were anticipating with horror a regular system of proscription and massacre whenever Cæsar should return from Spain. His arrival, invested as he was with the power of dictator, was thus viewed on all sides with eagerness and anxiety; and men watched to see the first measures of his government, by which they might judge whether he intended to imitate Sylla or Catiline; whether he felt himself strong enough to disclaim, as a tyrant, the principles which he had favoured as a demagogue; or whether he still proposed to tread consistently in the steps of his early life, and to uphold the needy, the extravagant, and the licentious, in their several courses of fraud, and dissipation, and profligacy.

Cæsar's regulations in his Dictatorship.

But Cæsar knew that no government can sport with the rights of property without sinking into weakness and contempt. He was obliged, therefore, to uphold the cause of the creditor, and to give no countenance to those who called for an entire abolition of all debts; but yet, wishing to relieve the debtor, he ordered that certain commissioners should be appointed to estimate the property of an insolvent,[2] and to oblige the creditor to receive it in payment at the price which it would have borne before the war. It is added, by Suetonius,[3] that he caused all sums, previously paid as interest, to be deducted from the principal of the debt; by which regulation, together with the preceding one, the creditor sustained, on the whole, a loss of twenty-five per cent. In his next measure, the dictator was enabled to indulge his inclinations with less restraint. We have already mentioned the improvements introduced in the laws against bribery and other offences during Pompey's last consulship, and that several individuals were tried and banished under the provisions of his acts. Cæsar now procured a decree of the people, reversing all the sentences passed at that time,[4] and allowing all who had been sufferers from them to return to their own country; alleging, that an undue influence had been exercised against them by the presence of Pompey's military force in the city during their

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. x. epist. xiii.
[2] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 1.
[3] *In Cæsare*, c. 42.
[4] Ibid.

B.C. 48. trials. But to show the real motives by which he was actuated, he excepted Milo from the benefit of this decree,[1] because he was well known to be an enemy to the popular party; although no one had been condemned at the same period against whom Pompey had testified a stronger feeling of dislike. It should be observed, too, that the language of Cicero, on several occasions, implies a far more general restoration of exiles on this occasion, than Cæsar or his partisans have thought proper to acknowledge;[2] that Dion Cassius, Appian, and Suetonius agree in asserting, distinctly, the same thing; and that Suetonius adds further,[3] that all those who had been degraded by the censors, were in like manner restored to their former rank. The object of this last step was probably to gratify those individuals whom Appius Claudius had lately disgraced in his censorship, and who at that very time threw themselves into the arms of Cæsar, in the hope of obtaining, through him, the recovery of their dignity.

He leaves Rome and proceeds to Brundisium,

When he had thus rewarded his followers, and endeavoured to gratify that class of persons who were most disposed to support him, without greatly offending the possessors of property, he resigned the dictatorship, as has been already mentioned, and set out for Brundisium. Here his army had been ordered to assemble; and the troops which had returned from Gaul and Spain, together with those which he had raised in Italy, formed, on the whole, a force of no fewer than twelve legions.[4] Some of these, however, were hardly more than skeletons, owing to their losses in former campaigns, which had not been yet made up, and to the effects of sickness, produced by the sudden change which many of the men had experienced from the climate of Spain and Gaul, to the influence of an autumn in Apulia; nor had he ships to enable him at once to transport into Greece so considerable an army. According to his own statement, the seven legions, which he at first proposed to embark, amounted to no more than twenty thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry, implying a diminution of their original numbers, for which his account of his former campaigns by no means would have prepared us; and with this force he put to sea on the fourth of January, and on the following day effected his landing in safety on the coast of Epirus.

From which he crosses over to Greece.

Campaign of Curio in Africa.

B.C. 43.

The advantages which Cæsar had gained in Spain and Italy in the first year of the war, were somewhat chequered by the ill success of his officers in Africa and in Illyricum. We have already seen that C. Curio had occupied Sicily without opposition, M. Cato having thought his forces insufficient to defend the island, and having accordingly abandoned it before the arrival of the enemy. Curio's original

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xli. p. 170. Appian, lib. ii. c. 48.
[2] *Ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. i. xi. lib. x. epist. xiii. xiv.
[3] *In Cæsare*, c. 41.
[4] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 2. 7.

instructions from Cæsar,[1] directed him to cross over into Africa so soon as he should have secured Sicily; and this first object being already effected, he set sail with two legions, about the middle of the summer, and reached the African coast in safety after a passage of two days and three nights. The Roman province of Africa was at this time held by P. Atius Varus, an officer attached to the cause of Pompey, but little scrupulous, as it appears, of disregarding the forms of the commonwealth. He had been opposed to Cæsar in Italy, at the beginning of the rebellion; and being then deserted by his soldiers, he left Italy, and hastened to Africa,[2] a province which had formerly fallen to his lot to govern in the year that followed his prætorship, His old authority in that country was still favourably remembered; and the late prætor, C. Considius, having returned to Rome,[3] and left the province under the care of his lieutenant, Q. Ligarius, till the appointment and arrival of a successor, P. Varus thought proper to take the chief command upon himself, in order to secure so valuable a portion of the empire from the usurpation of Cæsar. Ligarius was a quiet man, and was glad to be released from a situation of much difficulty and danger; so that he willingly allowed Varus to supersede him. But soon after L. Tubero[4] arrived off the coast, as the lawful successor of C. Considius, having received Africa as his province, amongst the various appointments made by the authority of the senate just before they were compelled by Cæsar to abandon the capital. It seems, however, that Tubero had no inclination to accept the office, and had only been persuaded to do so by the strong remonstrances of some of his friends, who represented his compliance as a duty which he owed to his country in these times of peril. A man thus reluctantly engaged in the cause, appeared to Varus unfit to be trusted with a post of such importance as the command of Africa; and thus, availing himself of the license of civil wars, Varus forcibly excluded the lawful officer of the commonwealth from taking possession of his province, and would not even suffer him to set his foot upon the shore. Tubero, thus repelled, showed the injustice of the suspicions entertained against him, by repairing immediately to the standard of the commonwealth in Macedonia;[5] while the possession of Africa was to be disputed between two parties, both of whom were equally destitute of a legal title to it.

B.C. 47.

State of that Province.

Varus, however, professed to act as an officer of the commonwealth, and a partisan of Pompey; and as such was strongly supported by Juba, king of Mauritania. That prince was the son of

Juba, king of Mauritania, assists the party of the Commonwealth in Africa.

[1] Cæsar, *de Bello Civili*, lib. i. c. 30. lib. ii. c. 23.
[2] Ibid. lib. i. c. 31. Cicero, *pro Ligario*, c. 2.
[3] Cicero, *pro Ligario*, c. 2.
[4] Ibid. c. 7. Cæsar, lib. i. c. 31.
[5] Cicero, *pro Ligario*, c. 8.

B.C. 47. Hiempsal,[1] who, in the civil wars between Marius and Sylla, had been rewarded for his services with the kingdom of Mauritania, when Pompey overthrew the united forces of Domitius and Hiarbas, and established the authority of Syllain Africa. Juba, therefore, was disposed naturally to assist Pompey, as the benefactor of his family; and his assistance was given with double readiness when he found that the army against which it was required was commanded by Curio; for it seems that Curio,[2] during his tribuneship, had proposed a law to declare the kingdom of Mauritania forfeited to the Roman people. The succour which Juba afforded was prompt and decisive.[3] Curio obtained at first some advantages over the Roman forces under Varus; but, being too much elated by his success, he neglected the necessary precautions; and attacking the army which Juba brought up to the relief of Varus, without duly acquainting himself with its strength, he and the entire force under his command were cut to pieces. By this victory the province of Africa remained under the authority of the commonwealth, and became afterwards the favourite refuge of the constitutional party when the defeat of Pharsalia had ruined their cause in Greece and Asia.



[Juba.—*Caneui's Iconografia*]

Defeat and death of Curio.

Defeat of Cæsar's lieutenants in Illyricum.

With regard to the operations in Illyricum, our information is exceedingly defective. It appears that Cæsar, before his departure for Spain,[4] had left C. Antonius, the brother of Marcus, with a certain naval and military force, in Illyricum, which country was comprised, together with the Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, within the limits of his original province. Its occupation at the present moment was of considerable importance to Cæsar's interests; because it might otherwise, during his absence in Spain, have afforded to Pompey a passage to the north of Italy, and thus have enabled him to cut off the resources which Cæsar drew in abundance from the attachment of the people of that country. Reports, indeed, were prevalent at Rome, as early as the month of April, that Pompey was actually making this attempt;[5] but his plans were of another kind, and his armaments were not yet in such a state of forwardness as to encourage him to act on the offensive. To the southward of Illyricum, the mouth of the Adriatic[6] was guarded

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xli. p. 172. edit. Leunclav. Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 12. *Auctor de Bello Africano*, c. 56.
[2] Cæsar, lib. ii. c. 25.
[3] Ibid. lib. ii. c. 36, *et seq.*
[4] Appian, *de Bello Civili*, lib. ii. c. 41.
[5] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. x. epist. vi.
[6] Ibid. lib. x. epist. vii. Appian, lib. ii. c. 41.

with a small squadron by P. Cornelius Dolabella, the son-in-law of Cicero; but, like most others of the young nobility of bad character, engaged in the cause of Cæsar. Inferior as Cæsar was to his adversaries in naval means, he could only expect Dolabella to keep the sea for a time, till the fleets of the enemy should be brought together; after which it became his business to preserve his ships with the utmost care, as Cæsar was ill able to replace them if they should be taken or destroyed. But whether from want of caution on the part of Dolabella, or from any other cause, he was attacked on the eastern shore of the Adriatic by the ships of the commonwealth, under M. Octavius and L. Scribonius Libo,[1] and was defeated with the loss of his entire fleet. His disaster was only the prelude to another of greater magnitude; for C. Antonius,[2] coming up in the hope of relieving him, was surrounded by the victorious forces of the enemy, who, putting on shore a portion of their seamen, blockaded him by land and sea, till he was obliged to surrender himself prisoner, with all the troops under his command. The soldiers were incorporated with Pompey's army; and these successes tended, probably, to facilitate the levies which were now going on, in the name of the commonwealth, in Greece, and in the eastern provinces of the empire. B.C. 47.

Preparations of Pompey for war.

It is now proper to notice more particularly the proceedings of Pompey since his arrival in Greece. In the early part of the year B.C. 49, he found himself attended by both the consuls, and about two hundred senators;[3] so that he might fairly consider himself as being supported by the authority of the commonwealth. For the present, indeed, almost all the magistrates of the republic were at his quarters; but as their power would expire at the end of the year, and as it was impossible to observe the proper forms of election in any other place than at Rome, it was resolved that the present officers should be continued in their commands, with the titles of proconsuls, proprætors, &c., by a decree of the senate. This appears to have been perfectly consistent with the constitutional power of that order; and a place was accordingly marked out

[1] Florus, lib. iv. c. 2. Dion Cassius, lib. xli. p. 171. Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 36. Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 4.


[2] Florus, Dion Cassius, *ubi supra*. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cx.—Cæsar asserts that Antonius was betrayed by one of his officers, T. Pulcio, who afterwards served in Pompey's army—Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 67. It has been a favourite resource with others besides Cæsar, to attribute their disasters to treason; but such statements, when resting merely on the assertion of the vanquished party, should be received with great suspicion. An officer in the army of Antonius might very possibly have deserted to the enemy on this occasion, and might have carried to them some useful information, the importance of which Cæsar would gladly exaggerate, so as to ascribe the loss of the army chiefly, or entirely, to this cause. The treason of T. Pulcio, whatever it was, is not even hinted at by Florus, Suetonius, the epitomizer of Livy, Appian, nor Dion Cassius—writers, none of whom can be called unfavourable to Cæsar, and the two latter of whom have rather a bias in his favour.

[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xli. p. 173.

B.C. 47. The Senate assembles at Thessalonica.

at Thessalonica, and duly consecrated by the augurs, that the auspices might be taken with the usual solemnities, and that the senate might not assemble on profane ground—a circumstance which would have violated all its acts. Meanwhile, Pompey was busily employed in collecting troops and ships, and supplies of provisions from all quarters. Many of the petty princes and States of Asia Minor and the eastern coast of the Mediterranean, were indebted to him for their crowns or their dominions during his long commands in that part of the empire; so that his private influence came powerfully in aid of the name of the Roman republic, in procuring their support. He had under his immediate standard an army of nine legions of Roman citizens,[1] five of which he had brought with him from Italy, two had been raised by order of Lentulus in the Roman province of Asia, one was composed of the veteran soldiers who had settled in Crete and Macedonia after their

Strength of Pompey's army.



[Crete—Ruins of Gortyna—*La Borde.*]

term of service had expired, and one had been formed out of the soldiers of two veteran legions which had been quartered in Sicily. With these was joined an auxiliary force of infantry which Pompey had lately raised in Greece; and a reinforcement of two legions more was expected ere long to be added to the army, which Scipio, Pompey's father-in-law, was to bring with him from his province in Syria. The cavalry is said to have amounted to seven thousand; but it seems to have consisted of the troops of so many different nations, that much time and a careful discipline must have been needed before such various elements could coalesce. The light infantry were also numerous; but they, like the cavalry, were a

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 4.

motley force of Greeks, Cretans, Syrians, and natives of Pontus, whose steadiness was little to be trusted in the hour of difficulty. It is difficult to ascertain the real numbers of the whole army, because we know not whether the legions contained their full complement of men, or whether some of them were not mere skeletons, which it was intended to fill up from time to time with new levies. But whatever was the numerical strength of Pompey's troops, they were so decidedly inferior in quality to those of the enemy, that their general, under present circumstances, could not venture to oppose them to Cæsar's veterans in the open field. He was fully sensible, indeed, of their inferiority, and exerted himself to the utmost, during the interval of leisure that was afforded him, in improving their discipline, and training them incessantly in those military exercises which the nature of ancient warfare rendered so important.[1] Pompey himself took part in these exercises with all the spirit and activity of youth; and added at once to his own popularity and to the confidence of his soldiers, by his skill and strength in throwing the javelin, and the perfect address with which he managed his horse while he was directing the manœuvres of the cavalry. He hoped to keep the enemy at a distance by the aid of his numerous fleet, till he had sufficiently organized and disciplined his army to return to Italy with every prospect of final success. All the maritime countries of the eastern part of the Mediterranean had contributed their quotas of ships;[2] and the whole naval force was placed under the command of M. Bibulus, the colleague of Cæsar in his first consulship, who felt a strong personal enmity against him, in consequence of their differences at that period. Finally, ample magazines of corn had been collected from Thessaly, Asia Minor, Egypt, and Cyrene, that the army might be enabled to wait patiently the issue of their general's plans, and might not be driven to risk any desperate measures from the want of provisions. Meantime, the language held by Pompey was, in the highest degree, lofty and uncompromising. Not only were Cæsar's partisans deservedly spoken of as rebels, and threatened with the vengeance of the laws, but all who had remained in Italy, and had taken no share in the defence of the commonwealth, were considered as guilty of an abandonment of their duty; and it was proposed to confiscate their property, in order that the faithful soldiers, by whose aid the Constitution should be preserved and restored to its independence, might be rewarded by its distribution. Cicero several times speaks in the strongest terms of the severities which would have followed the victory of the constitutionalists;[3] and declares, that they would have

B.C. 47.

Pompey's fleet.

Language held by his party.

[1] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 64. Appian, lib. ii. c. 49.
[2] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 3, 5.
[3] *Ad Atticum*, lib. ix. epist. vii. x. xi. lib. x. epist. vii. lib. xi. epist. vi. *Ad Familiares*, lib. iv. epist. ix. lib. vii. epist. iii.

B.C. 47. ordered a general proscription as unsparing as that of Sylla. We are told, indeed, by Plutarch,[1] that a resolution was passed, at Cato's suggestion, by the senate assembled at Thessalonica, declaring that no Roman citizen should be put to death out of the field of battle, nor any city subject to the Roman government given up to plunder. If this be true, we must suppose that the declaration was meant to apply only to the period of actual hostilities; nor is it unlikely that the humanity of Pompey and Cato might have been able thus far to mitigate the horrors of warfare, while the violence of some of their associates would have defied any such restraint in the event of the final triumph of their party. The character of Pompey himself is most remote from cruelty, although he may have been unable to check the excesses of his partisans, or may have threatened to punish, perhaps with an excessive severity, the treasons from which he himself, as well as the commonwealth, had suffered so heavily. But it is also consistent with other parts of his life to believe, that whatever irritation he might now feel, while witnessing the present success of the rebellion, yet when the supreme power was placed in his hands, he would have used it with the utmost moderation and fairness, and would himself have been sincerely desirous of restoring peace and liberty to his country. On the other hand, it must be confessed, that the members of the high aristocratical party, who had regarded him with jealousy from his earliest youth, might have overruled his own dispositions, and have either forced him to become the instrument of their rapacious and cruel designs, or have sacrificed him to secure their own exclusive ascendency. And, doubtless, the happiness of mankind was ultimately far better secured by the victory of Cæsar, and the establishment even of his successor's despotism, than it would have been by the unchecked dominion of the most profligate members of a corrupt aristocracy.

Operations of Cæsar after his landing

Such was the state of Pompey's party when the negligence or over-confidence of his naval officers allowed Cæsar, as we have already mentioned, to transport, without opposition, from Italy, the first division of his army, and to effect a landing on the coast of Greece. On the very day of the disembarkation, Cæsar advanced to summon the town of Oricum,[2] which was held by an enemy's garrison under the command of L. Torquatus. But already the cause of the commonwealth felt the disadvantage of having abandoned the seat of government, and having allowed Cæsar to receive at Rome, from the people assembled in the ordinary place of election, the title of Roman consul. The garrison, consisting of Illyrian soldiers and the citizens of Oricum, alike refused to resist an officer bearing the rank of the chief magistrate of the Roman people; and

[1] *In Pompeio*, c. 65. *in Catone*, c. 53.
[2] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 11.

Torquatus, thus deserted, was obliged to surrender himself and the town to Cæsar. This example was followed by the people of Apollonia,[1] and by a great many other places in the neighbourhood; so that Cæsar immediately acquired a firm footing in the country, and, by his possession of the towns on the coast, was enabled, in a great measure, to neutralize the naval superiority of the enemy. B.C. 47.

Proceedings of Pompey's fleet.

It is probable that the lateness of the season, which, though nominally the month of January, was in reality the beginning of November, together with Cæsar's known want of shipping, had impressed Bibulus with the belief that no attempt to invade Greece would be made at present; and that Cæsar would require the winter months to complete his preparations before he thought of commencing hostilities. Surprised, therefore, by the tidings that the enemy were actually arrived on the coast of Greece,[2] Bibulus put to sea in haste from Corcyra, in the hope of intercepting a part at least of the transports employed in the passage; but Cæsar had already landed in safety, and Bibulus only succeeded in cutting off about thirty of the empty vessels, which Cæsar had ordered instantly to return to Brundisium. His vexation at his own want of vigilance, combined with his general hatred against Cæsar, led him to commit an atrocious act of cruelty upon the masters and crews of the vessels which thus fell into his hand; for, having set the ships on fire, he burnt the men in the same flames. He then lined the coast with detachments of his fleet, from Salone to Oricum, a distance of about two hundred miles; and, as a mark of his resolution to use every possible exertion, it is said that he lived entirely on board his ship, even at that inclement season. The ancient ships of war, it should be remembered, being calculated chiefly for coasting voyages, and accustomed to send their crews ashore on every occasion to take their meals and to sleep, were very ill provided with accommodations in themselves, and could neither hold a large supply of provisions, nor afford tolerable quarters on board for the officers and men. To remain, therefore, continually at sea was attended with great inconvenience, and considerable distress; and thus, when Cæsar's occupation of the landing-places on the coast prevented the enemy from coming on shore, or from getting supplies of wood and water, he retaliated upon them, to the full, the annoyance which he suffered from their blockade. But Bibulus and the officers and men under his command bore their privations with the utmost patience and resolution; transports were employed in bringing them regular supplies of wood, water, and provisions from Corcyra;[3] and when the badness of the weather on one occasion interrupted this communication, they are said to have wrung the dew from the skins with which the holds of their ships were covered, and thus to have

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 12. [2] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 8. [3] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 15.

B.C. 47. allayed the intensity of their thirst. They enjoyed, however, the satisfaction of feeling that they were effectually stopping the passage of the second division of Cæsar's army, which it had been intended to transport, without loss of time, on board the vessels which had returned to Brundisium, after carrying over the first division. The troops were actually embarked, and had just left the harbour, when a despatch arrived from Cæsar announcing the strict blockade maintained on the opposite shore by the enemy's cruisers. Immediately the ships returned to Brundisium; and one single private vessel, which had no troops on board, resolving still to attempt the passage, was taken by Bibulus off Oricum, and, according to Cæsar,[1] the whole ship's company, both freemen and slaves, were, by his orders, put to death. Cæsar thus seemed left to his fate in an enemy's country, with only half his army, cut off from all relief, and obliged to depend for subsistence only on the narrow district immediately subject to his control.

Cæsar attempts in vain to surprise Dyrrhachium.

But his system of always acting on the offensive tended at once to keep up the confidence of his own soldiers, and to make public opinion think favourably of his situation. After having gained possession of Oricum and Apollonia, he hastened forward in the hope of surprising Dyrrhachium, one of Pompey's principal magazines, and the place in which he had designed to fix his winter-quarters, in order to be at hand to counteract Cæsar's expected invasion in the spring. At the moment of Cæsar's landing, Pompey was in the interior of Macedonia,[2] proceeding slowly towards his intended winter-quarters, by the great road which crossed the whole country from Thessalonica, on the Ægean, to Dyrrhachium and Apollonia on the Ionian gulf. He was already advanced as far as Candavia, which lies at nearly equal distances between the two seas, when he was met with the news of Cæsar's invasion. He immediately hastened his march towards Apollonia; but finding that this town had already fallen, he turned off to the right, and pressed on with a rapidity, almost resembling the flight of a beaten army, in order to save his magazines at Dyrrhachium. As the troops marched by day and night without halting, many of the soldiers, unable to bear the fatigue, dropped behind,[3] threw away their arms, and deserted; and this produced so much disorder and consequent dejection, that although Pompey accomplished his object, and, having outstripped his antagonist, encamped his army in front of Dyrrhachium to cover the town, yet T. Labienus, and the other principal officers, thought it expedient to renew, in a public and solemn manner, their oath of fidelity to their general, swearing that they would abide by him in every extremity of fortune. The troops all followed this example;

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 14.
[2] Ibid. c. 11. Strabo, lib. vii. p. 374. edit. Xyland.
[3] Ibid. c. 13.

and soon afterwards their spirits were revived by an order to make a movement somewhat in advance: for Cæsar, finding himself cut off from Dyrrhachium, had halted on the river Apsus, intending to winter there under canvass, in order to protect the country in his rear which had espoused his cause, and proposing there to await the arrival of the rest of his army from Italy. Cæsar having thus fixed himself on the left bank of the Apsus,[1] Pompey advanced with his army from Dyrrhachium, and occupied a line on the right bank of the same river, to which he brought together his entire force, both Roman and auxiliary. A pause of some length then ensued in the operations on both sides, partly on account of the season of the year, and partly because neither general wished to risk an action at present—the one being desirous of improving still further the discipline of his soldiers, and the other being anxious to gain an accession to his numbers.

B.C. 47.

The two armies are opposed to one another on the Apsus.

During this interval some proposals of peace were exchanged between the two parties, but without producing any effect. Indeed, the officer from whom Pompey had received the first tidings of Cæsar's landing in Greece, was himself the bearer of a message from Cæsar,[2] conjuring Pompey to consider the evils which a protracted contest would certainly bring upon their country—proposing that each commander should take an oath, in the presence of his army, to disband his forces within three days—and that the terms of a permanent peace might be settled at Rome by the senate and people: offering, meantime, as a pledge of his sincerity, to disband at once all his own soldiers, whether they were in the field or in garrison. There was no time for replying to these propositions till Pompey's army was settled on the Apsus: then, when L. Vibullius Rufus, the bearer of them, was proceeding to state them in detail, Pompey is said to have interrupted him,[3] and to have declared, "that he valued neither his life nor the enjoyment of his country, if he must receive them as a favour from Cæsar." A little before this, Bibulus and L. Scribonius Libo,[4] who were maintaining their blockade off the harbour of Oricum, proposed to Cæsar's officers, commanding in the town, that a truce should be concluded between the fleet and Cæsar's troops stationed along the coast, in order to allow time for entering upon a negotiation for peace. Cæsar himself had just left his lines on the Apsus, and had marched southward with a single legion, to secure some of the towns that were situated at a greater distance in his rear, and to procure some supplies of corn. In pursuit of these objects, he was now at Buthrotum, a town on the main land of Epirus, immediately opposite to Corcyra, when he received intelligence, from his officers at Oricum, of the proposals made by Bibulus and Libo. He at once hastened in person to the spot, and

Ineffectual overtures for peace.

[1] Appian, lib. ii. c. 56.
[2] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 10, 11.
[3] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 18.
[4] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 15, 16, 17.

B.C. 47. Libo came on shore alone to meet him—Bibulus, it seems, thinking that an interview between himself and Cæsar was more likely to inflame the existing quarrel than to allay it. Libo assured Cæsar that nothing could be concluded without Pompey's authority; and only requested that a truce might be arranged till proposals of peace should be presented to Pompey, and till his answer to them could be known. He asserted that Pompey was most anxious to terminate the contest; and that for himself, his advice, and that of the other officers, would all lead to the same conclusion. Cæsar, in return, pressed Libo to guarantee the safety of the officers whom he might send to Pompey's camp; and with regard to the naval armistice, he said that he was willing to grant it, if the enemy's fleet would renounce their blockade, and allow the free passage of his troops from Italy. Libo replied, that he could guarantee nothing, but referred every thing to Pompey; at the same time he again urged the conclusion of the naval armistice. But Cæsar perceiving, as he says, that nothing more was designed by the enemy than to procure some relief for their ships, by obtaining leave to get supplies from the shore, broke off the conference, and turned his thoughts to the active prosecution of the war.

Cæsar's account of these matters is to be regarded with suspicion.

Such is the representation of these transactions which Cæsar or his partisans have given to the world. We may repeat it, in the absence of all other testimony; but we should remember, that it is the statement of the chief of a victorious party, and that it relates to matters of which he himself, when his account was published, was the only witness who dared to deliver his evidence. In the narrative, also, of this very transaction, there is one remarkable expression, which seems to imply that the writer was anxious to record nothing that would not redound to Cæsar's honour. Libo, it seems, during his conference with Cæsar, entered into some representation of the merits of the cause which he espoused, and of the amount of Pompey's forces: "but on these points," says the historian,[1] "Cæsar thought proper to make no reply at the time, nor do we see any sufficient reason for dwelling on the subject now." The writer of this sentence, whether it was Cæsar himself, or one of his officers writing under his authority, was well aware that the merits of his cause could not bear any minute detail, and that the manner in which the friends of the commonwealth represented them was too forcible, and in the main too just, to admit of any satisfactory reply. He acted wisely, therefore, as a party-writer, in passing by the subject altogether; but he has by so doing left us, at the same time, a sufficient proof how little he deserves the title of a historian.

Yet the narrative of this writer, such as it is, and rendered in

[1] "*Huc addit pauca* (Libo) *de causâ, et de copiis auxiliisque suis. Quibus rebus neque tum respondendum Cæsar existimavit; neque nunc, ut memoriæ prodatur, satis causæ putamus.*" Lib. iii. c. 16, 17.

parts still more defective from the corrupt state of the text in our present copies, is our sole authority for any particular account of the operations of this important campaign. The English reader will, perhaps, have a more lively sense of its incompetence, if he considers what sort of a history could be drawn up of the events of more modern wars, if we had no other materials than the gazettes or bulletins of one party only. We must request those, therefore, who may follow us through our narrative of the ensuing transactions, to remember, once for all, that we are fully aware of the unsatisfactory foundation on which it rests; and that, if we do not repeat our sense of its uncertainty in every page, it is only to avoid unpleasant and needless interruptions to the course of our relation. Besides, in ordinary cases, we are willing to leave the reader to the exercise of his own judgment, whenever the story becomes justly suspicious, rather than attempt on every occasion to dictate to him ourselves. Unquestionably, the writer of Cæsar's *Commentaries* had the best opportunities of knowing the truth; and he is perfectly free from those blunders in different matters which are the result of mere ignorance. His misrepresentations and misstatements are for the most part wilful; and it becomes a matter of great difficulty and uncertainty, to say how often the temptation was sufficiently strong to induce him to write against that better knowledge which makes him, where no such temptation has interfered, so respectable a witness. B.C. 47.

Irregular communication between the soldiers of the two armies

Whilst the two armies were encamped on the Apsus,[1] several attempts were made, on Cæsar's part, to keep up a correspondence between the soldiers of either party, and to impress on the minds of Pompey's followers his own eagerness to terminate the contest. The generals of the commonwealth, remembering the issue of a similar correspondence between the troops of Sylla and Scipio in the last civil war, were no way inclined to expose their newly-raised and ill-assorted soldiers to the seductions of Cæsar's veterans, it being sufficiently obvious which side was most likely to entice the other from its duty. The meetings between the men and the inferior officers of the two parties, which had gone on to a considerable extent, were at last forcibly broken off, on one occasion, by Pompey's generals, and some of the centurions and soldiers of Cæsar's army were wounded. This was in the same spirit with the conduct of Petreius in Spain, and was dictated by a similar sense of danger. It was a proceeding of great severity, but yet not inconsistent with the laws of war, as the meetings were not authorized by the commander-in-chief of the commonwealth's army, who alone, as Cæsar had been on a late occasion particularly informed, had power to guarantee the safety of any negotiator from the enemy. The

It is suddenly broken off by Pompey's Generals.

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 19.

B.C. 47. assertion of Cæsar, that Labienus himself appeared at the conference, and was actually in conversation with P. Vatinius, Cæsar's officer, when the meeting was broken off by acts of hostility on the part of Pompey, is intended to convey a charge of wilful treachery, of which we cannot, in fairness, convict Labienus on the sole testimony of his personal as well as political adversary.

Tumults excited at Rome by M. Cælius Rufus.

While the war was thus pausing in its course, and M. Antonius, with the second division of Cæsar's army, was still detained at Brundisium, unable to join his commander, a wild attempt was made to effect a counter-revolution in Italy.[1] The name of M. Cælius Rufus has already been mentioned in our account of the turbulent period of Pompey's third consulship. He was then one of the tribunes, and exerted himself warmly in behalf of Milo, amidst the agitations which followed the murder of P. Clodius: he also made himself particularly notorious by his opposition to the laws then proposed by Pompey with a view to the regulation of Milo's trial; and he so provoked Pompey as to draw from him the threat, "that if he met with any more obstructions, he would protect the interests of the commonwealth by force of arms." Like Curio, he was eloquent, unprincipled, and ambitious of distinction; and, therefore, during the height of Pompey's power at Rome, he delighted, like Curio, in appearing to defy him, as the readiest means of gaining favour with the multitude, who are ever ready to admire a spirit of resistance to authority. He thus was led to favour the pretensions of Cæsar—to which he was further induced by his friendship for Curio,[2] and his enmity to Appius Claudius, who was now closely connected with Pompey. Yet his intimacy with Cicero, to whose notice he had been early recommended by his father,[3] and by whom he had been defended some years before under a criminal prosecution, might have restrained him from openly taking part against the commonwealth, had he not been led to accompany Curio to Ariminium at the beginning of the war,[4] and been brought to a personal meeting with Cæsar, by consenting to be the bearer of a message to him from Cicero, urging him to lay aside his designs of hostility. It seems that Cæsar's winning address and behaviour, together with a nearer view of the resources by which he was supported, decided him in remaining with the rebel army, and accepting employment in Cæsar's service. He accordingly attended him on his way towards Spain,[5] and on his return thence, at the end of the year, he was elected prætor, as a reward for his attachment to his cause.[6] But the death of Curio had removed the principal link

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 20, 21, 22.
[2] Cicero, *ad Familiar.* lib. viii. epist. xvii.
[3] Ibid. *pro Cælio*, c. 3.
[4] Ibid. *ad Familiar.* lib. viii. epist. xvii.
[5] Ibid. lib. viii. epist. xv.
[6] It appears from some brief intimations in Cicero's letters to Atticus, that Cælius

between him and his present associates; and, although he was one of the prætors, yet he held only the less dignified rank of *prætor peregrinus:* the office of *prætor urbanus*, which possessed exclusive jurisdiction in all causes between citizens and citizens, was conferred on C. Trebonius, who had conducted the operations by land at the late siege of Massilia. His love of distinction, therefore, was ill gratified by his present situation; he felt himself slighted, and was desirous of at once avenging his fancied affronts upon Cæsar's party, and of regaining the friendship of the aristocrats, who were his old and natural connections, and whom his late behaviour had alienated. B.C. 47.

Violent measures of Cælius in his Prætorship.

Under the influence of these motives, Cælius began to tread in the steps of the old popular tribunes,[1] and, complaining of Cæsar's late regulations with regard to the payment of debts, he declared that he would support any debtor who should appeal against a sentence of the *prætor urbanus*, adjudging payment according to the terms fixed by Cæsar. Finding, if we may believe Cæsar, that no appeals were brought to him, he proceeded to propose a law of his own, directing debts to be paid at six instalments, without any interest. It is very probable that many of the timid and indolent part of the aristocracy, who preferred remaining at Rome under Cæsar's government, rather than submitting to the labours and perils of a civil war, were delighted to find their new circumstances suddenly reconciled, by these innovations of Cælius, with the line they would naturally take in politics. P. Servilius, Cæsar's colleague in the consulship, whose father had, in like manner, been the colleague of Sylla, and who himself, a few years before, had been remarked as affecting to imitate Cato,[2] was now called upon, while supporting the government of Cæsar, to act like the high aristocratical consuls of former times, L. Opimius, or Cn. Octavius, or Q. Catulus. Supported by the other magistrates, he resisted the measures of Cælius, who, finding his present law not sufficiently stimulating, proposed two others of a tendency still more revolutionary—one releasing all tenants of houses in Rome from their liability to be sued for rent during one year, and the other proclaiming a general release to all insolvent debtors from the claims of their creditors. Cælius had now degraded himself low enough to become the head of the most worthless portion of the community: mobs assembled as in the days of L. Saturninus, P. Sulpicius, and

was already disgusted with Cæsar's party before the end of the campaign in Spain; and that he was engaged in some attempts to excite disturbances among the legions left for the protection of Italy. Possibly, therefore, Cæsar did not take him with him into Spain, but left him with those troops, in Cisalpine Gaul, which did, in fact, break out into mutiny, as already related, about the time of Cæsar's return from Spain. *Vide* Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. x. epist. xii. xv. xvi.

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 20. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxi. Dion Cassius, lib. xlii. p. 195.

[2] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ii. epist. i.

B.C. 47. P. Clodius; and Trebonius was driven by violence from his seat of judgment. Servilius laid the consideration of these disturbances before the senate, and that body passed a resolution, the very same which had formerly been passed against Cæsar himself in his prætorship, that Cælius should be suspended from the duties and privileges of his office. He still attempted to harangue the people, but was forcibly pulled down from the rostra; and the support of the mere rabble being, as usual, utterly powerless in the time of need, he resolved to quit Rome, professing that he was going over to Macedonia, to offer to Cæsar an explanation and apology for his conduct.

He is obliged to leave Rome.

There is still extant a letter from Cælius to Cicero,[1] written apparently when he was just entered on this career of fruitless opposition to Cæsar's government. He flatters himself that he had alienated the general feeling at Rome from the cause of Cæsar; and that the poorer citizens, who had hitherto regarded it as the popular side, now thought their interests abandoned, and were ready to receive the friends of Pompey with open arms. He assures Cicero that it was Pompey's own fault that he had not recovered possession of Rome, for that every body there, with the exception of a few usurers, was now become his partisan. He promises to ensure the triumph of the aristocracy, even against their will, and laments the blindness of Pompey, in neglecting the fair field that was open to him in Italy, and persisting to combat Cæsar's veteran army in direct and open warfare. But a short time proved how greatly he had overrated the effect of his measures and of his abilities. On leaving Rome, he had entered into a correspondence with his old associate, T. Milo,[2] who was ready to join in any attempt against Cæsar, as he had been alone excepted by him from the general pardon granted to all who had been banished by the sentence of the tribunals in Pompey's third consulship. Milo still retained,[3] either in his service or under his influence, some of those numerous gladiators whom he had formerly employed in his contests with Clodius. At the head of a party of these he appeared in arms in the neighbourhood of Capua; and, professing that he had received, through Bibulus, a commission to levy troops in Pompey's name, he began to solicit the inhabitants of the different towns to join him. His character and resources, however, held out little encouragement; but having collected a certain number of runaway slaves, and of those who were kept at work in fetters in some of the workhouses, he made an attempt upon the town of Compsa,[4] and there lost his life by a stone discharged from one of the engines on the walls. Cælius, meantime, had not entirely thrown off the mask. He had secretly endeavoured to surprise Capua by the help of some

He invites Milo to join him in an attempt to revive the interests of Pompey in Italy.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiar.* lib. viii. epist. xvii.
[2] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 21.
[3] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 21, 22.
[4] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 93.

gladiators who were then kept at Naples, and of some partisans in the town itself; but the plot being discovered in time to prevent its execution, he continued his journey southward, as if still pursuing his original design of going to Cæsar in Greece. But when he reached Thurii, he conceived hopes of gaining that important place for Pompey; and, accordingly, he began to tamper with some of the inhabitants, and also with some Gaulish and German horse, whom Cæsar had left there as a garrison. To have secured a harbour for Pompey's ships on the coast of Italy, would have been one of the most signal services that could have been rendered at this period to the cause of the commonwealth; but the attempt was unsuccessful; and, according to Cæsar, Cælius was killed by some of those soldiers whose fidelity he was endeavouring to corrupt. Like most other fruitless insurrections, the disturbance excited by Cælius and Milo being thus quickly suppressed, rather tended, we may suppose, to strengthen Cæsar's authority; and persons possessed of property were more reconciled to his government, when they found it ready to protect them against the violence of the needy and the desperate. B.C. 47. Cælius and Milo are killed.

About this time Pompey sustained a severe loss in the death of M. Calpurnius Bibulus, the commander-in-chief of his fleet.[1] The vigilance which this officer had lately exerted, in order to atone for his previous neglect in suffering Cæsar to cross the Ionian Gulf, had thus far been completely successful in preventing the passage of the troops under M. Antonius, but it proved in the end fatal to himself. Fatigue, anxiety, and insufficient accommodations, severely affected his health; he refused, however, to quit his post, and persisted in struggling against his complaints, till he sank under them. On his death, his place as commander-in-chief was left vacant, possibly from some intrigues at Pompey's head-quarters, which made it difficult for the general to fix upon a successor. But the bad effects of this omission were soon notorious; for each separate commander of a squadron began to act for himself; and L. Scribonius Libo,[2] departing from the defensive system of Bibulus, crossed the Ionian Gulf with the fifty ships which formed his own division, and proposed to blockade the port of Brundisium itself, by occupying a small island which was opposite to the mouth of the harbour. His sudden appearance enabled him to surprise some vessels laden with corn, which he burnt or captured; he disembarked also a party of troops, with which he dislodged a body of Cæsar's cavalry from one of their posts near the shore; and, elated with these exploits, he wrote to Pompey to assure him that he might safely venture to bring the rest of the fleet into port to refit; for that he himself, with his single squadron, would engage to prevent the passage of Cæsar's reinforce- Death of M. Bibulus.

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 18. [2] Ibid. c. 23, 24.

B.C. 47. ments. A short time, however, proved the emptiness of these promises; for the island which Libo occupied was unable to furnish the ships with a sufficient supply of fresh water; and, after the first surprise was over, Antonius stationed his parties of cavalry along the shore in such numbers that they could not be dislodged, and thus effectually cut off the enemy from all communication with the land. The inability of an ancient fleet to act with success without military co-operation was thus again proved; and Libo was obliged to abandon the blockade of Brundisium, and resume his original station on the coast of Greece.

Cæsar becomes impatient at the delay of his expected reinforcements.

At length the winter was at an end,[1] and Pompey's naval force had kept the sea, through the most unfavourable season of the year, with unabated resolution. Their task would now become much easier, and the difficulty of effecting a passage would be proportionably increased to Cæsar's second division. He himself complains that his officers at Brundisium had neglected some opportunities of which they might have availed themselves; and, being impatient of their long delay, he wrote to them in very strong terms, enjoining them to put to sea with the first fair wind, and recommending them to steer for the coast of Apollonia, if possible, which, from its want of harbours, was less guarded by the enemy's fleet; adding, that they might there run their ships aground, and that the loss of the vessels was comparatively of no importance. But trusting, above all things, in the effect of his own presence, he made a bold attempt to cross over in person into Brundisium; and, having left his army secretly by night, he embarked, in disguise, on board of a small vessel, and, although the weather was very tempestuous, and the wind against him, he endeavoured, at the utmost hazard, to effect the passage of the Ionian Gulf; nor was he induced to desist, till he found it utterly impossible to accomplish his purpose.[2] His letters, however, had produced a sufficient effect: the soldiers themselves, he tells us, pressed their officers to risk the voyage; and M. Antonius and Q. Fufius Calenus, with four legions and about eight hundred cavalry, at length set sail with a south wind from Brundisium. But, with the wind in such a quarter, they not only failed in reaching Apollonia, but could not even make any land southward of Dyrrhachium. They were thus seen from Dyrrhachium by C. Coponius,[3] one of the proprætors, who commanded the Rhodian


M. Antonius embarks his troops at Brundisium.

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 25.

[2] Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. 8. The story, as given in the text, is copied from Valerius Maximus, the earliest writer in whom we have found any mention of it. The famous additions to it, which are given by Florus, Dion Cassius, Appian, and Plutarch, that Cæsar encouraged the terrified master of the vessel, by discovering himself to him in the midst of the storm, and telling him not to be afraid, for that he carried with him *Cæsar and his fortune*, resemble those embellishments of some simple expression or occurrence which anecdotes of great men are apt to gain, in proportion to the number of persons who successively report them.

[3] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 26, 27.

squadron at that port, and he instantly put to sea in pursuit of them. Flight was their only resource, and they ran before the wind northward, towards the harbour of Nymphæum, which, though open to the south, and threatening the loss of their ships, still held out a chance of their effecting a landing. But, by one of those B.C. 47.



[Roman Ship of War—*After Scheffer.*]

aa, Alveus; *bb*, Prora; *cc*, Puppis; *d*, Gubernaculum; *e*, Malus; *ff*, Antennae; *gg*, Cornua; *h*, Carchesium; *kk*, Acatium; *ll*, Supparum; *m*, Dolon (?); *nn*, Pedes; *oo*, Opisphorae; *pp*, Ceruchi; *qq*, πρότονοι.

remarkable instances of good fortune which have occurred in our own naval history, on some memorable occasions, the wind suddenly shifted to the south-west, as soon as the transports had reached Nymphæum; and thus, owing to the position of the harbour, they were now in perfect safety, whilst sixteen of the enemy's ships, that were most forward in the chase, were all driven on shore and wrecked. Of the crews a considerable number perished, and many were taken by Cæsar's soldiers; but these last, he tells us, he treated with humanity, and dismissed them unhurt to their own homes.

Two of Antonius's transports, being heavier sailers than the rest,[1]

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 28, 29.

B.C. 47. were overtaken by the night, and, not knowing what was become of their companions, came to an anchor off Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who commanded Pompey's garrison in the town, sent off a number of armed boats and vessels to attack them, and summoned them both to surrender. One of them, which had on board two hundred and twenty men of a newly-raised legion, submitted immediately;[1] but the other contained about two hundred veterans, who, although weakened and wretched from the confinement and sickness of a stormy voyage, preserved their courage, and compelled the master of the transport to run the ship on shore. They found a position favourable for their defence; and, after repulsing an attack that was made upon them on the following morning, they reached the main body of their army, which had landed at Nymphæum without loss. Immediately afterwards, Lissus, which was within the limits of Cæsar's province of Illyricum, and had received some favours from him during his government as proconsul, opened its gates to Antonius; and that officer, having sent back most of the transports to Italy, to bring over some reinforcements that were yet expected, sent word to Cæsar of his landing, informing him of the numbers that he had brought with him, and of the part of the country at which he had effected his descent.

M. Antonius and his troops land at Nymphæum, and occupy the town of Lissus.

As the transports had been seen from the shore passing by Apollonia and Dyrrhachium,[2] their arrival in the neighbourhood was known both to Cæsar and Pompey; but neither was at first aware of the precise point at which they might have come to shore. Both generals immediately broke up from their positions on Apsus; Pompey, with the hope of surprising and cutting off the troops under Antonius, and Cæsar with the view of effecting his junction with them. But, as Cæsar was delayed by being obliged to march up the left bank of the Apsus for some distance, in order to find a ford, Pompey might possibly have succeeded in his object, had not his approach been communicated to Antonius by some of the people of the country. Thus aware of his danger, Antonius suspended his march, (for it seems that he had set out from Lissus to meet Cæsar,) and kept his troops during one whole day within the protection of their camp; till, on the next day, Cæsar having recovered the ground which he had lost, came up with the main body of his army. It was now Pompey's turn to be apprehensive for his safety; and accordingly he fell back to avoid being surrounded, allowed the enemy's two divisions to effect their junction, and marching with

He effects his junction with Cæsar.

[1] Cæsar adds that they were all massacred, although their lives had been solemnly promised to them. We can only regret that we have not the report of Otacilius Crassus on this affair; but, as it is, we cannot admit into the body of our narrative a statement of this nature, which is utterly improbable in its present form, although it be very likely founded on something which did actually happen under different circumstances.

[2] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 30.

his whole force to Asparagium, a small town subject to the people of Dyrrhachium, but whose exact situation is not known, he there encamped his army again in a favourable position. Cæsar, on the other hand, now found himself enabled to extend the scene of his operations.[1] To maintain a large force on the coast was become less important; he diminished, therefore, the number of his troops in that quarter, and sent three considerable detachments into Ætolia, Thessaly, and Macedonia, as he had reason to expect that the inhabitants of those countries would declare in his favour, as soon as they could do so with safety; and, as his supplies by sea were rendered worse than precarious by the superiority of the enemy's navy, it was highly expedient that he should command the resources of a more extensive district than that narrow strip of coast to which he had hitherto been confined. B.C. 47.

Cæsar follows Pompey to Asparagium.

He himself, as soon as he learned the new position in which Pompey had placed his army,[2] followed him thither and offered him battle. The challenge was declined; for if Pompey had not thought proper to meet his enemy in the field before the arrival of Antonius, he was much less likely to risk a general action now. But an army, which feels itself superior to its antagonists, enjoys a great advantage in the freedom of its movements; for, as it is its interest to bring on a general engagement, it may attempt any enterprise it pleases, with the twofold chance either of winning that particular object, or of forcing the enemy to a battle if he endeavours to offer any opposition. In this manner Cæsar, finding that his adversary was resolved to avoid an action, conceived the plan of marching upon Dyrrhachium, which, as we have already stated, was one of the principal magazines of Pompey. To mislead his enemy, he set out at first from his camp in a different direction; and it was not till the following morning that Pompey, having discovered in the meantime his real intention, commenced his own march towards Dyrrhachium, in order to counteract it. Cæsar, however, had gained in time more than he had lost in distance by the circuitous route which he had taken; he pressed his march, moreover, with the utmost activity, allowing his men to rest only during a short portion of the night, and thus he appeared in front of Dyrrhachium early in the morning, and formed his camp before the town, so as to cut off all approach to it.

He marches upon Dyrrhachium, and encamps before the town.

Pompey, finding himself shut out from Dyrrhachium, took up a position on some high ground near the sea, known by the name of *Petra*, or Cliff, and which commanded a small harbour or bay, where vessels with some winds might ride at anchor, or be drawn on the beach with safety. Hither, accordingly, he collected a part of his fleet, and hither he ordered his supplies to be brought by sea from all the parts of the Empire which acknowledged his authority.

Pompey encamps at Petra, near Dyrrhachium.

Thus were the two contending parties opposed to one another at

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 34, 35, *et seq.* [2] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 41, 42.

B.C 47. Dyrrhachium; and, notwithstanding Cæsar's good fortune in seeing his whole army united on the eastern side of the Ionian gulf, he had as yet no prospect of bringing the war to a speedy termination. The naval force of the enemy preserved, and even improved its ascendancy;[1] and not only cut off all chance of supplies from Italy, but had lately made one or two successful attacks on some of the ports of Epirus, which were in the possession of his troops, and had burned or captured most of the ships which he had detained there out of the fleets used in transporting his army from Brundisium. Nor had Pompey been obliged to divide his own forces in order to oppose the detachments which Cæsar had recently sent into Thessaly and Macedonia; for his father-in-law, Scipio,[2] had just arrived from Asia with the legions which he had raised in his province of Syria, and was able to occupy the attention of Cæsar's lieutenants, without requiring any assistance from the commander-in-chief. Under these circumstances, Cæsar formed the plan of blockading Pompey's army in its position at Petra, by constructing lines of circumvallation extensive enough to intercept all the enemy's communications with the interior of the country—a measure to which, as he tells us, he was led by several considerations;[3] for he hoped in the first place, to render useless the fine and numerous cavalry of Pompey, and to secure his own foraging parties from its attacks; and he wished, besides, to preserve the reputation of his arms, and to gain the credit of blockading Pompey the Great in his camp, and forcing him thus practically to confess his own inferiority. Above all, it was necessary for him to employ his army in some active operations, in the course of which, he flattered himself, circumstances might arise which might bring his troops into contact with the enemy, in spite of Pompey's determination to avoid every engagement, and to trust to time and his naval superiority for a successful termination of the war.

Cæsar proposes to blockade Pompey in his position.

An attempt to detail minutely all the operations that followed, would scarcely be of any value, without a more intelligible guide than our present copies of Cæsar's *Commentaries* can supply, and without a more perfect knowledge of the ground, than it is now, perhaps, possible to obtain. We shall content ourselves, therefore, with a general view of the object pursued by each party, and of the manner in which this first act of the campaign, if we may use the expression, was brought to a conclusion. No sooner did Pompey perceive his adversary's designs of hemming him in on the sea-coast,[1] than he began to construct lines on his side, which he continually carried out to a greater distance, that he might command a larger space for the quarters of his own army, and might multiply the labour and difficulty of the

Description of the lines and operations in the neighbourhood of Dyrrhachium.

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 40, 42.
[2] Ibid. c. 31—38.
[3] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 43.
[4] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 44.

operations of the enemy. The defensive works of each party consisted of forts placed on the most commanding points of the country, and connected with one another by a rampart and ditch. Frequent contests took place between the troops employed in these works; as the possession of any important height, if gained by Cæsar, enabled him to draw his lines more closely around the enemy; or, if secured by Pompey, threw back his adversaries to a greater distance, and gave a greater freedom of movement to his own army. The result was, that Pompey raised no fewer than twenty-four forts, all continuous, and thus gained a space of fifteen miles in circuit for the accommodation and subsistence of his soldiers; while Cæsar, persevering in his original design, completed a blockading line of the extraordinary length of eighteen miles,[1] following the whole extent of the works of the enemy. Nor was this all; for, where his line came down to the sea, he constructed a second line parallel to it at the distance of about two hundred yards, and facing towards the opposite direction, to prevent his main line from being attacked in the rear, if Pompey should embark troops on board his ships, and direct them to cause a diversion, by landing on the outside of the blockading line, and attacking it on that quarter. For further security, these two lines were to be connected by a transverse line parallel to the sea, and closing up the opening between them; but this third work was not completed, owing to the immense magnitude of the labour which the army had to perform in other quarters; and the omission was afterwards attended, as we shall see, by some important consequences. B.C. 47.

Inconveniences suffered by both armies.

Both armies suffered some privations in this extraordinary kind of warfare.[2] Cæsar's soldiers were most pressed by the scarcity of wheat, an article which they seem to have considered so indispensably necessary, that their general praises their fortitude in high terms for enduring the want of it; although their condition does not seem to have been very deplorable, if, as Cæsar admits, they were plentifully supplied with meat, vegetables, barley, and a root which he calls *chara*, and which, he tells us, they used to prepare with milk, and make cakes of it. On the other side, Pompey's troops had wheat in abundance; but their situation in other respects was much worse than that of the enemy. As their position was near the sea, the streams naturally flowed down through it from the higher ground occupied by Cæsar's lines; and Cæsar was thus enabled either to turn their course, or to pond up the water with great labour in those narrow valleys or gorges into which the springs of the hills first discharged themselves, before they reached the lower and more open country. Deprived thus of the natural supply of running water, Pompey's soldiers were obliged to dig basins or reservoirs in the

[1] Cæsar, c. 63.

[2] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 47, 48, 49, 58.

B.C. 47. marshy grounds near the sea; and the water thus gained was not only bad in itself, but quickly dried up under the heat of the sun, as the season was now advanced to the middle of summer. In addition to this most severe suffering, they were reduced to the greatest want of forage for their horses, insomuch, that they were obliged to give them leaves from the trees, and the roots of reeds, to eke out the supplies which they received by sea; and thus most of the draught animals of the army, being less considered than the cavalry horses, died, and the stench of their carcasses in the hot summer weather, and in the low and comparatively confined space occupied by the troops, produced a considerable effect, we are told, on the health of the men. How far Cæsar may have exaggerated the distress which his blockade occasioned to his adversaries, it is not easy to decide; but it is probable that, in one respect, his views were answered, and that Pompey suffered in general estimation, by allowing himself, with an unbroken and numerous army, to be hemmed in by his antagonist. "He cannot escape with honour," says Dolabella in a letter to Cicero,[1] written about this time from Rome, "driven as he has been from Italy; deprived of Spain with the loss of a veteran army; and now even blockaded in his camp; a disgrace which scarcely any other of our commanders has ever endured." Yet Pompey, it is likely, was daily improving the quality of his troops, by exercising them in those partial conflicts to which the nature of the operations on both sides constantly gave occasion; and it may be conjectured that Cæsar had better reasons for praising the patience and fortitude of his soldiers than he chooses to confess; for every account of these transactions dwells upon the distress which they suffered from the want of provisions, in a manner not very consistent with Cæsar's statement, that they had every thing in abundance except wheaten bread. At length Pompey thought that the time was come at which he might act on a more vigorous system. Whether he was urged, as Cæsar says, by the distress which he suffered in his present position, or whether he wished at last to make some trial of the fitness of his soldiers to oppose the enemy in the field, he resolved to break out from his confinement, and force a passage through Cæsar's lines. Having been accurately informed by some deserters of the disposition of the enemy's troops,[2] and of all the defects of their works, particularly of the opening left between their first and second line near the sea, owing to the unfinished state of the transverse line which was intended to connect them together, Pompey prepared his plan of attack accordingly. Directing his main effort against the weak point of Cæsar's works, he assaulted the first line in front with his legionary soldiers, whilst he embarked on board his small craft a large force of his light infantry, and

Pompey resolves to release himself from his blockade.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiar.* lib. ix. epist. ix.
[2] Cæsar, c. 59, *et seq.*

caused them to be landed, some on the outside of the second line to attack it in front, and some in the opening between the two lines, where they could distract the defenders of both by assailing them in the rear. These combined movements were crowned with complete success. The attack was made at daybreak, the lines were forced with great slaughter, and Pompey had taken up a new position beyond the works which had been constructed with so much labour to confine him, before Cæsar could come up to the support of his men from the remote part of his lines in which he had fixed his usual quarters. When he did arrive on the spot, and saw that all his plans must at once be changed, he gave orders to form a new camp near that of Pompey. But scarcely was the work completed,[1] when some of his reconnoitring parties brought him word that a portion of the enemy's army, apparently amounting to an entire legion, was stationed by itself at some distance from its main body, and might possibly be cut off by a sudden attack. Eager to retrieve the loss which he had sustained in the early part of the day, Cæsar caught at the chance of success thus held out to him, and advanced with about three legions to assail the single legion of the enemy. But the ground, it seems, was intersected with walls and ditches which had been made in some of the multiplied operations of the last few weeks, and these impediments delayed and disarranged the order of the advancing troops, and gave Pompey time to come up with a strong reinforcement. Cæsar's soldiers, confused amidst the difficulties of the ground, and now themselves attacked both in front and rear, were seized with a panic, and fled. In vain did Cæsar attempt to stop the rout; when he caught hold of the colours, which the terrified bearers were carrying off in their flight, they were thrown away, or left in his grasp; when he stopped the horses of any of his fugitive cavalry, the riders leaped off, and ran away on foot. But the same impediments, which had first thrown the vanquished party into disorder, obstructed, in their turn, the pursuit of the conquerors; and Pompey himself, it is said, surprised at his easy victory, suspected that the flight of the enemy was counterfeited, in order to draw him into some ambuscade, and accordingly did not press upon them so closely as he might have done. Still he had gained a great and decisive advantage, for Cæsar at once felt that he could not continue the campaign on his present ground; and having brought together all his scattered detachments, and abandoned all his lines, he determined to retreat from the neighbourhood of Dyrrhachium with the greatest expedition, and began to concert measures to preserve his army during its retreat from the annoyance likely to be offered by the victorious enemy.

B.C. 47.

He forces Cæsar's lines.

Affair of Dyrrhachium, in which Cæsar is defeated.

For this purpose he sent off all his baggage with the sick and

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 66, *et seq.*

B.C. 47. Cæsar retreats from Dyrrhachium.

wounded in the early part of the night, under the escort of a single legion.[1] The main body of the army commenced its march a little before daybreak, but Cæsar remained in the camp, with two legions, for some little time longer; and then, after the usual order had been given for the soldiers to prepare to march, he set out with the utmost expedition, and soon overtook the other legions, which had already made some progress. The order for marching was generally, it appears, conveyed through the camp with considerable noise,[2] being notified by repeated calls to get the baggage together; and thus it might easily be heard by an enemy, when posted at the little distance which was customary in Roman warfare. Pompey, accordingly, no sooner heard this signal, than he put his own army in motion, supposing that the enemy were only then beginning their retreat; but Cæsar, through the precautions which he had employed, was so much in advance, that he could not be overtaken till he came to the Genusus, a river which falls into the sea a little to the south of Dyrrhachium, and whose steep and rocky banks necessarily occasioned some delay ere the passage of it could be effected. Here Pompey's cavalry, came up with the rear of the retreating army; but Cæsar ordered his own cavalry up to the scene of action, and, by supporting them with a detachment of his light-armed legionary infantry, enabled them, according to his own account, though greatly inferior in numbers, to repulse the enemy with some loss. Having thus crossed the Genusus in safety, he led his troops into a camp which they had formerly occupied, described before as being close to Asparagium,[3] and which was distant about eight miles from the position which they had quitted in the morning.[4] The cavalry were immediately sent out to forage, as if Cæsar intended to halt here for the night; but they were ordered to return quickly to the camp, by the gate furthest removed from the enemy; and about noon the order was given to resume the march, and the army continued its retreat for eight miles more, without the least disturbance. Pompey, on his part, had occupied his old camp near Asparagium; and, concluding that Cæsar would move no further during that day, had not only sent out his cavalry as usual to collect wood and forage,

He is pursued by Pompey without effect.

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 75.
[2] Ibid. *de Bell. Civili*, lib. i. c. 66.
[3] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 76.
[4] This is spoken of as a day's march, although it was completed some time before noon, and the distance seems very inconsiderable. It should be remembered, however, that it was now midsummer, a season at which it would be desirable, in the climate of Greece, to avoid marching in the heat of the day; and, besides, the circumstance of finding a camp ready formed, would be a reason why the army should halt a little sooner than usual, rather than advance a few miles at the price of having to undergo the whole labour of raising the customary works for itself. The passage of the Genusus, moreover, was probably more fatiguing than a march of some length over a plain country; and the armies had both moved at an unusual pace during the whole day; so that, altogether, it was not unnatural to suppose that Cæsar, might really intend to halt in his camp at Asparagium.

but had allowed many of the soldiers to return to their position of the morning, in order to collect various articles of their baggage which they had been forced to leave behind when summoned so suddenly to move in pursuit of Cæsar. It was thus impossible for him to follow his adversary; and the advance which Cæsar had gained was so important, that no subsequent exertions of Pompey could make up for it. Accordingly, on the fourth day, he discontinued the pursuit, and Cæsar arrived at Apollonia without interruption. This town, it seems, was one of his most valuable posts,[1] and he had placed there his military chest, which he now required for the payment of his soldiers; he judged it also to be the place where he could most securely leave behind his wounded; and for both these reasons he had fixed upon it as his first point of retreat. He had no intention, however, to remain there long, as he had decided to move at once into Thessaly. Accordingly, having sent orders to Cn. Domitius Calvinus, the commander of that part of his army which was in Lower Macedonia, to join him as soon as possible, and having left garrisons at Apollonia, Lissus, and Oricum, to facilitate his communications with Italy, he set out once more to commence what may be called a new campaign; and turning aside from the coast, he commenced his march towards the interior of the country, through Epirus and Athamania.[2] B.C. 47.

He resolves to march into Thessaly.

The final success of Cæsar at Pharsalia, ought not so far to impose upon us as to prevent us from seeing that his plans, up to the moment of his retreat from Dyrrhachium, had entirely failed, and that Pompey's confidence in the wisdom of his own system had hitherto been fully justified. By exposing his soldiers gradually in partial encounters, and under favourable circumstances, he had enabled them to meet and to vanquish Cæsar's veterans; while Cæsar, after undergoing a series of labours for the purpose of tempting his adversary to fight, and having seen the patience of his troops tried to the utmost from the want of provisions, arising

[1] Cæsar, lib iii. c. 78.

[2] The reading in the only two editions of Cæsar which we have consulted, (neither of them, it must be confessed, of any great value, or of recent date,) is "Acarnania;" "*per Epirum atque Acarnaniam iter facere cœpit*," c. 78. It is evident that Cæsar could not march through *Acarnania;* but *Athamania* is the name of that wild mountain region which lies between Epirus and Thessaly, and which immediately overhangs the valley in which Gomphi stands. *Vid.* Livy, lib. xxxi. c. 41. "*Imminet Althamania huic urbi;*" *sc. Gomphis.* It should be remembered, that in the part of his history from which these words are quoted, Livy has so generally copied Polybius, that his geography is unusually clear and correct. See also Strabo, lib. vii. p. 378. and lib. ix. p. 491. Plutarch also says, expressly, ἐβάδιζε δι' Ἀθαμάνων εἰς Θετταλίαν. *in Pompeio*, c. 66. Another blunder occurs in the very next chapter in the same edition of Cæsar, where the Heraclea, through which Pompey passed, is called Heraclea Sintica. Heraclea Sintica was near the eastern frontier of Macedonia, between the Strymon and the Axius; Vid. Livy, lib. xlv. c.29.; but the Heraclea, through which Pompey passed, was on the western frontier, and was, in fact, situated on the Ignatian way, at the eastern foot of the Candavian mountains. *Vid.* Strabo, lib. vii. p. 374.

B.C. 47. from the enemy's naval superiority, had imposed all this suffering upon them without deriving the least benefit from it; and when at last he did meet Pompey in battle, he was beaten, and obliged to change his whole plan of the campaign. But although he had thus been baffled, he allowed no signs of dejection, nor of a sense of difficulty to appear in his conduct. He had so artfully soothed the vanity of his soldiers by extenuating their defeat,[1] and imputing it to any cause rather than to a want of courage or zeal on their part, that the men were less dismayed than irritated by their disaster; and feeling grateful to their general for the kindness of his behaviour towards them, they were impatient for an opportunity of retrieving their disgrace, and of proving to him that his confidence in them had not been bestowed unworthily. The success with which the retreat to Apollonia had been conducted, was likely to lessen their impression of the events at Dyrrhachium; and they now had the prospect of resuming at once the offensive, of drawing away the enemy from the neighbourhood of the sea, which had hitherto given him so great an advantage, and of enjoying the supplies which the approaching harvest promised them in the rich and comparatively unwasted plains of Thessaly. Still, however, the utmost expedition was necessary; for it was not to be doubted that Pompey, after having ceased to pursue Cæsar, would at once march into Macedonia by that great and direct communication called the Ignatian way,[2] which, as we have already mentioned, crossed the whole country from Dyrrhachium, on the Ionian Gulf, to Thessalonica, on the Ægean Sea. Whichever general should first arrive to support his officer who commanded in Lower Macedonia, was likely to gain an important advantage, by overwhelming the detachment of the enemy; and thus, whilst Pompey was hastening to join Scipio, Cæsar was equally anxious to unite his army with that of Cn. Domitius.

His reasons for so doing.

Cn. Domitius Calvinus had been consul with M. Messala during the latter part of the year, after the long interregnum which lasted through all the earlier months of it. He was then reputed a partisan of the aristocracy; but was implicated, while a candidate, in that corrupt agreement with the consuls of the preceding year, which forms so remarkable an instance of audacious profligacy.[3] Such a man had probably little to guide him, except his interest or his passions; and, accordingly, he was now an officer under Cæsar, and had been sent into Macedonia some time before with two legions, to gain, if possible, that important province.[4] Here he had been opposed to Scipio, who had just brought with him from Asia an

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 73, 74.
[2] Strabo, lib. vii. p. 374. edit. Xyland.
[3] *Vide.* p. 217 of our *Life of Cæsar.*
[4] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 34.

army of nearly equal force; and as Scipio imitated the policy of Pompey and declined an action, the two armies lay opposite to one another for some time on the banks of the Haliacmon, without engaging in any affair of importance. It seems, however, that this system of warfare was as annoying to Cæsar's lieutenants as to himself; for we find that Cn. Domitius, having exhausted the resources of the country immediately around him, was obliged to change his position, and had moved towards Heraclea,[1] a town situated on the Ignatian way, and at the eastern foot of the Candavian mountains, which are the central chain from whence the streams flow eastward to the Ægean, and westward to the Ionian gulf. This movement took place exactly at the time that Pompey was marching to join Scipio; and as Heraclea was one of the towns through which his road lay, he would have cut off Domitius and his troops without difficulty, had they not escaped in the utmost haste only four hours before his arrival. The news of Cæsar's defeat at Dyrrhachium, exaggerated as usual by report, had produced every where a strong sensation; and the people of the country, considering his cause desperate, hoped to recommend themselves to the conqueror, by cutting off his communications, and practising against him all those desultory modes of annoyance which a retreating or beaten army is so apt to suffer from such hands. For a long time, therefore, neither Cæsar nor Domitius could receive any intelligence from each other; but at last Domitius, having learnt at once the march of Cæsar towards Thessaly, and his own danger from the advance of Pompey, fell back southwards with all haste, and met Cæsar at Æginium,[2] a town of considerable natural strength, standing amongst the mountains of Athamania, which immediately overhang the plains of Thessaly. Scipio, who had, perhaps, been earlier informed of the approaching change of the seat of war, left the banks of the Haliacmon, and stationed himself at Larissa, on the Peneus, one of the principal cities of Thessaly, and which it was of importance to lose no time in securing. As for the detachment which had been sent by Cæsar into Thessaly while he was himself opposed to Pompey near Dyrrhachium,[3] it had been driven out of the country by Scipio, just before Cn. Domitius began to engage the whole attention of that officer in Macedonia; so that Cæsar, when he arrived at Æginium, had nothing else to trust to for a favourable reception, except the affections of the Thessalians themselves; and those, he tells us, had been greatly alienated by the exaggerated reports which prevailed of the desperate situation of his affairs.

B.C. 47.

He joins Cn. Domitius, his lieutenant, on the frontiers of Thessaly.

On descending from Æginium into the plain of Thessaly, the first town of importance on the line of Cæsar's march was Gomphi.[4] He

[1] Cæsar, c. 79. Strabo, lib. vii. p. 374.
[2] Ibid. 79. Livy, lib xxxi. c. 41. lib. xxxii. c. 15.
[3] Ibid. c. 36.
[4] Ibid. c. 80.

B.C. 47. found the gates shut against him; although he tells us that the citizens had sent to him some time before to offer him their services, and to invite him to garrison their city. But when he represented to his soldiers the importance of striking terror into the Thessalians by vigorously chastising this first act of hostility, and encouraged them by promises of the plunder of a wealthy town, they were animated with such a spirit, that they scaled the walls within three or four hours after their arrival before the place, and sacked the town with all the eagerness of men who had been long unused to every indulgence. The example, however, produced the desired

He takes Gomphi, and wins over most of the Thessalian towns.



[The Testudo.]

effect. Metropolis, the next place on the army's route, submitted at once; and here, as a contrast to the fate of Gomphi, the soldiers were forced to observe the greatest forbearance. With such a lesson before their eyes, the other towns of Thessaly followed generally the behaviour of the people of Metropolis; so that Cæsar rapidly advanced, till he found himself in the midst of a country covered with crops of corn almost ready for harvest,[1] where he determined to await the approach of Pompey, and again, if possible, try the fortune of a battle. His camp was pitched a few miles to the south of Larissa, at no great distance from the right bank of the river Enipeus, in the ever memorable plains of Pharsalus or Pharsalia.

And encamps in the plains of Pharsalia.

Meanwhile, the victory of Dyrrhachium and the retreat of Cæsar had produced a fatal effect on the mind of Pompey, and made him

Confidence of Pompey's armys

[1] Cæsar, c. 81.

less firm in resisting the rash and violent counsels of his officers. B.C. 47.
His soldiers had saluted him with the title of *Imperator* on the field of battle, a name usually given in this manner by an army to its victorious general, and expressive of the sense entertained by his troops of the greatness of his success. But it is mentioned, that although Pompey adopted the title thus conferred on him,[1] he abstained from the general custom of wreathing his fasces, or surrounding his letters with laurel; implying that he intended to claim no triumph for a victory gained over his own countrymen. His generals immediately began to propose various plans for the future operations of the army. L. Afranius (who had brought with him from Spain a part of the troops which he had formerly commanded there,[2] having enlisted, perhaps afresh, some of those soldiers who had been discharged according to the capitulation granted them by Cæsar) strongly urged that Pompey should avail himself of the first renown of his victory,[3] and should transport his army at once into Italy, that he might thus easily recover the seat of government, and might deprive his adversary of the resources which he now drew from Sicily, Sardinia, Gaul, and Spain. But Pompey replied, that he would never consent to expose Italy and Rome itself to the miseries of war: that besides, by leaving Greece at this moment, he abandoned Scipio and his legions to a certain destruction; whereas by effecting a junction with him he might reasonably hope to complete the work which they had so well begun, and might return to Rome within a short period, without leaving behind them any cause for apprehension or future anxiety. It is said that some of the members of the high aristocratical party were in the habit of reproaching Pompey for his procrastinating system of warfare,[4] and accused him of wishing to protract the contest, that he might the longer enjoy the distinction of seeing the flower of the nobility of Rome obeying him as their commander-in-chief. But his policy was so evidently wise, that, inclined as he was to defer too much to public opinion, he yet persevered in his own plans till after the battle of Dyrrhachium. The unexpected panic which he had on that occasion witnessed among Cæsar's veterans, inclined him, perhaps, to think that he had judged too highly of their superiority; while his confidence in his own soldiers would be proportionably raised. He thought that his long course of cautious training had at last been brought to perfection; and that with a more numerous army, now flushed with victory, and a very superior cavalry, he need not fear to face his enemy in the field. This feeling was heightened, when he found that the plains of Thessaly were to become the scene of the contest; for on no ground could his cavalry

[1] Cæsar, c. 71. [2] Ibid. c. 88.
[3] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 66. Appian, lib. ii. c. 65.
[4] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 67. Appian, lib. ii. c. 67. Cæsar, c. 82.

B.C. 47. act with more advantage; and we are told that he placed his main reliance on that part of his forces.[1] But be this as it may, he set out with the bulk of his army to follow Cæsar, as we have already related, having left fifteen cohorts at Dyrrhachium, under the command of M. Cato, to secure his magazines in that town.[2] Two other distinguished individuals remained also at Dyrrhachium, and thus were not present at the battle of Pharsalia—M. Varro, who had been lately one of Pompey's lieutenants in Spain, and who was accounted the most learned Roman of his time; and M. Cicero, who, though warmly attached to Pompey himself, was disgusted at the language and conduct of some of his principal officers, and was, probably, not sorry for the indisposition which, according to Plutarch,[3] prevented him from taking a more active part in the contest. He had always been anxious for peace, and had left Italy in the preceding summer, and joined Pompey in Greece more out of personal friendship to him, and a regard to his own character, than from any ardent zeal in the quarrel, or still less from an approbation of the manner in which it was conducted.

Pompey, on his arrival in Thessaly, formed a junction with Scipio's army, and then advanced and pitched his camp at no great distance from that of Cæsar. He was abundantly supplied with provisions from the sea, and from the country in his rear, while Cæsar could command only the resources of that part of Thessaly which was in his own immediate occupation; and these, though plentiful at present, must, of necessity, be soon exhausted. Cæsar, therefore, lost no time in offering battle to his antagonist; but this was for some days declined; and Pompey, though he drew his troops out in order, yet kept them so near to the protection of their camp, that Cæsar could not venture to attack him.[4] There was still, perhaps, a struggle in Pompey's mind between his own better judgment and his deference to the wishes, or rather the clamours, of his generals, combined with that confidence in his strength with which his late victory had inspired him. At length Cæsar resolved to change his ground, calculating, he tells us, that by moving often from place to place, he should be able to subsist his troops more readily;[5] and, if he was pursued, might have some opportunity of forcing the enemy to an engagement during the march. Besides, he still looked upon Pompey's soldiers as raw levies, in comparison with his own practised veterans; and hoped to weary out their spirits and patience by harassing them incessantly, and keeping them in continual motion. But when the order for marching had been actually given, when the tents were already struck, and the troops were moving out of the

Pompey is persuaded to hazard a battle.

[1] Cæsar, c 86.
[2] Cicero, *de Divinatione*, lib. i. c. 31. Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 55.
[3] *In Cicerone*, c. 39.
[4] Cæsar, *de Bello Civili*, lib. iii. c. 84. [5] Cæsar, c. 85.

gates of the camp, word was brought that the enemy was formed in line of battle at a greater distance from his intrenchments than usual, as if disposed to venture an action on equal terms. Immediately the march was stopped, the red ensign, or signal of battle, was displayed at the general's quarters,[1] and the soldiers, freed from the load which they were accustomed to carry when marching, were instantly led out into the plain equipped merely for battle, and were drawn up in front of the enemy. B.C. 47.

Disposition of the two armies.

The engagements of modern warfare cannot be understood without an exact knowledge not only of the grander features of the scene of action, but even of the minutest details of its hills, valleys, streams, woods, roads, villages, and insulated houses. A space of several miles is occupied by the contending armies; and a battle is for the most part a game of positions, in which the carrying one important point renders the retreat of the enemy a matter of necessity. Generals, therefore, are obliged to calculate time and distance with the utmost exactness, as success will depend on the combined movements of different bodies of men acting out of sight of one another, and over a wide extent of country, and meeting with obstacles of a very unequal nature in their respective operations. But in ancient times, the great battles, which decided the fate of a campaign or a war, were conducted on a much more simple system. The two parties descended, as by agreement, into a wide field for action; both were drawn up in parallel lines, and there decided the contest by hard fighting, man to man, with seldom any other attempts at manœuvring, than those made by either army to turn the flank of its antagonist. In this manner Cæsar and Pompey met in the plains of Pharsalia. Their lines fronted one another in the usual order of battle; the right flank of Pompey's army, and the left of Cæsar's, were covered by the river Enipeus, whose banks were steep and broken;[2] while Pompey had stationed his whole cavalry on his left, at once to cover that extremity of his own line, and to turn the wing of the enemy. To obviate this, Cæsar formed a reserve of six cohorts, which he had drafted from the legions of his third line, and placed them on his right, behind his own cavalry, ready to present a front and to charge the cavalry of the enemy as soon as they should prepare to execute their intended manœuvre. He, himself, besides, took his station on the right of his line, at the head of the tenth legion, the most distinguished body of troops in his army; while Pompey, equally aware that this would be the most important point in the field, placed himself on his own left wing, at the head of the two legions which had formerly belonged to Cæsar, and which had been recalled from his army in Gaul, as we have already seen, a little before the beginning of the war. The numbers on each side are, as usual,

Their numbers.

[1] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 68.
[2] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 88.

B.C. 47. uncertain; the writer of the *Commentaries* (for the more we read them the less can we persuade ourselves to consider Cæsar as their author, although, to avoid circumlocution, we often speak of them as his work) states the amount of Pompey's infantry at forty-five thousand, and that of Cæsar's at twenty-two thousand.[1] In cavalry, Pompey's superiority is made out to be still greater: he had seven thousand men, and Cæsar only one thousand.[2] Appian, also, without referring directly to the *Commentaries*, gives exactly the same numbers, following, he says, the most credible authorities on the subject;[3] but he mentions several other statements, some representing the disparity between the two armies to have been greater, and others to have been less than he has recorded. The auxiliary troops on both sides were very numerous, but their exact amount, says Appian, is not known; because the Romans consider the foreign part of their forces as of little importance. Almost every province of the Empire had given assistance to one or other of the two antagonists; and it was on the foreign troops in Pompey's army that Cæsar ordered his soldiers to glut their fury, while he commanded them to spare all who were Romans, as soon as they should cease to resist. Yet it was the most beneficial result of Cæsar's final victory, that the distinction between the Italians and the inhabitants of other parts of the empire was gradually lessened, till it was at last removed altogether. And although, to effect this equality, Rome was somewhat degraded, as well as the provinces raised, yet the general interests of mankind were promoted by the change; inasmuch as a larger proportion became admitted to that rank and that civil condition which were the highest and most desirable existing at the time in the world.

The signal of attack was first given by Cæsar;[4] and his soldiers rushed forward to the onset. But finding that the enemy did not advance to meet them, and fearing to exhaust their strength before they closed, they halted, of their own accord, for a few minutes, in the middle of their course, to recover their breath; and then, renewing their charge, they launched their javelins against the adverse ranks, and instantly drawing their swords engaged the enemy hand to hand. The soldiers of the Commonwealth received the attack with coolness, and the action soon became general; when the cavalry,[5] which was stationed on the left of Pompey's line, moved forward to charge Cæsar's right, accompanied by all the light troops, which formed a numerous body. Cæsar's cavalry, unable to stand the attack, was presently beaten; and the victorious cavalry of Pompey were beginning to fall on the defenceless flank of the line of infantry,

Battle of Pharsalia, 9th August. B.C. 48.

[1] Cæsar. lib. iii. c. 88, 89.
[2] Ibid. c. 84.
[3] Appian, lib. ii. c. 70.
[4] Cæsar, c. 90, 92. Florus, lib. iv. c. 2.
[5] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 93, 94.

when the reserve of six cohorts, or about three thousand men, which B.C. 47.
Cæsar had formed for this very purpose, suddenly advanced; and, without waiting to receive the charge of the cavalry, itself charged them with great impetuosity. Pompey's cavalry, as we have seen, consisted mainly of foreigners, and those of many different nations.[1] Startled, therefore, at this unexpected attack, afraid of the high courage and discipline of Cæsar's regular infantry, galled by the terrible discharge of the javelins, and perhaps in some disorder at the moment from not having completed the manœuvre in which they were engaged, the soldiers, on whom Pompey had placed his chief dependence, were seized with a shameful panic, and fled.[2] The light troops, abandoned to their fate, were instantly cut to pieces; and the reserve, still pushing its success, fell upon the flank and rear of the line of Pompey's infantry, which was at that moment warmly engaged in front with the best troops in Cæsar's army, the famous tenth legion. At the same instant Cæsar brought up the third line of his army, which had not hitherto been engaged;[3] and the arrival of a fresh force at once overpowered the resistance of the enemy; who, wearied with a long contest already, and attacked at once in front and in rear, were unable to withstand this third attack, and broke and fled. The impression communicated itself rapidly, and the whole line of Pompey's infantry began to give ground. Still, however, they disputed the approach towards their camp; when Cæsar issued the order to give quarter to all Roman citizens, and only to kill the foreign auxiliaries.[4] Many of the legionary soldiers instantly embraced the safety thus offered to them, while the auxiliaries, deserted by the most effective part of the army, were slaughtered without difficulty and without mercy. In this manner the conquerors soon arrived at Pompey's camp, which they proceeded to storm, and carried it after a brief but sharp resistance from some Thracians and other auxiliaries who had been stationed to defend the rampart.[5] From the camp the fugitives fled in a body to some very high ground, which rose immediately behind it;[6] and Cæsar, having authority enough to call off his soldiers from the spoil that was lying before them, instantly followed to complete his victory.[7] But the

[1] Cæsar lib. iii. c. 4. *Confer. Lucan, Pharsalia*, lib. vii. v. 521, *et seq.*

[2] The reader will recollect the similar circumstances which occasioned the disgraceful route of Prestonpans in the rebellion of 1745. The dragoons, who were ordered to charge the Highlanders as they advanced, were beaten off, and fled, leaving the artillery and infantry to their fate. And it is remarkable, that, till then, the cavalry had been regarded as the particular kind of force which was likely to be most efficacious against the Highlanders.

[3] Cæsar, c. 94. [4] Appian, lib. ii. c. 80.

[5] Ibid. c. 95. [6] Ibid. c. 95, 97.

[7] It was on this occasion that Cæsar exclaimed, in the hearing of Asinius Pollio, upon witnessing the total defeat of the Commonwealth's army, "*Hoc voluerunt: tantis rebus gestis C. Cæsar condemnatus essem, nisi ab exercitu auxilium petiissem.*" The words of Napoleon Bonaparte were in the same spirit when he was exciting the indignation of his soldiers against the Jacobin members of the Council of Five

B.C. 47. enemy finding that their position was destitute of water, abandoned it, and continued their retreat towards Larissa. Cæsar still pursued them with a part of his forces, having left the other part to secure his own camp, and that which he had just taken from the enemy. The fugitives, finding that he was gaining ground upon them by moving on a more practicable road, halted again on another height, which had a stream flowing at its foot. Night was coming on, and the exertions of the day had almost exhausted both parties; but Cæsar encouraged his men to make one effort, more, and to raise works between the hill and the stream, that the enemy might not supply themselves with water during the night. His wish was accomplished; and the unfortunate fugitives, exposed to all the horrors of thirst after a day of intense fatigue, and at the hottest season of the year, sent some of their number to offer an immediate surrender.[1]

Defeat of Pompey.

Some senators, it is said, who were on the hill, not choosing to submit to Cæsar, escaped during the night; but the rest of the fugitives, as soon as morning came, were ordered to come down into the plain and give up their arms; after which their lives were granted them; and in the cruelty of ancient warfare they had reason to congratulate themselves on their fortune, in being preserved alike from massacre and from slavery. The indefatigable conqueror, having thus completed the destruction of the enemy's army, ordered the legions he had with him to be relieved by those which, on the preceding afternoon, he had sent back to the camp, and then continuing his advance, he reached Larissa on that day, and entered it without resistance.

Surrender of a large portion of his army.

Such was the battle of Pharsalia. It is needless to inquire what was the number of the slain on the part of the vanquished, or of the conqueror; for a victory so complete is to be estimated rather by its results than by the immediate slaughter in the field; and where the empire of the world was lost and won, no subordinate considerations could aggravate the defeat, nor materially lessen the joy of the victory. L. Domitius, who had been named by the Senate at the beginning of the war as Cæsar's successor in Gaul, was killed in the

Hundred, on the memorable 19th Brumaire, (10th November, 1799.) "*J'allais leur faire connaître les moyens de sauver la république, et de nous rendre notre gloire. Ils m'ont répondu à coups de poignard. Ils voulaient ainsi réaliser le désir des rois coalisés. Qu'aurait pu faire de plus l'Angleterre! Soldats, puis-je compter sur vous?*" —*Mémoires de Napoléon*, tome i. p. 91.

[1] Pompey was murdered the day before his birthday; that is, according to Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* lib. xxxvii. c. 2, on the 29th of September; which, allowing for the disordered state of the Roman Calendar at this time, was really about one of the latter days of July. Consequently the battle of Pharsalia must have been fought about the beginning or middle of July; but we have found no record of the precise day, and, indeed, one might imagine, from some words of Lucan, that it was not exactly known even in his time. He says—

Tempore signavit leviorum Roma malorum,
Hunc voluit nescire diem.

—*Phars.* lib. vii. v. 410.

pursuit ;[1] T. Labienus and L. Afranius had escaped to Dyrrhachium; B.C. 48.
whilst P. Lentulus, L. Lentulus the late consul, Scipio, and Pompey the Great himself, were seeking shelter and protection from foreigners. But the fortunes of Pompey deserve to be traced more particularly. When he saw his cavalry defeated,[2] and the reserve of Cæsar's six cohorts threatening to surround that part of his line in which he had taken his place, it is agreed that he instantly left the field, and rode back to his camp. As he entered the gates, he addressed himself to the centurions, who were stationed there on guard, charging them to do their duty in defending the camp, if it should be needful, and adding, "that he was going to visit the other gates, and to increase the guards at every point." Yet we are told that he went directly to his own tent, and there remained as if stupified, till he found that the enemy had already forced their way into his intrenchments. We find, indeed, that when he saw his cavalry routed, he suspected that he was betrayed; and this feeling, working vaguely in his mind, was likely, above all others, to make him helpless and irresolute. Yet, if he were afraid of treason in the field, it was, perhaps, his wisest plan to retire to his camp, and endeavour to secure that at least from the enemy; and his subsequent flight did not take place till all hope of resistance was clearly vanished. Then he changed his dress, and, withdrawing from the camp by the back gate, he rode off, attended by about thirty horsemen, amongst whom were Publius and Lucius Lentulus, and M. Favonius,[3] the friend and professed imitator of Cato. He fled first to Larissa, but did not halt there; and thence continuing his flight during the whole night, he reached the sea at the mouth of the Peneus, and was there taken on board a small trading vessel, which happened to be passing by the coast. At first he bent his course towards the mouth of the Strymon,[4] and lay there at anchor for one night, in order to learn the state of his affairs; but finding them desperate, and having procured a supply of money from his friends at Amphipolis, he crossed over to Mitylene in Lesbos, where he had left his wife Cornelia, and his younger son Sextus,[5] The purity and tenderness of Pompey's private character rendered his meeting with his family particularly affectionate. Cornelia had heard no tidings of the war since the exaggerated reports which she had received of her husband's success at Dyrrhachium; his arrival, therefore, as a fugitive, was a shock for which she was wholly unprepared. She joined him on board the vessel immediately; for he would not go on shore,


Personal adventures of Pompey.

Flies to Larissa.

[1] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 99. Cicero, *de Divinatione*, lib. i. c. 31. Dion Cassius, lib xlii. p. 190.
[2] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 94, 96.
[3] Velleius, Patercul. lib. ii. c. 79.
[4] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 102.
[5] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 74.

B.C. 48. although warmly invited by the Mitylenæans to do so, and although he was detained by contrary winds for two days off the harbour. He would not, he said, expose his friends to the resentment of the conqueror, by availing himself of their kindness; but recommended them to submit to Cæsar, adding, that they would find him disposed to be merciful. But being here joined by some other small vessels he sailed to the southward, hoping to make a stand in the southern part of Asia Minor, or in Syria; and trusting that at that distance he might rally his navy, and with the assistance of the eastern provinces again renew the contest. The effect of the battle of Pharsalia, however, was rapidly felt in every quarter. Rhodes,[1] which still retained some part of its old naval renown, and which had contributed a squadron to Pompey's fleet, now refused to admit the fugitives within its ports; and Pompey, mortified at this first check

Effect of the battle of Pharsalia.



[Pharsalia.—*G. F. Sargent, after Dodwell.*]

to his hopes, continued his voyage along the coast as far as Cilicia, without meeting any where with any decided encouragement or support. His views were now turned, it is said, towards Syria. That province was still, by law, subject to the government of his father-in-law, Scipio, and its own resources might be powerfully supported by the arms of Parthia—a power to which Pompey was inclined to look for assistance in this extremity of fortune. But when he arrived at Paphos, in Cyprus, he learned that Antioch, the capital of Syria, had declared against him;[2] that the citadel of that place had been secured for the very purpose of excluding him; and that the citizens had given notice that none of the fugitives of Pompey's party should be allowed to enter their territories. There was no hope then of renewing the war in Syria, and Pompey was strongly advised not to take refuge at the court of Parthia;[3] a place the least calculated to offer an honourable protection to a Roman

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. xiv. Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 102.
[2] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 15. Cæsar, c. 102.
[3] Plutarch, *in Pompeio*, c. 76.

lady, who was now the wife of Pompey, and whose first husband had been the son of Crassus. It was then suggested that he should retire to Africa, where the friendship of Juba and the triumphant state of his party seemed naturally to invite him. But this plan he declined, and, in an evil hour, resolved to throw himself on the gratitude of the King of Egypt. The present sovereign was a mere boy; but his father had owned the recovery of his kingdom, as we have seen, to Pompey's influence; and this, it was hoped, would now ensure a hospitable reception from the son. Pompey, accordingly, sailed to Pelusium;[1] and, before he landed, he sent a message to the young king, to request an asylum at Alexandria, and assistance for himself and his friends in their distress. It happened that Ptolemy then lay with an army on the most eastern boundary of Egypt, in order to repel an expected invasion from his sister, the famous Cleopatra; who, having been left by her father's will joint heir of the Kingdom with her brother, had been since expelled by him, and was now endeavouring, with some aid which she had procured in Syria, to effect her restoration. Pompey's messenger, accordingly, found the King near mount Casius, some miles to the eastward of Pelusium; and, having discharged his commission, was sent back with a kind answer, and an invitation to Pompey to join the King immediately. But Ptolemy had at this time in his service a number of Roman soldiers, who, having belonged to that army with which Gabinius had restored the late King to his throne, had since chosen to remain in Egypt, and to transfer their obedience to a new master. Gabinius had been raised entirely by Pompey's influence, and many of his soldiers had served against the Pirates, or against Mithridates, and might thus be supposed to retain some respect and affection for Pompey, their old and most illustrious commander. As a Roman pro-consul, Pompey would little hesitate to recall these men to his own standard; and as the Roman people had been named by the late King as his executors, their officer might interfere, more than Ptolemy wished, in the quarrels of the royal family, and might even attempt to dispose of all the resources of Egypt by his own authority. The King's Council, therefore, resolved to tempt Pompey into their power, and to murder him—an act by which they hoped to merit the favour of Cæsar, while they freed themselves from a guest who might, if once admitted, become too powerful to be dismissed or to be resisted.

B.C. 48.

He resolves to seek an asylum in Egypt.

At Cyprus[2] Pompey had supplied himself with money from the funds of the farmers of the revenue, and from the contributions of some private individuals: he had also raised, as we are told, about two thousand men, chiefly from the large slave establishments belonging to different persons in the island; and with this force,

He is murdered.

[1] Plutarch, c. 77. Cæsar, c. 103.
[2] Cæsar, c. 103. Plutarch, c. 78, 79.

B.C. 48. having been joined besides by several Senators from different quarters, he had crossed over to the coast of Egypt. The whole of his little squadron followed him from Pelusium, when he went to meet the King; and on board of his own ship, as we have already mentioned, were his wife Cornelia, and his son Sextus. As he came near Mount Casius, the Egyptian army was seen on the shore, and their fleet lying off at some distance, when presently a boat was observed approaching the ship from the land; and it was soon found to contain one of the King's chief officers, a man of the name of Achillas, attended by two or three other persons of inferior rank. Among these was a Roman. named L. Septimius, who had served as a Centurion under Pompey in the war with the Pirates, and who, when the boat came near the ship, addressed his old General in Latin by the title of *Imperator*, while Achillas, saluting him courteously in Greek, invited him to enter the boat, informing him that there was not water enough near the shore for a vessel of any burden. The King himself,[1] and a group of his principal officers, were at this time seen on the shore, as if waiting to bid their illustrious guest welcome; and Pompey accordingly descended into the boat, accompanied by two Centurions, by one of his freedmen, and by a single slave. As the party were borne towards the land, Pompey is said to have recognised L. Septimius, and to have observed to him, "that he thought they must have formerly served together;" to which Septimius answered by a mere movement of assent. No one seemed willing to break the silence, upon which Pompey took out an outline of a Greek address which he had intended to deliver on his introduction to the King, and amused himself with reading it. At last the boat touched the shore, and several of Ptolemy's officers crowded down to the water's edge, as if to receive Pompey immediately on his landing. He rose from his seat, and, leaning on his freedman's arm, was in the act of stepping on shore, when L. Septimius stabbed him in the back, and instantly, on this signal, Achillas and his Egyptian soldiers



[Pompey the Great.—*Visconti, Iconog. Grec.*]

Murder of Pompey.

[1] Appian, *Bell. Civil.* lib. ii. c. 84. Plutarch, *ubi supra.* Cæsar, c. 104.

drew their swords to complete the work. It is said that Pompey did not utter a single cry, but, folding his gown over his face, received the blows of his assassins without attempting to resist or to escape. As soon as the murder was finished, his head was cut off and embalmed, in order to be presented to Cæsar, and his body was cast out carelessly and left upon the beach. His freedman lingered near it, till the crowd was dispersed, and then burnt it on a rude funeral pile of such broken pieces of wood as he found scattered along the shore, assisted, as it is said, by an old Roman soldier, now in the Egyptian service, and who remembered that Pompey the Great had once been his General. Cornelia, and her friends, who saw the murder committed, instantly put to sea, and escaped the pursuit of the Egyptian fleet, which at first threatened to intercept them. Their feelings, as is natural, were for the moment so engrossed by their own danger, that they could scarcely comprehend the full extent of their loss;[1] nor was it till they reached the port of Tyre in safety, that grief succeeded to apprehension, and they began to understand what cause they had for sorrow. B.C. 48.



[Miles, an old Soldier.—*Mus. Florentinum.*]

But the tears that were shed for Pompey were not only those of domestic affliction: his fate called forth a more general and honourable mourning. No man had ever gained, at so early an age, the affections of his countrymen—none had enjoyed them so largely, or preserved them so long, with so little interruption; and at the distance of eighteen centuries the feeling of his contemporaries may be sanctioned by the sober judgment of history. He entered upon public life as a distinguished member of an oppressed party which was just arriving at its hour of triumph and retaliation; he saw his associates plunged in rapine and massacre, but he preserved himself pure from the contagion of their crimes; and when the death of Sylla left him almost at the head of the Aristocratical party, he served them ably and faithfully with his sword, while he endeavoured to mitigate the evils of their ascendency, by restoring to the Commons of Rome, on the earliest opportunity, the most important of those privileges and liberties which they had lost under the tyranny of their late master. He received the due reward of his honest patriotism, in the unusual honours and trusts that were conferred on him; but his greatness could not corrupt his virtue; and the bound- Character of Pompey.

[1] Cicero, *Tusculan. Disputat.* lib. iii. c. 27.

B.C. 47 less powers with which he was repeatedly invested, he wielded with the highest ability and uprightness to the accomplishment of his task, and then, without any undue attempts to prolong their duration, he honestly resigned them. At a period of general cruelty and extortion towards the enemies and subjects of the Commonwealth, the character of Pompey, in his foreign commands, was marked by its humanity and spotless integrity; his conquest of the Pirates was effected with wonderful rapidity, and cemented by a merciful policy, which, instead of taking vengeance for the past, accomplished the prevention of evil for the future: his presence in Asia, when he conducted the war with Mithridates, was no less a relief to the Provinces from the tyranny of their Governors, than it was their protection against the arms of the enemy. It is true that wounded vanity led him, after his return from Asia, to unite himself for a time with some unworthy associates; and this connection, as it ultimately led to all the misfortunes, so did it immediately tempt him to the worst faults of his political life, and involved him in a career of difficulty, mortification, and shame. But after this disgraceful fall, he again returned to his natural station, and was universally regarded as the fit protector of the laws and liberties of his country, when they were threatened by Cæsar's rebellion. In the conduct of the civil war he showed something of weakness and vacillation; but his abilities, though considerable, were far from equal to those of his adversary; and his inferiority was most seen in that want of steadiness in the pursuit of his own plans, which caused him to abandon a system already sanctioned by success, and to persuade himself that he might yield with propriety to the ill-judged impatience of his followers for battle. His death is one of the few tragical events of those times which may be regarded with unmixed compassion. It was not accompanied, like that of Cato and Brutus, with the rashness and despair of suicide; nor can it be regarded, like that of Cæsar, as the punishment of crimes, unlawfully inflicted, indeed, yet suffered deservedly. With a character of rare purity and tenderness in all his domestic relations, he was slaughtered before the eyes of his wife and son—whilst flying from the ruin of a most just cause, he was murdered by those whose kindness he was entitled to claim. His virtues have not been transmitted to posterity with their deserved fame; and while the violent Republican writers have exalted the memory of Cato and Brutus—while the lovers of literature have extolled Cicero—and the admirers of successful ability have lavished their praises on Cæsar—Pompey's many and rare merits have been forgotten in the faults of his Triumvirate, and in the weakness of temper which he displayed in the conduct of his last campaign. But he must have been, in no ordinary degree, good and amiable, for whom his countrymen professed their enthusiastic love, unrestrained by servility, and unimpelled by faction; and, though the events of his life must


His humanity.

Purity of his character.

now be gathered for the most part from unfriendly sources, yet we think that they who read them impartially will continually cherish his memory with a warmer regard, and will feel that in themselves the prophecy of the poet has been fulfilled— B.C. 48

> Fates such as these, mid future nations wide,
> And late posterities, both hope and fear
> And useless prayers shall raise.
> And all surprised, shall read those fates
> As unfulfilled;—and still thy name,
> Great Pompey, shall adore.[1]

Cæsar was fully aware of the importance of pursuing Pompey, as he knew that the whole cause of the commonwealth depended on him alone, and that if he were once removed, his partisans would instantly be divided, and probably only a small portion of them



[Amphitheatre at Ephesus.—*La Borde.*]

would be inclined to continue the contest. Accordingly, while M. Antonius led the greater part of the victorious army back to Brundisium,[2] Cæsar himself crossed by the Hellespont into Asia, and, by

[1] *Hæc et apud seras gentes, populosque nepotum,*
Spesque, metusque simul, perituraque vota movebunt.
Attonitique omnes, veluti venientia, fata,
Non transmissa, legent, et adhuc tibi, Magne, favebunt.
—Lucan, *Pharsalia*, lib. vii. v. 207.

[2] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 24. Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 105, 106.

C. 48. B.C. the fame of his arrival, dissipated an assemblage of some citizens of rank, who had been called together at Ephesus to sanction the removal of the treasures of the temple of Diana, for the service of Pompey and the commonwealth. After a short stay in the province of Asia, he received information that Pompey had been seen at Cyprus; and thinking it probable that he would seek an asylum in Egypt, he resolved to follow him thither. Already the news of the battle of Pharsalia, and the flight of Pompey, had induced many of the squadrons, which had been sent to support the cause of the commonwealth by the states in alliance with Rome, to return to their own countries. The Egyptian fleet had been one of this number; whilst the Rhodians, taking a more decisive part, had excluded Pompey, as we have seen, from their harbours, and now furnished Cæsar with ten ships of war, to enable him to follow the man in whose cause they themselves had been so lately engaged. These, with a few other vessels procured in the ports of the province of Asia, sufficed to transport the two incomplete legions, which, at this moment, were the whole of Cæsar's disposable force; and of which one had followed him immediately from Pharsalia, and the other had been sent for from the south of Greece, where it had been employed on a separate service, and consequently had not been present at the late battle. With these two legions he landed at Alexandria, and there was informed of Pompey's murder, and saw his head and his ring presented to him as a grateful offering by the murderers. He is said to have shed tears at the sight;[1] but those signs of mere physical susceptibility, so little imply any real humanity of character, that they flowed very probably from a spontaneous feeling, and Cæsar may have indulged them with pleasure, flattering himself that they were a proof of the tenderness of his nature. At any rate it cost him no effort to refuse any expressions of gratitude to the murderers; for he was immediately involved in a quarrel with them, because he claimed the right as Roman Consul,[2] to arbitrate in all disputes which related to the execution of the late king's will. Thus the very interference, from the fear of which Ptolemy's counsellors had resolved to murder Pompey, now threatened them in a much more alarming shape, when Cæsar announced it as his decision that Ptolemy and Cleopatra should both dismiss their armies, and repair to his quarters at Alexandria, there to state their respective pretensions before him. The king's officers, indignant at the affront thus offered to the crown of Egypt, instantly brought up their army from the Syrian frontiers, and prepared to attack Cæsar; but the young king himself, with his tutor and minister Pothinus, was already in Alexandria, and in Cæsar's power; so that the attempts of his subjects to deliver him were represented by

esar pur-
Hies Pom-
huy.

He arrives
in Egypt,

and is there
involved in
a war, by
his inter-
ference in
the disputes
of Ptolemy
and Cleo-
patra.

[1] Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 48. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxii.
[2] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 107.

his oppressor as a rebellion against his authority. Cleopatra too was in Cæsar's quarters; but she was no unwilling prisoner, if the common stories of the time may be credited;[1] which tell us, that trusting to the influence of her charms, she readily obeyed Cæsar's summons, and finding that access to him was precluded by the besieging army of her brother, she caused herself to be wrapped up in a package of carpeting, and in this manner was safely conveyed into Cæsar's presence. It is added, that she was not disappointed in her expectations; that Cæsar's interference in the dispute between her and her brother, which had originated in political and ambitious motives, was continued, after his interview with Cleopatra, from feelings of a different nature; and that his passion for her involved him more deeply in a contest, in which he had at first found himself engaged unexpectedly, and from which, when it became serious, he might otherwise have deemed it politic to extricate himself. Be this as it may, Cæsar remained some months at Alexandria, maintaining a difficult, and sometimes a perilous struggle with the Egyptians. Without entering here into the detail of his adventures, we must take a survey of the state of the Roman Empire during his absence, and describe the effects of his victory at Pharsalia, and of the subsequent neglect of his affairs which delayed for two years the full enjoyment of its advantages.

B.C. 48



[Portrait of Cleopatra.]

If Pompey ever received intelligence, during his flight, of the services preformed by his navy in the seas westward of Greece, and of the sudden check given to this career of success by the fatal issue of the battle of Pharsalia, he must have been most bitterly sensible of his error in staking his fortunes on the event of a general action by land. At the very moment when he was escaping as a fugitive from the scene of his defeat in Thessaly, one of his squadrons was again blockading the harbour of Brundisium;[2] and another, under the command of C. Cassius, was infesting the coasts of Sicily, and had lately burnt the entire fleet of the enemy, amounting to thirty-five ships, in the harbour of Messina. But the news of Pompey's defeat at once deterred his lieutenants from pursuing their advantages; their squadrons retreated from the coasts of Italy and Sicily, and repaired to Corcyra, at which place the principal surviving leaders of the party of the commonwealth were at this time assembled. We have already mentioned that M. Cato had been left with fifteen cohorts to defend Dyrrhachium, when Pompey set out

Proceedings of Pompey's partisans after the battle of Pharsalia.

[1] Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 49. Dion Cassius, lib. xlii. p. 201, edit. Leunclav.
[2] Cæsar, lib. iii. c. 100, 101.

B.C. 43. in pursuit of Cæsar into Thessaly, and that M. Cicero, M. Varro, and some other distinguished individuals, had remained from different causes at Dyrrhachium also. In the midst of their anxiety for the issue of the campaign, T. Labienus arrived a fugitive from the rout of Pharsalia;[1] and the tidings which he brought produced at once a general consternation and disorder. The magazines of corn were presently sacked by the soldiers, who, considering the war as ended, were resolved to pay themselves as they best could for their services; nor could they be induced to accompany their officers in their flight, but proceeded to burn the transports in the harbour, that none of their number might be able to separate their fortunes from those of the rest. But the ships of war for the most part were still faithful; and in these the chiefs of the vanquished party hastened to escape to Corcyra. When they had reached that island, a new scene of distraction ensued. The command of the forces was offered to Cicero, as he was the oldest senator present of consular dignity;[2] but he, being determined to take no further part in the contest declined it; and being protected, as it is said, by Cato, from the violence of Cn. Pompeius, Pompey's eldest son, who wished to kill him as a deserter from the cause of the commonwealth, he returned to Italy to throw himself on the mercy of the victorious party. D. Lælius,[3] one of the commanders of the Asiatic squadron in Pompey's fleet, followed the example of Cicero. There were others, and these formed a considerable body, who neither chose to continue the war, nor to submit to Cæsar; but who resolved, for the present, to remain in Greece, and there to observe, from a distance, the course of events at Rome. But Cato,[4] Cn. Pompeius,[5] Labienus, and several others, hoping that Pompey would be able to make a stand in some of the eastern provinces, determined to carry their fleet thither in order to join him; and accordingly set sail to the south without delay. They touched at Patræ, on the coast of Peloponnesus, and there took on board Petreius and Faustus Sylla; after which they continued their voyage to the coast of Africa. Here

Cato withdraws to Africa.

[1] Cicero, *de Divinatione*, lib. i. c. 31.
[2] Plutarch, *in Cicerone* c. 39.
[3] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xi. epist. vii., xiv.
[4] Dion Cassius, lib. xlii. p. 190, 191. Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 56.
[5] We had originally added here the name of Afranius, on the authority of Dion Cassius. But if Afranius had been with Cato, the command would naturally have devolved on him, as being a person of consular dignity; exactly on the same principle that Cato, on his arrival in the province of Africa, ceded the chief authority to Scipio. Again, we have followed Dion Cassius in representing C. Cassius as only leaving Cato on the news of Pompey's death; but it seems probable, from one of Cicero's letters, that he sailed directly from Corcyra to Syria to offer his submission, as soon as he had received the news of the battle of Pharsalia. *Epist. ad Familiar*, lib. xv., epist. xv. Appian confounds C. Cassius with his brother Lucius, and supposes him to have been in the Hellespont with his fleet when Cæsar crossed over into Asia in pursuit of Pompey. So difficult is it to ascertain the truth, even in such indifferent matters, when good contemporary testimony fails us.

they met with Cornelia and her son Sextus Pompeius, who, finding no secure asylum in the east, were now, probably, flying to the province of Africa, which, since the death of Curio, had remained in the peaceable possession of the friends of the commonwealth. On receiving the disastrous tidings of Pompey's murder, a fresh divison took place among his partisans. C. Cassius, afterwards so distinguished, abandoned his associates, and sailed at once with the Syrian squadron, which he commanded, to Syria, intending to offer his submission to Cæsar. Cato, and those who were with him were resolved to perish in their opposition to the prevailing party, saw that the province of Africa was now the quarter which held out to them the most favourable prospects. The command of the forces was, by common consent, bestowed on Cato; and he resolved to attempt to carry his troops by land across the desert from Cyrene to the frontiers of the Roman province; either because the departure of the Syrian squadron had deprived him of the means of transporting his whole force by sea; or that the navigation of the neighbourhood of the great Syrtes was looked upon as more formidable than the fatigues and privations likely to attend on the march by land. However, the army arrived in the province in safety, and found that Scipio had already escaped thither from Pharsalia, and that Juba, King of Mauritania, was disposed, as heretofore, to support the cause of Pompey to the uttermost. Meantime the tyranny and exactions of Q. Cassius Longinus,[1] whom Cæsar had left with the chief command in what was called Further Spain, and who, when Tribune of the people, had fled with M. Antonius from Rome to Cæsar's quarters at the beginning of the contest, had provoked a very serious mutiny among the legions of his province. B.C. 48.

Mutiny of the troops in Spain against Q Cassius Longinus.

The troops, supported by the inhabitants of Corduba, transferred their obedience to M. Marcellus, his Quæstor; and some of them were inclined to espouse the cause of Pompey, had not Marcellus, though not without difficulty, prevented them; being himself, it is said, not inclined to take so decisive a step till the state of Pompey's affairs in other quarters should appear more promising. At length the disturbance was appeased by the arrival of M. Lepidus, Proconsul of the Province of Hither Spain, who took the command of the revolted legions without resistance: and soon after C. Trebonius was sent to supersede Cassius Longinus in the command of the Further Province; and the ex-governor, while proceeding to Italy by sea with the plunder which he had acquired by his exaction, was lost in a storm at the mouth of the Ebro. It appears that Cæsar attached great importance to the service which Lepidus had rendered him on this occasion, insomuch that he afterwards rewarded him with the honours of a triumph;[2] and, indeed, the mutiny of the legions in

[1] *Auctor de Bell. Alexandrino*, c. 48, *et seq.* Dion Cassius, lib. xlii. p. 192.
[2] Dion Cassius. lib, xliii. p 214, edit. Leunclav.

B.C. 48. Spain produced a strong sensation in Italy,[1] coupled as it was with the tidings of the great force acquired by Scipio and Cato in Africa, and of some disasters which had befallen Cæsar's arms at the same time in Illyricum and in Asia Minor. M. Octavius,[2] whom we have already had occasion to mention as the commander of one of the squadrons in Pompey's fleet, had lingered in the Illyrian seas after Cato's departure from Corcyra—partly relying on the courage and fidelity of some of the native tribes of Illyricum, and partly, perhaps, hoping to organize a force out of the remains of Pompey's army, which were still numerous, although in a state of dispersion and despondency. The absence of Cæsar favoured his hopes; many persons of distinction, who had remained in Greece rather than follow Cato into Africa, and who would have submitted to Cæsar at once, if he had returned directly to Rome, began now to accuse themselves of pusillanimity, when they heard of the war which was beginning in Egypt; and some of them began to draw together into Illyricum, and to put themselves into a hostile attitude. Upon this A. Gabinius, Cicero's ancient enemy, who, in his tribuneship, had proposed to invest Pompey with the extraordinary command against the pirates, and who now, like most other men of equal profligacy, was the partisan of Cæsar, received orders to cross over from Italy with some legions that had been lately raised, and secure Illyricum and Macedonia. But Gabinius found himself unequal to the task imposed upon him: the country, which was the seat of war, was unable to support his army, and the stormy season was by this time arrived, which rendered his supplies by sea very precarious. He struggled to relieve his wants by taking some of the strongholds occupied by the enemy; and in these attempts, being often repulsed with loss, he was at last obliged to retreat to Salona, a town on the sea-coast, in which he hoped to defend himself during the winter. But the Illyrians attacked him on his march, and defeated him with considerable loss, so that he reached Salona in a very miserable condition; and being blockaded by the victorious enemy, and reduced to great extremities, he was taken ill in the course of a few months, and died. His disasters were afterwards retrieved by P. Vatinius, a man of equally profligate character, who, in his tribuneship, had rendered himself the tool of Cæsar, and on whose motion Cæsar had been originally appointed to his fatal command in Gaul. Vatinius obliged Octavius to resign the contest and escape to Africa; and in a short time from his first arrival in Illyricum, he reduced the whole province to a state of obedience. But before this change took place, and while Gabinius was shut up in Salona, the aspect of Cæsar's affairs was very unpromising; and it was at the same time that another of his lieutenants, Cn. Domitius Calvinus sustained a severe

Defeat and death of A. Gabinius in Illyricum.

[1] Cicero *ad Atticum*, lib. xi. epist. x. xvi.
[2] *Auctor de Bell. Alexandrino*, c. 42, *et seq.*

defeat in Asia from Pharnaces, the son of the famous Mithridates. B.C. 48. This prince having received from the Romans the kingdom of the Bosporus,[1] or what is now the Crimea, as the reward of his treason against his father, wished to avail himself of the distracted state of the Roman empire to recover some other parts of his hereditary dominions, and began to invade Cappadocia and the Lesser Armenia, which were possessed by two petty princes under the protection of Rome. Application was presently made by one of them to Cn. Domitius Calvinus for aid, as Cæsar had entrusted that officer with the chief command of the different provinces of Asia Minor; and, after some fruitless attempts at negotiation, Domitius advanced with an army into the Lesser Armenia; and there coming to an engagement with Pharnaces, he was defeated, and obliged to fall back as far as the province of Asia. Pharnaces, meanwhile, overran the whole of Pontus, which had been the chief seat of his father's government, and congratulated himself on having so soon recovered so large a portion of that which Mithridates had lost. During all this time Cæsar was still in Egypt; and the various reports which arrived from that country, together with the certain ill success of his affairs in other quarters, produced a constant accession of strength to the party of the commonwealth in Africa.

Defeat of Cn. Domitius Calvinus by Pharnaces, son of Mithridates, in Asia.

From this sketch of the condition of some of the provinces, we turn back, with an eager curiosity, to inquire what was the state of Rome itself, and with what temper the bodies, which still retained the names of the senate and people, were disposed to receive their new master. After Cicero had crossed over into Greece, about the middle of the year, to join the army of the commonwealth, none, it is probable, remained in Italy, but such as were the active partisans, or the unresisting slaves of Cæsar. Among the latter was T. Pomponius Atticus, who, according to the tenets of the Epicureans, considered it an unwise disturbance of his enjoyments to take any part in political contests, calculating that, whatever became of the liberties of his country, he should still retain his own villas and gardens through the influence of his friends on one side or on the other. Men of this stamp were a clay that might be moulded to any shape at the pleasure of the conqueror; and the daily growth of this selfish spirit, under pretence of an aversion to the horrors of a civil war, will easily account for the introduction of that mere despotism which was established as soon as the contest in Africa was decided. Out of the capital it seemed vain to look for any remains of public feeling: some of the boldest and hardiest of the Italian tribes had been nearly extirpated by Sylla's victories and massacres; the general admission of the Italians to the privileges of Roman citizens would naturally attract the most enterprising and active part of

State of Rome and of Italy.

June 7th B.C. 49.

Position of the Italian tribes.

[1] Appian, *de Bell. Mithridat.* c. 113. *Auctor de Bell. Alexand.* c. 34, *et seq.*

B.C. 48. the population to Rome: and their places would be ill supplied by that multitude of disbanded soldiers whom Sylla had converted into landed proprietors, by settling them in the districts which he had desolated. It is probable, that many of these soldiers would soon, moreover, be glad to part with their land, either to cover their losses in farming, or to supply their extravagances. As early as the period of Catiline's conspiracy, we find many of them ready to promote a new scramble for plunder; and in the fourteen years which had since elapsed, we may suspect that a very large proportion of the estates, granted by Sylla to his veterans, had passed into the hands of the great nobility, by whom the soil of Italy was so generally monopolized. Wherever land was held by a proprietor of this description, the free population quickly withered away, and slaves were the only cultivators, and the only inhabitants. The towns were overwhelmed by the disproportionate greatness of the capital, and were each of too little importance to form a rallying point in opposition to Rome; whilst the local distinctions and prejudices which divided the Tuscan from the Campanian, or the Apulian from the inhabitant of Picenum, were still too strong to admit of much habitual sympathy of feeling or concert in action between the people of different parts of the peninsula. Besides, they had no longer that peculiar and direct interest in the civil wars of Rome which they had felt in the times of Marius and Sylla. Then every town of Italy was conscious that its enjoyment of the envied privileges of Roman citizens, the elevation of its people from the rank of subjects to sovereigns, would be secured by the victory of Cinna and Carbo, and would be at least endangered by the triumph of the aristocracy. But now, whatever was the issue of the war, Nola and Volaterræ, Asculum and Corfinium, would only share the fate of Rome; and what the capital would submit to endure, the provincial towns could scarcely presume to consider as an evil. It was this want of confidence in themselves, this political helplessness, leading the rest of Italy to follow tamely in the steps of Rome, and disposing the people of Rome itself to rely for every thing upon their government, and to be incapable of any organized exertions among themselves, which, above all other causes, tended to lower the character of the times, and marked each successive generation, during a course of many centuries, with a deeper stain of timidity and weakness.[1]

[1] It implies a much higher national character to be anxious for the general liberty, good government, and positive amelioration of the state of the whole people, than to make a desperate struggle for the removal of invidious distinctions between one class of the community and another. The Romans and the Italians had vigour enough to do the latter, but they wanted the much higher qualities requisite to ensure the former. In like manner Napoleon Bonaparte has observed, "*que le peuple Français tenait plus á l'égalité qu'á la liberte.*" (*Mémoires*, tome i. p. 145.) The revolution succeeded completely in destroying the offensive privileges possessed by the Aristocracy; but it may be doubted whether, even at this, the French entertain a just value for the general freedom and political welfare of the whole State.

Whatever, therefore, might have been their secret wishes, the people of Rome and of Italy had remained tranquil during the campaign in Greece, had given no support to the attempts of Cælius and Milo, and were now ready to receive the destruction of their liberties as the natural consequence of the battle of Pharsalia. After that battle, M. Antonius, as we have seen, returned with the greater part of the victorious legions to Italy. It was soon shown that the power of the sword was henceforth to be paramount; the troops were quartered on the inhabitants of the different towns, and indulged themselves in the full license of unrestrained soldiers.[1] The general, after exhibiting a second time a scene of scandalous debauchery in his progress through the country, arrived at Rome, and there commenced the work of confiscation and pillage. We hear nothing further of P. Servilius, who was the nominal consul of the republic; the government of Italy seems to have been vested solely in Antonius, although he possessed no other title than that of Cæsar's lieutenant. But it was soon proposed that the office of dictator should be again conferred on Cæsar, although he was then far from Italy; and when this power was bestowed on him, by a vote of the people, for the term of a year, M. Antonius was, at the same time, named his master of the horse, and thus appeared to be in some sort invested with a legal authority. It is said by Dion Cassius,[2] that a vote of the people empowered Cæsar to punish the adherents of Pompey as he thought proper, and gave him besides the power of consul for five years, and that of Tribune of the people for life. There was no reasonable ground for bestowing these unusual honours; for the original pretext of Cæsar's rebellion was merely to place himself on a level with Pompey in retaining or resigning his province, and to obtain the right of becoming a candidate for the consulship. He was now at this time consul, and Pompey's death had left him not only without a superior in dignity, but without an equal. He had already gained therefore all that he pretended to fight for; and a general amnesty might now have been passed, which, while it saved him from the punishment due to his treason, would have left him in undisputed possession of the first place in the commonwealth. Nor had he, like Sylla, any public evils to remedy; no undue preponderance of the aristocratical or of the popular party required the aid of a legislator with absolute powers to restore the constitution to a healthier condition. There were no wrongs to be redressed, but those which he had himself caused; nor was there any voice which called for a reform of the constitution, except that of his own ambition.

B.C. 48.

Cæsar appointed dictator; M. Antonius master of the horse.

It is probable that Cæsar's protracted absence, and the want of all ordinary magistrates at Rome, impelled individuals of the victorious

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 25.

[2] Lib. xlii. p. 194.

B.C. 48. party to aspire to greatness independently of the patronage of their chief, P. Dolabella,[1] Cicero's son-in-law, procured his election, as one of the tribunes of the people, for the year B.C. 47; and, when he had entered on his office, he began to revive the laws lately proposed by M. Cælius, for exempting tenants from all demands for the rent of their houses during one year, and for a general abolition of debts. The master of the horse was likely, he thought, to support him, both from personal friendship, and from his general inclination to uphold the cause of the needy and the profligate, and, if his countenance could be procured, there was no effectual opposition to be dreaded. L. Trebellius, indeed, one of Dolabella's colleagues,[2] attempted to defend the interests of the landlords and creditors, and scenes of great disorder were frequently exhibited in the streets of Rome in consequence of these disputes, in the course of which many lives were lost on both sides; but, as long as M. Antonius allowed Dolabella to go on with impunity, his party was likely to prevail in the contest. But the Senate called upon the master of the horse to exert his power for the preservation of the public peace; and it was rumoured that he was made acquainted at this time with a criminal intercourse subsisting between Dolabella and some female friend or relation of his own.[3] This private injury made him more willing to listen to the Senate's call: he brought troops into the city and when the populace broke out into a riot in support of Dolabella's laws, he chastised them with great severity, and is said to have put no fewer than eight hundred of the rioters to the sword.[4] The present masters of the commonwealth, although at the beginning of their career they professed to espouse the popular party, had now obtained a power which enabled them to cast off their old connections; and declared, by their conduct, that it was to the swords of a disciplined army, and not to the uncertain favour of a tumultuous populace, that they were resolved to own their ascendency.

Disturbances caused by P. Dolabella in his Tribuneship.

B.C. 47.

Yet at this very time the obedience of the army itself was beginning to waver. Antonius, while indulging in every excess himself, connived, it is probable, at many irregularities in the conduct of the soldiers; and the other officers,[5] from a wish to gain popularity, or from the natural relaxation consequent upon victory, permitted the discipline of the troops to be seriously impaired. It was known that Cæsar intended to transport his veteran legions into Africa, as soon as the affairs of the East should leave him at liberty; and the soldiers were highly dissatisfied at finding that they were to be exposed to another campaign,[6] while no mention was heard of fulfilling the promises which had been made to them on former occasions. They

Discontent in Cæsar's army in Italy.

Dion Cassius, lib. xlii. p. 198. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xi. epist. xxii.
[2] Cicero, *Philippic.* vi. c. 4. [3] Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 9
[4] Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxiii. [5] *Auctor de Bell. Alexand.* c. 65.
[6] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xi. epist. xx. xxii.

confirmed one another in their resolutions not to leave Italy till their previous claims were satisfied; and when P. Sylla, an officer of high rank,[1] who had commanded the right wing of Cæsar's army at Pharsalia, endeavoured to pacify them, the soldiers of the twelfth legion assailed him with stones, so that he narrowly escaped with his life. Several other persons experienced the same treatment, and some individuals of Prætorian dignity are said to have been actually murdered by the mutineers.[2] Intelligence of these disorders quickened Cæsar's wish to return to Italy. He had at last, about the middle of the year B. C. 48, brought the war in Egypt to a conclusion, by placing Cleopatra and her younger brother on the throne,[3] as the elder Ptolemy had perished in the course of the contest. From Egypt he had marched into Syria, and thence to Cilicia and Cappadocia—arranging on his way the affairs of those several Provinces, receiving the submissions of all the petty princes or chiefs dependent on the Roman Empire, and continuing them in their respective governments on such conditions as he judged proper. These matters were easily and quickly settled; but Pharnaces, King of the Bosporous, was likely to occasion a longer yet an unavoidable delay. It was the boast of the Romans never to allow a foreign power to take advantage of their domestic quarrels; and it would have reflected disgrace on Cæsar had he suffered Pharnaces to enjoy his late conquest without molestation, from his eagerness to prosecute his own private contest with his countrymen. Accordingly he called upon Pharnaces to evacuate Pontus without delay; and finding, according to the statement of his anonymous partisan,[4] that his demands were evaded, because it was well known how anxious he was to return to Italy, he marched instantly in quest of the enemy. Pharnaces was at this time encamped near Zela,[5] a town of Pontus, on the spot on which his father had gained one of his most famous victories over the Romans; and when Cæsar arrived and encamped at no great distance from him, his confidence in the fortune of the place, and in his own recent successes, induced him to attack the Roman army in the strong position which it had occupied. His rashness was quickly punished by a total defeat; he himself fled from the field of battle with only a few horsemen, and the whole of Pontus was lost by this single blow. Cæsar, unusually delighted at this rapid and most seasonable conquest, left two legions to secure Pontus, and himself hastened on his way towards Italy; still however, as before, employing the time on his journey in settling the affairs of the provinces, and accustoming the petty Asiatic princes to look upon the government of Rome as already become mon-

B.C. 47.

Cæsar leaves Egypt.

He passes through Syria and Cilicia.

He defeats Pharnaces and recovers the province of Pontus.

[1] Cicero, lib. xi. epist. xxi. xxii.
[2] Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 51. Dion Cassius, lib. xlii. p. 209.
[3] *Auctor de Bell. Alexand.* c. 33–65, *et seq.*
[4] Ibid. c. 71. [5] Ibid. c. 72, *et seq.*

B.C. 47. archical. It was late in the year,[1] according to the corrupt Calendar of the period, when he arrived in the capital, and there proceeded to exercise that sovereign authority with which his office of Dictator, and still more the swords of his soldiers, had invested him.

His acts of spoliation and wanton display of power.

M. Antonius, on his return to Italy after the battle of Pharsalia,[2] had published an edict by Cæsar's express orders, forbidding all the fugitives of the vanquished party to set foot in Italy without having received their pardon from Cæsar himself. In this manner multitudes of distinguished citizens were condemned to live in banishment; but their property was not in every instance confiscated, and some were afterwards allowed, as we shall see hereafter, to return to their country. The rapacity of the conqueror, however, had been abundantly gratified in the eastern provinces, where he had amassed immense sums,[3] partly by imposing fines on those princes or States who had supported the cause of the commonwealth, partly by the direct plunder of their wealthiest temples, and partly by receiving a price for the grants or titles which he gave or confirmed to any city or individual. But the demands of the approaching campaign in Africa could not be answered without further exactions; and although he had a very considerable fund in the numerous golden crowns, figures, and other articles, which were presented to him from every quarter through fear or flattery, he deemed it expedient, on his arrival in Italy, to raise money to a large amount by compulsory loans from different cities as well as from private individuals; and at the same time he proceeded to confiscate and expose to public sale the property of some of his most distinguished opponents,[4] which Antonius had not ventured to touch by his own authority. It was on this occasion that the house and furniture of Pompey the Great were set up to auction by the command of his father-in-law; and that Antonius, amidst the general grief and indignation of the Roman people, became their purchaser. At this time also, if we may believe Dion Cassius,[5] Cæsar made some additional regulations in favour of insolvent debtors, and actually enforced the proposed law of Dolabella, for relieving tenants from rent for one year, in all cases where the rent amounted to five hundred denarii, or about £15 12s. 6d. His chief partisans were rewarded by being appointed to various public offices, of which he assumed the complete disposal; and, as a cheap method of gratifying the vanity of some of his associates, he conferred the empty title of Consuls, for the short remainder of the year, on Q. Fufius Calenus, his late lieutenant in Achaia, and on P. Vatinius, who had rendered him most important services in

Rewards his partisans.

[1] Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 51.
[2] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xi. epist. vii.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xlii. p. 208. Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 54.
[4] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 26, *et seq.*
[5] Lib. xlii. p. 209.

Illyricum. The prostitution of a dignity so respected excited a general disgust; and in this open assumption of absolute power he already betrayed the same contempt for the feelings of his countrymen, which afterwards, when exhibited with still greater aggravation, contributed principally to the fatal conspiracy of the Ides of March. But amongst all this distribution of honours and benefits, the veteran legions found that they were still to trust only to promises; and that the period when they should obtain their discharge, and be rewarded with settlements of lands, was still far distant. Aware of their own importance on the eve of another campaign, but not sufficiently appreciating the able and resolute character of their commander, they broke up from their quarters in Campania,[1] and advanced to Rome, committing various excesses on their march, and filling the country and the Capital with terror. When they arrived before the city, Cæsar allowed them to enter the walls, retaining only their swords, and instantly presented himself before them in the Campus Martius, and demanded why they had left their quarters, and what they wanted at Rome. They replied that they were come to claim their release from any further service; upon which Cæsar answered, without any apparent reluctance, that their claim was reasonable, and that he would discharge them instantly, assuring them at the same time that all their comrades who had served their full term of years should be discharged in the same manner, and promising still to give them the settlements in lands which he had before allowed them to look for. The soldiers were not prepared for this treatment, and in proportion to his seeming readiness to part from them, their wish to continue in his service revived. Cæsar perceived his advantage, and persisted in giving them their discharge, expressing particularly his surprise and sorrow to find the soldiers of his favourite tenth legion implicated in this meeting. At last on their repeated entreaties to be forgiven, he said that he would retain them all except the tenth legion; nor could he be prevailed on to receive that legion into his favour,[2] so that it followed him to Africa without his orders, from the mere zeal of the soldiers to do something that might entitle them to pardon. After all, he punished those who had been most active in the mutiny, by depriving them of a third part of their share of the plunder gained in Africa, and of the lands which he afterwards bestowed on his army; some also he actually discharged at once, and settled them in different parts of Italy; and others, it is said, he found means to employ in the most dangerous services in the ensuing campaign,[3] and thus freed himself from their turbulence, while he made their deaths useful by occasioning a loss to his enemies.

B.C. 47.

Mutiny of his army.

He quells it by his firmness and address.

Having thus re-established his authority over his legions, he pro-

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlii. p. 209, 210. Appian, *de Bello Civili*, lib. ii. c. 92, *et seq.*
[2] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 70.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xlii. p. 211.

B.C. 47. Campaign in Africa.

ceeded with his usual activity to carry the war into Africa. He arrived at Lilybæum in Sicily,[1] on the seventeenth of December, and having waited there till he had assembled a force of six legions, and about two thousand cavalry, he embarked from Sicily on the twenty-seventh, and reached the coast of Africa on the thirtieth. He landed near Adrumetum with no more than three thousand men; the rest of his forces having been dispersed in different directions on their passage; and as he knew not what points of the coast might be least occupied by the enemy, he had been unable before his departure from Sicily to appoint any particular spot, as the place of destination for the whole armament. Finding Adrumetum too strongly garrisoned to be attacked with any hope of success, he put his troops in motion again on the first of January, and on the evening of that day halted at Ruspina, from whence he again set out on the following morning, and approached Leptis. The inhabitants of that town sent to offer their submission to him, and he accordingly occupied the gates with a guard, and having given strict orders that no other soldiers should be allowed to enter the walls, he encamped for the night in the neighbourhood of Leptis, and was joined on that very evening by a part of his army from Sicily, which had put in by a fortunate accident at this very point of the coast. On the third of January he returned to Ruspina; and there remained for some time, having collected considerable supplies of provisions from the adjacent country, and having received a large accession of strength by the arrival of another division of the troops from Lilybæum. But his numbers were as yet very inferior to those of the enemy, and he could not depend for the permanent subsistence of his army on the resources of a country which was almost entirely possessed by his opponents. He waited therefore anxiously for the arrival of additional reinforcements, as well as of supplies of provisions from Sicily, Sardinia, and other parts of the Empire;[2] whilst he secured himself for the present by bestowing extraordinary care on the fortifications of his camp, and by carrying lines from this and from the town of Ruspina down to the seashore, in order that ships might approach the land with safety, and that the succours of whatever kind, which might be contained in them, might reach his camp without molestation.

Forces of Scipio and Cato.

It appears that the supporters of the commonwealth had by this time organized a very large army in Africa; and that their navy, although not possessing the command of the sea so exclusively as during the campaign in Greece, was yet strong enough to cause great annoyance to the enemy, and during Cæsar's absence in Egypt had made descents on the coasts of Sicily and Sardinia,[3] and

[1] *Auctor de Bell. Africano*, c. 1, *et seq.*
[2] Ibid. c. 20.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xlii. p. 211.

had carried off from them severals vessels, and a considerable quantity of arms. While Italy was suffering under the misrule of Antonius, and Rome itself was distracted by the turbulent Tribuneship of Dolabella, it was expected that Scipio and Cato would transport their forces from Africa, and avail themselves of so fair an opportunity for regaining possession of the seat of Government.[1] But we must suppose that they had not yet collected an army sufficient to encounter Cæsar's veteran legions; and perhaps the want of arms for their regular infantry was a principal obstacle to such an attempt. With cavalry and light troops they were abundantly provided; for the Numidians of the Roman province were admirably calculated for those services, and to them was added the whole force of the Kingdom of Mauritania, which Juba furnished to the cause of the commonwealth. Utica, the most considerable city in Africa, was held by M. Cato;[2] and he had made it a great magazine of arms and provisions, as well as a depot for the new levies which he was constantly forming to reinforce the main army in the field. That army was commanded by Scipio, with the title of Proconsul; and although the military talents of the general-in-chief were not very highly distinguished, yet Labienus and Petreius, his principal lieutenants, were officers of great experience and ability. B.C. 47.

In landing on the coast of Africa with a force very inferior to that of his opponents, Cæsar may be supposed to have had two objects in view: first, to prevent the enemy from carrying the war into Italy, and to preserve his usual character of being always the assailant; and, secondly, to deprive them by his presence of some part of the resources of the Province, of which otherwise they would have had the complete disposal. His great renown as a general, his success in other parts of the empire, and that character of the lawful representative of the Roman people which he derived from the possession of the capital, gained him immediately some partisans among the cities and tribes of Africa,[3] and thus produced at once a diversion in his favour. Yet soon after his first landing he was severely harassed by the attacks of the enemy's cavalry under Labienus and Petreius; and, had Juba united his forces to those of Scipio, their combined efforts might have been too overwhelming for Cæsar to resist. He was saved from this danger by an unexpected interference. P. Sitius, of Nuceria, had been in his early life engaged in money transactions on a very extensive scale,[4] not only with many persons in different parts of the empire, but also with some foreign princes, and amongst the rest with the King of Mauritania, the father of Juba. The sums embarked in these various speculations were not always easily to be recovered:

Difficulties of Cæsar at the opening of the campaign.

Diversion made by P. Sitius in his favour. Adventures of Sitius.

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xi. epist. xv.
[2] *Auctor de Bello Africano*, c. 22, 36. Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 58.
[3] *Auctor de Bell. Africano*, c. 7. 32, 33.
[4] Cicero, *pro P. Syllâ* c. 20.

B.C. 47. Sitius had incurred heavy debts at Rome, which brought him into the society of dissolute and desperate men, and had made him acquainted with L. Catiline and his associates at the eve of their memorable conspiracy. Whether he himself entered into their schemes is uncertain. It appears that he went about that period to Africa, professedly to settle some business with the King of Mauritania, but, as many asserted,[1] to employ his influence with that prince in levying an armed force against the commonwealth. However, his innocence or his good fortune saved him from the fate of the other conspirators, and Cicero himself, while defending P. Sylla from the same charge of having been Catiline's accomplice, took occasion equally to deny the accusation against Sitius. But he was a man of ruined fortunes, and it seems that he was afterwards brought before the tribunals for some private offence,[2] and was obliged to go into exile. He repaired again to Africa, with an armed force, which he had raised in Italy and Spain, and which it seems could easily be collected by any adventurer of notoriety, while every part of the empire was full of slaves and other needy and desperate persons, to whom all change was gain. Thus accompanied, Sitius appeared in Africa, like one of the chiefs of the free companies in Italy during the fourteenth century; and sold his services to the highest bidder in the constant petty wars which the wild tribes and barbarian sovereigns of that country were carrying on against one another. His fame soon became great, for the party which he espoused was always victorious; and if the King of Mauritania was slow in paying his debt to him, we may the less wonder that he readily associated himself with those inferior chiefs who were constantly engaged in predatory warfare with that more powerful sovereign. In this way he was closely united with a prince of the name of Bogud, according to Roman orthography, at the time that Cæsar landed in Africa. By attacking Juba, Sitius might hope to gain far more than plunder, or the pay of a poor barbarian chief—he might obtain the repeal of his banishment, and expect besides a splendid reward from the sovereign of the Roman Empire for a service so seasonably rendered to him. Bogud himself had before shown himself friendly to Cæsar,[3] probably because Juba supported the party of Pompey; and now when Juba was on his march to join Scipio with a considerable army, Bogud and P. Sitius attacked his kingdom,[4] took Cirta, one of his principal cities, and committed such ravages in his country, that he was obliged to return with his whole force to oppose them, and even to recall the troops which he had before sent to serve under the Roman general, his ally. Meanwhile Cæsar was reinforced by the arrival of two

He unites with Bogud.

[1] Sallust, *de Bello Catilinar.* c. 21. Cicero, *pro Syllâ, ubi supra.*
[2] Appian, *de Bello Civili,* lib. iv. c. 54. Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 214.
[3] *Auctor de Bell. Alexandrino,* c. 59.
[4] Ibid. *Africano,* c. 25.

veteran legions from Sicily;[1] and when at length Juba yielded to Scipio's pressing applications, and came to join him, leaving one of his generals to contend with Bogud and Sitius,[2] the decisive moment was already passed, and Cæsar's army was now too formidable to be seriously injured by any force which Juba could bring against it. B.C. 47.

From this time the event of the campaign might be looked for with little hesitation. Cæsar was soon after reinforced by two more of his veteran legions, the ninth and tenth; and he was anxious, as before in Greece, to bring the enemy to a general action as soon as possible. But his situation now was very different from what it had been in his campaign against Pompey. Then he was opposed to a general of talents far less disproportioned to his own, and of reputation equal or even superior; the fleets of his adversaries commanded every sea, and cut off all hope of supplies and reinforcements; and the army of the commonwealth was as yet unvanquished, and under the command of its great leader was daily gaining fresh strength and confidence. At present, he was continually receiving deserters from the enemy's army,[3] and offers of submission and assistance from the towns of the province and of Mauritania: the regular infantry of his opponents was utterly unable to resist his veteran legions; and the only annoyance which he experienced was from their superior cavalry and light troops, whose attacks became daily less alarming as his soldiers grew more familiar with them, and better understood how to oppose them most effectually. Scipio, indeed, carefully avoided a battle; but the rapidity of Cæsar's movements, and the extraordinary celerity with which his troops were accustomed to construct works of every description, at last obliged him to depart from his system of caution. On the fourth of April Cæsar gained a march upon his antagonists by night,[4] and appeared on the following morning before the town of Thapsus, a place which had shown peculiar attachment to Scipio's cause, and which was at this time defended by a strong garrison. Without loss of time, Cæsar began to form lines of circumvallation, and to occupy every important post in the neighbourhood so effectually, that when Scipio arrived to protect the town, he found his communications with it already cut off. Under these circumstances, Scipio, unwilling to abandon so important a place to its fate, prepared to form his camp on a spot upon the seashore, from which he hoped to obstruct the operations of the enemy; and whilst he was employed in the construction of the rampart and ditch, he drew out his army in order of battle, to cover the parties engaged in the work. In this situation he was attacked by Cæsar, and completely defeated. His troops first fled to the camp, which was as yet unfinished, and, this being forced,

Increase of Cæsar's force.

Battle of Thapsus. B.C. 46.

[1] *Auctor de Bell. Africano.* c. 34.
[2] Ibid. c. 48.
[3] Ibid. c. 52. 56, 72.
[4] Ibid. c. 79. *et seq.*

B.C. 47. they hastened to the camp they had left the day before, in the hope of being enabled there to make a stand. But finding no officer to rally them, if we may believe the statement of Cæsar's partisan, they fled, as a last resource, towards the camp of Juba, which was at some distance from that of Scipio; but which they now found equally in possession of the victorious enemy. Despairing of any further resistance, the fugitives halted on a neighbouring hill, laid down their arms, and implored quarter. But Cæsar's soldiers, with the ferocity natural to men who respected no law, and who felt that their swords were disposing of the empire of the world, not only massacred the whole of this defenceless multitude, but wounded and murdered several persons of distinction who were present in their own army, against whom they had some supposed grounds of offence. Cæsar himself was an eye-witness of this butchery, which, according to his partisan's narrative, he in vain endeavoured to prevent. Such a scene might have taught him to what a brutal and unmanageable power he had subjected his country; but the crimes of his soldiers were forgotten in the splendour of their victory, by which the campaign was irrecoverably decided. The news of the battle spread rapidly in every direction, with an effect as powerful as the tidings of the rout of Pharsalia two years before. Scipio, with three or four other superior officers, escaped by sea from the scene of their defeat, in the hope of finding an asylum in Spain.[1] They were driven by contrary winds into the port of Hippo, where they were surrounded by a superior naval force, employed, as we are told, in the service of the fugitive P. Sitius. Scipio's ship was instantly boarded, and he killed himself to avoid falling into the hands of the enemy. The officers who were with him, amongst whom we find the noble name of L. Manlius Torquatus, either followed his example or were put to death. Of the other generals of the vanquished party, Labienus effected his escape into Spain with Atius Varus and Cn. Pompeius, who, during the late campaign, had both held commands by sea. Juba, accompanied by Petreius, fled to his own dominions;[2] but finding that the forces which he had left to protect them had been totally defeated by Bogud and P. Sitius, and being shut out of Zama, his capital, by his own subjects, who wished to make their peace with the conqueror, he continued his flight to one of his country houses, and there Petreius and he resolved to die by each other's hands. But Juba having easily killed Petreius, and having attempted without effect to stab himself, persuaded one of his own slaves to become his executioner. The fate of Petreius was soon shared by L. Afranius, his former colleague in the command of Pompey's army in Spain. Afranius, with Faustus Sylla,[3] while attempting to reach Spain along the northern

Deaths of Scipio, Juba, Afranius, and Petreius.

[1] *Auctor de Bell. Africano*, c. 96. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxiv.
[2] Ibid. 91, 94.
[3] Ibid. c. 95. Florus, lib. iv. c. 2. Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 219.

coast of Africa, fell, together with the wife and children of the latter, B.C. 46. into the hands of P. Sitius. They were soon after killed, according to Suetonius and Dion Cassius, by Cæsar's orders; but the statement of Cæsar's partisan attributes their death to a disturbance in the army, and the violence of the soldiers. The wife of Faustus, who was a daughter of Pompey, was spared, together with her children, and the enjoyment of all her property was granted to her.

Cato attempts in vain to defend Utica.

Intelligence of the battle of Thapsus was brought to Utica by a party of Scipio's cavalry, who were flying from the action under the command of Afranius.[1] With the usual temper of a defeated and desperate army, these fugitives began to revenge themselves for their defeat by plundering and murdering many of the citizens of Utica, who were supposed to be attached to the cause of Cæsar. M. Cato alone, with a spirit unbroken amidst the disasters of his party, in vain endeavoured to give their feelings a better direction, by persuading them to defend the town against the enemy; and when he saw that they could not be induced to do their duty, he distributed a sum of money to every soldier amongst them, to prevail on them to depart without committing any further excesses. They thus pursued their retreat along the coast on their way to Spain, as we have already mentioned; and in the meantime numerous parties of the vanquished army arrived in Utica, with all of whom Cato was earnest in his efforts to induce them to continue the contest, and to maintain the place. But when he found that their minds were possessed by an overwhelming panic, he furnished them with all the ships in the harbour to convey them wherever they wished to go; and recommended his son and his other friends to the intercession of L. Cæsar, his Quæstor, who, as being related to the conqueror, might be supposed to possess some influence with him. His anxiety, however, for the safety of those about him appears less amiable when we find him too proud to accept for himself that mercy which he wished to procure for them, and resisting with passionate violence the solicitations of his son, that he would consent to live for his sake. When the evening came he retired to his own apartment,[2] and employed himself for some time in reading one of Plato's *Dialogues*, endeavouring, it is said, to lull the suspicions of his friends by seeming to take a lively interest in the fate of those who were escaping by sea from Utica, and by sending several times to the seaside to learn the state of the wind and of the weather. But towards morning, when all was quiet, he stabbed himself. He fell from his bed with the blow, and the noise of his fall immediately brought his son and his servants into the room, by whose assistance he was raised from the ground, and an attempt was made to bind up the wound. Their efforts to save him were vain; for Cato no sooner had recovered his self-possession, than he tore

He kills himself.

[1] *Auctor de Bell. Africano*, c. 87, *et seq.*

[2] Plutarch, *in Catone*, c. 70.

B.C. 46. open the wound again in so effectual a manner that he instantly expired.

Such was the end of a man whom a better philosophy, by teaching him to struggle with his predominant faults instead of encouraging them, would have rendered truly amiable and admirable. He possessed the greatest integrity and firmness; and, from the beginning of his political life, was never swayed by fear or interest to desert that which he considered the cause of liberty and justice. He is said to have foreseen Cæsar's designs long before they were generally suspected; but his well-known animosity against him rendered his authority on the subject less weighty; and his zeal led him to miscalculate the strength of the commonwealth, when he earnestly advised the Senate to adopt those measures which gave Cæsar a pretence for beginning hostilities. During the civil war, he had the rare merit of uniting to the sincerest ardour, in the cause of his party, a steady regard to justice and humanity; he would not countenance cruelty or rapine because practised by his associates or coloured with pretences of public advantage. But the pride and coarseness of mind, of which we have already given some instances in his behaviour to his private friends, overshadowed the last scene of his life, and led him to indulge his selfish feelings by suicide, rather than live for the happiness of his family and friends, and mitigate, as far as lay in his power, the distressed condition of his country. His character, however, was so pure, and, since Pompey's death, so superior to all the leaders engaged with him in the same cause, that even his enemy's partisans could not refuse him their respect and praise; and his name has become a favourite theme of panegyric in after times, as the most upright and persevering defender of the liberties of Rome.

Character of Cato.

Cæsar, meantime, was advancing from Thapsus towards Utica,[1] and had occupied, without resistance, on his march, the towns of Uceta and Adrumetum, in both of which he found considerable magazines of arms and provisions. As he drew near to Utica, he was met by L. Cæsar, who implored his mercy; and to whom, says his partisan, he readily granted it, according to his natural temper and habits of clemency. At the same time he spared the lives of Cato's son and a number of other individuals who threw themselves on his mercy; but he levied heavy fines on those Roman merchants and citizens of other descriptions who had formed Cato's Council, and had contributed money to the cause of the commonwealth. He imposed also large contributions on the inhabitants of Leptis, Adrumetum, and Thapsus;[2] and sold by auction the property of Juba, and of all the Roman citizens resident in Mauritania who had borne arms in his service; after which he reduced his kingdom to the form of a Roman province, and entrusted the government of it to C. Sallustius Crispus

End of the war in Africa

[1] *Auctor de Bell. African.* c. 89. [2] Ibid. c. 97.

the historian, with the title of Proconsul. On the other hand, Cæsar B.C. 47. bestowed rewards on the people of Zama, for having excluded their Sovereign from their walls; and divided the territories of another Mauritanian Prince, who had been Juba's ally, between Bogud and P. Sitius.[1] Having thus brought the war in Africa to a conclusion, he embarked at Utica on the thirteenth of June, and sailed to Sardinia, there to impose fresh fines, and to order confiscations against some towns and individuals that had assisted the party of his adversaries. He sailed from Sardinia again on the twenty-ninth of June, and, after a tedious voyage of eight and twenty days,[2] arrived at Rome about the twenty-seventh of July, or, according to the true calculation, about the end of May.

From the date of Cæsar's return to Africa to his assassination there is a period of somewhat less than two years; and even of this short time nine months were engrossed by the renewal of the war in Spain, which obliged him to leave Rome once more, and contend for the security of his power at the point of the sword. He enjoyed the sovereignty, therefore, which he had so dearly purchased, during little more than one single year—from the end of July, B.C. 46, to the middle of the winter, a period of between seven and eight months, owing to the reformation of the calendar which he introduced during this interval; and again, from October, B.C. 45, to the Ides of March in the following spring. After giving this outline of the order of events, we shall, first, briefly notice the disturbances in Spain, and in other parts of the Empire, by which the tranquillity of Cæsar's sovereignty was interrupted; and shall then endeavour to present our readers with a general view of the nature of his government, and of the internal state of Rome under his dominion; which last subject will naturally lead us to trace the origin of the conspiracy formed against him, and to follow it up to the moment of its fatal termination.

Renewal of the civil war in Spain by Scapula and Cn Pompeius.

The condition of Spain had become far from tranquil before the conclusion of the campaign in Africa. Cnæus Pompeius, who, as we have mentioned, was invested with a naval command, had been invited thither by some of the Spanish cities,[3] which had taken part in the resistance offered to Q. Cassius, Cæsar's lieutenant, and whose inhabitants were apprehensive that their conduct, though not hitherto noticed, must necessarily have excited Cæsar's resentment. Accordingly Cn. Pompeius sailed from Africa to the barbarian islands,[4] and succeeded in making himself master of them; but, being seized with an illness, he was detained there till after the defeat and death of Scipio, and the conclusion of the African campaign. When the

[1] Appian *de Bell. Civil.* lib. iv. c. 54.
[2] *Auctor de Bell. African.*, c. 98.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 228.
[4] Ibid. *Auctor de Bell. Africano*, c. 23.

B.C. 47. tidings of Cæsar's victory arrived in Spain, the party which had invited Pompeius to be their leader, finding that he was still delayed by sickness, resolved to seek out another chief; and for this purpose they fixed on T. Annius Scapula,[1] a man of great rank and influence in the province, and who had been deeply concerned in the opposition against the authority of Q. Cassius. His own slaves and freedmen were a numerous body, and with them he first took up arms; but his adherents daily became more formidable, being swelled partly by the accession of Roman and native soldiers from Spain itself, and partly by the fugitives from Africa, who sought his standard as their last refuge. At length Pompeius himself appeared, and was acknowledged as commander-in-chief of the whole assembled force. The popularity of his name gained him the zealous support of the Spaniards; and soldiers resorted to him from every quarter of the empire, as if it were reserved for the son of Pompey to revenge the fate of his father and of the commonwealth. Cæsar's lieutenants, to whom he had intrusted the government of Spain, were unable to withstand the progress of the enemy; and Cæsar himself was obliged to suspend his labours for the civil administration of the empire, and once more appear at the head of an army.

Cæsar leaves Rome, and goes into Spain.

He set out from Rome, as has been already observed, about the end of the year; and exerting his accustomed activity, he is said to have arrived at Obulco,[2] near Corduba, in the province of Farther Spain, in twenty-seven days from the time of his leaving the capital. His presence, as usual, encouraged those cities which still remained faithful to him, and restrained those which were inclining to the enemy. The troops which he found in Spain, added to those which followed him from Italy, formed an army superior to that of the enemy in the quality of its infantry, and in the numbers of its cavalry; and Cæsar, therefore, as in his former campaigns, was anxious to bring on a general action; and in order to accomplish this, whilst he was advancing his own cause at the same time in other respects, he employed himself in laying siege to some of the towns that were garrisoned by his opponents. In this manner he besieged and took Alegua, and one or two other places;[3] till Cn. Pompeius, unwilling to discourage his partisans by appearing unable to offer any resistance to his enemy's enterprizes, and having persuaded himself that the soldiers in Cæsar's present army were no longer the same veterans who had conquered at Pharsalia or at Thapsus, was induced to offer battle in the neighbourhood of Munda. He disposed his army, however, upon ground so defensible by nature,[4] and his soldiers conducted themselves so bravely, that

Battle of Munda, 7th March, B.C. 45.

[1] *Auctor de Bell. Alexandrino*, c. 55. *De Bell. Hispaniensi*, c. 33. Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. ix. epist. xiii.

[2] Strabo, lib. iii. p. 169, edit. Xyland.

[3] *Auctor de Bell. Hispan.* c. 6, *et seq.*

[4] Ibid. c. 29, *et seq.*

the first attack of the enemy was vigorously repelled; and, it is said, B.C. 47. that Cæsar dismounted from his horse, and by offering to expose his life as a common soldier in the front of the line, at last, with difficulty, rallied his men, and retrieved the fortune of the day.[1] The victory, though hardly won, was complete and decisive. Labienus and Atius Varus were killed in the field, and Cn. Pompeius was wounded, but effected his escape in a litter to Carteia. From thence, mistrusting the fidelity of the inhabitants, he endeavoured to withdraw by sea to a safer refuge;[2] but being pursued by a squadron of Cæsar's, and being surprised at the very moment when his ships had put in to shore to obtain fresh supplies of water, his vessels were all taken or burnt, and he was obliged once more to pursue his flight by land. He at first attempted to defend himself with the aid of a few followers who still remained with him, on one of the strong positions which the country afforded; but when his pursuers began to construct regular works, under cover of which they might gain a footing on the high ground occupied by his party, he was forced to fly, and his men began to disperse on every side. His wound disabled him from escaping on foot, and the country was impracticable for a carriage, or even for a horse; so that concealment was his only remaining chance of safety, and he took shelter in a cavern, in one of the wild and lonely glens among the mountains, such as have afforded a sure protection to the fugitives of a vanquished or oppressed party in various periods of Spanish history. But he was discovered by the information of some prisoners whom the enemy had taken, and was slaughtered in his place of refuge. His head was cut off, and presented to Cæsar, who, at that very moment, was entering Hispalis in triumph; and this bloody trophy being instantly, by his orders, exhibited to the multitude, informed them that the ruin of Pompey's cause was complete. Scapula had put an end to his own life a short time before at Corduba,[3] and Sex. Pompeius, the younger son of Pompey the Great, having fled from the same place on the news of the battle of Munda, sought a refuge amongst the Iaccetani or Lacetani,[4] one of the tribes of Hither Spain, who lived between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, in what is now a part of Navarre and Arragon. More fortunate



Death of Cn. Pompeius.

[Sextus and Cneius Pompey, sons of Pompey the Great.]

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 82.
[2] *Auctor de Bell. Hispan.* c. 37, 38, 39. Vell. Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 88.
[3] *Auctor de Bell. Hispan.* c. 33.
[4] Strabo, lib. iii. p. 170, edit. Xyland. Dion Cassius, lib. xlv. p. 275. Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. iv. c. 83. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xii. epist. xxxvii.

B.C. 47. than his brother, Sex. Pompeius was enabled, by the attachment of the natives, to baffle the vigilance of his pursuers, and soon to commence a predatory warfare, which became more serious after Cæsar's departure from Spain, and gradually assumed the shape of an organized hostility. But for the present he was reduced to the condition of a fugitive; and Cæsar pursued a course of executions and confiscations for some months,[1] till he had destroyed every appearance of regular opposition, and had enriched himself and largely rewarded those towns or tribes which had taken part with him in the late contest. The arrangements necessary to be made of one kind or another, detained him in Spain till the autumn, so that, as we have already observed, he did not return to Rome till the month of October.

The whole of Spain is reduced to submission, and Cæsar returns to Rome.

Disturbances in Syria excited by Cæcilius Bassus.

There was one other part of the Empire in which Cæsar's authority was still disputed, nor was tranquillity ever fully established in it during his lifetime. On his hasty progress from Egypt towards Pontus, when he was preparing to attack Pharnaces, he had conferred the command of the Province of Syria upon Sex. Cæsar,[2] a friend and connection of his own. At this time there was a Roman knight, residing at Tyre, of the name of Q. Cæcilius Bassus,[3] who had served in Pompey's army during the late campaign, and after the battle of Pharsalia had taken refuge in Syria. As belonging to the Equestrian order, he was likely to have been engaged in commerce, and he, probably, had some friends or connections in the great trading town of Tyre, which led him to fix on that place as his asylum. He was an active and enterprising man, and when reports began to be circulated that Cæsar was in a state of great danger and difficulty in Africa,[4] Bassus thought that he saw a favourable opportunity for reviving the cause of Pompey in the east. His command of money enabled him easily to raise soldiers in these times of general disorder, and also to corrupt those of Sex. Cæsar, as different detachments were successively placed in garrison at Tyre: we are told also, that when his military preparations became so notorious as to excite alarm, he satisfied Sex. Cæsar by assuring him that they were intended only to assist Mithridates of Pergamus in taking possession of his Kingdom of the Bosphorus, which Cæsar had bestowed on him



[Tyre.—*Martin and Corbould.*]

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 233.
[2] *Auctor de Bell. Alexandrino*, c. 66.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xlvii. p. 342. Livy *Epitome*, lib. cxiv.
[4] Cicero, *pro Deiotaro*, c. 9. Dion Cassius, *ubi supra*.

as a reward for the services he had rendered him in his Egyptian campaign.[1] Suspicion being thus lulled asleep for the present, Bassus soon afterwards pretended to have received letters from Scipio, announcing the defeat and death of Cæsar in Africa, and bestowing on himself the government of Syria. Accordingly, by virtue of this imaginary commission, he took possession of Tyre; and in a very short time won over to his side the whole army of Sex. Cæsar, whose soldiers, corrupted by the money of his antagonist, murdered him, and then deserted to Bassus. In this manner a private individual, with no other means than the money and influence which he had acquired by his commercial dealings, became master of an army, and of the province of Syria. He fixed his head-quarters at Apamea,[2] a town of remarkable strength, situated on a hill rising out of a level country, and protected partly by the river Orontes, which flows almost round it, and partly by a large tract of marsh or stagnant water, which obstructs the approach of an enemy. It commanded, besides, the resources of a most abundant district, which had long been famous for its wealth and fertility; and there were several other strong fortresses in its neighbourhood, the petty chiefs of which were induced by the money, or by the credit of Bassus, to support him in his enterprise. We are told, too,[3] that the chief of one of the wandering Arab tribes, inhabiting the desert between Syria and the Euphrates, was bribed by promises of high pay to himself and his followers, to offer his services to the same cause; nor did Bassus scruple to call in the more powerful succour of the sovereigns of Parthia, who were naturally glad to foment the internal quarrels of the Romans, and who once or twice relieved Apamea by their sudden appearance, when Bassus was hard pressed by the forces employed by Cæsar against him.[4] Thus there were two private individuals acting a conspicuous part in two different extremities of the Empire, and each indebted for his political importance to the connections with foreign Princes which he had formed in the course of his commercial dealings. We have already noticed the services rendered to Cæsar in Africa by P. Sitius, at the very time that Q. Cæcilius Bassus in Syria was organizing an opposition against him. Other more important occupations prevented Cæsar employing a very considerable force to put him down; and he continued, therefore, to retain possession of Apamea, and to command the troops which had deserted to him from Sex. Cæsar, till C. Cassius, after the death of Cæsar, became the head of the party of the commonwealth in Asia, when the superior fame and rank of Cassius induced the soldiers of Bassus to commit a second act of

B.C. 47.

Pretensions of Bassus.

Keeps possession of Apamea.

[1] *Auctor de Bell. Alexand.* c. 78.
[2] Strabo, lib. xvi. p. 871. Dion Cassius, lib. lxvii. p. 342.
[3] Dion Cassius and Strabo, *locis citatis.*
[4] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. ix.

B.C. 47. desertion, to abandon him, and put themselves under the command of Cassius.[1]

There are few more curious historical records, than that which Evelyn, in his *Memoirs*, has left of the state of England immediately after the great civil war. He gives a journal of an excursion which he made through the midland and northern counties just at that period; and draws a most lively picture of the state of the country and of the towns, and of the marks of havoc and confiscation which naturally attended the decision of so obstinate a contest. But when we would strain our eyes to discover what was the condition of the Roman Empire when the sword was at last sheathed, and the victory of Cæsar was no longer disputed, we are obliged to turn away in disappointment, and can only indulge a vain regret, that the materials for obtaining a really valuable knowledge of ancient history are so exceedingly scanty. We have seen that Spain and Syria were even yet disturbed by the show of actual warfare—that Sex. Pompeius was the chief of a formidable band of plunderers in the one country, while Q. Cæcilius Bassus possessed in the other a strong and important city, and the command of a Roman legion. Before we return to Italy itself, we wish to glean a few facts illustrative of the condition of the other Provinces of the Empire, and to describe the characters of some of the persons to whose care Cæsar had committed them.

Sketch of the state of the different provinces.

The countries on the eastern side of the Adriatic and the Ionian gulf, which had been so lately the principal seat of the civil war, were now governed by P. Vatinius and Ser. Sulpicius. We have already mentioned the services which Vatinius had rendered to Cæsar in Illyricum, when he succeeded A. Gabinius in the management of the war in that Province, and obliged M. Octavius to abandon the contest and withdraw into Africa. He had been rewarded with a titular Consulship during the last three months of the year B.C. 47,[2] and was afterwards appointed to command the Province of Illyricum, as Proconsul. He was continually occupied in reducing the strongholds of the neighbouring Dalmatians,[3] who had taken an active part against Cæsar throughout the late war; and it appears, too, that some Roman officers, who had probably taken refuge in Illyricum after the defeat of Pompey, were carrying on a plundering and desultory warfare, accompanied with all that wanton cruelty which usually marks the last vindictive struggles of a vanquished party in a civil war. Achaia, under which name was included the whole of Greece southward of Thermopylæ, was at this same period under the government of Ser. Sulpicius. Sulpicius, the most distinguished lawyer of his day, had been one of those who remained in Italy when Pompey

Illyricum.

Achaia.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. xii.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. lxii. p. 211.
[3] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. v. epist. x.

first withdrew into Greece, nor had he at any subsequent time been induced to follow him. The neutrality thus observed by a man of his high birth and character was too grateful to Cæsar to pass unrewarded; and when Q. Fufius Calenus returned home, to share the honours of the Consulship with P. Vatinius, Cæsar fixed upon Sulpicius as the most fit person to succeed him in the government of Greece.[1] Such a task was probably not an easy one: there were several distinguished persons who had been involved in the defeat of Pompey,[2] and who were now living in Greece in exile; many again of the Greeks themselves had been forward in opposing Cæsar,[3] and were to pay the penalty of their conduct by the forfeiture of their properties; while the adherents of the victorious party could not, at once, lay aside the license to which the war had accustomed them, and still indulged themselves in frequent acts of lawless violence,[4] which it might not be safe or practicable for Sulpicius to punish. Yet, on the whole, his professional attachment to the laws, and his moderate character, disposed him to alleviate, as far as possible, the sufferings of the people whom he governed; and the state of Greece was, perhaps, enviable, when compared with that of some of the other Provinces of the Empire. B.C. 47.

Condition of Asia.

Of the condition of Asia, little appears to be known; except that the Province, called by that name, was now under the government of P. Servilius Isauricus,[5] who had been Cæsar's colleague in the Consulship in the year B.C. 48, and whom Cicero compliments on his beneficent and equitable administration. Deiotarus,[6] King of Galatia, who had formerly assisted Pompey in the civil war, but after the battle of Pharsalia had endeavoured to appease Cæsar's anger by his active services in the war with Pharnaces, was about this time accused, by his own grandson, of having intended to assassinate Cæsar, when passing through Asia Minor two years before, on his return from Egypt. Although he had been acknowledged as an independent Sovereign by Cæsar himself, yet Deiotarus was obliged to apply to Cicero, with whom he had been long familiarly acquainted, to defend him against this charge, and the cause was tried by Cæsar in his own house. It appears that nothing was determined immediately; and as Cæsar was forming plans for an expedition into Parthia, he may have deferred his judgment on Deiotarus till he should be himself in Asia, and should be able to ascertain more fully what decision would be most conducive to his own interests.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. iv. epist. iii., iv.; lib; vi. epist. vi.

[2] For instance, M. Marcellus, A. Torquatus, Cn. Plancius. Vid. *Ciceron. ad Familiares*, lib. iv. epist. vii., xiv.; lib. vi. epist. 1.

[3] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xiii. epist. xix.

[4] *Magna est gladiorum licentia; sed in externis locis minor, etiam ad facinus verecundia.* Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. iv. epist. ix.

[5] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xiii. epist. lxviii.

[6] Cicero, *pro Deiotaro.*

B.C. 47. Cæsar's late conquests in Africa had been intrusted (as we have already mentioned) to the command of C. Sallustius Crispus the historian.[1] His oppressions and extortions are said to have been carried to such a pitch, that he was more like a plunderer than a Proconsul; and the unfortunate inhabitants, finding the miseries of war succeeded by the tyranny of such a government, must have been amongst the most wretched of all the subjects of the Roman Empire.

Of Africa.

The return of Cæsar from Africa, in the end of July, B.C. 46, was almost immediately followed by his triumphs which he now celebrated in commemoration of his various successes in Gaul,[2] in Egypt, in Pontus, and in Africa. Each of these pageants occupied a separate day, and there was an interval of some days between them, that the interest of the people might be kept alive, and that each might pass off without weariness. In the first triumph, Vercingetorix,[3] who had been made prisoner at the famous siege of Alesia six years before, was led amongst the captives in the procession, and was immediately afterwards put to death. It is mentioned that an accident happened to Cæsar's triumphal chariot on this occasion, by which he was nearly thrown out of it; and so natural is superstition, even to men of the greatest natural abilities, if unenlightened by the knowledge of God, that he was accustomed,[4] ever afterwards, as soon as he had seated himself in any carriage, to repeat a certain form of words three times over, by way of a charm for the security of his journey. The injury which the chariot had sustained rendered it necessary that another should be substituted for it; and the procession was so long delayed, that it was dark before the final ceremony of ascending into the Capitol could take place. But the spectacle lost nothing by this circumstance; for we are told that forty elephants were ranged in order on both sides of the way,[5] supporting, in their trunks, a number of candelabra filled with lights. It seems, however, that the accident of the morning had produced a strong impression on Cæsar's mind; and that, with the feeling so common in ancient times of wishing by a voluntary humiliation to disarm the envy with which the gods were supposed to regard excessive prosperity, he climbed, or rather crawled, up the steps leading to the Capitol upon his knees.[6] In his Egyptian triumph, Arsinoe, the younger sister of Cleopatra, appeared amongst the prisoners, and excited a general feeling of compassion, which, together with Cæsar's fondness for her sister, saved her from sharing the fate of Vercingetorix. The triumph over Pharnaces was rendered remarkable by the display of a banner, with the famous words,

Cæsar's Triumphs.

[1] *Auctor de Bell. African.* c. 85. Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 217.
[2] Livy *Epitome*, lib. cxv. Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 37.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 223.
[4] Pliny, *Hist. Natural.* lib. xxviii. c. 2.
[5] Suetonius, c. 37. [6] Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 224.

"*Veni, Vidi, Vici;*"[1] and we may imagine that Cæsar delighted in representing his victory over the King of Pontus as so easily won, in order to depreciate Pompey's glory as the conqueror of Mithridates. In his African triumph, Juba, the son of the late King of Mauritania,[2] was the most distinguished prisoner; but his life was spared, and he afterwards became an historian of considerable eminence, and recovered his hereditary throne, with an accession of territory, from the favour of Augustus. The civil wars, according to the constant practice of the Romans, could not be the subject of a regular triumph; but, if we may believe Appian,[3] pictures were exhibited in the procession representing the deaths of Scipio, Petreius, and Cato, although their names were not mentioned in the list of conquered enemies, which, as usual, was displayed to the people as a part of the ceremony. Indignation was naturally excited by this indirect glorying at the deaths of some of the most distinguished citizens of the commonwealth; but the splendour of the pageant drove all other considerations, we are told, from the eyes of the multitude;[4] and when they were informed that Cæsar had brought into the treasury, as the fruit of his conquests, a sum exceeding £4,843,750 of our money,[5] few would be disposed to estimate justly the immense price of wickedness and misery at which this plunder had been purchased. B.C. 47.

Largesses to the populace and to the soldiers.

His triumphs were followed by various largesses of provisions and money to the populace; and by a succession of splendid spectacles, which were perhaps equally effectual in winning the affections of the multitude. Magnificent public entertainments were given, and the people were feasted, we are told, at two and twenty thousand tables;[6] besides which every one of the poorer citizens received a certain portion of meat,[7] about two bushels and a-half of corn, ten pounds of oil, and £3 4s. 7d. in money. A year's rent,[8] or possibly a year's house-tax, was also remitted to every person in Rome who paid for his dwelling less than £16 2s. 11d., and to every one in Italy who paid less than £3. 0s. 3¾d.; or possibly the remission to the Italians was now given in addition to that which Cæsar had already given to the Romans, according to Dion Cassius, before he set out for Africa, in the preceding winter.[9] But it is said that he somewhat lessened

[1] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 37.
[2] Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 55. Strabo, lib. xvii. p. 959.
[3] *De Bell. Civil.* lib. ii. c. 101.
[4] Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 223.
[5] Vell. Paterculus, lib. ii.
[6] Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 55.
[7] "Visceratio," *Conf.* Suetonium *in Cæsare*, c. 38.
[8] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 38. Dion Cassius, lib. xlii. p. 209.
[9] It is not quite clear what was the nature of the payment which Cæsar remitted on this occasion. To have deprived all landlords of a year's rent seems a measure more violently iniquitous than Cæsar was likely to have sanctioned; especially as he, or his partisan, represents this very same thing as one of the mischievous pro-

B.C. 47. the effect of these liberalities, by a previous scrutiny and reduction of the number of citizens who were to profit by them; for finding that the list of paupers at Rome,[1] or of persons receiving relief from the distributions of corn issued at the public expense, amounted to three hundred and twenty thousand, he caused this account to be rigorously examined, and diminished by about one-half; providing, moreover, by a law, that no new claimants on the public bounty should be admitted, unless when vacancies in the number now established should be occasioned by death. To his soldiers he gave at the rate of £161 9s. 2d. to each of the common men; £322 18s. 4d. to the Centurions; and £645 16s. 8d. to the military Tribunes.[2] The cavalry are said to have received at the rate of £193 15s. a man. In addition to these presents in money, settlements in land were given to the army; yet we are told that the soldiers were dissatisfied with the rewards conferred on them;[3] and something of real bitterness mingled perhaps with the wild license of the moment, when, as they followed their leader in his triumphal procession, they sang doggerel verses, attacking the infamous profligacy of his youth, reproached him with their miserable fare of roots at Dyrrhachium, and, parodying the sentiment of the Stoics, told him that, if he acted honestly, he would be condemned for his treasons, but if he played the villain, he might win the throne. Already, too, they assumed so much of the self-importance of the guards of a military despot, that they murmured loudly against the extravagance of Cæsar's spectacles; and, if we may believe Dion Cassius, they actually showed symptoms of mutiny, which were only suppressed by the vigour of their chief, in seizing one of them with his own hand, and ordering him to be executed immediately. Yet wiser and better citizens might have joined them in condemning the profusion of the enter-

posals of M. Cælius in his prætorship, brought forward by him at the same time with a law for the general abolition of all debts, which exposed him to the censures of those persons to whom Cæsar had intrusted the administration of the capital. Possibly it was a remission of all rents due to the government, which may have been the proprietor of a large portion of the land occupied by buildings in Rome, as well as in many other towns in Italy. Dion Cassius says, that in consequence of the repeated conflicts which took place between the soldiers of Octavius Cæsar and the citizens, both in Rome and in the other towns of Italy, after the battle of Philippi, in the course of which a great many houses were burnt, there was granted also a remission of rent both in the capital and in the country towns; but he does not say whether this was an act of the government, or an arrangement generally made between the landlords and their tenants, in consideration of the temporary distress of the latter. Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 362.

[1] Suetonius, c. 41. Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 224.

[2] Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. ii. c. 102. The sum here stated appears enormous; yet a natural correction of the text of Suetonius, which in its present state is clearly corrupt, makes his testimony exactly confirm that of Appian; and all parts of the empire had been plundered to furnish Cæsar with the means of enriching his soldiery.

[3] Pliny, lib. xix. c. 8. Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 224, 226. Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 49, 51.

tainments now given to the multitude, and might have recognized B.C. 47.
the invariable policy of tyrants, in the conduct of Cæsar, thus pampering the populace with shows and feastings, while he was plundering and oppressing the rich, the respectable, and the industrious. He had built a Forum, or great square, which was called after his own name, an Amphitheatre, and a Temple in honour of Venus, giving her the epithet of "*Genitrix*," or "the Ancestress," in allusion to the fabled descent of the Julian family from Iulus, the son of Æneas. These various buildings were now to be opened, or consecrated; and this, together with the pretence of paying honours to the memory of his daughter Julia,[1] who had died about eight years before, furnished him with an occasion of gratifying the favourite tastes of the multitude to the utmost. Dramatic entertainments were exhibited in all the different quarters of the city,[2] and were performed in several different languages, for the amusement of the numerous strangers assembled in the capital from all parts of the empire. It was in one of these performances that Dec. Laberius, a Roman knight, and well known as a writer of farces, was forced, at Cæsar's request, to appear as an actor on the stage in one of his own plays; and having thus forfeited his rank by becoming one of a profession which the Romans considered infamous, he recovered it again from Cæsar, as a reward for his condescension, and received besides a large present in money. But the dramatic spectacles were little regarded in comparison with the sports of the Circus, and the Amphitheatre, the combats of gladiators, and the exhibition of the Naumachia. The hunting of different animals was continued during five days: and it is said that the camelopard, or giraffe, was, on this occasion, for the first time, exhibited at Rome.[3] On the last day, a regular engagement took place, in which twenty elephants, thirty horsemen, and five hundred foot soldiers fought on each side; and at another time twenty elephants,[4] mounted with their turrets, and assisted by sixty light-armed soldiers, were opposed to five hundred infantry and twenty horsemen. The combats of gladiators were also on the grandest scale; and, if we may believe Suetonius, Furius Leptinus, a man whose father had been prætor, and Q. Calpenus, a senator, fought in these contests amongst the hundreds of prisoners taken in war, or criminals condemned to die, who in general were the combatants. In like manner, the martial exercise, called the Pyrrhic dance, was performed by the sons of men of the highest rank in the provinces of Asia and Bithynia; and, many of the young Roman nobility appeared as drivers of chariots in the races of the Circus. But the Naumachia, or sea-fight, excited greater admiration than even the combats of the gladiators or of the

Shows of various kinds exhibited to the people.

Dramatic entertainments.


Sports of the Amphitheatre.

Combats of gladiators.

Naumachia, or sea-fight.

[1] Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 55. Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 225.
[2] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 39.
[3] Dion Cassius, *ubi supra*.
[4] Pliny, lib. viii. c. 7.

B.C. 47. elephants. An immense pond or lake was dug near the Tiber, and having been filled with water, ships of war, of different sizes, of which some are said to have been quadriremes, or vessels with four rows of oars, were introduced upon it. Two fleets were formed, one consisting of Egyptians, and the other of Tyrians; and it is said that there were on board of each two thousand rowers,[1] and one thousand fighting men, who engaged with one another, and displayed all the horrors of real warfare. Even the habitual inhumanity of the Romans was shocked, we are told, in some measure, by this enormous



[Pyrrhic Dance.]

and wanton effusion of blood;[2] yet they were much more shocked, it is added, at the thought of the vast sums of money which were thus prodigally expended. Amongst other instances of magnificence, it is mentioned that the whole Forum in which the gladiators fought, together with the whole length of the Via Sacra, was covered over with awnings to protect the spectators from the sun;[3] and some accounts which Dion Cassius had seen, added the incredible circumstance that these awnings were made of silk. Yet, however justly there might have existed a partial and temporary feeling of indignation or disgust at so much prodigality and cruelty, the entertainments were altogether so attractive, that the multitudes which flocked to Rome to witness them were obliged to live in booths or tents, with which they lined the roads near the capital, as well as the principal streets,[4] and many lives were continually lost from the pressure of the crowd—two senators, it is said, perishing amongst the rest in this manner. One circumstance yet remains to be told, in order to

[1] Appian, *de Bell Civil.* lib. ii. c. 102.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 225, 226.
[3] Pliny, lib. xix. c. 1.
[4] Suetonius, c. 30.

complete the picture of these festivities. For some cause, which Dion Cassius could not learn, human sacrifices were judged to be necessary; and, accordingly, two men were offered up in the Campus Martius, by the Pontifices and the priest of Mars.[1] Such were the scenes exhibited in the capital of the civilized world, under the express direction of the sovereign of the empire, himself a man of the highest and most cultivated intellect in his dominions. B.C. 47. Human sacrifices offered in the Campus Martius.

We have called Cæsar the Sovereign of the Empire; for, independently of that actual power which his sword had conferred on him, the Senate, since the tidings of his successes in Africa, had showered upon him all the dignities and offices of the commonwealth. He had been appointed Dictator for ten years,[2] and *Præfectus Morum*, or Superintendent of Public Manners and Morals, with the whole vast authority formerly enjoyed by the Censors, for three years. He was to nominate the other Magistrates, who were before elected by the people; although it appears that he did not avail himself of this power to its full extent, but, with the exception of the Consuls, allowed all other public officers to be appointed half by the tribes, as usual, and half by himself.[3] He was allowed to have his Curule chair in the Senate placed on a level with those of the Consuls, and he was entitled to deliver his opinion before every other person in the debates. To all these were added some of those profane and disgraceful flatteries,[4] which were afterwards so commonly bestowed on the Roman Emperors. His statue, raised upon a figure representing the earth, was placed in the Capitol opposite to the statue of Jupiter, and on it was the inscription, "He is a demigod." Other divine honours were voted to him, either now, or after his return from the campaign

Powers and honours bestowed on Cæsar.



[Remains of the Flaminian Circus.— *Overbeke. Les Restes de L'Ancienne Rome.*]

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 226.
[2] Ibid. p. 220. Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. ix. epist. xv.
[3] Suetonius, c. 41.
[4] Dion Cassius, ibid. Suetonius, c. 76.

B.C 47. against the sons of Pompey, in Spain. His statues were carried, together with those of the gods, in the processions of the Circus, temples and altars were dedicated to him, and priests were appointed to superintend his worship. These things he received with a vanity which affords a striking contrast to the contemptuous pride of Sylla. Cæsar took a pleasure in receiving every token of homage, and in contemplating, with childish delight, the gaudy honours with which he was invested. It was a part of the prize which he had coveted, and which he had committed so many crimes to gain; nor did the possession of real power seem to give him greater delight than the enjoyment of these forced, and therefore worthless, flatteries.

When Sylla had raised himself to the supreme power, there was a definite object before him which he never lost sight of—the depression of the popular party, and the strengthening the Aristocracy; and when he had accomplished these ends, he laid aside his individual Sovereignty, and took his station as the chief of that part of the commonwealth on which he had conferred an absolute ascendency. But Cæsar's policy was entirely selfish: he could not pretend to act for the benefit of the aristocracy, or of the lower orders. There were no grievances in the old Constitution which could be redressed only by his despotism; there had been no offence committed by the Senate and people of Rome which deserved that their liberties should be surrendered into the hands of one profligate individual. Those therefore who draw comparisons between Sylla's proscriptions and Cæsar's clemency, forget the utterly different circumstances in which the two Dictators were placed. Wicked as Sylla's cruelties were, they were a retaliation for former atrocities, or a security for the establishment of the interests of the high aristocratical party at Rome. The Samnites were butchered to maintain the ascendency of the Romans over the Italian allies; the proscription lists were opened to exterminate, if possible, the adherents of the popular faction, who had abetted the violences of Sulpicius and Cinna, and had so lately trampled the nobility under their feet. But after the deaths of Pompey, of Scipio, of L. Domitius, of M. Bibulus, of L. Lentulus, of M. Cato, and of all the most eminent citizens of the commonwealth, whom could Cæsar wish to proscribe? His own wrongs, even if we were to admit his own statement, had been abundantly revenged already: the security of his government could not be ensured by massacres, when every one seemed ready to submit to his power; and if he had wished to get rid of all those whose interests were incompatible with his own, he must have destroyed every free citizen in the Empire. Cæsar's policy was to draw a veil over the past, as far as possible—to conciliate, by an apparent clemency, those whom he held in subjection—and to invest himself, as early as he could, with all the splendour and popularity which attend a prince of commanding abilities ruling over a great Empire.

Contrasted policy of Cæsar and Sylla.

Had he but retained a small military force about his person, to save him from the danger of assassination, there was no probability that his power would ever have been disturbed by any national resistance: he might have died, like Augustus, in a peaceful old age, quietly enjoying the Imperial Crown, and might have transmitted his dominions to his successor, without the intervention of that period of misery which elapsed, between his murder and the final exaltation of his nephew Octavius, after the battle of Actium. B.C. 47.

Distribution of lands to Cæsar's soldiers.

One of the most necessary measures for the security of Cæsar's government, was the granting settlements of lands to his victorious soldiers. He did not wish to plant them all together in any one part of Italy;[1] partly that by being dispersed into different quarters they might be less likely to remember their own power, and attempt to overthrow the throne which they had raised; and partly in order to avoid the odium of expelling a large body of the lawful occupants of the soil in order to make room for them. It was professed that for this purpose Cæsar could find land enough amongst the forfeited estates of the adherents of Pompey, or in those parts of Italy and Cisalpine Gaul which were the property of the commonwealth. But it appears that the Commissioners whom he appointed to manage this business, might extend, with little control, the limits of what they chose to call national or confiscated lands; and thus we find them dividing out the districts of Veii and Capena;[2] threatening the neighbourhood of Tusculum, so that Cicero entertained some fears for the safety of his own villa; seizing on estates in Cisalpine Gaul,[3] which belonged to the corporation of the town of Atella, in Campania; claiming the whole territory of Volaterræ,[4] because Sylla had decreed its confiscation, although it had since been protected by an especial law, passed by Cæsar himself in his first Consulship; and by a still more striking instance of arbitrary power, marking out for distribution a property which had already been sold by public auction under Cæsar's authority,[5] as belonging to an adherent of Pompey; and had been purchased by C. Albinus, a Senator, in the natural confidence that Cæsar would cause the validity of such sales to be religiously observed, inasmuch as his own credit and interest were concerned in maintaining his own acts. But in this manner, at whatever expense of individual oppression and misery, the veterans were provided for; and the favour of the army was conciliated towards a chief, whose sole dependence was on their support, and who had shown himself ready to repay their services with the rewards which they most coveted.

It is not possible to estimate the amount of property forfeited in

[1] Suetonius, c. 38. Dion Cassius, lib. xlii. p. 210. Appian, lib. ii. c. 94.
[2] Cicero, *ad Familiar.* lib. ix. epist. xvii.
[3] Ibid. lib. xiii. epist. vii.
[4] Ibid. lib. xiii. epist. iv.
[5] Ibid. lib. xiii. epist. viii.

B.C. 47. Purchases of forfeited property by Cæsar's adherents.

different parts of the Empire, on account of the support given by its owners to the party of Pompey. At Rome the sales of houses and lands were constantly going on, and as it was naturally considered odious to become a purchaser,[1] monied men of low character, and some of Cæsar's partisans, who cared not for public opinion, were able to buy splendid possessions at a very low price. It is said that M. Antonius,[2] having thus bought the house which had belonged to Pompey, was very unwilling to pay the price of it, presuming that his services to Cæsar entitled him to share in his spoils gratuitously. But Cæsar, on his return from Africa, insisted absolutely on the payment being made; and when Antonius still demurred, he ordered a military guard to take possession of his property. It was now time to give up the plea of right, and to appeal to Cæsar's forbearance, that he would not press for immediate payment; and Cæsar, whose main objection was to the principle on which Antonius had before refused to pay, having no wish to distress so useful an adherent, readily allowed him a longer time to discharge his debt. It does not appear that it was ever paid, for the profligacy of Antonius kept him always poor, and Cæsar did not wish to exasperate him, and to run the risk of offending a large party among his principal officers, by seeming to grudge them any portion of the fruits of his usurpation. We are told that, whilst Cæsar was in Spain,[3] Antonius proceeded as far as Narbo, in Gaul, to join him, but went no further; and after staying there some time returned to Rome, in order to prevent the sale of his property with which he was at that period threatened for his insolvency. During his stay at Narbo,[4] he is said to have communicated with C. Trebonius some design against Cæsar's life; and it was owing to this circumstance that Trebonius afterwards led him aside out of the Senate-house, when Cæsar was assassinated, supposing that he, who had once himself proposed the very same deed, would feel no regret when it was carried into execution. But it is not unlikely that some among the conspirators were actuated by the same motives which had led Antonius to contemplate the murder of Cæsar; and that it was the creditor rather than the tyrant whom they wished to destroy. Be this as it may, the friends of Cæsar seized largely upon the spoils of the defenders of the commonwealth; and although in many instances the property thus gained was speedily dissipated, yet the scandal and the suffering occasioned by these proceedings was great and deplorable.

Sketch of the lives of Cæsar's principal adherents.

We shall take this opportunity of noticing some of those persons who had been Cæsar's principal supporters in the civil war, and who were now raised by his victory to the highest situations in the com-

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xii. epist. iii.
[2] Ibid. *Philippic.* ii. c. 29.
[3] Ibid. c. 30, 31. *Ad Atticum*, lib. xii. epist. xviii.
[4] Ibid. c. 14.

monwealth. Of all these M. Antonius was the most distinguished. B.C. 47.
He has been, necessarily, often mentioned already in the course of M. Antonius.
this history; and we have seen that his flight from Rome, during his Tribuneship, furnished Cæsar with a pretence for commencing his rebellion in the year B.C. 49, that he was afterwards intrusted with the government of Italy during Cæsar's absence in Spain in the same year; that he held a high command in Cæsar's army in the subsequent campaign in Greece; and that, after the battle of Pharsalia, he carried the greatest part of the victorious legions back to Italy, and enjoyed the government of that country for the second time till the return of Cæsar from Egypt in the autumn of B.C. 47. He was then named Master of the Horse to Cæsar in his second Dictatorship; but he did not follow him into Africa, and employed himself, during his stay at Rome, in wasting, amidst the grossest excesses, the property which he had purchased at Cæsar's auctions. Next to Antonius we may rank P. Cornelius Dolabella, Cicero's son-in-law, P. Dolabella.
whose early profligaces and extravagances had led him to join Cæsar at the beginning of his rebellion as the natural patron of men of broken fortunes—who had since fought under him at Pharsalia,[1] had distinguished himself by his revolutionary proceedings when Tribune, during Cæsar's absence in Egypt, and afterwards had gone with him into Africa, and had served under him through the whole of that campaign. On his return to Italy, after Cæsar's final victory, he appears to have lived in a style of great magnificence, and the excellence of his entertainments is recorded by Cicero,[2] who at this time often visited him, and through him, and one or two other friends, maintained a friendly intercourse with the prevailing party. M. M. Æmilius Lepidus.
Æmilius Lepidus is entitled to our notice, more from the elevated situation to which circumstances afterwards raised him, than from any merit or abilities of his own. Having been Prætor at the beginning of the rebellion, he had remained at Rome when the Consuls and the great majority of the Senate left it to follow Pompey;[3] and when Cæsar returned from Spain, towards the end of the year B.C. 49, Lepidus presided at the Comitia, which conferred on him the office of Dictator. For thus giving the sanction of a lawful Magistrate to Cæsar's proceedings, he was rewarded with the government of the Province of Hither Spain,[4] which he retained for two years; and having made himself useful in quieting the disturbances occasioned by the unpopularity of Q. Cassius, he received the honours of a triumph on his return to Rome, and was named Cæsar's colleague in the Consulship for the year B.C. 47. This dignity he was now enjoying; and when Cæsar again set out for Spain, at the

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 30.
[2] *Ad Familiares*, lib. ix. epist. xvi.
[3] Ibid. *ad Atticum*, lib. ix. epist. ix. Dion Cassius, lib. xli. p. 170.
[4] Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 214. *Auctor de Bell. Alexand.* c. 50, 51.

B.C. 48. close of the year, being then invested with the Dictatorship, Lepidus was appointed his Master of the Horse, and was intrusted with the care of the Capital during his absence. The principal partisans of Cæsar are enumerated by Cicero in one of his letters,[1] where we find the names of Pansa, Hirtius, Balbus, Oppius, Matius, and Postumius.

C. Vibius Pansa. C. Vibius Pansa had been Tribune in the year B.C. 43, and being already devoted to the interests of Cæsar, he interposed his negative upon some of the earliest resolutions passed by the Senate,[2] with a view to the appointment of a new Proconsul in the Province of Gaul. We know not how actively he was engaged in the civil war; but it appears that he preserved, through the whole of it, an unblemished character,[3] and so distinguished himself by various acts of kindness and protection towards distressed individuals of the vanquished party, that when he was appointed to succeed M. Brutus in the government of Cisalpine Gaul, in the year B.C. 45, he received from the people, on leaving Rome, the liveliest tokens of their good-will and gratitude.

A. Hirtius. A. Hirtius was also a friend of Cæsar before the civil war broke out, and was with him in Gaul in the year B.C. 48,[4] from whence he was despatched to Rome, to make arrangements with some of Cæsar's partisans in the Capital, and returned to Cæsar immediately after, so that he was probably with him when he first began his rebellion. We hear of him again as residing in Italy in the year B.C. 48,[5] when he, like Dolabella, was famous for the sumptuousness of his table, and flattered Cicero's vanity by coming frequently to receive instructions from him in the art of oratory. He is known as the author of the eighth book of the *Commentaries of Cæsar's Wars in Gaul*;[6] and was by some said to have written also those narratives of the campaigns in Egypt, Africa, and Spain, to which we have so often referred in our account of those events. He also took upon himself to write an invective against Cato in answer to Cicero's panegyric on him;[7] and he is said to have displayed some talent in the work, but to have incurred much greater ridicule, for the evident spirit of flattery to Cæsar by which it was dictated. Both Hirtius and Pansa appeared inclined, after Cæsar's death, to acknowledge the authority of the old Constitution; they were both Consuls together in the year B.C. 43, and both perished in the actions fought at Mutina, when commanding the armies of the commonwealth against the rebellious attempts of M. Antonius. The names of Balbus and Oppius are generally coupled together in

[1] *Ad Familiares*, lib. vi. epist. xii.
[2] Cicero, *ad Familiar.* lib. viii. epist. viii.
[3] Ibid. lib. xv. epist. xvii., xix. *Ad Atticum*, lib. xii. epist. xxvii.
[4] Ibid. *ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. iv.
[5] Ibid. lib. xii. epist. ii. *Ad Familiares*, lib. vii. epist. xxxiii.; lib. ix. epist. xvi., xviii., xx.
[6] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 56.
[7] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xii. epist. xl., xli. xliv., xlv.

Cicero's letters, as if either personal or political friendship had established the closest union between them. L. Cornelius Balbus was a native of Spain, and by birth a citizen of Gades. He distinguished himself in the service of the Roman Government in the war so long carried on against Sertorius, and was rewarded by Pompey with the rights of a Roman citizen.[1] From this period he removed to Rome, where he lived in a style of affluence, and, as it appears, was exposed to some odium on account of his wealth and luxury.[2] He soon became acquainted with Cæsar, to whom, perhaps, his money enabled him to be useful; and his intimacy with him was already firmly established, when Cæsar, after his Prætorship, obtained the Province of the Farther Spain; for we find that Cæsar conferred many kindnesses for his sake on his native city, Gades.[3] When Cæsar was afterwards Consul, Balbus was one of those whom he most warmly patronised; and when his title to the character of a Roman citizen was disputed in a Court of justice, by the instigation, probably, of those who hated him as Cæsar's friend, Crassus, Pompey, and Cicero pleaded for him in his defence. Whilst Cæsar was in Gaul, Balbus occasionally visited him,[4] and found opportunities, we may suppose, of adding to his fortune from the plunder of that country and Britain; for Cicero, in one of his letters,[5] alludes to the gardens and a Tusculan villa of the favourite, as the fruits of Cæsar's friendship. When the civil war broke out, he remained at Rome, and was not required by Cæsar to take any active part in the quarrel,[6] as he was under great obligations to Pompey, and to L. Cornelius Lentulus, then Consul, from whom he had taken his name when he became a Roman citizen. But he was always highly valued by Cæsar, and possessed great influence with him; insomuch, that Cicero relied chiefly on his interest to procure for him the favour of the conqueror after the battle of Pharsalia.[7] He was an Epicurean in principle and in practice, building splendid villas after Cæsar's victory in Africa,[8] and enjoying the gifts of fortune to the uttermost. According to the philosophy which he professed, he seems to have been a selfish but easy tempered man, willing to keep up a friendly intercourse with persons of all parties, and studying to preserve his fortune unhurt through all the political changes which he witnessed. In this object he was fully successful; for after the battle of Philippi he obtained the title of Consul from M. Antonius and Octavius in the year B.C. 40,[9] being the first individual who rose

B.C. 47.

L. Cornelius Balbus.

[1] Cicero, *pro Balbo*, c. 2, 3. [2] Ibid. c. 25. [3] Ibid. c. 19.
[4] Cicero, *Epist. ad Q. Fratrem*, lib. iii. epist. i.
[5] *Ad Atticum*, lib. vii. epist. vii.
[6] Ibid. lib. ix. epist. vii.
[7] Ibib. lib. xi. epist. vii., viii., &c.
[8] Ibid. lib. xii. epist. ii.
[9] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 376. Pliny, lib. vii. c. 43. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii.

B.C. 48. to that honour without being an Italian or a Roman citizen by birth; and at his death he was rich enough to bequeath the sum of 16s.1d. to every individual of the Roman people.

C. Oppius. His associate, Oppius, was a man of mean, or at least of humble birth,[1] and apparently became acquainted with Cæsar by furnishing him with money at a time his profligacies were continually draining his means and ruining his credit. When Cæsar was in Gaul, Oppius seems to have been employed by him as his agent at Rome,[2] and was in the habit of forwarding the letters which passed between him and his principal officers and their friends in the capital. Like Balbus, he enjoyed the confidence of Cæsar without interruption, and his name is constantly mentioned as that of a person whose influence in the internal administration of affairs was very considerable. But we have been unable to find any particulars recorded of him which throw light upon his individual character.

C. Matius. C. Matius was a citizen of the equestrian order,[3] and became at an early period of his life acquainted with Cæsar. He was with him for some time in Gaul,[4] and exerted himself at that period to reconcile him to Cicero, for whom he entertained an old regard. At the beginning of the civil war, he did his utmost to preserve peace; but when his efforts proved fruitless, a false estimate of the claims of private friendship led him to follow Cæsar, though at the same time he disapproved of his cause. He does not appear, however, to have taken much part in the war, nor did he acquire either riches or honours by its event; but availed himself of his influence with the conqueror to mitigate the sufferings of the vanquished party, and to recommend a system of clemency. After the death of Cæsar, when his assassins were at the height of their power, Matius never disguised his sorrow for the loss of his friend, and was one of the first persons to notice and support C. Octavius, when he came forward to claim the name and inheritance of his uncle. Octavius did not forget his kindness, but lived on terms of friendship with him,[5] when the course of events had raised him to the imperial throne: and Matius lived to old age, possessed of fortune and influence, without reproach, amusing himself with his gardens and trees, and, like our own Evelyn, leaving a name behind him for his attention to the practice of horticulture, and the ornamenting of pleasure grounds.

Postumius. Of Postumius we have been able to collect no other notices, than that he was employed by Cæsar in the civil war,[6] and after his death undertook, together with C. Matius, the direction of the

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ix. epist. vii. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 60.
[2] Cicero, *ad Q. Fratrem*, lib. iii. epist. i.
[3] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 60.
[4] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xi. epist. xxvii., xxviii.
[5] Pliny, lib. xii. c. 2.; lib. xv. c. 14.
[6] Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. ii. c. 58. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xv. epist. ii.

games which were celebrated by Octavius in honour of his uncle's victories. B.C. 47.

One reflection naturally presents itself when we read over this list of names hitherto unknown in Roman history, and now raised to the highest eminence of wealth and political importance. With all the misery which they had occasioned, the civil wars had yet produced the beneficial effect of depriving the oligarchy of great Roman families of that predominant share of power and honours which they had been accustomed to enjoy. In times of commotion, men of wealth, or of personal qualifications, naturally made their way to distinction and greatness; and more monied men and foreigners were thus introduced into the highest class of society, and gave a severe wound to that narrow aristocratical spirit which would perpetuate nobility in one particular caste, and considers it as a profanation to admit individuals taken from the mass of the people into the ranks of this privileged order. It was a general benefit to the provinces of the Roman empire when Balbus obtained the consulship; it was a general elevation of the commercial and monied classes of the Roman people, when Oppius and Matius were raised to a degree of power and importance above the families of the oldest nobility in the commonwealth; while, at the same time, it was a fortunate circumstance towards maintaining a just but not excessive respect for noble ancestry, that the person who had seized the very highest place in the republic, was one whose birth made him on a level with the proudest of the patricians, and thus rendered his sway less galling than if his abilities and crimes alone had exalted him above them.

Epicurean doctrines of Cæsar's friends.

It may be remarked, also, that almost all the friends of Cæsar, whom we have enumerated, were men of Epicurean principles; and the same may be said of T. Pomponius Atticus and C. Mæcenas, two of the most distinguished individuals of the equestrian order, who flourished about this same period. The doctrines of Epicurus naturally suited a class of men who enjoyed wealth without political dignity; and such was the general character of the equestrian order, to which the persons of whom we have been speaking originally belonged. Where these principles were united with an amiable temper and kindly feelings, the mischief to which they led was either indolence and a sort of elegant selfishness, or, in the most favourable circumstances, it was a preference of feeling to principle, and a habit of substituting kind and generous actions for the harder task of balancing the claims of conflicting duties, and following that which was right, rather than that which was agreeable. It is probable that Matius and Pansa thought that their conduct in supporting Cæsar was amply atoned for by their acts of personal kindness and disinterestedness after his victory—so prone are men to purchase the privilege of declining a painful duty by the practice of

B.C. 48. those amiable virtues which confer at once the greatest self-complacency on themselves, and most attract the admiration of others. This tendency was especially encouraged by the doctrines of Epicurus, which, making pleasure the end of human conduct, represented virtue as the surest means of attaining it. Men of coarser and viler natures abused this philosophy, as was natural, far more grossly; but its evil tendency was most shown in the lives of its best disciples: for they who believe virtue to be indeed the truest road to pleasure, were yet misled by perceiving that the virtues most agreeable to their natures, led them to pleasure most readily; and, content with the practice of these, they failed altogether in assigning to each virtue its proper comparative rank, and in disciplining their natures to choose their highest duty, when the gratification of their intellect or their feelings was to be the necessary sacrifice.

Laws and regulations of Cæsar.

Meantime, Cæsar proceeded to turn his attention to the general settlement of the commonwealth, and, like Sylla, to attempt to terminate the disorders from which he had now nothing further to gain. With this view he proposed and carried a law, restricting to two years the term during which any command in the provinces might be held;[1] and ordering that all those provinces which were governed by prætors or proprætors should be held only for one year. But as he had himself marched with his army out of his province by his own sole authority, in open defiance of the Cornelian law of Sylla, which rendered such conduct treasonable, so a popular adventurer, or an able and ambitious general, would not fail to procure or to retain the command of a province for as long a time as might suit his purposes, notwithstanding the prohibitions of this law of Cæsar. Another law, in which also the example of Sylla was followed, proposed to increase the severity of the criminal code.[2] Wilful murderers were to incur the forfeiture of all their property, in addition to the penalty of exile, which had hitherto been the utmost extent of punishment legally inflicted on the most enormous crimes; other criminals, when banished, were to forfeit the half of their fortunes; and persons condemned for disturbing the public peace,[3] or for any other of those offences against the public welfare, included under the term "*Majestas imminuta*," or "*læsa*," were to be expelled from Italy by the form of forbidding them the use of fire and water within so many miles of the capital. But this strictness ill accorded with the indemnities which he had himself granted to so many persons condemned for bribery and other offences;[4] or with his reversing the sentences of degradation formerly passed by the censors upon several who had since served him in the civil war. A third law, which was most completely at variance with the

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* i. c. 8.
[2] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 42.
[3] Cicero, *Philippic.* i. c. 10.
[4] Suetonius, c. 41.

popular principles on which he had professed heretofore to act, contained an alteration of the Aurelian law respecting the persons to whom the judicial power was to be intrusted. By that law, passed as we have seen in the first consulship of Pompey and Crassus, B.C. 70, the judges were to be chosen from the senate, the equestrian order, and from a description of men among the plebeians who possessed a competent fortune, and were known by the name of *Tribuni Ærarii*. But Cæsar now made the *Tribuni Ærarii* no longer eligible, and confined the judicial power, exclusively, to the members of the senate, or of the equestrian order.[1] Another of Cæsar's measures was directed against extravagance in the expenses of the table, being a renewal and an enforcement of the old sumptuary laws. Intemperance in eating and drinking was not Cæsar's favourite sensuality; and perhaps his feelings as a soldier may have made him dislike an indulgence which he might think inconsistent with the hardiness of a military nation. But he found that the impatience which men feel at being controlled by law, in a matter so entirely of a domestic nature, was too strong in this point for his authority; and learning that as soon as he left Rome his enactments were disregarded, he wrote angrily from Spain to say that he was resolved henceforward to remain constantly in the capital, that his laws might be duly observed;[2] and afterwards, he is said not only to have posted guards at the markets, to prevent the sale of any forbidden articles,[3] but sometimes to have sent his lictors and soldiers into private houses, and to have actually carried off from the table any dishes which exceeded the allowed expense of private entertainments. There were others of his acts which excited great odium against him at the time, and which proceeded, indeed, very probably, from selfish motives; but which were really wise and liberal, and loudly called for by the existing circumstances of the empire. He conferred the rights of Roman citizenship on a whole legion of soldiers whom he had raised in Transalpine Gaul, and called by the name of the Alaudæ.[4] He bestowed also the same privilege on many of the inhabitants of Cisalpine Gaul, and intended to communicate it to all the people within the Alps,[5] a purpose which was carried into effect soon after his death by M. Antonius and Octavius. He gave also the inferior distinction of the rights of Latin citizenship, "*Jus Latii*," to all the inhabitants of Sicily.[6] He introduced a number of persons into the senate, so that the majority of the whole body were said to owe their admission to him;[7] and

B.C. 48.

Judicial power confined to the senate or equestrian order.

[1] Seutonius, c. 41. Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 226.
[2] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xiii. epist. vii.
[3] Suetonius, c. 43.
[4] Ibid. c. 24.
[5] Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. v. c. 3.
[6] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist xii.
[7] Ibid. *de Divinatione*, lib. ii. c. 9.

B.C. 48. Transalpine Gauls senators.

amongst the rest were several Transalpine Gauls;[1] upon which an ironical notice was handed about in Rome, ordering "that no one should pretend to show the new senators the way to the senate-house." He raised several new families to the dignity of patricians,[2] in order to supply the diminution of that order in the late war; and he admitted all physicians, as well as the professors of all other liberal arts and sciences, resident at Rome, to the right of citizenship. All these acts had a beneficial tendency, as far as they contributed to place the inhabitants of different parts of the empire on a level with each other; and prepared the way for their forming gradually one united nation, instead of regarding one another, as hitherto, in the light of masters and slaves, between whom there existed an insuperable barrier. Another class of Cæsar's measures regarded the important subject of population, and was an attempt to relieve the capital from some portion of that multitude of indigent citizens by which it was overburdened, and to substitute free inhabitants in the room of some of the slaves, who were now almost the sole cultivators of the soil in many parts of Italy. He is said to have

His colonies.

settled no fewer than eighty thousand citizens,[3] many of them freedmen, in different colonies; and to have restored on this occasion many towns which had been ruined in former wars, particularly Carthage and Corinth. These two famous cities had been both destroyed in the same year, exactly a century before the period of their restoration; they were now rebuilt together, and in a very short time rose to a high degree of wealth and importance. Then, to ensure the existence of a free population in Italy,[4] he forbade all citizens, between the ages of twenty and forty, from being abroad for more than three years together, except on military service; nor were the sons of senators allowed to leave the country at all, except they travelled in the suite of a magistrate. He also insisted that all graziers, and persons who fed sheep or other animals on a large scale, should employ freedmen in the proportion of at least one-third out of the whole number of their shepherds or herdsmen. But the short duration of Cæsar's power prevented these regulations from producing any sufficient effect; and in the reign of Augustus,[5] it was still matter of complaint that many districts of Italy were only redeemed from desolation by the number of slaves belonging to the great landed proprietors of Rome.

[1] Suetonius, c. 76, 80.

[2] Ibid. c. 41. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xi. c. 25. Dion Cassius makes Q Fufius Calenus say, in his speech in defence of M. Antonius, that Cicero's family was among those raised, on this occasion, to the rank of patricians. This is not impossible, as Cæsar would naturally fix upon those families which were noble, though not patricians: and, as Cicero was almost the only man surviving who had been consul before the civil wars, his family would readily suggest itself as one of the first to receive this accession of dignity.

[3] Suetonius, c. 42. Strabo, lib. viii. p. 436.; lib. xvii. p. 968. edit. Xyland.

[4] Suetonius, *ubi supra.*

[5] Livy, lib. vi. c. 12.


B.C. 47. Reform of the Calendar.

The reform of the calendar, which was accomplished by Cæsar, is too famous to be altogether passed over in silence. It has been observed several times in the course of this history, that the nominal time was about two months in advance of the real season of the year, so that what was called midsummer, was, in reality, the latter end of April. This confusion was mainly owing to the strange power allowed to the Pontifices of intercalating or adding to the year what number of days they pleased; and this power was very capriciously exercised, as the interests of their friends might require a greater number to be added to lengthen the period of their being in office, or a less number in order to shorten the term, when the annual magistracies were held by men of the opposite party. Cæsar now employed the ablest astronomers of the age to place the computation of time on a true footing;[1] and two months were added to the current year, that on the ensuing first of January the real and nominal time might agree with one another. For the future, the year was to consist of three hundred and sixty-five days, and a single day was to be added every fourth year, according to our present practice; so that this Julian calendar has been followed ever since by the nations of Europe, with only the slight correction introduced by Pope Gregory XIII. in 1582, and adopted in Great Britain in 1752, under the denomination of the New Style.

Additional honours bestowed on Cæsar after his victory in Spain.

Such were the principal public measures of Cæsar's government; but it was not by these that he provoked the conspiracy to which he fell a victim, so much as by the arrogance of his personal behaviour, and his open assumption of the state, as well as of the power, of an absolute sovereign. After his last victory over the sons of Pompey in Spain, the flattery of the senate added yet more to the extravagant honours which they had already lavished on him; and it appears that the homage thus profusely offered to him was more than he could bear, and that he fancied himself greater in proportion to the increased servility with which he was regarded. It was voted that he should be styled the "Father of his country," and that the title *Imperator* should be prefixed to his name;[2] that his person should be declared sacred; and that he should be appointed dictator for life. His statue was placed in the temple of Quirinus or Romulus,[3] and in the Capitol, next to those of the seven traditional kings of Rome, and of L. Junius Brutus, the founder of the commonwealth. He was allowed to wear, on all public festivities,

B.C. 45.



[Denarius of Caius Julius Cæsar.]

[1] Plutarch, *in Cæsar*, c. 59. Suetonius, c. 40.
[2] Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxvi. Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 235-236.
[3] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xii. epist. xlv.

B.C. 45. His dress.

the dress used by victorious generals at their triumphs;[1] and at all times to have a crown of laurel on his head. The month in which he was born, and which had till then been called Quintilis, was now named Julius, or July, in honour of him. Money was stamped with his image; and a guard of senators and citizens of the equestrian order was voted for the security of his person. It was apparently soon after his return from Spain, that the whole body of the senate waited upon him to communicate to him the decrees which they had passed in his honour. He received them in state in front of the temple of Venus Genitrix which he had himself founded;[2] but he never rose from his seat, either when they first approached him, or when they presented to him so many tokens of their submission and devotion. This was an affront which was never forgiven; and it was particularly remarked,[3] that during his own triumph, a short time before, when L. Pontius Aquilia, one of the tribunes, allowed his triumphal chariot to pass by the benches appropriated to himself and his colleagues without rising from his place, Cæsar noticed it with great indignation, openly saying, that Aquilia had better at once take from him the administration of the commonwealth; and for some days afterwards, whenever he promised any thing to any one who waited upon him, he used, ironically, to add, "But you must obtain the consent of Pontius Aquilia!" On another occasion when, at the time of the Latin holidays,[4] Cæsar was riding into Rome in solemn procession, after having performed the usual sacrifices on the Alban hill, some voices amongst the multitude saluted him with the title of king; and a laurel crown, bound round with the white fillet or diadem, which was the well-known ornament of royalty, was placed upon one of his statues. Two of the tribunes, Epidius Marullus and C. Cæsetius Flavius, ordered the diadem to be taken off from the laurel wreath, and the man who had put it on the statue to be taken into custody. Upon this Cæsar upbraided them in strong language for endeavouring to excite the popular odium against him, as if he were really ambitious of the kingly title; and by an exercise of what Paterculus calls his censorian power,[5] he forbade them acting any more as tribunes, and expelled them from the senate, deploring at the same time, we are told, his own hard fortune, in being thus obliged to do violence to the clemency of his nature, or to suffer his dignity to be compromised. It is added that Cæsar so deeply resented the conduct of these tribunes,[6] that he applied to the father of Cæsetius to renounce his son for his seditious behaviour, promising him that he would

He gives offence by the arrogance of his behaviour.

Expels two of the Tribunes from the Senate.

[1] Suetonius and Dion Cassius.
[2] Livy, *Epitome*, cxvi. Dion Cassius, lib. xliv. p. 244.
[3] Suetonius, c. 78.
[4] Dion Cassius, lib. xliv. p. 245. Suetonius, c. 79. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii.
[5] Lib. ii. c. 94.
[6] Valerius Maximus, lib. v. c. 7.

amply provide for his two other sons, if he complied with his wishes. B.C. 45. But the old man replied, "that Cæsar should rather deprive him of all his children, than prevail on him to turn one of them out of his house as deserving to be given up by his father." Yet Cæsar was probably well aware of the odium to which he would be exposed if he were suspected of aiming at the honours of royalty; and it was to remove any such impression from the public mind, that he took occasion to answer to the acclamations of the populace, on one occasion, when they were saluting him with the title of king, "that he was Cæsar and not a king." With the same view it is not unlikely that he had concerted beforehand the famous scene which took place on the fifteenth February, at the festival of the Lupercalia, when M. Antonius, who then held the office of consul, approached Cæsar, as he was sitting in state in the rostra above the forum, and presented to him a royal diadem. A murmur ran through the multitude;[1] but it was instantly changed into loud applause, when Cæsar rejected the proffered ornament, and persisted in his refusal, although Antonius threw himself at his feet, imploring him, in the name of the Roman people, to accept it. To complete the purpose for which this scene was in all probability acted, Antonius caused a memorandum to be entered in the calendar for the year, "That on the day of the Lupercalia M. Antonius the consul had, by the command of the people, offered the dignity of king to C. Cæsar, perpetual dictator, and that Cæsar had refused to accept it." Yet the opinion was still entertained, that Cæsar coveted this unlawful and abhorred title; and as mankind are the slaves of words, the imputation of aspiring to be king was eagerly laid to his charge by his enemies, as one which would most surely provoke against him the popular hatred.

Cæsar gives offence by his irregular manner of bestowing offices.

Another part of Cæsar's conduct which gave great offence, was his assuming so openly not only the patronage of the ordinary offices of the State, but the power of bestowing them in an unprecedented manner, in order to suit his own policy. At the beginning of the year B.C. 45, he had assumed the title of Consul, together with his Dictatorship, but he had no colleague, and the office was, in fact, merely nominal. But on his return to Rome in October,[2] after he had finished his campaign in Spain, wishing for an opportunity of rewarding two of his adherents, he resigned his Consulship, and appointed Q. Fabius Maximus and C. Trebonius to succeed him for the remaining three months of the year. It happened that Q. Fabius died on the thirty-first of December, early in the morning;[3] and, that no occasion of exercising his patronage might be lost, Cæsar caused the comitia to assemble about two o'clock in the afternoon, and to elect C. Caninius Rebilus for the few remaining hours

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 34.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 236.
[3] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. vii. epist. xxx. Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 58.

B.C. 45. of the year. The benefit of this short-lived honour appears to have been, that it conferred on the person who enjoyed it the rank of senator for life. Cæsar, in like manner, increased the number of Prætors to fourteen,[1] that of Ædiles to six, and that of Quæstors to forty; he also added one new member to the college of Augurs, one to that of the Pontifices, one to the Quindecemviri or keepers of the Sibylline books, and three to the *Septemviri Epulonum*, who had the care of providing the feasts of the gods on all great solemnities. He made a point of rewarding every one who had served him; and thus he did not hesitate to intrust the charge of the public mint to some of his own slaves,[2] and even to appoint the son of one of his freedmen to command three of his legions which he left in Egypt, after his departure from that country in the autumn of the year. He allowed the same spirit to interfere in the administration of justice; and we are told that one of his veterans,[3] who had received a grant of land, having been brought before him on a charge of violent and oppressive behaviour towards his neighbours, was not only acquitted, but was presented by his judge with the very land on which he had unjustly encroached, as soon as he reminded Cæsar of some personal services which he had rendered him during his first campaign in Spain. In fact, Cæsar openly avowed, that if ruffians and cut-throats had supported him in his quarrel, he should think himself bound fully to requite them.[4] Yet, after all, in spite of his multiplication of offices, and the profusion with which he bestowed them, the claims of his partisans were more than he could satisfy; and many of those who had served him through all his career of wickedness, were afterwards in the number of his assassins, because they did not think themselves sufficiently rewarded.[5]

Increases the number of civil officers.

Sketch of his personal manners and behaviour.

Cicero has left us a curious sketch of a visit which he received from Cæsar at his villa near Puteoli, in the month of December.[6] On the twentieth of December Cæsar arrived at the house of L. Philippus, the father-in-law of Octavius, attended by two thousand soldiers, who followed him either for the security of his person, or as a mere guard of honour. He spent the morning of the following day at the house of Philippus, but was engaged the whole time in transacting business in private with L. Balbus. About one or two o'clock he took a walk on the seashore; after which he went into a bath, and heard, with the utmost composure, a most virulent epigram of Catullus against him, in which he was taxed, in plain terms, with those abominable profligacies to which we have before alluded.[7] After this he took his place at the table at Cicero's house, his immediate attend-

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 237, 239, 240; lib. xlii. p. 209.
[2] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 76.
[3] Seneca, *de Beneficiis*, lib. v. c. 24.
[4] Suetonius, c. 72.
[5] Seneca, *de Irâ*, lib. iii. c. 30.
[6] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xiii. epist. lii.
[7] Catullus, *Cann.* 29 and 57.

ants forming part of the company, whilst the rest of his suite were B.C. 45. entertained in separate apartments, according to their rank and respectability. "Cæsar seemed to enjoy himself exceedingly," says Cicero, "and was in very good spirits. The conversation did not



[Puteoli.]

touch at all on politics, but we talked much on literary subjects."[1] Yet, however agreeable he might make himself in private society, he kept up a degree of state at Rome, which rendered access to his person difficult and humiliating to those who had lived with him so long, in former times, on a footing of equality. Cicero complains of the vexations and mortifications which he was obliged to endure in obtaining an audience from him;[2] and he was told by C. Matius,[3] that once, when he had been detained for a long time, waiting till Cæsar could receive him, Cæsar had himself observed, "that he must necessarily be very unpopular, when M. Cicero was thus kept in attendance, and could not see him whenever it suited him." "I know," he continued, "that no one would be more ready than himself to make allowances for me, but I am sure that he must detest me." There were, however, many incautious expressions of his own, which found their way into general circulation, and excited a much stronger feeling against him. He was accustomed to ridicule Sylla for re-

[1] "Σπουδαῖον ἀδὲν, *in Sermone: φιλόλογα, multa.*"

[2] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. vi. epist. xiv. "*Quum omnem adeundi et conveniendi illius indignitatem et molestiam pertulissem.*"

[3] *Epistol. ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. i., ii.

B.C. 45. signing the Dictatorship;[1] he used to say, "that the commonwealth was now nothing; it was a mere name totally devoid of any reality," and in language, yet more arrogant, he added, "that he ought now to be spoken to with more deference, and that what he said should be considered as law." Yet he would not believe that he had any thing to fear from popular resentment, insisting that his life was of the utmost importance to his country; for that his ambition was now satisfied; but that if he were to die, the Republic would again be involved in civil wars more miserably than ever. Besides, his great courage rendered him insensible to danger, and impatient of precautions. In spite of the advice of his friends Hirtius and Pansa,[2] who advised him to guard by the sword that power which the sword had won for him, he used to say that he would rather die than make himself an object of terror to the people; and he so far confided in his popularity, or in the ascendency which he had acquired, that he dismissed the guard of Spanish soldiers which had been in the habit of attending him. Meantime, as if his government at home were settled in full security, he formed plans of foreign conquests on the most extensive scale, which would employ him for some years at a distance from Rome. He talked of attacking the Parthians,[3] and of subduing those wild tribes who dwelt on the banks of the Danube, and who occasionally made inroads upon the Roman territory in Thrace; and in order to provide for the administration of affairs during his absence, he drew out a list of persons who were to hold the principal offices of state for the next two years,[4] still retaining to himself the title and authority of dictator. Nor, whilst projecting schemes of conquest, was he neglectful of the internal improvement of his dominions. It is mentioned, that he was intending to frame a digest of all the Roman laws;[5] to form public libraries, containing all the most valuable works of Greek, as well as of Roman, literature; to build in the capital a temple in honour of Mars, and a theatre, both in the highest style of magnificence; to drain the Pomptine marshes; to make a grand line of communication across the Apennines from the Tiber to the Adriatic; to carry a canal from Rome to Tarracina, in order to facilitate the arrival of goods in the capital from Sicily and the east; to improve and enlarge the harbour of Ostia, and to dig through the Isthmus of Corinth. Such are said to have been his designs; and preparations were already made for carrying the military part of them into execution. His nephew, C. Octavius,[6] whom he had named as his master of the horse for one of

His confidence in his own security.

His plans of conquest and of internal improvement.

[1] Suetonius, c. 77, 86.
[2] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 83. Suetonius, c. 86.
[3] Suetonius, c. 44. Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 289. Plutarch, c. 58.
[4] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. vi. Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 239.
[5] Suetonius, c. 44.
[6] Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 239; lib. xlv. p. 271. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 85.

the years of his intended absence, was sent over to Apollonia, in Epirus, there to remain, and to pursue his literary studies, till Cæsar should arrive in Greece to put himself at the head of his army; and a force both of infantry and cavalry had been already transported across the Ionian gulf,[1] and was quartered in Macedonia, waiting till the return of spring should enable them to commence their expedition against Parthia. B.C. 45.

Report that it was intended to declare him King.

It was about this time reported, that L. Cotta, one of the Quindecemviri, or keepers of the Sibylline books, was intending to propose to the senate that Cæsar should be declared king;[2] and this step was to be urged on the authority of the Sibylline oracles, which declared that a king was necessary to the safety of Rome, in the event of a war with Parthia. Whether the rumour was true or false, it is said to have hastened the resolution of those persons who had already formed a conspiracy against Cæsar's life, and to have determined them to choose the fifteenth, or Ides of March, for the execution of their purpose, that being the day on which it was believed that L. Cotta would bring forward his proposal before the senate. It remains, therefore, that we give some account of the origin of this famous conspiracy, and of the principal persons who were engaged in it.

A conspiracy formed against his life.

Sketch of the principal conspirators.

M. Junius Brutus.

It is agreed on all sides that M. Junius Brutus and C. Cassius Longinus were the chief promoters of the design. The former of these was the son of that M. Brutus, who had taken part in the rebellion of M. Lepidus immediately after the death of Sylla, and who had in consequence been put to death at Mutina, by the orders of Pompey, in the year B.C. 77. The son, M. Brutus, was, by his mother's side, the nephew of M. Cato, and he accompanied his uncle to Cyprus in the year B.C. 58, when he was sent by P. Clodius to annex that island to the Roman empire. It appears, however, that he did not copy the example of Cato's integrity; for, having become the creditor of the citizens of Salamis to a large amount,[3] he employed one M. Scaptius, a man of infamous character, to enforce the payment of his debt, together with an interest four times exceeding the rate allowed by law. And when Cicero governed the province of Cilicia, to which Cyprus seems to have been attached, Brutus wrote to him, and was supported by T. Atticus in his request, entreating him to give Scaptius a commission as an officer of the Roman government, and to allow him to employ a military force to exact from the Salaminians the usurious interest which he illegally

[1] Appian, *Bell. Civil.* lib. ii. c. 10. Appian says there were seventeen legions, and ten thousand cavalry—a most ridiculous exaggeration. But Appian is the worst authority, and that is saying not a little, of all the writers who have left us accounts of these times.

[2] Suetonius, c. 79. Cicero, *de Divinatione*, lib. ii. c. 54.

[3] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. v. epist. xxi.; lib. vi. epist. i., ii., iii.

B.C. 47. demanded. Cicero was too upright a magistrate to comply with such requests; but they were so agreeable to the practice of the times, that he continued to live on intimate terms with the man who could prefer them; and the literary tastes of Brutus were a recommendation which he could not resist; so that he appears soon to have forgotten the affair of Scaptius, and to have spoken and thought of Brutus with great regard. They both, indeed, were of the same party in politics; and we are told that Brutus exerted himself very actively in Pompey's service in the campaign of B.C. 42, in Greece,[1] and being taken prisoner after the battle of Pharsalia, received his life from the conqueror. Before Cæsar set out for Africa to carry on war against Scipio and Juba, he conferred on Brutus[2] the government of Cisalpine Gaul;[3] and in that province Brutus accordingly remained, and was actually holding an office under Cæsar, when his uncle Cato was maintaining the contest in Africa, and committing suicide rather than fall alive into the hands of the enemy. His character, however, seems to have been greatly improved since his treatment of the Salaminians; for he is said to have governed Cisalpine Gaul with great integrity and humanity[4] insomuch, that his statue was preserved in Milan when Augustus had obtained the sovereignty of the empire; and the popularity which he obtained was reflected, in some measure, we are told, upon the government of Cæsar, from whom he had received his appointment. In the year B.C. 45, he returned to Rome, but afterwards set out to meet Cæsar on his return from Spain, and in an interview which he had with him at Nicæa,[5] pleaded the cause of Deiotarus, king of Galatia, with such warmth and freedom that Cæsar was struck by it, and was reminded of what he used frequently to say of Brutus, that what his inclination might be, made a very great difference, but that whatever they were, they would be nothing lukewarm. It was about this time, also that Brutus divorced his first wife, Appia, the daughter of Appius Claudius, and married the

Character of Brutus.

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xi. epist. iv. Dion Cassius, lib. xli. p. 104. Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 6.

[2] Ibid. *ad Familiares*, lib. vi. epist. vi.

[3] "Where," says Ferguson, "he remained, perhaps, rather under safe custody, than high in the confidence of Cæsar," vol. iv. p. 147, 8vo. edit. 1805. "He was induced," says Middleton, "by Cæsar's generosity, *and his mother's prayers*, to lay down his arms and return to Italy. Cæsar endeavoured to oblige him by all the honours which his power could bestow; but the indignity of receiving from a master what he ought to have received from a free people, shocked him much more than any honours could oblige."—*Life of Cicero*, vol. ii. p. 210, 8vo. edit. 1819. Ferguson's conjecture, so far as we have been able to find, is as destitute of any authority or probability, as Middleton's insertion of the words which we have printed in italics, and which endeavour to represent Brutus as sacrificing his patriotic independence to the entreaties of his mother. As to the rest of Middleton's statement, we can only wonder that a writer, in a Christian country, should think that he was panegyrizing his hero by imputing to him such a disposition.

[4] Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 6. *Comparat. Dions. cum Bruto*, c. 5.

[5] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. i.

famous Portia, his cousin, the daughter of Cato. Soon after he received another mark of Cæsar's favour,[1] in being appointed *Prætor Urbanus* for the year B.C. 44; and he was holding that office when he resolved to become the assassin of the man whose government he had twice acknowledged, by consenting himself to act in a public station under it. Sir Matthew Hale did well to accept the place of Judge during the usurpation of Cromwell; but what should we think B.C. 44.



[Cato and Portia.—*Le Musee Royal*]

of him, if, whilst filling that office, he had associated himself with Colonel Titus, and other such wretches, in their plans to remove the Protector by assassination?

C. Cassius Longinus was remarkable, even when a boy, for the pride and violence of his temper, if we may believe the anecdotes reported of him by Plutarch[2] and Valerius Maximus. He accompanied M. Crassus into Parthia as his Quæstor, and distinguished himself, after the death of his General, by conducting the wreck of the Roman army back to Syria in safety. We have already spoken of him as being one of the Tribunes at the beginning of the civil war; and we have mentioned his having the command of the Syrian squadron in Pompey's fleet, and the interruption which he met with, whilst engaged successfully against the enemy, from the news of the battle of Pharsalia. He afterwards resigned the contest, and submitted himself to Cæsar in Asia Minor, when Cæsar was returning from Egypt into Italy; yet Cicero asserts[3] that at that very time he had intended to assassinate the man whose clemency he was consent- C. Cassius Longinus.

[1] Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 7. Dion Cassius, lib. xliv. p. 246.
[2] *In Bruto*, c. 9. Valerius Maximus, lib. iii. c. 1.
[3] *Philippic.* ii. c. 11.

B.C. 44. ing to solicit, had not an accident prevented the accomplishment of his purpose. He was not only spared by Cæsar, but was appointed by him one of his lieutenants[1]—a favour bestowed by magistrates on their friends, in order to invest them with a public character, and thus enable them to reside or to travel in the provinces with greater comfort and dignity. Even during the last campaign of Cæsar in Spain, Cassius wrote to Cicero, saying that he was anxious that Cæsar should be victorious,[2] for that he preferred an old and merciful master to a new and a cruel one. He also, together with Brutus, was appointed one of the Prætors for the year B.C. 45,[3] at a moment in which he was entirely discontented with Cæsar's government, and is said to have been the person by whose intrigues the first elements of the conspiracy were formed.

Decimus Brutus and C. Trebonius.

Next to M. Brutus and C. Cassius may be ranked Decimus Brutus, and C. Trebonius. These had both served Cæsar in the civil war, and had commanded the land and sea forces employed by him in the siege of Massilia. Since that time Trebonius had been appointed proconsul of the Further Spain, and more recently, as we have seen, had enjoyed the title of consul during the last three months of the year. Decimus Brutus was chosen to succeed to the

B.C. 42. consulship in the year B.C. 42,[4] and to the command of the province of Cisalpine Gaul immediately; he was also named by Cæsar in his will, amongst those persons who were to inherit his fortune, in case of the failure of his direct heirs. Another of the conspirators was

L. Tillius Cimber.

L. Tillius Cimber, a man notorious for his drunkenness and low violence,[5] who had been throughout the civil war a vehement partisan of Cæsar, and had received from him lately the appointment to the

Ser. Galba.

province of Bithynia.[6] Ser. Sulpicius Galba, the great grandfather of the emperor of that name, had also served under Cæsar in Gaul, and, probably, in the civil war; but he was now offended, because Cæsar

L. Minucius Basilus.

had not given him the honour of the consulship.[7] L. Minucius Basilus is also mentioned as having had a command in Cæsar's army in Gaul,[8] and as now being one of the conspirators against him; while P. Servilius Casca, Cn. Domitius Ænobarbus, L. Pontius Aquilia,

Q. Ligarius Cn. Domitius Ænobarbus.

and Q. Ligarius, had been attached to the party of Pompey, although they had since submitted and received the conqueror's pardon. Ligarius, in particular, had been suffered to return to Italy in consequence of the earnest solicitation of his friends, amongst whom

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. vi. epist. vi.
[2] *Ad Familiares*, lib. xv. epist. xix.
[3] Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 7. Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xi. epist. ii. iii.
[4] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 84. 86. Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 83.
[5] Seneca, epist. lxxxiii. *De Irâ*, lib. iii. c. 30.
[6] Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. iii. c. 2. Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. xiii.
[7] Suetonius, *in Galbâ*, c. 3.
[8] Cæsar, *de Bell. Gallico*, lib. vi. c. 27. He had afterwards fought in Spain under Cneius Pompeius, and had then submitted to Cæsar, promising to be faithful to him hereafter, as he had been to Pompeius. *Auctor de Bell. Hispan.* c. 19.

Cicero had appealed most strongly to Cæsar's clemency,[1] and had gone so far as to represent Ligarius penitent for his fault, taking refuge in Cæsar's mercy, and imploring pardon for his past conduct. Cn. Domitius[2] was the son of that L. Domitius, who had been the unsuccessful candidate for the consulship, in opposition to Pompey and Crassus, in the year B.C. 55, who had been appointed Cæsar's successor in Gaul at the beginning of the civil war, who had been taken prisoner at Corfinium, and had afterwards been killed at Pharsalia. His son was also the nephew of Cato, whose sister L. Domitius had married; so that this young man was likely to inherit a violent hatred against Cæsar; nor does it appear that he had ever imitated the conduct of Brutus in accepting places of confidence and honour from the conqueror. B.C. 42. B.C. 55.

The motives by which the conspirators were actuated, which perhaps they themselves could not have analyzed exactly, have been variously guessed by historians, according to their own prevailing opinions. Personal and party feelings may be confounded unconsciously with patriotism, even by the very man who is influenced by them; nor would it be reasonable to deny that many of Cæsar's murderers had persuaded themselves that the interests of their country were promoted by their act. But if we could inquire by what process they had acquired this persuasion, and with how much self-deception it was accompanied, we should, it is probable, find that their motives were widely distinct from that purity and singleness and sincerity of purpose which are essential to real goodness. At any rate it is clear that they who had served Cæsar in the civil war, and had shared in the honours and advantages of his victory, could with no shadow of justice become his murderers. Their patriotism ought to have been shown when Cæsar first commenced his rebellion; and had they then followed the example of Labienus, and forsaken their general when he began to be guilty of treason against his country, their motives might have been unquestioned, and their conduct would have been really just and honourable. Nor can even Brutus and Cassius be excused for accepting honours and offices from a government which they must have considered as unlawful and tyrannical. If Cæsar's power were required by the circumstances of the commonwealth, to destroy him was mischievous:—if it were an evil which was only to be endured so long as it was inevit- Motives of the Conspirators.

[1] Cicero, *pro Ligario*, c. 10.

[2] His name is mentioned amongst the assassins of Cæsar by Cicero, *Philippic.* ii.c. 11.; but Suetonius (*in Nerone*, c. 3.) says that he was accused without foundation, of having had a share in the deed. Was he among those Patrician youths who joined the conspirators immediately after the murder, wishing to appear concerned in it, and did Cicero favour from policy this false pretension? or were Domitius himself and his posterity anxious in aftertimes to deny the fact, when he was receiving the favours of Augustus, or when one of them, Nero, ascended the Imperial throne?

B.C. 55. able, to countenance it in a public station, was an abandonment of their duty to their country. But above all, the act of assassination is in itself so hateful, and involves in it so much dissimulation and treachery, that whatever allowance may be made for the perpetrators, when we consider the moral ignorance of the times in which they lived, their conduct must never be spoken of without condemnation. And it is satisfactory to find that crimes of this nature have generally been as fruitless as they deserved to be. Harmodius and Aristogition, by murdering Hipparchus, only subjected Athens to a heavier tyranny; and the assassination of Cæsar furnished something of a pretence to his surviving followers, to involve the most eminent friends of the commonwealth in one unsparing destruction.

The whole number of the conspirators is said to have exceeded sixty; and their intention was at first to have effected their purpose either in the street in which Cæsar lived, or in the Campus Martius when he was presiding at the elections of magistrates; but when they heard that the senate was summoned to meet on the fifteenth of March, and it was rumoured that the proposal of bestowing on Cæsar the title of king was then to be brought forward, they fixed upon that day, and on that meeting of the senate, as the time and place best suited for their attempt.

Events which happened previous to Cæsar's murder.

On the evening of the fourteenth of March, Cæsar was supping with M. Lepidus, his master of the horse, who was now at the head of a body of troops without the walls,[1] and was preparing shortly to march with them into Transalpine Gaul, which had been assigned to him by Cæsar as his province. It happened that Cæsar was engaged in writing, when the rest of the party began to discuss the question, "What kind of death is most to be desired?" The subject on which they were talking caught his attention, and he cried out, before any one else had expressed an opinion, "That the best death was a sudden one." A coincidence so remarkable was likely to be remembered afterwards by all who had been present; but it is said, also, that he had been often warned by the augurs to beware of the Ides of March;[3] and these predictions had probably wrought on the mind of his wife, Calpurnia, so that, on the night that preceded that dreaded day, her rest was broken by feverish dreams, and in the morning her impression of fear was so strong, that she earnestly besought her husband not to stir from home. He himself, we are told, felt himself a little unwell;[3] and being thus more ready to be infected by superstitious fears, he was inclined to comply with Calpurnia's wishes, and allowed some part of the morning to pass away, and the senate to be already assembled, without having as

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. p. 240. lib. xliv. p. 249. Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 63. Suetonius, c. 87.

[2] Plutarch, ibid. Suetonius, c. 81.

[3] Suetonius, ibid.

yet quitted his house. At such a moment the conspirators were alive to every suspicion; and, becoming uneasy at his delay, Decimus Brutus, was sent to call on him,[1] and to persuade him to attend the senate, by urging to him the offence that he would naturally give, if he appeared to slight that body at the very moment when they were preparing to confer on him the title of King. Decimus Brutus visited Cæsar, and being entirely in his confidence, his arguments were listened to, and Cæsar set out about eleven o'clock to go to the Senate-house. When he was on his way thither, Artemidorus of Cnidus, a Greek Sophist, who was admitted into the houses of some of the conspirators, and had there become acquainted with some facts that had excited his suspicions, approached him with a written statement of the information which he had obtained, and putting it into his hand, begged him to read it instantly, as it was of the last importance. Cæsar, it is said, tried to look at it, but he was prevented by the crowd which pressed around him, and by the numerous writings of various sorts that were presented to him as he passed along. Still, however, he held it in his hand, and continued to keep it there when he entered the Senate-house.

B.C. 55.

He is nearly warned in time of his danger.

M. Antonius, who was at this time Cæsar's colleague in the Consulship, was on the point of following him into the Senate, when C. Trebonius called him aside,[2] and detained him without by professing to desire some conversation with him. It is said that some of the conspirators had wished to include him in the fate of Cæsar; but Brutus had objected to it as a piece of unnecessary bloodshed; and when it was remembered that he himself, not along ago, had proposed to Trebonius the very act which they were now about to perform, they consented that his life should not be endangered. Meantime, as Cæsar entered the Senate-house, all the senators arose to receive him. The conspirators had contrived to surround his person in

Antonius is taken aside by Trebonius at the entrance of the Senate.



[Curule Chair.]

[1] Suetonius, c. 81. Plutarch, c. 64.
[2] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 14. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 84.

B.C. 55. the street, and they now formed his immediate train as he passed on to the Curule chair, which had been prepared, as usual, for his reception. That chair had been placed near the pedestal of a statue of Pompey the Great; for the building in which the Senate was assembled had been one of Pompey's public works;[1] and it is said that Cassius,[2] labouring under the strong feeling of the moment, turned himself to the image, and seemed to implore its assistance in the deed which was to be perpetrated.

Assassination of Cæsar, March 15.

When Cæsar had taken his seat, the conspirators gathered more closely around him, and L. Tillius Cimber approached him as if to offer some petition,[3] which he continued to press with vehemence when Cæsar seemed unwilling to grant it, and the other conspirators
B.C. 45. joined in supporting his request. At last, when Cæsar appeared impatient of further importunity, Cimber took hold of his robe and pulled it down from his shoulders—an action which was the signal agreed upon with his associates for commencing their attack, and it is said that the dagger of P. Casca took the lead in the work of blood, and that Cæsar, in the first instant of surprise, attempted to resist and to force his way through the circle which surrounded him. But when all the conspirators rushed upon him, and were so eager to have a share in his death, that they wounded one another in the confusion, he drew his robe closely around him, and having covered his face fell without a struggle or a groan. He received three and twenty wounds, and it was observed that the blood, as it streamed from them, bathed the pedestal of Pompey's statue. No sooner was the murder finished than M. Brutus,[4] raising his gory dagger in his hand, turned round towards the assembled Senators, and called on Cicero by name, congratulating him on the recovery of their country's liberty. But to preserve order at such a moment was hopeless: the Senators fled in dismay; Antonius made haste to escape to his house; and a universal consternation was spread through the city, till the conspirators, going in a body to the Forum, addressed the people, and by assuring them that no violence was intended to any one, but that their only object had been to assert the liberty of Rome, they succeeded in restoring comparative tranquillity. Still, however, distrusting the state of the popular feeling, they withdrew into the Capital which Decimus Brutus had secured with a band of gladiators whom he retained in



[Marcus Brutus.]

1 "*Curia Pompeia.*" Cicero, *de Divinatione*, lib. ii. c. 9.
2 Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 66.
3 Suetonius, c. 82. Plutarch, c. 66.
4 Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 12. 35. Dion Cassius, lib. xliv. p. 249, 250.

his service; and there, having been joined by several of the nobility, B.C. 45. they passed the first night after the murder. Meanwhile, the body of Cæsar was left for some hours, amidst the general confusion, on the spot where it fell,[1] till at last three of his slaves placed it on a litter, and carried it home, one of the arms hanging down on the outside of the litter, and presenting a ghastly spectacle. It was asserted by the surgeon, who examined the wounds, that, out of so many, one alone was mortal; that, namely, which he had received in the breast when he first attempted to break through the circle of his assassins.

Character of Cæsar.

Cæsar is said to have been in his stature tall,[2] and of a fair complexion, but with black and lively eyes. In attention to his person and dress he almost exceeded the bounds of mere neatness; and in gratifying his tastes for villas, furniture, pictures, statues, and in the choice of his slaves, he was accustomed to spare no expense or trouble. He was temperate in his eating and drinking, as became a soldier; and his activity of body corresponded with the extraordinary vigour of his mind. It is a remarkable feature in his character, that he seems to have been alive to so many and such various enjoyments; excessively addicted to gross sensualities, a lover of every kind of intellectual gratification, from the humblest of the fine arts to the highest and deepest parts of philosophy, enamoured at the same time of popular honours, and, above all things, ambitious of political greatness. He is said to have composed two books,[3] "*On the Method of speaking Latin with the greatest Propriety*," while he was crossing the Alps on his return from his winter quarters in the north of Italy to rejoin his army in Gaul; and on another occasion he wrote a poem entitled *The Journey*, while he was travelling into Spain with the utmost rapidity to oppose the progress of the sons of Pompey in the year B.C. 44. His *Commentaries*, which alone, of all his writings, have reached posterity, are admirably calculated to answer the purpose for which they were designed, the impressing his readers with the most favourable notions of himself. Although the representations which they contain are a continued picture of his abilities and successes, yet, because they are given in a quiet and unpretending style, they have gained credit for truth and impartiality; and critics, in their simplicity, have extolled the modesty of the author, because he speaks of himself in the third person. As a general, it is needless to pronounce his eulogy; we may observe, however, that the quality which most contributed to his success on several occasions, was his great activity; and although this may seem a virtue no way peculiar to men of superior minds, yet in the practical business of life there is none which produces more important results. Nor is it,

His Commentaries.

[1] Suetonius, c. 82.
[2] Ibid. c. 45, 46, 47.
[3] Cicero, *de claris Oratoribus*, c. 72. Suetonius, c. 56.

B.C. 45. in fact, an ordinary quality, when exhibited in persons invested with extensive power; for then it implies quickness and decision in difficulties, than which nothing confers on one man a more commanding superiority over others. In his political career, Cæsar was at once patient and daring; and the uniform success of all his schemes through so many years, must prove his judgment in the choice of means to accomplish his purposes. One weakness he seems to have possessed, and that was vanity; which he indulged unseasonably and fatally in receiving so greedily the honours which were at last heaped upon him, and in disgusting the public feeling by expressing, with so little reserve, his sense of his own superiority. The submissions which he met with were, indeed, enough to excite his arrogance; for not the most servile flattery of our own clergy and lawyers to the Tudor and Stuart Princes can equal the meanness and extravagance of the language addressed to Cæsar by the Republican Romans. In fact, we see from different parts of Cicero's works, and particularly from many of the letters inserted in the collection of his correspondence, that the expressions used by inferiors towards their superiors in rank, seem to imply very little independence of feeling in the bulk of the Roman people; and the excessive compliments which Cicero delighted to receive, and which he paid with equal liberality, betray a littleness and indelicacy of mind which we should not have expected to meet with in men of high birth and station, the citizens of a free commonwealth.

His Politics.

His moral Character.

If from the intellectual we turn to the moral character of Cæsar, the whole range of history can hardly furnish a picture of greater deformity. Never did any man occasion so large an amount of human misery, with so little provocation. In his campaigns in Gaul, he is said to have destroyed one million of men in battle,[1] and to have made prisoners a million more, many of whom were destined to perish as gladiators, and all were torn from their country and reduced to slavery. The slaughter which he occasioned in the civil wars cannot be computed: nor can we estimate the degree of suffering caused in every part of the Empire by his spoliations and confiscations, and by the various acts of extortion and oppression which he tolerated in his followers. When we consider that the sole object of his conquests in Gaul was to enrich himself and to discipline his army, that he might be enabled the better to attack his country; and that the sole provocation on which he commenced the civil war, was the resolution of the Senate to recall him from a command

[1] Plutarch, *in Cæsare*, c. 15. Pliny has estimated the sum with greater minuteness, probably from the returns exhibited at Cæsar's Triumphs of the number of enemies whom he had destroyed. He makes the persons whom Cæsar had killed in war to amount altogether to one million one hundred and ninety-two thousand, exclusive of those who had perished in the civil war, and of whom no account was taken. Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* lib. vii. c. 25.

which he had already enjoyed for nine years, after having obtained B.C. 45.
it in the beginning by tumult and violence; we may judge what credit ought to be given him for his clemency in not opening lists of proscription after his sword had already cut off his principal adversaries, and had levelled their party with the dust. Yet, after all his crimes, the circumstances of his death render him almost an object of compassion; and though it cannot be said of his assassins, that

> "Their greater crime made his like specks appear,
> From which the sun in glory is not clear,"

yet we naturally sympathize with the victim, when the murderers, by having abetted or countenanced his offences, had deprived themselves of all just title to punish them, and when his fall was only accomplished by the treachery of assassination.



[Remains of the Palace of the Cæsars, on Mount Palatine.— *Venuti, Antichita di Roma.*]



[Augustus.—*Museum Florentinum.*]

CAIUS OCTAVIUS CÆSAR AUGUSTUS.

PART I.

CONTAINING A VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF ROME.

FROM B.C. 45 TO B.C. 32.

B.C. 45. WE have already spoken slightly of the family of Augustus Cæsar, and have mentioned his relationship to C. Julius Cæsar, as being the grandson of his sister Julia. Julia married M. Attius Balbus, a native of Aricia.[1] who rose to the rank of prætor at Rome; and Attia, their daughter, married C. Octavius, a man of respectable family, who also obtained the same dignity, and died when he was on the point of offering himself as a candidate for the consulship. He left behind him one son, C. Octavius, who was born at Rome on the twenty-third of September, B.C. 32, in the consulship of M. Cicero and C. Antonius. The young Octavius lost his father when he was only four years old; and his mother soon after married L. Philippus, under whose care he was brought up, till his great uncle, Julius Cæsar, having no children, began to regard him as his heir,[2] and when he was between sixteen and seventeen years of age bestowed on him some military rewards at the celebration of his triumph for his victories in Africa.[3] In the following year he accompanied his uncle into Spain, where he is said to have given signs of talents and of activity; and in the winter of the same year he

Parentage and early life of Augustus.

[1] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 4.
[2] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 85.
[3] Suetonius, c. 8.

was sent, as we have seen, to Apollonia in Epirus, there to employ himself in completing his education till Cæsar should be ready to take him with him on his expedition against the Parthians. He was accordingly living quietly at Apollonia when the news of his uncle's death called him forward, when hardly more than eighteen years of age, to act a principal part in the contentions of the times. B.C. 45.

State of affairs in Rome, after Cæsar's death.

On the morning of the sixteenth of March, Brutus and Cassius with their associates were still in the Capitol, and Cicero and several other persons attached to the aristocratical party,[1] had joined them there. Antonius finding himself exposed to no danger, appeared again in public, as consul; and Dolabella,[2] who had been appointed by Cæsar to succeed him in the consulship, as soon as he should commence his expedition against the Parthians, now at once assumed the ensigns of that dignity; although with strange inconsistency he went up into the Capitol to visit the conspirators, and, if Appian may be believed,[3] strongly inveighed against the late dictator in a speech addressed to the multitude in the Forum. M. Lepidus, who as we have seen, was at this time invested with a military command, having been lately appointed to the government of the Nearer Spain, had some intentions, it is said, of availing himself of his actual power to establish himself in the place of Cæsar;[4] but Antonius, who had no wish to see his own views thus anticipated, easily prevailed upon him to lay aside such designs for the present; representing to him, we may suppose, the danger of such an attempt, and encouraging him with the prospect of obtaining hereafter all that he desired, if he would consent to temporize at the moment. But the real obstacle to the restoration of the commonwealth consisted in the numbers and dispositions of Cæsar's veteran soldiers, many of whom were waiting in Rome to receive their promised allotments of land; and others had come up from their new settlements to compliment their old general, by attending in his train when he should march out of the city to commence his eastern expedition.[5] These then naturally resented the death of their benefactor, and feared at the same time lest they should be deprived of their grants of land if he were declared a tyrant, and his acts should be reversed. They were therefore a great encouragement to Antonius and Lepidus, and gave such alarm to the conspirators, that they remained in the Capitol, still trusting to the gladiators of Decimus Brutus for protection, and not venturing to expose their persons in the streets or in the Forum. Nor were the veterans the only set of men who were interested in upholding the legality of Cæsar's government. He had nominated as we have seen, the prin-

Dispositions of the veterans,

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 35.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xliv. p. 250.
[3] *De Bell. Civil.* lib. ii. c. 122.
[4] Ibid. lib. xliv. p, 257.
[5] Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. ii. c. 119.

B.C. 45. cipal magistrates of the commonwealth for the next two years, under pretence of preventing any disorders during his absence in Asia: and the individuals, who, by virtue of these appointments, were either in the actual enjoyment or in the expectation of offices, either honourable or lucrative, were little disposed to submit their pretensions to the chance of being confirmed or rejected by the free votes of the Roman people. Besides the late civil war had so extended over every part of the empire, and every province contained so many persons who had risen to affluence or distinction in consequence of the offices or of the grants of forfeited estates conferred on them by Cæsar, that to repel all his measures, and to brand his government as an usurpation, would have at once unsettled the whole existing order of society. The foreigners who had been admitted to the rights of Roman citizens, and the many individuals who, in the course of the late commotions, had risen from humble stations to greatness, would have ill brooked the return of that exclusive and insulting system, which was upheld by the friends of the old aristoracy.

And of those in office.

Under these circumstances, the act of the assassins of Cæsar was likely to have no other effect than to expose their country to a fresh series of miseries, from which it would have no better prospect of relief, than a return at last to that very military despotism which they had so rashly attempted to overthrow. Cicero indeed had advised the only measure which could have given the conspirators any chance of maintaining their ground in Rome;[1] for he had urged Brutus and Cassius to summon the senate, by their authority as prætors, to assemble in the Capitol immediately after Cæsar's death; before Antonius had recovered from his panic, or the veterans had had time to calculate their own strength or to look out for a new leader. But this counsel was not followed; and it was left for Antonius, in his character of consul, to call the senate together at the Temple of the Earth on the seventeenth of March,[2] when the doors of the assembly were beset with Cæsar's veterans in arms, and when they who hoped that they had restored the old constitution of the commonwealth dared not even to leave the shelter of the Capitol. Nor was it a slight circumstance, that Calpurnia, Cæsar's widow, had put into Antonius's hands the money and all the papers of her late husband,[3] a trust from which he intended to derive the most important benefits.

Meeting of the Senate on the seventeenth of March.

In the meeting of the senate on the seventeenth of March, the reviving strength of Cæsar's party was already distinctly marked. Instead of declaring him a tyrant, it was ordered that the late dictator should be honoured with the usual funeral rites paid to dis-

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. x.
[2] Ibid. lib. xiv. epist. xiv. and *Philippic.* ii. c. 35.
[3] Appian, lib. ii. c. 125.

tinguished persons,[1] and that Antonius should deliver to the multitude an oration in his praise. All his acts were confirmed; his appointments of public officers for the next two years, were pronounced valid; and all the grants of lands made to the veterans, were to be preserved inviolable. In return for these concessions, the partisans of Cæsar acceded to Cicero's proposal,[2] that the whole transaction of the Ides of March should be consigned to oblivion, and that all hostile designs should be relinquished on all sides. Antonius in particular expressed himself warmly in favour of a general and lasting peace; and this being the prevailing feeling of the assembly, the act of oblivion was passed; Antonius sent his son to the Capitol as a hostage for his sincerity. The principal conspirators then descended from it; and we are told that Brutus that same evening supped with Lepidus, and Cassius with Antonius.[3] B.C. 45. A general Act of Amnesty passes.

After this apparent termination of all dissensions, the conduct of Antonius was exceedingly artful. He frequently invited the most distinguished members of the senate to his house, and consulted them as to the measures which it would be expedient to pursue. On the other hand, by coming forward to deliver Cæsar's funeral oration, he gave the veterans reason to understand that he was really attached to their late commander, and would not fail when an opportunity should offer, to act upon his real sentiments. In the meantime Cæsar's will was opened and read: and it appeared that C. Octavius was named the heir to the greatest part of the property,[4] and that he was adopted into the name and family of Cæsar. Several of the conspirators had been appointed guardians to Cæsar's son, if ever he should have one; and Decimus Brutus, as has been said before, was mentioned amongst those who were to inherit his fortune, in case of the failure of his regular heirs. To the Roman people Cæsar bequeathed his gardens on the right bank of the Tiber; and to each citizen a sum of money amounting to about £2 8s. His funeral was prepared in a style of great magnificence;[5] the pile on which the body was to be consumed had been raised in the *Campus Martius;* and a small model of the Temple of *Venus Genitrix*, which he had built and dedicated, was placed in front of the *Rostra* in order to receive the bier, whilst the funeral oration was delivered. The bier was made of ivory, and covered with scarlet and gold, and at the head of it was displayed on a pole the very dress in which he had been assassinated. In the dramatic entertainments which were got up as a part of the solemnity, passages were selected from the plays of Pacuvius and Attius, which the Cæsar's will opened. Cæsar's Funeral.

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. vi., ix., x. *Philippic.* i. c. 1, 7.
[2] Cicero, *Philippic*, i. c. 1, 13; Ibid. ii. c. 36.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xliv. p. 257. Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 19.
[4] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 84. [5] Ibid. c. 84.

B.C. 45. audience might readily apply to the circumstances of Cæsar's fate; particularly one line from Pacuvius,

——————— Was I so merciful,
But to provide assassins for myself?

When, then, Antonius came forward in the *Rostra* to speak the funeral oration, he ordered the crier to read aloud to the multitude all the decrees of the Senate, by which Cæsar had been invested with many and such extraordinary honours, and the oath which all the senators had taken to defend his person; after which he added only a few words of his own.[1] But his purpose had been sufficiently answered, and enough had been done to excite the feelings of the multitude, disposed as they were of themselves to remember Cæsar's brilliant achievements with admiration, and his liberalities with gratitude and regret. Instead of carrying the body to the *Campus Martius*, some proposed to burn it in the Temple of Jupiter in the Capitol, and others in the Senate-house of Pompey, which had been the scene of his murder. But on a sudden two of the veteran soldiers who attended the funeral, stept forward armed with their swords, and each holding two javelins in his hand, and set fire to the bier with lighted torches in the place where it was standing in the front of the *Rostra*. The flames were fed by the zeal of the surrounding crowd with a quantity of dry brush-wood, and with the benches and seats which were usually left in the *Forum*:—those who had brought offerings of various kinds to present them at the funeral pile now threw them in to increase the conflagration; the musicians and actors in the funeral games stripped off their dresses, and cast them also into the fire, several matrons added their own ornaments, and those of their children, while the veteran soldiers crowned the whole with the offering of their own arms. Groups of foreigners of various nations were seen expressing their grief according to the fashion of their several countries: and amongst these the Jews were particularly remarkable; their hatred to Pompey for the violation of the sanctity of their Temple having, perhaps, disposed them to support the cause of his adversary. When the populace were satiated with feeding the fire, they dispersed in all directions, bent upon violence and bloodshed. They attacked the houses of those persons who were known to be adverse to Cæsar;[2] and especially those of the chief conspirators, Brutus and Cassius, whence they were driven off by force of arms, as in the old disorders and contests between Clodius and Milo. In the midst of their fury, they fell in with a man by name Helvius Cinna; and mistaking him for Cornelius Cinna, who had given great

His body burned in the Forum.

Riots of the populace on that occasion.

[1] *Perpauca à se verba addidit*—Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 84. Dion Cassius makes him deliver a speech on this occasion which occupies nearly nine folio pages. He had just before filled six pages with a speech which he ascribes to Cicero, and which is about as genuine as the pretended funeral oration of Antonius.

[2] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 36. Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 85.

offence by a speech delivered the day before, full of invective against Cæsar, they instantly murdered him, and carried his head about with them on the end of a pike. This display of the temper of the populace served the purposes of Antonius by intimidating the conspirators; but as he designed to establish his power on a surer basis than the support of a riotous rabble, he appeared to give no countenance to their excesses. A mixed multitude consisting of slaves, and foreigners, and citizens of the lowest class, erected a marble pillar,[1] twenty feet high, in the Forum, with an inscription declaring it to be dedicated to Cæsar, under the title of "Father of his Country." Close by this pillar there was an altar raised, on which sacrifices continued for some time to be offered to Cæsar as a god; and parties at variance with one another would come to this spot, and decide their quarrels by an oath in Cæsar's name. The groups that used to assemble round this column menaced the capital daily with scenes of outrage similar to those which had been exhibited at Cæsar's funeral, till P. Dolabella proceeded to disperse them, and, with the usual summary severity of a Roman magistrate, crucified a number of the slaves, and threw down from the Tarpeian rock those free citizens who were most forward in exciting these disturbances.[2] It is said that when Dolabella returned to his house after these executions, he was followed by a crowd of all ranks of persons, testifying their admiration of his conduct—that he received similar applauses shortly afterwards in the theatre—and that Cicero was warmly complimented by his friends on this earnest of patriotic intentions which his son-in-law had afforded.[3]

B.C. 45.

Dolabella disperses the rioters.

Antonius had also on opportunity about the same time of gaining the good opinion of the higher classes of citizens by acting in a similar manner. There was a man of very low origin, of the name of C. Amatius, who, some months before, in the lifetime of Cæsar, had claimed to be the grandson of the famous Marius, and had applied to Cicero as a relation and townsman of Marius,[4] to support him in making good his pretensions. Cicero was not disposed to commit himself by maintaining such a cause; but the name of Marius was popular amongst a large proportion of the common people, and we are told that almost all the companies of the different trades in Rome,[5] together with some of the newly-founded colonies of the veterans, and even some considerable free towns of Italy, believed the story of Amatius, and chose him to be their patron. He was followed also by a considerable multitude when he appeared in the streets; till Cæsar, impatient of such a rival in popularity, issued a decree to banish him from Italy.

Story of C. Amatius, the pretended grandson of Marius.

[1] Suetonius, c. 85. Cicero, *Philippic.* i. c. 2.
[2] Cicero, *Philippic.* i. c. 2, 12; *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. xvi.; *ad Familiares*, lib. ix. epist. xiv.
[3] Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxvi.
[4] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xii. epist. xlix.
[5] Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. 15.

B.C. 45. But after the Ides of March he returned again to Rome, and professed, as the descendant of Marius, to feel particular regret for the murder of his relation, Cæsar; insomuch that he continually instigated the populace to take vengeance on the conspirators, and under this pretence had formed a design, as we are told,[1] to massacre the principal senators of the aristocratical party, and to rule in Rome as L. Saturninus and P. Sulpicius had done in former times. But the days were past in which ambition could hope to rise by the mere support of the turbulent rabble of the capital. Antonius, glad perhaps to please and to blind his opponents so cheaply, employed a military force against Amatius, and, having arrested him, ordered him to be put to death in prison, in pursuance of a decree of the Senate, and caused his body to be dragged by a hook through the streets, and to be thrown into the Tiber. This execution took place about the middle of April;[2] and up to this period Antonius had appeared desirous, in several instances, to maintain the old constitution of the commonwealth. To lessen the dissatisfaction that might be felt by many at the confirmation of all the acts of Cæsar,[3] he assured the Senate that Cæsar's papers contained no grants of privileges or peculiar exemptions of any sort, and that they directed the recall of only one exile, Sex. Clodius: he agreed, moreover, to the motion of Ser. Sulpicius, that none of Cæsar's decrees or grants should be published, which had not already been announced by public advertisement before the Ides of March. Above all, he proposed that the office of dictator should be for ever abolished—a proposal which was most joyfully acceded to by the Senate, and for which they bestowed on him their thanks in the warmest terms. His treatment of C. Amatius combining with his behaviour in all these instances, is said to have given satisfaction even to Brutus himself;[4] and seemed to afford so fair a prospect of future tranquillity, that Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, expresses his belief that Brutus might now go in safety through the Forum, with a cover of gold upon his head.[5]

The office of Dictator is abolished by Antonius.

But these hopes were chequered by fears even from the beginning, and it was not long before they were destroyed altogether. The tumults in the city, and the threatening language held by Cæsar's veterans, who were now assembled at Rome in great numbers, rendered the situation of the conspirators so unsafe, or at least so uncomfortable, that they judged it expedient to withdraw for the present out of the reach of danger. At first they had remained in their own houses at Rome, and had only avoided appearing in public;[6] but

The conspirators retire from Rome.

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* i. c. 2. Valerius Maximus, *ubi supra.* Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. iii. c. 2, 3.
[2] Conf. Ciceron. *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. vii., viii.
[3] Ibid. *Philippic.* i. c. 1.
[4] Ibid. *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. viii.
[5] Ibid. lib. xiv. epist. xvi.
[6] Ibid. lib. xiv. epist. v.

when the disorders continued, they thought it best to remove to a greater distance; and accordingly Brutus, apparently accompanied by Cassius, retired to his own villa at Lanuvium;[1] Trebonius set out in the most private manner to go to his province of Asia; and Decimus Brutus hastened to Cisalpine Gaul,[2] to secure the command of that province, which Cæsar, as has been already noticed, had conferred on him before his death. This appears to have been a sudden resolution; for there is extant a letter from Decimus Brutus to M. Brutus and Cassius,[3] dated in the month of April, in which he speaks in a very desponding manner of the state of his party, and says that they have no other resource but to withdraw into a voluntary exile; that they can do nothing at present, as they have no military force to support them, nor was there any quarter to which they could look for aid, except to the camp of Sex. Pompeius in Spain, and of Q. Cæcilius Bassus in Syria. Yet on the twenty-sixth of April Cicero had received intelligence from Atticus, that Decimus Brutus had already joined his legions in Cisalpine Gaul; and in that province he remained during the whole summer, endeavouring to strengthen himself to the utmost against any attempts of his adversaries. In order to acquire some reputation for himself, and to obtain the means of attaching his soldiers to him by his liberality, he employed his time in attacking some of the Gaulish tribes who inhabited the Alps;[4] and having taken many of their strongholds, and wasted their country, he received from his army the title of *Imperator*, and was enabled, as he hoped, to gratify it with a large share of plunder.

B.C. 44.

Decimus Brutus takes possession of Cisalpine Gaul.

Soon after the departure of the conspirators from Rome, Antonius proceeded to show the use which he intended to make of the confirmation of Cæsar's acts by the Senate. In spite of the restriction to which he had himself assented, that no new grant should be published after the Ides of March, Antonius is accused of having commenced a system of audacious forgeries,[5] affixing notices in the *Forum* of all sorts of donations and immunities, both to states and private individuals, which he pretended to have discovered amongst Cæsar's papers; but which he is charged with having invented at his own discretion, and sold as an unfailing source of revenue to himself. Besides all this, he is taxed with having appropriated an immense treasure which Cæsar had acquired by his confiscations and plunderings, and had deposited in the Temple of Ops. With this money Antonius is said to have discharged the debts of his colleague Dolabella, and to have thus secured him to his own interests; at the

Antonius forges grants in Cæsar's name, and sells them for his own benefit.

[1] Conf. Ciceron. *ad Atticum*, epist. vii., x.
[2] Ibid. epist. xiii.
[3] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xi. epist. i.
[4] Ibid. lib. xi. epist. iv.
[5] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 86. Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 37, 38; *Philippic.* v. c. 4; *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. xii., xviii.

B.C. 44. same time he found his power of selling forged grants so profitable to himself, that, if we may believe Cicero, he paid all his own debts to the amount of above £300,000 in the short interval that elapsed between the Ides of March and the first of April.

He courts Cæsar's veteran soldiers.

In order to obviate effectually all opposition to his views, he made a progress through several parts of Italy in the months of April and May,[1] in which he took occasion to address himself to Cæsar's veterans in their different settlements, and to conjure them to bind themselves by oath to maintain all Cæsar's acts; and to procure the appointment of two commissioners to inspect his papers every month, in order to decide whether all their provisions were duly carried into effect. He also spread a report, that the veterans would be most nearly concerned in the discussion which was to take place in the Senate on the first of June;[2] and this rumour induced them, as he intended, to assemble in crowds at Rome, so that it became unsafe for the conspirators or their friends to be present at the meeting. Yet, during all this time, Antonius preserved an appearance of respect and civility towards Brutus and Cassius. He had prevailed on them to dismiss their friends, who had assembled from several of the municipal towns of Italy to protect them, assuring them that it would be wise to avoid every appearance of suspicion or hostility; and he had also proposed to the Senate that Brutus should be dispensed from the observation of the law,[3] which forbade a prætor to be more than ten days absent from Rome. He wrote also to Cicero in very friendly language, requesting him to consent to the restoration of Sex. Clodius from exile; and telling him, that although he might be bound in duty to restore him, as his recall had been one of Cæsar's acts, yet he would not press the point, unless Cicero was willing to agree to it. Cicero, in return, assured Antonius of his perfect readiness to comply with his request; and added, that both on public and private grounds there was no man for whom he entertained a higher regard.[4] Such was his language towards the end of the month of April: in the September following he delivered his first Philippic.

C. Octavius returns to Italy from Epirus.

In the meantime the tidings of Cæsar's murder had reached his nephew C. Octavius at Apollonia; whither, as we have before-mentioned, he had been sent to complete his education, and to be in readiness also to attend his uncle when he should set out on his expedition into Parthia. As the probable heir of Cæsar's greatness, he already received many attentions from the officers of the army which was then quartered in Macedonia; and when Cæsar's death was known, M. Vipsanius, Agrippa, and Q. Sabidienus Rufus, who

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 39; *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. xxi.
[2] Ibid. *ad Familiares*, lib. xi. epist. ii.
[3] Ibid. *Philippic.* ii. c. 13.
[4] Ibid. *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. xiii. B. *Nam quum te semper amavi, primum tuo studio, post etiam beneficio provocatus: tum his Temporibus Respublica cte mihi ita commendavit, ut cariorem habeam neminem.*

are here first spoken of as his friends,[1] advised him to embrace the offers which many of the soldiers and centurions made him, of assisting him to revenge his uncle's murder. But as he was not yet aware of the strength of that party which he would find opposed to him, he judged it expedient in the first instance to return to Italy in a private manner. On his arrival at Brundusium he learned the particulars of Cæsar's death, and was informed also of the contents of his will,[2] by which himself was declared his heir, and his adopted son. He did not hesitate instantly to accept this adoption, and to assume the name of Cæsar; and, it is said, numerous parties of his uncle's veterans, who had obtained settlements in the districts of Italy through which he passed, came from their homes to meet him, and to assure him of their support.[3] He arrived at Neapolis on the eighteenth of April,[4] and had an interview there with L. Balbus, who had been so long the confidential friend of Cæsar, and who reported to Cicero, on the very same day, that Octavius was resolved to accept the inheritance bequeathed to him. From Neapolis he proceeded to see his mother, and his father-in-law, L. Philippus, at their villa near Puteoli. It happened that Cicero was at this time at his own villa, which was almost close to that of Philippus,[5] and not only L. Balbus, but A. Hirtius and C. Pansa were also staying in the same neighbourhood. Octavius, doubtless, consulted these old adherents of his uncle with some anxiety, as to the prospects which were opened to him at Rome; he expressed, however, great respect and regard for Cicero, as he was disposed at present to conciliate persons of every party; although Cicero, in conformity with the example of L. Philippus, did not address him by the name of Cæsar. It is said, indeed, that both his mother and his father-in-law earnestly dissuaded him from coming forward as his uncle's heir, and from availing himself of his adoption into the Julian family;[6] but his own resolution was taken, and he continued his journey to Rome without loss of time. On his arrival in the capital, he requested an interview with M. Antonius, hoping, probably, to form at once a coalition with him, in order to take vengeance on the perpetrators of his uncle's murder; but Antonius was at this time in the height of his power, as the executor, in a manner, of Cæsar's grants and ordinances; nor was he disposed to admit such an associate as Octavius, who, as the relation and heir of Cæsar, would naturally take the highest place in any party that might be formed to avenge his death. Accordingly he treated him with great coolness, and declined any co-operation with him; upon which, Octavius, not at

B.C. 45.

He is coolly received by Antonius.

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 85.
[2] Dion Cassius. lib. xlv. p. 271. Velleius Paterculus, *ubi supra*.
[3] Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. iii. c. 12.
[4] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. x.
[5] Ibid. lib. xi. epist. xii.
[6] Velleius Peterculus, lib. ii. c. 86. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 8.

B.C 44. all discouraged, proceeded to exhibit some games to the people in honour of Cæsar's victories,[1] the management of which was undertaken by two of Cæsar's old friends, Matius and Postumius. It was on this occasion that Octavius ventured to exhibit Cæsar's State chair, which the senate had allowed him to use, whenever he appeared in public; but the Tribunes of the people ordered it to be removed; and it appears that the whole of the Equestrian order loudly applauded them for doing so. It is said, too, that Antonius, in this instance, supported the Tribunes;[2] and that he also opposed the views which Octavius entertained of being elected Tribune himself,[3] in the place of one of that body who happened to die about this time. Irritated at this behaviour, Octavius began to turn his attention to the aristocratical party,[4] to speak with apparent respect of Brutus and Cassius, and seem desirous of courting the friendship of Cicero. In the meantime he exerted himself more earnestly to secure to himself the attachment of the legions,[5] well knowing that if he could gain their support, he might make his own terms either with Antonius, or with the aristocracy.

We may suppose that Antonius felt himself greatly strengthened by the favourable reception which Cæsar's colonies of veterans had given him, during his progress through different parts of Italy in the months of April and May. The expectations of the veterans were raised by the reports so industriously spread, that their interests would be nearly concerned in the measures to be proposed at Rome when the Senate should assemble on the first of June; and it was probably whispered among them, that the aristocratical party would endeavour to recall or to diminish the grants of land which they were at present enjoying. Suspicions of a similar kind were, indeed, not confined to the soldiers and inferior officers, but were shared largely by those who had been most familiarly connected with Cæsar, by Balbus, Hirtius, Oppius, Matius, and by their friends in general. Assassination is a crime which, when once practised or defended by a political party, must render it impossible for their opponents to trust them again; and while Cæsar's friends regarded the late Dictator as the victim of his own unsuspecting confidence, they naturally imagined that the conspirators and their friends assumed the language

Cæsar's friends are suspicious of the designs of the Aristocratical party.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xi. epist. xxviii.; *ad Atticum*, lib. xv. epist. iii.

[2] Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 16. Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. iii. c. 30.

[3] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 10. Appian, lib. iii. c. 31. Dion Cassius, lib. xlv. p. 272.

[4] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xv. epist. xii.

[5] Ibid. lib. xv. epist. iv. dated the twenty-third of May. In this letter there occurs a passage which is given variously and corruptly in the MSS., but which Schüts in his edition has ventured to alter on conjecture, into *De Legione probè*. He supposes that Cicero alludes to a disposition manifested by one of the legions to take part against Antonius. That Octavius was intriguing with Cæsar's veterans is stated by Appian, lib. iii. c. 31; but none of them actually joined him in arms till a later period.

of moderation only whilst they were overawed by the populace and the veterans;[1] and that so soon as Decimus Brutus should have organized an army in Cisalpine Gaul, and Sex. Pompeius with his rapidly-increasing force should have arrived from Spain to join him, the aristocratical party would retract the concessions made in the Temple of the Earth on the seventeenth of March, and would annul all the acts of Cæsar's sovereignty, as they had formerly intended to do to those of his first Consulship. With regard to Brutus and Cassius themselves, although they were living in apparent privacy at Lanuvium, yet it was suspected that they were turning their views towards the eastern Provinces,[2] and were trusting to establish their ascendency over that portion of the empire. Their associate Trebonius was already gone to take possession of the Province of Asia. Q. Cæcilius Bassus was still in arms against Cæsar's officers in Syria; Deiotarus, King of Galatia,[3] whom Cæsar had deprived of a part of his dominions for his adherence to the cause of Pompey, had immediately, upon receiving tidings of Cæsar's death, reinstated himself in the territories which he had lost; the name of Cassius was highly respected in Syria, from the ability which he had shown in preserving the wreck of Crassus's army after the Parthian expedition, and more recently in conducting the operations of the Syrian squadron in Pompey's fleet, during the late civil wars; and there were in Greece and Macedonia many who had suffered severely from Cæsar's confiscations,[4] and who would therefore gladly contribute to aid the reviving cause of aristocracy. On all these accounts the better class of Cæsar's friends distrusted the fair professions of the conspirators, and dreaded the approach of a counter revolution; while Antonius and Dolabella, sharing these feelings perhaps themselves, and at any B.C. 44.

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xiv. epist. xxii. *Ὑπόθεσιν hanc habent, (scil Cæsariani,) eamque præ se ferunt, virum clarissimum interfectum, totam Rempublicam illius interitu perturbatam; irrita fore quæ illi egissent, simul ac desistamus timere; clementiam illi malo fuisse, quâ si usus non esset, nihil ei tale accidere potuisse.*

[2] It is asserted by Appian, lib. iii. c. 2, and by Florus, lib. iv. c. 7, that Macedonia and Syria had been assigned by Cæsar to Brutus and Cassius before his death; and Appian adds, that this appointment was confirmed by the senate on the seventeenth of March, but afterwards revoked by Antonius before the arrival of Octavius at Rome. But it is evident from Cicero, that this was not the case, and that Brutus and Cassius had not, like Trebonius and Decimus Brutus, any provinces of which they could claim the command, till the senate in the month of June or July, while appointing the prætors as usual to their provincial governments, bestowed on them respectively, Crete, and, as it appears, Cyrenaica. These proofs of the inaccuracy of the latter writers make us approach with regret to that period when we shall be obliged to follow them entirely, and when we shall lose the invaluable guidance of Cicero, whose letters are our only good authority for the transactions of these times.

[3] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 37.

[4] The people of Buthrotum in Epirus, for instance, are often spoken of in Cicero's letters as having had their lands confiscated by Cæsar for the benefit of his veterans. And the people of Dymè, in Achaia, being in the same predicament, had recourse to piracy about this very time, to afford them a maintenance. See Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xvi. epist. i.

B.C. 44. rate well aware of the policy of pretending to feel them, prepared to make these suspicions their own ground of justification for the violent course which they were now going to pursue.

The presence of the veterans at Rome, and the hostile feelings which they were said to entertain towards the friends of the old constitution, created an unwillingness on the part of the conspirators and their friends, to attend the approaching meeting of the Senate on the first of June. As the day drew nearer, the violent dispositions of the soldiers seemed likely to find a leader in Antonius; and the show of military force at his disposal was so menacing, that a considerable proportion of the Senators absented themselves from the capital;[1] and their absence furnished Antonius with a pretext for neglecting the authority of the Senate from this time forward. Accordingly, on the second of June,[2] a law was passed in the Assembly of the people, intrusting to the Consuls the entire cognizance of all Cæsar's Acts and measures, and thus sanctioning that absolute control which they already exercised, by having Cæsar's papers in their possession; and, it is added, his secretary in their pay.[3] Another law bestowed on Antonius the command of the Province of Cisalpine Gaul for six years,[4] together with the army which had been sent over into Greece by Cæsar, in preparation for his expedition against Parthia. This was in direct violation of Cæsar's law, which forbade the Consular Provinces to be given to any one for a longer period than two years; but, if we may believe Cicero,[5] the soldiers of Antonius occupied all the avenues to the Forum, and kept out all whom they thought likely to oppose the measure. At the same time Macedonia was given for two years, equally in defiance of Cæsar's law, to C. Antonius, the brother of Marcus, who was one of the Prætors for the year;[6] and P. Dolabella obtained the appointment to the Province of Syria.

Laws passed by Antonius and Dollabella.

On the fifth of June the Senate was again assembled,[7] and it was voted that Brutus should be sent into Asia, and Cassius into Sicily, to buy corn, and see that it was transported to Rome for the supply of the market of the capital. Brutus and Cassius were at this time at Antium,[8] and Cicero met them there on the eighth, and consulted with them on the propriety of accepting or refusing such an appointment. The commission to buy corn they considered as degrading; and Servilia, the mother of Brutus, who, from her intimacy with Cæsar, enjoyed considerable influence amongst the members of his

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 42.
[2] Ibid. *ad Atticum*, lib. xvi. epist. xvi.
[3] Ibid. lib. xiv. epist. xviii. Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. iii. c. 5.
[4] Ibid. *Philippic.* v. c. 3; Ibid. ii. c. 42; Ibid. i. c. 2, 8. Dion Cassius, lib. xlv. p. 274.
[5] *Philippic.* i. c. 1, 10; Ibid. v. c. 4.
[6] Cicero, *Philippic.* v. c. 3. Dion Cassius, lib. xlv. p. 274, 277.
[7] Ibid. *ad Atticum*, lib. xv. epist. ib.
[8] Ibid. epist. xi.

party, assured Cassius, who was particularly averse to it, that she would procure the repeal of that part of the Senate's decree which related to the corn. However, both Brutus and Cassius were invested with the character of public officers, and Provinces were voted to them in common with the other Prætors;[1] but whether the vote was passed at this time, or a few weeks later, does not sufficiently appear. It was proposed, we are told, by Antonius, and was accompanied by a permission to them to appoint a greater number of Lieutenants than was usually allowed; for Antonius had not yet laid aside the appearance of friendship towards them. Yet his other acts as Consul seemed to declare that he was not really inclined to content himself with the condition of a citizen in a free commonwealth. He brought forward at once an Agrarian law, a change in the constitution of the judicial power, and another in the manner of proceeding against persons charged with rioting, or with treasonable practices. So invariably did each new adventurer tread in the steps of his predecessors, and endeavour to re-open the door which they had successively hoped to shut against all future demagogues, so soon as they had themselves passed through it. By his Agrarian law, Antonius proposed to nominate a commission of seven persons,[2] who were to possess the usual exorbitant powers granted to such Commissioners in declaring what were national domains, and in distributing them at their pleasure. Their authority was so extensive, that Cicero hyperbolically describes them as empowered to divide the whole of Italy;[3] and it is mentioned that Campania,[4] together with some of the most valuable lands possessed by the commonwealth in Sicily, were amongst the districts to be subjected to their disposal. The Constitution of the judicial power had been, as we have seen, a frequent subject of dispute during the course of the last century; and one of Cæsar's late enactments had bestowed it, exclusively, on the senatorian and equestrian orders, and had repealed the more liberal provisions of the Aurelian law, by which it had been communicated also to some of the wealthiest class of the plebeians. Antonius, however, proposed not only to repeal Cæsar's restrictions, but to open the judicial power more indiscriminately than ever, by making any man eligible who had ever held the rank of Centurion;[5] and, in fact, by so removing all the qualifications formerly required, that common soldiers

B.C. 44.

Laws of Antonius.



[Marcus Antonius.—*Visconti Icon. Rom.*]

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 13.
[2] Ibid. *ad Atticum*, lib. xv. epist. xix.; *Philippic.* vi. c. 4.
[3] Ibid. *Philippic.* v. c. 3. [4] Ibid. ii. c. 39.
[5] Ibid. i. c. 8. Ibid. v. c. 5, 6.

B.C. 44. and naturalized foreigners might now become judges. His third and worst measure was, to allow an appeal to the people from all persons convicted, before the ordinary tribunals, of any acts in violation of the public peace;[1] a law which was, in fact, a promise of impunity to all who should be guilty of riots or seditions. These acts were all carried, it is said, by violence,[2] and in contempt of all the religious impediments with which their opponents attempted to obstruct their course. Antonius was openly escorted by armed men in the Forum, and in the Senate; and the veterans, whose grants of land he had taken care to confirm by the authority of the people, were present in crowds in the capital to support him against all opposition.

Growing animosity between Antonius and the conspirators.

While these proceedings were going on at Rome, Brutus and Cassius were chiefly at Antium, or in Campania; and both were preparing to pass over into Asia. Brutus was to exhibit some games at Rome in the early part of July;[3] but as he did not like to appear in the city himself, C. Antonius, as one of his colleagues in the Prætorship, undertook the management of them in his name. It was on this occasion that the people eagerly caught at some passages in one of the dramatic entertainments which seemed applicable to Brutus, and received them with enthusiastic applause. This, perhaps, irritated and alarmed Antonius; nor was he pleased that Brutus and Cassius, in one of their proclamations which they issued as Prætors, should have declared their intention still to absent themselves from Rome on account of the disordered state of the capital,[4] and that they were evidently preparing to leave Italy and repair to the eastern provinces. Antonius, in a counter proclamation, treated this language as a declaration of war, and threatened to have recourse to arms; his tone in his public speeches became more arrogant; and he was heard to say openly, that none could hope to save their lives, except their party should prove victorious;[5] which was, in other words, a denunciation of woe to the vanquished. L. Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law,[6] ventured to speak against Antonius in the Senate on the first of August, but no one supported him, and, finding all resistance hopeless, he forbore to attend in the Senate again. Yet soon after this it appears that Brutus and Cassius entertained the hope of organizing a more successful opposition;[7] for they sent letters to all the senators of Consular and Prætorian rank, requesting them to be

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* i. 9, 10.
[2] Ibid. i. c. 10; Ibid. ii. c. 42; Ibid. v. c. 4, 6, 7.
[3] Ibid. *ad Atticum*, lib. xv. epist. xxvi.; lib. xvi. epist. i., ii. Dion Cassius, lib. xlvii. p. 338.
[4] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xi. epist. iii.
[5] Ibid. *ad Atticum*, lib. xv. epist. xxii.; *Philippic.* v. c. 8, *nisi victorem, neminem victurum.*
[6] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xvi. epist. vii.; *Philippic.* i. c. 4, 6.
[7] Ibid. lib. xvi. epist. vii.

present in the Senate on the first of September; and on the seventeenth of August Brutus met Cicero at Velia; and finding that he had already renounced his design of leaving Italy, and was then returning to Rome, he expressed the greatest satisfaction at this change of purpose, and his hopes that Cicero was going to take an active part in the administration of the commonwealth. It is probable that Brutus and Cassius, being now fully resolved to secure to themselves, if possible, the resources of the eastern Provinces, were anxious to acquire such a support in the Senate as might free them from the charge of rebellion, and might ensure, for all their proceedings, the sanction of the Government at home. We cannot tell, however, by what means they hoped to deprive Antonius of his military superiority in Italy; and yet, while he retained it, they could not calculate on their party's obtaining the ascendency either in the Senate or in the Forum. Perhaps they trusted that many of Cæsar's old officers, and particularly Hirtius and Pansa, the two Consuls elect, were disgusted with the late conduct of Antonius, and would be able to counteract his influence over the minds of the soldiers.[1] But their plans and their cause were finally ruined by the interference of C. Octavius; who, taking to himself the part which Hirtius and Pansa might have performed sincerely and effectually, succeeded indeed in drawing away the army from Antonius, but only to attach it to himself; and coming forward as the heir and adopted son of Cæsar, rallied around him the whole strength of his uncle's adherents, and was thus enabled, eventually, to dictate terms to Antonius on the one hand, and on the other to crush for ever the reviving hopes of the aristocracy. B.C. 44.

Sex. Pompeius restored to his country by an agreement with Lepidus.

It was about this time that the aristocratical party lost an army, which, if it had existed for a few months longer, might have altered the whole complexion of affairs. We have already stated that Sex. Pompeius was in arms against the officers of Cæsar in Spain, at the period of Cæsar's assassination. He had been gradually increasing his strength, had defeated C. Asinius Pollio, Cæsar's lieutenant,[2] and had made himself master of New Carthage, and of most of the towns in what was called the Farther Spain. The tidings of Cæsar's death gave him great encouragement, and produced a general sensation in his favour: he had seven legions under his command, which constituted a formidable force, although they were probably composed chiefly of ill-disciplined troops, and might not perhaps have had their full complement in point of numbers. Thus circumstanced, he addressed a letter to the consuls at Rome, couched, according to Cicero, in firm but temperate language, in which he demanded his restoration to his country; and that all armies in every part of the empire should be equally disbanded. At the same time

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xv. epist. xxii. dated on the twenty-fifth of June.
[2] Ibid. lib. xvi. epist. iv. Dion Cassius, lib. xlv. p. 274, 275.

B.C. 44. he wrote to his father-in-law, M. Libo,[1] to say that he would conclude no peace unless he could recover the property of his father which had been confiscated by Cæsar, and sold to different individuals by public auction. The validity of these sales, as well as of all the rest of Cæsar's acts, had been recently confirmed by law; and, besides, Antonius himself had been the purchaser of Pompey's house at Rome, and was now actually residing in it; so that it was not likely to be given up without some compensation. But at this time M. Lepidus commanded the province of the Hither Spain;[2] and thus found himself exposed to the first attacks of an enemy who had already overrun the whole of the Farther Spain, and had defeated one of Cæsar's lieutenants in the field. Lepidus felt himself unequal to the contest, and was therefore warmly disposed to accede to all that Sex. Pompeius requested.[3] The Senate willingly confirmed what Lepidus had promised; and it was agreed that Sex. Pompeius should be restored to his country, and that a sum amounting to about £5,650,000 should be granted to him out of the treasury, to enable him to redeem his father's property. Satisfied with these conditions, Pompeius gave up his army, quitted the province in which he had so long maintained himself, and repaired to Massilia,[4] where he remained for some time in a state of suspense, not deeming it expedient or safe to return to Rome in the midst of those disorders which had now begun to distract the commonwealth.

Cicero commences his opposition to Antonius.

We have said that Cicero was met by Brutus at Velia on the seventeenth of August, and was requested by him to take an active part from henceforward in the management of public affairs,—in other words, to put himself at the head of the aristocratical party, and make one vigorous attempt to recover for them their ancient ascendency. This, indeed, was now become Cicero's fixed resolution; he thought he saw a more favourable opportunity for acting with effect than had occurred at any period of the late war between Cæsar and Pompey; and laying aside at last all hesitation, he went to Rome to commence his memorable career of opposition to Antonius, and to all the partisans of his revolutionary system. He arrived in the capital on the thirty-first of August, and on the following day the senate was to assemble, in order to vote a solemn thanksgiving to the gods in honour of Cæsar's exploits. According to his own account,[5] Cicero feeling some fatigue from his journey, and not considering the business on which the Senate was summoned to be very important, forbore to attend the meeting. His absence greatly exasperated Antonius, who interpreted it probably into an

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xvi. epist. iv.
[2] Ibid. *Philippic.* v. c. 14, 15; Ibid. xiii. c. 4, 5. Dion Cassius, lib. xlv. p. 275.
[3] *Quum Lepido omnes Imperatores forent meliores*, is the remark of Velleius Paterculus on another occasion, lib. ii. c. 89, and it is equally applicable here.
[4] Cicero, *Philippic.* xiii. c. 6. Appian. *de Bell Civil.* lib. iv. c. 84.
[5] Ibid. i. c. 5, *et seq.*

insinuation that it was useless to appear in the Senate while the debates of that body were overawed by a military force. Accordingly, Antonius spoke with great violence, and threatened to come and pull down Cicero's house, if he persisted in absenting himself. It was usual, we must remember, for the consuls to enforce the attendance of senators, either by a fine, or by seizing some article of their property, as a security for their appearance; but the threat of Antonius far exceeded the authority which any former consuls had been known to exercise in similar circumstances. On the following day, however, Cicero did attend the Senate, when Antonius in his turn was absent; and he then delivered the speech which is known by the name of the first Philippic Oration. It contains a strong condemnation of the measures which Antonius was pursuing, expressed however in temperate language, and unmixed with personalities; yet it gave Antonius the greatest offence. He summoned the senate to meet again on the nineteenth of September, and on that day replied to Cicero's attack upon his measures by a violent invective,[1] in which, amongst other things, he charged him with being an accomplice in Cæsar's murder, intending, as Cicero asserted, to excite the resentment of the veterans against him, and hoping that they would make some attempts on his life, if he ventured to appear in the Senate-house. But Cicero having suspected, whether justly or not, that he could not attend without danger, was resolved not to risk the experiment; and similar fears, he tells us, kept away P. Servilius, who had expressed the same sentiments as he had done on the second of September; and L. Piso, who had set the first example of opposition to Antonius, by his speech on the first of August. The famous oration, therefore, which is entitled the second Philippic, and which professes to have been spoken in the Senate on the nineteenth of September, in reply to the invectives of Antonius, was in reality never delivered at all; but was written by Cicero about this time, and sent to Atticus in the month of October, with an express caution that he would not let it be seen by those friends of Antonius who were in the habit of visiting at his house.[2] In fact, Cicero retired into the country soon afterwards, and remained for some time at one or other of his villas, only going to Rome at intervals, and leaving it again immediately. He thought that nothing could be done in the Senate till the new consuls entered upon their office; meantime an unexpected enemy suddenly came forward against Antonius, and attacked him with weapons more effectual than Cicero's eloquence.

B.C. 44.

C. Octavius comes forward against Antonius.

We have seen that C. Octavius had been coolly received by Antonius at his first arrival in Rome, after Cæsar's murder. It is said that, not content with slighting him as a political associate, Antonius

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* v. c. 7; *ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. ii.
[2] Ibid. *ad Atticum*, lib. xvi. epist. xi. *Caleni interventum et Calvenæ cavebis.*

B.C. 44. endeavoured to obstruct, or at least to delay, his adoption into the Julian family; as he could not claim the possession of his uncle's inheritance[1] till he had gone through the forms by which he became Cæsar's adopted son. On this provocation, Octavius resolved to do himself justice by the most atrocious means, and although he was only nineteen years of age, he suborned some ruffians to assassinate Antonius,[2] the consul of the republic, in his own house. The attempt was discovered in time, but it threw Antonius into the utmost perplexity and alarm. As it had not succeeded, a large portion of the people doubted its reality, and believed that the charge had been falsely brought forward against Octavius, in order to procure his ruin, that Antonius might enjoy his property without disturbance. So strong, in fact, was the public feeling, and so unpopular was Antonius at this period, that he did not think it advisable to bring his intended assassins to trial. But he trembled at the insecurity of his situation; and finding that Octavius was now leagued with his enemies, and being informed probably of the intrigues which he was carrying on with Cæsar's veterans, he thought that he should require the support of a stronger military force than the guard with which he had hitherto protected his person, and by which he had overawed the Senate and the Forum. In justice to his memory, we should remember, that the assassination of Cæsar might well have deterred him from exposing himself in a similar manner to the daggers of the conspirators or of their partisans; and that when Cicero so loudly complains of the introduction of a barbarian guard into the Senate-house, he should have reflected that the crime committed by his own friends had rendered such a precaution natural, if not necessary. Be this as it may, Antonius thought his present force insufficient any longer to defend him; and accordingly he set out on the ninth of October for Brundusium,[3] in order to secure the four legions which were quartered in that neighbourhood, and which having formed part of the army assembled in Macedonia by Cæsar for his Parthian expedition, had lately returned to Italy, and remained still embodied, under no other authority than that of their own immediate officers. When he arrived at Brundusium,[4] he proceeded to address the soldiers, and offered to each man a gratuity of about £3 4s. 7d., in order to win them to his interests; but far from receiving this offer with thankfulness, the troops murmured at it and ridiculed it, as utterly inadequate to their expectations; and many of the centurions and soldiers appeared inclined to disown his authority altogether. Alarmed at these symptoms, he sent for several of those centurions whom he most suspected, to his own quarters, and there caused them

[1] Florus, lib. iv. c. 4. Dion Cassius, lib. xlv. p. 272.
[2] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. xxiii. Seneca, *de Clementiâ*, lib. i. c. 9.
[3] Ibid. lib. xii. epist. xxiii.
[4] Dion Cassius, lib. xlv. p. 276. Cicero, *Philippic.* iii. c. 2; Ibid. v. c. 8.

to be instantly executed. But this severity failed to effect its object; B.C. 44. the legions could not be prevailed upon to follow him; and at the same time the tidings which he received of the proceedings of Octavius, made him feel the necessity of returning to Rome without delay. In fact, no sooner had he set out for Brundusium, than Octavius hastened into Campania, and by giving to each man a donation of about £16,[1] he prevailed upon Cæsar's veterans, who had been settled at Casilinum and Calatia, to join his standard. He then applied to some other of the military colonies in that neighbourhood, and succeeded in raising a considerable force, which he began to organize at Capua with the greatest activity. The municipal towns,[2] no less than the establishments of the veterans, testified the strongest attachment to his cause; and he wrote at the same time to Cicero, requesting a personal interview with him, asking his advice as to his subsequent movements, and wishing him to come forward as his avowed associate, and to exert his influence in the Senate in his behalf.

He persuades Cæsar's veterans to join him.

Cicero could not but entertain a natural distrust of so dangerous an assistant; and expressed, in a letter to Atticus,[3] his unavailing wishes that Brutus were at hand instead of Octavius to turn the impending crisis to the advantage of the commonwealth. But Brutus and Cassius were already on the other side of the Ionian Gulf; and to wait for their return was impossible. In an evil hour, therefore, for himself, did Cicero listen to the advances of Octavius, and encourage him to repair to Rome, and endeavour to strengthen his party by the favour of the popular assembly. Octavius adopted this plan, and was introduced into the Forum, and brought forward to speak, by the tribune Tiberius Canutius,[4] one of the most violent enemies of Antonius. But his speech was ill calculated to please the aristocratical party; for he attempted, we are told, to recommend himself to the popular favour as the heir and adopted son of Cæsar: he dwelt largely on the great services of the late dictator; and when making some promises with regard to his own future conduct, he stretched out his hands towards a statue of Cæsar, which Antonius had lately placed in the Rostra,[5] and swore that he would be true to his word, "as he hoped to arrive at his father's greatness." But not feeling himself strong enough as yet to maintain the capital against Antonius, and finding, if we may believe Appian, that the veterans were not well disposed to fight in such a quarrel, he withdrew into Tuscany with his forces, and endeavoured to get some assistance from that quarter.

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xvi. epist. viii. ix.
[2] Ibid. lib. xvi. epist. xi.
[3] Ibid. lib. xvi. epist. viii. "*O Brute, ubi es? quantam ἰκαιρίαν amitis!*"
[4] Dion Cassius, lib. xlv. p. 276. Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. iii. c. 41.
[5] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. iii. *ad Atticum*, lib. xvi. epist. xv. *Jurat*, "*ita sibi parentis honores consequi liceat;*" *et simul dextram intendit ad statuam.*

B.C. 44. In the meantime Antonius was returning with all speed to Rome, attended by the legion of the Alaudæ,[1] a corps which had been raised by Cæsar in Transalpine Gaul, and had afterwards, as we have seen, been admitted by him to the rights of Roman citizens. Since his death this legion had been greatly favoured by Antonius, and its common soldiers had been rendered capable, by his law, of serving amongst the third order of judges on criminal trials. He had therefore apparently taken it with him to Brundusium, and was now returning with it to Rome; for the four legions which he had gone to secure had not received him so cordially as to induce him to rely on them in any critical service; and he was well satisfied that they should consent to march by themselves towards Gaul; there, as he hoped, to receive him as their commander when he should arrive to take possession of that province. The Alaudæ then formed his escort when he approached Rome, and were left by him at Tibur, while he entered the city with no other force apparently than that which he had been long in the habit of employing to support his authority or secure his person. He then, as consul, issued a number of proclamations,[2] charging Octavius with rebellion, and threatening the severest punishments against some other individuals whom he considered as his abettors. He summoned the Senate to meet on the twenty-fourth of November, and announced that if any member absented himself, he would be justly considered as a conspirator against the consul's life, and a party to the treasonable counsels of Octavius. But he soon learned that one of the legions from Brundusium,[3] instead of pursuing its march towards Gaul, had suddenly turned off towards the capital, and had actually stationed itself at Alba in a state of open disobedience to his authority. He then repaired to the troops whom he had left at Tibur, and tried, we may suppose, to assure himself of their fidelity, by promising to them abundant rewards out of the property of his antagonists.

Two of the legions desert Antonius and join Octavius.

Again he returned to Rome, feeling it important, if possible, still to maintain possession of the capital; and not choosing, whatever was his reason, to attend in the Senate on the twenty-fourth, he postponed the meeting of that body to the twenty-eighth,[4] and summoned the senators then to assemble in the Capitol. He was extremely anxious to fortify himself by their authority, and to obtain a vote which should declare Octavius and his abettors public enemies. For this purpose he prohibited three individuals by name,[5] all of them his vehement opponents, from appearing in the Senate on this occasion; threatening one of them with death, according to Cicero, if he ventured to disobey his injunction. But just before the Senate assem-

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xvi. epist. viii.
[2] Ibid. *Philippic.* iii. c. 7, 8.
[3] Ibid. iii. c. 3; Ibid. xiii. c. 9.
[4] Ibid. *Philippic.* iii. c. 8.
[5] Ibid. iii. c. 9.

bled, he was informed that the fourth legion,[1] another of those which he had met at Brundusium, had not only stopped its march towards Gaul, but had actually joined the standard of Octavius in Tuscany. Under the impression produced on men's minds by this intelligence, he dared not submit to the Senate his intended motion on the state of the commonwealth, lest the decision of the majority might rather favour his enemies than himself. His only hope lay in the success of his arms, and in stopping, by his presence, the growing spirit of disaffection among the soldiers. Accordingly, the Senate was only consulted on the question of voting the usual thanksgivings to the gods in honour of M. Lepidus for his services in Spain; and, as soon as the senators separated, Antonius proceeded to the customary allotment of the provinces to the different magistrates of the year on the expiration of their term of office. His brother, C. Antonius, received his nomination to the province of Macedonia, which had been already, as we have seen, conferred on him by the people; and he himself, in the same manner, entered upon his own appointment to the command of Cisalpine Gaul. He immediately assumed the military dress, and left the city with the utmost secrecy to take the command of his troops at Tibur;[2] whence he hastened, by cross roads, towards his province, fearing lest Octavius might intercept his march. B.C. 44. Antonius retires from Rome to Cisalpine Gaul.

On his arrival at Ariminum, he found there the two remaining legions from Brundusium, which acknowledged his authority without dispute; and with them a third, according to Appian,[3] which had returned from Macedonia after Antonius's departure from Brundusium, and, choosing to embrace his party, had followed the other two which still adhered to him into Gaul. These forces, together with the legion of the Alaudæ, and a considerable number of the veterans from Cæsar's colonies, who preferred his service to that of Octavius, formed altogether an imposing army; and there was nothing in Cisalpine Gaul which could offer to them any resistance in the field. But Decimus Brutus, who, as we have seen, had held the command of that province for some months, was resolved not lightly to abandon it; and accordingly threw himself into the town of Mutina,[4] to maintain that place against the invader. Antonius immediately advanced and began to lay siege to it; and thus the commonwealth was again involved in a civil war, when little more than a year had elapsed since the termination of hostilities in Spain, and the last triumphant return of Cæsar to Rome. He is opposed by Dec. Brutus, whom he besieges in Mutina.

When Antonius left the capital to take possession of Cisalpine Gaul, his colleague, P. Dolabella, seems to have been already on his way towards Syria. We find that he was at his villa, near Formiæ,

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* iii. c. 3, 9.
[2] Ibid. iii. c. 10.
[3] *De Bell. Civil.* lib. iii. c. 43, 48.
[4] Cicero, *Philippic.* xiii. c. 9.

B.C. 44. in the latter end of October,[1] and that he then was making some arrangements for the payment of a debt due from him to Cicero, while he should be absent from Italy.

Hence he probably crossed over into Greece soon afterwards, accompanied by a small military force; so that Rome, in the beginning of December, was deserted by both the consuls, while of the tribunes, two at least, Tiberius Canutius and L. Cassius, were warmly devoted to the party of the aristocracy. The Senate and the people of Rome seem now, for the first time during many years, to have been left to express their sentiments freely; the terror of a military force was removed on the one hand, nor does the peace of the city seem to have been disturbed by any disorders of the populace on the other. The measures of the Government, therefore, and the votes of individuals were likely now, if ever, to be independent, and wise, and pure; debased only by that inevitable alloy which the actions and principles of men will always contract from the original folly and selfishness of human nature. But the influence of eloquence is a less unworthy motive than the fear of the sword; and it was a fit reward for the general purity of Cicero's character, that his ascendency marked the last moments of his country's freedom; and that, when Rome was left to herself, she followed his guidance with enthusiastic affection.

Cicero returns to Rome.

Immediately on the departure of Antonius, he hastened to return to the capital, where he arrived on the ninth of December.[2] The tribunes had summoned the Senate to meet on the twentieth, that a vote might be passed empowering the consuls elect, Hirtius and Pansa, to provide for the assembling the Senate in safety on the first of January. A very few days before the twentieth, there appeared a proclamation from Decimus Brutus, in which he engaged to maintain the province of Cisalpine Gaul against the attempts of Antonius, and to preserve it in a state of obedience to the authority of the Senate and people. This declaration was likely to encourage the timid and the wavering; and, that the impression produced by it might not be lost, Cicero went very early to the Senate on the morning of the twentieth, and having thus awakened an interest in men's minds, and procured a full attendance of senators, he delivered the speech which is entitled the third Philippic. In this he proposed that the Senate should declare its approbation of the conduct of Decimus Brutus, and of the province of Cisalpine Gaul, in upholding the Senate's authority; that it should also express its gratitude to Octavius, and to the two legions which had deserted Antonius; and that it should order Decimus Brutus, and all other officers who held commands in the provinces by virtue of Cæsar's arrangements, to retain their governments till the Senate should think proper to supersede

[1] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xv. epist. xiii.
[2] Ibid. *ad Familiares*, lib. xi. epist. v., vi. *Philippic.* iii. c. 4, 5.

them. The Senate agreed to all that Cicero wished;[1] and thus not only was M. Antonius adjudged to have no pretensions to the Province of Gaul, but the claims of his brother upon Macedonia, and of P. Dolabella upon Syria, were condemned on the same ground. Meanwhile the siege of Mutina was carried on with vigour by Antonius; and Octavius, having intercepted some cavalry, archers, and elephants,[2] which were on their way to join the besieging army, was proceeding to attempt the relief of the town, as soon as he should be strengthened by the arrival of the Consuls with fresh troops from Rome. Such was the state of things when the first of January arrived, and the new Consuls, A. Hirtius and C. Vibius Pansa, entered upon their office. They assembled the Senators on the very first day of their Consulship—first, to consult them generally on the commonwealth, and then to determine on the honours which were to be paid to C. Octavius and to his followers, according to the resolution passed before at the meeting of the twentieth of December. B.C. 44.

Q. Fufius Calenus defends Antonius in the Senate.

It was not to be expected, composed as the Senate was, of a considerable proportion of the partisans of Cæsar, that Antonius should be left altogether without an advocate. The person who first came forward in his behalf was Q. Fufius Calenus, who had been made Consul by Cæsar during the last three or four months of the year B.C. 47, and had before commanded a separate division of his army in the campaign of the preceding year in Greece. At an earlier period, in the year B.C. 61, he had been one of the Tribunes; and it was owing to a law proposed by him,[3] and directing that the judges should be chosen by lot, instead of selected by the Prætor, that P. Clodius obtained an acquittal, when tried for his infamous profanation of the Mysteries of the *Bona Dea* in Cæsar's house. He now moved that a deputation from the Senate should be sent to Antonius, to demand of him that he should raise the siege of Mutina;[4] that he should abstain from all acts of hostility against Decimus Brutus and the Province of Cisalpine Gaul; and that he should submit himself to the authority of the Senate and people. If he refused to comply with these demands, he was to be declared a public enemy, and the whole population of the State was to assume the military dress, as in a war of the last importance to the general safety. It was not supposed that Antonius would accede to the terms offered him; and as he would gain time to prosecute the siege of Mutina, and to strengthen his party whilst the deputation should be going to his camp from Rome and returning with his answer, Cicero, well aware of the necessity of decisive measures, was anxious, on this very

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* iv. c. 1, *et seq.* Dion Cassius, lib. xlv. p. 277.
[2] Ibid. v. c. 17. Dion Cassius, lib. xlv. p. 276.
[3] Ibid. *ad Atticum*, lib. i. epist. xvi.
[4] Ibid. *Philippic.* vi. c. 2, 3.

B.C. 44. account, that he should be declared a public enemy immediately, and that the people should be summoned at once to take up arms against him. After a vehement debate, however, which was protracted by successive adjournments during three days, the proposal of Q. Calenus prevailed, and it was resolved that a deputation should be sent to Antonius.[1] On other points, the opinion of Cicero was followed, settlements of land were promised to the veterans and to the two legions which had joined Octavius;[2] and an exemption from military service was granted to them and to their children, except in the case of a war breaking out in Gaul or in Italy. L. Egnatuleius, the quæstor who had led the fourth legion over to Octavius, was allowed to be a candidate for and to hold any public office three years before he should have attained the age prescribed by law. To Octavius still higher honours were paid. He was constituted an officer of the commonwealth, with the title and authority of Proprætor; he was admitted into the Senate among the Senators of Prætorian rank; he was allowed to be a candidate for all public offices several years earlier than the law permitted; and on the motion of his step-father, L. Philippus,[3] an equestrian statue was erected to his honour in the Rostra.

A deputation sent from the Senate to Antonius with proposals of peace.

Immediately after this debate, the deputation, which was to carry the commands of the Senate to Antonius, set out on its journey. It consisted of three members:—Servius Sulpicius, the celebrated lawyer, whom Cæsar had appointed Proconsul of Achaia in the year B.C. 46; L. Philippus, the step-father of Octavius; and L. Calpurnius Piso, the father-in-law of Cæsar, who had formerly, when Consul, countenanced the attacks of Clodius upon Cicero, in order to win the favour of the Triumvirate. About the same time, A. Hirtius took the field and marched to the relief of Mutina;[4] while his colleague, C. Pansa, remained at Rome to superintend the levies of troops which were carrying on with the greatest activity. Cicero meanwhile was exerting himself to the utmost to strengthen the cause of the commonwealth by securing the fidelity of the different commanders in the western provinces. If Antonius were obliged to retreat from before Mutina, it was a question of the last importance to him, to ascertain whether he could hope to find an asylum and support in the armies of Spain and of Transalpine Gaul. There were three officers who held commands at this time in those countries; M. Æmilius Lepidus, the proconsul of Gallia Narbonensis, and of the Hither or Nearer Spain; L. Munatius Plancus, who enjoyed the government of all the other parts of Transalpine Gaul which were added by Cæsar's conquests to the Roman Empire; and C. Asinius Pollio, who had been employed in the Farther Spain

Account of the officers commanding in Gaul and Spain.

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* vi. c. 1. [2] Ibid. v. c. 17, 19.
[3] Ibid. *ad Brutum*, lib. i. epist. xv. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 87.
[4] Ibid. *Philippic.* vii. c. 4

against Sex. Pompeius with the title of Cæsar's Lieutenant, and who still possessed the chief authority in that Province. Of these three men Lepidus was likely to join that party which could most work upon his hopes of personal advantage; but his inclinations would lead him to oppose the cause of the commonwealth, inasmuch as the forms of the old constitution would confine within moderate bounds his irregular ambition. L. Munatius Plancus is mentioned as one of those persons who received large presents from Cæsar, at the time when he was employing the plunder of Gaul in purchasing partisans among the needy and the prodigal at Rome.[1] When the civil war began, we find that L. Plancus was in Cæsar's service, and held a command in his army in Spain during the campaign against Afranius and Petreius.[2] At a later period he was one of his lieutenants in Africa;[3] and on the whole his conduct throughout the war obtained for him from Cæsar, the appointment to the province of Transalpine Gaul, and the nomination to the consulship for the year B.C. 42, together with Decimus Brutus, so that he was at this time Consul elect. His reputation however had not kept pace with his fortune. Cicero tells him plainly in one of his letters,[4] that he had been generally regarded as a time-server; and Paterculus speaks of him as "behaving with that wavering honour, which was characteristic of him."[5] But as he was at the head of an important province and a considerable army, Cicero tried to attach him to the cause of the commonwealth; and wrote to him a number of letters to this effect, which he answered with the fairest professions of his zeal in behalf of his country, but without declaring his sentiments with regard to Antonius. C. Asinius Pollio, whose name reminds us that we are arrived at the age of Virgil and Horace, was early distinguished as an orator,[6] and at the beginning of the civil war espoused the party of Cæsar; because, according to his own account,[7] the power of some one of his personal enemies in the camp of Pompey made him afraid to join the standard of the commonwealth. He served Cæsar faithfully, and was left by him, as we have seen, in the command of the province

B.C. 44.

M. Æmilius Lepidus.

L. Munatius Plancus



[Lepidus.]

C. Asinius Pollio.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. viii. epist. i.
[2] Cæsar, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. i. and *Auctor de Bell. Africano.*
[3] Ibid.
[4] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. x. epist. 3.
[5] Lib. ii. c. 89. *Plancus dubiâ, id est, suâ Fide.*
[6] Quintilian, lib. xii. c. 6.
[7] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. x. epist xxxi.

B.C. 44. of Farther Spain, after the defeat of Cnæus Pompeius at Munda. He had since been opposed to Sex. Pompeius, and had been defeated by him, as we have already mentioned. Yet he professed a great zeal for the liberties of his country, and a determination to resist any person whatsoever, who should again attempt to gain absolute sovereignty.[1] He was at the head of an army of three legions;[2] and Antonius had endeavoured already to seduce one of these to his own service, nor had Pollio been able to retain it in its duty without difficulty. In fact the dispositions of the soldiers in general were so adverse to the establishment of the old constitution, that when they understood the quarrel to be between Antonius and the cause of the Senate and the People, they could not be prevailed upon to support the latter; and it was this circumstance that ensured the success of Octavius, when, a few months afterwards, he revealed his own treasonable intentions, and enslaved the Senate whose authority he was now affecting to uphold.

Antonius rejects the proposals of the Senate.

Meantime the deputation from the Senate had proceeded to the camp of M. Antonius. Ere its members had reached the end of their journey,[3] Ser. Sulpicius, the most distinguished of their number, died of an indisposition which had attacked him before he left Rome, and which had been aggravated by the fatigue of travelling, and by the anxiety which he felt for the success of his mission. His surviving colleagues, L. Philippus and L. Piso, were too nearly connected with the family of Cæsar to be very zealous in the cause of the commonwealth. They presented the commands of the Senate to Antonius, and consented to carry back to Rome a counter proposal on his part;[4] in which, far from complying with the orders which he had received, he agreed to give up Cisalpine Gaul only on condition of receiving in exchange the province of Transalpine Gaul for five years,[5] with an army of six legions, and that his brother should retain Macedonia as long as Brutus and Cassius should enjoy the command of any provinces as Consuls or Proconsuls. Besides these concessions he demanded grants of lands for the soldiers who had followed him, a confirmation of all grants already made by himself and Dolabella, and of all the decrees issued by them on the pretended authority of Cæsar's papers; and that his law relating to the

[1] *Si id agitur ut rursus in Potestate omnia unius sint, quicunque is est, ei me profiteor inimicum.*—Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. x. epist. xxxi.

[2] Ibid. lib. x. epist. xxxii.

[3] Ibid. *Philippic.* ix. c. 7.

[4] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. iv.

[5] Ibid. *Philippic.* viii. c. 9. The text towards the latter end of the ninth chapter of the eighth Philippic is evidently defective. One sentence relative to C. Antonius is marked by Schüts as inserted in this place by mistake; but it seems to us that some words have rather been omitted in the preceding sentence, and that the clause, *tamdiuque ut obtineat, quamdiu M. Brutus, C. Cassius, Consules, prove Coss. Provincias obtinebunt*, refers to C. Antonius, and not, as Schüts imagines, to Marcus. M. Antonius throughout speaks of himself in the first person, and immediately after the stipulation in behalf of his brother, which we have just quoted, he adds, *Ipse autem ut quinquennium obtineam.*

judicial power should be maintained inviolate. When these proposals were reported to the Senate, L. Cæsar,[1] the uncle of Antonius, moved that the country should be declared in a state of disturbance; and the whole people assumed the military dress, in token of the imminent danger which threatened the commonwealth. The spirit of all ranks, if we may believe Cicero,[2] was keenly alive to the necessity of putting down the rebellion of Antonius, with the exception only of those citizens who were of Consular dignity, whom age or the honours and emoluments which they had gained in the last revolution made unwilling to risk the chances of another. Besides, many of these persons had been so connected with the party of Cæsar, that the revival of the old aristocratical interest, supported by the eloquence and integrity of Cicero, was to them a prospect full of apprehension. They served the cause of Antonius at present, by professing an extreme anxiety for peace; but they hoped to espouse it more effectually, and to introduce divisions amongst the opposite party, so soon as they could find a handle to insinuate that, whilst Cæsar's friends were quarrelling with one another, the partisans of Pompey were watching for the moment in which they might once more establish their own ascendency. B.C. 44.

Its proceedings.

Nor was the opportunity which they sought for backward in presenting itself. Brutus and Cassius had left Italy in the preceding autumn, with the intention, we may suppose, of strengthening themselves against the enmity of Antonius by the resources of the eastern provinces. The opposition begun by Cicero in the Senate on the second of September, and the subsequent state of terror under which the Senate was said to be kept by the military force of Antonius, induced them, or furnished them with a pretext, to act in a more decisive manner. Brutus at first had repaired to Athens,[3] and had remained there for some time apparently engrossed with the philosophical studies of the place; but during this interval his emissaries had been at work in Macedonia, endeavouring to conciliate to his interest the soldiers that were still quartered there; and he was himself gaining partisans among that numerous body of young men of family or talent who were in the habit of resorting to Athens as the university of the ancient world. He was, however, principally enabled to declare himself openly in consequence of an important service rendered him by M. Apuleius,[4] who had for some time past filled the office of quæstor in the province of Asia. Apuleius happened to be returning to Rome with a fleet, on board of which was a large sum of money belonging to the government, collected by

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* viii. c. 1.

[2] Compare, besides his assertions in his *Philippics*, *Epist. ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. iv. v.; lib. xi. epist. viii.; lib. x. epist. v.

[3] Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 24.

[4] Cicero, *Philippic.* x. c. 11; Ibid. xiii. c. 16. Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 24. Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. iv. c. 75. Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xiii. epist. xlv.

B.C. 44. Brutus obtains possession of the provinces of Achaia, Macedonia, and Illyricum.

him in his province for the benefit of the revenue of the commonwealth. Brutus met him on the coast of Eubœa, and prevailed upon him to make over the whole of this treasure. He was thus in a condition immediately to raise an army, partly by inviting to his standard those soldiers who had formerly served under Pompey,[1] and who it seems were still numerous in Thessaly, and partly by tampering with troops belonging to P. Dolabella, which were at this time passing through Greece on their way towards Syria. It is particularly mentioned, that two divisions of Dolabella's cavalry were thus persuaded to desert their officers and join Brutus;[2] and the same means were probably used with effect towards a legion commanded by one of the lieutenants of C. Antonius, which submitted itself to M. Cicero, Cicero's son, one of those young men whom Brutus had won to his interests during his residence at Athens. Soon afterwards, Q. Hortensius, the son of the famous orator of that name, who was at this time proconsul of Macedonia, put the whole resources of his province at the disposal of Brutus; and he was thus become so formidable, that P. Vatinius, proconsul of Illyricum, and one of Cæsar's oldest and most zealous partisans, finding himself unable to depend upon his soldiers, surrendered to him the important town of Dyrrhachium, and saw his troops immediately enter into the service of his enemy. In this manner Brutus made himself master of the provinces of Achaia, Macedonia, and Illyricum, and had now become the general of an army of seven legions;[3] while C. Antonius, who had set out from Italy in the hope of entering upon the government of Macedonia, found that province now armed against him, and the troops which he expected to command adding themselves to the forces of his enemy. Thus disappointed, he threw himself into Apollonia with seven cohorts which still remained faithful to him;[4] and, being master of that city, and of one or two other places in the neighbourhood, he prepared to resist the attacks of Brutus.

It is difficult, while relying upon Cicero's authority for almost the whole of our accounts of these times, not to forget that this authority is not equally to be followed in its judgments of men and actions as in its reports of matters of fact. We catch insensibly the opinions of a writer whom we are continually consulting; and we do not remember that, during all the transactions which we are now relating, he was the active leader of a party, and could not therefore represent with impartiality the motives or the merits of the conduct of his opponents. This remark must apply particularly to those proceedings of Dolabella which we are now called to notice. He

[1] Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 25.
[2] Cicero, *Philippic.* x. c. 6. Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 25.
[3] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 94.
[4] Cicero, *Philippic.* x. c. 6; Ibid. xi. c. 11.

found that the assassins of Cæsar were resolved to consider as illegal all the acts of his colleague, M. Antonius, and of himself in their late consulship. Decimus Brutus was maintaining Cisalpine Gaul against M. Antonius, in defiance of the decree of the people; M. Brutus was occupying Macedonia, which had been equally given by the people to C. Antonius; and C. Cassius was proceeding towards Syria to take away that province in a similar manner from Dolabella himself. Already, as we have seen, Dolabella's cavalry had been seduced from his service, and had joined the army of Brutus; so that, under these circumstances, whilst his enemies by their own sole authority were converting to their own use the resources of the empire, he might think himself justified in following their example, and depriving the officers of their provinces, as he himself and his friends had been deprived of those held by themselves. With this view he formed the design of securing the province of Asia, which was now held by C. Trebonius. But in the execution of this purpose he is charged with acts of the greatest perfidy and cruelty; he is said to have entered the province of C. Trebonius as if he were merely passing through it on his way to Syria;[1] he had an interview with Trebonius, in which he professed the most friendly dispositions towards him; and having thus lulled him into a fatal security, he made a sudden assault by night upon the city of Smyrna, in which Trebonius then was, and thus obtained possession of his person. Trebonius thus treacherously seized, was immediately put to the torture to draw from him some information as to the treasure of the province; and after he had suffered these cruelties for two days, he was beheaded, with circumstances of additional barbarity: his head was carried about on the point of a spear, and his body was exposed to the insults of Dolabella's soldiers, and finally cast into the sea. After this murder, Dolabella enriched himself by seizing some of the public money in the province, and by the plunder of a great number of individuals;[2] but not having a sufficient force to enable him at once to maintain Asia, and to prosecute his march towards Syria, he abandoned the prize which he had gained, and continued his progress towards the east. But receiving alarming accounts of the force under C. Cassius, and thinking it probable that Syria would be effectually barred against him, he prepared a large fleet of transports in the ports of Lycia, on board of which he intended in case of need to embark his troops and his treasures, and return to join Antonius in Italy. This scheme was defeated by the activity of P. Lentulus Spinther, the son of that Lentulus who had been consul in the year, and to whom Cicero was largely indebted for his recall from banishment. The younger P. Lentulus had been quæstor under Trebonius in Asia, and had first retired into Macedonia after the

B.C. 44. Dolabella surprises and plunders the province of Asia, and murders C. Trebonius.

Cruelty of Dolabella.

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* xi. c. 2, 3. Livy *Epitome*, lib. cxix.
[2] Ibid. *ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. xv.

B.C. 44. murder of the proconsul;[1] but finding that Dolabella did not retain possession of Asia, he returned thither, and having reorganized the administration of that province, he hastened to Rhodes with the fleet under his command, in order to procure assistance from the government of that island to enable him to attack the fleet of Dolabella in Lycia. The Rhodians, however, had suffered too severely under the dominion of the old aristocracy at Rome to be inclined to support its defenders. They had refused to receive Pompey himself within their walls, when he was a fugitive after the battle of Pharsalia; and a squadron of their ships had joined Cæsar at that period, and had distinguished itself highly in his service during the contest in which he was involved in Egypt. But P. Lentulus, even without their aid, was strong enough to effect his purpose; the ships of war belonging to Dolabella fled from Lycia; and either dispersed and abandoned his cause, or retreated to Cyprus and Syria; while the transports, thus left to themselves, were immediately secured by Lentulus.

Dolabella is shut out from Syria by Cassius.

Dolabella arriving in Syria with a force which was probably not very considerable, found the gates of Antioch closed against him,[2] and having in vain endeavoured to force an entrance, he fled in disorder to Laodicea. In this distressed state of his fortunes, his soldiers began to desert him, and he soon found himself besieged by C. Cassius, who had gained full possession of the province of Syria, and now commanded an army of ten legions. Laodicea was blockaded by land and sea, till Dolabella, hopeless of relief, and dreading the fate which he had inflicted on Trebonius, ended his life by suicide.[3] This event took place in the summer of B.C. 43, and the tidings of it reached the capital, and cheered the aristocratical party with a moment's exultation immediately before their complete and final overthrow.

He is besieged in Laodicea. and kills himself.

Account of the proceedings of Cassius in Syria.

The army with which Cassius had obtained this great success had been collected by him from various quarters, since his first departure from Italy in the autumn of the preceding year. He had first visited Trebonius in the province of Asia;[4] and was liberally supplied with money by his quæstor, P. Lentulus; who also claimed the merit of winning over to his interest a large body of cavalry forming part of Dolabella's army, and which had been sent on by him from Macedonia, to precede his march into Syria. Some forces were also raised in the province itself; and Cassius, thus provided with men and money, did not hesitate to proceed to Syria without delay, while Dolabella was still lingering in Europe. He reached Syria in the depth of the winter, perhaps about the end of January or beginning of February, when the ascendency of the aristocratical party in Rome, and the measures taken against Antonius, were

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib xii. epist. xiv., xv.
[2] Ibid. lib. xii. epist. xiii., xiv., xv.
[3] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 94. Livy *Epitome*, lib. i. 121.
[4] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. xiv. Dion Cassius, lib. xlvii. p. 342.

already known in the east. There was at this time in Syria an army, B.C. 44. according to Appian, of six legions,[1] under the command of L. Statius Murcus, and Q. Marcius Crispus, which had been committed to them by Cæsar for the purpose of reducing Q. Cæcilius Bassus, and the legion with which he maintained himself in Apamea. Both of these officers had served under Cæsar in the civil war, but they were then possessed of little ambition, and were disposed to obey any authority which might seem entitled to command them. Accordingly they gave up their legions to Cassius without hesitation,[2] believing that by so doing they should most consult the wishes of the government at Rome; and this example was presently followed by the legion under Q. Bassus; for although that officer himself was sufficiently desirous of retaining his command, yet his soldiers looked upon Cassius as so much more respectable a leader, that he was unable to prevent them from making him an offer of their services. Soon after, A. Allienus, who had been employed by Dolabella to lead from Egypt four legions which had been mostly left there by Cæsar to secure the throne of Cleopatra, meeting Cassius in Syria, and being neither willing or able to resist him, surrendered to him the whole force which he commanded. With regard to foreign states, it may be mentioned that the inhabitants of Syria in general,[3] and particularly the people of Tyre, as also Cæsar's old enemy, Deiotarus, king of Galatia, were inclined to support Cassius; while, on the other hand, Cleopatra, queen of Egypt, the Rhodians, the Lycians, the people of Tarsus,[4] and the Jews, were the enemies of the old aristocracy, and devoted to any one who should profess himself the representative of the party of Cæsar. The Jews, however, being placed in the midst of the forces of Cassius, were soon obliged to submit to him; and he proceeded soon afterwards to attack the Rhodians, whose eminence as a naval power made their opposition more formidable.

Vote of the Senate in favour of Brutus.

We have thus carried on our narrative of the state of affairs in the east to a period some months later than that at which we had arrived in describing the course of events at Rome and in Italy. When M. Brutus had made himself master of Macedonia and Achaia, he sent despatches to the Senate containing an account of his successes.[5] After they had been read, Q. Fufius Calenus proposed that they should be acknowledged by an answer of mere compliment, and that Brutus at the same time should be ordered to give up the legions the command of which he had gained so irregularly. But Cicero, rejoicing to see a powerful army in the hands of a general on

[1] *De Bell. Civil.* lib. iv. c. 58.
[2] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xii, epist. xi., xii.
[3] Ibid. *Philippic.* xi. c. 13, 14.
[4] Ibid. *ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. xiii. Dion Cassius, lib. xlvii. p. 343.
[5] Cicero, *Philippic.* x. *passim.*

B.C. 44. whom he could so fully rely, moved on the contrary "that the Senate highly approved of the conduct of Brutus, and that it confirmed to him in the fullest manner the possession of the armies and provinces which he had acquired, requesting him at the same time to remain with his forces as much as possible in the neighbourhood of Italy, that he might be ready to lend his assistance to the commonwealth if necessary." This motion, it appears, was carried; and excited probably no small jealousy amongst the partisans of Cæsar. Soon afterwards tidings arrived of the murder of Trebonius, and the seizure of the Province of Asia by Dolabella. The cruelty which had accompanied this action excited a general feeling of indignation. Q. Calenus,[1] with a frankness highly creditable to him, being first asked his opinion by his son-in-law, C. Pansa, moved that Dolabella should be declared a public enemy, and that his property should be confiscated—adding, that if any Senator should propose a decree of greater severity, he would gladly assent to it. But the unanimity which had been thus happily produced by the cruelty of Dolabella, was soon disturbed. It was next to be considered, to whom the commonwealth should intrust the duty of revenging the death of Trebonius, and prosecuting the war against Dolabella. L. Cæsar,[2] who had been Consul twenty-one years before, in the year preceding the conspiracy of Catiline, the uncle of M. Antonius, but who had always firmly and honestly opposed his ambitious and violent measures, proposed that P. Servilius Isauricus should be the person selected. Servilius had been Cæsar's colleague in the Consulship in the year B.C. 48; but even then he had supported the aristocratical interest with vigour against the mischievous laws of E. Cælius. He had since been himself Proconsul of Asia, and had borne the character of a moderate and humane magistrate;[3] so that his appointment seems to have been most unexceptionable, and was likely to have answered Cicero's purposes sufficiently in putting down Dolabella, without giving offence to the partisans of Cæsar. Another proposal advised that the war should be committed to the two Consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, who were to be appointed to the command of the two provinces of Asia and Syria. By this method it was artfully intended to allure the two Consuls from Italy by the prospect of an honourable command in the most lucrative stations in the empire; to leave Octavius by their departure at the head of the troops opposed to Antonius, and, above all, to stop the progress of Cassius, who was suspected of seizing Syria by his own authority. Nothing seemed so likely to disappoint this scheme, as the proposal of L. Cæsar, which, if supported by the aristocratical party, would probably have been carried. But Cicero, most injudiciously, opposed the nomination of Ser-

Dolabella declared a public enemy by the Senate.

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* xi. c. 6.
[2] Ibid. c. 8. *Epist. ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist v.
[3] Ibid. *ad Familiares*, lib. xiii. epist. lxvi., lxviii.

vilius, as well as that of the Consuls; and moved "that the war with Dolabella, together with the province of Syria and all the troops in that part of the Empire, should be intrusted to C. Cassius; that for the prosecution of the war, he should be invested with an absolute control over the fleets and revenues of the East; that his command should extend to the Provinces of Asia, Pontus, and Bithynia, as well as to Syria; and that into whatsoever province he should enter in the course of his hostilities against Dolabella, his authority in that province should immediately supersede that of the regular officers of the commonwealth." Even the very mother and brother of Cassius,[1] who were at that time in Rome, remonstrated with Cicero upon the gross impolicy of such a proposal. When Brutus had so lately been confirmed in the command of three provinces, and an army of seven legions, how was it to be expected that even moderate men, and much less that the partisans of Cæsar should consent to invest another of the conspirators with powers and resources still more ample? The only effect of Cicero's motion was to render him an object of increased suspicion to all the friends of Cæsar's Government, and to procure the triumph of that party who wished to give the command of the war with Dolabella to the Consuls Hirtius and Pansa. It is true that they did not live long enough to avail themselves of the vote of the Senate in their favour; and Cassius, as we have seen, soon afterwards destroyed Dolabella by his own authority. But Cicero by thus showing himself so intemperate a partisan of the assassins of Cæsar, and of those two in particular who had even during the civil war been among the adherents of Pompey, gave a general disgust to that numerous portion of the commonwealth, who wished to see Cæsar's system and measures preserved under certain limitations; and who dreaded and abhorred the exclusive dominion of the high aristocratical party.

B.C. 44.

The war against Dolabella intrusted to the two Consuls.

The proceedings of Antonius, however, during his consulship, had been so violent, that the majority of the senate were disposed to pass the strongest decrees against him individually, however unwilling they might be to concur in the excessive powers and honours proposed by Cicero for the assassins of Cæsar. It was resolved that the laws passed by Antonius were not binding;[2] that he had forged decrees of the Senate; and that he had corruptly appropriated to himself above five millions sterling of the public money. By these resolutions the Senate seemed to declare that their quarrel with him was perpetual; and although they were so far moved by L. Piso and Q. Calenus as to vote that another deputation should be sent to him, in the expectation that he would submit implicitly to their orders; yet when they found that this expectation was not likely to be realized, the measure was dropped altogether. Nay, when letters

Vote of the Senate against Antonius.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. vii.
[2] Ibid. *Philippic.* xii. c. 5.

B.C. 44. were received from M. Lepidus,[1] urging them to put an end to the civil war, they voted according to the sentiments of P. Servilius, who moved, that peace with Antonius was prejudicial to the commonwealth. It was about this time also, that is, the beginning of April, that M. Varisidius arrived at Rome,[2] being the bearer of a letter addressed by L. Plancus to the Senate. In this letter Plancus asserted that he had an army of five legions under his command; and that both himself, his soldiers, and the people of his province of Gaul, were entirely devoted to the interests of his country; and ready to undertake any service to which the commonwealth might think proper to call them. There was an ambiguity in the terms "country" and "commonwealth," of which Plancus possibly designed hereafter to avail himself; yet the tone of his letter was so promising, and his language in a private letter to Cicero was so strongly in favour of his attachment to the course now pursued by the Senate, that Cicero thought proper to move for a grant of extraordinary honours to him, in recompense of his fidelity. This motion was opposed by P. Servilius; and when the majority of the Senate agreed to it, P. Titius, one of the tribunes, interposed his negative at the request of Servilius, and thus stopped the decree. The debate was adjourned to the following day, the ninth of April, when Cicero spoke with great vehemence against Servilius and Titius; and at last, partly from the effect of his own eloquence, and partly owing to the impression produced by the arrival of despatches from P. Lentulus in Asia,[3] containing an account of the progress of Cassius

Letter of Plancus.

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* xiii. c. 4, *et seq.*

[2] Ibid. *ad Familiares*, lib. x. epist. viii., xii.

[3] Cicero, *ad Brutum*, lib. ii. epist ii. We are aware that the genuineness of the two books of "Epistles to Brutus," has been often questioned; and Schüts has classed them, together with five Orations commonly ascribed to Cicero, among the works which he believes to be forgeries, and has published them in a separate volume. But, judging from the arguments which he brings to prove their spuriousness, the genuineness of a work was never more unreasonably suspected. He says that the letter which we have just quoted (lib. ii. epist. ii.) must be a forgery, because it speaks of the arrival of tidings concerning Cassius on the ninth of April; whereas in another letter to Brutus, dated on the fifth of May, the writer says that nothing was known of the forces of Cassius. But on attending to the entire passages in both letters, the inconsistency vanishes. Despatches had reached Rome, on the ninth of April, from P. Lentulus, who had been Quæstor to Trebonius, and who appears to have written them from the province of Asia. They contained a report of the information which he had received from Syria, of the occupation of that province by Cassius, and of the surrender of the legions under L. Marcus and Q. Crispus. It is not said that the despatches of Lentulus entered into any particulars; but they probably stated in general terms, as was natural, what he had heard of events which had occurred in a distant province. Nearly a month afterwards, Cicero informs Brutus that the Senate had given him a discretionary power to act against Dolabella or not as he should judge most expedient; and adds, as the reason why so much was thus left to his own judgment, that nothing was known about the army of Cassius; nothing, that is, as to its position, its operations, or even its means of taking the field. It was known that Cassius had an army and a province; but this knowledge was of no use towards deciding the question, whether he might require the aid of Brutus in destroying Dolabella, or

in Syria—the opinion of Cicerio triumphed, the tribune withdrew his negative, and the vote of honours to L. Plancus was carried. But the subsequent conduct of Plancus seems to indicate that, with regard to him, as well as to Octavius, Cicero either believed or pretended to believe their professions much too readily; and by his lavish votes in their favour injured, in fact, the dignity of the commonwealth, and gave to the contest the appearance of a personal quarrel with Antonius, rather than of a general opposition to the principle of usurped and illegal power, and military tyranny. B.C. 44.

While the aristocratical party was thus triumphing in the fancied support of Plancus, Antonius was endeavouring to seduce the officers who were employed against him, A. Hirtius and C. Octavius. He addressed to them a letter,[1] in which he represented the impolicy of their conduct in serving the purposes of the Pompeian party, and fighting against their old comrades and natural associates, in behalf of men by whom they were hated in reality as bitterly as he himself. And he spoke of Lepidus and Plancus as being united with him in all his designs, and approving his proceedings. This letter was transmitted by Hirtius to Cicero, and was by him read aloud in the Senate. To Octavius, doubtless, it suggested nothing which he had not himself clearly perceived before. It was not, and could not be his real intention to exalt the cause of Pompey, or to see the assassins of his uncle in possession of the greatest power and dignity in the commonwealth. Nor ought the enemies of Antonius to have

Letter of Antonius to Hirtius and Octavius.

not; and therefore, as far as that point was concerned, it was equivalent to a "total ignorance about the army of Cassius." We have quoted the "Epistles to Brutus" without hesitation; for we think that all the positive arguments, of inconsistency with themselves or with other authorities, which Schüts has repeated from Tunstall, are founded on mistakes and misinterpretations of the passages attacked. Another class of arguments, if they deserve to be called so, is built on the pretended occurrence of unclassical or inelegant expressions in these letters; and sometimes a letter is condemned because *tota ejus compositio prorsus a Ciceronis elegantiâ abhorret.* Schüts, *Præfat*, in tom. viii p. 3. *Ciceron Oper.* It must be a very strong case, indeed, that could warrant us in pronouncing a work to be a forgery, on account of fancied inelegancies in its style, or even of dissimilarity from the usual language of the writer. But in the present instance we see no such dissimilarity; and as for the inelegance of particular expressions, we do think that it is quite absurd to pretend to decide, in a dead language, what expressions might, or might not have been used in the familiarity of a private letter. The evidence in favour of the "Epistles to Brutus," is the same on which we believe the genuineness of any ancient writing; namely, that they have been transmitted down to us amongst the other works of Cicero, and profess to be his composition. If the arguments brought against them be of no weight, if there be, as we think there is not, no evidence to render them suspected, we may receive them as genuine on the external evidence of their having been always ascribed to Cicero, without inquiring whether they afford any positive internal evidence in their own favour. But we think that they possess also this mark of genuineness, and that they are such letters as no man was likely to have forged, from the brevity and uninteresting nature of many of the numbers; and from their real, but neither apparent nor designed, agreement with what we know from other really respectable authorities concerning the facts to which they allude.

[1] Cicero, *Philippic.* xiii. c. 10, *et seq.*

B.C. 44. neglected that part of his letter, in which he boasted of the entire co-operation of Lepidus and Plancus. With regard to Lepidus, the whole course of his former life, as well as his recent interference to procure peace for Antonius, rendered the assertion extremely probable; and if Lepidus deserted the cause of the commonwealth, the fidelity of Plancus would be exposed to a very severe temptation. On the other hand, the consuls Hirtius and Pansa, the latter of whom had now taken the field with the army which he had been levying and organizing at Rome, possessed and deserved the entire confidence of the Senate; and whilst the greatest part of the forces employed against Antonius was in their hands, Octavius must, of necessity, remain faithful, and the contest might be decided before Lepidus or Plancus should venture to throw aside the mask which they now thought it prudent to wear.

Meantime the events of the campaign were becoming of the highest importance. In the month of February, Antonius, while closely besieging Decimus Brutus in Mutina, was in possession of the important places of Parma, Regium Lepidi or Reggio, and Bononia or Bologna. These three towns were all situated on the Æmilian way, at that time probably the only good line of communication by which it was possible to reach Mutina; and lying, two to the westward, and one to the eastward, of the place that was besieged, the occupation of them by the besieging army rendered it difficult for Hirtius and Octavius to advance to its relief. The season, besides, was unfavourable, and C. Pansa was still busied in levying troops at Rome; so that Hirtius and Octavius remained quiet for some time; the former at Claterna,[1] and the latter at Forum Corneli, or Imola; both of which towns were situated on the Æmilian way, between Bononia and Ariminum. But as the spring came on, and Decimus Brutus began to suffer severely from the strictness of the blockade, Hirtius and Octavius deemed it necessary to act more vigorously. They advanced towards Mutina, and Antonius thought proper to abandon Bononia to them; so that they were enabled to approach very near to the lines of the besiegers; and in t[1] is situation they were endeavouring to open a communication with Decimus Brutus, and were waiting at the same time for the arrival of Pansa with his newly-raised legions from Rome. It was about the middle of April,[2] when Hirtius was informed that Pansa was approaching at the head of four legions of newly raised troops; and in order to favour his safe arrival, which Antonius would naturally endeavour to prevent, he despatched the Prætorian cohorts of himself and Octavius, together with one of his legions, by night to join him, and strengthen him on his march. It happened that this was the Martian legion, which had first set the example of desertion from Antonius, and which was ani-

Battle of Mutina.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. v.
[2] Ibid. lib. x. epist. xxx.

mated by the fiercest animosity against him. Antonius, not aware of the reinforcement which Pansa had thus received, marched with two of his veteran legions, and some of Cæsar's disbanded soldiers, whom he had assembled under his standard at the beginning of the campaign, to intercept him on his way. But on the first appearance of his light troops and cavalry, the Martian legion, unable to restrain its impetuosity, advanced hastily forward, and, followed by the two Prætorian cohorts, engaged with the enemy before it could be supported by the newly raised legions, which were at some distance in the rear. It was in consequence overpowered and defeated with severe loss;[1] Pansa, who had taken the command of it in person, after having vainly endeavoured to check its imprudent advance, was dangerously wounded, and carried off to Bononia; and Antonius following up his advantage, attempted to take the camp of the enemy. Here, however, he was repulsed by two of Pansa's newly raised legions; and, finding that he could no nothing further on that side, he commenced his retreat towards his own camp before Mutina. But Hirtius, who had received intelligence of Pansa's danger, had set out with two legions to his rescue, leaving Octavius to defend their camp; and although he could not arrive in time to prevent the defeat of the Martian legion, yet he fell in with Antonius when retreating towards Mutina after his victory, and assaulting his soldiers, fatigued as they were by their preceding exertions, he totally routed and dispersed them. Antonius reached his lines in safety at the head of his cavalry, a kind of force with which Hirtius was unprovided, and found that the troops whom he had left there in the morning had made an attempt on the enemy's camp during the absence of Hirtius, but had been repulsed with loss by the forces left with Octavius to guard it. B.C. 44.

By this action the army of Antonius was greatly weakened, but as it yet retained its lines around Mutina, the relief of Decimus Brutus had not yet been effected by the success of his associates. Hirtius and Octavius, therefore, were anxious to bring Antonius to a second action; and this they accomplished by threatening to force their way into Mutina at a distant and ill-guarded quarter of his lines. Antonius was forced to fight in order to oppose this attempt; but he was again defeated with great loss; and Decimus Brutus making a sally at the same time with the garrison of Mutina, he had no other resource but to abandon all his positions, and fly with the wreck of his infantry, covered by his still unbroken cavalry, in the direction of the Alps.[2] Unfortunately for the cause of the aristocracy, Hirtius, while pursuing the enemy into their lines, had fallen, and the command of his army devolved thus suddenly upon Octavius. This circumstance deprived Decimus Brutus for the moment of any

Defeat of Antonius, death of the two Consuls.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. x. epist. xxx. *Philippic.* xiv. c. 9, 10, 14.
[2] Ibid. *ad Brutum*, lib. i. epist. iv.

B.C. 44. co-operation. Octavius drew back his troops into his own camp, and Brutus, not aware of the death of Hirtius,[1] waited in expectation of receiving some communication from him. When he learned that Octavius was now the sole general of the army of the commonwealth, he wished to ascertain his sentiments, before he ventured freely to act with him; and having requested and obtained an interview with him, although Octavius removed all suspicion by the language which he held, yet it was too late in the day, after this meeting, to take any active steps in pursuing Antonius. On the following morning Decimus Brutus was summoned to Bononia to see Pansa, who was lying there ill of his wounds; but on his way thither he received intelligence of the consul's death, and returned immediately to Mutina, having lost irreparably another day. Meantime, Antonius was retreating with the utmost rapidity, marching in no regular order, and swelling his numbers by opening all the workhouses, and enlisting the slaves who were kept there under their taskmasters.[2] His object was to enter Gaul as soon as possible by way of the Maritime Alps; and accordingly he allowed himself no respite till he had crossed the Apennines and arrived at Vada,[3] a spot which still retains the name of Vado, and is situated on the road from Genoa to Nice, a little to the westward of Savona. Here he received a most seasonable support in the junction of P. Ventidius with three legions. This officer was a native of Asculum, and when that town had been taken by Cn. Pompeius Strabo in the Italian war, Ventidius, then quite a boy, had walked amongst the other prisoners in the triumphal procession of the conqueror. Since that time he had risen to considerable eminence, and had probably become acquainted with Antonius while they both served under Cæsar. When the civil war was again begun by the siege of Mutina, and Italy seemed likely to be the scene of a bloody contest, as in the times of Marius and Sylla, Ventidius repaired to his native country, Picenum, and there began to raise soldiers, partly from among Cæsar's veterans, and partly from the inhabitants. He had collected a force of three legions, and was apparently still in Picenum, or its neighbourhood,[4] when he received intelligence of the defeat of Antonius. Without loss of time he set out to join him, and as Octavius took no pains to intercept him, he crossed the Apennines by roads scarcely practicable, and succeeded in his attempt. Their cavalry was exceedingly formidable,[5] and L. Antonius was sent forward with it to occupy the passes of the Alps, on the coast road from Vada to Forum Julii, or Frejus. Antonius himself arrived at Forum Julii on the fifteenth of

Antonius retreats towards Gaul, and is joined by Ventidus.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xi. epist. xiii.
[2] Ibid. lib. xi. epist. x., xiii.
[3] Strabo, lib. iv. p. 221. edit. Xyland.
[4] Cicero, *Philippic.* xii. c. 9.
[5] Ibid. *ad Familiares*, lib. x. epist. xv., xxxiii., xxxiv.

May,[1] with the first divisions of his infantry—Ventidius following at the distance of two days' march in the rear. They found that M. Lepidus had arrived with his army at Forum Vocontii, a place distant little more than twenty miles from them; and, whatever private reasons Antonius might have had for depending on his assistance, yet his avowed object was to prevent the fugitive army from entering his province, and he had called upon L. Plancus to co-operate with him for that end. Plancus, as we have seen, had been rewarded with thanks and honours by the Senate, on the motion of Cicero, in return for the assurances of patriotism which he had sent to Rome from his province in the month of March. He crossed the Rhone, near Lyons and Vienne, on the twenty-sixth of April,[2] with the intention, as he declared, of marching into Italy, to the relief of Decimus Brutus; but, receiving intelligence of the battles of Mutina a few days afterwards, he halted between the Rhone and the Isère, and began to communicate with Lepidus on the best means of serving the commonwealth.

B.C. 43. Lepidus pretends to oppose his passage.

The chief agent in this correspondence was M. Juventius Laterensis, who was at this time one of the lieutenants of Lepidus; but, unlike his general, had been through life, and still continued to be, a fearless and sincere supporter of the old constitution.[3] Laterensis, believing what he wished, assured Plancus of the good intentions of Lepidus, and earnestly entreated him to move to his assistance against Antonius. It was on the twelfth of May that Plancus had thrown a bridge over the Isère, and had crossed the river; but he had remained on the left bank for nine days—being inclined, he said, to wait there for the arrival of Decimus Brutus, on whose co-operation he could more safely rely than on that of Lepidus. But being urged by the repeated entreaties and assurances of Lepidus and Laterensis, he moved forward from the Isère with four legions on the twenty-first of May,[4] having built and garrisoned two towers at the two extremities of his bridge, in order to secure the passage for Decimus Brutus, if he should arrive from Italy to join him. Three days only after he left the Isère, Decimus Brutus was at Eporedia or Ivrea,[5] in the direct road from the plains of the Po to the passage over the Alps by the Little St. Bernard, by which, retracing Hannibal's footsteps, he would have descended into the plains of Dauphinè by Montmeillan, and the road to Vienne. Brutus had under his com-

Movements of Plancus and Decimus Brutus.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. x. epist. xvii. [2] Ibid epist. ix.

[3] Laterensis had abandoned his canvass for the tribuneship in the year U.C. 694, because all candidates for any magistracy were required to take an oath, that they would never propose to the people any alteration in Cæsar's Agrarian law, relative to a division of lands in Campania. Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. ii. epist. xviii. And he had afterwards loudly taxed Cicero with a disgraceful tergiversation, when he allowed himself to court the friendship of Pompey and Cæsar in opposition to the Senate after his return from exile. Cicero, *pro Plancio*, c. 38, 39.

[4] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. x. epist. xviii.

[5] Ibid. lib. xi. epist. xx.

B.C. 43. mand an army of seven legions,[1] consisting of the legions raised by Pansa, those which he had levied himself, and one legion of veterans; but having been delayed at first in pursuing Antonius after the battle of Mutina, having lost the co-operation of Octavius, and being unprovided with the means of adequately supplying his army, he was probably an unequal match for the united forces of Antonius and Ventidius; and was therefore obliged to rest his dependence on the assistance of Plancus. But when he had reached Eporedia, he was induced to suspend his march by the alarming reports which he received of the dispositions of Octavius and his veterans,[2] reports which made him unwilling to leave Italy, and to abandon the seat of government to the ambition of one who was far more dangerous than Antonius. Meanwhile Plancus moved forward from the Isere to join the army of Lepidus;[3] but by this time the soldiers of Antonius were in communication with those of Lepidus, and these last had openly told their general that they were determined to have peace, and would fight with none of their fellow-soldiers. M. Laterensis, perceiving that Lepidus took no steps to check these feelings in his soldiers, wrote to Plancus to warn him that he should advance no further; and Plancus accordingly halted within forty miles of Forum Julii to wait the event. On the twenty-ninth of May, Lepidus united his forces with those of Antonius; and the two generals instantly began to march in pursuit of Plancus. He fell back upon the Isère as they advanced, recrossed the river without suffering any annoyance, and having broken down his bridge, resolved again, according to his own account, to look forward to the arrival of Decimus Brutus. But it may be suspected that Antonius and Lepidus would have pursued him more vigorously, had they apprehended any serious effects from his hostility; and the indecision of Plancus may have joined with the treachery of Lepidus in provoking Laterensis to that act of despair, by which, when he saw the junction with Antonius consummated, he fell upon his own sword.

Union between Antonius and Lepidus.

Suicide of Laterensis.

It is now time to return to Rome, and to notice the effect produced in the capital by the tidings of the battle of Mutina. When it was known that the siege of Mutina was raised, and that Antonius was flying in disorder with the wreck of his army, the expressions, and, probably the feelings, of public joy, were great and general.[4]

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. x. epist. xxiv.; lib. xi. epist. x.

[2] Ibid lib. xi. epist. xx.

[3] Ibid. lib. x. epist. xxi., xxiii.

[4] Ibid *ad Brutum*, lib. i. epist. iii. There is a story told by Valerius Maximus, lib. v. c. 2, which seems to confirm the statement of Cicero, that the war with Antonius was regarded by the people in general as a struggle for their liberty. When M. Cornutus, the Prætor, was proceeding to contract for the funeral solemnities of Hirtius and Pansa, the principal undertakers in Rome begged that they might be allowed to furnish every thing that was required, even to the labour of their slaves, without receiving any sort of payment, because they considered the two consuls to have fallen in the service of their country.

The people, as if all danger were at an end, laid aside the military dress; a triumph was voted to Decimus Brutus,[1] an oration to Octavius, and a public funeral in the *Campus Martius* to the two consuls, Hirtius and Pansa. Antonius, and all his followers were declared public enemies; and as the death of the consuls left vacant the charge of conducting the war against Dolabella, P. Servilius moved that it should be now conferred on Cassius; and it was added, on the suggestion of Cicero, that M. Brutus might take part in it or not, as he should judge most expedient for the commonwealth. The first check which his exultation sustained, was from the tidings of the unmolested retreat of Antonius, and of his junction with P. Ventidius; and the public complained loudly of the neglect of Decimus Brutus and Octavius in suffering their defeated enemy to escape. Decimus Brutus, however, had so deep an interest in the success of the aristocracy, that he cannot be suspected of any want of vigour in their cause; and his own justification, which he sent to Cicero in one of his letters, appears entirely satisfactory.[2] We have already mentioned the circumstances which detained him two days from the pursuit of Antonius immediately after the battle; and it became then impossible for him to overtake the fugitives, who were making their way with the utmost expedition by tracts which were probably impracticable for a regular army, whose order was unbroken. But Decimus Brutus requested Octavius to cross the Apennines and intercept the division of Ventidius,[3] for the troops of Antonius, if left to themselves, would naturally dwindle away by desertion; whereas if they were reinforced immediately by a fresh army, their spirits would gradually recover, and their fidelity to their chief would be confirmed.

B.C. 43. Proceedings at Rome.

And here we want a more detailed account of events, and a more careful specification of dates than it is now possible to gain. All the veteran legions, which had been commanded by the late consuls, were now, with one exception, under the orders of Octavius; but it seems that neither they nor their general were inclined to obey the Senate any longer. What excuses he made to Decimus Brutus for not attempting to intercept Ventidius, we cannot tell; but no such attempt was made, and it was impossible for him, so soon after the battle, to have received intelligence of those decrees of the Senate which his partisans represent as so injurious to him. The fact appears to be, that the death of both the consuls instantly opened to Octavius a new prospect; and that his thoughts were henceforward bent far more on forwarding his own schemes of ambition at Rome, than on lending any effectual assistance to Decimus Brutus. He conceived the design of procuring his own election to the consulship

Conduct of Octavius.

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 62, edit. Oxon, 1693. Cicero, *ad Brutum*, lib. i. epist. v., xv.

[2] *Ad Familiares*, lib. xi. epist. xiii.

[3] Ibid. epist x.

B.C. 43. for the remaining months of the year; and possibly he showed some symptoms of his intentions after the battle of Mutina; for Decimus Brutus gives some intimations of this kind in a letter to Cicero, dated on the fifth of May.[1] If this were at all suspected, it was just and reasonable that the Senate should endeavour to transfer the chief command of the armies in Italy to an officer on whom more reliance could be placed; and, accordingly, it was proposed by L. Livius Drusus,[2] the father of the future wife of Octavius, and by L. Æmilius Paulus, that the fourth legion and the Martian should be given up to Decimus Brutus. This was never done, for the soldiers would not be commanded by one of Cæsar's assassins,[3] and Octavius was not at all unwilling to avail himself of their inclinations, and to plead his inability to comply with the order of the Senate.

Yet although his conduct in this matter, combined with his designs upon the consulship, and his negligence in acting against Antonius and Ventidius, must have given just offence, nothing was decreed by the Senate against him; but a deputation of senators was sent to the legions to try whether they could not be prevailed upon to remain firm in their duty, and to pacify them with regard to some claims for pay and military rewards which they had been lately advancing.[4] In times of civil war, which are necessarily accompanied by great public and private distress, the government naturally finds it difficult to pay the armies by which it is supported; and this inability is commonly made a handle by the soldiers and their generals to colour their own usurpations. The poverty of the Roman treasury was very great; and it seemed impossible to supply it without having recourse to direct taxation,[5] from which the Romans had been exempted ever since the conquest of Macedonia by L. Æmilius Paulus. A property-tax of one per cent. appears accordingly to have been levied;[6] but the money thus procured was no more than sufficient to discharge the promises formerly made by the Senate to the fourth legion and the Martian for their early desertion of the cause of Antonius. A vote passed, besides, that lands should be distributed among the soldiers of four legions;[7] but which they were is not mentioned. And as a commission of ten senators had lately

Poverty of the Roman Treasury.

[1] *Ad Familiares*, lib. xi. epist. x. *Primum omnium, quantam perturbationem rerum urbanarum afferat obitus Consulum, quantamque cupiditatem hominibus injiciat vacuitas, non te fugit. Satis me multa scripsisse, quæ literis commendari possint, arbitror. Scio enim, cui scribam.*

[2] Ibid. epist. xix.

[3] Ibid. epist. xiv.

[4] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 62. Appian, lib. iii. c. 86.

[5] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xii. epist. xxx. *Pecunia conquiritur undique, ut optimè meritis militibus promissa solvantur; quod quidem fieri sine tributo posse non arbitror.*

[6] Cicero, *ad Brutum*, lib. i. epist. xviii. *Obdurescunt magis quotidie boni viri ad vocem tributi; quod ex centesimâ collatum impudenti censu locupletum in duarum legionum præmiis omne consumitur.*

[7] *Ad Familiares*, lib. xi. epist. xx.

been appointed,[1] for the purpose of examining the acts of Antonius during his consulship, and amongst the rest his grants of lands to Cæsar's veteran soldiers; it appears that some of the members of the commission were anxious to have the management of the grants now proposed to be made to the four legions, which they would have connected with the reversal of those made by Antonius. All the commissioners were warm partisans of the aristocracy, and Cicero was amongst the most distinguished of the number; but on account of the jealousy which was felt towards every military man who might possess a dangerous influence over the soldiery, neither was Decimus Brutus nor Octavius, included amongst them. In these measures there was a spirit manifested which alarmed and irritated all the partisans of Cæsar, and which made the army fear that they should soon be deprived of the fruits of their victories. The veterans expressed their indignation that, while their own generals were slighted, all the acts of government were directed by Cicero;[2] and all the bounties which they were to receive were to be given them by men of whom they had no knowledge, and from whose gratitude or ambition they had nothing to expect.

B.C. 43.

The army irritated against the Senate.

Such language repeated by every person around him served, perhaps, to excuse to Octavius himself the guilt of the conduct which he meditated. He threw himself into the hands of his soldiers, with the mutual understanding that he should defend their interests, while they served the ends of his ambition. His own grounds of offence against the Senate were utterly trifling. It is a mere mockery of all government, when a military officer thinks himself justified in committing treason, because his services have not been rewarded according to his estimate of their merits; and Decimus Brutus had as much right as Octavius to complain of the omission of his name among the ten commissioners. But Decimus Brutus, instead of turning the irritation of the soldiers to his own purposes, wrote to Cicero to acquaint him with it, and to advise him to take some steps to pacify it. He recommended that no one legion should be favoured above the rest; that the lands which had belonged to the soldiers of Antonius should be divided amongst the veterans who had fought under the late consuls and Octavius; and that Octavius and himself should be entrusted with the distribution of them. Cicero, in answer, expressed his entire approbation of these proposals;[3] assured Decimus Brutus that he had already prevented his colleagues in the commission from having the management of the division of lands, and that it was not his fault that neither Decimus nor Octavius had been included amongst the commissioners. Under these circumstances, it was the army, and not Octavius personally, whom it seemed expedient to the Senate to conciliate. Their demands of pay and of

Advice of Brutus.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. xi. epist. xiv., xx., xxi. Appian, lib. iii. c. 82.
[2] Ibid. lib. xi. epist. xx.
[3] Ibid. epist. xxi.

B.C. 43. rewards in land, were to be satisfied or moderated; their jealousy of the Senate, and of the civil authorities, was to be lessened; and they were to be persuaded to show their obedience and their respect to the usual practice of the commonwealth, by submitting to the command of Decimus Brutus, who was consul-elect, rather than to that of a youth of nineteen, who had been only qualified to exercise any military authority at all by the extraordinary favour of the Senate in dispensing with the strict observance of the laws in his behalf. But when the deputation of the Senate reached the camp of Octavius, the soldiers professed to be indignant that they were addressed distinctly from their general;[1] and Octavius, who had probably determined already on the part which he was to act, affected to be deeply injured, and while he professed his readiness to obey the Senate, only inflamed the veterans still more by his pretended meekness, and determined them to persist in their refusal to listen to any communication which they did not receive through him.

They refuse to listen to a deputation sent to them by the Senate.

The defection of Lepidus, which took place, as we have seen, on the twenty-ninth of May, made Octavius more anxious than ever to terminate his opposition to Antonius. It seems that in the beginning of June, Plancus had conducted his forces across the Alps, and had formed a junction with those of Decimus Brutus, in the neighbourhood of Eporedia or Ivrea. Their united army consisted of four veteran legions, of one of two years standing, and of nine newly levied;[2] so that although some of these were probably incomplete, yet the numerical strength of the whole must have been very considerable. But hardly any superiority of numbers could enable the newly raised troops to meet veterans in the field; so that in opposing the united armies of Lepidus, Antonius, and Ventidius, the four veteran legions were the only part of their force on which Plancus and Brutus could safely calculate. Plancus, therefore, sent repeated letters to Octavius, requesting him to march to their assistance; and Octavius answered them by assurances that he was coming without delay, although, in fact, he was bent on moving in the very opposite direction, and on employing his troops, not against Antonius but against the Senate and people of Rome. Meantime the Senate, on the thirtieth of June, declared M. Lepidus a public enemy, together with all his adherents;[3] and it seems to have been a question whether or not the veteran legions in the province of Africa, and M. Brutus, with his victorious army in Greece, should be recalled for the defence of Italy. It seems probable that Cæsar's friends, as long as the intentions of Octavius were any way doubtful, represented that it could not fail to disgust and alienate him entirely, if the Senate appeared to mistrust his fidelity; and, above all, if M. Brutus were

The Senate declares Lepidus a public enemy.

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 62.
[2] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. x. epist. xxiv.
[3] Ibid. lib. xii. epist. x.

called in to overawe him in the centre of Italy, whilst the command of the war in the north had been just transferred from him to Decimus. Accordingly, the fear of offending Octavius seems to have had such influence, that M. Brutus, although privately urged by Cicero to cross over into Italy, was never officially summoned home by the Senate; but two legions from the army in Africa were sent for, and were despatched accordingly by Q. Cornificius, the commander of the province; they did not, however, arrive in Rome till the month of August, and their arrival, after all, as we shall see, produced no benefit. B.C. 43.

Military deputation sent by Octavius to Rome, to demand the consulship.

It was in the month of July that Octavius sent to the Capitol a deputation from his army, headed by one of his centurions, to request, or rather to demand, that he should be elected consul.[1] Wishing, as we may suppose, to avoid the infamy of such an outrage, he had before endeavoured to find some friend, amongst the magistrates or members of the Senate, who would propose his request in a less obnoxious manner; but Cicero affirms,[2] as a splendid proof of the unanimous good spirit by which the people were actuated, that not a single individual could be prevailed upon to countenance his ambition. His soldiers, however, were less scrupulous, and it is mentioned that when the deputation was admitted into the Senate, and had declared the wishes of the army, the centurion who headed it, finding that the senators hesitated in complying, threw back his military cloak, and, pointing to the hilt of his sword, exclaimed, "If you refuse our request, this shall grant it." When such treasonable language could be uttered with impunity, a military despotism was, in fact, already established. The Senate could not, at once, be induced to surrender up that liberty which so lately seemed to have been securely recovered; but Octavius being now determined to throw off the mask altogether, put his army in motion from Cisalpine Gaul; whence entering Italy, as we are told, by the very road which his uncle had taken at the beginning of his rebellion,[3] he advanced without opposition to the very gates of the capital, and occupied the Campus Martius with his troops. Thus, under the imminent terror of a military usurpation, he was admitted into the city, and was elected consul, together with Q. Pedius, an old officer of his uncle, in the month of August, B.C. 43.[4] From this moment the liberty of the commonwealth was lost for ever; the Senate, now the helpless instrument of military violence, was obliged to repeal its former decrees, by which Antonius and Lepidus had been declared public enemies; and the famous Pedian law was proposed and carried by Q. Pedius, which enacted that all the assassins of Cæsar, and all who had approved of the murder, should be brought to trial for that crime; and, on condemnation, should be

Octavius marches to Rome, and is elected consul, together with Q. Pedius.

[1] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. x. epist. xxiv. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 26.
[2] *Ad Brutum*, lib. i. epist. x.
[3] Appian, *de Bell. Civil.* lib. iii. c. 88, *et seq.*
[4] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 31. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 65, 69.

B.C. 43. forbidden the use of fire and water, according to the usual style of attainder. It is said that M. Agrippa came forward as the accuser of C. Cassius under this law;[1] and, as neither he nor any of the other conspirators were in Rome to answer the charge, sentence of condemnation was passed against them all. In the midst of these disturbances, the two legions from Africa arrived in Italy;[2] but the soldiers were soon corrupted by the general example of their comrades, and put themselves under the command of Octavius.

The assassins of Cæsar are condemned by a law brought forward by Q. Pedius.



[Agrippa.]

We have now reached the period at which we can no longer avail ourselves of the inestimable guidance of Cicero and his correspondents; and we are left, at the very moment when our curiosity and interest are most intensely excited, without any means of gratifying them. We might, indeed, still present our readers with a very detailed narrative of the course of events, if we could prevail on ourselves to rely on Dion Cassius and Appian. But as on the one hand, we have found how little they are to be trusted when we have been able to try them by a reference to good authorities, so on the other, when we have no opportunity of doing so, we cannot follow them with confidence, nor will we injure the truth of history by the indiscriminate admission of evidence so worthless.

It seems that Octavius, soon after his usurpation of the consulship, took the field to watch the movements of Antonius, who, since his junction with Lepidus, appears to have remained for some time quietly in Gaul, and not to have made any attempts against the army of Plancus and Brutus. But it is likely that he was prepared for the change in the conduct of Octavius, and rightly augured that he should draw from his consulship the same advantages which he must otherwise have risked a battle to gain. Asinius Pollio,[3] finding that Cæsar's officers were all uniting in one common cause, and that his heir was on the point of taking his natural station amongst them, surrendered his legions to Antonius; and L. Plancus did not hesitate to separate his troops from those of Decimus Brutus, and to follow the example of Pollio. Of the four veteran legions which Plancus and Brutus had commanded, three had belonged to Plancus;[4] and when these submitted to Antonius, it is likely that the single one which had been commanded by Brutus, was easily induced to follow the example of its comrades. It is said also, that Plancus endeavoured

Asinius Pollio and L. Plancus join Antonius.

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 69.
[2] Appian, lib. iii. c. 92.
[3] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 63. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxx.
[4] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. x. epist. xxiv.

to make his defection still more acceptable to Antonius,[1] by treacherously getting the person of his late associate into his power. In this he failed, but Decimus Brutus soon found that he could not depend upon the newly raised legions which alone continued to acknowledge his authority. They gradually dropped away from him, and Brutus saw that his only resource was to escape, if possible, from Italy, and reach the camp of M. Brutus in Greece. His troops at last deserting him altogether, he assumed the disguise of a Gaul, and hoped, by avoiding all the ordinary roads, to make his way to Aquileia and Illyricum, through the territories of the Gaulish chiefs, which bordered upon the Alps. He was discovered, however, by one of the chiefs, who instantly detained him, and sent word to Antonius of his capture. Antonius sent a party of soldiers to put him to death, and to bring his head away with them, and his commands were speedily executed. If, as is reported, the Gaulish chief who betrayed him had formerly received great kindnesses at his hands,[2] Decimus Brutus met a treatment more exactly corresponding to the peculiar perfidy which he had himself shown in the assassination of Cæsar. It is true that in the last part of his life he had well and honourably supported the cause of the commonwealth; but if Antonius had had never been guilty of a worse crime than the putting him to death, his conduct would have had some plea of retaliation to urge; and amidst the low morality of the times, the illegality of the action might seem excused by the former illegal violence of him who was now the victim.

B.C. 43.

Decimus Brutus is deserted by his soldiers, and endeavours to escape into Greece.

He is taken and put to death by order of Antonius.

Octavius, or Augustus, as we shall for the future call him,[3] now invested with the title of consul, and commanding a numerous army, marched back again towards Cisalpine Gaul, and found that Antonius and Lepidus had by this time crossed the Alps, and were arrived in the neighbourhood of Mutina. A friendly correspondence had been carried on between the chiefs of the two armies before they were advanced very near to one another; and it was determined that all differences should finally be settled, and the future measures which they were to take in common should be arranged at a personal interview. Accordingly the meeting took place in one of the islands,[4] if so they may be called, which were formed in the low

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 64. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxx. Appian, lib. iii. c. 97, 98. Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. 13.

[2] Appian, lib. iii. c. 98.

[3] We have resolved to call Octavius henceforward by the name of Augustus, in order that the cruelties of the Triumvirate, and the splendour of the Imperial Government may be distinctly associated in the reader's mind with one and the same person; for otherwise the emperor seems to have derived a real benefit from his change of name, and Octavius with all his atrocities is forgotten, while we think only of Augustus, the peaceful sovereign of the civilized world, the patron of literature, and the idol of the favourite writers of our youth.

[4] Appian, lib. iv. c. 2. Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 19. Such a spot as that described in the text, was the Isle of Athelney, in Somersetshire, to which Alfred is said to

B.C. 43. Meeting between Antonius Lepidus and Augustus.

fenny district between the Apennines and the Po, by the numerous streams which descended from the mountains, and which, for want of a proper drainage, spread themselves to a vast extent over the low country, encircling various tracts of marshy ground in their irregular courses. On one of these spots, which the subsequent alterations in the nature of the country would soon make it almost impossible to identify, amidst a scenery, the dull and loathsome character of which well befitted the actors and the acts which they meditated, Antonius, Lepidus, and Augustus held their conference. It was pretended afterwards by the writers who flourished under the imperial government,[1] that Augustus for a long time remonstrated against the bloody executions which Antonius and Lepidus were eager to perpetrate; but his language at a private meeting could not be so well ascertained as his subsequent conduct; and this, it is confessed, was more remorseless than that of either of his associates; for whilst Antonius and Lepidus listened in several instances to the influence of entreaties or of favour, and spared those whom they had condemned to death, it is mentioned that Augustus did not pardon a single victim.[2] But whatever discussions may have taken place between the three leaders, the result sufficiently proved that all principles and all feelings of good were overpowered in their minds by revenge and ambition. They constituted themselves into a triumvirate, or high commission of three,[3] for settling the affairs of the commonwealth during five years; they divided among themselves those provinces of the empire which were subject to their power; and nominated the persons who were to hold the usual annual magistracies during the term of the triumvirate; they made such liberal promises to their armies, that it is said that eighteen of the finest cities in Italy, together with the territories adjacent to them, were to be given up to the soldiers as military colonies; and they agreed to draw up a list of proscription, including the names of all those individuals whom they proposed to murder. To cement the personal union of the triumvirs, it was resolved that Clodia,[4] the daughter-in-law of Antonius, being the daughter of his wife Fulvia by her first husband, P. Clodius, should be given in marriage to Augustus; but she was as yet too young to become a wife, and, in a short time afterwards, the nominal connection, which policy had formed, was, by a change of political circumstances, as readily dissolved.

B.C. 42. The second Triumvirate.

have retired when the Danes had overran his kingdom. And the Isle of Ely still retains the name of an island, which it obtained originally from similarity of situation. The progress of agricultural improvement so alters the appearance of such districts, that Athelney now can scarcely, if at all, be recognised; and the country between the Apennines and the Po, which was in the days of the Triumvirate little better than a great fen, is now discribed to be one of the richest and most delightful parts in Italy.

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 66.

[2] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 27.

[3] Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxx. Appian, lib. iv. c. 3.

[4] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 62

Immediately after the conclusion of this agreement, and while its purport was unknown at Rome, orders were despatched to the capital for the murder of twelve or sixteen individuals whom the triumvirs wished to destroy before any general alarm was given.[1] Some of these victims were suddenly assassinated in the streets, or at social entertainments; and, although the armies of the triumvirs were yet at a distance, the consul, Q. Pedius, who had been left by Octavius at Rome, sanctioned these crimes by his authority, and at once showed to the people the hopelessness of the evil under which they had fallen. He attempted, indeed, to allay the panic which these first murders occasioned, by publishing the names of the individuals whom he had been ordered to destroy, and by assurances that no others should be molested. But it is said that Pedius died suddenly, in consequence of his excessive personal exertions to preserve tranquillity in the city; and the triumvirs were thus freed from the difficulty in which his official limitation of the number of the proscribed might otherwise have involved them. A few days afterwards they entered Rome with their troops; the Comitia were assembled in mockery; the appointment of the triumvirate was proposed by P. Titius (one of the tribunes who had before distinguished himself by his opposition to Cicero's measures), and was of course agreed to without a murmur. Then the lists of proscription began to be published; but gradually, as had been done before by Sylla, as if to protract the misery of the sufferers by this horrible state of suspense. The lists were accompanied by a proclamation which Appian professes to have faithfully translated into Greek from its Latin original, and to which probably no other parallels can be found in history than that which defended the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and that which encouraged the populace of Paris to the murders committed in the prisons in September, 1792. It is remarkable, too, that in the latter of these two cases, the very same excuse was assigned for the massacres as was now alleged by the triumvirs. "Whilst we are hastening to attack our enemies abroad," said Lepidus, Antonius, and Augustus, "we cannot with safety leave so many other enemies behind us in Rome; nor again can we linger to take precautions against our domestic adversaries, lest the dangers with which we are threatened from abroad become too formidable to be overcome." "Whilst the patriots are hastening to the defence of their country in the plains of Champagne," said the municipality of Paris, "they cannot leave their wives and children exposed to the machinations of those numerous aristocrats who will be let loose from their prisons on the first successes obtained by the enemy, to fill our streets and our houses with bloodshed."

B.C. 42. The great Proscription.

Under pretence of thus providing for their security, the Triumvirs

[1] Appian, lib. iv. c. 6, *et seq.*

B.C. 42. Extent of the Proscription.

inscribed on the proscription list the names of one hundred and thirty senators,[1] at the lowest computation, and of a far greater number of the equestrian order. All persons were forbidden to harbour or to promote the escape of any of the proscribed, under pain of being sentenced to the same fate themselves;[2] while rewards were offered to any who should put them to death, and bring their heads to the Triumvirs; and it was added, that no record should be kept of the payment of this blood-money; that he who received it might not hereafter be exposed to the public detestation. That no aggravation of wickedness might be wanting, each of the three associates stained themselves with the blood of some near relation or former friend. M. Lepidus insisted that his brother, L. Æmilius Paulus, should be proscribed;[3] Antonius inserted on the list the name of his uncle, L. Cæsar; and Augustus added that of his guardian, C. Toranius. In emulation of the chiefs, L. Plancus requested that his brother, Plotius Plancus, might be amongst the victims; and, if Appian may be credited, Asinius Pollio, in like manner, procured the murder of his father-in-law. The rewards offered to the murderers added the instigations of avarice to those of revenge or fear, and produced instances of the most horrible domestic treachery—freedmen betraying their patrons, slaves their masters, and children their parents. It is the remark of Paterculus,[4] that the proscription was marked by the heroic fidelity of wives towards their husbands, whilst the conduct of sons towards their fathers was peculiarly undutiful and perfidious; and he imputes this to the eagerness which men feel to anticipate their hopes of future advantage; for the son hoped, by the merit of his parricide, to save his father's property from confiscation, and to obtain an earlier possession of his inheritance. Anecdotes of these fearful times were greedily collected, and volumes, as we are told, were filled with them;[5] some recording the most tragical deaths, and others the most extraordinary escapes, of those who were destined to destruction. But of all the victims of the proscription we must select the most illustrious, and follow as carefully as we can the circumstances of the fate of M. Cicero.

Murder of M. Cicero.

From the moment that we can no longer derive any information concerning him from his own writings, our knowledge of his conduct becomes much less accurate. The latest of his own letters, which has been preserved to us, is one written to M. Brutus on the twenty-seventh of July,[6] in which he expresses great fears lest Augustus should disappoint all his hopes, and should falsify by some act of treason all the praises which he had bestowed upon him. But two letters

[1] Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxx.
[2] Appian, lib. iv. c. 11.
[3] Ibid. lib. cxx. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 27.
[4] Lib. ii. c. 67.
[5] Appian, lib. iv. c. 16.
[6] *Epist. ad Brutum*, lib. i. epist. xviii.

from Brutus are extant,[1] apparently of a still later date, written one B.C. 42.
to Cicero and the other to T. Atticus, in both of which Cicero is taxed with an excessive complaisance towards Augustus, and is accused particularly of having interceded with him in too humble a manner in behalf of the conspirators against Cæsar; and even of having endeavoured to conciliate him by condemning their conduct, and by attacking P. Casca, who was one of the tribunes for the year, and who, on the motion of P. Titius, had been degraded from his office by the votes of the tribes, since Augustus had usurped the



[Cicero.]

consulship. It is very likely that Cicero was somewhat too credulous in trusting to the fair professions which Augustus constantly made to him: he believed, besides, that in spite of the pernicious counsels of his military friends, so young a man could not yet be thoroughly corrupted; and might still be led to choose the better part. if his suspicions of the aristocracy could be lessened. With this view he thought it politic to praise him, and to move that extraordinary honours should be granted him; he may also have felt that if Augustus could be taught to respect the constitution of his country, much might be indulged to his natural resentment towards the assassins of his uncle; and that in speaking to him of them and of their conduct, the language of deprecation and censure was more fitting than any higher tone. It is true that Cicero's personal enmity against Antonius made him over-estimate the services which Augustus had rendered in first taking up arms against him; nor did he rightly appreciate the real danger which threatened the commonwealth; and which arose not from the ambition of any one man,

[1] *Epist. ad Brutum*, lib. i. epist. xvi., xvii.

B.C. 42. however unprincipled, but from the power and insolence of the army at large, who were now conscious of their strength, and were determined to exert it. We are told that Cicero at one time was desirous of becoming the colleague of Augustus in the consulship;[1] and if he could have effected this, the evil designs of his colleague would have been in great measure neutralised; the declarations of the Senate against Antonius and Lepidus would not have been so easily repealed—the law condemning the assassins of Cæsar might not have passed, nor the nominal authority of government have been so speedily transferred to that party which had hitherto been considered as in a state of rebellion. But Augustus, having the power of the sword in his hands, determined to avail himself of it to the utmost: he chose therefore, for his colleague, not Cicero but Q. Pedius, and the first measures of his consulship must have almost prepared Cicero for that consummation of treachery which was soon afterwards displayed in establishing the Triumvirate.

Cicero desirous of being the colleague of Augustus.

It is said that the name of Cicero was included in that first list of victims whom Q. Pedius received orders to destroy before the arrival of the Triumvirs at Rome. But be this as it may, Cicero could not doubt of his own danger, from the moment that he heard of the conferences and engagements between the three generals. He instantly, therefore, quitted the capital,[2] and retired to his villa near Tusculum, whence, by cross roads, he escaped to another of his villas near Formiæ, intending to embark on board of a vessel at Caieta, and make the best of his way by sea to Macedonia. A vessel was provided for him, and he commenced his voyage; but the wind was contrary, and the delay thus occasioned, together with the sickness which he always felt severely at sea, induced him to return, and to take no further steps to avoid the fate which awaited him. "I will die," he said, "in that country which I have so often saved." He was now sixty-three years of age, so that death seemed to him preferable to the miseries and anxieties of a doubtful flight. He landed therefore once more, and returned to his Formian villa near Caieta. Here he was disposed to remain and to meet his death, but his slaves,[3] who were warmly attached to him, could not bear to see him thus sacrificed; and when the party of soldiers sent to murder him was advancing towards the villa, they almost forced him to put himself into his litter, and to allow them to carry him once more on board of the vessel, which was still lying at Caieta. But as they were bearing the litter towards the sea, they were overtaken in the walks of his own grounds by the soldiers who were in search of him, and who were headed by one Herennius, a centurion, and by C.

[1] Plutarch, *in Cicerone*, c. 45, 46.
[2] Livy, *Fragm. apud Senecam, inter Fragmenta T. Livii, editum.*
[3] Plutarch, *in Cicerone*, c. 47, 48.

Popilius Lænas. Popilius was a native of Picenum,[1] and had, on a former occasion, been successfully defended by Cicero, when brought to trial for some offence before the Courts at Rome. As the assistance of advocates was given gratuitously, the connection between them and their clients was esteemed very differently from what it is amongst us; and it was therefore an instance of peculiar atrocity that Popilius offered his services to Antonius to murder his patron, from no other motive than the hope of gaining his favour by showing such readiness to destroy his greatest enemy. The slaves of Cicero,[2] undismayed at the appearance of the soldiers, prepared to defend their master, but he refused to allow any blood to be shed on his account, and commanded them to set down the litter, and to await the issue in silence. He was obeyed, and when the soldiers came up, he stretched out his head with perfect calmness, and submitted his neck to the sword of Popilius. When the murder was accomplished, the soldiers cut off his two hands also, as the instruments with which he had written his Philippic Orations; and the head and hands were

B.C. 42.

His murder, 7th of December, B.C. 43.



[Roman Orators.—*Composed from the Antique.*]

both carried to Rome and exposed together at the Rostra, at that very place where he had been so lately heard with an universal feeling of admiration,—"such," says Livy, "as no human tongue had ever excited before." Men crowded to see his mangled remains, and testified by their tears the compassion and affection which his unworthy death, and his pure and amiable character had so justly deserved.

B.C. 42

[1] Valerius Maximus, lib. v. c. 3.
[2] *Fragment. Livii, ubi suprà.*

B.C. 42. Political character of Cicero.

In reviewing the political life of Cicero, it cannot, we think, be doubted, that none of his contemporaries surpassed him in the liberality of his views, or the integrity of his motives. He has been usually charged with vacillation and timidity throughout the period which elapsed between his return from banishment in B.C. 57, and the close of the civil war between Pompey and Cæsar. It seems, indeed, that in all great political convulsions, candour and acuteness are apt to lead to indecision;[1] it is certain, at least, that they will incur the reproach of it from all the more violent partisans of either side. At Rome, immediately before the commencement of Cæsar's rebellion, neither of the two parties, by which the state was divided, was worthy of the cordial support of an honest and well-judging citizen. The heads of the high aristocracy were selfish and violent; the popular tribunes, and the military leaders, whose interests they served, were turbulent and unprincipled. A few years earlier, while Pompey and Cæsar were as yet acting in union with one another, the aristocratical leaders were not such as to encourage confidence; and their jealousy of Cicero, because he was not by birth or inclination exclusively connected with them themselves, was a public as well as a personal reason for his regarding them with suspicion and dislike. At the same time Cicero must be allowed to have been biassed at this particular period by private feelings; by the flattering language of Pompey and Cæsar on the one side, which affected the placability of his nature even more than its vanity; and by the countenance which the aristocracy at this time gave to his enemy Clodius, because they wished to employ his services in annoying the triumvirate. The greatest error into which these feelings led him, was the speech he made in the Senate "on the disposal of the consular provinces;" in which he pronounced a high panegyric upon Cæsar, and urged that he should be continued in his command in Gaul, while at the same time he advised the recall of Piso from Macedonia, and of Gabinius from Syria. But six years before the commencement of Cæsar's rebellion, it was hardly to be suspected that he intended to use his province as a means of enabling him to make war upon his country; or that he had no thoughts of resigning his command in Gaul till it should be exchanged for the sovereignty of the empire.

His conduct in the civil war.

When the civil war at last broke out, Cicero disapproved of the system on which Pompey intended to conduct it, and particularly of his purpose of leaving Italy. Yet he was only prevented at first from following him into Greece by the rapid advance of Cæsar's

[1] Τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνιτὸν, ἐπί τε ταν ἀρχὸν.—Τὸ δὲ σῶφρον, τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα. Such was the manner in which Thucydides tells us that the violent and unprincipled members of the aristocratical and democratical factions in Greece represented the characters of those few moderate and upright men who regarded both the contending parties with equal disapprobation, lib. iii. c. 82.

army into Apulia, by which he was precluded from joining Pompey at Brundusium; and afterwards, having tried in vain, yet without the least compromise of his own character, to persuade Cæsar to conclude a peace on equitable terms, he escaped from Italy on the first opportunity, and joined the standard of the commonwealth in Macedonia. There, a nearer view of the avowed sentiments and designs of the aristocratical leaders, made him, indeed, a lukewarm follower of their cause. To say nothing of the immediate confiscations and proscriptions, which they announced as the first-fruits of their victory, Cicero might justly dread that their triumph would be followed by the re-enactment of Sylla's most tyrannical measures, the destruction of the tribunitian magistracy, and the appropriation of the whole judicial power to the senatorian order. Seeing thus so much to excite his fears in the success of either party, the miseries of civil war would naturally strike upon his mind with proportionate force; and he wished to escape at any rate, from any personal share in a struggle which he abhorred, as soon as he could with honour. Accordingly after the battle of Pharsalia, he took no farther part in the war, but returned to Italy, and received the conqueror's permission to live in the quiet enjoyment of his own property. When Cæsar's power was finally established, Cicero kept up his former acquaintance with him on the terms of mutual civility; but he received from him no favours, unless we consider it in the light, that his family was one amongst many which Cæsar raised to the dignity of Patricians, when he wished to fill up the losses sustained by that order in the late wars. At last, after Cæsar's death, when a fair prospect opened of restoring the old constitution, Cicero acted with a degree of firmness and decision, which we think adds probability to the representation which we have given of his motives and feelings in the earlier part of his career. B.C. 42.

His main error, as it seems to us, in the latter part of his life, was his excessive partiality to the assassins of Cæsar, and his throwing so great a military force into their hands. The murder of Cæsar was an action, at the best, to be buried in oblivion. Except the single pretence of revenging his death, the new enemies of the constitution had not another excuse for their treason; while the cause which Cicero upheld was perfectly pure, if it did not needlessly encumber itself by upholding an act of assassination, and rewarding the murderers. The more respectable part of Cæsar's old officers, such as Hirtius, and Pansa, and Cornificius; and of those moderate men who had submitted to his power without having shared in the guilt of his first rebellion, such as P. Servilius, Ser. Sulpicius, L. Philippus, and others, were the very men to whom the commonwealth might most safely have trusted the defence of its liberties against Antonius; for not only would Cæsar's veterans have obeyed them without reluctance, but all that numerous party who had been gainers by the late His chief error.

B.C. 42. revolution, looked upon these men as their security against the excesses of complete reaction, and would have willingly supported the commonwealth so long as they conducted the administration of it. And with them Cicero might safely have taken his place as their associate, or even as their leader; for his eloquence and his integrity had made him long and generally popular: and the only ground of the offence which Cæsar's veterans entertained against him, was his so closely connecting himself with the assassins of their general. Even Augustus himself might not so soon have proved a traitor, had he not seen that while Cicero was on the one hand courting his support, he was on the other conferring exorbitant powers on Brutus and Cassius, and investing them with the whole military command of the east. The restoration of the commonwealth might have been feasible; but to reinstate the old aristocracy, or the friends of Pompey, in their former supremacy was clearly not so. But perhaps after all the preservation of any form of civil government was become impossible, since the army was grown so formidable as to form a distinct interest of its own; and since its favour or displeasure were held up even in the debates of the Senate as objects of hope or fear. Be this as it may, Cicero died as he had lived, with a reputation for patriotism and integrity; nor is his life, as a citizen, stained with any thing worse than some mixture of vanity and erroneous judgment amid many splendid instances of liberality and moderation, of wisdom and vigour.

Some account of other persons included in the Proscription.

Amongst the other distinguished persons who were murdered in the same proscription, may be noticed Q. Cicero and his son, C. Toranius, a man of prætorian dignity,[1] and who had been guardian to Augustus; L. Villius Annalias,[2] one of the prætors for the present year; C. Plotius Plancus, the brother of L. Plancus; and according to Appian, Salvius,[3] one of the tribunes, and Minucius, also one of the prætors. L. Cæsar,[4] the uncle of Antonius, was saved by the influence of his sister; L. Paulus, the brother of Lepidus, was allowed to escape by the soldiers sent to murder him, who respected, it is said, the brother of their general; or perhaps were shocked at the unnatural wickedness of that general, in commanding the murder of so near a relation. M. Varro,[5] formerly one of Pompey's lieutenants in Spain, but much more known as a man of letters, was saved by the intercession of Q. Calenus. Apulius,[6] perhaps the same person who was tribune in this very year, and who was warmly attached to Cicero, escaped to the army of M. Brutus in Macedonia. Some of the expedients by which individuals who had been proscribed preserved their lives, are worthy of mention, as

[1] Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. 11. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 27.
[2] Ibid. Appian lib. iv. c. 18.
[3] Appian, lib. iv. c. 17.
[4] Ibid. c. 37.
[5] Ibid. c. 47.
[6] Ibid. c. 46.

serving to illustrate the circumstances of the times. Sentius Saturninus Vetulian[1] assumed the dress and ensigns of a prætor, disguised his slaves as lictors, and proceeded from Rome towards Naples, with all the state of a public officer—impressing carriages for his use, taking possession of the inns on the road, and obliging all travellers whom he met to move out of the way till he had passed. Having thus reached Puteoli in safety, he there pretended to be employed on the service of the State, and demanded some vessels for the conveyance of himself and his attendants, which being granted, he effected his passage in safety to Sicily, where Sex. Pompeius was holding the chief command. Antius Restio had been proscribed,[2] and escaped from his house secretly by night, while his slaves, having heard of their master's sentence, were busily engaged in plundering his property. One slave alone had watched him, and followed him in his flight; a man who had been branded in the face by his master for some offence, and had been confined in chains in his workhouse, from whence he had only been released by some of his fellow-servants at the time of the general ruin of their master's fortunes. This man overtook Antius, assured him that he entertained no resentment against him for the punishment which he had received, but rather felt grateful to him for many former kindnesses; and having concealed him out of the way of the soldiers who were in search of him, he began to construct a funeral pile, and then having, without any scruple, murdered an old man who happened to be passing by on the road, he placed his body upon it. The soldiers coming up while he was thus employed, he hastened to tell them that he had himself killed the object of their search, in revenge for the former ill treatment which he had received from him; and as his story seemed probable, they contented themselves with taking the head of the murdered man as that of Antius, in order to obtain the usual reward from the triumvirs on producing it; and suspicion being thus laid asleep, Antius, himself was conducted from his hiding place by his slave, and escaped with him into Sicily. M. Volusius,[3] one of the Ædiles, procured from a friend the dress of one of the ministers of Isis, and distinguished himself in the long linen gown, and wearing the mask made like a dog's face, which were the distinguishing marks of that order of persons, he went about through the streets dancing and begging money of the passengers; and in this manner he made his way through a considerable part of the country, till he at last escaped out of Italy. Some of the proscribed assumed the disguise of centurions, and arming their slaves as soldiers went about as if they were themselves employed in the pursuit of others; and once, it is mentioned, two of these parties

B.C. 42. Anecdotes relating to the Proscription.

Disguises of the Proscribed.

[1] Valerius Maximus, lib. vii. c. 3. Appian, lib. iv. c. 45.
[2] Ibid. lib. vi. c. 8. Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, lib. i. c. 11. Appian, lib. iv. c. 43.
[3] Ibid. lib. vii. c. 3. Appian, lib. iv. c. 47.

B.C. 42. fell in with one another;[1] and each mistaking the other for the real emissaries of the triumvirs, they fought for some time without discovering their mutual mistake. One man of the name of Vitulinus,[2] formed a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Rhegium, partly out of those who were proscribed, and had, like himself, escaped the murderers, and partly out of the inhabitants of the eighteen Italian cities which the triumvirs had given up to their soldiers as settlements. Thus supported, he cut off several parties that were going about in pursuit of the proscribed; till at last, when a strong detachment was sent against him, he maintained several obstinate contests, and before he was killed had the satisfaction of knowing that his son, and several others who had been proscribed, had effected their escape to Sicily in safety. Amidst the horrors of the times, we are told that several orphans,[3] of tender age, who were heirs to large properties, were included in the proscription, that their wealth might become the prey of the triumvirs. One of these of the name of Atilius, had just gone through the ceremony of putting on the manly gown, and was going, as was the custom, attended by a numerous company of his friends, to offer sacrifice at the temples. It was suddenly announced that his name was among the number of the proscribed: the procession instantly dispersed, and Atilius, deserted by all his relations, fled to his mother's house for shelter. But even she refused to receive him, dreading to incur the penalty denounced against all who should harbour the proscribed. Thus cast off, and despairing of protection from any one else when his own mother had abandoned him, he fled to an unfrequented part of the country and took refuge amongst the mountains; but being obliged to descend into the vallies to get food, he was seized by a kidnapper, who was in the habit of carrying off travellers, and confining them as slaves in his workhouse. Unable to bear the cruelties to which he was here exposed, he made his escape to the high road, and, in utter despair, gave himself up to the first military party that passed by, and was by them, accordingly, put to death.

Behaviour of the Triumvirs.

If any thing could be wanting to complete the general misery, it was added by the utter insolence with which the triumvirs mocked the victims of their tyranny. Rufus Cæsetius, a senator,[4] had been proscribed, because he was the owner of a house and property adjoining to those of Fulvia, the wife of Antonius, and had often refused to sell them to her. He was murdered, and his head, as usual, was brought to Antonius, who happened to be at table with a party of his associates. After carefully examining the features of the face, Antonius said to the soldiers, "This is no acquaintance of mine,"[5] and desired them to take it to Fulvia; and she ordered it to

[1] Appian, c. 46. [2] Ibid. c. 25. [3] Ibid. c. 30.
[4] Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. 5. Appian, c. 29.
[5] "*Hunc ego notum non habui.*" Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. 5.

be exposed, not as usual at the Rostra, but in front of the house which had been the occasion of his murder. M. Lepidus and L. Plancus,[1] in the very midst of the proscription, determined to enjoy the honours of a triumph for some victories which they had gained while commanding respectively the provinces of Gallia Narbonnensis, and Gallia Transalpine. An order was issued, commanding that the usual marks of general rejoicing should not be omitted—that the people should attend the triumphal procession, and should offer sacrifices of thanksgiving at the temples. It must be remembered that Lepidus and Plancus had each caused the name of his own brother to be inserted in the list of the proscribed; and in allusion to this, their own soldiers, availing themselves of the customary license of the occasion, shouted aloud, as they followed their chariots, *De Germanis, non ne Gallis, duo triumphant consuls.*[2] B.C. 42.

Their rapacity.

One object of all these dreadful atrocities had been the money which the triumvirs hoped to gain from the sale of the property of their victims.[3] But in this hope they were greatly disappointed. The plate and most articles of valuable furniture were generally plundered by the slaves of the owner, as soon as his name was seen on the fatal list; and the houses and landed estates could only be sold at low prices, because the people in general considered it infamous to become purchasers; and A. Cascellius,[4] a lawyer of high reputation, steadily refused to make any instrument of conveyance of property granted by the triumvirs, or possibly sold at their auctions, considering such means of acquiring it to be no better than robbery. Accordingly, the triumvirs finding themselves still in want of money, drew out a list of fourteen hundred ladies,[5] who were ordered to make exact returns of their property, that a proportionate tax might be levied upon them. This excited great indignation, and the persons aggrieved, having first appealed in vain for the intercession of the female relations of the triumvirs, assembled themselves in the Forum, and, trusting to the protection of their sex, addressed the triumvirs in very forcible language, and succeeded in obtaining from them an abatement of the greatest part of the tax which it had been intended to raise. But as the men could not utter their complaints with equal safety, they were condemned to make up for this deficiency. Every person, of what rank or condition soever, who was possessed of property to the amount of more than 400,000 H.S., or about £3,200,[6] was required to furnish a loan of two per cent. upon

[1] Appian, c. 31. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 67.

[2] "The consuls are triumphing, not over the Gauls, but '*de Germanis*,' which signifies, either 'over the Germans,' or 'over their brothers.'"

[3] Appian, c. 31.

[4] Valerius Maximus, lib. vi. c. 2.

[5] Appian, lib. iv. c. 32, *et seq.* Valerius Maximus, lib. viii. c. 3.

[6] Ibid. c. 34.

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all that he was worth, and at the same time to pay the value of a year's income as a tax for the immediate expenses of the war.

Crimes of the soldiers and others.

But the cruelty and rapacity of the triumvirs themselves, great as they were, might yet have been satisfied by so many murders and confiscations as we have already recorded. A wider and almost boundless scene of misery was opened by the infinite vexations, robberies, and violences of every kind which were committed by the army at large;[1] when every soldier gratified his passions without scruple, and the triumvirs dared not refuse to their instruments that same license of wickedness which they were themselves so largely enjoying. The example of the soldiers was followed by numerous bands of slaves and other low persons, who took advantage of the general confusion to plunder and murder in their turn, and often assumed the disguise of soldiers to insure to themselves impunity. But as their resentment was not dreaded, their disorders were more speedily repressed; orders were given by the triumvirs to punish those who committed unauthorized acts of violence; and as the soldiers were too formidable to be restrained, the inferior malefactors were the only sufferers; and of these last several were seized and crucified.

Reflections on the Proscription.

Although no previous provocation, nor any prospect of future benefits to the commonwealth, could justify in any degree so atrocious a massacre, yet its wickedness becomes still more heightened when we consider the only pleas which its perpetrators could urge in their defence, and the utter selfishness of the motives by which they were actuated. Their great pretence was to revenge the murder of Cæsar; an act the guilt of which was confined to about sixty individuals, scarcely any of whom were among the victims of the present proscription. Thousands, who had no share in his death, might very justly have rejoiced in the effects of it, in the dissolution of a tyrannical power, and the restoration of the lawful constitution; and after the murder had been perpetrated, the best course which could be followed was that which the Senate actually adopted, on the motion of Cicero, to decree a general amnesty for the past; and to resume the usual form of the government, as if Cæsar's usurpation had never interrupted it. And on this principle the more respectable of Cæsar's friends, such as Hirtius and Pansa, acted; who, while openly lamenting and condemning his murder, thought that it ill became them to renew the civil war for the purpose of revenging it; but that it was the duty of all good citizens to uphold that old constitution of their country which was now by whatever means restored; especially as all the beneficial effects of the late revolution were still maintained, in the extension of the privileges of citizenship to a great number of foreigners, and the elevation of many individuals of humble birth to

[1] Appian, c. 35.

the enjoyment of wealth and honours. But Antonius and Lepidus, wishing to continue the system of military usurpation, and having been deservedly declared public enemies, were anxious to exterminate all those who were zealously attached to the constitution of their country; while Augustus, hoping to inherit his uncle's sovereignty, as well as his name and private fortune, and animated besides with that inveteracy which men naturally feel against a cause which they have deserted and betrayed, longed to destroy, if possible, the whole of the aristocratical party, that his way to the throne might be cleared from all impediments. His conduct, accordingly, was marked by peculiar traits of malignity and hard-heartedness. We have already mentioned that he himself was not known to spare a single victim of those whom he had marked out for death; and he opposed every inclination to clemency in his associates. When the proscription was ended,[1] Lepidus, in a speech to the Senate, made something of an apology for what was past; and said that henceforth such instances of severity would not be repeated, as enough of the guilty had been already punished; but Augustus arose and added, that he had only closed the proscription as long as he thought proper, but without meaning to impose the least restriction on himself with regard to his future measures. When he thus spoke and acted, he was scarcely one-and-twenty years old. Had his whole after life been marked by nothing but benefits to his country, no human judgment would be warranted in attributing his altered conduct to any better motive than the absence of temptation; for he who had once plunged so deeply in wickedness, must ever be suspected of being ready to do the same again if his interests required it, unless he could give positive proof that he regarded his former crimes with remorse and abhorrence.

B.C. 42.

Speech of Lepidus.

Whilst Italy was overwhelmed by these calamities,[2] three neighbouring countries afforded a secure refuge to all those of the proscribed who were happy enough to reach them. Many accordingly escaped to M. Brutus in Macedonia, and to Q. Cornificus in Africa; but a still greater number fled to Sicily, where Sex. Pompeius, in a manner worthy of his name, was exercising the most unwearied benevolence towards all of his persecuted countrymen to whom he had the means of extending it. We have already mentioned, that after he had been recalled from banishment, and the Senate had resolved to pay him out of the treasury the value of his father's property, he remained for some time at Massilia, waiting to see the issue of the campaign at Mutina; and unable to take the active part in it which he wished, because Cæsar's veterans, who were serving under Hirtius, Pansa, and Augustus, were unwilling to receive amongst them the son of Pompey. After the battle of Mutina, however,

The proscribed are sheltered in Greece, Africa, and Sicily.

Naval command of Sextus Pompeius. He occupies Sicily.

[1] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 27.
[2] Appian, lib. iv. c. 36.

B.C. 42. when the treason of Lepidus, and the suspected fidelity of Augustus, made it necessary for the Senate to avail themselves of some more trustworthy aid, Sex. Pompeius was appointed to the general command of the naval forces of the commonwealth,[1] with an authority on every part of the coast, which, like that granted to his father in the war with the Cilician pirates, extended over the whole country within a certain distance from the sea. He had retained at Massilia part of the fleet which had belonged to him in Spain; and having speedily increased it after he had received his commission from the Senate, he sailed to Sicily, deeming that island a favourable situation for his head-quarters; and the whole of it, according to the tenour of his appointment, being properly included within the limits of his authority. Sicily was at that time held by A. Pompeius Bithynicus, who had received the government of it from Cæsar; but it was occupied, after some resistance, by Sex. Pompeius, and when the proscription began, he was in complete possession of it. He instantly ordered his ships and smaller vessels to cruize along the coasts of Italy,[2] to intimate their presence by every possible signal, and to receive on board every one who applied to them for protection. To tempt the avarice of the soldiers employed in the massacres, he offered to each individual who should preserve any proscribed person, double the sum which the triumvirs gave for his murder. To those who reached Sicily he offered every consolation and relief in his power, supplying them with clothing and other articles of which they stood in need, and conferring on those of higher rank amongst them some command in his army or navy. Nor did he ever afterwards, from any selfish consideration, abandon them; but when he concluded with Antonius and Augustus, he expressly stipulated that all who had fled to him at the time of the proscription should be allowed to return to their homes in perfect safety. It is delightful to refresh ourselves for a moment with a picture of power actively exerted for objects of benevolence: and, to those who revere the memory of Pompey the Great, it is pleasing to think that as his conduct in the war against the pirates was a single instance of wisdom and humanity, amidst the cruelties of other Roman generals, so the virtues of his son afford the principal relief to that dismal scene of wickedness and misery which the party of his enemies were now exhibiting.

His active benevolence to the proscribed.

In the midst of the horrors of the proscription the year B.C. 42 expired; and although the whole actual power of the State was in the hands of the triumvirs, they resolved, nevertheless, to preserve nominally the usual offices of the commonwealth; and accordingly M. Lepidus and L. Plancus were named as consuls for the new year.

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 72, 73, edit. Oxon. 1693. Appian, lib. iv. c. 84. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxxiii.

[2] Appian, lib. iv. c. 36. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 77.

Lepidus was to remain at Rome,[1] and superintend the government of Italy, whilst his two associates, Antonius and Augustus, were to undertake the management of the war against Brutus and Cassius in the East, and against Sex. Pompeius and Q. Cornificius in Sicily and Africa. In Africa, indeed, the contest was speedily terminated in favour of the triumvirs by T. Sextius, one of their officers,[2] assisted by the power of Arabio, one of the native princes of Mauritania. Arabio's father had taken part with Scipio and Juba in the former African war; and had, on that account, been deprived of his dominions by Cæsar, and had seen them divided between Bogud, a Mauritanian prince in Cæsar's interest, and P. Sitius, the Roman exile, whose services to the cause of Cæsar, under very critical circumstances, have already been noticed. But about the time of Cæsar's death, Arabio returned home from Spain, whither he fled to join the sons of Pompey; and by the aid of some African soldiers, who had been disciplined in their service, he expelled Bogud from his share of his father's territories, and procured the assassination of Sitius. The aristocratical party at Rome began to conceive hopes from this conduct of Arabio,[3] and, perhaps, expected that he would support their cause with the same zeal which they had formerly found in Juba. But the repeated victories of Cæsar had impressed Arabio with a deep sense of the utter hopelessness of the cause of the commonwealth; and he chose rather to purchase a pardon for his treatment of Bogud and Sitius, by proving to the triumvirs that he was disposed to exert in their favour the power which he had seized from the hands of their partisans. Accordingly, he so effectually assisted T. Sextius, when the war broke out, that Q. Cornificius was defeated and killed, the wreck of his party dispersed, and the province of Africa became subject to Augustus without dispute, according to the terms of agreement originally concluded between the triumvirs.

B.C. 42.

The Triumvirs obtain possession of Africa.

The contest in Sicily was not terminated so easily. Augustus was eager to gain the island, because the usual supplies of corn which it sent to the Roman market were now interrupted; and the horrors of a scarcity were thus added to the accumulated miseries under which Italy was suffering. But Q. Salvidienus, one of Augustus's principal officers,[4] was repulsed by the fleet of Sex. Pompeius, when attempting to cover the passage of troops from Rhegium to the opposite shore: and the naval and military forces of the triumvirs were all required immediately after in another quarter, to stop the progress of Brutus and Cassius in the East.

They attack Sicily without success.

Since the defeat and death of Dolabella at Laodicea, which seems

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlvii. p. 338.
[2] Appian, lib. iv. c. 53, *et seq.*
[3] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. xv. epist. xvii. *Arabioni de Sitio nihil irascor.*
[4] Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxxiii. Appian, lib. iv. c. 85.

B.C. 42. Progress of Brutus and Cassius in the East.

to have taken place about the end of June, in the summer of the year B.C. 42, Cassius had been engaged in an obstinate, but at last successful, contest with those cities and countries of Asia Minor which had manifested their attachment to the cause of his enemy. After the fall of Laodicea, he had hoped to make himself master of Egypt, in return for the succours which Cleopatra had sent to Dolabella; but being pressed, it is said, by messages from Brutus,[1] he abandoned his enterprise, and began to return towards the province of Asia. On his way he levied a severe contribution upon the inhabitants of Tarsus,[2] and having enriched himself considerably, by this and



[Tarsus.—*La Borde.*]

many similar exactions, he met Brutus at Smyrna, as far as appears, about the middle of the winter.[3] Brutus had lately crossed over with his army from Macedonia, having constantly refused to listen to the pressing exhortations of Cicero and Decimus Brutus, who had urged him to come to the assistance of the commonwealth in Italy, before the treason of Augustus had openly manifested itself. We cannot now decide whether he acted wisely or timidly in adopting a different line of conduct; but it seems impossible not to condemn the result

[1] Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 28. Appian, lib. iv. c. 63.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xlvii. p. 345.
[3] Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 28. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxxii.

of his subsequent meeting with Cassius at Smyrna, if the writers, whom we are now reduced to follow, have put us at all in possession of the real circumstances of the case, or of the grounds of the resolution which was adopted. Cassius,[1] it is said, insisted on the difficulties with which the triumvirs were actually surrounded at Rome; on their want of money, and on the delay which Sex. Pompeius must necessarily occasion them by his occupation of Sicily; and therefore he urged the policy of employing the present moment in the reduction of Rhodes and Lycia, which were warmly attached to the party of the triumvirs, and might effect a formidable diversion in the rear, if left unsubdued, while Brutus and himself were advancing into Greece. No reasoning could be more opposite to the soundest principles of policy and military conduct; and if Cassius really argued in such a manner, he was a very unequal antagonist to generals who had been trained like Antonius in the school of Cæsar. The event was a memorable lesson on the folly of wasting time in war upon inferior objects, and of pecking at the extremities of an enemy's power, instead of striking at the heart. Rhodes and Lycia indeed were successively conquered;[2] but the power of the triumviri was in the meantime consolidated, their armies were in a condition to take the field; and they themselves, acting in the true spirit of Cæsar's system, were prepared to anticipate attack, and had already despatched a force into Macedonia, to fix the seat of war in the territories of their adversaries instead of in their own. B.C. 42.

The Triumviri send a force to occupy Macedonia against them.

The first division of the army of the triumvirs was commanded by C. Norbanus and Decidius Saxa.[3] Of the former we can find nothing recorded; but if he were of the family of that C. Norbanus who was proscribed by Sylla, and who killed himself at Rhodes, that he might not fall into the hands of his enemies, his connection with the party of the triumvirs was natural. Decidius Saxa was a Spaniard,[4] on whom Cæsar had conferred the rights of Roman citizenship, and had afterwards caused him to be named one of the tribunes. He was with Antonius during the siege of Mutina, and is frequently mentioned by Cicero in his Philippics as one of his principal adherents. At the time when Saxa and Norbanus crossed over into Greece, there was no enemy to obstruct their progress either by land or sea, for both the fleets and armies of Brutus and Cassius were still employed in Asia. They advanced, therefore, through Macedonia, till they approached Philippi, a place favourably situated for intercepting the march of an army from the Hellespont towards Greece. The great plain of the Strymon is bounded on the east by a branch of the

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlvii. p. 346. Appian, lib. iv. c. 65.
[2] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 95.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xlvii. p. 347.
[4] Cicero, *Philippic.* xii. c. 5, and xiii. c. 13.

B.C. 42. mountains known by the name of Pangæus,[1] and which running to the southward, nearly at right angles with the general course of the chain, is only separated from the sea by a tract of low and marshy ground, over which there was, at this time, no practicable road. The road, therefore, from the Hellespont to Macedonia crossed this projecting branch of Pangæus by two mountain passes, before it descended into the plain of the Strymon; and a little to the westward of the passes, it came to the city of Philippi, which was itself situated on one of the lower points of the mountain range, near the head of a small stream which flowed to the westward, through the plain, to its junction with the Strymon. The two passes to the eastward of Philippi were occupied by Norbanus and Saxa; and in this position they hoped to check the march of the enemy, if he should return from Asia to attack them, until they could be supported by Antonius himself, who was to join them as soon as possible with the rest of his army from Italy.

Brutus and Cassius advance to Philippi.

Brutus and Cassius, having effected the conquest of Rhodes and of Lycia, met again at Sardis,[2] and thence resolved to carry their united forces into Europe. They were aware that a part of the army of the triumvirs had already arrived in Macedonia, but they trusted, by the superiority of their naval force, to prevent the passage of the remainder; and for this purpose L. Statius Murcus was sent with a considerable squadron to cruise off Brundusium,[3] exactly as Pompey's naval officers had done before in the war with Cæsar. Meanwhile they themselves crossed the Hellespont, and advanced towards Philippi. And here again the impossibility of defending a mountain line of considerable length, against a superior enemy, was fully proved.

The positions of Norbanus and Saxa were impregnable in front; but one of the Thracian chiefs pointed out a way over the mountains to the northwards of the passes,[4] by which the army of Brutus and Cassius crossed without opposition, after a laborious march of three days through the woods; then appearing suddenly on the flank of Saxa and Norbanus, they obliged them to retreat with great expedition, and to fall back across the plain of the Strymon, as far as Amphipolis. Brutus and Cassius then formed their respective camps on two hills, distant somewhat less than a mile from one another, and about a mile and a-half to the westward of Philippi. Immediately to the south, or left of their position, the marsh began, and extended from thence to the sea. On their right were the mountains, the regular passes being probably covered by their own position; while they were likely to keep a watchful eye upon the more difficult tract by which they had themselves effected their passage.

[1] Dion Cassius, p. 348. Appian, lib. iv. c. 105.
[2] Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 34.
[3] Dion Cassius, p. 348. Appian, c. 82.
[4] Appian, lib. iv. c. 103, 104.

The space between their two camps was secured by fortifications connecting the two hills with each other; their fleet was stationed in the neighbouring harbour of Neapolis to co-operate with them; and their magazines of every kind were placed in perfect safety in the island of Thasos, which lay just opposite to that part of the coast at an inconsiderable distance from the main land. Thus situated, and having all the resources of Asia in their rear, while their enemy's communications with Italy and the western provinces would be, as they hoped, constantly intercepted by the fleets of Sex. Pompeius and L. Murcus, they hoped to follow successfully the system which Pompey, under similar circumstances, had been unwisely induced to abandon, and to bring the war to a triumphant end, without exposing themselves to the hazard of a battle. B.C. 42.


Antonius and Augustus arrive in Macedonia to oppose them.

But Antonius effected his passage from Brundusium with the same success which had attended him before in the very same place, and under the same circumstances, when he commanded the rear division of Cæsar's army, and joined his general on the coast of Epirus, in spite of all the fleets of Pompey. After he had been blockaded for some time by L. Marcus, he sent to Augustus, who was then at Rhegium, requesting him to suspend his preparations against Sicily, and to employ his naval force in driving off the blockading squadron from Brundusium.[1] It does not appear, however, that the fleet which Augustus could spare for this service was at all able to meet that of L. Murcus in battle. But the apprehension of being hemmed in in the narrow space between Brundusium and the little island which lay off the harbour's mouth, induced L. Murcus to draw off his ships, and to allow Augustus to join Antonius without opposition. The legions were then embarked on board of vessels, such as were usually employed in commerce, and which were worked only by sails; while an escort of ships of war accompanied them, to be sacrificed, if needful, to the superior force of the enemy, in the hope that their resistance might at least allow the transports time to escape. But the wind, for some days, happened to blow so freshly, that the transports were carried across with full sails, at a rate which rendered it impossible for the enemy's ships of war, worked only with oars, to overtake them; and in this manner, we are told, Antonius and Augustus landed the main body of their army on the coast of Epirus without loss. Antonius instantly hastened to the support of Saxa and Norbanus, with an activity which rivalled that of his old commander, and which far exceeded, as we are told, all the calculations of his opponents.[2] We might wonder, indeed, why Brutus and Cassius had not pressed upon Saxa and Norbanus in their retreat from Philippi, instead of allowing them quietly to strengthen themselves on the Strymon; but it is idle to attempt to give the military history

[1] Appian, c. 86.

[2] Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 38.

B.C. 42. of a campaign, when the writers, whom we are obliged to follow, have not recorded the date of any one operation or movement on either side. It only appears, that as soon as Antonius arrived at Amphipolis,[3] he instantly moved forward with his whole army, and



[Amphipolis.]

encamped near Philippi, within a short distance from the enemy; and that here he was in a short time joined by Augustus, who, on his first landing, had remained at Dyrrhachium, on account of illness; but not choosing to be absent from the scene of action at so critical a moment, he hastened to follow his troops, as soon as he heard of the position of the two armies, and arrived in the camp while he was still too weak to discharge the most active duties of a general.

First action at Philippi, autumn of B.C. 42.

In the present contest, as in that between Pompey and Cæsar, the army of the constitutional party was the more numerous, their naval superiority was undoubted, and their resources were so ample, that they could easily afford to protract the war. But on the side of the triumvirs there were generals and officers trained in the school of Cæsar; these were the remains of his invincible veterans; and even the newly raised soldiers, disciplined by the same commanders, and having before their eyes, in their more experienced comrades, such a perfect pattern of military excellence, were likely to emulate the good conduct of the veterans themselves. Antonius, therefore, was

[1] Appian, lib. iv. c 107. Dion Cassius, p. 349.

eager to bring on a general action, and finding that the enemy remained immoveable within his lines, he endeavoured to make opportunities of fighting, by carrying a road through the marsh on the left of Cassius's camp, as if he designed to turn his position.[1] It appears that an irregular engagement was at last the consequence of these operations; for the details of which we can best rely on the narrative of Plutarch, as he appears to have copied from the memoirs of M. Messala, an officer of the highest rank in the constitutional army, next to Brutus and Cassius. According, then, to the statement of Messala, the left of the triumvirs' army, which was the part commanded by Augustus, was drawn out in order of battle in front of its camp, to effect a diversion in favour of Antonius. But the troops of Brutus making a sudden and unexpected sally, Messala himself, with a part of the army, turned the left flank of the enemy, pushed forward at once to their camp, and carried it with little opposition; while Brutus, assailing them at the same time in front, broke them with great slaughter, and chased them back to their camp, which was already in Messala's possession. Meanwhile the centre of the triumvirs' army, observing that the troops of Cassius had taken no part in the action, passed by the left flank of the victorious legions of Brutus, and attacked the left wing of the constitutional army, commanded by Cassius. Antonius himself, on the extreme right of his own army, was at the same time engaged in the marsh, in an attempt to take the cross wall which Cassius had carried out from his own camp, in order to intercept the projected road of the enemy. It appears that the veteran legions were all in that part of the army commanded by Brutus, and that the troops of Cassius were probably very unfit to maintain a contest with the disciplined soldiers of the triumvirs. In spite, therefore, of all the efforts of their general, they were easily routed—their cavalry, instead of covering the infantry, fled in disorder towards the sea—and the enemy pursuing his advantage, not only carried the cross wall in the marsh, but attacked and took the camp of Cassius. The prospect over the field was so obscured, it is said, by clouds of dust, that the victorious divisions of both armies were not aware of the fortune of their friends in the other wing; and when they were informed of it, both Brutus and Antonius returned to their respective camps, and both parties, on the following morning, remained in the same positions which they had occupied before the action. But the hasty despair of Cassius gave to a battle, which was otherwise of doubtful success, all the appearances, and some of the consequences, of a total defeat of the constitutional army. When he saw his own legions routed,[2] he supposed that all was lost, and could scarcely be prevailed on to despatch an officer to the other part of the field to

B.C. 42.

The action becomes general.

[1] Appian, c. 109, *et seq.*
[2] Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 43. Appian, c. 113. Dion Cassius, p. 354.

B.C. 42. learn what was the fate of Brutus. The officer, however, was sent, and Cassius, it is said, attended by one of his freedmen, watched his progress for a time from a hill on which he had taken refuge. He soon saw him met by a party of cavalry; he then heard a loud shout of triumph, and presently observed that the cavalry continued to advance towards the spot where he was, and that his officer was forming one of their company. Concluding from this that the horsemen belonged to the enemy, that his messenger was their prisoner, or was, perhaps, now guiding them to the place where they might find his general, Cassius conjured his freedman to save him from falling into their hands, and instantly to kill him. The freedman obeyed, and fled; and presently after the officer arrived on the hill, followed by the horsemen whom Brutus had sent to announce his success to his colleague, and who, on meeting the messenger despatched by Cassius, had shouted aloud to announce their victory, and turned him back with them, to acquaint his general with the happy tidings. It is added, that when he saw the body of Cassius lying on the ground, he immediately stabbed himself, and fell dead beside it.

Death of Cassius.

The body of the deceased general was sent by Brutus to be buried privately at Thasos, least the performance of the funeral solemnities, in sight of the army, should communicate some discouragement to the soldiers. Brutus himself resolved still, as before, to act on the defensive,[1] and hoped that the enemy would soon be obliged to retreat from want of provisions. But a system which even Pompey could not steadily persevere in, was found much more impracticable now. The soldiers, and even the superior officers, grew impatient of the taunts which the enemy continually threw out against them; while the enemy were more eager than ever to fight, as their situation was greatly compromised by a heavy disaster recently sustained in the Ionian Gulf. Since Antonius and Augustus had effected their passage, L. Marcus had been reinforced by a numerous squadron under the command of Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, the son of that Domitius who had been one of the most violent enemies of Cæsar, and who was himself charged, whether truly or not, with having been one of Cæsar's assassins. With his fleet thus strengthened, Marcus soon after fell in with a large force of soldiers which Cn. Domitius Calvinus was carrying over in transports, escorted only by a few ships of war, to reinforce the army of the triumvirs.[2] The weather was now as favourable to Murcus as it had been before adverse; for the wind suddenly dropped, and the transports were left becalmed and perfectly helpless, while the enemy's ships of war could use their oars with increased facility in the smooth water. After an obstinate resistance the whole of the transports were taken, burnt, or dispersed; and a

Impatience of Brutus' army.

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlvii. p. 354, 355. Appian, lib. iv. c. 123, *et seq.*
[2] Appian, c. 115.

force which had consisted of two legions, and a prætorian cohort of two thousand men, besides a numerous body of cavalry, were thus almost entirely destroyed. But these successes could not decide the general issue of the war. Brutus was at last induced, as Pompey had been before him, to yield to the wishes of his army; for latterly several desertions to the enemy had taken place,[1] and he feared that his troops, the best of which had formerly served under Cæsar, might be persuaded, if longer suffered to remain inactive, to join the standard of the friend and adopted son of their old general. Accordingly he drew out his legions in order of battle, and was cheerfully met by the enemy; who already began to suffer serious inconvenience from want of provisions. The battle of Philippi was marked, according to our accounts, by no display of generalship on either side; but after some hours of close combat, the superior discipline of the triumvirs' army prevailed, and the soldiers of Brutus first began slowly to give ground, and were then totally routed. Brutus himself,[2] being cut off from his camp, fled to a small glen or deep dell, at no great distance from the field of battle, through which a stream flowed between deep banks, ocasionally covered with wood, and sometimes consisting of bare cliffs. He was accompanied by several of his friends, and amongst the rest by P. Volumnius, who, from his love of literature, had long lived on terms of familiarity with Brutus, and whose account of the close of his friend's life Plutarch appears to have followed as his principal authority. We may venture then to give the following particulars, as resting on the testimony of one who was present at the scene which he describes.

B.C. 42.

Second battle of Philippi.

It was already dark when Brutus seated himself on a large piece of rock in the narrow valley, and, looking up to the sky, which was bright with stars, he repeated two lines from the Greek poets, one of which, from the *Medea* of Euripides, Volumnius still remembered, when he wrote his narrative, and has recorded it. It was an imprecation, "that Jove would not forget to punish the author of all this misery."[3] He was full of the thought of the many friends who had already fallen in the battle; and he particularly lamented the loss of Labeo, who had been one of his lieutenants, and of C. Flavius, his master of the works, who had been long one of his intimate friends.[4] Shortly afterwards he began to express his hopes that the number of his soldiers who had fallen could not be great; upon which Statyllius, one of his companions, engaged to make his way to the camp, to send up a fire signal from thence, if he found it still in the possession of their own troops, and then to return to Brutus.

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlvii. p. 355.
[2] Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 51, *et seq.*
[3] Ζεῦ, μὴ λάθοι σε τῶνδ' ὃς αἴτιος κακῶν. *Med.* 333.
[4] See Cornel. Nepot. *in Attico*, c. 8.

B.C. 42. He went accordingly, and after a certain interval, the fire signal was observed to be made, but Statyllius did not return, so that Brutus rightly conjectured that he had fallen in with some of the enemy on his way back, and had perished by their hands. This circumstance showed that it would not be easy to regain the camp, or to rally any part of the army that might have taken refuge in its neighbourhood. Accordingly, as the night wore away, Brutus was seen to whisper something successively to two of his attendants, and his words were observed to draw tears from those to whom they were addressed. He then spoke in Greek to P. Volumnius himself, reminded him of the studies which they had shared together, and plainly requested him to lend him his assistance in killing himself. But Volumnius refusing to comply, and some one of the party observing that it would not be safe to remain any longer where they were, Brutus arose from his seat, and said: "Yes, indeed, we must go hence; but it must be with our hands, and not with our feet." He then, with a cheerful countenance, shook hands successively with every one present, and declared to them the happiness it gave him to think that none of his friends had proved false to him. On his country's account he might justly, he said, complain of the cruelty of fortune; but for himself, he was even, at that moment, a happier man than the conquerors, inasmuch as he should leave behind him a character for goodness which neither their arms nor their treasures would ever procure for them. In conclusion, he conjured all his friends to provide for their own safety; and having said thus much, he left them, with only two attendants, and retired to some distance out of their sight. There, according to the general report, Strato, who was one of those who still remained with him, and who had been used to practice declamation with him, and to take part in his studies in oratory, yielded at last to his repeated requests; and, turning away his face, held out towards him the point of his sword. Brutus having placed it exactly at his heart, threw himself upon it, and expired immediately.

Death of Brutus.

Meantime, whatever was the numerical loss of the constitutional army, many citizens of the noblest names in Rome had already fallen. M. Cato, the son of M. Cato of Utica, and L. Lucullus, the son of the conqueror of Tigranes, are particularly mentioned;[1] while Q. Hortensius, the son of the famous orator of that name, M. Favonius, so long known as the friend and imitator of Cato,[2] and M. Varro, who had been quæstor under Brutus in Cisalpine Gaul, and a relation probably of that M. Varro, who was reputed the most learned of the Romans, had fallen into the hands of the enemy. When these prisoners were brought before the triumvirs, they addressed Antonius with respect as an honourable adversary;[3] but

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 97
[2] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 13.
[3] Velleius Paterculus, c. 13.

directed against Augustus the bitterest reproaches; as, in addition to the perfidy and cruelty which he had before exhibited, he had been guilty of some atrocious instances of cold-blooded barbarity to some other captives who had fallen into his power in the last battle. Yet Antonius was not more merciful to them than his colleague, and Hortensius, Varro, and Favonius were all put to death. To complete the destruction of the aristocratical party, L. Livius Drusus, the father of the future wife of Augustus, killed himself in his tent; and Quintilius Varus, having arrayed himself in the insignia of the offices which he had borne, desired one of his freedmen to become his executioner. B.C. 42.

Dispersion of the aristocratical party.

The greatest part of the constitutional army rallied under the command of M. Messala and L. Bibulus, at a little distance from the field of battle, and were soon joined by several persons of distinction, who, immediately after the action, had taken refuge in the island of Thasos. Messala was called upon to become the leader of this last hope of the aristocratical party;[1] but he wisely considered all further resistance as hopeless, and preferred to submit himself and all his troops to the triumvirs, on a promise of full indemnity for them all. The magazines at Thasos were then surrendered;[2] and the victorious generals, being now in fact absolute masters of the empire, concluded a new agreement between themselves; in which, disregarding Lepidus altogether, they made some new arrangements in the division of the provinces, and determined that Antonius, with the greater part of their army, should proceed into Asia, to organize that country, and to raise contributions in order to enable him to fulfil the promises which he had made to his soldiers; while Augustus should return to Italy, to superintend the division of lands there, and to establish the veterans in the settlements which they had been encouraged to expect. Meantime the officers of Brutus and Cassius, who had been left behind by them in Asia, now fled to L. Marcus and Cn. Domitius, whose fleet still remained unsubdued. But the battle of Philippi produced an universal derangement of the constitutional party. L. Marcus,[3] with his squadron, joined Sex. Pompeius in Sicily, while Cn. Domitius acted for a time as an independent commander, and maintained his seamen, we must suppose, by forcible contributions raised upon the people of the sea-coast, or by acts of piracy upon ships employed in commerce.

In an evil hour for himself did Antonius turn his back upon Italy, and leave the immediate government of the capital in the hands of his associate. Augustus, still suffering from ill health,[4] travelled slowly on his way towards Rome; whilst the population of Italy,

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 97.
[2] Appian, lib. iv. c. 136; lib. v. c. 3. Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 357, 358.
[3] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 98.
[4] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 358.

B.C. 42. Augustus returns to Italy to superintend the division of lands among his soldiers.

who had already experienced his cruelty and rapacity, looked forward with horror to the moment of his arrival, which would consign some of the finest districts of the peninsula to the occupation of a rapacious soldiery. How eagerly should we open the smallest volume of contemporary history, which might paint to us from the life the state of society in Italy under the effects of this dreadful revolution! But not a single annalist of these times has reached posterity; and we must find our way, as best we can, with no other guidance than that of the weak and ignorant Greeks of a later age, whose testimony we have so often found worthless.

L. Antonius, the Consul, opposes the tyranny of the army.

It was not till the spring of the following year that Augustus returned to Rome, and found P. Servilius and L. Antonius, the brother of the triumvir, in possession of the title of consuls. Antonius had been tribune three years before, and had then courted popularity by proposing divisions of land on a very extensive scale among the poorer citizens of Rome. He now saw a division on the eve of being made, which was to be still more extensive, and which was to benefit, exclusively, the officers and soldiers of the triumvirs' army. So long as the aristocratical party was strong enough to excite jealousy, that union between the popular party, and some ambitious military leaders which had first been observed in the coalition between Sulpicious and Marius, had continued for the most part unbroken; but when the power of the Senate was utterly destroyed, it was manifest to the most prejudiced of the popular leaders that the liberties of Rome were at least as endangered by the usurpation of the army as they had ever been by the oppression of the rich nobility; and that a large proportion of citizens, who, with all their turbulence and violence, were yet, in the main, sincerely attached to their country, perceived that all their hopes of a beneficial change in the political system of the empire were about to be crushed, in a manner that seemed likely to render them for ever desperate. Besides, there were considerations of immediate personal interest, which aroused the inhabitants of Italy in general against the triumvirs. Their cities and their lands were to be torn from them, merely on the plea that it was necessary to fulfil the promises made by the generals to their army. If the people had been guilty of any crime in supporting the government against the rebellion of M. Antonius, it was a crime in which Augustus himself had shared; and again, since the formation of the triumvirate, Italy had suffered much from the proscription on the one hand, and from the loss of its ordinary supplies of foreign corn on the other, but had submitted to all its calamities without resistance. Under these circumstances, the contest which took place, nominally, between Augustus and L. Antonius, may be looked upon, in reality, as a struggle between the people of Italy and the army; as the last effort made in defence of liberty and property against a military despotism. It is said that

L. Antonius and his sister-in-law, Fulvia, who was the partner of all his measures, at first quarrelled with Augustus, because they wished to have their share in the proposed distribution of lands to the soldiery;[1] and also that the promised rewards should be given in the name of M. Antonius as well as in that of Augustus. But the general clamours which prevailed throughout Italy, against this spoliation of property, induced L. Antonius to espouse a nobler cause, and to oppose altogether the pretensions of the army. In Rome itself,[2] and in all the principal towns of the peninsula, there were frequent and bloody engagements between the soldiers and citizens, which were attended with the destruction of a great number of houses; and as the pressure of scarcity began to be severely felt from the total cessation of all supplies from Sicily, robberies and disorders of every kind became common, till at last the shops in Rome were shut up, and the ordinary magistrates of the city, utterly unable to preserve tranquillity, gave up their offices, we are told, to pacify the people, who were indignant at seeing the semblance of government retained, when it had lost all its power of affording protection. B.C. 44.

War between L. Antonius and Augustus.

L. Antonius now openly professed his opposition to the illegal power of the triumvirate,[3] as well as to the spoliation of the cities and lands of Italy. His brother, he said, was willing to resign the title of triumvir, to see the lawful authority of the consulship restored, and to receive himself, in his election to that office, the reward of the sacrifice which he should make to his country's good. All ranks of people joined the standard of opposition to the triumvirate with equal eagerness:[4] the nobility and the commons, the patricians and equestrian order at Rome, as well as the inhabitants of all the cities of Italy, took up arms against Augustus, and the system of military tyranny of which he was the leader. He himself leagued with his soldiers to support their mutual oppressions, was obliged to tolerate many acts of violence and disrespect to himself,[5] which his army, knowing their power, unscrupulously committed; and, in order to attach them to his service, he plundered even the temples, wherever they were in his power,[6] and thus added still more to the odiousness of his cause. But, on the other hand, in proportion as L. Antonius became more evidently the head of a party truly national, so the feeling of the army in every part of the empire was more interested to assist Augustus. Asinius Pollio and P. Ventidius,[7] who were both warmly attached to M. Antonius, and who commanded such a force in Cisalpine Gaul as would have enabled them readily to turn

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 359. Appian, lib. v. c. 14.
[2] Ibid. p. 362. Appian, lib. v. c. 18.
[3] Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxxv. Appian, lib. v. c. 30.
[4] Appian, lib. v. c. 27, 29, 31.
[5] Ibid. lib. v. c. 15, 16.
[6] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 364.
[7] Appian, lib. v. c. 32.

B.C. 42. the scale in favour of his brother, hesitated, when they saw that his success was likely to put a stop universally to the overgrown greatness of the army; and, although they did not actually take part against him, yet they allowed Augustus and his lieutenants to shut him up in Perusia, without making any effort in his favour, when he had advanced towards the frontiers of Cisalpine Gaul, relying on their co-operation. Abandoned thus to himself, and left to struggle against a veteran army, with only the feeble support of an undisciplined and unwarlike population, L. Antonius could only defend himself in Perusia till the provisions of his garrison were exhausted, and he was then obliged to submit to his adversary. He was himself dismissed in perfect safety, for it was not politic to exasperate M. Antonius at such a juncture by the execution of his brother; his soldiers also were pardoned at the intercession of their comrades in the service of Augustus; but neither L. Antonius nor his troops were the chief objects of the conqueror's jealousy and hatred; and the true nature of the contest was shown by the choice of the victims who were marked out for destruction at the close of it. There were captured at Perusia a great number of Roman citizens of distinction,[1] who had taken up arms for the restoration of their liberties and laws; these Augustus put to death without remorse, and on this occasion displayed again the same vile and unfeeling nature which he had shown in the whole course of his public life. Though he was only three and twenty years of age, he heard the prayers and excuses of his victims without the least emotion, answering every suppliant by a repetition of the words, "You must die;" and to show that he considered his triumph as gained, not so much over L. Antonius as over the liberty of his country, he selected three hundred persons from among his prisoners, some of the rank of senators, and others of the equestrian order, and ordered them all to be butchered on the Ides of March, at an altar erected in honour of his uncle, Cæsar. To the citizens of Perusia he acted with equal cruelty; for they, in common with the people of the other Italian cities, had zealously entered into the war, to save their property from military violence. He put to death all the magistrates of the town, and gave up the city to be plundered; and, in the confusion thus occasioned, it was set on fire, and burnt to the ground.

L. Antonius is obliged to surrender at Perusia.

Cruelties of Augustus.

Towards the close of the siege of Perusia, P. Ventidius and the other officers who commanded the forces belonging to M. Antonius in Cisalpine Gaul, made a show of marching to the relief of their general's brother; but their efforts were hardly more than nominal, and plainly showed that they did not enter sincerely into the quarrel. Yet the union between L. Antonius and the friends of the old constitution, seems to have brought about a temporary coalition between

Appearances of a coalition between M. Antonius and the People, against the oppression of Augustus and the army.

[1] Appian, lib. v. c. 48. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 15. Dion Cassius, lib. xlvii. p. 365.

the remnants of the aristocratical party and the officers of M. Antonius himself; and thus Cn. Domitius, who still commanded in his own name a portion of the fleet which had belonged to Brutus and Cassius, and was cruizing with it in the Adriatic to intercept the communications between Italy and the opposite coasts of Illyricum and Epirus, was now induced, by Asinius Pollio,[1] to submit himself to the command of Antonius; on the assurance, probably, that Antonius was disposed to join with his brother in restoring the lawful government of the commonwealth. And in the same spirit, when Julia,[2] the mother of Antonius, fled from Italy, after the success of Augustus at Perusia, she was received by Sex. Pompeius in Sicily, and treated by him with every possible attention and kindness. Amidst all the cruelties and profligacies of Antonius's life, some traits of generosity were recorded, which might lead men to believe, that he had acted rather from personal resentment than from a deliberate design to enslave his country. Anecdotes in particular were told of his behaviour after the battle of Philippi,[3] which contrasted strongly with the mean and merciless cruelty of Augustus on the same occasion. It might not be impossible that the affronts offered to so many of his near relations by his ambitious associate, that the example of his brother, and some sense of the innumerable miseries under which Rome and Italy were groaning, might at last awaken the better feelings of his nature, and urge him to atone, as far as possible, for the guilt of the proscription, by becoming in some measure the restorer of his country's liberty. B.C. 42.

Total overthrow of the national cause in Italy.

Meantime the war in Italy was brought rapidly to an end after the fall of Perusia. An armed force had taken the field in Campania,[4] in defence of the common cause of liberty and property, under the command of Tib. Claudius Nero, a man of the highest nobility. Ten years before this time he had been much valued as a young man by Cicero, and had nearly become his son-in-law;[5] he had afterwards served under Cæsar in Egypt, and had been by him created one of the pontifices;[6] yet, after Cæsar's death, he had supported the party of the aristocracy, though without taking a prominent share in the events of that period. He now, after the surrender of L. Antonius, endeavoured to raise the slaves in Campania to swell his forces; but failing in this attempt, he was obliged to fly to Sicily, accompanied by his wife, and by his son, a child of about two years of age. His wife was Livia Drusilla, who was shortly afterwards married to Augustus; and his son was that Tiberius, who, in little more than

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 101.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 366.
[3] Valerius Maximus, lib. v. c. 1. Plutarch, *in Bruto*, c. 50.
[4] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 100.
[5] Cicero, *ad Atticum*, lib. vi. epist. vi.
[6] *Auctor de Bell. Alexan.* c. 25.

B.C. 42. fifty years from this period, became the Sovereign of the Roman empire.

Effects of military despotism.

Such was the termination of this brief contest, which consigned the people of Rome and of Italy to many centuries of helpless weakness. In this, more than in any other of the civil dissensions of the Romans, it was a direct struggle between the army and the nation: and the triumph of the army, in which it ended, was a much more serious evil to the State, than the victories and usurpations of any political party, or even than the tyranny of Cæsar himself. It committed henceforward the whole power of the empire to a mercenary standing army; and reduced all the other classes of society to that state of conscious insignificance in the government of their country, which most surely leads to the degradation of national and individual character. Literature may flourish under such circumstances, and the physical comforts of mankind may suffer at times little diminution; but the soul of civilized society, the power and the will to take part in the administration of the great system of national government—to watch over and assist in the execution of the existing laws, and at the same time to observe their deficiences, and propose their remedies—the spirit of real liberty which distinguishes the citizen from the mere subject—this is totally destroyed; and carries away with it that practical vigour of mind which, when diffused amidst the mass of the people, under the guidance of sound principles, is the greatest earthly blessing of which mankind are susceptible. The siege of Perusia, then, may be regarded as an event far more really disastrous to liberty than the battle of Philippi.

Fate of the expelled possessors of lands in Italy.

After the victory of Augustus, the proposed distribution of lands among the soldiers was probably carried into effect in every part of Italy. The occupiers of estates or of farms, thus driven from their homes, sought, for the most part, we are told, an asylum in Sicily with Sex. Pompeius.[1] But great numbers wandered, it is probable, into the adjacent provinces,[2] and there found settlements, we may conjecture, where their agricultural experience and industrious habits would make them valuable inhabitants. In this manner good may have arisen out of evil; and the civilization of Gaul and Spain, and that general dissemination of the Latin language, which took place at so early a period in those countries, may have been accelerated by the desolation of Italy. There were others of the expelled Italians who repaired, it is likely, to Rome, and helped to increase the immense population of the capital; for the inhabitants of Rome were too important to be neglected; and care was taken by the Govern-

[1] Appian, lib. v. c. 53.

[2] The Mantuan Farmer, in Virgil, speaks of his countrymen flying to Africa, to Scythia, and to Britain; but these are only hyperbolical expressions to denote that species of exile in a less favourable climate, and a less civilized country, which was in reality, we may suppose, the lot of many of the poet's neighbours and friends.

ment to provide for their maintenance, and even for their enjoyments, while the country of Italy was suffered to remain in a state of misery. But at the actual moment of which we are now speaking, Rome herself was sharing in the common distress, for the fleets of Sex. Pompeius still blockaded all the ports, and intercepted the supplies on which her subsistence depended. B.C. 42.

Meantime M. Antonius had been recalled from Asia, by the tidings of hostilities in Italy, and, it is said, was induced actually to form an alliance with Sex. Pompeius in his dread of the ambition and ascendency of Augustus. On his arrival off Brundusium he found the gates of that city shut against him, and he accordingly laid siege to it;[1] while his alliance with Sex. Pompeius, and the accession of force which he had lately gained through the submission of Cn. Domitius, gave him the undisputed dominion of the sea. But we hear nothing of his entering into the views of his brother Lucius; and his quarrel with Augustus now seems to have been of the same kind with his final contest with him a few years later, a mere struggle for dominion between two military leaders, in which the nation had no other interest than as far as it would decide which should be Sovereign. On the present occasion, however, the veteran soldiers were strongly averse to a war between Cæsar's oldest associate and his nephew, which would tend, perhaps, to raise a son of Pompey on the ruins of their common cause. Accordingly the mutual friends of the two generals endeavoured to bring about a reconciliation; and C. Mecænas was despatched by Augustus to Brundusium,[2] together with L. Cocceius, a common friend to both parties, to settle all their differences. The death of Fulvia,[3] the wife of Antonius, which happened about this time, removed, it is said, one obstacle to peace; and suggested the plan of cementing the union of the triumvirs by the marriage of Antonius with Octavia, the sister of Augustus. In other points it was agreed, that all the provinces, eastward of the Ionian Gulf,[4] should be held by Antonius, and those to the westward of the same boundary, by Augustus; that both the triumvirs might equally raise recruits for their armies in Italy; that Lepidus should be left in possession of Africa; and that Antonius should afford no protection to Sex. Pompeius against Augustus.

Return of Antonius to Italy.

Peace of Brundusium. B.C. 40.



[Octavia.—*Museum Florentinum.*]

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 373. Appian, lib. v. c. 56.
[2] Horace, *Sat.* v. lib. i. Appian, lib. v. c. 64.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 374. Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 30.
[4] Ibid. Appian, c. 65. Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 30.

B.C. 40. The peace of Brundusium was celebrated by both the triumvirs with the ceremony of the smaller Triumph or Ovation;[1] and the marriage, which had been agreed on between Antonius and Octavia, was soon after concluded. The people of Rome,[2] meanwhile, finding their usual supplies of provisions still intercepted by the fleets of Sex. Pompeius, were clamorous against the triumvirs for not relieving them from this evil; and Antonius, probably ashamed of having deserted Pompeius, was desirous of including him in the general peace. Accordingly, after some preparatory correspondence, the triumvirs and Pompeius met at Misenum,[3] on the coast of Campania, and there concluded a treaty by which Pompeius was to hold the islands of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, and the province of Achaia, for the same period as the triumvirs should retain the command of the other provinces of the empire. It was agreed, besides, that he should be allowed to hold the office of consul without appearing personally at Rome; that he should be appointed a member of the college of Augurs; and that the sum of about £565,104, should be given to him as a compensation for his father's property which had been confiscated. Pompeius, on his part, was to withdraw his garrisons from all the ports which he occupied on the coasts of Italy; he was not to add to the actual number of his ships, nor receive any deserters from the service of the triumvirs; and he was to allow the usual tribute of corn to be sent from his provinces to Rome. But the stipulation which reflected most honour on Pompeius, was that in which it was agreed that all persons who had fled from Italy, during the proscription, should be allowed to return in perfect safety, and should recover a fourth part of their forfeited property; that all others, who had any reason to dread the resentment of the triumvirs, should enjoy a general amnesty; and those whose property had been confiscated, should receive back its full value. The assassins of Cæsar were alone exempted; but most of these, probably, had already perished; and Cn. Domitius, who had, at least, the reputation of belonging to their number, was not only freed from all personal danger by his previous submission to Antonius, but a few years afterwards was raised to the dignity of consul. In this manner Sex. Pompeius earned the real glory of putting an end to the worst part of the miseries of the civil wars, and of closing that long course of banishments and forfeitures by which the late revolution had been accompanied. In the succeeding contests, the leaders of parties, with a few of their principal officers, were all who suffered on the vanquished side; proscription lists were no more needed, and the old constitution having been

Peace between the triumvirs and Sex. Pompeius.

B.C. 39.

[1] *Fasti Capitolini, apud Sigonium.*

[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 375, 376. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 102.

[3] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 102. Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 378. Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 32. Appian, lib. v. c. 72.

already effectually destroyed, there was no renewal of those scenes of general devastation which had marked the convulsions of its overthrow. Society began to settle in its new form, and to taste that tranquillity which, during the later years of the life of Augustus, was enjoyed so universally. B.C. 39.

We shall make no apology for passing briefly over the events of the eight following years, which intervened between the peace concluded with Sex. Pompeius, and the final contest between Augustus and Antonius. When we can copy the narrative of a good contemporary historian, the most ordinary times deserve attention; but when we can only follow the compilations of writers of a distant age, from whom it is vain to expect a faithful picture of the physical condition of mankind, or of their opinions, feelings, and morals; during the period under review, there are many wars and intrigues which may be safely dismissed with only a bare outline of their origin and issue. Such, for instance, are the campaigns of P. Ventidius and of Antonius himself against the Parthians; the last war between Augustus and Sex. Pompeius, and the deposition of Lepidus from that scanty share of dominion which he had till then been suffered to retain. The connection between Antonius and Cleopatra will be more properly noticed in the sketch of Egyptian history, which will be given in a separate article.[1]

Before the battle of Philippi, Brutus and Cassius had despatched an officer to the Parthian Court,[2] to solicit the assistance of that power. The officer employed on this mission was a son of T. Labienus, of that general who, alone in Cæsar's army, had remembered his duty to his country, and had left the standard under which he had gained so many laurels, as soon as it became dishonoured by the guilt of rebellion. His son, the younger Labienus, found the Parthian Court unwilling to give him a decisive answer, and in this manner the time passed away, till Brutus and Cassius had perished, and the aristocratical party was utterly ruined. Labienus, foreseeing that his return to his own country was now hopeless, continued to remain in Parthia; and when it was known that M. Antonius had abandoned all public business for the society of Cleopatra in Egypt, and that Augustus was engrossed in Italy with the struggle between the army and the people, Labienus prevailed on the Parthian king to seize the favourable moment and attack the Roman empire. A large Parthian army was intrusted to his guidance, and with this he suddenly invaded Syria. Many of the Roman troops in that province had served under Brutus and Cassius, and had passed under the standard of Antonius after the battle of Philippi; and these im-

War in the eastern Provinces. The Parthians overrun Syria, Cilicia, and Asia.

[1] *Vide* "Early Oriental History," by Dr. Eadie, in the Encyclopædia Metropolitana, p. 136–150.

[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 371, *et seq.* Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 103. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxxvii.

B.C. 39. mediately joined Labienus. Thus strengthened, he was enabled to give battle to Decidius Saxa, whom Antonius had made his lieutenant in Syria, and totally defeated him. The conquest of all Syria and Palestine, with the exception of the single city of Tyre, was the result of this victory; after which Pacorus, the son of the Parthian king, remained in the conquered Provinces with a part of the army, while Labienus, with the other part, advanced into Cilicia. There was no force capable of resisting him; so that he not only occupied the whole of Cilicia, but attacked the province of Asia, obliged L. Plancus, the governor of the province, to retire to one of the islands of the Ægean, and made himself master of all the cities on the continent, except Stratonicea, which he besieged for a long time in vain. Yet the contest between Augustus and L. Antonius in Italy seemed of more urgent importance to M. Antonius than even the recovery of the eastern provinces; and accordingly, as we have seen, he hastened to return to Italy, and Labienus was left in the undisturbed possession of his conquests till after the conclusion of the treaty between the triumvirs and Sex. Pompeius in the year B.C. 39.

They are driven out of all their conquests by P. Ventidius.

Immediately after that treaty,[1] Antonius crossed over into Greece, and despatched P. Ventidius before him into Asia, to attack Labienus. The fortune of that officer was as rapid in its ebb as it had been in its flood; he was surprised, and driven out of the province of Asia almost without resistance; then, having halted on the frontiers of Cilicia, and being reinforced by the Parthians, he was attacked by Ventidius, and his army defeated and dispersed. He himself fled in disguise, but was discovered soon after and, as it seems, put to death.[2] Cilicia was thus recovered, and a second victory over the Parthians in Syria put the Romans again in possession of all their former dominions, except the town of Aradus, which being exceedingly strong in its natural situation, was long and obstinately defended.[3] It was in the following year, while Antonius was still lingering in Greece, that Pacorus, the son of the Parthian king, made a second attempt to reconquer Syria, and was defeated and slain by Ventidius in a battle which the Romans dwelt on with peculiar delight, as a retaliation for the defeat and death of Crassus.

Renewal of the war between Augustus and Sex. Pompeius.

Augustus, probably, was by this time well aware of the little danger he had to apprehend from the character of Antonius; and he commenced, accordingly, his attacks upon Sex. Pompeius, in order to make himself sole sovereign of the western provinces, in a spirit

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 380. Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 33.

[2] "*Extinctus est virtute et ductu Ventidii*," are the words of Paterculus: *P. Ventidius Parthos, prælio victos, Syriâ expulit, Labieno eorum duce occiso*," is the account of the Epitomizer of Livy. But as it appears from the more detailed and seemingly probable account of Dion Cassius, that Labienus was not killed in the field, but was made prisoner, his death seems to have taken place in the manner described in the text, and not in battle.

[3] Strabo, lib. xvi. p. 873, edit. Xyland.

of undisguised ambition, which a more observant and active rival would have repressed by a timely resistance. He at this time received into his service a man of the name of Menas,[1] one of the ablest officers of Sex. Pompeius, who, being an enfranchised slave, and a mere soldier of fortune, was tempted easily to follow a master so much more powerful than his old one. Menas, not content with his own desertion, gave up to Augustus the islands of Sardinia and Corsica, and an army of three legions, which had been intrusted to his command; and when Pompeius remonstrated against this breach of the treaty, Augustus answered him by complaints of counter violations of it on his own part; accusing him of having built new ships of war, and of still encouraging, secretly, the commission of acts of piracy on trading vessels bound to Italy. It appears that some of the men taken on board of some piratical ships were put to the torture,[2] and it was thus that the confession was extorted from them, that they were acting at the instigation of Sex. Pompeius. On the other hand, Pompeius complained that the exiles, who had returned to Italy, had not recovered the portion of their property which had been promised them, and that Achaia was not ceded to him; but that Antonius was draining it to the utmost of all its wealth,[3] that when he gave it up it might be a useless acquisition to its new master. When we compare the respective grounds of complaint alleged by the two parties, and consider, besides, which was most likely to be anxious for a new rupture, there can be little doubt but that Augustus was the aggressor, and that Pompeius was in truth, according to the expression of Tacitus,[4] deceived to his ruin by a mere show of peace. Be this as it may, the war was speedily renewed, and Augustus requested Antonius to co-operate with him in conducting it. Antonius, who was then in Greece, crossed over to Brundusium to meet him;[5] but not finding him there, he returned

B.C. 39.



[Baths of Agrippa.—*Overbeke Les Restes de l'Ancienne Rome.*]

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 384, *et seq.* Appian, lib. v. c. 77.
[2] Καὶ ὁ Καῖσάρ τινα ληστήρια συλλαζῶν ἐβασάνιζεν. Appian, lib. v. c. 77.
[3] Dion Cassius, p. 385. Appian, c. 77.
[4] *Annal.* lib. i. c. 10.
[5] Dion Cassius, p. 385. Appian, c. 79.

B.C. 39. again immediately, with so little apparent cause for his sudden departure, that men accounted for it according to their own fancies, and some attributed it to a superstitious alarm occasioned by a reported prodigy. Perhaps he was glad of any excuse for not taking part in the contest, and availed himself of some rumours respecting the progress of the Parthians in the east, as a reason for returning instantly to his own provinces. Augustus, however, resolved to carry on the war alone, but his first attempts to invade Sicily were so foiled by storms, and the resistance of the enemy, that he recalled his ablest lieutenant, M. Agrippa, from Gaul, to assume the direction of his forces, and began to make preparations for another attempt on a scale proportioned to the greatness of his power.[1]

Treaty of Tarentum between Augustus and M. Antonius.

It seems to have been towards the close of the year B.C. 37, when Augustus was greatly annoyed by the disappointment of his hopes of conquest in Sicily, and irritated at receiving no assistance from Antonius, that Antonius crossed over to Italy once more with a fleet, as it is said, of three hundred ships of war,[2] which he seemed as much inclined to employ against Augustus as in his behalf. His honour and his interest, indeed, alike urged him to defend Sex. Pompeius; but his unsteady resolutions were liable to be influenced by any motive that could gain a momentary ascendency over him; and on this occasion his wife Octavia was as injurious to her husband's interests, by persuading him to peace with her brother, as she was a few years afterwards, when the affronts which she received from him became one of the ostensible causes of the last decisive war. Antonius and Augustus met at Tarentum; Antonius contributed a large portion of his fleet for the prosecution of the Sicilian war, and received in exchange two legions from Augustus, to strengthen the army which he intended soon to lead into Parthia. Then, as the term of their triumvirate was just expiring, they renewed it, by their own sole authority, for five years more; and to cement their union more strongly, a further interchange of marriages between the different members of their families was agreed on, but was never carried into effect.[3] When this

[1] Dion Cassius, p. 387. Appian, c. 96.

[2] Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 35. Dion Cassius, lib xlviii. p. 390. Appian, lib. v. c. 93.

[3] The character of all these transactions between the triumvirs is well given by Tacitus, in the following words: "*Antonium Tarentino Brundusinoque Fœdere, et nuptiis Sororis illectum, subdolæ affinitatis pœnas morte exsolvisse.*" *Annal.* lib. i. c. 10. Augustus and Antonius were the exact counterparts of Louis XI. of France, and Charles, Duke of Burgundy; and the manner in which Augustus amused his rival till he had cut off all his other opponents, brings strongly to mind the cautious observance which Louis showed towards Charles, till he had destroyed the Count de St. Pol, and divided and broken the power of his own nobles, in whom the House of Burgundy might have found such useful auxiliaries. The cunning and calculating cruelty of Augustus, his wisdom in the choice of his servants, his skill in corrupting those of his rivals, the address with which he made his political talents supply his total deficiences as a general, and his utter want of generosity and noble feeling, are all represented over again most faithfully in Louis XI.; while the vio-

new arrangement was settled, Antonius left Italy, to return to it no more; and consigning Octavia, as well as his children by his former marriage, to the care of Augustus, he immediately hastened into Asia. B.C. 39.

Marriage of Augustus with Livia, the wife of Tib. Nero.

About this same time Augustus married his third wife Livia,[1] who was given up to him by her husband, Tiberius Nero, although she was at that very time far advanced in her pregnancy. Into this act, indecent and scandalous even in the estimation of the Romans themselves, Augustus was hurried, it is said, by his passion for the person of Livia; and this union of mere sensuality, with a temper of the utmost coldness and heartlessness, is by no means uncommon; and shows with what facility vices, apparently the most opposite, can exist together in a character totally unprincipled. We have already mentioned that the first marriage of Augustus with Clodia, the daughter-in-law of Antonius, originated altogether in political views; insomuch, that he treated her with total neglect, even while their connection nominally lasted; and he divorced her when her mother, Fulvia, joined with L. Antonius in opposing his dominion in Italy. He then married Scribonia,[2] the daughter of L. Scribonius Libo, and whose sister was the wife of Sex. Pompeius; and the second marriage was concluded like the first, from mere motives of personal interest, when he dreaded the union of Antonius and Sex. Pompeius against him soon after the siege of Perusia, and was anxious to form some connection with those whose influence might be supposed to be powerful over Pompeius. But Scribonia's conduct, according to his own account, was exceedingly profligate,[3] and he chose to divorce her, it is said, on the very day on which she became the mother of his daughter Julia;[4] though, as we are told, that he was already enamoured of Livia, the guilt of Scribonia may be as doubtful as that of Anne



[Livia.—*Museum Florentinum.*]

lent and headstrong selfishness of Antonius, the cruelties in which he indulged from passion and resentment, the easiness with which he was managed by his adroit antagonist, that incapability of pursuing his own interest steadily, which rendered his military prowess so often nugatory, together with those gleams of a noble spirit, which sometimes burst through the darker parts of his character, are qualities which the reader of Philip de Comines will recognise as distinguishing the unfortunate Charles of Burgundy.

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 104. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. i. c. 10; lib. v. c. 1.

[2] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 62. Appian, lib. v. c. 53.

[3] "*Cum hâc etiam divortium fecit, pertæsus, ut scribit, morum perversitatem ejus.*" Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 62.

[4] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 377.

B.C. 39. Boleyn, whom her husband accused of infidelity, when his own affections were diverted to a new object. It should be remembered, that when Augustus formed his new connection with Livia, after having been twice married from political views, and having been twice divorced, he was still no more than twenty-five or twenty-six years of age.

Beginning of the Sicilian war.

The whole of the year B.C. 38 was employed by Augustus and Agrippa in completing their naval preparations. The Italians and the provinces were again oppressed with a fresh load of taxation to furnish the money that was required;[1] while the establishments of all senators, members of the equestrian order, and other wealthy individuals, were called upon to supply a certain number of slaves to man the fleet as rowers. It was on this occasion also, that M. Agrippa converted the lakes, Lucrinus and Avernus, on the coast of Campania, into harbours, in which the ships might be assembled,[2] and where the seamen might be exercised at the oar in perfect safety, alike secured from storms and from the enemy. At length, in the spring of B.C. 37, Augustus commenced his operations, being supported not only by the fleet which he had received from Antonius, but by the military and naval force of the province of Africa, which the third member of the triumvirate, M. Lepidus, was to bring over to his aid. A force thus overwhelming could gain little glory by its victory;[3] but Sex. Pompeius bravely resisted it, and in one engagement totally defeated the enemy's fleet, commanded by Augustus in person, and reduced to the utmost distress the legions which, under the command of Cornificius, had effected a descent on the coast of Sicily. They were, however, relieved by M. Agrippa, and soon after

Sex. Pompeius is conquered.

Sex. Pompeius, having been defeated by Agrippa in a general naval engagement,[4] and being utterly unable to withstand the united forces of Augustus and Lepidus on shore, abandoned the contest, and escaped with his family and most valuable effects to Peloponnesus.

Disputes between Augustus and Lepidus

The moment was now favourable to Augustus for ridding himself of another rival. Some disputes had already arisen between him and Lepidus, because Lepidus naturally objected to that tone of superiority which his associate pretended to assume;[5] but the quarrel came to an height when the army of Sex. Pompeius at Messina sur-

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 387.

[2] Ibid. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 104.

[3] Ibid. lib. xlix. p. 392, *et seq.* Velleius Paterculus, c. 104. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxxix.

[4] The whole account of this battle given by Dion Cassius, is almost a transcript of the famous description of the decisive defeat of the Athenians in the harbour of Syracuse, in the seventh book of Thucydides, c. 70, 71. We care little for the plagiarism, but it shows the manner in which the later Greek historians compiled their narratives, not giving authentic accounts of the battles or sieges which they profess to describe; but borrowing some famous passage of description from one of their old writers, and applying it, without scruple, to their own immediate subject.

[5] Dion Cassius, lib. xlix. p. 398, *et seq.* Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 105.

rendered to Lepidus, in the absence of Augustus; and Lepidus saw B.C. 35.
no reason for yielding up to his colleague a force which had voluntarily submitted to himself. In this state of things, Augustus presented himself with only a small guard attending his person, at the camp of Lepidus; and being allowed to enter without suspicion, he began to tamper with the soldiers of his rival, trusting that his superior power and ability would prevail on them to desert to him. But he was disappointed in this hope, and the soldiers of Lepidus, irritated by his proposals, fell upon him and his escort, and obliged him to save his life by a precipitate flight. When treachery had thus failed, he applied himself to open force; and, bringing up his whole army, prepared to besiege the camp of Lepidus. Lepidus, destitute of all personal influence over his soldiers, saw them now gradually abandon him, and go over to his enemy; till at length, despairing of his fortune, he laid aside his general's dress, and, in a mean habit betook himself to the camp of Augustus, and prostrated himself before his feet. With that nice discrimination which led him to shed no blood, unless it were for his interest, and to show no mercy towards those whom he respected and feared, Augustus merely deprived Lepidus of his power as triumvir, and granted him the free enjoyment of his life and of his private property; while he put to death, with few exceptions, every senator and member of the equestrian order whom he found amongst the followers of Pompeius, and either gave up all the slaves among his prisoners to their former masters for execution, or, if their masters could not be found, ordered them himself to be crucified.

Lepidus is deserted by his army and deprived by Augustus of all his power.

Immediately after these great successes, the army in Sicily,[1] conscious of its power, began to mutiny; and finding that their demands were not listened to, the legions petitioned for their discharge, imagining that Augustus would be afraid to disband them, and thus leave himself exposed to the attacks of Antonius. But the example of his uncle's conduct in similar circumstances was not lost upon him; he professed his readiness to comply with their wishes, and first discharged all those who had served under him against M. Antonius at Mutina; he then dismissed every soldier who had been enlisted as long as ten years; but to these last he refused to give the rewards and settlements in land which they had expected; and by this punishment, and by declaring that he would never again employ any of the troops whom he should now discharge, he terrified the rest of the army, and made them desirous of continuing in his service. Having thus restored order, he proceeded to conciliate the late mutineers by a display of his liberality. Besides various honorary rewards, and a donation in money, he assigned to them those settlements in land which they coveted above everything else; and, to

Mutiny of the army suppressed by Augustus.

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 106. Dion Cassius, lib. xlix. p. 399.

B.C. 35. increase the value of the gift, he purchased, we are told, a large tract of country in Campania, to be divided amongst his soldiers;[1] and repaid the former colonists of Capua by a grant of a larger revenue arising from some lands in Crete. Before he returned to Rome, he was desirous of crossing over into Africa, to superintend the settlement of that province, which, on the deposition of Lepidus, had submitted to his authority without resistance; but he was prevented by a continuance of stormy weather;[2] and thus, it is said, Africa and Sardinia were the only provinces in the empire which, in the course of his life, he never visited.

[1] Dion Cassius and Paterculus, *locis citatis*. We have copied the statement of Dion Cassius, but without being at all confident of its accuracy. Capua, as we believe, became a Roman colony in consequence of the Julian law, passed by Cæsar in his first consulship, B.C. 59. But the soil of this part of Campania was so much coveted, that succeeding demagogues or usurpers, were not pleased to be deprived of a means of bribing or rewarding their followers; and accordingly we find that M. Antonius, soon after Cæsar's death, planted new colonies in Campania, regardless of the right of those already established there, and encroaching, in particular, on the territory of Capua. Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 39, 40. Appian tells us, that Capua was one of the cities which the triumvirs gave up to their soldiers when they commenced their usurpation. Probably it was not a military colony, and its inhabitants might therefore have been ejected without scruple. But a colony of veterans seems to have been settled there, when Augustus divided so large a portion of all Italy amongst his soldiers, after the battle of Philippi. This colony, however, was capable of receiving a greater number of inhabitants: ἐτοίμων ἡ πόλις πολλῶν ἐδείτο, are the words of Dion Cassius. Possibly the veterans who had been settled there had been tempted to serve again either under Augustus or Antonius, and many of them may thus have perished, either in the east, or in the actions with Sex. Pompeius. Besides, the decay of these military colonies was often inconceivably rapid, from the habitual extravagance of the soldiers, and their ignorance of farming; so that they soon parted with their shares, and were eager to go to the wars again, to entitle themselves to a new division of spoil. But it was competent to the government to fill up the numbers of colonies thus diminished; "*Colonos novos adscribi posse*," Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 40, because the State never lost its right of re-entering into the possession of its demesne lands, if the tenants to whom they had been granted, or their heirs, ceased to occupy them. According to Dion Cassius, however, we must suppose that Augustus gave the revenues in Crete to the old colonists of Capua, as a compensation for the land which he reclaimed, for the purposes of the State, in Campania; and which may have come into their hands as the shareholders dropped off, in the same way that the national lands were so often usurped of old by the rich citizens, as the small landholders became obliged to part with their shares. But if we could be sure that Dion Cassius had copied his account from Velleius Paterculus, and certainly the passages strongly resemble one another, we should think that he had misunderstood the writer whom he was following; and that Paterculus had meant to say, that the revenues in Crete were given to the Roman treasury, as a compensation for the loss of the Campanian rents, which were at all times so valuable a part of the revenue; and which were constantly paid by the small farmers who cultivated those parts of the national lands which had not yet been divided out as colonies. See Cicero, *de Lege Agrariâ, Orat.* ii. c. 30, 31. We should apologize, perhaps, to the general reader for this long and unsatisfactory note; but if any person, well conversant with the Roman history, should peruse these pages, the statement of what is to us a difficulty, may, perhaps, direct his attention more successfully to the same subject; and thus even a display of our own ignorance, may possibly not be without its benefit to our readers.

[2] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 47.

He returned to Italy in time to check a rising insurrection in Tuscany: this is all that Dion Cassius tells us;[1] nor have we any means of estimating the magnitude of the danger from which his timely victory in Sicily had delivered him. But, as it was, he found nothing in Italy but an excess of servility. He seemed already to be regarded as the sovereign of the empire; for he had for some years resided amidst the Romans, while Antonius was engaged in distant wars, or had been revelling in Greece and in Egypt; and now Antonius appeared to be altogether forgotten, while the Senate, if we may still call it by that name, was lavishing on Augustus those excessive and odious distinctions which had before been heaped upon his uncle. As if in ridicule of its own flattery, we are told that the Senate presented to Augustus a list of the different honours which had been voted to him,[2] that he might either accept the whole, or select as many as he thought proper. It is said that he chose the following: to enter the city with the ceremony of the smaller triumph, or ovation; that his victory should be commemorated every year by some days of solemn thanksgiving; and that his statue in a triumphal dress should be erected in the Forum, on the top of a pillar ornamented with the beaks of ships. The dignity of *Pontifex Maximus*, which was held by M. Lepidus, was also offered to him; but as it could only be legally vacated by death, he refused to accept it: he was invested, however, with the more valuable character of perpetual tribune;[3] that is, his person was declared sacred; and to offer any violence to him was made as great a crime as to injure the person of a tribune. On his first arrival at Rome, he addressed the Senate and the people successively in set speeches, which he afterwards published; and which contained a general exposition of his whole political career. He then promised his hearers the enjoyment of a state of peace and prosperity; and in some measure to verify his words, he remitted all the yet unpaid taxes which he had imposed for the support of the war with Sex. Pompeius, and gave

B.C. 35.

Honours paid to Augustus on his return to Italy.



[Augustus.—*Ressi Racidta di Statue Antiche*, xvi.]

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlix. p. 400.
[2] Appian, lib. v. c. 130.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xlix. p. 401.

B.C. 35. a general discharge to all those who were indebted to the treasury before the commencement of the civil war; but this last piece of liberality excited some ridicule, inasmuch as he made a merit of resigning what he had little chance of ever recovering. The system of audacious robbery, which the distresses of the times had long fostered in Rome, he now took effectual measures for suppressing;[1] and by the establishment of a strong night patrol, and the appointment of an officer with those ample powers with which the special commissions even under the old government had always been invested, he is said to have delivered the country entirely from this evil in the space of a twelvemonth. Another of his measures rivalled in cruelty the sweeping massacres of Sylla, and was marked by a perfidy which was eminently characteristic of Augustus. Great numbers of slaves had enlisted some years before in the service of Sex. Pompeius;[2] and when he concluded his treaty with the triumvirs, it was stipulated that all these persons should be allowed their liberty, and might return in safety to Italy.[3] But Augustus suspecting that they would cherish a fondness for the memory of Sex. Pompeius, which would make them disaffected towards himself, is said to have sent sealed orders to all his armies, with directions that they were all to be opened on the same day; and on that day all the freedmen, who had gained their liberty from the treaty between Pompeius and the triumvirs, were arrested and sent to Rome. Augustus then ordered them all to be given back to their former masters, or to their masters' heirs, if they belonged to a Roman, and Italian, or a Sicilian; and if no one appeared to claim them, they were sent to the cities in which they had lived in their state of slavery, and were there put to death. A somewhat similar act of bloody treachery is recorded to have been committed by the Spartans upon those of their Helots, whose spirit and enterprise they most dreaded; but while the Spartans have been ever justly condemned for this and other such deeds, the memory of Augustus has escaped the detestation which it deserves, and this perfidy and cruelty has been called, even by a modern historian, "a severe, but well-concerted reform."[4]

His perfidy towards the freedmen who had served under Sex. Pompeius.

[1] Appian, lib. v. c. 132. [2] Ibid. c. 131.

[3] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 378. Appian, lib. v. c. 72.

[4] Ferguson, vol. v. 8vo. edit., 1805, p. 7. In this instance, as well as in the account of Sylla's massacre, which we formerly noticed, Ferguson has completely misrepresented the facts of the case; for he entirely omits to mention that the slaves were men who had served under Sex. Pompeius; that they had received their liberty by a solemn treaty; and that they were living peaceably, as far as appears, in Italy, at the moment at which they were treacherously seized. According to Ferguson, they were slaves who, having deserted during the civil war, were "enrolled with the levies which were continually forming by *different parties;*" and Octavius wished "to purge the army of a dangerous class of men by whom it was overcharged and contaminated." If, indeed the freedmen, who had formerly served under Pompeius, had enlisted since their emancipation in the army of

Sex. Pompeius did not long survive this treatment of his old followers. When he reached the coast of Peloponnesus, he was joined by several vessels which had escaped from Sicily; but, despairing of continuing the war, he recommended their captains to provide for their own safety; and himself, with a very small force which he still retained, sailed for Asia, with the intention of requesting the protection of Antonius. He first stopped at the island of Lesbos; at that very city of Mitylene,[1] in which his mother and himself, then a boy, had received his father in his flight from the battle of Pharsalia, and where the inhabitants still cherished with a fond regard the memory of his father's virtues. The kind reception which they gave him revived his hopes; at the same time he received tidings of the disastrous expedition of Antonius against the Parthians, and of the dissension between Augustus and Lepidus in Sicily. He is said accordingly to have played a double part, on the one hand endeavouring to win the support of the Parthians, and on the other soliciting the friendship of Antonius, when he found that he had returned from Parthia in safety. But we are told also, that C. Furnius,[2] who was the lieutenant of Antonius in the province of Asia, had shown an unfriendly disposition towards Pompeius from the first moment of his arrival at Lesbos; and that M. Titius, whom Antonius had sent from Syria to oppose him, on the first tidings of his hostile purposes, had formerly received kindnesses from him, which he had repaid by deserting his service and going over to Antonius. What provocation then these two officers may have given, or how far they may have misrepresented to their general the conduct of Pompeius, is difficult to say; but we are told, that Pompeius having collected a small force, partly from his own partisans who now again joined him after their dispersion, and partly from that distressed portion of the population which seems in these times to have abounded in every quarter of the empire, and to have been always ready to follow any standard in the hope of plunder, began to act in a hostile manner in Asia. Some of his principal friends,[3] and among the rest his own father-in-law, L. Libo, are said to have left him, from a conviction of the utter hopelessness of his cause, and to have made their own terms with the officers of Antonius. Pompeius himself was willing to surrender himself to C. Furnius,[4] but this offer was refused; and he could not bear to put himself in the power of Titius, whom he considered an ungrateful traitor. But being overpowered by the force brought against him, and having in vain endeavoured to make his way into the interior of Asia Minor, he was finally taken

B.C. 35.

Last adventures of Sex. Pompeius.

Augustus, it only enhances the atrocity of his conduct towards them; but it does not appear that they had done so, but rather that they were living peaceably in Italy on the faith of that treaty which had stipulated for their liberty.

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlix. p. 402. Appian, lib. v. c. 133.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Appian, lib. v. c. 139.

[4] Ibid. c. 141.

B.C. 34. He is put to death in Asia by Titius, one of the Lieutenants of Antonius.

prisoner, and, as might have been expected, was put to death by Titius,[1] at Miletus. It is the more probable account that this act was committed without the knowledge of Antonius; but it was received by Augustus at Rome as a triumph won by his associate,[2] and he celebrated it by rejoicings, and by paying some public compliments to Antonius, while the people at large, indignant at the death of the last surviving son of the great Pompey, retained a strong detestation of Titius as the author of it; and some time afterwards when he was exhibiting some games in the theatre of Pompey,[3] he was driven from the theatre by a general burst of public feeling, as if one of the monuments of Pompey's munificence ought not to be profaned by the presence of the murderer of his son.

In the interval, which followed before the commencement of the final contest with Antonius, we read of several wars carried on by Augustus and his lieutenants against the rude tribes inhabiting the Alps, and against the Dalmatians:[4] it is mentioned, also, that he now led the Roman armies, for the first time, against the Pannonians, who lived between Dalmatia and the Danube, and whom he attacked without any provocation for the mere object of keeping his soldiers in employment. On his return from these wars to Rome, fresh honours were lavished upon him in the distinctions conferred upon his wife Livia,[5] and his sister Octavia, whose persons were declared sacred, like those of the tribunes; and they were allowed the privilege of managing their own affairs without a guardian or trustee, whose agency was necessary to all women in legal transactions, as no female was supposed to be independent, or was capable of acting in her own name.

First beginnings of the quarrel between Augustus and Antonius.

The triumvirs had renewed their power for a period of five years, as we have already seen, from the beginning of the year B.C. 37; and the succession to the ordinary offices of the commonwealth had been settled for eight years, when the triumvirs concluded their treaty with Sex. Pompeius in the year B.C. 39. According to this arrangement, the triumvirate properly expired on the last day of the year B.C. 33; and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and C. Sosius were the persons who had been named as consuls for the year B.C. 32. Already were the signs of an approaching quarrel between Augustus and Antonius, become clearly visible; Antonius could not be insensible to the great accession of power which his rival had gained by his acquisition of Sicily, Sardinia, and Africa; nor was this his only ground of complaint;[6] but he expressed his dissatisfaction that Augustus had appropriated to himself the military resources of Italy,

[1] Appian lib. v. c. 144. Strabo, lib. iii. p. 150. edit. Xyland.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. xlix. p. 403.
[3] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 104.
[4] Livy *Epitome*, lib. cxxxi. Dion Cassius, lib. xlix. p. 412, 413.
[5] Dion Cassius, lib. xlix. p. 414.
[6] Ibid. lib. l. p. 419. Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 55.

which were to be divided jointly between them; and that in assigning settlements in lands to the veteran soldiers, he had confined his grants almost exclusively to those who had served particularly under his own standard. Augustus, in reply, taxed Antonius with having, on his part, occupied Armenia, and having brought disgrace on the Roman name, by the treacherous murder of its king; he said Egypt was, in fact, become his province through his connection with Cleopatra; and that his soldiers could not claim their share of settlements in Italy, till they chose to divide, with equal fairness, what they had won themselves in Media and Parthia. This was a mere insult on the disasters of Antonius's late expedition into those countries; and there was hardly more weight in another accusation which Dion Cassius ascribes to Augustus, namely, that Antonius had put Sex. Pompeius to death, whereas he himself had purposely allowed him to escape from Sicily. But Augustus's main reliance was on the feeling of national pride which he hoped to awaken in the Romans, by representing his rival as one who had cast off his duty to his country, and was become the mere slave of a foreign queen. With this view every tale of the levities in which Antonius indulged in his hours of festivity with Cleopatra, and of the attentions and gallantries which he paid to her, was eagerly caught up and industriously circulated; and the public were taught to deplore the degradation of the majesty of the Roman name; because Antonius had assumed the character of Gymnasiarch, or master of the gymnastic exercises at Alexandria;[1] because he had called Cleopatra his queen and sovereign lady; and because she had some Roman soldiers amongst her guards, and her name was inscribed on their shields as their commander and mistress. B.C. 34.

Consulship of C. Sosius and Cn. Domitius.

But the two consuls, C. Sosius and Cn. Domitius, were friends of Antonius, and as the triumvirate was now legally at an end, the consular power might seem entitled to resume its ancient ascendency. Accordingly, on the very first day of the year,[2] C. Sosius delivered a speech full of the praises of Antonius, and of invective against Augustus; and he would have immediately proceeded to employ the authority of his office, in some measure, adverse to the interests of the latter, had not Nonius Balbus, one of the tribunes, interposed with his negative. But this revival of the legal government of the commonwealth was, of all things, most unwelcome to Augustus; he returned, therefore, speedily to Rome, (for he had absented himself purposely from the meeting of the Senate on the first of January,) assembled the Senate, and, surrounding his person with a military force, and with a multitude of his partisans, armed, it is said, with concealed daggers, he took his seat on the curule chair, which he was used to occupy, between the chairs of the consuls, and after hav- B.C. 32.

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. l. p. 421

[2] Ibid. p. 419.

B.C. 32. ing spoken at some length in defence of himself, he uttered a strong invective, in his turn, against Sosius and Antonius. The actual presence of his soldiers intimated sufficiently that "the master of the legions" was not a person with whom it was safe to argue; no one therefore answered him, and he summoned the Senate to meet again on a fixed day, when he assured them that he would produce written proofs of the unworthiness of Antonius. Meanwhile the consuls, followed by a considerable number of senators, left the capital privately, and repaired to Antonius; while Augustus, to avoid the odium which their retirement cast upon him, pretended that he had himself allowed them freely to withdraw, and that he would not oppose the departure of any other friends of Antonius, who might wish, in like manner, to join him. It appears that Antonius had already begun to prepare for war;[1] and that both Cleopatra and himself were about this time in Asia Minor, while their land and sea forces were gathering together in the same quarter and in the Ægæan. Here he heard of the proceedings which were going on against him at Rome,[2] of the subsequent meeting of the Senate which took place after the departure of the consuls, and of the language which Augustus had used both in speaking and writing concerning him. Upon this he assembled a sort of counter-senate, consisting of the numerous senators who had repaired to him from Rome. After much debate, it was resolved that the war should be undertaken; and Antonius sent a formal divorce to Octavia, exactly as Augustus had divorced his first wife, Clodia, on the occasion of his quarrel with her mother, Fulvia, and with L. Antonius. But the notoriety of the connection of Antonius with Cleopatra, made it appear that Octavia was rather sacrificed to his passion for the Egyptian Queen, than divorced on account of his quarrel with her brother; and this also was used as a topic on which to excite the national pride of the Romans, by representing a noble Roman lady as dishonoured and despised by her husband, in order to gratify the jealousy of his barbarian paramour.

The Consuls leave Rome and repair to Antonius.

Antonius renounces his connection with Augustus and divorces Octavia.

This feeling, indeed, was not confined to the Romans of the capital; even the officers of Antonius were disgusted at the evident influence which Cleopatra exercised over him, and against which their wisest counsels were sure to be offered ineffectually. They might conjecture, too, from the infatuation of their general, the probable result of the war; and thus L. Plancus,[3] who had formerly made so many professions of fidelity to the old constitution, and had afterwards joined the triumvirs, and procured from them the murder of his own brother, as one of the rewards of his treason, now deserted the cause of Antonius. Accompanied by his nephew, M. Titius, the author of the death of Sex. Pompeius,[4] he hastened to Rome to

[1] Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 56.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. l. p. 420.
[3] Dion Cassius. lib. l. p. 420. Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 58.
[4] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 108.

transfer his services to Augustus. Plancus and Titius had been deeply trusted by Antonius, and they now betrayed to his enemy every secret of which they were in possession. Amongst the rest, they intimated to him the contents of the will of Antonius, which they had themselves attested; and informed him in whose care it was deposited. Augustus immediately got this document into his power;[1] and, with shameless baseness, broke open the seals, and read the contents of it publicly, first to the Senate, and afterwards to the assembly of the people. The clause in it, which especially induced Augustus to commit this act, was one in which Antonius desired that his body might, after his death, be carried to Alexandria, and there buried by the side of Cleopatra. This proof of his romantic passion for a foreigner, seemed, in the eyes of the Romans, to attest his utter degeneracy, and induced the populace, at least, to credit the inventions of his enemies, who asserted that it was his intention, if victorious in the approaching contest, to give up Rome to the dominion of Cleopatra, and to transfer the seat of empire from the banks of the Tiber to those of the Nile. It is clear, from the language of those poets who wrote under the patronage of Augustus,[2] that this was the light in which the war was industriously represented; that every effort was made to give it the character of a contest with a foreign enemy; and to array on the side of Augustus the national pride and jealousy of the people of Rome. Nor were these arts unsuccessful; insomuch, that the infamy of stealing and divulging the contents of a will was forgotten, in the indignation felt by the Romans at the preference shown by Antonius to Egypt, rather than to his own country; and it is said that the Senate, as soon as they had heard the will read, decreed that Antonius should be deprived of the consulship to which he was to have succeeded in the following year,[3] and of all his other authority as an officer of the Roman commonwealth. His adherents, moreover, were encouraged to desert him, by promises of indemnity and honours.

B.C. 32.

He is deserted by L. Plancus and M. Titius.

Augustus publishes Antony's will before the Senate and people.

[1] Dion Cassius, p. 420. Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 58. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 17.

[2] *Antehac nefas depromere Cæcubum*
Cellis avitis; dum Capitolio
Regina dementes ruinas,
Funus et Imperio parabat,
Contaminato cum grege turpium
Morbo Virorum. —Horace, *Carm.* lib. i. Ode 37.

Hinc Augustus agens Italos in prœlia Cæsar,
Cum Patribus Populoque, Penatibus et Magnis Diis,
Hinc ope barbaricâ, variisque Antonius armis,———
—sequiturque, nefas! Ægyptia conjux!
* * * * * * *
Omnigenumque Deûm Monstra, et latrator Anubis
Contra Neptunum et Venerem, contraque Minervam,
Tela tenent. —Virgil, *Æneid.* viii. v. 678, 685, 698.

[3] Dion Cassius, lib. l. p. 421.


B.C. 32. Declaration of war against Cleopatra.

At the same time war was declared against Cleopatra,[1] and Augustus discharged the office of *Fecialis* or Herald, in going through all the usual ceremonies in denouncing it. But for a contest of this magnitude, immense resources were requisite, and accordingly Augustus imposed an income-tax of twenty-five per cent on all the free citizens who possessed any land in Italy[2] and a tax upon capital at the rate of £12 10s. per cent. on all freedmen who were worth fifty thousand *denarii*, or about £1,614. The inequality of these burdens was greatly resented by the freedmen, and numerous disturbances were the consequence; insomuch, that it was supposed that the appearance of Antonius in Italy at that moment would have ensured him a complete victory over his rival. But whether Antonius was not sufficiently advanced in his preparations to risk such an attempt, or whether there was any failure of enterprise on his part, it is certain that Augustus was suffered to crush the discontents of Italy without any interruption. His fleet was assembled in the neighbourhood of Brundusium,[3] and threatened the opposite coast of Epirus,
B.C. 31. about the autumn of the year B.C. 31, and Antonius judging it too late in the season to commence any active operations, fell back from Corcyra, to which place he had advanced in the hope of carrying the war into Italy before his adversary was ready to meet him, and passed the winter at Patræ, on the north-western coast of Peloponnesus. And thus having brought the two parties to the eve of the decisive struggle, we shall here pause in our narrative; and referring our readers to the history of Egypt for the details of the Actian war, we shall hereafter resume the story of Augustus at the period when his ambition had been fully gratified, and he had become the sole sovereign of the Roman empire.

[1] For the History of Cleopatra in connection with Rome, see "Early Oriental History" in the "Encyclopædia Metropolitana."

[2] Dion Cassius, p. 424. Plutarch, *in Antonio*, c. 58.

[3] Ibid. p. 424.



[Pyramid of Caius Cestus.—*Venuti, Antichita di Roma.*]



[Apotheosis of Augustus.—*From a Cameo in the Imperial Cabinet at Vienna.*]

CAIUS OCTAVIUS CÆSAR AUGUSTUS.

PART II.

CONTAINING A VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF ROME.

FROM B.C. 31 TO A.D. 13.

IF we were to judge of God's moral government, exclusively from the various earthly fortune of good and bad men, there are few instances of successful wickedness which would more disturb our faith than that of the long and peaceful reign of Augustus Cæsar. Other usurpers have indeed enjoyed till their death their ill-gotten power; but it has been beset by fears and anxieties; and the severity of their government has betrayed their consciousness of the real feelings with which they were regarded, and has proved that they could truly anticipate the sentence which after ages would pass upon their memory. But Augustus reigned amidst the grateful obedience of B.C. 31.

B.C. 31. his people; and the flattery with which his own court resounded, has been echoed by successive generations, till he has been habitually ranked amongst the best and greatest of sovereigns; and the period of his dominion has been considered synonymous with the highest state of civilization and public prosperity. Yet the man thus eulogised, had shown himself capable of every wickedness, so long as his interests required it; and the merit of his later years, consists only in that clearness of understanding which taught him that power, although most readily gained by crime, was most wisely exercised in promoting the happiness of mankind; and that justice and mercy, when they demanded no personal sacrifices, were only a means, as easy as effectual, of promoting at once his own security and greatness.

Augustus settles the government of Egypt.

The conquest of Egypt became a most seasonable source of riches to Augustus, and he availed himself of it to the utmost. It is said that besides the immense treasures accumulated by Cleopatra,[1] and the heavy forfeitures imposed on all those Egyptians who had served their Queen with most distinction during the late war, a tax was imposed on the whole people of Egypt to the amount of two-thirds of their property, besides a heavy contribution levied on the citizens of Alexandria, as a ransom for the exemption of their city from plunder. In this manner, Augustus, we are told, was enabled to pay all the arrears due to the army, and to discharge his obligations to those creditors who had lent him money for the expenses of the war; while, at the same time, he carried off a great number of magnificent offerings which had ornamented the temples of Egypt, and were now to be laid up in those at Rome. It is said, too, that after all the spoliations, the wealth and resources of Egypt appeared to him so formidable, that he was afraid to entrust that province to the charge of any man of rank or influence, lest he should raise up a rival to himself. He therefore committed the government of the country to Cornelius Gallus, a citizen of the equestrian order, and a person of very low extraction;[2] he would not allow the city of Alexandria to possess any municipal council; and he declared all Egyptians incapable of being admitted into the Senate at Rome. At the same time he employed his soldiers in clearing out many of the old canals with which the country had been formerly intersected,[3] and which had been for a long period choked up by the mud and sand deposited in the successive inundations of the Nile. He then departed from Egypt, passed through Syria, and thence continued his progress to the province of Asia, wherein he resolved to remain during the winter.

Honours decreed to him by the Senate.

The tidings of his final victory over Antonius and Cleopatra arrived at Rome in the month of September,[4] when, by a curious coincidence, M. Cicero, the son of the orator, was just entering upon

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. li. p. 455. edit. Leunclavii.
[2] Ibid. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 66.
[3] Ibid. lib. li. p. 456. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 18.
[4] Ibid. Pliny, *Hist. Natural.* lib. xxii. c. 6. Plutarch, *in Cicerone*, c. 49.

his consulship; for that office, which was now a mere empty title, B.C. 30. was not held as formerly for the whole year; but, in order to multiply the patronage of the sovereign, it was given successively to several persons, each of whom only retained it for two or three months. Although it might have been thought that all conceivable modes of flattery to the conqueror had been already exhausted, yet the Senate, on this occasion, was once more lavish of its honours to the chief of the victorious party, and of its marks of disgrace affixed on the memory of the vanquished. All monuments in memory of Antonius were ordered to be defaced, or destroyed; the day of his birth was to be held accursed, and no member of his family was ever to bear the prænomen of Marcus. On the other hand, solemn games were to be celebrated every five years in honour of Augustus; his birth-day, and the anniversary of the day on which the news of his victory had reached Rome, were to be kept as days of thanksgiving; he was to be met, on his approach to the capital, by the vestal virgins, the senate, and people, in procession, with their wives and children; and his power of protection as tribune, to any one who appealed to him, was to extend to the distance of seven stadia and a-half without the walls of Rome; and, further, he was to have a privilege of pardoning any criminal, by giving what was called the vote of Minerva, when the number of the voices which condemned exceeded only by one the number of those which acquitted. Finally, on the first of January in the ensuing year, B. C. 29, the senators all took an oath to observe all his acts; and the gates of the temple of Janus were shut, as if Augustus, by his conquest of Egypt, had delivered the commonwealth from every enemy, and had brought it to a state of perfect peace.

Meantime the cities of Asia, wherein Augustus was passing the winter, were vieing with Rome itself in the flatteries which they offered him. They professed to regard it as a great distinction, when he allowed temples, dedicated to Rome and to the divine Julius, to be raised at Ephesus and Nicæa,[1] and to others consecrated to Rome and to himself to be built at Pergamus and Nicomedia. It is observed, however, that the care of the temples dedicated to Julius Cæsar was committed to the Roman citizens resident in the cities wherein they were placed; while the charge of the temples of Augustus was given to the native inhabitants, or, as they were commonly styled, the Greeks. The Romans, it is said, would not at this time condescend to become priests in the temple of a living man,[2] although they did not object to bestowing divine honours on the same individual after death. But the subjects of Rome were lesss scrupulous, and the example of the Greeks of Asia was soon followed, we are told, by the inhabitants of the other provinces of the empire.

Flatteries paid him by the Greek cities of Asia.

In the summer of this year, Augustus crossed over from Asia into Greece, and thence to Italy.[3] He lavished the treasures of

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. li. p. 458. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. iv. c. 37.
[2] Ibid. lib. li. p. 458.
[3] Ibid.

B.C. 29. Augustus returns to Rome.

Egypt so liberally on all classes of people, in donations to his soldiers, in largesses of 100 *denarii*, or about £3 4s. 6d. to each individual citizen, and in paying all the sums which he had borrowed for the expenses of the war, that all his crimes and oppressions were forgotten amid the splendour of his munificence; nor did he give less general satisfaction by refusing the golden crowns which were offered to him, as they had been to his uncle, by the cities of Italy, and by remitting all arrears of taxes which were still due to the treasury. Such an overflow of money was at this time poured into the market at Rome, that the price of land rapidly rose,[1] and the usual rate of interest was reduced to only one-third of what it had been before; the great mass of disposable capital making every one eager to become a purchaser of land as the readiest means of investing it to advantage, while all who wanted to borrow money were enabled to procure it on far easier terms than usual. Augustus then celebrated his "triple triumph" during three successive days:[2] on the first of which were commemorated the victories gained either by himself or his lieutenants over the Dalmatians, Pannonians, and various other barbarian tribes of Germany and the northern extremity of Gaul;[3] on the second, his naval victory at Actium; and, on the third, his conquest of Egypt. No mention was made of Antonius, nor was the late contest represented in any other light than as a struggle between the Senate and people of Rome and the Queen of Egypt. A figure of Cleopatra, lying on a couch, intended to display the manner of her death, was carried in the procession; and two of her children by Antonius, Alexander and Cleopatra, were exhibited among the prisoners. One striking change of the forms practised under the old constitution was remarked on this occasion. The consuls, and other magistrates of the commonwealth, were accustomed to walk before the chariot of the victorious general; but now they followed in his train, in company with those senators who had served with him in his late campaigns, and were now sharing in the honours of his triumph.

His three Triumphs.

The consecration of a temple, dedicated to Julius Cæsar as a demigod, soon furnished Augustus with an opportunity of further gratifying the people by an exhibition of various kinds of sports and combats. It is mentioned that the hippopotamus and rhinoceros were on this occasion first hunted and killed in a Roman amphitheatre; and that large bodies of the Suevi and the Dacians, the former one of the most powerful of the German tribes, and the latter a people who occupied both banks of the Danube, in the lower part of the course of that river, were matched against each other, and

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. li. p. 458. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 41.

[2] *At Cæsar*, triplici *invectus Romana* Triumpho.
Mœnia, &c. —Virgil, *Æneid.* viii. v. 714.

[3] Dion Cassius, and Virgil, ibid. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxxxiii. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 22.

practised each their national mode of fighting in real battle for the entertainment of the spectators. B.C. 30.

Conspiracy of Lepidus.

It was a little before this time, apparently, that M. Lepidus, the son of the late triumvir, and the nephew of M. Brutus, formed a design to destroy Augustus.[1] The particulars of this attempt are not recorded: Paterculus charges him with intending to assassinate Augustus as soon as he should return to Rome, while the *Epitomizer* of Livy says that he was meditating an open attack upon his power, possibly by endeavouring to draw away some of the legions from his service. But whatever his plans were, they were discovered by C. Mæcenas, to whom Augustus had entrusted the government of the capital during his absence, and Lepidus was arrested and put to death. His wife, Servilia, is said to have killed herself in consequence of his loss, by swallowing fire.

In the midst of his triumph, and when the sovereignty which he had so dearly purchased lay at length securely within his grasp, Augustus is said to have meditated an entire resignation of his power, and the restoration of the old constitution. This report, which is mentioned by Suetonius, became embellished in process of time with additional circumstances; and Dion Cassius, in the true style of a Greek rhetorician, represents Augustus as consulting his two friends, Agrippa and Mæcenas, on this important question: and ascribes to these two counsellors two speeches of immense length, in one of which Agrippa repeats all the old common-place arguments in favour of a republic, and urges Augustus to restore the authority of the Senate and people; while, in the other, Mæcenas, in a strain equally trite, recounts the advantages of monarchy, and presses his friend to retain the power which fortune had put into his hands. It is most improbable that Augustus should ever have entertained a serious thought of sacrificing the prize which he had led a life of such surpassing wickedness to gain; although it is perfectly consistent with his character that he should have wished to spread such a belief among the people, and should appear to be reluctantly induced to bear the weight of government, from a compassion for the disordered state of the commonwealth. We may more readily believe that Mæcenas suggested to him many of the measures which he now began to carry into execution, for establishing the new order of things.[2] He first turned his attention to the Senate, which he proposed to reduce in its numbers, and to remove all those members who seemed unfit for their station, from their deficiencies in rank, fortune, or character; particularly those individuals who had procured their admission after Cæsar's death, by purchasing from Antonius a pretended grant of that honour by the late dictator, at the time when Antonius was availing himself of the possession of Cæsar's

Augustus remodels the Senate.

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxxxiii. Seneca, *de Clementiâ* c. 9. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 19.

[2] Dion Cassius, lib. liii. p. 494. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 35.

B.C. 29. papers to gratify his own rapacity and ambition. In this review of the Senate, Augustus chose M. Agrippa as his colleague; and after a considerable number of senators had resigned their rank of their own accord, to avoid the disgrace of expulsion, each remaining senator was directed to name one other whom he considered as most worthy to remain on the rolls. All those whose names found no place on this list, and all others whom the censors judged it expedient to remove, were then marked down, and obliged, it is said, to withdraw of themselves, although they were not allowed, like those who had resigned before the examination, to retain the dress of senators, nor their seats amongst those reserved for the Senate at the public spectacles. Whilst carrying on this scrutiny, Augustus is said to have worn armour under his clothes,[1] to have been constantly surrounded by ten of the senators, on whose personal strength and attachment he could most fully rely; and to have admitted no other senator into his presence without causing him to be previously searched, lest he should carry about him any concealed weapon. It is added also that he deposed one Q. Statilius from the office of tribune,[2] that he raised two senators to the privileges of the consular rank, although they had never held that magistracy, and that, following the precedent set by his uncle, he conferred on several noble families the dignity of patricians. But his jealousy of the nobility

Excessive fear and caution of Augustus.



[Temple of Agrippa.]

was shown by an order which he issued, forbidding any senator to leave Italy at any time without his permission, as if fearful of their

[1] Suetonius, *ubi supra.*
[2] Dion Cassius, *ubi supra.*

escaping from his superintendence. In this policy also he trod, as we have seen, in the steps of his uncle, Julius Cæsar. B.C. 28.

Salutary and popular measures of Augustus.

The ensuing year, in which Augustus held the office of consul for the sixth time himself, and chose M. Agrippa as his colleague, was marked by a variety of acts, all tending to render the new government generally popular, and thus preparing the way for the scene which was soon to follow. In the first place, Augustus affected to revive the appearance of the old consulship,[1] by treating his colleague entirely as his own equal. He amused the people with magnificent games of various kinds; he formed and opened, for public use, a voluminous library of Greek and Roman literature on the Palatine Hill; he is said to have borrowed money to enable him to make a large contribution to the public treasury; he issued four times the amount of the allowance of corn usually given to the poorer citizens at the public expense; he gave sums of money to the poorer senators, to enable them to bear the burden of the ædileship and other expensive public offices; he burnt the accounts of all debts of long standing which were due to the commonwealth; and made over to the possessors the full property of all ground in the capital to which the State maintained a doubtful claim.[2] It is mentioned, besides, that he not only liberally repaired all the temples in Rome which needed it,[3] but that he was careful not to efface the names of the original founders, nor to substitute his own as the restorer of their work. He also stopped the proceedings against all persons who had been long exposed to criminal prosecutions, and whose cases had never yet been decided—ordaining, that if the prosecutors were resolved to continue their suits, they should themselves be liable, if the accused were acquitted, to suffer the same punishment which he would have undergone had he been found guilty. Above all, this year is mentioned as the period in which most of the disorders and abuses introduced in the course of the civil wars[4] were corrected or removed. Three of the most flagrant of these are particularly noticed.[5] The unsettled state of the times had introduced the practice of wearing arms for self-defence even in the streets and neighbourhood of Rome; and whole bands of ruffians, pretending to be armed only for their own protection, carried on their outrages with impunity. These were suppressed by a vigorous exertion of military force. By a similar system of violence, travellers of all descriptions were continually kidnapped on the roads,[6] and carried off to private

System of kidnapping.

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. liii. p. 496.

[2] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 32. "*Loca in urbe publica Juris ambigui possessoribus adjudicavit.*"

[3] Livy, lib. iv. c. 20. "*Augustum Cæsarem, Templorum omnium conditorem aut restitutorem.*" Dion Cassius, lib. liii. p. 497.

[4] Dion Cassius, ibid.

[5] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 32.

[6] See the story of Atilius, given in the account of the Proscription under the Triumvirate, in the first part of our Life of Augustus, p. 324.

B.C. 28. workhouses, where they were confined as slaves, and treated with the most excessive cruelty; but this evil was remedied by submitting all these workhouses to a vigorous search, and delivering all who were unlawfully detained in them. A third mischief was the formation of a vast number of societies or clubs,[1] one of the worst aggravations of the miseries of revolutions. These professed to resemble the old companies belonging to the several trades in Rome; but they were in reality mere combinations for the purposes of corruption or violence; and it was therefore a general benefit when Augustus dissolved all associations except those that were ancient and agreeable to law. When these salutary measures had won the favour of all classes of people, Augustus continued himself and Agrippa in the consulship for the following year, and then proceeded to execute the trick on which he designed to found the permanent establishment of his government.

It is said by Dion Cassius,[2] that several of the senators had been prepared beforehand for the scene which was to take place, and these would not fail to suggest to the other members the behaviour which they were wished to adopt. Augustus then came to the Senate, and read a speech, composed for the occasion, in which he expressed his intention of resigning all his power, and restoring the old constitution of the commonwealth. We may suppose that such a declaration was heard by the majority with extreme surprise; many at once perceived its insincerity; but there were others, we are told, who, dreading above all things the restoration of the republic,[3] were led by their fears to suspect that Augustus was in earnest; and these joined most zealously with the senators who were already in the secret, in deprecating a resignation, which they said would be fatal to the empire. The senators who most regretted their ancient independence, joined perhaps the more eagerly in the general cry, lest they might betray their real feelings; and thus the proposal of Augustus was received exactly as he had hoped; and in consenting to be the despot of his country, he seemed to be only yielding to the national wish, and to accept a painful burden, which no other citizen but himself was able to bear. Yet, that he might not lay aside the mask altogether, he refused to undertake the administration of all the provinces; and selected only those which were considered as requiring the most vigilant superintendence, and in which the

He offers to resign the Government, B.C. 27.

But is prevailed upon to retain it.

[1] Similar societies were frequent in Greece, and are described by Thucydides as the ready instruments of violence, and particularly of assassination in all political disturbances. Their object was to support their members when engaged in any civil or criminal causes in the courts of law, and to further their election when canvassing for any public office. See Thucydides, lib. viii. c. 54, 65, and his character of such societies, lib. iii. c. 82, in that admirable passage on the seditions of Greece, which is a lesson to every age and nation.

[2] Lib. liii. p. 497.

[3] Dion Cassius, p. 502.

presence of a military force was most necessary.[1] The portion of the empire which he thus consented immediately to govern, consisted of the whole of Spain, with the exception of Bætica, the limits of which correspond nearly with those of the modern province of Andalusia, the whole of Transalpine Gaul, Cœle-Syria, Phœnicia, Cilicia, and Egypt. The other provinces were to be governed, as formerly, by proconsuls, annually appointed by lot from among the senators: and even that part of the empire which was given up to Augustus, he declared that he would only retain for ten years, within which period he hoped that every necessity for such an extraordinary power would be at an end; and, he added, that he would gladly restore his provinces earlier to the Senate and the people, if circumstances should render it practicable.

B.C. 27. He divides the administration of the provinces with the Senate.

The monarchy was thus established, and the Senate laboured to invent yet additional honours to heap upon their new master. It was ordered that laurels should be planted at the gates of his residence on the Palatine Hill, and a wreath of oak should be for ever hung up over them[2]—the first denoting that he was ever victorious, and the oaken wreath, or civic crown, implying that he was the perpetual saviour of the lives of his fellow-citizens. It was debated, also, what title of distinction should be conferred upon him; and it was then that L. Munatius Plancus suggested the name of Augustus,[3] an epithet which was ordinarily applied to places set apart for religious purposes, and containing anything consecrated by augury; and which was now offered to the new sovereign, as signifying that a more than human sacredness and majesty existed in his person.

He receives additional honours, and the surname of Augustus.

In this manner, at the age of six and thirty, did Augustus in regular form commence his reign over the Roman empire. He retained his power during forty years, a period of general peace and prosperity, during which the wounds inflicted by the long continuance of the civil wars were gradually and effectually healed. To write the annals of such a reign, especially with our present scanty materials, would be but a meagre and unprofitable labour. We shall rather attempt to give a general picture of the whole of it, and without pretending to detail the events of every successive year, to present a view of the external and internal state of the empire—of its relations with foreign powers—of the nature of the imperial government—of the condition of Italy and the provinces—of the physical, moral, and intellectual state of the Roman world during this most memorable period. Some notice of the family of Augustus, and of the person likely to become his successor, may then properly precede our account of his death,

Sketch of the contents of the remainder of this Memoir.

[1] Dion Cassius, ibid. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 47. Strabo, lib. xvii. c. 25, edit. Siebenkees.

[2] Dion Cassius, lib. liii. p. 507. Valerius Maximus, lib. ii. c. 8.

[3] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 7. Festus, *in voce* "*Augustus*."

B.C. 27. and serve to connect the present portion of our task with the lives hereafter to be given of the emperors who followed him.

Of the foreign relations of Rome.

The extent of the Roman dominion in the reign of Augustus was still below the point which it afterwards attained under Claudius and Trajan. Britain was as yet unsubdued, and a large tract of country between the mountains of Hæmus and the Danube was not yet tributary to Rome. But the empire embraced within its limits the whole of the Mediterranean; its eastern front reached the Euphrates; the conquest of Egypt extended its southern boundary to the cataracts of the Nile; while in Europe it possessed Spain and Gaul, together with all that portion of modern Germany which is situated between the Alps and the Danube. It is of little importance, however, to ascertain the exact line which separated the Roman provinces from the possessions of independent barbarians. Even within the limits of the empire, the more recently conquered tribes might create occasional disturbance, and afford some employment for the Roman arms. But as far as the knowledge of geography then attainable enabled them to cast their eyes around the world, the Romans could discover only two nations capable of offering an effectual resistance to their power—the Parthians in Asia, and the Germans in Europe.

I. With Parthia. Origin of the Parthians.

The Parthians, a rude tribe of mountaineers from the eastern shores of the Caspian sea, wearing large loose caps upon their heads,[1] and armed with short javelins and bows of cane, marched in company with the neighbouring tribes of the Chorasmians and Sogdians, amidst that countless multitude of nations whom Xerxes led with him on his memorable expedition against Greece. Such is the earliest notice of the Parthian name which is to be found in history; the later fortunes of the nation, their subjection to the Greek Kings of Syria, the foundation of their monarchy by Arsaces, and its subsequent progress down to the invasion and defeat of the Roman army under Crassus, have been related in a former part of the present work.[2] We shall reserve to the close of the reign of Augustus our notice of the attack made by the Parthians on Syria and Asia Minor, when T. Labienus, a Roman exile, conducted their armies; their rapid successes and equally rapid reverses; the victory gained by P. Ventidius over Pacorus, the son of their King; the disastrous attempt of M. Antonius to invade their country, in revenge for the assistance whieh they had rendered to the party of Brutus and Cassius; and, lastly, the investiture of Tiridates by the Emperor Nero. Their empire, which had thus contended against Rome with more than equal fortune, now embraced the whole of Asia eastward of the

[1] Herodotus, *Polymnia*, c. 66, 64, 62, 61.
[2] See also "Greek Bactrian Kingdom," in 2d vol. of the Hist. of Greece of this series.

Euphrates,[1] to the most remote of those countries which were within the knowledge of the Romans. They numbered among their provinces the once mighty names of Media and Assyria;[2] and even Persia itself, the seat of the empire of the Great King, although it still had princes of its own, was no more than a vassal kingdom dependant on the sovereign power of Parthia.[3] There were two capitals of the monarchy, Ecbatana and Seleucia.[4] The first, the ancient metropolis of Media, founded by Deioces the earliest of the Median princes, was the summer residence of the King of Parthia. His winters were passed in the lower and milder country on the banks of the Tigris, where stood Seleucia, the former capital of the Macedonian kings of Syria. But Seleucia still retained a shadow of independence; its inhabitants, proud of their Greek extraction, language, and manners, would have associated ill with the guards and attendants of a barbarian sovereign; and, in order to save the city from the burden of their presence,[5] the court was accustomed to reside at the neighbouring village of Ctesiphon, which was situated at the distance of about three miles from Seleucia, on the opposite bank of the Tigris. In later times, when the citizens of Seleucia were become obnoxious to the Parthian government, from having betrayed an impatience of its dominion, Ctesiphon was studiously favoured as a rival city, which might be made a national capital of the empire;[6] and thus it gradually increased in wealth and greatness, while Seleucia as gradually declined, and went to ruin. B.C. 27.

Our knowledge of the internal state of Parthia is confined to one or two isolated facts. Strabo expressly omits all notice of the subject in his geographical work, referring his readers to the information concerning it which he had given in some of his other writings;[7] and as these are now lost, his reference to them only excites our curiosity in vain. We can only discern in Parthia the existence of two orders, of the nobility and priesthood;[8] each of which formed a distinct member of the great national council, and from either of them indifferently the kings might be selected. There was also that striking characteristic of the Sclavonic tribes, a powerful nobility, with the rest of the population consisting almost entirely of slaves. The internal state of Parthia.

[1] Strabo, lib. xi. c. 9, sec. 2, edit. Siebenkees.
[2] Ibid. lib. xvi. c. 1, sec. 19, edit. Siebenkees.
[3] Ibid. lib. xv. c. 3, sec. 3, 24.
[4] Ibid. lib. xvi. c. 1, sec 16.
[5] Ibid. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. vi. c. 42.
[6] Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* lib. vi. c. 26.
[7] Strabo, lib. xi. c. 9, sec. 3, edit. Siebenkees.
[8] Ibid. τῶν Παρθυαίων συνέδρίον φησι Ποσειδώνιος εἶναι διττὸν· τὸ μὲν, συγγενῶν, τὸ δὲ σοφῶν τὸ δὲ σοφῶν καὶ μάγων, ἐξ ὧν ἀμφοῖν τὲς βασιλεῖας καθίστησιν. We have translated συγγενῶν by the word "Nobility," supposing it to signify an extended clan or caste, all the members of which claimed a sort of affinity with one another, as being all derived originally from the same stock, perhaps the traditional founder of the nation. The Achæmenidæ in Persia seem to have been an instance of a smaller class on a more limited scale.

B.C. 27. In time of war the nobles attended the king's standard, each bringing with him a large body of his dependants. These were not freemen like the feudal vassals of Europe, but slaves;[1] they were, however, all carefully armed and trained as cavalry, for this constituted the whole strength of the Parthian armies; and the greatness of the chiefs was measured by the number of slaves which they brought into the field. The growth of an intermediate class of freemen between the nobles and their slaves, was checked by the laws of the country, which forbade any master to give a slave his liberty; so that the highest and lowest classes of society seemed destined to exist alone, and in perpetual contact with each other. Probably, indeed, the evils of slavery were softened by the interposition of such wide distinctions between the slave and the freeman; as they must, on the other hand, appear more intolerable where the line of division is merely arbitrary; and the slave sees around him a number of freemen who appear, neither in wealth, or birth, or condition, elevated above his own level. But when freedom was identified with riches and power, and high nobility, it seemed placed completely out of his reach, and the absence of it was so natural, as hardly to excite a murmur. Those revolts and mutinies, therefore, of which we have seen such bloody instances among the slaves in the Roman empire, appear to have been unknown in Parthia. None would have dared in Greece or Rome to enlist slaves into the army, much less to give them the same arms which were entrusted to free citizens; but the Parthian chiefs armed their dependants like themselves, and, instead of trembling at any symptoms which they might display of courage and activity, they trained them carefully in all martial exercises,[2] and beheld their proficiency with the same pleasure as that of their own children.

Transactions between them and the Romans.

At the period with which we are now engaged, a prince, whom the Greek and Roman writers call Phraates, was seated on the Parthian throne.[3] Having been chosen by his father as his successor, he is said to have secured an earlier enjoyment of the crown by murdering both him and thirty of his other sons; and, committing additional cruelties after his repulse of the Roman invasion under Antonius, he was driven from the throne by the indignation of his subjects, and a successor, named Tiridates, was appointed in his room. After some time, Phraates, by the aid of some of the rude Scythian tribes which bordered upon Parthia, recovered his kingdom, and drove his competitor into exile in his turn. Tiridates fled into the dominions of Rome, carrying with him the youngest son of Phraates,

[1] Justin, lib. xli. c. 2. This account of the Parthians seems to be copied from some trustworthy authority, and is consistent and sensible.

[2] Justin, lib. xli. c. 2. He says that the army which repulsed Antonius, consisted of fifty thousand cavalry; in which number there were only four hundred freemen, all Nobles; the rest was made up entirely of slaves.

[3] Justin, lib. xlii. c. 5.

whom he had contrived to get in his power; and offering this young prince as a hostage to Augustus, he requested his assistance to restore him to his throne, promising him to extend the influence of Rome over Parthia, if he were reinstated by Roman aid. Phraates, on the other hand, solicited Augustus to release his son, and to give up Tiridates as a rebel.[1] Augustus, more disposed to consolidate than to extend his empire, sent back the son of Phraates, and refused to assist the attempts of Tiridates, while at the same time he allowed him to live quietly in the Roman dominions. Phraates, thus finding that he had nothing to fear from Rome, and still suspecting danger from his own subjects, resolved to commit four of his sons to the care of Augustus, partly as hostages, and partly, we are told, to prevent them from being raised to the throne in his place,[2] knowing that the Parthians would set up no competitor against him, unless he were of the royal stock of the Arsacidæ. Augustus received the Parthian princes, and treated them with the greatest kindness, bringing them up in the customs of the Romans, and instructing them in the arts and superior knowledge of Europe: he availed himself also of his friendly connection with Phraates to procure from him the restoration of all the Roman standards and prisoners which had been taken in the expeditions of Crassus and Antonius.[3] This supposed reparation of the greatest disasters sustained for many years by the Roman arms, was especially grateful to Augustus; and there is no foreign transaction of his reign on which the panegyrists of those times have dwelt with greater complacency. B.C. 27.

II. Relation of Rome with the Germans. Progress of the Roman conquests in Illyricum.

Nearly a century had now elapsed since the invasion of Italy by the Cimbri and Teutones; and, notwithstanding the final destruction of the invaders, the Romans could not forget that several consular armies had been overthrown before Marius had been able to stem the torrent. When Cæsar first took possession of his government in Gaul, he found that the Gauls regarded the Germans with the greatest terror, as a people far more warlike than themselves; and although he destroyed the army of Ariovistus, and made a short expedition beyond the Rhine, yet the conquest of Gaul afforded him sufficient employment, and the Roman arms had as yet made no serious impression upon Germany. During the thirteen years which elapsed between the death of Cæsar and the battle of Actium, we read of a second expedition made by the Romans beyond the Rhine in the year B.C. 37, under the command of M. Agrippa;[4] but this had probably no other object than to chastise some of the German tribes, who had assisted the Gauls in a fruitless attempt to recover their independence. A more regular hostility seems to have been

[1] Justin, lib. xlii. c. 5.
[2] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. ii. c. 1, 2. Strabo, lib. xvi. c. 1, sec. 28.
[3] Strabo, and Justin, *locis citatis*. Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxxxix.
[4] Dion Cassius, lib. xlviii. p. 389. edit. Leunclavii.

B.C. 37. carried on against those numerous tribes who were included under the general name of Illyrians,[1] who occupied the whole country between the Alps and the Danube, together with the whole of the eastern side of the Adriatic, extending southwards to the very confines of Greece. Some parts of this extensive tract had indeed been conquered by the Romans at a much earlier period: a king in the most southern extremity of it, had taken part with Perseus in the last struggle made by the Macedonian monarchy, and had paid for his offence by the forfeiture of his dominions; whilst the Dalmatians, who were thus brought into contact with the Roman frontier, were attacked twelve years afterwards, merely in order to find some employment for the Roman arms.[2] Accordingly, several victories were gained over them, which were the occasion of a triumph to several Roman generals; and the bounds of the Roman provinces of Illyricum were gradually extended. Yet the Dalmatians were persevering enemies; even in the civil war between Pompey and Cæsar they inflicted a signal defeat on Cæsar's officer, the notorious A. Gabinius; and, after the establishment of Cæsar's power, we find P. Vatinius, the successor of Gabinius, complaining, in a letter to Cicero,[3] of the tedious nature of the contest against them, and of the injustice of Cæsar, who seemed to expect that he should go through the endless labour of conquering a whole people before he would reward him with the honour of a triumph. The triumvirs, however, were more indulgent than Cæsar, for Vatinius obtained his triumph, through their favour, in the year after the proscription,[4] although the Dalmatians were still unconquered; and only three years afterwards, C. Asinius Pollio obtained another triumph over the same people,[5] and Horace could speak of the "eternal renown" which "the laurel of his



]Horace.—*From an antique Beryl in the collection of Lord Grey, (Worlidge).*]

[1] Cluverius, *Vindelica et Noricum*, c. 1, forming an Appendix to his *Germania Antiqua*. To the authorities there quoted, may be added Appian, *Illyrica*, c. 6.
[2] Polybius, lib. xxxii. c. 19.
[3] *Epist. ad Familiares*, lib. v. epist. x.
[4] *Fasti Consulares et Triumphi, a* Sigonio *editi.*
[5] Ibid. *et* Horace, *Carm.* lib. ii.—

Cui laurus æternos honores
Dalmatico peperit triumpho.

Dalmatian triumph had won for him." Again the contest was renewed by Augustus himself, who only four years years after the victories of Pollio, engaged personally in the Illyrian war; and is said to have been wounded in an attack upon one of the fortresses of Dalmatia.[1] Under his command Pannonia was invaded and conquered; and as the Roman arms continued to advance towards the Danube, the countries bordering on the Adriatic appear to have been at last more effectually subdued; and victories became less frequent in Dalmatia and Liburnia when they began to be won on the frontiers of Vindelicia and Noricum. After Augustus was established in the full possession of the empire, his sons-in-law, Tiberius Nero and Claudius Drusus, carried the Roman conquests into Rhætia;[2] and whatever occasional disturbances might still arise within that limit, the Danube was now regarded as the frontier of the empire, at least along the whole of its course through Germany. B.C. 27.

Expedition of Drusus and Tib. Nero beyond the Rhine.

While the Romans were thus extending their conquests from the Alps to the Danube, they attempted to penetrate in another quarter into the very heart of Germany, and to advance their frontier from the Rhine to the Elbe. Claudius Drusus was first employed in this service, and afterwards his elder brother, Tiberius Nero. In the course of these wars more than fifty Roman fortresses were built on the banks of the Rhine,[3] many of which were the first germ of towns still existing; and amongst these are to be numbered Mentz, Bingen, Coblentz, Andernach, and Bonn. A fleet also co-operated with the army, sailing round from the ports of Gaul to the mouth of the Elbe; and the country was so far overrun, that Drusus had established military posts along the coast of that river, as well as of the Weser. Had these successes been unchecked, the Romans would have permanently occupied the greatest part of Germany; the Latin language and the manners of Italy might have prevailed as entirely over the language and manners of the Germans, as they did over these of the Gauls and the Spaniards; whilst the Teutonic tribes, pressed by the Romans on the Elbe, and by the Sclavonic nations on the Oder and the Vistula, would have been either gradually overpowered and lost, or at any rate would never have been able to spread that regenerating influence, over the best portion of Europe, to which the excellence of our modern institutions may in great measure be referred. If this be so, the victory of Arminius deserves to be reckoned among those signal deliverances which have affected for centuries the happiness of mankind; and we may regard the destruction of Quintilius Varus, and his three legions, on the banks of the Lippe, as second only in the benefits derived from it

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlix. p. 412. Florus, lib. iv. c. 12. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 20.
[2] Livy, *Epitome*, lib. cxxxvi. Florus, lib. iv. c. 12. Suetonius, *in Tiberia*, c. 9.
[3] Florus, lib. iv. c. 12.

B.C. 9. to the victories of Charles Martel at Tours, over the invading host of the Mohammedans.

It was in the year B.C. 9 that M. Claudius Drusus died in Germany;[1] and his brother, Tiberius Nero, was appointed to succeed him in his command. Tiberius is said to have conducted the war with extraordinary success—to have overrun again the whole country between the Rhine and the Elbe—and to have reduced it almost to the condition of a Roman province. But when he returned to Rome to enjoy a triumph, and to receive the consulship, the effects of his victories began to wear away; and the Germans soon renewed the contest. Ten years afterwards, when Tiberius had been adopted by Augustus as his son,[2] he repaired for the second time to Germany, and employed two summers in retracing the ground of his former conquests, and again in terrifying rather than subduing the Germans into submission. On this occasion, too, the Roman fleet co-operated with the army, and again sailed round to the mouth of the Elbe, and advanced some way up the river.[3] A succession of such campaigns must have produced a permanent effect; and the Germans would have been conquered as completely as the Gauls; for the Gauls had maintained an eight years' struggle against Cæsar, and none of their efforts had been so formidable as the last, when Vercingetorix had roused all the force of his country to contend with the Romans at Alesia. But as Tiberius was on the point of commencing his third campaign, a general revolt of all the Pannonian and Dalmatian tribes interrupted his career, and gave at this most critical moment a breathing time to Germany.[4] The main force of the empire was engaged between the Danube and the Alps; and the recent conquests of Tiberius between the Rhine and the Elbe were committed to the charge of P. Quintilius Varus, with an army of three legions. Varus had been already entrusted with the government of Syria;[5] and in that station had made himself known by his exactions, and was said to have transferred to himself the riches of the province. In his command in Germany he seemed to consider himself again in Syria; he introduced the Roman jurisdiction into the conquered territories, and irritated the rude minds of the barbarians, by subjecting them to a discipline the most alien from their habits and character. But it is said that, in order to lull him into a false security, the German chiefs pretended to receive with gratitude the institutions he was introducing among them. They concerted quarrels amongst themselves, and solicited the arbitration of Varus to decide them; professing to admire the superior knowledge of the Romans, which taught them to settle their differences by the rules

P. Quintilius Varus commands the Roman army in Germany.

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 121.
[2] Ibid. c. 126.
[3] Ibid. c. 129.
[4] Ibid. c. 133.
[5] Tacitus, *Histor. Natural.* lib. v. c. 9. Velleius Paterculus, c. 142. Dion Cassius, lib. lvi. p. 582.

of equity instead of by the sword. Varus, by constitution and habit, B.C. 9. possessed little of the activity of a soldier; the imaginary dignity of his situation, as the lawgiver and instructor of Germany, flattered at once his vanity and his indolence; and the licentious and rapacious passions which the Roman magistrates were so often accustomed to indulge in the provinces, began now also to look for gratification. Those profligacies which Varus might have committed in safety amidst the general relaxation of morals in Syria, were considered as the most intolerable outrages by the severe chastity of the Germans, who looked upon adultery with abhorrence, and regarded their wives as the chosen partners of all the dangers and labours of their lives. It is likely that the Romans, believing themselves securely established in the dominion of the country, began to offer, without restraint, those insults to the wives and daughters of their subjects for which the armies of southern climates have ever been infamous, and which, in ancient days, from the low standard of morals everywhere existing, were committed with peculiar indifference.

Conspiracy of Arminius, or Herman.

In this state of things, the plan of surprising and cutting off the whole Roman army is said to have been first conceived by a young German chief, whose name the Roman writers have corrupted into Arminius, but to whom we may more properly give his true appellation of Herman. He had served in the late campaigns amongst the auxiliaries of Rome;[1] and had been admitted not only to the privilege of Roman citizenship, but also to the rank of the equestrian order. He now concerted his measures with his countrymen with the utmost secrecy; while, at the same time, he did everything in his power to increase the confidence of Varus, and to lead him into the snare which he was preparing. The Roman general had been persuaded to weaken his forces by sending detachments into various parts of the country, at the request of the German chiefs themselves, in order, as they said, to maintain tranquillity, and to secure the safe arrival of his convoys of provisions;[2] and, on a stated day, the insurrection broke out at a point most remote from his head-quarters; and he received intelligence that the people of the country had risen and massacred the troops which they had asked him to send among them. Upon this he instantly put his army in motion to chastise the insurgents; while Herman, and the other chiefs of the conspiracy, still professed the most entire attachment to Rome, and promised to join him with their own forces at a certain point on his line of march, that they might assist him in putting down the rebellion. Varus, we are told, had been previously warned of the treachery of Herman by another German chief, whom the Romans called Segestes.[3] Herman had married the daughter of this chief

[1] Velleius Paterculus, c. 143.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. lvi. p. 583.
[3] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. i. c. 55. Velleius Paterculus, c. 143.

B.C. 9. against his wishes, and this private injury, added to his own attachment to the Romans, made Segestes disposed to save them from the destruction with which they were threatened. When he found that all his warnings had been slighted, he addressed Varus immediately before he commenced his march, and while Herman and the other conspirators were yet in the Roman camp; and implored him that he would at once arrest Herman, himself, and all the other German chiefs who were present, as the only means of defeating their treachery. But Varus was obstinate in his incredulity; and Herman and his associates were allowed to depart, and put themselves at the head of their forces.

Varus sets out with his army from his camp.

The Roman army was impeded by an immense train of waggons laden with their baggage, and by a crowd of women and children belonging to the soldiers, who were permitted to follow the march, as the general would not allow himself to apprehend any danger. The way ran through an extensive forest, called by the Romans the Forest of Teutoburg,[1] the modern Hippische Wald, which spreads over a considerable tract of country between the Lippe and the Ems. In the intervals, between the woods, the ground was broken and boggy; and the Romans had to undergo the labour of forming for themselves a practicable road, by clearing away the trees, and constructing a sort of causeway through the worst parts of the morasses. When they were already wearied by their exertions, and perfectly unprepared for any attack, the troops of Herman and his associates, who were to join them at this place, suddenly appeared; and, rushing out from the woods on every side assailed them with a heavy discharge of their missile weapons. The Romans, encumbered by their heavy baggage, and by the nature of the ground, were unable to form in any regular order to repel the enemy; they thus sustained a heavy loss without being able to retaliate; and having made little or no progress in their march, they encamped for the night on one of the most open and level spots that they could find amidst the forest. Here they destroyed or abandoned a great part of their heavy baggage, and the next morning again renewed their march. But they still had to contend with the same natural difficulties of woods and bogs; and while their own numbers were decreasing every hour, the confidence of success was swelling the force of the Germans; and many, who had at first dreaded to take any part in the conspiracy, came now to share in the anticipated spoils of the Roman army. It is said too, that the weather was exceedingly tempestuous; and that violent squalls of wind and rain impeded the movements of the Romans, and so drenched their clothing and their wooden shields, that they could not stir themselves, or wield their arms. The result was the total

He is surprised on his march by the Germans,

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. lvi. p. 583, *et seq.*

destruction of the Roman army. Varus himself, and his principal officers, most of them having been already wounded, fell upon their own swords, that they might not be taken alive by the enemy;[1] and the wreck of his army, having attempted in vain to secure themselves at the approach of night by forming a camp, and to shelter themselves behind the ditch and rampart, were persuaded by one of their surviving commanders to lay down their arms, and to try the mercy of the conqueror. But there is little humanity to be expected from barbarians when they feel that the moment is arrived for taking vengeance for a long series of insults and injuries. The military tribunes and principal centurions among the prisoners were

B.C. 9. His army destroyed, and he kills himself.



[A Roman Centurion —*Bardon's Costumes.*]

slaughtered by the Germans as victims to their gods, before some altars raised in the adjoining woods; the common soldiers were hanged upon the trees, or stifled in the morasses; and the heads of many of those who had perished were fastened to the trunks of the trees as a trophy of the victory. Above all, it is said, the Germans felt a peculiar delight in torturing those of their prisoners who had practised as lawyers in the courts established by Varus:[2] they put out their eyes, or cut off their hands; and one man, we are told, cut out the tongue of his victim, and then sewed up his mouth, exclaiming, "Now, viper, cease thy hissing!" In the defeat of the army, the standards of the legions, and two of the eagles were also taken, and these trophies were exhibited by Herman to his soldiers, and

[1] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. c. 61.

[2] Florus, lib. iv. c. 12.

B.C. 9. treated with every mark of contempt and mockery. The third eagle was saved by the standard-bearer, who pulled it off from its staff, and kept it concealed under his girdle; he then hid himself in a bog till the enemy had left the spot, and effected his escape in safety to the Rhine. In the meantime other detachments of the Roman army were attacked in different quarters; and although some succeeded in cutting their way through the assailants, and escaping into Gaul, yet the triumph of the Germans was everywhere complete;[1] the Romans fled beyond the Rhine, and all the conquests which they had made between the river and the Elbe were totally and irrecoverably lost.[2]

The Romans are driven out of Germany.

Consternation felt at Rome.

The accounts of the consternation produced at Rome by the defeat of Varus, describe it as so excessive, that unless they come from the Romans themselves, we should regard them as the mere exaggerations of national pride in the conquerors, exalting the effects of their own success. We are told that Augustus posted guards in different parts of Rome;[3] that he continued all the governors of the provinces in their several commands, as if the crisis required only officers of tried ability and experience; and that he followed a precedent which had been set during the invasion of Italy by the Cimbri, and repeated in the war with the Italian allies, of vowing solemn games to Jupiter, "If he would be pleased to bring the commonwealth into a better condition." Augustus himself is said to have felt the calamity so deeply, that for some months he let his beard and hair grow, and would strike his head from time to time against the doors of his apartments, exclaiming aloud, "Quintilius Varus! give me back my legions." Had the Germans, indeed, united their efforts with those of the Pannonians and Dalmatians, and formed any connected plan for the invasion of the Roman frontiers, the danger of an invasion of Italy might not have been imaginary. But the revolt of Pannonia had been already quelled,[4] and Tiberius Nero was at leisure to march with his veteran legions towards Germany, and to maintain the usual policy of Rome, by acting at once on the offensive, and carrying the war into the enemy's country. The Germans were unable to meet him in the field, and his caution secured him against every attempt at surprise; he accordingly overran and laid waste a district of considerable extent beyond the Rhine, and led back his army to winter quarters on the banks of that river,[5] pretending to have retrieved the honour of the Roman arms, and to have restored them to their accustomed superiority. But the frontier had receded to the Rhine, and Tiberius could not again advance it. Four years

Expedition of Tiberius Nero into Germany,

But the Roman frontier never advances beyond the Rhine.

[1] Velleius Paterculus, c. 145.

[2] *Hâc clade factum, ut Imperium quod in litore oceani non steterat in ripâ Rheni fluminis staret.* Florus, iv. c. 12.

[3] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 23.

[4] Velleius Paterculus, c. 141.

[5] Ibid. 1] 145.

afterwards he succeeded to the empire on the death of Augustus; B.C. 9. and his jealous temper made him by no means inclined to see any of his officers obtain the glory of effectually conquering Germany. The Rhine thus became the permanent limit of the Roman dominions, and that great river formed so natural a boundary line, that all attempts to penetrate beyond it were renounced as inexpedient; so that the Germans, remaining unconquered, had leisure to grow in power and numbers, till they crossed the Rhine in their turn as conquerors.

State of Britain.

We have said that Britain was not subdued by the Romans till a period later than the reign of Augustus. But although it was not yet become a province, yet the petty chiefs of the island were glad to propitiate the favour of Augustus,[1] by sending offerings to be presented to the temple of Jupiter in the Capitol, and by paying a small tax or duty on all the articles which they imported from Gaul, or exported thither in return. However, as these duties were probably only levied in the ports of Gaul, the payment of them did not necessarily imply a state of dependence, inasmuch as it was only a voluntary compliance with the terms on which the Roman government chose to allow them to trade with its subjects. But the eagerness of the Britons for the toys and trinkets which they procured from the Roman empire, made them purchase them without complaining of the duty; and Augustus found it cheaper and easier to levy this tax upon their fondness for finery, than to incur the expense of maintaining an army in the island in order to reduce them to the condition of tributaries.

Having thus dwelt somewhat longer than we are accustomed to do on the foreign relations of the empire, we shall now return within the frontiers, and proceed to describe the nature of the imperial government, and the general condition of the people, under its dominion.

Despotic tendency of the Roman Commonwealth.

Whoever has traced the character of the Roman constitution through the successive periods of the commonwealth, must have observed it in a number of points which are entirely congenial to despotism. In fact, the powers of the magistrates were to a high degree tyrannical; and were only counteracted by the mutual check which they severally found in the equally tyrannical powers of the rest. For instance, the authority of the consul seems in itself to have been absolute, although its exercise was restrained within the walls of Rome by the protecting power of the tribunes, and by the right of appeal to the people—abroad, by the particular provisions of the Porcian Law. Till that law was enacted, the consul, when without the city commanding the armies of the commonwealth, was altogether the master of the life of every citizen. Nor was this con-

[1] Strabo, lib. iv. c. 5, sec. 3, edit. Siebenkees.

B.C. 9. fined to points of military discipline; for we read that Q. Fabius Maximus threatened with death, a citizen who had been just elected to the consulship for the ensuing year, because he had maintained the validity of his own election which Fabius wished to overthrow,[1] and to recall the centuries to give their votes over again. The censors might degrade any individual from his rank in the commonwealth at their sole discretion: the tribunes, or even single members of their college, might stop the proceedings of every department of the government, and seem to have possessed an arbitrary power of committing any one to prison who opposed their measures. If from the ordinary magistrates of the commonwealth we turn to the Senate itself, we shall see that body, although properly only a single member of the legislature, assuming to itself the right of dispensing with the laws, or of annulling them altogether; and claiming and exercising an unlimited despotism, whenever it thought proper to declare the country in danger, and to give the consuls charge to provide for its safety. Above all, the Romans were familiarised to arbitrary power in the authority possessed by the members of the various special commissions which were from time to time appointed. The commission of ten senators, who were usually empowered to settle the state of a newly-conquered country at the close of a war, was accustomed indeed to act only in the provinces; but the commissioners for planting colonies, for superintending the distribution of national lands under an agrarian law, for providing for the supply of the Roman markets, or for instituting an inquiry into any alleged misdemeanours and malversations, exercised their power towards citizens, and seem to have enjoyed an ample discretion which might be moderated only by the fear of future impeachment at the expiration of their office. In later times, the practice of appointing extraordinary officers had become almost equivalent to the formation of a temporary monarchy. Twice had Pompey been invested with sovereign power over a large portion of the empire; first, when he was entrusted with the supreme direction of the war with the pirates, and again when he was sent to finish the long-contested struggle with Mithridates. On a third occasion, when he was named comptroller of the markets, allowed to appoint his lieutenants to act under him in the different provinces, and entrusted with the discretionary employment of a large sum of the public money, his power seemed to exceed by far the level of a citizen of a free commonwealth. When, therefore, that atrocious commission of three, for regulating and settling the affairs of the republic was instituted in the persons of Augustus, Antonius, and Lepidus, it was a measure not altogether unprecedented, and certainly analogous to the less absolute, but very extensive powers

[1] Livy, lib. xxiv. c. 9. *Quam T. Otacilius ferociter voceiferaretur atque obstreperet, Lictores ad eum accedere Consul jussit; et, quia in urbem non inierat, admonuit, cum securibus sibi fasces præferri.*

which had been often given to special commissioners under circumstances of less general disorder. And the imperial power of Augustus was only an enlarged special commission of the same nature. It was limited in its duration, as it was to expire at the end of ten years: it was conferred by the Senate on the most distinguished citizen in the commonwealth, for the avowed purpose of remedying the evils which had grown up during a period of unparalleled confusion. That it was in the highest degree arbitrary, was conformable to the general spirit of similar commissions which had been conferred by the Senate and people in former times; and in this manner the government was made gradually to slide into a monarchy, merely by a dexterous application and enlargement of precedents, which had occurred repeatedly through the successive periods of the duration of the commonwealth. B.C. 9.

Power of the Roman emperors.

The people have in every age tolerated a despotic power which has professed to derive itself from their appointment, and to be exercised in their names and for their benefit. Such was the power of the Roman emperors; which therefore differed most widely in its avowed principle from the monarchies of Asia, and from those also which have been established on its ruins among the nations of modern Europe. It is true that in the eastern provinces of the empire, the people, unacquainted with the forms of the Roman government, and regarding only the absolute authority with which the emperors were invested, early began to bestow on them the title of kings, and to look upon them in the same light as they had been accustomed to view the successors of Alexander. But in Italy the name of king, or sovereign lord, would have seemed a degradation which the Roman people could not endure; and the gross flattery which was offered to the Cæsars, was by no means characteristic of the new state of the commonwealth, but arose out of those strongly marked distinctions by which the aristocracy were separated from the bulk of the people. It is plain, from many passages in Cicero's letters, that the ordinary language of citizens of humble, or merely of inferior rank, when addressing the nobility, was in a tone of deference approaching almost to servility. Nay, even men of rank themselves, when writing to those who were still above them in power and dignity, used a style of compliment which strikes our ears as offensive; so that it was no sudden influx of servility, but the mere operation of the ordinary feelings of the people, which produced that style of flattery so observable in the writers of the Augustan age, as well as in the decrees of the Senate, and the speeches of its members. In process of time, as the imperial power became more firmly established, and as the families of the old aristocracy gradually dropped off, this servile language came to be addressed more exclusively to the emperors; and as the government continued to be wielded by a single hand, the people felt more and more that strong distinction

B.C. 9. between themselves and their ruler, which marks the relation of sovereign and subject, as opposed to that of citizens and their chief magistrate. Hence, in later times, the Roman government became a monarchy in the oriental and modern sense of the term, and its laws and titles were transferred with perfect fitness to the kingdoms of Italy, France, and Germany.

Extent of the imperial power.

Augustus possessed a power entirely despotic, by the mere union of the ordinary magistracies of the commonwealth in his person, with some few especial enlargements of their privileges and authority. He was invested with proconsular power in all the provinces in Italy, and even within the walls of Rome; and his authority in the provinces was to be paramount to that of the ordinary governors. In the same manner Pompey the Great had received proconsular power in all the provinces of the empire within fifty miles of the sea, when he was intrusted with the command of the war against the Cilician pirates; and still more recently, when Cicero proposed to confer on C. Cassius the conduct of the war against P. Dolabella, the tenour of his commission allowed him to enter any province in pursuit of the enemy, and gave him superior power in that province to the magistrate by whom it was actually governed. The authority of the proconsuls in the provinces was entirely absolute under the old constitution; as they exercised supreme control over the military force, over the revenue, and over the criminal and civil jurisdiction; and by extending this power to Italy, and even to Rome itself, a virtual sovereignty was in fact bestowed. Whatever might be wanting in the proconsular power, was at all events given in the title of Imperator, which was prefixed to the name of Augustus as it had been to that of his uncle, and seems to have been equivalent to the name of "General of the Forces of the Commonwealth." By attaching a perpetual military command to the person of the emperor, and by allowing him to hold it in Rome as well as in the provinces, all the people were in effect subjected to martial law; and it is well known that the power exercised by Roman generals over their soldiers was ever most arbitrary; insomuch that, according to Cicero, "the Roman people in war obeyed their general as a king."[1]

Power of the proconsul.

Yet further, in addition to the powers of proconsul and imperator, Augustus enjoyed also all the authority formerly possessed by the censors. He would not, indeed, take the name of censor; but he received a title and power similar to that which had been bestowed on his uncle; and which Suetonius calls, "*Morum Legumque regimen*," the control of the manners and laws of the commonwealth. With regard to his control of the laws, it must be understood probably to regard those laws which concerned the objects of the censor's jurisdiction, such as the Sumptuary Laws, and those which related

[1] *Noster Populus* * * *in bello sic paret ut Regi.* Cicero, *de Republicâ*, lib. i. c. 40.

to marriage. His control of manners rendered him absolute master of the rank of every citizen; as it enabled him to choose members into the Senate, and to degrade them; to raise any plebeian to the equestrian order, or again to deprive him even of the political privileges of a simple citizen.[1] There was hardly any point of private life which did not fall under the censor's cognizance. Not only might a man be questioned for any intemperance in eating and drinking, or for any scandalous irregularities of conduct; but any excessive sumptuousness in his establishment, and even, it is said, any neglect of his property, such as omitting to cultivate or improve his land,[2] subjected him often to the loss of the most distinguished rights of citizenship. For this reason, according to tradition, the duration of the censor's power had been reduced from five year's to eighteen months;[3] as so great an authority could not be safely intrusted to any one for more than a very limited period; and now that it was conferred on Augustus for life, it was by no means one of the least of his imperial prerogatives. To the powers of proconsul, imperator, and censor, was added, moreover, that of tribune. By this, Augustus was not only enabled to stop at once, by his negative, any measure of the Senate or people which he disapproved, but his person was rendered sacred; and any violation of its sacredness, either in word or deed, exposed the offender to a complete religious and political excommunication, in which state he was devoted to some particular god,[4] as if peculiarly marked out for his vengeance, and might be killed by any man with impunity. Last of all must be mentioned the exemption from the authority of the laws, which Dion Cassius tells us was bestowed on the Emperors.[5] According to his account, Augustus was rendered absolutely despotic, inasmuch as he might dispense with any part of the code at his pleasure; and this prerogative he instances as one of those few which were not borrowed from the usages of the old constitution. But it has been reasonably supposed, that the Latin expression, "*Legibus solutus*," which was applied to persons enjoying a dispensation from some particular laws, combined with the real exemption from all the laws which was possessed by the later Emperors, has misled Dion Cassius; and that the exemption was, in fact, less comprehensive than he imagined. A dispensing power had been long exercised by the Senate; and we find that it was one of the measures of the patriotic

B.C. 9.

Censor.

The Imperator tribune.

[1] The "*Ærarii*," or persons expelled by the censors from their tribes, lost their right of voting in the *Comitia*, because it could only be exercised by those who belonged to some one of the thirty-five tribes. Their private rights, and personal liberties were not at all affected by their degradation. See Niebuhr's *Romische Geschichte*, vol. i. p. 384, &c., and vol. ii. p. 179.

[2] Aulus Gellius, lib. iv. c. 12.

[3] Livy, lib. iv.

[4] Festus, *in Vocibus* "*Sacer*," *et* "*Sacratæ Leges*."

[5] Lib. liii. p. 509.

B.C. 9. tribune, C. Cornelius,[1] in the year B.C. 67, to remove the abuses with which it was attended; and to enact that no dispensation should pass the Senate, or, according to the legal phrase, "that no one should be released from the laws, *Legibus solveretur*," unless two



[Temple of Jupiter Tonans.—*Overbeke, les Restes de l' Ancienne Rome.*]

hundred senators were present. Still later, in the year B.C. 44, M. Brutus had been dispensed by the Senate from continually residing in Rome during his prætorship, as required by law; and he is accordingly said by Cicero to have been "*Legibus solutus.*"[2] We may conclude that the same exemption, from a compliance with the injunctions of many of the old laws, was also granted to Augustus; and, indeed, if the fragments of what is called the *Lex Regia* are to be considered as genuine and authentic, it is evident that the exemption was not universal.[3]

Right of appeal to the People.

It becomes here a natural question to ask, whether the right of appeal to the people was not altogether extinct; and how the provisions of the Porcian Law were evaded, which made it highly criminal to scourge or put to death any Roman citizen? With regard to the first, we will endeavour to give the reader some notion of its nature, and of the cases in which it was allowed. In the earliest

[1] Asconius, *Argumentum in Ciceronis Orationem pro C. Cornelio primam.*

[2] Cicero, *Philippic.* ii. c. 13.

[3] *Utique quibus legibus, plebeive scitis scriptum fuit ne Divus Augustus, * * * * teneretur, iis, &c. Imperator Cæsar Vespasianus solutus sit.* *Apud* Heineccium, *Antiq. Roman. Syntagma*, lib. i. tit. ii. c. 67, edit. Haubold.

times it was no more than a part of the wild habits of savage life; B.C. 9.
where government, being ill understood, and therefore apt to be rudely exercised, each man might appeal from the authority of the chief to that of the society at large—the power of capital punishment, as distinguished from the taking away life in a quarrel or in anger, being one of the rights which the community did not choose to intrust out of its own hands. The appeal to the people was the first simple form in which a man was tried by his country; and before the establishment of independent judges, it was the only security against the arbitrary sentence of the magistrate. But as such an appeal could not be made on every occasion, the people deputed their power to judges specially appointed by themselves,[1] (as in the case of the *Quæstores Parricidii*,) or chosen at the beginning of every year by the prætors out of the whole order of citizens, sometimes out of the Senate alone, and sometimes from the Senate, the equites, and the richer plebeians, according to the various enactments successively made on this subject. When an independent judicial power was established, the right of appeal to the people at large could only be needless or mischievous, and therefore it gradually fell into disuse; nay, we doubt whether there was legally any appeal from the sentence of the select judges who sat with the prætor in criminal causes, for Cicero attacks Antonius for proposing a law by which criminals condemned for rioting or treason by the ordinary tribunals were allowed to appeal to the people;[2] and he complains that such an appeal was equivalent to the total subversion of all justice. Nor do we remember any instance in the later times of the commonwealth of a trial removed by appeal from the regular courts to the popular assembly, except in the case of C. Rabirius, B.C. 63; and Rabirius appealed not from the decision of the prætor and the select judges, but from that of two special commissioners, appointed by the prætor instead of the people, contrary to the usual practice, to try the case by themselves. The right of appeal was thus become obsolete, if it were not actually done away; but at any rate it was rendered useless by the military power which the title of *Imperator* conferred on Augustus. It was an old maxim of the Roman law, that from the sentence of a general in the actual service there was no appeal;[3] and in this consisted the plenitude of his

[1] Pomponius, *de Orig. Juris*, quoted by Creuzer, *Romische Antiquitaten*, p. 165. and Heineccius, lib. iv. tit. 18, c. 11, edit. Haubold. See also the expression of Cicero, *de Legibus*, lib. iii. c. 12. *Magistratibus judicia dantur, ut esset Populi potestas, ad quam provocaretur.*

[2] *Philippic.* i. c. 9. *Altera promulgata Lex est, ut et de Vi et de Majestate damnati ad Populum provocent, si velint.*

[3] Cicero, *de Legibus*, lib. iii. c. 3, 4. *Militæ, ab eo, qui imperabit, provocatio ne esto; quodque is, qui bellum geret, imperassit, jus ratumque esto.* Although these words are a part of the code devised by Cicero for his Utopian commonwealth; yet this code is confessedly borrowed almost entirely from that which actually existed at Rome.—*Omnium Magistratuum descriptio; sed ea pæne nostræ civitatis*, c. 5.

B.C. 9. power, for even if he might be questioned afterwards for an abuse of it, yet at the time there was nothing to check or limit it, and there is a wide difference between present protection and contingent future redress. As Augustus, therefore, was invested with military power both within and without the city, the right of appeal from his authority became extinct of course. Still, however, Roman citizens in the provinces, when not actually serving in the army, might appeal to Rome from the sentence of a provincial governor; but Augustus himself, if we may believe Dion Cassius,[1] was constituted judge of all such appeals; and we know, from a much higher authority,[2] that in the reign of Claudius they were regularly made to the Emperor, without any allusion to the old constitutional power of the people.

Of the Porcian Laws, and the nature of capital punishments under Augustus.

A remarkable obscurity hangs over the origin of the Porcian Laws, for it is not known with certainty by whom they were proposed, nor at what period they were enacted. It appears from Cicero that they were three in number, brought forward by three different members of the Porcian family;[3] but whether of the family of Porcius Læca, or Porcius Cato, is still undecided. However, it is sufficiently known that these laws confirmed the right of appeal to the people, and forbade, under heavy penalties, that any Roman citizen should be scourged or put to death, of whatever crime he might have been guilty, if we except, perhaps, the wilful murder of a parent.[4] Thus the greatest punishment that could be legally inflicted at Rome was simple banishment, till Cæsar, in his dictatorship, added the forfeiture of all property in the case of those convicted of wilful murder, and of the half of it for all other offences.[5] Nay, even the punishment denounced by the Pedian law, passed B.C. 43, against the assassins of Cæsar, was no more than banishment from Italy—so completely were Roman citizens exempted by law from suffering the penalty of death. It is generally thought, however, that the provisions of the Porcian law did not extend to citizens actually serving in the army; but this must be understood with considerable limitations. The old ignominious method of punishment, by which criminals were first scourged with rods, and then beheaded with an axe,[6] could never be inflicted upon a Roman citizen under any circumstances. This is plain from the fact mentioned by Sallust,[7] that Q. Metellus Numidicus, in the Jugurthine war, punished one of his officers in this manner, because, adds the historian, the offender was a Latin citizen. That is, he could not have so punished him had he

[1] Lib. li. p. 457.
[2] *Acts of the Apostles*, ch. xxv., ver. 10, 11.
[3] *De Republicâ*, lib. ii. c. 31.
[4] See Cicero, *pro Roscio Amerino*, c. 25.
[5] Suetonius, *in Cæsare*, c. 42.
[6] *Virgis cæsi et securi percussi.*
[7] *De Bello Jugurthino*, c. 69.

been a Roman. We believe, further, that a Roman soldier could not even be flogged on actual service; and we are inclined to think that this was one of the provisions of the Sempronian law, *De Militum Commodis*, carried by C. Gracchus in his tribuneship; for we are told by Plutarch,[1] that M. Livius Drusus, one of his colleagues, in order to outdo him in proposing popular measures, brought forward a law to exempt the Latins from the liability to be flogged when serving as soldiers; and although the passage in Sallust, already quoted, shows either that this law was soon after repealed, or that Plutarch, as we rather believe, has assigned to it a wrong date, and ascribed to it a wrong author; yet its being proposed at all clearly proves that the Roman soldiers already enjoyed a similar exemption, as no one would ever have thought of granting to the Latins immunities which were not possessed by the Romans themselves. Nor is our position refuted by the instances recorded in later times, of soldiers suffering death by running the gauntlet;[2] for this was a punishment inflicted not by the general's lictors, but by the hands of the soldiers themselves, and was expressive of the feelings of the army at large towards those who were guilty of cowardice, or of any other flagrant breach of military duty. In cases of mutiny, or any other crime which required an instant and terrifying example, a general would have ordered the offenders to be executed, there being no appeal at the time from his sentence; and, if ever he was afterwards questioned for his conduct, he would have urged the plea of necessity or public expediency, which was ever admitted as an excuse for any departure from the ordinary laws. And thus only can we reconcile the extreme bloodiness of the proscriptions and occasional executions of the Romans, with the excessive mildness, or rather weakness, of the letter of the constitution. When soon after Cæsar's death a disorderly multitude used to assemble round his altar in the Forum, and committed several outrages on the property of different citizens, P. Dolabella, who was then consul, attacked the rioters in a summary manner, and put numbers of them to death without any sort of trial, crucifying the slaves, and throwing the free citizens from the Tarpeian rock. This behaviour was applauded by Cicero as an act of salutary vigour;[3] yet had the meanest of the citizens thus executed been brought to a legal trial under the severest of the existing statutes for the punishment of riots, he could have received no heavier sentence than that of exile.

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Military power of punishment.

A system like this, in which the laws were so frequently superseded by acts of summary violence, was admirably calculated to serve the purposes of despotism. The Porcian Laws existed unre-

[1] *In C. Graccho*. c. 9.

[2] *Auctor de Bell. Hispaniensi apud Cæsaris Commentar*, c. 27. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 103. *Fuste cæsi.*

[3] *Philippic.* i. c. 12. *Epist. ad Atticum*, lib. xiv., epist. xv., xvi., xvii.

B.C. 9. pealed, but equally unregarded whenever it suited the interest of the sovereign to violate them. How, indeed, could they be more signally violated by the emperors than they had been in innumerable instances under the old constitution; not only in the proscriptions, but in the suppression of less alarming disorders, in the executions ordered by the Senate after the death of the two Gracchi, in the punishment of the accomplices of Catiline, and in the severity which we have just noticed of P. Dolabella! So much respect was shown to the forms of the constitution, while its spirit was violated, that in the infliction of the punishment of death some pains were taken to deprive it of the appearance of an execution, and to give it the character of an irregular but necessary act of policy or vengeance — a sort of capital ostracism, in which the sufferer was treated more as an enemy than a criminal, and his life was taken without any accompanying circumstances of degradation.

Irregular exercise of legal power.

Hence a party of soldiers were so often employed as the ministers of death, instead of a regular executioner; and the sword, instead of the axe, was the weapon used—a distinction which continued to exist to a much later period; insomuch that when beheading by the sword was recognised as a legal punishment, still beheading by the axe was looked upon as degrading and illegal.[1] Hence the sufferers were so often allowed to choose their own mode of death, and were constantly permitted to be their own executioners. For all these acts, committed by the sovereign power on the alleged ground of public expediency, the practice of the old constitution furnished precedent and apology; and the Porcian law still availed to save Roman citizens from the rods and axe of the lictor, from those cruel and ignominious scourgings which were inflicted so often by the Roman magistrates in the provinces,[2] and sometimes as a punishment, and at other times as an instrument of torture, to extort a confession from a prisoner before his trial. In process of time, as was natural, the infliction of capital punishment grew to be considered as legal and regular; it began to assume the character of an execution; and as the government became more decidedly monarchical, the cruel and degrading punishments, so congenial to tyranny, were engrafted upon the law of the empire. But, for the period with which we are now engaged, it is important to observe how an excessive mildness in the laws defeats its own object, no less than excessive severity. Because the Roman constitution provided no adequate legal punishment for enormous crimes, men became reconciled to irregular inflictions of vengeance on the plea of necessity; and thus exemplified the danger of looking with indifference upon any departure from the written law, when necessity was as easily pleaded by

[1] Heineccius, *Antiquitat. Roman. Syntagma*, lib. iv. tit. 18, c. 10, edit. Haubold.

[2] *St. Matthew*, ch. xxvii., ver. 26. *Acts of the Apostles*, ch. xxii., ver. 24, 29.

their tyrants for the murder of Cicero, as for those of Saturninus, Cethegus, or Lentulus. B.C. 9.

Imperial prerogatives of war and peace.

Amongst the prerogatives possessed by Augustus, Dion Cassius mentions the right of making war or peace with whatever nation he thought proper.[1] This arose out of the proconsular power which had been conferred on him, and from the immediate command which he exercised in all the frontier provinces of the empire. Wherever the dominions of the commonwealth came in contact with any foreign nations, there the whole civil and military authority belonged to Augustus as proconsul; and if he possessed the power of making war or peace with the people who bordered upon his provinces, it was no more than had been commonly practised by the proconsuls of former times; nor could Augustus act with a less restrained discretion than his uncle had done in Gaul during the whole term of his command there, or than Crassus had exercised in his government of Syria, when he commenced his unprovoked attack upon the Parthian empire.

It is further stated by Dion Cassius, that Augustus was the absolute master of the revenue, and that he was enabled to levy money for the public service by his sole authority. And here, perhaps, we may fitly lay before the reader some notice of the pecuniary resources of the Roman empire, of the taxes paid by the people, and of the general administration of the treasury. In doing this, we shall frequently go back to the history of an earlier period; but the calm of the reign of Augustus allows us to turn our attention to many points connected with the internal state of Rome, which we have passed over amidst the press of wars and internal disturbances, through which our narrative has hitherto had to struggle. Once for all, however, we must remind the reader of the extreme difficulty of this part of our task, and request his indulgence for the faults or omissions which we fear he will not fail to discover. We must draw our facts from scattered and scanty sources; and it may often happen that some passage has escaped our notice, which, had we known it, might have taught us to qualify or to amend much that we had advanced. We have said this, indeed, nearly in the same words on a former occasion; but we deem it not superfluous to repeat it again, not only to disclaim for ourselves pretensions to a more perfect



[Mæcenas, Minister of Augustus.—*Visconti, from a Colossal Bust.*]

[1] Lib. liii. p. 508.

B.C. 9. knowledge than we possess, but to impress upon the reader the unsatisfactory nature of many of those disquisitions in which historians, endowed with more eloquence than industry, have permitted themselves to indulge. As the lessons of history are the most valuable part of that wisdom which concerns our earthly welfare, so it is most important that they should not be rashly offered, but that they be at once so full and so uncorrupted, as to furnish us with a trustworthy guide. And he who feels the deficiencies of his own performance may at least render some service to his readers if he shows them how far they may safely rely on him, and does not attempt to mislead them by assuming that tone of self-satisfied confidence which will always impose upon the mass of mankind, however much the wiser few may detect and despise it.

Of the Roman revenue.

The revenue of the Roman people, before their dominion embraced so many dependent provinces, arose chiefly out of three sources: 1st, a property tax,[1] levied directly upon every citizen, and proportioned to the amount of the property which he possessed;[2] 2dly, the rents or payments of whatever kind which were received from the national domains—using this last term in its most extensive sense, as including not only lands in cultivation, whether arable or pasture, but also forests, mines, and buildings; 3dly, the customs, including the duties levied at the different ports on all imported goods, and the tolls paid at all public ferries. Of these three, the property tax, or *tributum*, is said to have been discontinued after the conquest of Macedonia by L. Æmilius Paulus, in the year B.C. 169;[3] that is, the revenue which the State received thenceforward from its conquered provinces, enabled it to relieve its own citizens from all species of impost, which is ever most galling to the popular feeling.

Of the nature of the National Domains.

The second source of revenue, namely, the national domains, cannot be fully understood without touching upon a field of inquiry at once most interesting and most laborious; and which neither our limits nor our ability enable us fully to explore.[4] All lands conquered in war, surrendered

[1] *Tributum.*

[2] Livy, lib. i. c. 43.

[3] Cicero, *de Officiis*, lib. ii. c. 22.

[4] For the groundwork of what follows on the subject of the National Domains, the writer has great pleasure in acknowledging his obligations to the masterly work of Niebuhr; and particularly to the excellent chapter on the Nature of the Agrarian Laws, vol. ii. p. 349, *et seq.* He is indebted to Niebuhr also for his first acquaintance with the collection of writers, *De Re Agrariâ*, published by Goesius, at Amsterdam, in 1674, and which is so little known in England, that he has found no allusion to it in any English writer on the Roman History, whose works have fallen under his notice. Niebuhr's *Roman History* is one of those great works of genius which throw at once a blaze of light over subjects before obscure, and which, by the clearness and justness of the views which they communicate, make us full of surprise that the same discoveries had never been made before. Niebuhr carries some hypotheses perhaps too far, and in some of his opinions may be led away by a fondness for novelty; but these are faults which succeeding writers may easily correct, while they and the world in general derive perpetual benefit from the great excellencies of his work—its surprising knowledge, and the eminent ability with which detached notices of facts are brought together and made to

by the inhabitants, or ceded by treaty, became the property of the B.C. 9.
conquering people, who thus were not only the sovereign, but the landlord of the territories which they acquired. Sometimes this right was so far mitigated in practice, that the old inhabitants were allowed to retain their lands, as tenants, on payment of a rent to the conquering people as their landlord; but sometimes, also, it was exercised in its widest extent,—the old proprietors were expelled altogether, and the land was disposed of according to the pleasure of its new masters. In Grecian history there is an instance of the first of these methods of proceeding in the behaviour of the Athenians, after their conquest of Mitylene, in the Peloponnesian war. The territory of the Mitylenæans was divided into a certain number of lots, on each of which a certain rent was levied, and the former proprietors continued to occupy their estates as before, but in the character of tenants instead of landlords. On the other hand, when Ægina was conquered, the inhabitants were suffered to remain undisturbed for a time in their old homes; but on the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians thought proper to act upon their right of conquest more rigorously: they expelled the Æginetans accordingly, altogether, from the island, and divided the lands amongst a certain number of Athenian colonists, who became its inhabitants for several years, till they were, in their turn, driven out by the Lacædemonians, after the battle of Ægospotami. The Romans, in the same manner, made a difference in the treatment of the different nations whom they conquered; but in all cases they claimed a sovereignty over the soil; and in all cases, therefore, they derived from it a revenue. The peculiar mark of this sovereignty was the reservation of a right to a certain portion of the produce of the land, and this portion was generally the tenth or tithe. Even when the lands of a conquered country were restored, as it was expressed, to the old proprietors, (for by the act of conquest they were held to be instantly forfeited to the conquering people, and the right of the old inhabitants was immediately lost,) still the tithe of the produce was reserved. When they were not restored, they were either sold by the quæstors in lots of a certain size, or divided among a certain number of the citizens; or not being regularly disposed of by the government, were occupied by individuals without any particular title, as they severally happened to take possession; or, 4thly, were let on leases for terms of different length to farmers, who had the power of underletting them again either entire or in lots. In the second of these cases, and in that only, the full sovereignty of the land appears to have been granted together with the occupation or enjoyment of it. When a colony was planted in a conquered country,

illustrate each other, and the penetration with which he has discovered principles of civil and religious law amidst an apparent chaos of anomalous and unconnected particulars.

B.C. 9. Case of colonies planted.

and a division of lands made among the new settlers, according to the solemn forms transmitted through a long succession of ages from the priests of Etruria, then the State resigned all its rights, and the lots thus given to each colonist became, in the fullest sense of the word, his freehold.[1] But every other mode of alienation was made with a reservation of the State's sovereignty: a tenure, more or less favourable, was granted to the individual; but the government retained its right to the tithes of the produce, and its power of planting colonies at a future period in the domains over which it did not think proper to exercise at present its full authority. Now, as the whole territory of Rome, to speak generally, had been gained by conquest, the sovereignty of it was vested in the Roman people; and, with the exception of such portions as had been divided out into colonies, it was all subject to the payment of tithes. In process of time, the whole of Italy became exempted from this burden by the gradual division of every part of the public land amongst the inhabitants of its various colonies; and when the Italians successively acquired the rights of Roman citizens, all the land which had been given back after conquest to its old possessors,[2] as well as that which had been sold by the quæstors, assumed the character of the private property of Roman citizens, and thus was placed on a level with that

[1] In the collection of writers, *De Re Agrariâ*, to which we have before alluded, there is a very remarkable fragment, ascribed to Vegoia, and which is evidently translated from an Etruscan original of the highest antiquity. It is so curious that the reader may not be displeased to see a part of it here transcribed—"*Scias Mare ex Æthere remotum. Cum autem Juppiter Terram Hetruriæ sibi vindicavit, constituti jussitque metiri Campos, signarique Agros, sciens Hominum Avaritiam vel terrenam Cupidinem, Terminis omnia scita esse voluit, quos quandoque ob Avaritiam prope novissimi octavi Sæculi datos sibi Homines Dolo malo violabunt, contingentque atque movebunt. Sed qui contigerit moveritque Possessionem, promovendo suam, alterius minuendo, ob hoc Scelus damnabitur a Diis*," &c., p. 258.—How exactly does this agree with the very words of the Mosaic Law, that "cursed is he who removeth his neighbour's landmark."

[2] Hyginus says expressly, *Agri qui redditi sunt non obligantur Vectigalibus, quoniam scilicet prioribus Dominis redditi sunt.* But Cicero says as positively, that the conquered lands in Sicily, which had been restored to their old inhabitants, were regularly let by the censors; that is, the tithes which they paid, were regularly farmed, (Cicero, *in Verrem*, lib. iii. c. 6) And Aggenus Urbicus lays it down as a general rule, that in the provinces, *omnes etiam privati Agri Tributa atque Vectigalia persolvunt. Commentar. in Frontin.*, p. 47, edit. Goesii. We suppose, therefore, that so long as the Italians were foreigners to Rome, the lands given back to them were subject to the same burden as those which were restored to the States of Sicily. With regard to the lands sold by the quæstors, Niebuhr classes them with those divided amongst the settlers of a colony, and considers them as entirely freehold. *Romische Geschichte*, vol. ii. p. 379. It is with the utmost diffidence that we differ from so great an authority; but Hyginus says that the tenure of the *Agri Quæstorii* was the same with that of the other lands of the Roman people; and Siculus Flaccus gives it as a definition of "land belonging to the Roman people," that its revenue belongs to the treasury. Edit. Goesii, p. 2. However, as the lands sold by the quæstors were not very extensive, it is of the less consequence to ascertain minutely, whether it was a sale of the sovereignty, or only of the possession of the land for ever, subject to the payment of its tithes to theg overnment.

divided out amongst the settlers of a colony, and became altogether freehold. But in the provinces, all land, except that which belonged to any Roman colony, was subject to some payment to the government. In some instances a general land-tax was levied over the whole province, as a sort of fine paid by the inhabitants for the renewal of their term of possession, after their rights, as freehold proprietors, had been forfeited by the conquest of their country. But in other cases, where the province had been peaceably ceded or bequeathed to the Romans by its former sovereign, as in the instance of the province of Asia, the inhabitants retained their former rights, and the Roman people only acquired the sovereignty or superiority over the country; (if we may borrow a nearly analogous term from the Scottish law,) which was signified by the reservation of the tenth part of the produce, as the invariable property of the government. This claim upon the tithes existed, we believe, quite distinctly from the general land-tax or fine levied upon some particular provinces; and, where that land-tax was paid, the tithes were nevertheless paid also. In some instances, we find that the provincial lands paid a seventh, and sometimes a fifth part of their produce to the government;[1] and here it may be difficult to decide, whether this payment was still independent of the tithes, or whether it was made as an equivalent both for the tithes and the land-tax or tribute. But, in addition to all these burdens, we have a long list of others which were imposed by the provincial governors when their own avarice or the alleged exigencies of the public service required any extraordinary resources.[2] First, there was a general levy of money enforced over the whole province,[3] corresponding perhaps to the feudal aids, and raised, we may suppose, by a per centage upon property. Then followed the most odious of all imposts, a poll-tax, demanded alike of slaves and freedmen; and, besides this, other taxes upon houses or house doors,[4] and upon the columns which were so much used in the more expensive architecture of the ancients. Finally, there was a general impression of soldiers, seamen, and carriages, for the military and naval service, additional requisitions of corn for the maintenance of the troops, and of arms and military engines. Under these multiplied exactions, besides a charge altogether indefinite made by the proconsul or proprætor for the

B.C. 9.

The poll-tax.

[1] Hyginus. *de Limitib. constituend.* p. 198, edit. Goesii. Creuzer distinguishes these payments of the fifth or seventh parts of the produce, both from the tithes and from the land tax, *Romische Antiquitaten*, p 265. But we know not on what authority this statement arose, and it seems to us somewhat doubtful.

[2] Cæsar, *de Bello Civil.* lib. iii. c. 31, 32.

[3] *Imperatæ Pecuniæ.*

[4] *Ostiaria, Columnaria.* The poll-tax and house-tax seem not to have been peculiarly confined to periods of great public exigency: for both are mentioned by Cicero as having been levied in Cilicia in the year B.C. 52, and, by the manner in which they are spoken of, they appear to have been ordinarily levied there. *Epist. Familiares*, lib. iii. epist. viii.

B.C. 9. maintenance of himself and all his inferior officers, it is no wonder that the provinces were overwhelmed with debt; for the necessity of paying the taxes being immediate, the people were reduced to borrow money at an exorbitant interest, and there were always wealthy Romans of the equestrian order at hand who carried on a regular traffic in the distress of the provinces, and who were accustomed to lay out their money in loans of this kind, as they thus gained not only a very high rate of interest, but also an extensive influence over the individuals or communities who were indebted to them.

Of the Publicani.

In the dealings between the government and its subjects, the intervention of a third party was generally employed. The revenues of every province were commonly farmed by wealthy individuals of the equestrian order, called by the well-known name of *Publicani*. As the senators were not allowed to engage in any sort of traffic, the equestrian order, consisting of all citizens not being senators, who possessed property beyond a certain amount, embraced almost the whole commercial interest of the empire; and a favourite branch of their speculations was that of farming the revenues. As soon as a province fell under the dominion of Rome, a number of these adventurers proceeded to settle themselves in it, and to acquaint themselves with the extent of its resources. They then purchased of the censors the different taxes claimed by the government; the land-tax, the tithes, the poll-tax, and the other subordinate imposts; and thus took upon themselves the whole risk and trouble of collecting them. In doing this, they were armed with the full authority of the government, by the officer who commanded in the province; unless he happened to have some quarrel with their order, in which case they probably found their business sufficiently difficult, and were losers rather than gainers by their contracts.[1] But, in ordinary cases, the governor of the province and the *publicani* were well disposed to gratify one another; for the equestrian order, after the Sempronian law had placed the whole judicial power in their hands, was a body not lightly to be offended; and the condemnation of P. Rutilius, whose upright administration had checked the exactions of the *publicani* in Asia, was a lesson to future magistrates rather to share in the plunder of the farmers of the revenue, than to endeavour to repress it.

Revenues under the old constitution.

Under the old constitution, the revenues were under the control of the Senate, to which body the quæstors, who acted as treasurers both at Rome and in the provinces, were obliged to submit their accounts. But the civil wars had created so large a military force throughout the empire, and had so dangerously taught the soldiers to know their own power, that it became most important to provide

[1] Cicero, *de Provinciis Consularibus*, c. 5.

for them by regular means, lest they should again be tempted to listen to some new adventurer, and to renew the disorders which had prevailed for the last twenty years. Augustus, therefore, instituted a military treasury,[1] over which he possessed supreme authority, as *Imperator* or commander-in-chief of the army; and for the support of this treasury he invented some new taxes, particularly a sort of excise duty of one per cent. on all articles exposed to sale.[2] He enjoyed also the entire revenues of those provinces which were immediately subjected to his jurisdiction; and, even in those which were under the control of the Senate, he had a treasury of his own, distinguished by the name of *Fiscus* from the *Ærarium* or treasury of the people, into which probably were paid those taxes which had been created for the especial support of the *Ærarium militare*. In all the provinces alike, the revenues which belonged to Augustus were received in his name by officers called *Procuratores*;[3] a class of persons who at first were hardly considered as more than the agents or stewards of a wealthy individual, and who were accordingly selected not only from the equestrian order, but also from among the freedmen; while the regular governors of the provinces, whether proconsuls or lieutenants of the Emperor, were, with the sole exception of the governor of Egypt, appointed exclusively from the Senate. B.C. 9.

We here propose to notice, separately, the state of Italy and of the different provinces of the empire, under the government of Augustus, as far as we have been able to collect materials for the picture. The name of Italy was now at last applied to the whole peninsula from the Alps to the Straits of Messina;[4] and the inhabitants of the whole of this district had obtained the rights of Roman citizens. Their votes, however, were no longer to be given in the *Comitia* at Rome;[5] but the magistrates of the different colonies were to collect the votes of their fellow-citizens in their respective towns, and send them sealed up to Rome, there to be opened on the day of election in the *Campus Martius*. These colonies, it must be remembered, occupied at this time nearly all the surface of Italy. It was the boast of Augustus that he had himself planted no fewer than eight and twenty; a strange subject of exultation, when we consider that they were formed out of the soldiers of his army, and were planted in spots left desolate by the extirpation of their old inhabitants, who had suffered either under the first proscription of the triumvirs, or under that fatal establishment of military tyranny which was created by the reduction of Perusia. The soldiers of a mercenary army are miserable elements out of which to form a civil society; and thus, instead of


State of Italy and the provinces.

Italy.

Colonies of Augustus.

[1] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 49.
[2] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. i. c. 78.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. liii. p. 506. Conf. Creuzer, *Romische Antiquitaten*, p. 218, 219.
[4] Strabo, lib. v. c. 1.
[5] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 46.

B.C. 9. a people inheriting the soil from time immemorial, and blending, in one well-organized commonwealth, nobility and wealth, and honest industry, the new possessors of Italy were an ill-cemented horde of dissolute adventurers, with no natural connection with the spots on



[Casting Votes.]

Constituent population of Italy.

which they were settled, and with habits the most alien from those of good husbands, good fathers, or good citizens. We are told, accordingly, that the free population of many parts of Italy was reduced to a very low point,[1] whilst the slaves were numerous, and the capital itself was overburthened with the crowd of needy citizens, whom each successive civil war threw upon that common-shore of nations. The north of Italy, however, was in a more flourishing condition: there the military colonies had been far less numerous, and the inhabitants having lately acquired the rights of Roman citizens, and possessing natural advantages of the highest order in their soil and climate, were perhaps the most fortunately circumstanced of any people throughout the empire. In Patavium or Padua, there were five hundred citizens rich enough to be ranked among the equestrian order.[2] The town carried on a great trade with Rome,

[1] Livy, lib. vi. c. 12.

[2] Strabo, lib. v. c. 1, sec. 7.

supplying the capital with clothing, with the finest carpets, and with other articles of similar kinds to an immense amount, probably from its own manufactories. The woods of this part of Italy maintained also large droves of swine,[1] which supplied the population of Rome with the largest proportion of their food; and the vine was cultivated with great success, in proof of which Strabo instances the prodigious size of the wine vats, rivalling, it seems, those of our London brewers, for they are described as being larger than houses. The coarser woollen cloths, which formed the dress of the households of most of the people of Italy, were chiefly manufactured in Liguria and its neighbourhood; while the softest and finest wool was produced by the pastures of Mutina and Scultenna. Above all, it is said, that here was to be found a numerous free population,[2] which provided the State with its best supply of soldiers, whilst the rest of Italy was left exhausted and desolate, and Augustus was endeavouring to force its inhabitants to marry and rear families by the penalties and encouragements of the law. B.C. 9.

Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica.

The island of Sicily had been the seat of one of the latest civil wars—that between Augustus and Sex. Pompeius—and it is said to have suffered not only during the contest but during its previous occupation by Pompeius; the plundering and disorderly habits of his numerous seamen having proved, we may suppose, very mischievous to the inhabitants.[3] Since that time, Augustus had sent a colony of veterans to Syracuse, and a small portion of the former site of that famous city was again occupied and fortified. But the cities of Sicily were now become few and inconsiderable: its population was small; and almost the whole of its abundant produce was regularly sent to Rome for the maintenance of the people of the capital. A great part of the surface of the island was devoted to pasture for sheep, oxen, and horses;[4] and the slaves, who were employed in taking care of them, had formerly, as we have seen, carried on a long and obstinate struggle against the Roman power. In the reign of Augustus they still infested the country, and particularly the neighbourhood of Ætna, with their robberies; and Strabo mentions a robber-chief, whom he himself saw torn to pieces by wild beasts in the amphitheatre at Rome, and who, before he was taken, had been at the head of a considerable force. The mountains of Corsica and Sardinia were in like manner occupied by wild tribes of barbarians, who kept up a constant system of plunder against the inhabitants of the more level country: those of Corsica are described as so inveterately brutish[5] that, when taken and carried to the Roman slave market, their purchasers always repented of their bargain, however trifling the price they had paid for them; while the Sardinian robbers did not confine their depredations to their own island, but

[1] Strabo, lib. v. c. 1, sec. 12. [2] Ibid, c. 1, sec. 11.
[3] Ibid, lib. vi. c. 2, sec. 4. [4] Ibid, c. 2, sec. 6. [5] Ibid, lib. v. c. 2, sec. 7.

B.C. 9. frequently made excursions to the opposite coast of Italy; and were enabled, in great measure, to defy the Roman governors in their own haunts, from the impossibility of keeping a military force exposed to the pestilential atmosphere of the wilder parts of the country. Amongst the Alpine tribes, to the north of Italy, the same plundering habits had formerly prevailed, and even the Roman armies, which were stationed in their neighbourhood, had frequently suffered from their desultory attacks;[1] but Augustus, judging it most important to keep up a secure communication between Italy and the Transalpine provinces, and having himself, on one occasion, lost his baggage and several of his soldiers when crossing the mountains which they inhabited, determined to put an effectual stop to their incursions. He accordingly employed such vigorous measures against them, that he extirpated the nation of the *Salassi* altogether, selling no fewer than forty-four thousand of them for slaves, eight thousand of whom were the warriors of the tribe. Three thousand Roman settlers were then sent to colonise the town of Augusta, or Aosta, at the very head of the valley of the Dorea Baltea—from which place two roads were carried across the Alps, the one over the Little Saint Bernard, which was made practicable for carriages, and the other over the Great St. Bernard, which could be travelled only by mules. In consequence of these exertions, the whole neighbourhood was reduced to a state of perfect tranquillity, and the communication with Gaul was carried on without molestation.[2]

Gaul. The condition of the important province of Gaul itself will be regarded with more curiosity. Its "Cicatrice" must still "have looked raw and red after the Roman sword," when Augustus first became the sovereign of the empire; for scarcely more than twenty years had elapsed since his uncle had, for the first time, completed its conquest. Yet in the reign of Tiberius, Strabo describes the inhabitants as already settled into habits of peaceful submission to the Roman power;[3] and he attributes it to their national character, which long retained the remembrance of a defeat, and, if vanquished in one general contest, was cowed for ever. But the fact is, that the Gauls, when first attacked by Cæsar, were by no means a nation of savages. They had regular governments,[4] were perfectly familiar with agriculture, and were accustomed to pay the greatest veneration to their Druids, who professed, with whatever success, the study of moral and natural philosophy. Such a state of society, combined with the natural features of the country, which then, as now, was by no means favourable to the maintenance of a desultory and harassing warfare, ensured the permanence of the conquest of Gaul as soon as

[1] Strabo, lib. iv. c. 6, sec. 7.
[2] Ibid. and Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* lib. iii. c. 20.
[3] Lib. iv. c. 1. sec. 2, c. 4, sec. 2.
[4] Cæsar, *de Bell. Gallico*, lib. vi. c. 11, &c.

it was once effected. The people were able to appreciate the value of the arts, and the commercial advantages which they derived from their conquerors. Even before the invasion of Cæsar, traders were in the habit of visiting almost every part of the country,[1] and had familiarized the people with many even of the luxuries of civilized life. But the Roman conquest must have greatly increased this traffic, by enabling merchants to transport their goods from one end of Gaul to the other with perfect security, and by bringing the whole country into direct communication with the wealth and commercial enterprize of the Roman empire. The great rivers with which France abounds were successfully employed to expedite this intercourse;[2] and goods from all parts of the Mediterranean were conveyed by water up the Rhone and Saone, and from thence, after a short interval of land carriage, were again embarked on the Seine, and thus transported either to Britain, or to all the districts on the northern coast of Gaul, bordering on the British Channel; while the Loire and the Garonne afforded an equally convenient communication with the western parts of Gaul, and with the shores of the Bay of Biscay. B.C 9.

Benefits derived by Gaul.

In another point, also, the Gauls felt the benefit of their connection with Rome. Great quantities of oxen, sheep, and pigs, were reared in all parts of the country;[3] and we are told that not only Rome itself, but most other districts of Italy were supplied with coarse cloaks manufactured of Gaulish wool, and with Gaulish bacon of most excellent quality, particularly from the hogs fed in Burgundy, Franche Comté, and Lorraine. There were also some favoured spots in Gaul, to which the Romans had communicated their own political privileges. Narbo, Vienna, and Lugdunum were Roman colonies, and enjoyed the advantages of the *Jus Italicum* in its full extent;[4] that is, they were governed by their own laws and magistrates, and were not subject to the authority of the proconsul of the province; and their land was considered private and freehold property in the full Roman sense of the term; it was therefore not liable to pay land-tax or tithes, and it might be alienated by *Mancipatio;* that is, it might be sold in full sovereignty, and with an indisputable title—a privilege which was peculiarly confined to the soil of Italy,[5] and to those places in the provinces which, by possessing the *Jus Italicum*, were placed on the same footing as if they were situated in Italy. The lower privilege of the *Jus Latii* was conferred on the inhabitants of Nemansus, or Nismes;[6] and on the Convenæ and Ausci in

[1] Cæsar, *de Bell. Gallico*, lib. vi. c. 23.

[2] Strabo, lib. iv. c. 1, sec. 14.

[3] Ibid. c. 1, sec. 2, c. 4, sec. 3. Cæsar, *de Bell. Gallico*, lib. iv. c. 2.

[4] See Haubold, *Epicrisis Heinecci*, lib. i. Adpend, sec. 97, 98,, and Creuzer, *Romische Antiquitaten*, p. 253. This account of the *Jus Italicum* was first given by Savigny, in his Dissertation *Ueber das Jus Italicum*, published among the *Memoirs*, and read by him before the Academy of Berlin, in 1814 and 1815.

[5] See *Liber Simplici, apud Scriptores de Re Agrariâ*, p. 76, edit. Goesii.

[6] Strabo, lib. iv. c. 1, sec. 12, and c. 2, sec. 2.

B.C. 9. Aquitania; by which they also enjoyed an exemption from the authority of the proconsul of the province; and those who held any magistracy among them became *ipso facto* entitled to the full rights of Roman citizens. These, however, were, in the time of Augustus, rare exceptions; and the great majority of the inhabitants of Gaul shared largely in the miseries, as well as in the benefits, of subjection to the Roman empire. They were oppressed by all the burdens ordinarily imposed on the provinces, and suffered not only from direct taxation, but from that still heavier evil, to which we have before alluded, the frequent necessity of borrowing money, at an exorbitant interest, from the wealthy Roman citizens who were settled amongst them. Accordingly we find, as early as the reign of Tiberius,[1] that the whole of Gaul was overwhelmed with debt, and their sufferings from this cause led to the unsuccessful insurrection against the Roman power, which took place, about eight years after the death of Augustus, under Julius Florus and Julius Sacrovir.

Change of language.

The total extirpation of the Celtic language, which was effected, throughout the whole of Gaul, during the continuance of the Roman dominion, could not have taken place till long after the reign of Augustus. But an earnest of the change was already exhibited in Gallia Narbonensis, which had been now a Roman province for more than a century; for Strabo tells us,[2] that the inhabitants of the left or eastern bank of the Rhone were, even in his time, no longer to be considered barbarians, but were become Romans, both in their customs and in their language. Several important steps had also been taken towards the civilization of the more recently conquered provinces. Human sacrifices,[3] and all rites of the Celtic worship which were at variance with the practices of the Roman religion, were strictly prohibited; nor was more toleration shown to the barbarous custom of carrying about the skulls of their enemies whom they had slain, and fastening them up as a trophy over their gates. Besides, the Romans found the Gauls already disposed, in some measure, to adopt their institutions, from the popularity which the arts and literature of Greece had obtained amongst them. Their knowledge of these was derived from the famous Ionian colony of Massilia, or Marseilles; a city which was at this time the Athens of the western part of the empire;[4] and not only served as a school of instruction to the Gauls, but was frequented by many Romans of the highest distinction, who resorted thither, instead of to Greece, to devote themselves to literature and philosophy. So strong an effect had been produced by the Massilians upon the Gauls in general, that the Greek Sophists found in most parts of Gaul a liberal reception, and

[1] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. iii. c. 40. *Galliarum Civitates, ob magnitudinem Æris alieni rebellionem cœptavere.*

[2] Lib. iv. c. 1, sec. 12.

[3] Ibid. c. 4, sec. 5.

[4] Ibid. c. 1, sec. 5.

were often engaged, by particular cities, to open schools of public instruction for their citizens; while the Greek character began to be adopted wherever there was occasion for writing.[1] The Celtic, it appears, was not a written language; and the Druids refused to commit to writing any of the learning which they possessed and taught, giving their instructions only by word of mouth, and obliging their scholars to trust to their memory alone for retaining them. This circumstance, doubtless, contributed to the gradual adoption of the Roman language throughout Gaul. As soon as a fondness for literature was introduced, the Gauls, finding nothing to gratify it in their own language, applied themselves of necessity to that of their conquerors. This, co-operating with the influence which Latin necessarily enjoyed from political causes, introduced it universally, in time, amongst the higher classes; while the existence of domestic slavery made it much more necessary for the lower orders to acquire the language of the higher, than is the case in modern Europe. Thus the negroes in the West Indies learn, universally, the language of their masters, whilst in Wales and Ireland the gentleman often accommodates himself to his poorer neighbours, and consents to address them in Welsh or in Erse, because they choose to continue ignorant of English. B.C. 9.

The different parts of the neighbouring country of Spain presented a striking contrast to each other. The whole peninsula was at this time divided into three provinces,[2] known by the names of *Bætica*, *Lusitania*, and *Hispania Tarraconensis;* the first of which was governed by a proconsul appointed by the senate, and the two latter by the lieutenants of Augustus. Bœtica comprised nearly the same extent of country which is at present included within the limits of Andalusia and Grenada. It had been already conquered by the Carthaginians before the second Punic war, and in the course of that war was made a part of the Roman dominion by P. Scipio Africanus, after the expulsion of its former masters. The Romans had thus possessed it for about two hundred years, and it was now one of the most flourishing portions of their empire. Its inhabitants had almost lost their original language,[3] and in their speech, and dress, and manners, were become assimilated to their conquerors. The valley of the Bætis, or Guadalquiver, is described by Strabo as rivalling in richness and fertility the most favoured countries in the empire: its trade with Rome was exceedingly great, and carried on directly with Ostia and Puteoli, the ports in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital; the ships employed in this commerce were of the largest size of any that frequented the Mediterranean; and the articles exported in them were numerous and valuable—consisting of corn, wine, oil, of Spain. Bætica.

[1] Strabo, c. 1, sec. 5. Cæsar, *de Bell. Gallico*, lib. vi c. 13.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. liii. p. 503. Strabo, lib. iii. c. 4, p. 444, edit. Siebenkees.
[3] Strabo, lib. iii. c. 2 p. 404, 380, 389, &c.

B.C. 9. the finest quality, wax, honey, salt fish in immense quantities, pitch, *minium* or cinnabar,[1] and *coccus ilicis*, an insect of the cochineal species, and used by the ancients for their best scarlet dyes, as we now use the cochineal of Mexico. The Spanish wool then enjoyed the same high reputation which it still does to this day; great quantities of it, both in the raw and manufactured state, were exported to Rome; and so highly was the Spanish breed of sheep esteemed, that the rams were ordinarily sold for a talent,[2] or £193 15s. of our money. Above all, we should notice the mineral riches of Spain, which exceeded, in value and in quantity, all that were known to exist in any part of the world. We read of gold obtained partly from the mines, but more brought down in small particles by the streams from the mountains, and extracted by carefully washing the sand and gravel in which it was contained; and mention is made also of mines of silver, lead, tin, iron, and copper. Of the towns of Bœtica, the most distinguished were the Roman colonies of Corduba and Hispalis (Cordova and Seville), and Gades, or Cadiz. This place had been founded, at a very remote period, by a colony from Tyre;[3] their Phœnician extraction, however, did not induce the inhabitants to bear the Carthagenian dominion with willingness; but, on the contrary, they took an early opportunity to conclude an alliance with Rome,[4] even before the downfall of the Carthagenian power in Spain, and became thus, according to the usual nature of alliances between a stronger and a weaker state in the ancient world, a dependency of the Roman people. In the civil war, provoked by Cæsar's rebellion, the people of Gades espoused his cause with zeal, and expelled Pompey's officer from their town;[5] in return for which, if we may believe Dion Cassius,[6] Cæsar bestowed upon them the privileges of Roman citizenship. They found, at any rate, an effectual patron in their countryman, L. Cornelius Balbus, the nephew of that Balbus who had been presented with the freedom of Rome, by Pompey, for his services in the contest with Sertorius, and who has been mentioned before as one of the most confidential friends of Cæsar, and as one of the first instances of a man, by birth a foreigner, rising to the rank of consul at Rome. Balbus enlarged the city of Gades;[7] and built

[1] The *minium* (sulphuret of quicksilver) belonged to the Government, and, with other productions of the mines, was farmed by the *Publicani*. The price, however, at which it was to be sold was fixed by the Government at 15s. 8d. the pound, avoirdupois; but the *Publicani* made a large profit by adulterating it. The *coccus ilicis* was found so plentifully on the evergreen oak (*Quercus coccifera*), that Pliny says the poorer Spaniards were enabled to pay half their tribute by the money which they got from the sale of this insect. See Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* lib. xvi. c. 8, and lib. xxxiii. c. 7.

[2] Strabo, ibid.

[3] Velleius Paterculus, lib. i. c. 3.

[4] Cicero, *pro Balbo*, c. 15, 16. The language of the treaty ran, "*Majestatem populi Romani comiter conservato.*" (*Scil. populus Gaditanus.*)

[5] Cæsar, *de Bell. Civili*, lib. ii. c. 18.

[6] Lib. xli. p. 164, edit. Leunclav.

[7] Strabo, lib. iii. c. 5, p. 451, edit. Siebenkees.

a dockyard on the mainland, immediately opposite to the island in which the town is situated. In the reign of Tiberius, Gades was one of the most flourishing cities in the empire; and it is said to have rivalled Patavium, or Padua, in containing five hundred citizens rich enough to be reckoned amongst the equestrian order. It carried on an extensive trade both in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic, and the size and number of its merchant vessels are both especially noticed. B.C. 9.

Lusitania and Hispania Tarraconensis.

The two remaining provinces of Spain were far from being in so advanced a state as Bœtica. The Celtiberians indeed, who inhabited the central and eastern parts of the peninsula, were partially becoming more civilized;[1] and some of them, like the people of Bœtica, had learnt to wear the Roman dress, and to adopt the Roman manner of living. But the tribes which bordered on the Atlantic and on the Bay of Biscay still retained, in great measure, their original wildness. The *Cantabri*, whose territory corresponded with the modern provinces of Biscay and Asturias, had been only lately attacked by Augustus in person,[2] in the year B.C. 25; and, being then partially conquered, had soon afterwards renewed the contest, and had been more effectually subdued by L. Æmilius, in the year following, and again by M. Agrippa, in the year B.C. 19. In the reign of Tiberius,[3] the continued presence of a large Roman army in their country, (for out of three Roman legions stationed in Spain, two were quartered amongst the Asturians and Cantabrians,) had produced a partial effect upon them: some of them had entered into the service of Rome, and some of the tribes were learning the first elements of civil society. But the existence of the Basque language to this very day, undestroyed by the revolutions of eighteen centuries, sufficiently proves that in these remote districts the language and manners of Rome were unable to take deep root; and therefore, at the period of which we are writing, no more had probably been done than to reduce the hostilities of the natives to mere acts of robbery in the mountains and forests, and by quartering Roman soldiers among them to set before them a view of more civilized institutions. The coast of the Mediterranean presented naturally a different picture.[4] Here were cultivated the vine, the fig, and the olive; and here were the famous cities of Carthago, or Carthagena, and Tarraco, or Tarragona, both Roman colonies. On this coast also there grew in great luxuriance a species of broom, which was largely used in rope-making, and which was exported for that purpose to all parts of the empire. In the interior may be noticed the recently planted colonies of Augusta

[1] Strabo, lib. iii. c. 2. p. 404, and c. 4. p. 446.
[2] Dion Cassius, lib. liii. p. 513, 516, 528. Horace, *Carm.* lib. iii. *Ode* 14, and *Epistolar.* lib. i. *Epist.* 12.
[3] Strabo, lib. iii. c. 3. p. 416, c. 4. p. 445. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. iv. c. 5.
[4] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 4. p. 437, 429.

B.C. 9. Emerita, or Merida, Pax-Augusta, or Badajoz, and Cæsar-Augusta, or Zaragoza, which Strabo instances as a proof of the improved condition of the countries in which they were situated.[1]

Mauritania. The northern coast of Africa, from the Atlantic Ocean to the harbour of Saldas,[2] which lies a few miles to the eastward of Algiers, was known by the general name of Mauritania, and was at this time governed by an African prince, on whom Augustus had conferred the sovereignty: this was Juba, the son of that Juba who had so zealously supported the constitutional party in the civil war between Cæsar and Pompey, and the husband of one of the daughters of Antonius and Cleopatra. But notwithstanding these connections, Juba had served Augustus in the civil wars,[3] and had acquired his favour; and, as the greatest part of his father's dominions now formed part of the Roman province of Africa, he received the sovereignty of Mauritania as a sort of compensation. From the port of Saldas to the borders of Cyrenaica, the whole country, which had been formerly possessed by the kings of Numidia and the republic of Carthage, was now united under one government, and was called the province of Africa.[4] It was one of the provinces assigned to the senate and people, and was governed by a proconsul, with a military establishment of two legions;[5] and it is known to have been one of the countries which sent the greatest quantity of corn to the Roman market.[6] But of the details of its condition very little is recorded. We find by the *Fasti Triumphales*, that the proconsuls of this province frequently laid claim to the insignia of a triumph, on account of victories gained over the barbarians of the interior: we hear of a Roman colony,[7] lately founded by Augustus, close to the sight of the ancient Carthage; and we are told that private individuals possessed here immense estates,[8] chiefly woodland and pasture, on which many villages were built, and a numerous population was maintained around the villa of the proprietor or lord. Perhaps from this very cause the towns in Africa were few and unimportant: the old ones had been mostly destroyed, either in the Jugurthine war, or in the contest between Cæsar and the constitutional party, under Scipio and Cato: and as the land seems mostly to have been granted or sold away to individuals, there was less room for those military colonies, which in other parts of the empire were laying the foundations of so many cities, famous in after generations. Still we know

[1] Strabo, lib. iii. c. 2. p. 404.
[2] Ibid. lib. xvii. c. 3, 5, 7, 12. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. iv. c. 5.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. li. p. 454; lib. liii. p. 514.
[4] Strabo, lib. xvii. c. 3. sec. 25.
[5] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. iv. c. 5.
[6] Ibid. lib. xii. c. 43. See also several passages in Horace; for instance, *Sat.* lib. ii.; *Sat.* iii. ver. 87. *Carm.* lib. i. *Ode* l. ver. 40. lib. iii.; *Ode* xvi. ver. 31.
[7] Strabo, lib. xvii. c. iii. sec. 15. Appian, *Punica*, c. 136.
[8] Aggenus Urbicus, *de Controversiis Agrorum, apud Scriptores de Re Agrariâ*, edit. Goesii, p. 71.

that Africa carried on a considerable trade; for Strabo,[1] when wishing to represent the great number of the merchant vessels employed in the commerce between Italy and the south of Spain, observes that it almost rivalled the number of the vessels engaged in the commerce of Africa. B.C. 9.

Of the Eastern or Greek provinces.

In proceeding eastward to the small province of Cyrenaica, we enter upon a new division of the empire, and one most strongly distinguished from all the countries which we have hitherto noticed, by the general use of the Greek language. The Greek provinces, if we may so call them, were in a very different condition from those of the west, which, owing their civilization to the Romans, borrowed from them alone their language and their institutions. But in the east, society had long since assumed a settled form, which in its internal details was but little affected by the conquests of Rome.

Cyrenaica.

Cyrene, originally a colony from the little Island of Thera, in the Ægæan,[2] after enjoying some centuries of independence and prosperity, was conquered by Ptolemy,[3] the son of Lagus, the first of the Macedonian kings of Egypt, about the year B.C. 323. It was afterwards, like Cyprus, conferred from time to time, as a separate principality, on some member of the royal family; and a prince, named Ptolemy Apion,[4] who had obtained it in this manner, bequeathed it by his will to the Roman people, in the year B.C. 96. The lands which had belonged to him as king,[5] thus became the demesne of the Roman people; and not being divided out amongst a certain number of citizens, as was the case when a colony was planted, they were farmed in the mass by the Publicani, mostly as grazing lands, and were encroached upon from time to time, like the other national lands throughout the empire, by the proprietors of the surrounding estates. In the time of Augustus, Cyrenaica was united with Crete,[6] under the government of the same officer, and the two countries together formed one of the prætorian provinces which had been assigned to the jurisdiction of the Senate and people. It may be remarked, as a proof that Cyrenaica was the western limit of the Greek provinces, that the Jews, who had spread themselves over all the eastern part of the empire, are known to have been very numerous at Cyrene,[7] but are not mentioned as having established themselves in the adjacent provinces of Africa, or in any of the provinces westward of Italy. To Cyrene itself, its connection

[1] Lib. iii. c. 2. p. 387.
[2] Herodotus, *Melpomene*, c. 175, *et seq.*
[3] Diodorus Siculus, lib. xviii. p. 602, *et seq.* edit. Rhodoman.
[4] Livy, *Epitome*, lib. lxx.
[5] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xiv. c. 18. Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* lib. xix. c. 3. Hyginus *de Limitibus constituend*, p. 210. *Script. Rei Agrar.* edit. Goesii.
[6] Strabo, lib. xvii. c. 2. sec. 25.
[7] *Acts of the Apostles*, chap. ii. ver. 10; chap. vi. ver. 9. Dion Cassius, lib. lxviii. p. 786.

B.C. 9. with Egypt would naturally have led them; and they formed there a body so considerable as to have a synagogue, specially appropriated to them in Jerusalem.


Egypt. We have already mentioned some of the precautions taken by Augustus, to prevent the great resources of Egypt from being placed at the disposal of any one who might use them for the views of his own ambition. The governor of Egypt was always selected from the equestrian order; that is, from a class of citizens who enjoyed the comforts of an affluent private station, without taking any part in civil or military offices. Next under the governor was an officer invested with the administration of justice;[1] and after him came the procurator of the emperor, whose business was simply to receive and collect all sums which were due to the imperial treasury. The military establishment consisted at first of three legions, besides nine cohorts, employed on permanent garrison duty at particular points of the country; but as it was soon found that nothing was to be dreaded either from any disposition to revolt in the Egyptians themselves, or from the power of the yet unconquered neighbouring nations, it was thought safer to intrust the governor of so wealthy a province with the least possible military force, and the army in Egypt was consequently reduced to two legions.[2] So wretched had been the condition of the country under some of its recent kings, that the Romans are said to have introduced many beneficial reforms; and the trade with India, which was carried on by way of the Red Sea, increased prodigiously under their dominion, notwithstanding the heavy duties which they took care to impose on all articles imported into, or exported from, Alexandria.[3] There were two modes of communication between Egypt and the Red Sea—one was by that famous canal, which had been begun in the remotest times by Pharaoh Necho, again resumed by Darius, the son of Hystaspes, and finally completed under the government of the Ptolemies; and which, leaving the Nile near the southern point of the Delta, after a somewhat circuitous course, joined the Red Sea at the town of Arsinoe, close to the modern town of Suez. The other

[1] Strabo, lib. xvii. c. 1. sec. 12. ὁ διοικοδότης. The procurator was called ἴδιος λόγος, or "private account," which seems almost like a cant term bestowed on him by the Egyptians. The separation of the judicial power form the supreme, civil, and military administration of the province, appears to be another proof of the excessive jealousy with which the power and wealth of Egypt were regarded by the emperor.

[2] We thus attempt to reconcile the different statements of Strabo, who states the troops in Egypt to have consisted of three legions and nine cohorts, (lib. xvii. c. 1. sec. 12..) and of Tacitus, who rates them only at two legions, (*Annal.* lib. iv. c. 5.) Unless indeed Tacitus spoke only of the number of Roman soldiers, and Strabo meant to include the auxiliaries; a supposition which seems supported by his distinguishing the nine cohorts which were employed in garrison duty, by the epithet "Roman," as if all the troops of the three legions were not entitled to that appellation.

[3] Strabo, lib. xvii c. 1. sec. 13, 25, 45.

was by land, across the desert, Coptos on the Nile, situated a few miles to the north of Thebes, to the ports of Berenice and Myos Hormos; and the route was now supplied with water, partly by digging wells, and partly by reservoirs, which preserved the occasional supply from the clouds. B.C. 9.



[Obelisk in the Piazza del Popolo.—*Overbeke, les Restes de l'Ancienne Rome.*]

All the goods which were introduced into Egypt from the east, by either of these channels, were necessarily conveyed to Alexandria, where they were again re-shipped and exported to Italy and the rest of the empire. It may be observed, that two out of the three ships in which the Apostle Paul performed his voyage from Palestine to Rome,[1] were ships of Alexandria, which seems to indicate that vessels from that place sailing direct to Italy were more easily to be found than from any other port in the eastern provinces. Besides the various commodities of the east, Egypt exported to Rome great quantities of corn,[2] together with the best writing materials then known in the world, the famous *papyrus*, the two finest sorts of which were named the Augustan, and the Livian,[3] in compliment to the Emperor and his wife. Alexandria, having been long the capital of a great monarchy, and now becoming the seat of a commerce so extensive, was probably the second city in the Roman empire. But of all its buildings and institutions, the museum deserves most particular notice. It formed a part of that large division of the city which the successive kings of Egypt had inclosed within what may be called the precincts of their court,[4] a space equal to nearly a third of the whole of Alexandria; and which may be compared to the parks of London, and to that quarter of the town in which our palaces, our public offices, and our courts of justice are concentrated together. The museum comprised within it the great library of Alexandria, an ornamented walk, and a large building, which served as a refectory or college hall to the literary men who belonged to the institution. It may perhaps sur-

[1] *Acts*, chap. xxvii. ver. 6; chap. xxviii. ver. 11.
[2] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 43. *Histor.* lib. iii. c. 8, 48.
[3] Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* lib. xiii. c. 12.
[4] Strabo, lib. xvii. c. 1. sec. 8.

B.C. 9. prise some of our readers to hear that there was a society at Alexandria, which very closely resembled the colleges of our English universities. There was a head or master of the museum, who was also a priest, appointed by the government; and there was an endowment for the maintenance of the members of the college, who lived at the museum, and were accustomed to have their meals together, as we have seen, in their common hall. A similar assemblage of literary and scientific men had formerly existed at Heliopolis; and Strabo was shown the apartments in which, according to the tradition of the guides, Plato and Eudoxus had resided for several years, to learn wisdom from the sages of Egypt.[1] But this institution was gone to decay in the time of Augustus, and the buildings were occupied only by the persons engaged in the care of the sacrifices, and by those who instructed strangers in the forms which they were to observe when they came there to worship. In another point however Egypt had undergone little change since the days of Herodotus. The scandalous licentiousness of some of the festivals was still faithfully preserved; and the canals which led from Alexandria to the famous temple of Serapis, at Canopus,[2] were thronged day and night during the period of the festival with an innumerable concourse of people, indulging themselves without restraint in the worst excesses of debauchery.

Syria and Asia.

From Egypt to the Ægæan Sea, the countries included under the general names of Asia Minor and Syria, were in the time of Augustus portioned out into a number of divisions and subdivisions, which it would be of little importance to enumerate minutely. The principal of these were the two great provinces of Syria and Asia; the former governed by the lieutenants of the emperor,[3] the latter by proconsuls, in the name of the Senate and people. Next to these in importance were the united provinces of Pontus and Bithynia, which also belonged to the Senate and people: Galatia with Pisidia and Lycaonia,[4] which belonged to Augustus, and Cilicia which also was governed by a lieutenant of the emperor. Cappadocia still retained a nominal independence,[5] under its king Archelaus, till about four years after the death of Augustus; as did Judæa under Herod, till a somewhat earlier period. Lycia enjoyed its own laws,[6] and a free municipal government; and there were a great many detached and subordinate districts, which were governed by petty kings, dynasts, tetrarchs, and rulers of various designations, but which were all subject in fact to the control of the Romans; and the condition of which was altered from time to time at the pleasure of the emperor,

[1] Strabo, lib. xvii. c. 1. sec. 29.
[2] Ibid. lib. xvii. c. 1. sec. 16, 17.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. liii. p. 504. Strabo, lib. xvii. c. 2. sec. 25.
[4] Ibid. lib. 53. p. 514. Strabo, lib. xii. c. 5. sec. 1.
[5] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. ii. c. 42.
[6] Strabo, lib. xiv. c. 2. sec. 3.

as it was understood that all countries of this description were under his especial authority.[1] Throughout the whole of this part of the empire, Greek was commonly spoken and understood by the higher orders in all the large towns; but there was a great variety of native languages and dialects which still maintained their ground,[2] and an almost equal variety of manners prevailing amongst the different people and tribes. Many of the mountain districts were infested by robbers, who made frequent inroads upon the lowland country in their neighbourhood; while many of the cities, such as Antioch, Tyre, and Tarsus, in Syria and Cilicia, together with most of those in the province of Asia, were in a state of high civilization, cultivating the arts of peace successfully. But the Roman colonies were few, and few of the cities, in comparison with the western provinces, enjoyed the rights of Roman or of Latin citizenship. The burden of taxation was moreover great,[3] and much was often suffered besides from the tyranny and exactions of the provincial governors. On the other hand, the evils of war were no longer felt or dreaded; four legions only were stationed in the whole of Asia Minor and Syria,[4] and most of these were placed near the Euphrates, to guard the frontiers on the side of Parthia. The internal communications between different parts of the country were mostly become secure and easy; and the piracy which had been once so great an evil on the coasts of Cilicia and Pamphylia, was now so reduced as to offer no obstacles to the trade or general intercourse which was carried on by sea. B.C. 9.

Greece, Macedonia, and Achaia.

The condition of Greece was apparently one of great desolation and distress. It was divided in its widest extent into the two provinces of Macedonia and Achaia, both belonging to the jurisdiction of the Senate and people. Both had suffered severely by being the seat of the successive civil wars between Cæsar and Pompey, between the triumvirs, and Brutus, and Cassius, and lastly between Augustus and Antonius. Besides, the country had never recovered the long series of miseries which had preceded and accompanied its conquest by the Romans; and between those times and the civil contest between Pompey and Cæsar, it had again been exposed to all the evils of war when Sylla was disputing the possession of it with the generals of Mithridates. In the time of Augustus therefore it presented a mournful picture of ruin. If we go through Peloponnesus, and inquire what was now the fate of cities and States once so memorable, we shall find that Messenia and Arcadia[5] were almost reduced to a desert, and that Laconia was greatly decreased

[1] Strabo, lib. xvii. c. 2. sec 25.
[2] See *Acts*, chap. ii. ver. 9, &c.
[3] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. ii. c. 42, 54.
[4] Ibid. lib. iv. c. 5
[5] Strabo, lib. viii. c. 4. sec. 11; c. 8. sec. 1.

B.C. 9. in population, although its capital, Lacedæmon, enjoyed the title of a free State,[1] and the Laconians, or inhabitants of the country, and even the Helots, had been long relieved from that abject dependence upon the Spartans to which they were in the old times subjected.

State of the Greek Cities.

The most flourishing towns were Corinth and Petræ,[2] both of them Roman colonies, recently founded; the former by Cæsar, who peopled it with a number of freedmen; and the latter, one of the military colonies of Augustus, planted after the battle of Actium. Northward of the Isthmus the scene was equally melancholy. It was from a view of the ruins of the once famous cities of the Saronic Gulf, of Ægina, and Piræus, and Megara, that Ser. Sulpicius derived that lesson of patience under domestic calamities with which he attempted to console Cicero for the loss of his daughter Tullia.[3] Ætolia and Acarnania were become wastes,[4] and the soil was devoted to pasture for the rearing of horses. Thebes was hardly better than a village,[5] and all the other towns of Bæotia, except Tanagra and Thespiæ, were reduced to the same condition. Epirus was depopulated,[6] and occupied by Roman soldiers; Macedonia had lost the benefit of its mines which the Roman government had appropriated to itself, and was suffering from the weight of its taxation; but it appears not to have undergone so great a desolation as the neighbouring province of Achaia. Of the burden of taxation imposed on this part of the empire, there are two remarkable proofs on record. Strabo himself happened once to touch at the little island of Gyarus,[7] which he describes as a place containing no town, and inhabited merely by fishermen. When the vessel was again putting to sea, one of the fishermen came on board, and took his passage to Corinth, telling Strabo and his fellow-passengers that he was going on a deputation from his countrymen to Augustus, who happened to be in Greece at that time, to request some relief from taxation; for the inhabitants of Gyarus paid, he said, an hundred and fifty drachmæ, (£4 16s. 10½d.) annually, one hundred of which would be more than they were able to spare. It appears also that the provinces of Macedonia and Achaia,[8] when they petitioned for a diminution of their burdens, in the early part of the reign of Tiberius, were considered so deserving of compassion, that they were transferred for a time from the jurisdiction of the Senate to that of the emperor—a change which tended to relieve them, by subjecting them only to the exactions of the imperial procurator, instead of the joint demands of the procurator and proconsul; for the emperor's *fiscus*, or private treasury, received a portion of the revenues in the provinces belonging to the Senate, but in those which were particu-

[1] Strabo, lib. viii. c. 5. sec. 5.
[2] Ibid. c. 6. sec. 23. c. 7. sec. 5.
[3] Cicero, *ad Familiares*, lib. iv. epist. 5.
[4] Strabo, lib. viii. c. 8. sec. 1.
[5] Strabo, lib. ix. c. 2. sec. 5.
[6] Ibid. lib. vii. c. 7. sec. 3.
[7] Lib. x. c. 5. sec. 3.
[8] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. i. c. 76.

larly under himself, there was no officer employed by the Senate to collect taxes for the public treasury or *ærarium*. Meanwhile the change of circumstances had rendered Greece far less capable of affording a large revenue than in the days of her early greatness. Then the naval power of the Greeks, the uncommercial habits of the Persians, and the general barbarism of the west of Europe, bestowed upon Greece an extensive trade with all parts of the Mediterranean; and vessels from the coast of Ionia found their way not only to the Adriatic,[1] to Sicily, and to Italy, but also to the ports of Gaul and Spain, and even through the Straits of Gibraltar to the riches of Tartessus and Gades. Besides, the high military character of the Greeks procured them constant employment in the service of the Persian Satraps of Asia; and there were many officers who there amassed, like Xenophon, a considerable fortune, and returned with it in the decline of life to settle in their own country. This was particularly a resource for the Arcadians;[2] and money was thus poured into that wild and barren district of Peloponnesus, which the poverty of its soil and its inland situation would never have allowed it to gain from agriculture or trade. But now the commerce of the Mediterranean had passed into other hands, and the power of Rome had transferred to Italy the reputation of being the best school of soldiers. In literature and philosophy Greece, it is true, still retained her pre-eminence; and in these respects her excellence was appreciated over a greater portion of the world than ever, as we have seen the cities of Gaul eager to secure the services of Greek philosophers for the education of their people. But, although the honour of this general celebrity was reflected chiefly upon Greece properly so-called, yet it was far otherwise with the profit of it. Massilia, Tarsus, and Alexandria sent out over the Roman world as many public and private instructors as proceeded from the schools of Athens; and if we run over the list of Greek writers of the times of the early emperors,[3] we shall find very few of them to have been natives of Greece itself. In this manner Greece was left without any adequate means of repairing the devastations of war, or the exactions of the Roman government; and was thus already fallen into decay, while most other parts of the empire were as yet flourishing in unbroken vigour.

B.C. 9.

Change of circumstances in Greece.

While we have thus attempted to lead our readers step by step through most of the countries which were now subject to Rome, our

[1] Herodotus, *Clio*. c. 163. *Melpomene*, c. 152.

[2] Thucydides, lib. vii. c. 57. Of the Greeks who served under the younger Cyrus, in his attempt to dethrone his brother, more than half were Arcadians and Achaians; and of these the Arcadians formed by far the greatest portion. Xenophon, *Anabasis*, lib. v. c. 10; lib. i. c. 1, 2.

[3] Strabo was a native of *Amisus*, in *Pontus*; Dionysius was of *Halicarnassus*, in *Caria*; Appian, of *Alexandria*; Lucian, of *Samosata*, in *Comagene*; Diodorus, of *Sicily*. We hardly remember, indeed, any of the later Greek writers, except Plutarch, who was properly a native of Greece.

B.C. 9. General state of the Roman Empire.

task has been little else than to collect together some of the scattered notices of their condition preserved by the writers of the times, and to repeat them as we have found them recorded. But we naturally aspire to something more than this; the Augustan age is so famous in the history of mankind, that we wish to form to ourselves some general impression of it; we would fain compare it with that state of society which we ourselves are witnessing, and examine to what degree of physical and moral improvement it had attained. It requires also our especial attention, because this splendid period was succeeded, in the course of a few generations, by a very general and remarkable decline; and many centuries elapsed before the tide of civilization began again steadily to flow, after having been so long upon the ebb. It can be only by an attentive observation of the Augustan age itself, that we can at all hope to discover the causes of the phenomena which followed it: and so perhaps to learn whether there is any just reason to dread their recurrence: whether the great improvements of our own days may at some future period be again cut short, and the full stream of knowledge forced back once more to its original and scanty channel.

No physical condition.

In order to arrive at any just notions of the physical condition of a people, our attention must mainly be directed to the state of property. Where the means of creating wealth are wanting, there must be general wretchedness; where it is inadequately secured, the means of creating it are crippled; where it is very unequally divided, the splendour of individual fortunes may often make us forget the poverty of the great bulk of the people. The physical means of creating wealth were abundantly enjoyed in the Roman empire; as it possessed some of the most productive soils and favourable climates known in the world, with excellent water communication from one extremity of it to the other. The moral means of industry and skill were to be found in very different perfection in different parts of the empire; but we know that all the useful arts were successfully cultivated; and that the luxuries as well as the comforts of life were to be procured by any one who was rich enough to purchase them. In some districts, in several provinces, property was liable to very frequent assaults from the robber tribes who inhabited the neighbouring mountains; and in most of the provinces, perhaps, the weight of taxation was felt as a serious evil; but, on the other hand, the miseries of war were removed; and although the government and its officers interfered greatly with the profits of property, yet the actual right of possession was secured by regular laws, and was rarely disturbed by the violence of power. But the great misfortune of the Roman empire was the excessive inequality with which wealth was divided. We know enough of the splendid villas and magnificent establishments of the nobility, and of the wealthier members of the equestrian order; but the lower classes of free

zens at Rome were in the meantime supported, in great measure, by the largesses of the Emperor;[1] and, after all, from the decay of agriculture in Italy, any continuance of stormy weather which detained the usual supplies of corn from Africa, Spain, or Egypt, threatened the capital with a scarcity of bread. The fortune necessary to qualify a man for the equestrian order was 400 *sestertia*,[2] (£3229,) and in the time of Augustus there were not four thousand citizens in Rome, exclusive of the senators, whose property amounted to this sum; and there were only two towns in the empire, Gades and Patavium, which could produce five hundred citizens who possessed it. And this is rendered credible by a speech ascribed to L. Philippus, who was consul in the year B.C. 91, and who declared that there were not, at that time, two thousand citizens in the commonwealth worth anything.[3] In fact, when we read of the enormous riches possessed by some individuals in ancient history, by the kings of Babylon and Persia at an earlier period, and afterwards by the emperors and some of the great nobility of Rome, we could not reasonably credit the statements which are given, if we did not consider that this splendour was produced by the vast concentration of wealth in a few hands, and that it is in no respect an index of the general prosperity of the people at large. The great number of slaves kept in opulent families, and the practice of employing them in various trades for the supply of many of the common articles of life, was a great injury to the class of shopkeepers, and even in the liberal arts and professions, such as architecture and medicine, the high nobility were so much in the habit of having architects and physicians among their own slaves, that the respectability, as well as the profits of the free citizens of those and similar professions were necessarily lessened. The miseries of one immense portion of the whole population, the slaves themselves, need not be particularly dwelt upon. Where the slave market was so abundantly supplied as it was in Rome, the value of a slave, as an article of property, could not be considered very highly; and nothing but this selfish motive was likely to restrain masters in general from ill usage and cruelty; for the tendency of our nature to abuse absolute power, was aggravated in Rome by the utter indifference felt with regard to the fate of a slave, and by the want of some restraining and humanizing principles of morals. Something of this same indifference extended itself also to the condition of the people of the provinces, and subjected them often to a tyranny as insulting as it was oppressive. It is mentioned, indeed, to the praise of Augustus, and

B.C. 9.

Vast wealth of individuals.

[1] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 41, 42. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. ii. c. 87; lib. iv. c. 6. *Histor.* lib. iv. c. 38.

[2] Pliny, *Histor. Natural.* lib. xxxiii. c. 1, 2. Horace, *Epist.* lib. i., epist. i. ver. 58.

[3] Cicero, *de Officiis*, lib. ii. c. 21.

B.C. 9. of the early part of the reign of Tiberius,[1] that the cruelties and exactions of the provincial magistrates were greatly checked by them; that the subjects of Rome were protected from the rods of the lictors, and from confiscations of their property. And Augustus was the author of one most important reform, by assigning to the governors of provinces a certain fixed salary,[2] instead of allowing them, according to the old practice, to lay an arbitrary charge upon the inhabitants for the maintenance of themselves and their establishment. Yet the mere ordinary administration of justice towards the provincials was, at the best, harsh and summary;[3] and it was, perhaps, rendered more so by the strong contrast between their condition and that of a Roman citizen, whose liberty even yet was fenced round against all subordinate tyranny by the jealous laws of the old commonwealth.

Physical and Moral condition of the people.

If we regard the effects of the political constitution of the empire in another light, it will lead us by an easy transition from the physical to the moral condition of the people. It may be doubted whether all the improvements of modern civilization could diffuse life and activity through so vast a body as was now united under the government of Augustus. Much less was this actually accomplished, without an established conveyance for letters, without public carriages for travellers, and without circulation of newspapers. The Romans had excellent roads, it is true, as the Persians had had before them; and, like the Persians, they had relays of horses placed at certain distances, for the convenience of forwarding couriers, or other officers of the government. But these were of no benefit to the common traveller, who was obliged to find the means of conveyance for himself,[4] and who was forced to limit his day's journey by the distance which could be performed by the same horses. Add to this, that the difference of language between the eastern and western provinces created a barrier between them, which at all times was an obstacle to their perfect union, and at a later period rendered their separation easy and natural. Those countries which were most remote from the capital, lost all the advantages of independent government, and their inhabitants were brought up to a condition of unavoidable helplessness; while, at the same time, their imperfect intercourse with the heart of the empire prevented them from

[1] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. iv. c. 6

[2] Dion Cassius, lib. liii. p. 506.

[3] See *Acts*, chap. xvi. ver. 22, 37; chap. xx. ver. 24.

[4] ——— *Nunc mihi curto*
Ire licet Mulo, vel, si libet, usque Tarentum;
Mantica cui lumbos onere ulceret, atque eques armos.
—Horace, *Sat.* lib. i.; *Sat.* vi. ver. 104.

No man would have talked of going to Tarentum on his dock-tailed mule, carrying saddle-bags, if he could have had the convenience of a good coach, to transport him in half the time, and with infinitely greater ease and comfort.

deriving from it their due portion of nourishment, or from receiving any adequate return for the wealth and industry which were continually drawn from them to Rome. B.C. 9.

Meanwhile a taste for literature was becoming fashionable in the western provinces, as it had been long in the eastern; and we have seen that the cities of Gaul were in the habit of hiring Greek sophists for the public instruction of their people. But the expensiveness, and consequent rarity of books, was an invincible obstacle to the general diffusion of knowledge. It is mentioned of one of the literary men of these times,[1] that he had read in the province of *Syria* a great number of works of an earlier period, which continued to be known there, because they were not superseded, as at Rome, by the multitude of modern publications. And Horace speaks of his works being carried into Spain and Africa only as wrapping-paper for merchandize,[2] when they had lost their popularity at Rome. The consequence of this state of things was, that men of literature formed a distinct profession in the empire, which was followed for the sake of deriving from it a means of subsistence; but that the bulk of the people were left in a very general ignorance. What has been preserved to us of the writings of these times, has proceeded mostly from men who lived by their pen, or by giving instructions to their pupils—not from persons conversant with the business of actual life, from statesmen and soldiers, or men of independent fortune, such as were Cicero, Cæsar, and the elder Cato; or such as was Tacitus a few generations later. Hence the total want of intelligent books of travels, and the low state of experimental philosophy and political economy. The study of words, however, dignified by the titles of *Grammatica* and *Rhetorica*, was but a poor education for any man; yet to this an excessive attention was directed, and youth were taught to admire the purity of a writer's style, or the musical arrangement of his sentences, instead of observing the value of his facts, or the wisdom of his opinions. Oratory, in particular, which in the best days of Greece and Rome had been far too highly appreciated, was now become a worthless study, and a mere waste of time and ingenuity, since the practical occasions for its exercise were at an end. It is therefore to us no wonder at all, that, when all kinds of public disasters assailed the empire, the fair show of knowledge, which had just gilded the surface of the Augustan age, should have been utterly worn away. Separated as it was from the habits and concerns of the practical part of the community, it died away with the patronage and general tranquillity which had fostered it. It was but a rich man's luxury, which they who were hourly trembling for their lives had no leisure to care for.

Of the intellectual state of the Empire.

Grammar and Rhetoric.

[1] Marcus Valerius Probus, of Berytus. Suetonius, *de Illustoribus Grammaticis*, c. 24.

[2] *Epist.* lib. i. epist. xx. ver. 11.

B.C. 9. For, after all, if we look at the most famous writers of the Augustan age, of what description shall we find them? The highest eminence which they attained was in poetry; yet even in this it is an excellence most suited to an artificial age, and not perhaps the best suited to win the ears of the people at large when literature was no longer in fashion. In history, the famous work of Livy is below mediocrity;[1] and the reputation which it has enjoyed is the best proof of the long-continued and pernicious influence of the schools of grammar and rhetoric, which taught men to admire eloquent language, and to consider it as a compensation for ignorance and shallowness of judgment. In morals, in political science, in all the various branches of experimental philosophy, what do we owe to the Augustan age? But, happily for mankind, the wisdom of Providence was now preparing a knowledge the very opposite to that which we have been considering—a knowledge as unpretending and generally useful, as the other was ostentatious and trifling; which was fitted for the real business of life, and was received by persons of every condition; which struck root as deeply as the literature of the Augustan age had been scattered superficially; which continued its substantial benefits through revolutions which laid every thing else in ruins, and which preserves to this day its indestructible power of beneficent activity.

But the mere intellectual advancement of a people is of little importance, in comparison with their moral knowledge of right and wrong; and whether the literature of the Augustan age was generally valuable or not, the Romans might still have possessed a good state of public and private morals, and therefore might have been happily circumstanced with regard to the grand concern of human life. The great questions of the end of all our actions, and the nature of our several duties, were canvassed by the philosophers of every sect; and in the public lectures of those philosophers, such subjects formed the principal part. When a parent, well versed in these inquiries, became himself the instructor of his son, he was enabled to give him a moral education of no mean excellence; and the young man who, in addition to the conversation and example of his father, received from him such a guide as the great work of Cicero, *de Officiis*, addressed by him to his son, possessed, in many respects, a rule of conduct which required little further improvement. But neither were all parents philosophers, nor were philosophers the ordinary teachers of the great mass of the community. The common elementary schools of Rome, from which the majority of the people derived their whole education, were schools of reading and of arithmetic,[2] and

Philosophy.

[1] A tolerable specimen of Livy's manifold deficiencies, arranged under the several heads of "Ignorance of the Old Constitution," "Ignorance of Military Topography," "Want of Judgment," "Carelessness," &c., with numerous instances of each, is given by Wachsmuth, in his *Early History of the Roman State*, p. 33, *et seq.*

[2] Horat. *Satir.* lib. i. sat. vi. ver. 72. *De Arte Poeticâ*, ver. 325.

of nothing else; for the masters were men of humble station, unac- B.C. 9.
quainted with the writings of the philosophers, and quite unable to venture by themselves into all the difficulties with which the chief good of man, and the nature of his duties, were then enveloped. Under such circumstances, men's characters are formed partly by the influence of the society in which they live, and partly by themselves. Some virtues are always congenial to human nature in theory, however much selfishness may obstruct the practice of them; and these were often beautifully displayed in the lives of men of amiable dispositions, who wished to live up to the best of their knowledge. But unfortunately there are many vices also, of which the practice is far more natural to man than the theory is repugnant; and into these the force of inclination and the sanction of universal custom draw almost every one. It is in such points especially that an authoritative rule of life is wanted; which, being once acknowledged, may save common men the trouble of making out their duty for themselves, and may lead them at once to the true practical conclusion without the risks or the difficulties of the previous inquiry. But in the greater part of the Roman empire, no such authority was to be found. In this respect the popular religion had utterly failed; superstition, according to the necessary course of things, was closely connected with, and encouraged a complete moral carelessness; and whilst the high and pure doctrines so often inculcated by the oracles and choral songs of an earlier period were neglected or scorned, the follies and sensualities of Polytheism continued to flourish even with increased vigour. The oracles had lost all their authority;[1] a loss which Strabo ascribes to the influence of the Romans, who preferred their own national modes of inquiry into futurity, by consulting the Sibylline books, the entrails of victims, the flight of birds, and the phenomena of the atmosphere. But the change probably was greatly for the worse; for when the oracles were in vogue, they were consulted not only as prophets but as practical directors; and however much we may be resolved to charge their predictions with collusion and imposture, there are yet specimens of their moral doctrine preserved,[2] which exhibit a purity and a wisdom scarcely to be surpassed. Nor did the philosophers retain and communicate these sparks of true religion, when they were become extinct elsewhere. On the contrary, notwithstanding their many great excellencies as expounders of the duties of man to man, they were all agreed in one maxim, which amounts to a complete practical atheism;[3] the opinion, namely, that nothing was to be feared from the anger of God, because it was contrary to the Divine attributes that he should be the cause of pain to any one. By this doctrine they removed the greatest check upon

Oracles loose their authority.

[1] Strabo, lib. xvii. c. 1, sec. 43.
[2] See particularly, Herodotus, *Clio*, c. 158, 159, and *Erato*, c. 86.
[3] Cicero, *de Officiis*, lib. iii. c. 28, 29.

B.C. 9. wickedness which has been ever devised for it; for to the mass of mankind to say that God could not or would not punish, was the same thing as to say that he did not exist. It was a virtual denial of his moral government, the only point in his nature which it greatly concerns his creatures to be acquainted with. Thus while philosophy took away the best sanction of human conduct, and while those who could not be taught by philosophers were left to form their principles for themselves, or to pick them up from the opinions of the world, the morals of the people were in a state of great corruption. Of the sensualities which were universally practised, and of the excessive grossness of manners which naturally flowed from them, the writings of every author of the times, and still more strikingly, perhaps, the paintings and other embellishments of the houses which have been discovered at Herculaneum, offer proofs the most incontestible. But it is equally instructive and less disgusting to dwell rather on the entire absence of those virtues and feelings which operate with such extensive usefulness in the countries of modern Europe. Charity and general philanthropy were so little regarded as duties, that it requires a very extensive acquaintance with the literature of the times to find any allusion to them. There were no public hospitals, no institutions for the relief of the infirm and poor; no societies for the removal of abuses, or the improvement of the condition of mankind from motives of charity. Nothing was done to promote the instruction of the lower classes, nothing to mitigate the miseries of domestic slavery, and far less to stop altogether the perpetual atrocities of the kidnapper and the slave market. The selfishness of human nature was thus spared its most painful sacrifice; and he who was most largely endowed with the gifts of fortune, was taught only to abstain from doing active injury, and to enjoy the good things which he possessed in a life of social and intellectual gratification.

Sensualities practised.

Of the effect produced in the East by the residence of the Jews, and the Greek translation of the Old Testament.

But there was one part of the empire in which a better knowledge had been slowly working its way, and must by this time have produced considerable effect. We have already observed that the Jews were widely scattered over the eastern provinces; and as they adopted the language which was most prevalent around them, the Greek translation of the Old Testament, commonly known by the name of the Septuagint, was the form in which they were most familiar with their Scriptures. Intercourse with the Jews, and an acquaintance thus gained with the contents of their law, and of the writings of their prophets, gave birth, throughout Syria and Asia Minor, to a class of persons who are called, in our translation of the *Acts*, by the name of "the Devout;"[1] and who, without thinking themselves bound to con-

[1] Ch. xvii., ver. 4, 17. See also ch. x., ver. 2, ch. xiii., ver. 50. And the same word is used in the Greek, although it is differently translated in our version, ch. xiii. ver. 43, ch. xvi. ver. 14, ch. xviii. ver. 7.

form to the national peculiarities of the Jewish worship, had yet B.C. 9.
acquired those true notions of the Divine nature and attributes, and of the duties which God demands of man, which are so largely contained in the Old Testament. The effect of this knowledge, on those who profited by it, was to produce the very virtues in which the world was generally most deficient—devotion and charity;[1] and by these means a large portion of the people was in some degree prepared for the doctrines of a still more perfect law, which were a few years afterwards introduced among them by the Christian Apostles.

Here then our review of the state of the Roman world must terminate. Deficient as we well know it to be from the imperfection of our own knowledge, it will yet serve, perhaps, to show what were the most striking differences between the condition of society in those times and in ours; and to point out on how much less firm a foundation civilization was then built than we may hope is the case now. When, however, we reflect on the point of time at which this sketch terminates, other thoughts, we confess, are foremost in our minds, the expression of which we do not feel called upon entirely to restrain. About fourteen years before the death of Augustus, Jesus Christ was born into the world, and in less than twenty years afterwards the first foundations of the Christian society were laid. Henceforward the Roman empire acquires in our eyes a nearer interest; as a country to which we were before indifferent, becomes at once endeared to us when we know it to be the abode of those whom we love. In pursuing the story of political crimes and miseries, there will be henceforth a resting-place for our imaginations, a consciousness that, amidst all the evil which is most prominent on the records of history, a power of good was silently at work, with an influence continually increasing, and that virtue and happiness were daily more and more visiting a portion of mankind, which till now seemed to be in a condition of hopeless suffering. The reader, who has accompanied us through all the painful details presented by the last century of the Roman commonwealth, will be inclined, perhaps, with us to rejoice in the momentary contemplation of such a scene of moral beauty.

Of the family of Augustus.

It now only remains that we give some account of the family of Augustus, and conclude this memoir with some particulars of his own private life. We have already mentioned his marriage with Livia, the wife of Tib. Nero, in the year B.C. 37; and that he had at that time one daughter, named Julia, the child of his former marriage with Scribonia. As he had no children by Livia, Julia remained his only heiress, and the choice of her husband became a matter of great importance. She was first married to her cousin Claudius Marcellus, the nephew of Augustus by his sister Octavia;[2] and the person celebrated by Virgil in those famous lines of the 6th Æneid, for

[1] See the character of the Centurian Cornelius, *Acts*, ch. x., ver. 2.
[2] Tacitus *Annal.* lib. i. c. 3. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 63, *et seq.*


B.C. 9. which Octavia so largely rewarded him. But Marcellus dying young, and without children, Augustus selected for the second husband of his daughter, his oldest friend and most useful adherent, M. Vipsanius Agrippa. This marriage seemed to answer all his wishes, for Julia became the mother of five children, Caius, Lucius, Julia, Agrippina, and Agrippa Postumus, so called because he was born after his father's death, which took place in the year B.C. 13. Caius and Lucius were immediately adopted by their grandfather, and assumed the name of Cæsar; before they arrived at the age of manhood, they were distinguished by the title of "*Principes Juventutis*," or "Chiefs of the Youth;" they were marked out as consuls elect, to enter upon that office as soon as they arrived at a fit age; they were sent to the different provinces, and presented to the armies as the heirs of the emperor; their education was conducted, in great measure, by Augustus himself, and they were his constant companions at table and on his journeys. But all his hopes in them were marred by their successive premature deaths. Lucius Cæsar, when on his way to take the command of the army in Spain, was taken ill, and died at Massilia, about the year A.D. 1; and Caius Cæsar, who commanded the army on the frontiers of Parthia, having been wounded in Armenia, and returning slowly homewards towards Italy, died about eighteen months after his brother, at the town of Limyra, in Lycia.[1] Meanwhile their mother, Julia, had been married, for the third time by her father, after the death of Agrippa, to Tiberius Claudius Nero, the son of Livia; but when Caius and Lucius Cæsar were grown up to manhood, and were in the height of their favour with their grandfather, Tiberius, for whatever reasons, thought proper to withdraw from Rome to the island of Rhodes, where he lived in the greatest retirement, and during a part of the time in a sort of disgrace, for the space of more than seven years. During his absence, his wife, Julia, was guilty of such gross infidelities to him, that Augustus himself divorced her in the name of his son-in-law, and banished her to the island of Pandataria, off the coast of Campania,[2] where she was closely confined for some time, and treated with the greatest rigour; nor would Augustus ever forgive her, or receive her into his presence, although he afterwards removed



[Julia, daughter of Augustus.—*Visconti, Iconographie Romaine.*]

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 125.
[2] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. i. c. 53.

her from Pandataria to Rhegium, and somewhat softened the severity of her treatment. After the deaths of Caius and Lucius Cæsar, Tiberius was adopted by Augustus as his son, in the year A.D. 3,[1] and with him M. Agrippa Postumus, now the only surviving son of M. Agrippa. But Agrippa Postumus is represented as a youth of a brutal and intractable temper;[2] and Livia, to favour her son's interests, so exaggerated his faults, and so prejudiced his grandfather against him, that he too, like his mother, was banished from Rome, and confined in the island of Planasia: Tiberius thus remained the sole heir to the greatness of his father-in-law; but in order to point out the succession even for a more remote period, he was obliged by Augustus to adopt as his son his nephew Germanicus, the only surviving child of his brother Drusus, although he had at the same time a son of his own. Accordingly, during the last ten years of the life of Augustus, Tiberius was associated with him in the tribunican power, and in the general administration of the empire, and was clearly marked out as his successor; while Drusus and Germanicus, the two sons of Tiberius by birth and by adoption, seemed to ensure the continuance of the sovereign power in his family to the third generation. B.C. 9.



[Basilica of Caius and Cestus.—*Overbeke, Les Restes, de l'Ancienne Rome.*]

We have said that M. Vipsanius Agrippa died in the year B.C. 12. Four years afterwards Augustus lost his other chief counsellor and faithful friend, C. Cilnius Mæcenas, by whose advice he is said to have been greatly assisted in the arrangement of his government. But his power was now securely settled, and the various conspiracies which were formed against him at different times after the battle of Actium, were the mere efforts of individual revenge or ambition, and were all easily discovered and punished. In the case of L. Cinna,[3] who had intended to assassinate him when sacrificing at the altar, he not only forgave his intended murderer, but offered him his friendship, and afterwards raised him to the consulship; being resolved, it is said, to try the effect of clemency after having indulged so largely in cruelty, or being anxious rather to preserve that character of

Anecdotes of his character and behaviour.

[1] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 126.
[2] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. i. c. 3. Suetonius, c. 65.
[3] Seneca *de Clementiâ*, lib. i. c. 9, &c.

B.C. 9. magnanimity which, since the overthrow of every enemy whom he dreaded, he might counterfeit with little danger. Various other stories of his moderation are recorded; his manners were affable and courteous to all; he forbade, and probably in sincerity, that any one should address him by the name of *Dominus*, or Master;[1] and when the people wished to force upon him the ominous title of dictator, he threw himself on his knees, and casting off his robe, and baring his breast, intreated them rather to kill him, than to oblige him to accept it. In these points the example of his uncle always served as a useful warning to him; and he also learned from it to avoid every display of state in the appearance and manners of his family, in the size of his house, and in the regulation of his establishment. Yet it would be unjust to ascribe to a politic premeditation all the popular actions of his reign. Good is in itself so much more delightful than evil, that he was doubtless not insensible to the pleasure of kind and beneficent actions, and perhaps sincerely rejoiced that they were no longer incompatible with his interest. When Valerius Messala was sent to him by the Senate, to confer on him, in the name of the Senate and people of Rome, the title of "Father of his Country,"[2] he was affected even to tears, and replied, "I have now gained all that I desired, Conscript Fathers; and what have I left to pray for from the gods, but that I may preserve, to the latest day of my life, this same unanimous love of my countrymen." He did preserve it, and even with an increased affection; in proportion as the remembrance of his former cruelties became less lively, and the period of general tranquillity which had commenced under his auspices was continually lengthening. At last, in the seventy-sixth year of his age, when he was going to accompany Tiberius as far as Beneventum, on the way to Illyricum, he was seized with a dysentery, which at first attacked him but slightly, and did not prevent him from fulfilling the object of his journey, after having spent some days on the coast of Campania, in the hope of recruiting his strength. But on his return from Beneventum, his complaint grew more serious; he stopped at Nola, at the house which had belonged to his father, and in which his father had died; and as he became visibly worse, his wife Livia sent hasty messengers after Tiberius, to recall him instantly to the death-bed of the emperor. Meantime every thing that passed within the walls was concealed by Livia with the utmost care; insomuch, that although it was given out that Tiberius found his adopted father still alive,[3] and had a long and affectionate interview with him, yet Tacitus informs us that it was never clearly ascertained whether these stories were not mere fabrications,[4] and whether Augustus was not already dead when Tiberius arrived at Nola. The same authority which related the conversation of the

His last sickness.

His death.

[1] Suetonius, c. 53, *et seq.*
[2] Ibid. c. 58.
[3] Ibid. c. 97, *et seq.*
[4] See Suetonius and Velleius Paterculus.

dying emperor with his successor, pretended also that he actually B.C. 9.
expired in the arms of his wife, and that his last words were, "Farewell, Livia, and ever be mindful of our long union." It was said that he died about three o'clock in the afternoon, on the nineteenth of August, A.D. 14,[1] and when he had in fact a little more than completed his seventy-sixth year.

His appearance and character.

Augustus was in his stature something below the middle size, but extremely well proportioned;[2] his hair was a little inclined to curl, and of a yellowish brown; his eyes were bright and lively, but the general expression of his countenance was remarkably calm and mild. His health was throughout his life delicate, yet the constant attention which he paid to it, and his strict temperance in eating and drinking, enabled him, as we have seen, to reach the full age of man. As a seducer and adulterer,[3] and a man of low sensuality, his character was as profligate as that of his uncle: it is mentioned also, that he was extremely fond of gaming, a propensity which he indulged even when he was advanced in years. In his literary qualifications, without at all rivalling the attainments of Cæsar, he was on a level with most Romans of distinction of his time; and it is said that both in speaking and writing, his style was eminent for its perfect plainness and propriety.[4] His speeches, on any public occasion, were composed beforehand, and recited from memory; nay, so careful was he not to commit himself by any inconsiderate expression, that even when discussing any important subject with his own wife, he wrote down what he had to say, and read it before her. Like his uncle, he was strongly tinged with superstition; he was very much afraid of thunder and lightning,[5] and always carried about with him a seal skin as a charm against its power; notwithstanding which, in any severe storm, he was accustomed to hide himself in a chamber in the centre of his house, to be as much out of the way of it as possible; add to which, he was a great observer of dreams, and of lucky and unlucky days. He was totally destitute of military talent; but in every species of artful policy, in clearly seeing, and steadily and dispassionately following his own interest, and in turning to his own advantage all the weaknesses of others, his ability, if so it may be called, has been rarely equalled. His deliberate cruelty, his repeated treachery, and sacrifice of every duty and every feeling to the purposes of his ambition, have been sufficiently shown in the course of this narrative. But it was his good fortune, for the last forty years of his life, to be placed in circumstances in which he had no longer any temptation to the same kind of wickedness; and thus it has happened that he

[1] He was nominally born on the twenty-third of September, B.C. 63; but owing to the disordered state of the calendar, it was in reality more nearly the twenty-third of July.

[2] Suetonius, *in Augusto*, c. 79.

[3] Ibid. c. 69, 71.

[4] Ibid. c. 68, *et seq.*

[5] Ibid. c. 90.

B.C. 9. whose crimes fitted him to rank with Marius or Sylla, with Nero or with Domitian, has been loaded with praises as a benefactor to his species, and his name has passed into a proverb as a promoter of peace and a general patron of literature and of civilisation.



[Mausoleum of Augustus.—*Overbeke, Les Restes de l'Ancienne, Rome.*



[Tiberius and Livia.—*Museum Florentinum*]

CHAPTER VII.

TIBERIUS NERO CÆSAR.

FROM A.D. 14 TO A.D. 37.

THE tyranny which was established by the successful ambition of Augustus, was concealed by his cautious dissimulation; accordingly the character of his government did not appear in all its deformity, till the reign of his successor. It is remarkable, that the power which Augustus secured by the cold-hearted calculating sacrifice of his early friends, and which was afterwards extended by the event of the battle of Actium, did not only "place a barren sceptre in his hand, no son of his succeeding," but did afterwards, by a coincidence of circumstances which no human sagacity could have foreseen, descend to the family of Antonius himself, who was once the partner, and afterwards the rival of his fortunes. A.D. 14.

Tiberius was a descendant of the Claudian family, the son of Livia Drusilla; he was born B.C. 41, forty-two years before the Christian era. His father, Tiberius Nero, was distinguished by his naval skill in the Alexandrine war under Julius Cæsar,[1] and subsequently excited a sedition in Campania, by flattering the passions, and promising to restore the property of those who had suffered in the civil wars. This tumult, however, was soon quelled by the arrival of Octavius; Birth and parentage.

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. xlii.

A.D. 14. and Tiberius, together with his wife, Livia, took refuge in Sicily and Achaia, till the establishment of the second triumvirate made it safe for him to return to Rome. The young Tiberius, who had been the companion of his parents in exile,[1] was brought to the capital to share their fortunes; and his mother, Livia, having engaged the affections of Octavius, Tiberius transferred to him the name and privileges of an husband.[2] The family thus surrendered by their natural guardian, seem to have experienced the protection and love of Octavius. We find Tiberius the elder of the two sons, commencing his career of public life at an age earlier than that prescribed by law,[3] and holding successively the office of quæstor,[4] prætor, and consul, without the due legal interval of time. The first appointment he received in his nineteenth year; and when a partial failure of the annual produce threatened Rome with the peril of a famine, the measures he adopted were judicious and effectual. Soon after this period he was sent with military power into the eastern provinces. From the hands of the Parthian king, he received the standards which were lost by Crassus, the melancholy memorials of a fatal enterprise; and when factions in Armenia had deposed Artaxias, the reigning monarch, Tigranes,[5] his brother, was recalled from Rome, and placed on the throne by the agency of Tiberius. Whatever schemes of ambition might be suggested to the latter by the influence of his mother Livia, by his own military success, and by his personal interest at Rome, were now interrupted by an event which filled the emperor with joy, and gave him a lineal descendant to inherit the power of the Cæsars. Two sons were born to his daughter Julia, and were transferred,[6] by the usual ceremonies of adoption, to the peculiar care of Augustus.

Early civil and military offices.

In the meantime the Rhæti, a savage intractable race, who, being originally of Tuscan origin, had migrated into that part of Swisserland now occupied by the Grisons, were molesting, by frequent incursions, the adjacent parts of Italy: they were joined by the Vindelici, and affairs assuming a formidable appearance, Tiberius and his brother Drusus were sent to repel the invaders.[7] Roman courage and discipline were opposed in vain by a fierce and numerous enemy, and by the strong mountain barriers with which nature had fortified their country. The enterprise was conducted with vigour and success, and has formed the subject of a beautiful Ode of Horace, in

Rhætian campaign.

[1] Suetonius, c. 6. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 75.
[2] Tacitus, lib. v. c. 1.
[3] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. Dion Cassius, lib. liii.
[4] Suetonius, c. 9.
[5] Dion Cassius, lib. 54. Josephus, lib. xv. c. 5.
[6] Ibid. lib. liv. Suetonius, *in Augusto*, lib. lxiv.
[7] Strabo, lib. iv. Florus, lib iv. c. 12. Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 97.

which the praises of the victorious generals are ingeniously blended with the finest compliment to the wisdom of the emperor.[1] A.D. 14.

"The Rhætian bands beheld him such in war,
Those daring bands who with triumphant joy
Were wont to spread their baneful terror far,
Tamed by the courage of the martial boy,
Felt what true valour could achieve when led
By bright example and by virtue bred,
Felt how Augustus with paternal mind,
Fired the young Neros to heroic deeds.
—*Francis' Horace.*[2]

Tiberius had contracted in early life a marriage of affection with Vipsania, the daughter of Agrippa:[3] this union, however, was dissolved, at the instigation of Augustus, who persuaded Tiberius to marry his daughter Julia, when Agrippa's death left her a widow:[4] and thus to promote his political interests by the sacrifice of his domestic happiness. The affairs of Pannonia now demanding his presence, he assumed the command of the legions; and that province, together with Dalmatia and Dacia, was soon reduced to obedience. We forbear to dwell on these several expeditions, because they have already found a more appropriate place in the historical details of a preceding article. Subsequently he commanded in Germany, where he avenged the death and completed the conquests of his brother Drusus; and, on his return to Rome, he received from the hands of a grateful nation a second consulship, and a second triumph. Marries and repudiates Vipsania. Marries Julia.

On a sudden Tiberius demanded from the emperor permission to retire to Rhodes: the request was urged with importunity, at first resisted with vigour, and at length granted with reluctance. Various circumstances have been mentioned by historians, as the causes of this extraordinary conduct. Some ascribe it to the overbearing pride[5] and profligate infidelity of Julia. Perhaps Tiberius was unwilling to provoke the jealousy, or oppose the pretensions of the young grandsons of Augustus; indeed Velleius Paterculus,[6] says, a condescending and noble generosity prompted him to retreat, that the maturity and splendour of his own reputation might not eclipse their rising fame: others suggest that he retired from public life, that the nation, by feeling his loss, might learn to appreciate his value.

[1] Crevier, vol. i.

[2] . . . . . *diu*
Latèque victrices catervæ,
Consiliis juvenis revictæ,
Sensere, quid mens rite quid indoles
Nutrita faustis sub Penetralibus
Posset, quid Augusti paternus
In pueros animus Nerones.
—*Carm.* ode. 4. 4.

[3] Tacitus, lib. i. c. 12.
[4] Suetonius, c. 7.
[5] Ibid. lib. i. c. 53. Suetonius, c. 10.
[6] Lib. ii. c. 99.

A.D. 14. Retires to Rhodes.

However this may be, he quitted Rome privately; and chose for his abode an island, the salubrity and beauty of which he had admired on his return from Armenia. In this spot he passed seven years, enjoying neither the activity and usefulness of public employment, nor the dignity and ease of literary leisure;[1] retaining no external indication of his former grandeur, and even exchanging the Roman dress for the peculiarities of the foreign garb. Sometimes he would share and regulate the disputations of the sophists, or attempt to penetrate the secrets of futurity, by the assistance of the astrologer Thrasyllus. At the expiration of a few years, he solicited leave to revisit Rome, and, when this was denied, he abandoned his usual occupations, secluded himself in the interior of the island, and shunned the sight of those who were induced by curiosity or kindness to interrupt or relieve his solitude. At length, in the eighth year of his residence at Rhodes, a residence at once wretched and contemptible, he was recalled by the influence of Livia, and passed the two succeeding years in privacy at Rome.

Returns to Rome.

Adopted by Augustus.

The deaths both of Caius and Lucius Cæsar, the sons of Agrippa by Julia, left Tiberius without a rival, and accordingly he was adopted by Augustus. The wisdom and foresight of a declining monarch might suggest strong reasons of policy for this adoption;[2] but far other motives have been attributed to Augustus: he is said to have made his choice, with a full conviction of the miseries he was about to entail on his subjects, in order that posterity might readily forget his faults, and duly appreciate his merits, when they were contrasted with the dark vices of his successor. Such is the hint thrown out by Tacitus,[3] and Dion Cassius,[4] but the idea is somewhat wild and extravagant; it seems one which Augustus would not have adopted, and which, at this time, the character of Tiberius would not have justified. It is, indeed, probable, that the emperor was not influenced by the arts of Livia, and not ignorant of the character of her son; yet he might reflect with just complacency on the military success and fame of Tiberius, whom it was certainly easy to discard, but not so easy to replace: Agrippa, Marcellus, and the two young Cæsars were dead; and though another grandson still survived in exile, yet his disposition and abilities

[1] Suetonius, c. 11-14.

[2] In elective monarchies, the vacancy of the throne is a moment big with danger and mischief. The Roman Emperors, desirous to spare the legions that interval of suspense, and the temptation of an irregular choice, invested their designed successor with so large a share of present power, as should enable him, after their decease, to assume the remainder without suffering the empire to perceive the change of masters. Thus Augustus, after all his fairer prospects had been snatched from him, by untimely deaths, rested his last hopes on Tiberius, obtained for his adopted son the censorial and tribunitian powers, and dictated a law, by which the future prince was invested with an authority equal to his own over the provinces and armies. (Gibbon, vol. i. *Oct.* p. 119.)

[3] Lib. i. c. 10.

[4] Lib. lvi.

qualified him rather for the labours of a mechanic than for the command of a mighty empire. In the familiar epistles of the latter to Tiberius, there are many expressions of personal regard, which may induce us to believe that the motives of his choice were good, though its object and its consequences were afterwards unworthy and disastrous.[1] A.D. 14.

German campaign.

The station which Tiberius now attained, was not a post of honourable inactivity, for when the unquiet spirit of the Germans broke out in fresh revolts, he was appointed to quell them. Of this war, Velleius Paterculus was both the historian and the witness: his opportunities of observation made his statement of facts valuable; but his estimate of character is very exceptionable; and whether his errors arose from a want of discrimination, or the bias of prejudice, his information is equally useless: we might instance the concise and somewhat contemptuous mention of Marcellus,[2] and the comparison of that connection which subsisted between Tiberius and Sejanus, with the virtuous friendship of Lælius and Scipio, of Agrippa and Augustus. His account of this campaign commences in a tone of ludicrous self-importance: "O! ye good Gods what deeds of large expanse we achieved under the command of Tiberius Cæsar: all Germany was traversed by our arms, and nations were conquered almost unknown by name."[3] The fact seems to be, that these people were intimidated by the forces and the fame of Tiberius; and except a single attempt to surprise his army, nothing interrupted the conquest of the country from the Rhine to the Elbe. His next expedition was against Marodobuus, a chieftain of the Marcomanni, who had established a kingdom in Bohemia, and whom rank, popularity, talents, and a powerful force, rendered a formidable enemy to the Roman arms. Before, however, any encounter took place, news arrived of an extensive revolt in Pannonia and Dalmatia, and Tiberius was recalled to oppose the rebels. His circumspection, aided by the valour of Germanicus, his nephew and adopted son, reduced the insurgents in three years; but in the meantime, Varus and his legions being cut off in Germany, Tiberius was again sent thither, and he, having retrenched the luxury, and improved the discipline

[1] A similar view of the case is taken by Tillemont, the author of an elaborate *Ecclesiastical History*; speaking of Tiberius, he says, *Il sembloit avoir mérité cette élévation par les grandes services qu'il avoit rendu, dans plusieurs guerres où il avoit esté employé; sur tout dans la Pannonie, comme on le peut voir dans les auteurs qui ont fait l'histoire d'Auguste. Il estoit alors dans un grand estime qu'il s' estoit acquise par des actions grandes et belles en apparence.* Il en est cependant difficile qu' Auguste ne connust pas les vices d'un si mauvais naturel. Dion dit qu'il ne se resolut d'abord à l'élever après la mort que malgré lui et faute d'en trouver de meilleur.†* Tillemont, *Histoire des Empereurs, &c. Tibère.*

* Tacitus, lib. vi. c. 51. † Suetonius, c. 24.

[2] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 93.

[3] *Proh Dii boni quanti voluminis opera insequenti æstate sub duce Tiberio Cæsare gessimus! Perlustrata armis tota Germania est.*—(Velleius Paterculus, lib. c. 106.)—*Victæ gentes pæne nominibus incognitæ.*

A.D. 14. of the army, ravaged the country with his usual vigour and success. On his return to Rome, he triumphed for his victories, and the death of Augustus, which occurred soon after, left him sole monarch of the Roman empire.

Accession to the Imperial dignity.

Thus far the life of Tiberius was distinguished by singular vicissitudes: we have seen the son of a rebellious general, and a fugitive citizen, become the friend and companion of Augustus—we have observed him driven by discontent and domestic misfortune from the honours and fatigues of public life, to the seclusion of a remote island, returning to be again invested with high military command; and justifying this confidence by the restitution of salutary discipline,[1] by the prudent vigour of his counsels, and by that active courage which preserved the conquests, and extended the reputation of Rome. It would have been fortunate for his memory, if he had never lived to taste the pleasures, and abuse the power of imperial greatness; for though we may have found, in the preceding history of his life, little to excite admiration, yet some redeeming qualities might have softened the harsher features of his character, and at least he would not have been held up to the memory and detestation of posterity, as a monster of deceit, licentiousness, and cruelty. Tacitus[2] mentions the latter part of the Emperor's reign as a period exhibiting a dreadful uniformity of guilt—of savage mandates and incessant accusations, when friendship was without confidence, and innocence was no protection: the conduct also of his successor presents too often an awful picture of vice and folly; yet a thoughtful mind may contemplate with advantage even times and scenes like these: mankind are too often dazzled by the splendour of external circumstances, and require to be reminded that happiness does not consist in rank, opulence, or authority. The lives of such men as Nero, Domitian, or Heliogabalus prove, more effectually than the precepts of the moralist, how wretched is the state of those "who have few things to desire, and many things to fear—"[3] whose passions are neither impeded by any opposition, nor regulated by any principle.

The vigilance and precaution of Livia concealed the death of her husband, till she had secured the power of her son. Tiberius himself immediately assumed the military functions of an emperor; he gave the watchword to the prætorian guards, and despatches were sent in his name to the foreign troops. His conduct to the Senate was marked by useless dissimulation; he convened that body only, as he said, in right of his tribunitian power, that the will of Augustus might be read, and that their gratitude might decree to his memory the honour of an Apotheosis. These ceremonies having been performed, the Senate requested Tiberius to ascend the throne: his usual dissimulation did not forsake him: to friends who urged him

Dissimulation towards the Senate.

[1] Suetonius, c. 18, 19. [2] Lib. iv. c. 33. [3] Lord Bacon.

to yield to the general wish,[1] he replied that Augustus alone had power to sustain the weight of government—that his limited experience had taught him how great was the responsibility of empire, and how precarious its enjoyment; and that the duties of the State would be executed with greater fidelity, if they were divided among several of its illustrious citizens. This assumed diffidence deceived no one; and it was wittily observed, "other men grant reluctantly what they promised: he grants what he reluctantly promised."[2] At length the pretended reluctance of Tiberius gave way to the importunate and abject supplications of the Senate, who, together with the higher orders of people, ran headlong into servitude.[3] A.D. 14.

The causes of this degradation and abasement may be traced to that period, when Republican liberty had degenerated into faction, when faction had displayed itself in all the horrors of a civil war, and civil war had terminated in despotism. When Julius Cæsar overthrew the constitution, his friends and enemies alike combined to honour him with extravagant privileges: the former hoped, by the grant of unlimited power, to satisfy his ambition—the latter, to promote his ruin. Thus, the national spirit was debased, and a people who would once have despised life, when separated from freedom, now became habituated to the meanest acts of submission, and no flattery, however gross, could want the excuse of precedent. During the latter years of the Republic, the riches of the principal citizens were immense: but under the emperors, many of the sources of this wealth were stopped; the senatorial coffers were no longer filled by the offerings of numerous and opulent clients; and the money levied on the provinces, instead of being intercepted by individuals, found its way to the exchequer of the prince: hence the higher classes of society sought, by every method, the personal favour of the monarch, because this alone could enable them to support the luxury and expense which habit had rendered necessary. Such being the degenerate state of public feeling, a measure of Tiberius, which transferred the power of electing magistrates from the people to the Senate, made the latter still more dependent on his will. He professed, indeed, to respect their rights, and was scrupulously careful to bring before their notice all questions relating to public affairs;[4] yet he left them only the exterior form of power, while all substantial authority emanated really from himself. "The name of this great council, which had once dictated laws to the earth, was now employed to give a sanction to the acts of the monarch, and was often prostituted to the vilest purposes of tyranny:[5] not that Tiberius wished to de- Causes of national degradations.

[1] Tacitus, lib. i. c. 10.

[2] *Cæteros quod polliciti sint tardè præstare, sed ipsum quod præstet tardè polliceri* —Suetonius, c. 24.

[3] Tacitus, lib. i 7.

[4] Suetonius, c. 30. Tacitus, lib. iii. c. 60. Dion Cassius, lib. lvii.

[5] Gibbon, c. 3.

A.D. 14. grade the Senate; on the contrary, he was the first to complain of their baseness and adulation;[1] but his wishes were inconsistent; he aimed at uniting impossibilities; he desired an assembly of men who would become the willing ministers of his cruelty, his fears, and his jealousy, at the same time that their integrity and talents might make his government respected.

The measure by which the people were excluded from electing magistrates, seems to have passed with little resistance.[2] The welfare of the State, and the distribution of its public offices, were no longer objects of patriotic interest; the bad example of the Senate had produced corresponding effects on the people, and public spirit was absorbed in selfish feeling.

> "For since their votes have been no longer bought,
> All public care has vanished from their thought;
> And those who once, with unresisted sway,
> Gave armies, empire, every thing away,
> For two poor claims, have now renounced the whole,
> And only ask the Circus and the pole."
>
> —Gifford's Juvenal. *Sat.* 10. l. 94.[3]

Mutiny of the Pannonian legions.

The tranquillity, however, of the city did not extend to the camp. In Pannonia, J. Blæsus commanded three legions, and the commencement of a new reign provided a favourable opportunity for the intermission of the usual duties, and the indulgence of military festivities; but this indulgence was soon abused: exemption from military discipline, which had been granted as a temporary favour, was now demanded as a right; the minds of the army were irritated by the arts and eloquence of Percennius, who, in nightly meetings, expatiated on the severity of their officers, the length of their services, and the inadequacy of their pay, and contrasted their condition with the easy life and ample remuneration of the prætorian guards. Discontent soon assumed the character of mutiny, till Blæsus restored a temporary tranquillity by his personal address and courage, and by promising that his own son should be sent to the Emperor, to state their grievances, and entreat redress. This success encouraged the mutineers, and Vibulenus spread among the outlying detachments the flames of tumult and sedition. When intelligence of these disturbances was brought to Rome, Drusus was sent into Pannonia with two cohorts of the prætorian troops, under Ælius Sejanus. The disposition of Drusus was naturally severe,[4] but he used his discretionary power with judgment; he addressed himself alternately to the

[1] Tacitus, lib. ii. c. 87. Suetonius, c. 27. Tacitus, lib. iv. c. 8.

[2] Ibid. lib. i. c. 15.

[3] *Jam pridem ex quo suffragia nulli*
Vendimus, effugit curas, et qui dabat olim
Imperium, fasces, legiones, omnia, nunc se
Continet, atque duas tantum res anxius optai
Panem et Circenses. —Juv. *Sat.* 10.

[4] Tacitus, lib. i. c. 29.

hopes and fears of the disaffected: order was restored; and the ring-leaders having been put to death, he returned to Rome. A.D. 14.

And of the armies on the Rhine.

At the same time, another revolt broke out among the two armies stationed on the Rhine; a revolt more dangerous than the former, better organized, more extensive, and aiming at nothing less than placing Germanicus on the throne. Many transferred to him with alacrity the affection they had felt towards his father Drusus;[1] an affection founded on the opinion that, had he been the successor of Augustus, the Republican government would have been restored. But neither his own popularity, nor the consciousness that he was regarded by Tiberius and Livia with jealousy and suspicion, induced Germanicus to swerve from his duty: it was alike dangerous to exasperate the minds of the soldiers by too much rigour, or to encourage their demands by too great concessions. So atrocious and sanguinary were the outrages of the troops, that force alone seemed capable of checking the mischief; and yet to arm the allies of Rome against her rebellious legions, would again plunge the country into the miseries of civil war. The wisdom, integrity, and skill of Germanicus, overcame the difficulties by which he was surrounded: he reminded some that the very emperor whom they were now deserting, had himself led them to battle, and rewarded their success; some, who pleaded long and laborious services, were suffered to depart; the clamour of others was appeased by immediate distribution of the bequests of Augustus; and those centurions who were found guilty of peculation or cruelty, were speedily and publicly cashiered. By degrees the spirit of allegiance and subordination returned, and Germanicus led his troops against the Marci, that they might consume their dangerous valour upon the enemies of their country, and atone by present exertions for the guilt of past disloyalty. This expedition ended happily, and was followed by another against the Catti. The country at this time was divided into two parties, each having its respective leader: Arminius thought the discontents prevalent in the Roman camp offered a favourable occasion for the recovery of independence; Segestes, supported by the less enterprising spirits, still preserved his fidelity. Cæcina was left with four legions, supported by five thousand auxiliaries, to check the Cherusci, while Germanicus proceeded to release Segestes from a close and dangerous siege.

Quelled by Germanicus.

Tiberius viewed with mingled feelings of satisfaction and pain the career of his adopted son; his fidelity was, indeed, beyond suspicion, but the jealousy of the Emperor was awakened by his military fame, by the wisdom with which he calmed the internal tumults which threatened the safety of the State, and by the courage with which he subdued those enemies who ventured to renounce her supremacy:

Jealousy of Tiberius.

[1] Tacitus, c. 33.

A.D. 14. nay, even by the pious and affectionate zeal which induced Germanicus to visit the spot where the legions of Varus were defeated, and to honour their mouldering bones with the decent solemnities of interment.[1]

Campaign against Arminius.

In the meantime Arminius had induced some of the neighbouring nations to adopt his cause, and was conducting a dangerous and desultory warfare with unabated vigour, and occasional success; at one time he defeated the troops of Cæcina, when entangled in the intricacies of woods and morasses, while two legions under Vitellius scarcely escaped destruction from the high tides of the German Ocean. Those who desire to be more acquainted with the circumstances of the several campaigns, may find them detailed in Tacitus: we will, however, extract one passage, because it seems admirably suited to illustrate the characteristic excellence of that historian; his power of communicating in few words a livelier image than could have been produced by the most elegant and pathetic prolixity. Tacitus having mentioned that Arminius was obliged to retire from a city in which he had besieged Segestes, thus proceeds:[2]—"Among other women of rank was the wife of Arminius, who was also the daughter of Segestes—with more of her husband's spirit than her brother—not reduced by defeat to tears or supplications—with hands crossed on her bosom she contemplated her pregnant womb."[3] Nothing can be added to such a picture. Three years had now been spent in a difficult and unsatisfactory warfare. The Roman soldiers were superior in skill or discipline to the hardy barbarians, but their resources were exhausted by protracted winters, and their plans impeded or destroyed by the impracticable nature of the country. Hereupon Germanicus determined to transport the war into the heart of Germany: he sent Vitellius to collect subsidies in Gaul, and ordered a fleet of a thousand galleys to be speedily prepared, under the superintendence of Silius, Anteius, and Cæcinæ: some of these were adapted to the transportation of cavalry or military engines, and obedient to the oar or sail, as the nature of the navigation might require. *Insula Batavorum* was the point at which the forces were collected. When every preparation was made, Germanicus, passing along the canal, cut by his father Drusus, entered the Rhine, and crossing the Zuyder See, coasted the German Ocean till he came to the mouth of the Emse. Here he disembarked his troops, and hearing that the *Cherusci*, under Arminius, were encamped on the further side of the Veser, he crossed the river. Affairs were now manifestly drawing to a crisis; and Germanicus was anxious to ascertain the genuine sentiments of his army, their opinion of the expedition, and

[1] Tacitus, lib. i. c. 62.

[2] Ibid. c. 57.

[3] *Inerant fœminæ nobiles inter quas uxor Arminii, eademque filia Segestis, mariti magis quam parentis animo, neque victa in lachrymas, neque voce supplex, compressis intra sinum manibus, gravidum uterum intuens.*

their confidence in himself: he felt that official reports are often erroneous, from accidental inaccuracy or intentional deceit, and he therefore determined to form his own judgment from the results of personal observation. Accordingly he traversed the camp in disguise; and, in secrecy, heard from his soldiers every expression of confidence in their leader's skill, gratitude for his kindness, and ardour in his cause.[1] The same night an attack was attempted on the Roman camp, but the timely information of a deserter had occasioned particular precaution, and the Germans advanced in vain. The next day the two armies met in a plain, bounded on one side by the winding course of the Veser, on the other by the range of wooded hills, which lies near the town of Bremen. Arminius supported his own reputation, and animated his troops alike by his eloquence and example; but the Romans gained an important and easy victory, and a triumphal pillar commemorated, in the language of gratitude and superstition, the extent and authors of their success.[2] The winter, however, was now approaching, and the returning legions encountered the more formidable dangers of an unknown and tempestuous sea; some galleys were sunk, others were stranded on the continent, or driven with their terrified crews to the remote shores of Britain. Upon this, the Germans again resolved to try the chance of war; fresh insurrections led only to fresh defeats, and the Romans retired into winter quarters, having retrieved their late disaster by the acquision of new honours.

A.D. 14.

Victories of Germanicus.

Tiberius viewed with more envy than delight the military celebrity of Germanicus, and therefore resolved to withdraw him from an obedient and attached army;[3] to this end the emperor addressed at once his vanity and his moderation, by promising to the former the honours and duties of a new consulship, and requesting from the latter that a few enemies might still be left to employ the arms, and establish the reputation of Drusus. Germanicus was not deluded by this artful pretext, but opposition was useless, and accordingly he returned to Rome.[4] The recovered standards of the unfortunate Varus —the personal accomplishments of the victorious general—the rank and number of his captives—the nature and extent of his conquests, and especially the genuine expressions of popular affection and respect which welcomed him to the capital, all tended to increase the magnificence of his triumph. But he was not destined to enjoy in tranquillity the distinctions he had acquired in war; disturbances arose in the East, Syria and Judæa petitioning for a lighter taxation; the small states of Commagena and Cilicia struggling for a change of masters.[5] The regulation of these affairs was entrusted to Germanicus, and the next step taken by the emperor was the removal of

Recall of Germanicus.

He is appointed to command in the East.

[1] Tacitus, lib. ii. c. 13.
[2] Ibid. c. 22.
[3] Ibid. c. 5.
[4] Strabo, lib. vii.
[5] Tacitus, lib. ii. c. 42. Josephus, lib. xviii. c. 3.

A.D. 14. Creticus Silanus from the government of Syria. In his place was substituted Cneius Piso, whose family pride, augmented by an alliance with Plancina, and whose unyielding, impetuous temper well qualified him to disturb the peace and oppose the counsels of Germanicus. He adopted arts, the most unworthy and pernicious, to gain and secure popularity. The veteran officers, who still upheld military discipline, were superseded by the creatures of the new general; the minds of the soldiers were corrupted by bribery; licentiousness was allowed in the cities, and indolence in the camp.

Arts of Piso.

Germanicus, on leaving Rome, stopped on the coast of Dalmatia, where Drusus was employed to watch and foment the dissensions of the German states. Arminius and Mandobuus were the rival leaders: the former was followed by the *Senones*, *Cherusci*, and their allies, and the latter was king of the *Marcomanni*, with whom he had emigrated from the banks of the Rhine, and fixed himself in the centre of Bohemia.[1] Mandobuus was overpowered by a combination of foreign enemies and rebellious subjects, and passed his latter days, by the permission of Tiberius, in inglorious exile at Ravenna.[2] Arminius, the champion of German liberty,[3] who in war was unsubdued, and whom occasional failure never discouraged, at length himself invaded the rights he had fought so bravely to establish, and fell by the hand of his countrymen the victim of unprincipled ambition.

Death of Arminius.

Arrival of Germanicus in the East.

The character and conduct of Piso were not unknown to Germanicus; but his arrival in Syria was delayed, because the affairs of Armenia seemed to require his presence. The nation had no king, but popular favour inclined to Leno, son of Polemo, the king of Pontus, and he accordingly was crowned at Artaxata.[4] Cappadocia, about this time, became a Roman province, on the death of Archelaus. Appian, indeed, places this event in the reign of Augustus, but he is contradicted by the evidence of other writers. This prince, who by some neglect had incurred the hatred of Tiberius during his residence at Rhodes, was persuaded to ask pardon personally at Rome. The emperor, who forgot no slight, however unintentional or remote, treated Archelaus with severity, and he soon fell a victim to age, sorrow, and indignity.

Germanicus having arranged the affairs of these provinces, proceeded to meet Piso, at Cyrrhus, in Cæle Syria; mutual discontent was fostered by the intervention of pretended friends; false charges were invented, or true ones exaggerated; they separated with disguised dislike, and Piso either omitted to attend the military tribunal of Germanicus, or came only to oppose his measures.

[1] Strabo, lib. vii. [2] Tacitus, lib. ii. c. 63.
[3] Tacitus, lib. ii. c. 88.
[4] Strabo, lib. xii. Tacitus, lib. ii. c. 56.

The next year, Germanicus visited Egypt, its lake, and pyramids, its majestic ruins and ancient records; and, combining the pursuit of knowledge with the discharge of duty, he penetrated as far as Syene, or the cataracts of the Nile. He imitated the artful policy of Alexander in Persia, and Scipio in Sicily, and won the affections of the people by adopting their customs. But on his return from the expedition, he fell ill at Antioch, and in his thirty-fourth year this accomplished prince perished by a tragical, premature, and mysterious death. The historical student who appreciates duly the character of Germanicus,[1] will perceive that in the days of public oppression and private immorality, he shines with bright and solitary lustre. We have seen him invested with military power which he never abused, and adhering to an emperor who hated his excellence, and disparaged his services, even when the offer of a throne tempted him from his allegiance. He acquired the esteem of the citizens, and the affection of the soldiers, without courting the favour of the one, or relaxing the discipline of the other. The harmony which existed between himself and Drusus, was interrupted neither by the feeling of personal rivalry, or the efforts of intriguing courtiers; in short, he was as amiable in all the relations of private life, as he was eminently distinguished in the discharge of public duty. Amidst the occupations of the general, he did not neglect the accomplishments of the scholar;[2] and we learn from the testimony of antiquity, that he had pursued with success the study of eloquence and poetry.

A.D. 14.

His death and character.



[Drusus Germanicus.—*From a Medal in the Museum Florentinum.*]

Nothing could equal the general sorrow and consternation with which Rome and the provinces learned the death of Germanicus. Piso, on the contrary, and Plancina, displayed the most exulting and indecent joy;[3] and thus seemed to sanction the prevalent suspicion, that their machinations had contrived the catastrophe. Whether any marks of poison, visible in the body after dissolution, countenanced this report, historians are not agreed. Piso, having sent his son Domitius to Rome, immediately endeavoured to put himself at the head of the legions in Syria; this attempt was frustrated by the promptitude and courage of Sontius. Piso, having occupied a fort in Cilicia, called Celendris, was there besieged, and capitulated on condition of a free passage to Italy.

[1] Josephus, lib. xviii. c. 8. Dion Cassius, c. 57. Tacitus, lib. ii. c. 72. Suetonius, *in Caligula*, lib. iii.

[2] Ovid *Fasti*, lib. i. c. 21.

[3] Tacitus, lib. ii. c. 75.

A.D. 20. Return of Agrippina.

In the meantime, Agrippina, bearing the ashes of her husband Germanicus, and attended by her two children, arrived at Brundusium. Sorrow in her case was natural and laudable, but she seems to have neglected the lessons of submission which were inculcated by the last words of Germanicus,[1] and to have admitted more of sternness and revenge than is consistent with the softness and delicacy of the female character. The soldiers who had served under the standards of the departed hero, the friends who were attached to his person, and many who knew only his reputation, flocked to the coast to meet Agrippina, and the widow's sorrow was mitigated by the sympathy of national feeling, though time alone could remove it. No funeral honours were omitted, which could adorn the memory of Germanicus; a mourning crowd, with unornamented standards and reversed fasces, attended his ashes: these were met at the entrance of the city by the consuls, the senate, and the people, and deposited in the tomb of Augustus, with the genuine, unaffected tribute of a nation's esteem and sorrow. Popular clamour now demanded that the manner of Germanicus's death should be ascertained by immediate investigation.[2] Vitellius, Veranius, and Servæus conducted a prosecution against Piso. The emperor was solicited to undertake the office of judge, but he referred the affair to the cognizance of the Senate. The deep displeasure with which he witnessed the expressions of respect that greeted Agrippina, was cautiously concealed; but an edict from the palace soon admonished the people that all virtue and ability had not perished with Germanicus. That however the State might deplore the loss of illustrious citizens, her internal resources could always repair it; and that national feeling should now be transferred from public sorrow to public festivity. At length the important trial came on, and the proceedings in the Senate were opened by a speech from Tiberius, which, however it might belie his real sentiments, was replete with good sense and impartiality: this was, perhaps, the impartiality of indifference rather than of justice; he was, probably, careless about the fate of Piso, and when popular indignation so loudly demanded a victim, interference was dangerous and useless. The speech of Tiberius was followed by an eloquent harangue from Vitellius, who accused Piso of corrupting the minds, and destroying the discipline of the army in the East; of having contrived and accomplished the murder of Germanicus; and of having risen in arms against the State itself. Six days were allowed for the accused to prepare his defence, during which interval, he escaped by a voluntary death the formalities of justice and the certainty of condemnation.[3] From the circumstances relating to this trial, which have come down to us, we learn there was a strong suspicion that Germanicus had been poisoned by

Funeral honours.

Prosecution of Piso.

His suicide.

[1] Tacitus, lib. ii. c. 71.
[2] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 13.
[3] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 14.

Piso and Plancina with the consciousness and sanction of the emperor and Livia. Perhaps, from the nature of the case, very rigid proof cannot in fairness be demanded; but to us the evidence does not appear sufficiently clear and satisfactory to fix the guilt on the accused parties; at least, we would not determine by peremptory decision, a question which Tacitus [1] acknowledged to be involved in obscurity and doubt. A.D. 20.

Considerations on the death of Germanicus.

On one hand it may be urged, that the emperor's feeling of envy and hatred against Germanicus is unquestionable: that his mission into the East, the removal of Piso,[2] and the appointment of Silanus, were consistent with these sentiments, and might be parts of the imputed plan; that most historians agree in their assertions that Germanicus was poisoned by the agency of Piso, and that his subsequent conduct seemed to justify the suspicion: that when a question arose whether Piso should attempt to seize Syria, Domitius encouraged him, by suggesting that his conduct was known to the empress, and secretly sanctioned by Tiberius. Tacitus also mentions a traditional report, that Piso had written documents containing this very sanction; and that unless Sejanus had contrived to obtain them by treacherous promises, they would have been produced on the trial. Besides, the testimony of Germanicus himself is valuable;[3] he scruples not to call Piso his murderer, and the expression, "*muliebri fraude*," ("woman's wickedness,") points either to Plancina or Livia, or both.

On the other hand it may be said, that the story of the written documents is only mentioned by Tacitus as a rumour, and there is no reason to suppose he believed it himself—that it is highly improbable that such documents should have been written by Tiberius or surrendered by Piso. Could an emperor, who so well knew and practised the arts of dissimulation, find no safer mode of contriving an enemy's death than by writing an order for his assassination? Besides, neither Piso's character nor conduct make it likely that he should have been chosen by the wily monarch to be the accomplice and the perpetrator of such dark designs. He was, indeed, well calculated by his pride, ambition, and impetuosity, to thwart the projects and disturb the happiness of Germanicus; but had his instructions from Tiberius extended further; he would scarcely have awakened suspicion, and provoked the anger of his intended victim, by personal abuse, by indications of open enmity, by vexatious opposition, or by constant disobedience. It is true Germanicus ascribed his death to the machinatious of Piso; perhaps this very conviction tended to accelerate his end; at least, he could furnish no proofs of

[1] Tacitus, c. 19.

[2] Josephus, lib. xviii. c. 3. Suetonius, *in Caligula*, 1. Dion Cassius. Pliny, lib. xi. c. 37.

[3] Tacitus, lib. ii. c. 70, 71.

A.D. 20. the fact, since none were produced on the trial. "The defence," says Tacitus,[1] "on other points was a failure: the only accusation he seemed to have refuted was that of poisoning; nor, indeed, did the accusers urge it with sufficient force."[2] The story of Germanicus having been poisoned at his own table, is rejected by the same historian as an incredible absurdity; neither does his account justify Suetonius in saying, that the body of the deceased general exhibited manifest marks of poison. The passage in Dion Cassius is curious: "Germanicus died at Antioch by the insidious arts of Piso and Plancina; for while he was yet alive, there were found in his house the bones of men concealed in the earth, and leaden plates, on which was inscribed the name of Germanicus, connected with certain forms of imprecation."[3] Here the accusation is made, and the proof adduced consists in certain incantations and charms, which, in days of ignorance and superstition, alarmed the imagination, and deluded the credulity of man. Upon the whole, that the death of Germanicus was contrived by Piso, is probable; that it delighted Tiberius is certain; but that he himself was privy to the plan or the execution, is neither certain nor probable.

Change in the character of Tiberius after the death of Germanicus.

The character of Germanicus had hitherto exerted a salutary influence over the conduct of Tiberius, who felt the power of that virtuous example which he had not wisdom enough to imitate. The early death of that accomplished prince removed this restraint, and developed more decidedly the natural qualities of Tiberius. Before this period, there is something to extort respect in the splendour of his military prowess,[4] and even during the first years of his administration of imperial powers, there is much that deserves commendation. Public magistrates were judiciously selected; merit was, in many cases, the avenue to office, and a faithful discharge of duty the only cause of its continuance. The condemnation of Capito and Silanus, who were accused of extortion by some Asiatic cities, showed that the emperor was willing to respect the rights of his provinces; they were exempted from new burthens, confiscation of property and personal punishment were forbidden; at home, the private estates of Tiberius were not extensive, and any question between himself and his subjects, was decided by the voice of law.[5] But the voice of law was always silent respecting the mysterious guilt of high treason. Here, indeed, a wide door was opened to the evils and abuses of caprice and cruelty, for this crime no skill could define, and no innocence avoid. Not only were those incautious expressions, which naturally arise in the social intercourse of domestic life, remembered with accuracy, and treacherously betrayed,—not only

[1] Lib. iii. c. 14.

[2] *Defensio, in cæteris trepidavit;—solum veneni crimen visus est diluisse, quod ne accusatores quidem satis firmabant.*

[3] Dio. lvii. [4] Tacitus, lib. iv. c. 6. [5] Ibid. c. 7.

did a privileged set of base informers artfully pass the limits of cautious conversation, in order to detect in others something which might be considered criminal, and then communicate to the emperor the very words which they had suggested or encouraged; but Tiberius publicly disclosed the vices of his own life, as if they had been tales invented by his enemies,[1] and imputed to them the relation of facts which, perhaps, they never knew, and certainly never mentioned. As, on the one hand, it was dangerous to condemn the character of the living, so was it, on the other, to eulogise the virtues of the dead; and thus, Cremutius Cordus was put to death for having introduced into a life of Augustus an encomium on Brutus and Cassius. The habit of attempting to penetrate futurity, which had occupied Tiberius, during his residence at Rhodes, did not abandon him when he ascended the throne; and, if on casting the nativities, and calculating the fortunes of individuals, he fancied they were destined to be his rivals, the unfortunate objects of his speculations were soon made the victims of his power.[2] A.D. 20.

Influence of Sejanus.

Many of these abuses may be traced to the influence of Ælius Sejanus. This man, who had risen to be præfect of the prætorian guards, combined with personal vigour, a spirit bold and daring in accusing others, artful and adroit in exculpating himself. His pride was not sufficient to prevent his exercising the arts of flattery; while luxurious indolence or vigilant activity were alternately employed, as they might best promote his ambitious projects. His first step was to collect in one spot the prætorian troops, who had formerly been dispersed over the city, and whose favour he had secured by the arts of bribery and corruption. To Tiberius, whose habitual circumspection seems to have been eluded by his plausibility, he urged the facilities of discipline, which would result from such an arrangement, and the general confidence which the soldiers would feel from opportunities of mutual intercourse. The throne was the ultimate object of Sejanus, but Drusus and the sons of Germanicus were still formidable opponents. He commenced his scheme against the former, by seducing the affections of his wife Livia, whom he persuaded to destroy her husband, in order to share with himself the honour of imperial greatness. The death of Drusus was borne by his father with a calmness which his friends called patriotism, and his enemies insensibility; the people viewed the event with indifference, or perhaps were glad to see the avenue to the throne lying open to the sons of Germanicus. The heir apparent being thus removed, permission to marry his widow was next requested; this, however, Tiberius refused, on the plea that the discord of the imperial family would be fomented by so degrading an alliance; at the same time he expressed strongly his personal attachment to Sejanus,[3]

His design upon the Throne.

[1] Dion Cassius. [2] Ibid. lib. lvii. [3] Tacitus, lib. iv. c. 40.

A.D. 20. the warmth of whose affection, and the value of whose services, no public honours could adequately reward. And indeed he had exhausted them all; the favour of the prince had been followed by the flattery of the people; every morning brought to his gates the tide of morning worshippers: to him every public measure was communicated, through him every private request preferred; the day of his birth was commemorated as a national festivity, and his name was joined with the emperor's, in the sacrifices and prayers of a corrupt and degraded people.

The progressive success of Sejanus was still farther advanced by a determination of the emperor to leave Rome for ever: this plan was naturally promoted by Sejanus, whose interests and schemes it had a manifest tendency to promote. He had previously exerted every method to exasperate Tiberius against Agrippina and her sons, who, were not so circumspect as the last words of Germanicus had advised, and their dangerous situation demanded. Nero was surrounded by the creatures of Sejanus; it was alike dangerous to speak or to be silent; the one seemed opposition, the other contumacy; every action was reported with malignant exaggeration, and insidious friends were employed to complete his ruin, by urging him to fly to the legions in Germany.

Tiberius retires to Capreæ.

In the meantime, Tiberius had quitted Rome with a small retinue, and becoming weary of the towns of Campania, hid himself at length in the Isle of Capreæ. Various causes have been assigned for this retreat; the spot selected certainly provided the beauties of nature for his enjoyment, leisure for his declining years, and concealment for his habitual vices. His manner of life at Rhodes had inclined him to solitude, and the parental restraint of his mother had disquieted his residence at Rome.[1] Her death now gave new scope to his natural disposition; and the unfortunate family of Germanicus were among the first victims of his cruelty. His first letters on the subject embarrassed the Senate by their ambiguity; every one was afraid to proceed against the accused, lest Tiberius should wish to save in a moment of caprice those whom he had condemned in a moment of anger. Sejanus represented this to the emperor as a contempt of his sorrows, and a disposition to revolt; a second letter from Capreæ repeated the former accusations, and the Senate showed themselves willing to execute whatever Tiberius might choose to ordain.[2] That part of the Annals of Tacitus is unfortunately lost, which should describe the trial, condemnation, and punishment of Agrippina and her sons. But we know that Drusus was starved at Rome,[3] that the exiled Nero ended his days by famine, and that Agrippina met a similar fate in the island of Pandataria. Her memory was pursued with the most unfounded calumnies, and the

Destruction of the family of Germanicus.

[1] Tacitus, lib. v. c. 3. [2] Ibid. c. 5.
[3] Suetonius, c. 54. Tacitus, lib. vi. c. 23.

emperor claimed the praise of clemency, because she had not been publicly strangled, nor was the body drawn with a hook to Gemoniæ, where those of common malefactors were exposed.[1] A.D. 20.

We forbear to give our readers a detail of the disgusting and wanton cruelties which now disgraced the reign, and developed the character of Tiberius. They differ from the sanguinary acts of any other ferocious tyrant, only by the strange dissimulation with which they were occasionally conducted. Thus Syriacus, who had passed a life of study, exempt alike from guilt or imputation, was executed for being the friend of Asinius Gallus. Gallus himself was courteously received by the emperor as a guest, at the moment he was writing to the Senate to order his immediate condemnation.[2] Cruelty and dissimulation of Tiberius.

The secession of Tiberius, augmented, as might naturally be supposed, the pride and power of Sejanus; it seemed as if he were emperor of Rome, and Tiberius monarch of Capreæ.[3] At length, intelligence was conveyed thither, that the favourite had abused the confidence of his master, and had formed a political party to usurp the throne.[4] The conduct of Tiberius on this emergency was completely characteristic: instead of hastening to his capital, to crush the treacherous attempts of a rebellious subject, by rallying around him those who, from interest, gratitude, or principle, still retained their allegiance, he remained in his retreat, choosing rather to circumvent his enemy by fraud, than oppose him by open force. Accordingly, he wrote letters to the Senate the most inconsistent and contradictory; at one time declaring himself to be at the point of death; at another, announcing his speedy return to Rome; now extolling Sejanus, and treating his friends with new distinctions, now reproving his conduct with severity, and exalting his rival Caligula. This artful conduct produced its intended effect; for, while some letters awakened the fears of Sejanus, and prepared his party to desert their leader, whenever it should be their interest to do so, others still gave him hopes of a continuance of the emperor's favour, and this prevented his boldly taking arms in his own cause, which numerous adherents, and a strong interest with the prætorian guards, might have enabled him to maintain with success. On a sudden, despatches arrived at night, by the hands of Macro, who communicated his private orders to Saco and Regulus, and with them the necessary measures were concerted. Sejanus was persuaded to join the assembled Senate, by the assurance that these letters contained an order from Tiberius to invest him with the tribunitian power. Every one was now eager to offer his services and congratulations to the successful minister. The letter was publicly read. It commenced about indifferent topics, and censured, as it were, incidentally, some parts of the conduct of Sejanus, again it digressed into irrelevant matter; Fall of Sejanus.

[1] Tacitus, lib. vi. c. 25.
[2] Dion Cassius.
[3] Dion Cassius.
Josephus, lib. xviii. c. 18.

A.D. 20. it returned to the subject of Sejanus,[1] and concluded with an order for his immediate arrest. This singular composition, as it was characteristic of the disposition of Tiberius, so was it important to his interests. Had his intention been decidedly shown at the commencement of his epistle, the rebel might have escaped to his party, and Tiberius, not Sejanus, might have been the victim of contending factions; but escape was delayed till it became impossible; the confusion and perplexity of the Senate were succeeded by indignation and resentment; he who had used with cruelty and pride the power he had gained by guilt and meanness, was now their prisoner; the man whom they had lately attended as a prince to the Senate, they now dragged as a criminal to execution;[2] popular execration exulting over his fall, and extending its merciless revenge to his innocent and unfortunate family.

"Then roar the fires the sooty artist blows,[3]
And all Sejanus in the furnace glows;
Sejanus, once so honoured—so adored,
And only second to the world's great lord,
Runs glittering from the moulds in cups and cans,
And such mean things, plates, pitchers, pots, and pans.
Crown all your doors with bay—triumphant bay,
Sacred to Jove the milk-white urchin slay,
For, lo, where great Sejanus by the throng
A joyful spectacle is dragged along:
What lips, what cheeks, ah! traitor! for my part.
I never loved this fellow in my heart:
But tell me why was he adjudged to bleed,
And who discovered, and who proved the deed.
Proved!—a verbose epistle came to-day
From Capreæ: good:—what do the people? they!
They follow fortune as of old, and hate
With their whole souls the victim of the State.

But there are more to suffer; so 'tis said,
A fire so fierce for one was scarcely made:
I met my friend, Brutidice, and fear,
From his pale looks, he thinks there's danger near.
What if this Ajax, in his frenzy strike,
As doubtful of our zeal, at all alike;
Swift let us ply our loyalty to show,
And trample on the carcass of her foe:
But, mark me, lest our slaves the fact forswear,
And drag us to the bar, let them be there."
Thus of the favourite's fall, the converse ran,
And thus the whisper passed from man to man.[4]

[1] Dion Cassius. [2] Ibid. Seneca, *de Tranquill.* c. 2.

[3] *Jam Stridunt ignes jam follibus atque caminis*
Ardet adoratum populo caput et crepat ingens
Sejanus: deinde ex facie toto orbe secundâ
Fiunt urceoli, pelves, sartago, patellæ.

[4] These lines from the tenth Satire of Juvenal may remind the reader of its imitation by Dr. Johnson, called, "The Vanity of Human Wishes." The Historical example chosen as a counterpart to Sejanus is Cardinal Wolsey.

A.D. 20.

At length the Sovereign frowns, the train of State
Mark the keen glance, and watch the sign to hate:
Where'er he turns he meets a stranger's eye,
The suppliant scorn him, and his followers fly;
At once is lost the pride of awful state,
The golden canopy, the glittering plate,
The regal palace, the luxurious board,
The liveried army, and the menial horde.
With age, with cares, with maladies opprest,
He seeks the refuge of monastic rest;
Grief aids disease, remembered folly stings,
And his last sighs reproach the faith of kings.]

Indiscriminate punishment of his friends.

A deputation of senators and knights, with Regulus at their head, now solicited Tiberius to return to Rome: this, however, he refused, and though occasionally approaching the city, never entered the gates: his letters breathed only the spirit of cruelty, and involved every age, sex, and party, in desolating, indiscriminate persecution. The friends of Sejanus were naturally the first sufferers: nothing could satiate the vengeance of the tyrant: the dead were exposed to every insult, and he who pitied openly their fate, was punished as if he had been implicated in their fault.[1] Dion Cassius relates a curious story of Terrentius Varro, who was saved by his boldness and ingenuity, when his innocence would have been unavailing. Instead of denying his having been a friend of Sejanus, he directly avowed the fact, and pleaded as an apology the example of the emperor; "if," said he, "the penetrating wisdom of Tiberius has been deceived, surely my error is venial: a good citizen should always love the friends of his monarch, without instituting any troublesome inquiries with respect to their

Pone domi lauros, duc in Capitolia magnum
Cretatumque bovem: Sejanus ducitur unco
Spectandus. Gaudent omnes. Quæ labra? quis illi
Vultus erat? nunquam si quid mihi credis amavi
Hunc hominem. Sed quo cecidit sub crimine? quisnam
Delator? quibus indiciis, quo teste probavit?
Nil horum: verbosa et grandis epistola venit
A Capreis. Bene habet; nil plus interrogo. Sed quid
Turba Remi? Sequitur Fortunam ut semper, et odit
Damnatos.

—Juv. *Sat.* x. 73.

Perituros audio multos.
Nil dubium, magna est fornacula; pallidulus mi
Brutidius meus ad Martis fuit obvius aram.
Quam timeo victus ne pœnas exigat Ajax
Ut male defensus! curramus præcipites, et
Dum jacet in ripâ calcemus Cæsaris hostem.
Sed videant servi, ne quis neget et pavidum in jus
Service astrictâ dominum trahat. Hi sermones
Tunc de Sejano, secreta hæc murmura vulgi.

—Juv. *Sat.* x. 90.

[1] Tacitus, lib. vi. c. 10.

A.D. 20. worth or character."[1] This speech, as related by Tacitus,[2] assumes a more dignified tone, and contains a noble and manly remonstrance against the baseness and servility of the Senate, and against the absurdity of involving the personal friends of Sejanus in the same guilt as his political accomplices.

Depravity of Tiberius. In the meantime, Tiberius had lived in the indulgence of every vice which unbridled passions can desire, or a morbid imagination invent, and presented an awful and singular specimen of the degradation and abasement of which human nature is capable, and the

His illness wretchedness which accompanies its fall. His last illness seized him in his seventy-eighth year: he was returning to Capreæ, but was unable to proceed beyond Misenum; his confidence in the predictions of the astrologer Thrasyllus, and the natural strength of his constitution, induced him to neglect the progress of this disorder. He had wavered in his choice of a successor: the two candidates were Tiberius Nero, his lineal grandson, and Caius Caligula, the son of Germanicus. Suetonius says the empire was divided between them by will;[3] but the Senate excluded the former on account of his youth. However this may be, Caligula, who was at this time about the person of the emperor, concerted his plans with Macro, and

And death. contrived, by poison or by suffocation, to terminate the life of Tiberius.

Character of Tiberius. Such was the life, and such the death, of this emperor, whose character is thus summed up with brevity and candour, at the close of the Sixth Book of the Annals of Tacitus:—"His character was different at different periods: distinguished in life and reputation as long as he was in a private station, or held military command under Augustus; deep and crafty in assuming excellencies while Germanicus and Drusus were alive, a mixture of good and bad during his mother's life. His cruelty was detestable; but, as long as he either loved or feared Sejanus, his evil passions were partially disguised: afterwards he broke out at once into guilt and infamy, when shame and fear were alike removed, and he followed only his own disposition."[4] His education seems to have been conducted with care, nor was he destitute of a taste for polite literature. In rhetoric he was instructed by Theodorus Gadareus, who, observing at an early age the slow and savage disposition of his pupil, surnamed him πηλὸς αἵματι πεφυραμένος—a compound of dirt and blood. On his father's death he delivered a funeral oration, and when Varro Muræna and Fannius Cæpio conspired against Augustus, the prosecution was ably

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. lviii. [2] Lib. vi. c. 50. [3] Suetonius, c. 76.

[4] *Morum quoque tempora illi diversa: egregium vitâ famâque quoad privatus vel in imperiis sub Augusto fuit; occultum ac subdolum fingendis virtutibus, donec Germanicus ac Drusus superfuere: idem inter bona malaque mixtus incolumi matre: intestabilis sævitia, sed obtectis libidinibus, dum Sejanum dilexit timuitve: postremo in scelera simul ac dedecora prorupit, postquam remoto pudore ac metu, suo tantum ingenio utebatur.*

and successfully conducted by Tiberius.[1] His model in composition was Corvinus Messala, one of those who contributed, by deserting the school of Ciceronian eloquence, to vitiate the taste of his contemporaries. Tiberius highly esteemed the poems of Euphorion and Parthenius, and in conversation studiously avoided the use of Greek terms; however, he composed some verses in that language. Astrology and mythology were his favourite pursuits; grammarians and historians he was wont to ridicule, and when disposed to be facetious, he would ask the latter to state the name of Hecuba's mother, and enumerate the tunes which the Syrens sang. At times, however, his jokes were not so innocent: soon after the death of Augustus, as a corpse was borne along in the presence of Tiberius, a soldier drew near and seemed to whisper in the dead man's ear: when the emperor asked the meaning of this action, the soldier replied he had desired the dead man to tell Augustus that his bequest to the Roman people had not been paid. Tiberius ordered the soldier to be paid and put to death, adding, "you may now go to Augustus yourself, and tell him you have had your share." A.D. 20.

The age of Tiberius was an age of dissoluteness, extravagance, and licentiousness. How impure and degraded must have been the state of public morals, when it was necessary to pass a law that no woman might adopt the profession of a prostitute, whose father, grandfather, or husband had been of equestrian rank—so little efficacy had a period of intellectual greatness in elevating the tone of public feeling, or controlling the progress of moral guilt—so necessary was that pure system of belief and practice, which was introduced at this time, by the great author and finisher of our holy faith, promulgated by his doctrine, recommended by his example, and confirmed by his death—a system intended to correct the errors of philosophy, to disperse the darkness of Polytheism, and to form the happiness of man, by raising his hopes, and regulating his desires. Tiberius did, indeed, in some instances, exert his influence to check the foolish extravagance of his people. Markets and taverns were subjected to certain rules, that intemperance and gluttony might have less temptation: the number of matches of gladiators, and the extent of theatrical prodigality was reduced: he himself gave few public festivities. Occasionally, in order to check the prevalence of idle profusion, he would suffer frugality to degenerate into the meanest parsimony—a plan conducted without judgment, and producing no effect: at other times his intemperance was so excessive that his name was ludicrously altered into Biberius. Some money was distributed to the legions in Syria, some to the prætorian guards as a reward for having deserted Sejanus; and, on one occasion, when many of the citizens had suffered by fire, Immorality of his times.

[1] Suetonius, c. 8.

A.D. 20. their loss was alleviated by the emperor. Perhaps the administration of his money is, upon the whole, the least exceptionable part of Tiberius's character; and there are instances of his having rebuked, with merited and salutary severity, the debts and extravagances of thoughtless spendthrifts, and the importunity of needy senators.



[Temple of Vesta and the Sybyl, Tivoli.—*G. F. Sargent.*



[Caligula.—*Museum Florentinum.*]

CHAPTER VIII.

CAIUS CÆSAR CALIGULA.

FROM A.D. 37 TO 41.

UPON the death of Tiberius, Caius Cæsar, surnamed Caligula,[1] immediately assumed the imperial power. He was one of nine children of the accomplished and popular Germanicus, by his wife Agrippina,[2] of whom two died in their infancy, one in his childhood, and six arrived at maturity; three daughters, Agrippina, Drusilla, and Livilla, born in three successive years, and the same number of sons, Nero and Drusus, (who were condemned by the Senate as enemies to the State, at the instigation of Tiberius,) and Caius Cæsar, who was born during the consulship of his father with C. Fonteius Capito, A.D. 10. The place of his birth is uncertain; but Suetonius brings evidence that it happened whilst his mother was with the army;[3] and his earliest years were spent principally in camps. Upon his father's death he returned from Syria, and lived with his mother till her exile, when he removed to the house of Livia Augusta, his great-grandmother, whose funeral oration he delivered in public, whilst he still wore the *prætexta*. He afterwards remained in the family of his grandmother Antonia, until his twentieth year, when,

A.D. 37. Accession of C. Cæsar Caligula.

His origin and early life.

[1] Or rather *nicknamed* Galigula, "the booted," or more literally "*Boots*," from *Caliga*, the boot much worn in the army, and in the country—*gelidos, veniam caligatus in agros.* Juv.

[2] Daughter of M. Agrippa and Julia.

[3] *In castris natus, patriis nutritus in armis.* Suetonius, *Cal.* 8.

A.D. 37. being invited to Capreæ by the emperor, he assumed the dress proper to manhood, but without the customary ceremonies.

His disposition.

In the court of his grandfather, his naturally mean and vicious temper appeared in a servile compliance with the caprices of those in power, in a wanton love of cruelty towards the unfortunate, and in the most abandoned and unprincipled debauchery; so that Tiberius observed that he was breeding a second Phæton for the conflagration of the world, and the courtiers remarked that the young prince would make the best of servants, but the worst of masters.[1]

Will of Tiberius set aside.

Tiberius had, by his testament, appointed his two grandsons, Caius Cæsar and Tiberius Gemellus, successive partners in the empire; but, as he had himself fraudulently disregarded the will of his mother Livia, his own met with no greater respect. The first act of Caius Cæsar was the assembling of the Senate, for the purpose of declaring the invalidity of this testament;[2] an object which was readily effected by the influence of the same Macro, whom we have already seen worshipping the rising son of Caligula, and turning his back upon the setting rays of Tiberius,[3] the base and cruel wretch who prostituted his own wife to the former, whilst he attempted to poison the latter.

Popularity of the new Emperor.

The will of the late emperor being annulled, and Tiberius Gemellus declared unfit for the command, on account of his youth, (for he still wore the *prætexta*,) Caius Cæsar was immediately declared emperor, amid the most unbounded demonstrations of joy—the Senate and the people vieing with each other in extravagance, and the country towns, and even the provinces, exhibiting similar rejoicings. It has been calculated that upwards of sixteen hundred hecatombs were offered on the occasion: vows were publicly made for the safety of the new emperor: individuals devoted their own lives to the infernal deities, as a ransom for his whenever it might be in danger: others undertook gladiatorial combats to propitiate his good genius, and advertised their loyalty in handbills. Nor was this general feeling of respect and good hope limited by the confines of the empire; foreign princes, who had slighted the profligate and vacillating government of Tiberius, showed an anxiety to cultivate a good understanding with his successor; and among others, the haughty and independent Artabanes, King of Parthia, condescended to cross the Euphrates, in order to offer his congratulations in person to the Consular Legate;[4] and he *adored* the Roman eagles and standards, and the "images of the Cæsars."[5]

The commencement of the reign of Caius Cæsar appeared likely to realize the sanguine hopes which had been formed of him; although

[1] Suetonius, *Cal.* 10, 11. The two observations harmonize rather curiously; for fire is commonly said to be a good servant, but a bad master.

[2] Dion Cassius is here at variance with Suetonius; but Crevier gives satisfactory reasons for following the former, and Echard, a laborious author, appears to have come to the same conclusion.

[3] Tacitus, lib. vi. [4] Vitellius. [5] Suetonius, *Cal.* 14.

those hopes arose rather from interested views than from a true sense of patriotism, or an honest respect for virtue. The new emperor had learned all the profound dissimulation of his wily predecessor; and he esteemed it prudent to assume the appearance of moderation, liberality, and justice, till he should be firmly seated on the throne, and freed from all apprehension that the claims of the young Tiberius might be revived on any offence taken by the Senate. A.D. 37. Auspicious beginning of his reign.

Accordingly, he requested of the conscript fathers, that the late emperor might be buried with the same honours which had been paid to Augustus. The wish was refused; nevertheless he attended the funeral in person, amid the acclamations of the populace, who cheered him with the most flattering titles—terms lavished by nurses upon hopeful children; and he completed his disgusting task by pronouncing an oration, distinguished for its eloquence, in praise of the deceased. To afford a further demonstration of his piety towards his family, he visited, in dangerous weather, the islands of Pandataria and Pontia, in order to bestow the due honours upon the neglected ashes of his mother and elder brother, whose urns he brought, with every show of affection, to Rome, and deposited with great pomp in the cemetery of Augustus. The legacies left by Tiberius, although his will had been declared null and void, were all exactly paid; and to these the new prince added a largess from himself, upon pretence that he had assumed the manly garb without the gratuity usually bestowed among the populace on such occasions by persons of his rank. This therefore he ordered to be paid to the citizens, with interest. At the same time, all persons confined in prison were liberated; all exiles were recalled; and an immense file of papers was burned, which purported to be criminal proceedings and secret informations collected by Tiberius, and which Caius Cæsar declared that he had never read. The real documents, however, he carefully concealed, and diligently perused. He affected to be extremely mortified by the exclusion of his cousin Tiberius from the succession; and upon his coming of age, he bestowed upon him the empty title of *Princeps Juventutis*, with other honours, which were only a prelude to the execution of the design he had from the first entertained, to put him to death.[2] The people, meanwhile, were entertained with a succession of shows, games, and theatrical entertainments, more magnificent than any which had ever before been exhibited; and of which the cost, added to an unbounded expense in all other departments, swallowed up in one year the vast sums amassed by the avarice and rapacity of Tiberius during his long reign.[3] Nevertheless, the new His hypocrisy.

[1] *Sidus et pullum, et pupum, et alumnum.* Suetonius. *Cal.* 14.

[2] Dion Cassius, lib. lix.

[3] According to Suetonius, (*Cal.* 17,) the treasury, at the death of Tiberius, contained two thousand seven hundred millions of sesterces — nearly twenty-two millions of English money. Other authors reckon the sum to have been two thousand three hundred millions of sesterces, or above eight millions of our currency.

A.D. 37. emperor, with seeming liberality restored many of the confiscations of his predecessor.

Reforms in the State.

At the same time that he was thus lavish to the people, he affected a great deal of moderation and humility in his own person, refusing all those pompous and high-sounding titles which the Senate were impatient to confer upon him, and which he himself soon afterwards assumed, with many vain and ridiculous additions.[1] And notwithstanding the abominable depravity of his own life, he took upon himself to cleanse the city of the detestable receptacles of unnatural vices introduced by Tiberius.[2] The conductors of these stews were condemned to be cast into the sea; and it was only on the most urgent entreaties that the sentence was commuted for perpetual exile. And that he might not appear to punish vice without rewarding virtue, eighty thousand sesterces were granted to a freedwoman, for having resolutely endured the torture without betraying her patron.[3]

He becomes Consul.

He reviewed the Roman knights, the most important class in the State, with a just severity, tempered with moderation; and deprived all those of the insignia of their rank, the horse, and the ring, whose crimes were a disgrace to the order. Several valuable privileges and immunities were conferred upon the people, of which the most important were the independence of the judges, and what would now be termed the freedom of the press. In the midst of these reformations, the emperor made a speech to the Senate, setting forth in such forcible language the true principles of good government, that the conscript fathers passed a resolution to have it read once a-year. They had offered him the consulship immediately upon the death of Tiberius; but he, pretending an excess of modesty, declined that honour in favour of the ordinary consuls; and it was not until the expiration of their statutable six months that he consented to accept the office, taking his uncle Claudius as his colleague. He retained this office rather more than two months, and then appointed the consuls designated by his predecessor.[4]

His family pride and depravity.

His pride, which was excessive, appeared at first chiefly in bestowing extravagant honours upon the members of his own family, which flattery dignified with the appellation of piety: in these honours his grandmother Antonia, and his sisters, had the greatest share; and the names of the latter were added to his own,[5] in the forms of the oaths on admission to offices. But his attachment to his sisters Drusilla, Agrippina, and Julia had a worse incentive: he had in early life seduced them all; and this incestuous passion continued to

[1] *Viz. Pius, Pater exercitûm, Filius Castrorum, Opt. Mak. &c.* Suetonius, *Cal.* 22.

[2] *Sellarii et spintriæ.* Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. vi. c. 1. vol. 10.

[3] About £650.

[4] Dion Cassius, and Suetonius, *loc. cit.*

[5] Suetonius, *Cal.* 15.

be indulged under circumstances of disgusting depravity, over which it must be equally the wish of the historian and of the reader to draw a veil.[1] A.D. 37.

His sickness.

Soon after he had resigned the consulship, he had a dangerous illness, in consequence, as it is imagined, of a love potion given him by his mistress Milonia Cæsonia, (whom he afterwards married,) with a view to secure his inconstant affections; and such was still the public confidence in his good intentions, that the whole empire put up supplications for his recovery, and individuals bound themselves by vows, which, contrary perhaps to their expectations, they were afterwards compelled to fulfil. From this period, whether weary of the restraints of hypocrisy, or actually deranged in his intellect by the inflammatory effects of the potion which he had taken,[2] the emperor threw off all appearance of virtue and moderation, as well as all prudential considerations, and acted on all occasions with the mischievous violence of unbridled passion and wanton power;[3] so that the tyranny of Tiberius was forgotten in the enormities of Caligula.[4]

Tiberius Gemellus put to death.

One of his first atrocities was the judicial murder of the innocent Tiberius Gemellus, upon the poor pretence that he had taken an antidote against poison, and thus thrown a slander upon the character of the emperor.[5] The execution of Silanus, whose daughter he had married and repudiated, followed soon afterwards. This virtuous old man had declined to accompany the court on an aquatic excursion, on account of his liability to sea-sickness: it was pretended that he made this an excuse for remaining on shore to carry into effect a treasonable conspiracy; and Julius Græcinus, a man of the most inflexible integrity, was ordered to become his accuser. Græcinus refused to obey, and both were put to death.[6]

Antiochus and Agrippa restored.

The restoration of Antiochus to the kingdom of Commagena, of which he had been deprived by Tiberius, is placed by Dion Cassius in this year;[7] and about the same time, it appears that Agrippa,

[1] *Stupra sororibus intulit, ex unâ etiam natam filiam cognovit.* Eutropius, *in Caligula*, lib. vii. c. 7. Cassaubon and the Abbé de Marolles, and indeed Pæanius, the Greek translator of Eutropius, understood *cognovit* in the obscene sense, although some copies (*conj. emend.*) read *agnovit.* But Barthius (*Adversar.* lib. xxiii. c. 9,) refutes this construction, and shows that the daughter could not be more than ten years of age when Caius Cæsar died. *Cognovit*, therefore, must be construed *acknowleged*—a sufficient proof of impudent depravity.

[2] ——— *Avunculus ille Neronis*
Cui totam tremuli frontem Cæsonia pulli
Infudit.——— —Juv. *Sat.* vi. 614.

[3] *C. Cæsar quem mihi videtur rerum Natura edidisse ut ostenderet quid summa vitia in fortunâ possent.* Seneca, *de Consolat. ad Helvium*, lib. ix. c. 779.

[4] *Sceleratissimus ac funestissimus et qui etiam dedecora Tiberii purgaverit.* Eutropius, lib. vii.

[5] Philo, *Legat. ad Caium.* [6] Tacitus, *Agric.* lib. iv. [7] Lib. lix.

A.D. 37. grandson of the celebrated Herod,[1] whom the late emperor had imprisoned, not without some cause, was remunerated with the kingdom of Chalcis, and several tetrarchies in the neighbourhood. It is said that these two princes had instilled into Caius Cæsar the most abominable principles, and had instigated him to murder his grandfather and his young cousin, that he might at once seize the empire, and put them in possession of their respective dominions.[2]

A.D. 38. On the first day of the new year, after his accession, the customary oaths were administered, enjoining obedience to the institutes of Augustus and of Caius Cæsar, omitting his predecessor Tiberius; and it deserves remark, that the name of this emperor was never afterwards admitted into the list which was annually appended to the oath.[3] Henceforth the life of Caligula becomes a series of atrocious crimes and infantile follies, involving no important historical events, and as uninteresting to the reader as it is irksome and disgusting to the compiler: the writers who have recorded his enormities, have been little careful to arrange, in chronological order, the unconnected sallies of a desperate maniac; and the only advantage to be derived from tracing them is in the proof they afford of the degraded condition of the Roman people, and of the mischievous consequences resulting from an unsettled government.

Monstrous cruelties.

His cruelties were so excessive and so wanton, that the endurance of his subjects is scarcely credible; for he not only gratified his sanguinary temper without remorse on the smallest provocation, but he took also an unnatural pleasure in shedding blood and inflicting tortures.[4] He condemned many citizens to death on the alleged evidence of those very documents which, at his accession, he had pretended to burn unread; he superintended the executions in person, giving directions to the officers to prolong the sufferings of the criminals, "that they might feel themselves die;" and such was his hatred of mankind in general, that he once was heard to express a wish, "that the whole populace of Rome had one neck, that he might be enabled to shed their blood at a single blow." When the number of gladiators was not sufficient to glut his appetite for slaughter, he would frequently oblige Roman knights to combat on the *arena;* and a great number of valuable lives were sacrificed in this manner. He was particularly delighted with seeing criminals thrown to wild beasts, and admired the savage manner in which those animals tore them to pieces; and if it happened that there was not a sufficient number of condemned persons for his amusement, he made no scruple of ordering some of the spectators to be cast into the den; when, if they presumed to remonstrate against the injustice of the command, he silenced them by cutting out their tongues.

[1] Josephus, *Antiq.* lib. xviii.
[2] Dion Cassius, *loc. cit.* [3] Ibid.
[4] See Suetonius, *Cal.* 27, &c. Dion Cassius, *in loco.*

His endearments bore the same ferocious character; he used to clasp the necks of his favourite women, exclaiming, "How soon would one word from me sever this pretty neck from the body." He kept two lists, one entitled *Gladius*, and the other *Pugio*,[1] in which he inserted the names of such senators and knights as he intended to put to death; and it is asserted that they contained the greater part of both those estates. As for the hatred of the people, he rather took pleasure in it, and was accustomed to observe, "*Oderint dum metuant*,"[2] let them hate me, provided they fear me. He valued himself particularly upon what he called his "*Adiatrepsia*,"[3] meaning the indifference with which he could be a spectator of bloodshed and tortures; and he professed himself satisfied that the infant daughter of Cæsonia was his own child, because her first efforts were directed to scratch out the eyes of all who nursed or played with her.[4] A.D. 38.

Among the numerous victims of his cruelty was the infamous Macro, who well merited the death he suffered from any hand but that of Caius.[5] About the same time he put to the sword Ptolemy, the son of King Juba, his cousin, merely because he happened to be better dressed than himself,[6] and Ennia,[7] whose services he ought not to have forgotten. Having been accidentally disturbed by a concourse of people hastening to see some of his public shows, he caused above twenty knights, and as many women of quality, together with a great number of meaner persons, to be beaten to death with bludgeons;[8] and soon afterwards he condemned to a similar punishment several respectable citizens for not showing a sufficient eagerness to be present at the same entertainments. Death of Macro and others.

He treated his grandmother Antonia, whom at one time he affected to idolize, with so much harshness as to occasion her death; at her funeral he conducted himself with the most indecent levity; and endeavoured to slander her birth, although in so doing he vitiated his own pedigree. When he banished two of his sisters, he reminded them that he possessed the power of inflicting not only exile but death; but upon the decease of Drusilla, who had been his mistress, and afterwards his wife, he exhibited the most extravagant symptoms of grief;[9] he left Rome on foot in the middle of the night, and retired into Sicily, whence he returned with his beard grown, and his hair uncombed, in sordid mourning, to celebrate the apotheosis of that wretched woman; and, in order to make it a pretence for the further indulgence of his malignity, he declared all those who appeared to be sad to be guilty of disrespect to her memory, because His madness.

[1] Suetonius, *Cal.* 49. [2] Ibid. 30. [3] Ibid. 29.
[4] Dion Cassius. Suetonius, *Cal.* 25. Josephus, *Antiq.* lib. xix. c. 1.
[5] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. vi. c. 1. Philo.
[6] Suetonius, *Cal.* 26.
[7] According to Dion Cassius he obliged her to destroy herself, lib. lix.
[8] Seneca, *ad Polyb.* Philo. [9] Ibid.

A.D. 38. they rejoiced not in her translation to heaven; while those who rejoiced were held equally criminal, because they lamented not her loss; and a few who attempted to avoid every demonstration either of joy or sorrow, were accused of indifference to the interests and feelings of the emperor. One man, who sold warm water in the streets, was condemned to death for impiety, in following his ordinary occupation on so solemn an occasion.[1] Thus, as Dion Cassius observes, he was in all things more contrary to himself than to any one else.[2]



[Antonia, mother of Germanicus.—*Bottari, Museo Capitolino.*]

Historians have been diffuse in relating the abominable and shameless debaucheries of this emperor;[3] but enough has already been told to prove that decency had been from a very early period a stranger to his bosom: the licentiousness of his palace spread itself rapidly through his dominions, contaminating whatever remained of the chastity of Roman women, or the honour of Roman families. Among his most flagitious offences of this kind must be reckoned his five marriages,[4] which took place in the course of about as many years, with circumstances of the most revolting depravity. His first wife was Claudia, the daughter of the venerable Silanus, whom he put to death on the frivolous pretence already noticed; she died before he became emperor. After his accession, he happened to be present at the wedding of C. Piso and Livia Orestilla; and, when the ceremony was concluded, he abruptly commanded the bridegroom, on pain of death, "not to touch the bride of Cæsar." Livia was accordingly conducted to the palace, and the emperor gave out that "he had taken a wife after the manner of Romulus and of Augustus." She enjoyed her imperial honours but a short time; and, upon her being dismissed, she was reported to have returned to Piso. When the rumour reached the emperor's ears, he immediately banished them both.

His profligacy,

And marriages.

Soon after this, he annulled the marriage of his sister, Drusilla,

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. lix. [2] Ibid.
[3] See Suetonius, *Cal.* 36.
[4] Ibid. 25. Crevier, *in Caligula*, lib. vii. c. 1.

with L. Cassius, that he might make her his own empress; but he speedily married her to M. Lepidus, the associate of his most abandoned and nameless vices. His next wife was the unhappy Lollia Paulina,[1] who was in Macedonia with her husband, C. Memmius, an officer of high rank, when the emperor, having heard it accidentally mentioned that her family were remarkable for female beauty, sent for her to share his throne; but, as she did not equal his expectations, she was in a short time divorced, and prohibited from living with any other man for the future. A.D. 38.

In the following year he was married to Milonia Cæsonia, a woman with whom he had previously cohabited, who possessed neither youth nor beauty, and who was, before he became acquainted with her, the mother of three daughters. Of this abandoned women, he was so ardently and constantly enamoured, that not only his court, but himself also, expressed surprise at the attachment; the courtiers attributing it to the effect of some love philtre which she had administered to him, and the emperor often declaring that "he should like to put her to the torture, to make her discover her art." She excelled all the women of her time in an exquisite perception of sensuality; and this detestable skill so besotted her voluptuous husband, that he delighted to exhibit her to his guards in a military costume, and to his intimates in shameless nakedness.[2]

Pride and envy of the Emperor.

His pride was equal to his debauchery; he affected to consider himself as of a different nature from his subjects, and was accustomed to argue, that "as a shepherd was not a sheep, nor an herdsman an ox, so neither is an emperor a man."[3] And to maintain the superiority which he claimed, he endeavoured to destroy, or to drive into obscurity, every species of merit which he could not pretend to surpass; he made a ridiculous attempt to suppress the works of Homer and Virgil, that his own verses might be the best extant; and he used to speak slightingly of Livy as an historian, and of Seneca as a moral writer.

Being jealous of the fine person of a young man, who, from his stature and beauty, was called the *Colosseros*, or Colossal Cupid,[4] he put him to death with the most cruel insults; and it is said, that he obliged those who had fine hair to shave their heads, that no man's

[1] F. Norris (*Cenotaph. Pisam*, p. 189,) shows that Archbishop Usher is mistaken in his construction of Suetonius, *Cal.* 26. "*Deq; Lolliâ Paulinâ quæ C. Cæsari nupta fuerat, &c.*" The Archbishop applies these words to Augustus's grandson, (the son of Agrippa;) but this supposition cannot be reconciled with Suetonius, *Cal.* 25, where it is stated that Caligula married Lollia Paulina, and soon afterwards divorced her; nor with Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. iv. c. 40, where it appears that "C. Cæsar, the grandson of Augustus, married Livia, the daughter of Drusus, and sister of Germanicus;" and that she survived him; for she was *afterwards* (*posteà*) married to Drusus, son of Tiberius.

[2] *Amicis verò etiam nudam.* Suetonius, *Cal.* 25. Echard quaintly remarks, that he made her a man and a beast.

[3] Philo. *Judæus, in loco.*

[4] Suetonius, *Cal.* 35.

A.D. 38. love-locks might be compared to his own. He was disposed to have deprived all his allies of their regal titles and authority, alleging the opinion of Homer :—

> " The headship of many is no good thing.
> Let there be one king—one chief,"[1]

in order that he might be proclaimed and crowned king of the Roman dominions; and this most unpopular and dangerous attempt would have been made, had not his friends taken the alarm, and diverted him from it, by suggesting to him, that he was already so much above all kings, that he could only degrade himself by assuming their distinctions. He would not acknowledge himself to be the grandson of Agrippa, on account of his plebeian extraction; but, by way of assuming a nobler origin, he feigned that his mother was the offspring of an incestuous intercourse between Augustus and his daughter Julia.[2]

He deifies himself.

But all these, and a thousand similar extravagances, of which these are selected as specimens, were eclipsed by his erecting a temple to his own divinity, and instituting a college of priests to officiate at his altars. Admissions into this notable priesthood were purchased at an enormous price[3] by some of the first senators in Rome, and among the successful candidates for sacerdotal offices were the emperor's uncle, Claudius, who was kept as a kind of court buffoon;[4] his wife Cæsonia, his favourite horse, and, to complete the impiety and folly of this transaction, Caius Cæsar himself, who thus became priest to his own deity.[5] What that divinity was, it would have puzzled the most able mythologists to determine; for he assumed the character and costume of all the gods, male and female, in their turns, and sometimes of two or three at once. He would walk out by moonlight, and pretend to have enjoyed the favours of Diana, whom he addressed in the language of a lover; he seated himself between Castor and Pollux, and claimed all the honours which the people intended for those divinities; he was often on friendly terms with Jupiter, and would whisper in the ear of his statue, and apply his own to its mouth, affecting to be satisfied or displeased with the answers he received; and he placed upon its knees the infant daughter of Cæsonia, declaring that if the child were his, it must be also " the offspring of high Jove."[6] But as his ambition enlarged itself, he began to regard Jupiter as a rival for universal empire, and he contrived an artificial thunder to silence that of

[1] Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω,
Εἷς βασιλεύς,

[2] Suetonius, *Cal.* 23.
[3] It is said £80,000 English. Suetonius, *Claud.* 9.
[4] Suetonius, *Cal.* 23.
[5] Dion Cassius, lib. lix. c. 759, 761. Suetonius, *Cal.* 22. Josephus, *Antiq.*
[6] Josephus, *Antiq.* lib. xix.

heaven; when it lightened, he hurled stones into the air, challenging the king of the gods to mortal combat, to decide their respective claims.[1] And then affecting to be the victor, he passed sentence of banishment upon his adversary.[2] A.D. 38.

But, notwithstanding these bravadoes, he was subject to fits of superstitious terror; and when he attempted to remove the image of Jupiter Olympius, he was terrified at the appearance of the Divine displeasure, and betrayed the most childish cowardice.[3]

His horse.

All these puerilities were less offensive to the public than the honours he lavished upon the horse[4] which he had made one of his priests, and which, by way of insult to the republic, he had declared consul. This animal was kept in an ivory stable, and fed from a golden manger; and when it was invited to feast at the emperor's table, gilt corn was served up in a golden basin of exquisite workmanship.

Gaming and rapacity.

By his unbounded profusion, the Treasury was in a few months completely drained; and Caius Cæsar hesitated at no expedient to raise money. He obliged the most wealthy citizens to gamble with him for enormous sums, which he was sufficiently sure of winning;[5] and when they declared that they had lost all they possessed, he insisted upon their throwing for their lives, and redeeming them when lost by solicitations among their friends: all places of honour and profit were set to sale, and the purchasers frequently were deprived of their situations in order that they might be sold again. Persons of fortune were daily accused of capital offences, that the emperor might either confiscate their property, or commute their sentence into a ruinous fine. Taxes of all sorts, and of the most infamous nature, were multiplied upon the poorest classes of the community, and even the wages of prostitution (as in modern France) were subject to a tribute.[6] These new laws were written in a small character, and fixed up at so great a height, that it was scarcely possible for any one to read them, in order that the people might, through ignorance, become liable to surcharges;[7] and when it appeared, on the collection of the revenue, that the profits of the bagnios were very considerable, the emperor established a brothel in his own palace, and gave public notice of the nature of the accommodation. On the birth of his daughter,[8] he was not ashamed to plead poverty, and to proclaim his readiness to receive new-year's-gifts, to enable him to provide for her; and when, by all these extortions, he had acquired

[1] Dion Cassius. *Ad pugnam vocavit Jovem, et quidem sine missione, Homericum illum exclamans versum* ἢ μ' ἀνάειρ, ἢ ἐγώ σε. Seneca, *de Irâ*, lib. i. xvi.

[2] Εἰς γαῖαν Δαναῶν τιράω σε.

[3] *Nemo in audaciorem aut effrenatiorem Numinis contemptum prorupisse legitur; nemo tamen miseriùs trepidavit, cùm aliquod iræ divinæ indicium se proferebat.* Calvin, *Institut.* lib. i. c. 1.

[4] Suetonius, *Cal.* 55. Dion Cassius, lib. lix.

[5] Ibid. 41. [6] Ibid. 40. [7] Ibid. 41. [8] Ibid. 42.

A.D. 39. a vast sum of money, he spread it upon the floor, and rolled himself upon it naked, in an ecstacy of gratified avarice.[1]

In the ensuing year, the emperor caused himself to be nominated consul with L. Apronius Cæsianus;[2] he resigned his own fasces after thirty days,[3] and appointed another consul. But he did not suffer either of these magistrates to enjoy their empty honours more than six months; and he deprived them of the consulship in a manner truly characteristic. When the anniversary of the battle of Actium arrived, which was usually celebrated as a great national deliverance, by public thanksgivings and rejoicings, Caius Cæsar observed, that "as he was grandson both of Augustus and of Antony, the consuls could hardly fail to affront him, whether they should omit to do honour to the victory of one, or appear to rejoice in the defeat of the other." The usual shows were exhibited, and the consuls were ignominiously deposed. The object of this wanton injustice was to make a vacancy for Domitius Afer, who, by a peculiar readiness and good fortune, had suddenly attained his height of favour, after escaping from the imminent risk of a cruel death. He was considered as the most eloquent speaker of his time, and was consequently an object of jealousy to the emperor, who valued himself, not without reason, upon his own oratorical powers;[4] Afer, unconscious of the brooding storm, or anxious to avert it, erected a statue in honour of Caius Cæsar, upon the pedestal of which he inscribed the words: "twice consul *ætat.* xxvii." The emperor pretended that the statement contained in this inscription was intended as a censure upon him for having aspired to the consulship before the age appointed by law; he accordingly impeached Afer before the Senate, and conducted the prosecution himself with surprising skill and fluency.[5] Domitius perceived his danger; and, instead of attempting a defence, he pleaded guilty, and declared himself wholly unable to reply to the able speech of his accuser, which, however, he reviewed in a masterly manner and with apparent satisfaction, declaring that Caius Cæsar the orator was more to be dreaded than Caius Cæsar the emperor. This gross flattery so delighted Caligula, that he not only procured his acquittal, but, deposing the ordinary consuls,[6] made him consul *suffect* with Callistus his freedman, who had been instrumental in the management of the Senate on this occasion. This body had long since lost all its dignity and authority, as well as all claim to respect; and appeared to have no other object than to propitiate the favour of the emperor by the most servile adulation and

Story of Domitius Afer.

Base temper of the Senate.

[1] Suetonius, *Cal.* 42. Dion Cassius, lib. lix.
[2] *Al.* Cælianus et Cestianus. See Dion Cassius.
[3] Suetonius, *Cal.* 17.
[4] Ibid. 53.
[5] Dion Cassius, *in Caligula.*
[6] *Both* consuls however could not be *Ordinarii*, since Caius Cæsar himself was named on the first of January.

the most unprincipled compliances.[1] They readily acknowledged that they held their lives and property by no surer tenure than his clemency; and they did not hesitate to deprive any citizen of both who might have become obnoxious to his jealousy. A.D. 39.

The same mean spirit pervaded the whole people of Rome, and no servility was too degrading for those who still affected to boast of their republic, and to despise the subjects of monarchical governments. If there were some exceptions to this baseness, they were distinguished by the puritanical cant of the Stoic philosophy, more than by the generous bravery of former times, and served rather to point one of Plutarch's tales, than to prove that any portion still remained of "the old Roman virtue." And people.

Of this description is the story told by Seneca,[2] of Canus Julius, a young pedant who chose to enter the lists of disputation with the emperor, and to conduct the debate in such a manner as to ensure his own destruction. Accordingly, upon his taking leave, Caius Cæsar called out to him, "That you may not go away with a mistaken impression of the result of this conference, I tell you fairly, that you are condemned to die." "I heartily thank you, most gracious sovereign," was the reply of Canus: he affected the most perfect indifference during the ten days which the law allowed, between the condemnation and execution of the criminal; and when the centurion came to lead him away to his death, he was found playing at a game resembling chess, and jocosely desired the officer to bear witness that though he could not stay to finish his game, he had the advantage in it. To his friends he observed in a similar strain, "I am more fortunate than you; for you are tormented with anxiety to know that of which I shall be certified in a moment;" and he continued a scholastic discussion on the immortality of the soul, till the axe of the executioner put a period to his harangue. Story of Canus Julius.

Josephus,[3] and Philo,[4] are very copious in their accounts of the oppressions which, probably about this time, the emperor began to inflict upon the Jews; and Crevier[5] has thought fit to copy, at great length, the details and the speeches which they have collected. But the circumstances of this persecution belong more to Jewish[6] than to Roman history, and wear the character rather of one of Plutarch's romances than of authentic narrative. Oppression of the Jews.

The enormous sums, which the vast extent of the Roman empire, and the passive submission of the citizens continued to supply, were insufficient for the unprecedented expenditure of Caius Cæsar, who Vast extravagance of Caligula's expenditure.

[1] Dion Cassius, *in loco*. Seneca, *de Benef.* lib. xi. c. 12.
[2] *De Tranquill.* lib. xiv.
[3] *Antiq.* lib. xviii. *De Bell. Jud.* lib. ii.
[4] *Leg. ad Caium.*
[5] *Caligula*, book vii. A.C. 40.
[6] Some account of these transactions will be found in Tillemont, and in Archbishop Usher.

A.D. 39. was as lavish in scattering money as he was covetous in amassing it, and defended his prodigality upon the principle that, "frugality becomes other men, but not an emperor."[1] Suetonius possibly exaggerates the childish extravagances of his table and furniture, when he speaks of loaves of solid gold set before the guests, and of the prows of galleys decorated with diamonds;[2] but he is supported by other testimony in his description of the excessive luxury of the entertainments given at the palace, some of which are said to have cost from fifty to a hundred thousand pounds of English money;[3] of the splendour of the baths and greenhouses, and other accommodations on board the imperial yachts; and of the enormous waste of labour employed upon the emperor's villas, in attempting to exalt the valleys and level the hills, to make the sea firm ground, and to cut the dry land into bays and lakes. Amid all this useless and mischievous profusion, some works and institutions were undertaken more worthy of the natural talents of Caius Cæsar, and of a refined and tasteful age; though all was done with that capricious violence, and arbitrary disregard for the rights of others, which marked the whole conduct of his reign. He instituted public games in Sicily and in Gaul; and at Lyons he established prizes for eloquence, of which the conditions were, that the unsuccessful candidates should bestow the palm upon their competitors, and proclaim their success; and that they should either efface their own compositions with a sponge, or with their tongues, or be beaten with the ferule, or cast into the nearest water.[4] He completed several useful works which had been commenced by his predecessor;[5] and brought to Rome, at an enormous expense, one of those celebrated Egyptian obelisks which to this day remain among its noblest ornaments. He projected a commercial harbour at Rhegium,[6] which would have been highly advantageous to the Alexandrian and Sicilian merchants; and he repaired the ruined walls and temples at Syracuse. He had taken measures to cut a canal through the isthmus of Corinth, to enable the trading vessels to avoid the dangerous and tedious passage round the Peloponnesus; and, to facilitate the intercourse with Gaul, he intended to have built a city upon the summit of the Alps. At the same time he proposed to gratify his own taste by restoring the famous Palace of the fortunate Polycrates at Samos, and the sanctuary of Apollo at Miletum.

Games in Sicily and Gaul.

All these undertakings were not sufficient to employ the morbid activity of a powerful but unsound mind; Caius Cæsar, from some motive, at which his contemporaries could only guess,[7] determined to build a bridge across the bay, from Baiæ to Puteoli, a distance of

[1] Suetonius, *Cal.* 37.
[2] Ibid. *et* 20, 21.
[3] Seneca, *ad Helv.* lib. ix., ten million sesterces. Dion Cassius, lib. lix.
[4] Suetonius, *Cal.* 20. Juvenal, l. 44. Ibid. 21.
[5] Josephus, *Antiq.* lib. xix. Suetonius, *Cal.* 19.

rather more than three miles and-a-half: a prodigious number of round-hulled vessels were put in requisition for this preposterous design, and many more were built; and as soon as a sufficient quantity were collected, they were anchored together, and a broad Roman road, formed of the usual materials, was carried over their decks. Upon the sides of this road inns were erected, supplied by conduits with fresh water; trees and shrubs were planted; and a high parapet defended the whole from the surge, and from the near view of the sea. The opening of this grand but useless work, was conducted in a style of magnificence corresponding with the boldness of the undertaking; the army, both infantry and cavalry, was marched dry shod over the ocean, the emperor leading the van on horseback, and returning by the same road in triumph. Largesses, speeches, and feasting followed, which continued throughout the night; and so admirable was the contrivance for lighting the bridge, that, according to the inflated language of the imperial flatterers, the absence of the sun was scarcely perceived. The weather proved serenely calm, and Caius Cæsar indulged the belief, that Neptune stood more in awe of him than he had done of Xerxes on a similar occasion: but the complete gratification of his vanity and luxury could not calm his passion for cruelty; and part of the amusement afforded him, consisted in throwing the spectators over the parapet into the sea, and in running down, with ships of war, the numerous boats which crowded around the spectacle.[1]

A.D. 39. The great bridge over the sea.

There was nothing for which the thoughtless impetuosity and selfish timidity of Caius Cæsar was less adapted than a military expedition; for although he had been bred in camps, and early accustomed to discipline, his irregular life and violent temper had totally disqualified him for the duties of a soldier. But his inordinate vanity was not to be satisfied without having gained at least the semblance of martial glory; and he set out for a German campaign with so little previous preparation, that all the activity of his officers, and all the resources of the empire were insufficient to raise men, and to collect supplies as rapidly as he required them. Universal confusion and haste prevailed;[2] veteran cohorts and new levies were seen marching from every point to join the emperor; the roads were thronged with waggons laden with enormous quantities of provisions and of ammunition; and the prætorian guards were so exhausted by forced marches that, contrary to all precedent, they were constrained to lay their standards upon the baggage; when, on a sudden, the emperor grew weary of this violent motion, and, reclining on his litter, proceeded with all the pomp and luxurious leisure of an oriental despot.

Ridiculous expedition of Caius Cæsar.

Upon his arrival at head quarters, he assumed the command of

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. lix.
[2] Suetonius, *Cal.* 43. Dion Cassius, lib. lix.

A.D. 39. Severity of discipline.

eight legions, which had been stationed upon the banks of the Rhine since the reign of Augustus; and he began immediately to enforce the most rigid discipline. Those officers who failed to bring up their respective corps at the time appointed in the general orders, were either deprived of their seniority, or cashiered; and he dismissed from the army a number of veteran invalids who, according to the regulation of the service, were entitled to pensions and rewards.[1] But, after all this parade and expense, there was as little disposition to face actual danger on the part of the emperor, as there was in the Germans to offer him any resistance: he was obliged, therefore, to contrive a mock fight with some boys, whom he had concealed in a wood; after which exploit he congratulated his brave comrades on their important [2] victory—affected to treat with contempt those who had no share in the action—and wrote pathetic letters to the Senate, complaining that the people of Rome were indulging themselves in the lap of peace and plenty, whilst their emperor was fighting their battles, and enduring every species of hardship and danger.

About the same time an event occurred which contributed not a little to the gratification of his puerile ambition. Adminius, the son of Cunobellinus, a British chieftain, having been banished by his father, arrived in Gaul, with a slender retinue, and claimed the protection of Cæsar, who thought proper to represent this adventure as the submission of the whole island of Britain to his arms; and accordingly directed the bearers of his despatches to go to the *Forum* and to the *Curia* in a carriage of State, and to deliver them only to the consuls in full Senate assembled in the Temple of Mars, as if some important addition had been made to the imperial dominions.

Unsuccessful conspiracy.

In the midst of these successes, a trifling alarm induced the emperor to return suddenly to Rome; and, during his stay in the capital, he discovered,[3] or affected to discover,[4] a plot for his destruction, in which several of the principal senators, and his two surviving sisters were implicated. Executions and confiscations followed of course: the princesses were banished for life to the island of Pontia, and were deprived of all their property, the major part of which the emperor carried with him on his return into Gaul, and sold by public auction;[5] and so great was the profit of the sale, that he was induced to send to Rome for a large quantity of his own splendid furniture and rich jewellery, for the same purpose.—But the display of wealth which the Gauls had made in these purchases was calculated to stimulate, rather than to satisfy the cupidity of Caius Cæsar; and that unhappy province[6] was more cruelly impoverished by his

[1] Suetonius, *Cal.* 44.
[2] Ibid. 45. Dion Cassius, *loc. cit.*
[3] Tacitus, lib. xiv. *Annal.* ii.
[4] Dion Cassius, *in loco.*
[5] Suetonius, *Cal.* 39.
[6] Ibid. lib. lix.

rapine and exactions, than if it had been plundered by a conqueror. A.D. 39.
A great number of the most respectable and wealthy among the officers of the army were sacrificed on suspicion of having been concerned in the alleged conspiracy; and among these were some who had held commands in the province for many years, and had enjoyed ample opportunities of enriching themselves.[1]

It remained, however, to make good his undertaking in Britain; and with this view he marched his whole army, to the number of more than two hundred thousand men, towards the coast. But when he arrived upon the sea-shore, instead of preparing for the embarkation of the troops, he drew them up in order of battle; and while all men wondered what design the emperor could be meditating, he ordered them to fill their helmets with shells, which he called "the spoils of the ocean due to the Capitol and to the palace."[2] After this exploit, he assured his soldiers that their toils and perils were at an end; and, distributing a largess of a hundred *denarii* (about three guineas) to each man, he bade them "from henceforth be happy and rich." Spoils of the ocean.

He now turned his attentions to the preparations for a triumph; and not satisfied with a number of German hostages and criminals, whom he treated as prisoners of war, he compelled many of the tallest and most martial Gauls, without regard to their rank, to assume German names and habits,[3] and even to learn the German language, that he might pass them for captives of that nation. The transports which had been fitted out to convey him to Britain were dragged, at a vast expense overland to Rome; and an enormous light-house was erected upon the beach, on which the shells had been gathered, as a trophy of his victory. Preparations for a triumph.

His return to Rome was accelerated by an attempt of greater atrocity than any which he had before conceived. He resolved to massacre the whole of those legions which had mutinied against his father, upon the death of Augustus;[4] and though he was with great difficulty convinced of the danger of such a prodigious effusion of blood, he could not be dissuaded from punishing them by decimation. The troops, however, were not disposed to submit patiently to this unprecedented barbarity; and the emperor, upon the first symptom of discontent, was seized with a panic, and fled to Italy in the utmost consternation. He had previously entered upon his third consulship without a colleague.[5] Attempt to decimate the legions.

The Senate had descended to the most shameless adulation in their addresses to the emperor, on the occasion of his pretended achievements, and on his escape from the treasons which had been brought to light; and they had decreed him an ovation; but Caius Cæsar, A.D. 40.

[1] Julius Sacerdos. Lentulus Getulicus. Marcus Lepidus. Dion Cassius, lib. lix.
[2] Suetonius, *Cal.* 46. Dion Cassius, *loc. cit.*
[3] Ibid. 47. [4] Ibid. 48. [5] Ibid. 17.

A.D. 40. who considered an ordinary triumph as too little for his merits, was furiously indignant that they should presume to offer him an inferior honour: he refused to receive some of the deputies from Rome, and forbade others to enter the province; and they who were admitted to his presence were treated with the grossest ignominy, and sent back to the Senate with the most alarming threats;[1] in consequence of which, no magistrate durst convene the Senate, and all the business of the empire was suspended till his return. He entered the city on his own birthday, with the usual ceremonies of an ovation;[2] but he had forbidden any of the senators to meet him on the road, and fear kept many others from witnessing the procession; so that he had rather the air of a wild beast approaching the fold, than of a victorious prince returning to his subjects.

Servility of the Senate.

His bosom boiled with rage against the nobility; and he studied to mortify, and, if possible, to extirpate them; he deprived all the ancient aristocratic families of their heraldic honours,[3] and obliged those of the highest rank to submit to the most degrading offices; all eminence of merit, even in his own service, was equally dangerous; and no man could be commended but at the hazard of his life. As his despotism became more wanton, the servility of the Romans grew more base; and even generals, who had distinguished themselves by their courage in the field, were found capable of the meanest flattery at Court. Vitellius, who had gained such credit by his military conduct as necessarily exposed him to danger, eluded it by an ingenious reply, which, though it satisfied the self-love of the emperor, must have been felt by the whole Court to be a severe and cutting sarcasm.[4] Caius Cæsar was boasting of his amatory successes in the heavens, and appealed to Vitellius, whether he had not seen him enjoy the favours of the moon: the general, holding his hand over his eyes, as if to protect them from the bright rays of the emperor, answered, that "the gods are only visible in such situations to each other, and not to mortals."[5]

Hatred and indignation of the people.

But although the independent spirit of true virtue was extinct in Rome, the natural passions of hatred and revenge, and selfish fear, which can never be suppressed by tyranny, rendered the situation of the tyrant as dangerous as it ought to have been. Treasonable designs were formed; and more than one plot was prematurely discovered, and he added to the long list of proscriptions, and of judicial murders, all who were obnoxious to suspicion, or capable of gratifying avarice. The accounts which have reached us of these conspiracies are, however, so vague and unsatisfactory, that their existence is rather inferred than related; and Suetonius and Dion Cassius differ so much from each other, and are both so deficient in arrange-

[1] Suetonius, *Cal.* 49.
[2] Ibid. 17.
[3] Rollin, lib. iii. sec. 1.
[4] Dion Cassius, *loc. cit.*
[5] Dion Cassius, *loc. cit.*

ment and perspicuity, that the events of this reign are not to be adjusted without considerable difficulty, and must, after all, be subject to great uncertainty. A.D. 40.

Caius Cæsar had entered upon his fourth consulship,[1] about a month, when that vengeance which, however odious in the perpetrator, is amply merited by such bloody and profligate oppressors, delivered the world from his cruel yoke. Among the officers of his guards was Cassius Chærea, a veteran of high character and tried courage, and shrewdly suspected of entertaining Republican opinions. The emperor had been in the habit of taunting this brave man with having a feeble and effeminate voice, aud had more than once called him "coward"—an insult never forgiven by a soldier—and whenever it came to Chærea's turn to wait upon him, in order to receive the watchword, he gave him some name[2] which could not be repeated by the officer to the soldiers, without exposing himself to ridicule and shame. Irritated beyond endurance by these repeated insults, Chærea sounded some others of the most disaffected persons about the Court,[3] and particularly Valerius Asiaticus, who was known to retain a keen sense of the injuries he had received from Caligula; for the emperor, not content with the seduction of his wife, had rallied him in public upon the subject, in the grossest and most offensive language.[4] The design which they were maturing, would have been crushed in its infancy, but for the constancy of Quintilia, an actress, who endured the rack without betraying Pompadius, a nobleman with whom she had an intrigue, and whose imprudence had excited suspicion. The sufferings of this woman[5] served to incense the conspirators, particularly Chærea, who presided at her punishment, and to hasten the accomplishment of their purpose.[6] It was, of course, preceded by the usual train of prodigies: the statue of Jupiter burst out into a horse-laugh, to the great terror of some workmen who were employed about it; several persons, and amongst others the emperor himself, had ominous dreams; and an astrologer warned him "to beware of Cassius," which he interpreting of Cassius Longinus, then proconsul of Asia, despatched orders for his execution, which were, fortunately, superseded by his own death.[7] Conspiracy of Chærea. A.D. 41.

It had been resolved to assassinate the emperor during the Palatine Games. In the three first days no favourable opportunity occurred, and Chærea began to grow impatient and desperate; but Death of Caius Cæsar Caligula IX. Cal. Feb.

[1] Suetonius, *Cal.* 17.
[2] Ibid. 56.
[3] Clemens, Cornelius Sabinus, Callistus Eparchus, &c. Dion Cassius, lib. lix.
[4] Seneca, *Con. Sap.* lib. xviii.
[5] Crevier, (*Caligula*, book vii. sec. 2,) seems to think that this is the same woman mentioned by Suetonius, *in Caligula*, lib. xvi., to whom the emperor gave a reward for her fidelity to her patron; but as the accusation, in this case, was treason, the supposition appears very improbable.
[6] Josephus, *Antiq.* lib. xviii.
[7] Suetonius, *Cal.* 57.

A.D. 41. he was restrained by the prudence of the other conspirators from attempting open violence.

On the fourth day of the games, Caligula was oppressed by indigestion, and seemed inclined to remain in the theatre, instead of returning, as usual, to dinner, about one o'clock; but he was prevailed on to try the bath, and was actually going home for that purpose, when he was met in a narrow passage by a company of youths, who were to perform a scenic representation before him; his eagerness to enjoy this entertainment would have induced him to return to the theatre, had not the boys requested time to warm themselves:[1] at this moment Chærea struck him, and he was soon despatched; for above thirty wounds were found in his body; and Dion Cassius affirms, that the conspirators tore his flesh with their teeth.[2]

Character.

Thus perished Caligula in the twenty-ninth year of his age, and in the fourth year of his flagitious reign.[3] His character is sufficiently depicted in his conduct. Historians have assigned him a superiority of natural talents, powers of eloquence, and literary acquirements, which a life of debauchery could not wholly quench. His health had never been good, and his constitution, impaired by his vices, was severely shaken in the illness which was attributed to Cæsonia's amatory potion. His disorder appears to have affected his intellect; and Suetonius relates,[4] that he was himself so impressed with this idea, as to have entertained an intention of retiring, perhaps to Anticyra, for the purpose of undergoing a course of medicine. In his habits of life, he was as irregular and inconstant as might be expected in a madman. He appeared sometimes in the dress of a female, and often in that of a barbarian; frequently he adopted the costume of the different male, or even female, deities; and at other times he wore the uniform of a triumphant General, or the armour which he had taken from the tomb of Alexander the Great.[5]

He devoted himself eagerly to low and degrading exercises, and was ambitious to excel in driving, and sword-playing, in dancing, singing, and even in acting.[6]

Death of Cæsonia and her child.

In the confusion which ensued upon his assassination, the empress was stabbed by a centurion, and her child dashed against a wall and killed;[7] the body of Caligula was hastily interred, after being half burnt, in a private garden;[8] and was not honoured with the rites of sepulture till the return of his sisters from exile, when the persons

[1] Suetonius, *Cal.* 58.

[2] Dion Cassius, lib. lix. *sub. fin.* This is the mildest construction that can be put upon the words of Dion Cassius, σάρκων ἐγευσάντο, which literally imply, as Crevier understands them, that they eat part of the corpse.

[3] He reigned three years, ten months, and eight days. Suetonius, *Cal.* 59.

[4] *Cal.* 1.

[5] Dion Cassius, *loc. cit.*

[6] Suetonius, *Cal.* 54.

[7] Ibid. lib. lix. Dion Cassius, lib. lix. *sub. finem.*

[8] Josephus, says, by M. Agrippa.

who were employed to remove it, were said to have been alarmed by frequent apparitions.[1] A.D. 41.

The news of his death was, for some time, distrusted—the people suspecting that it was an artifice to try their loyalty;[2] but when the report was confirmed, the Senate met in the Capitol, not in the Julian Curia, which they regarded as the tomb of their independence, and ventured to deliberate upon the restoration of the republic.

[1] Suetonius, *Cal.* 59.

[2] Ibid. 60.



[From a Mosaic at Hadrian's Villa.]



[Apotheosis of Claudius.]

CHAPTER IX.

TIBERIUS CLAUDIUS DRUSUS CÆSAR.

FROM A D. 41 TO 54.

A.D. 41. Interregnum.

THE spirited conduct of the Senate, upon the death of Caligula, produced less important consequences than might have been anticipated. A few Republican speeches were made in the Senate-house and in the Forum, for which the speakers afterwards suffered; but the consuls wanted firmness, and the senators had long ceased to be warriors; and though the few troops in the city submitted for the moment to their commands, they were only waiting the determination of the Prætorian cohorts and German guards, who were in fact masters of the empire:[1] the populace, for the most part, were

[1] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. i.

actuated by no political principle, but were ready to afford their acclamations to the prevailing party. A.D. 41.

The first impulse of the court party, and of the foreign guards, was to massacre all who had participated in the murder of the emperor; and several persons of distinction,[1] who imprudently exposed themselves, became the victims of their fury. But this violence subsided upon their discovering Claudius, who had concealed himself in an obscure corner of the palace, and, being drawn from his hiding place, threw himself at their feet in the utmost terror, and besought them to spare his life. The soldiers in the palace immediately saluted him emperor, and the Prætorian cohorts and city troops agreed in supporting him; so that the Senate, after a feeble attempt at remonstrance, were forced to confirm the election, and the triumph of military despotism; and Claudius set the first example of paying the army for the imperial dignity by a largess from the public treasury.[2] Tib. Claudius made Emperor.

It is difficult to assign any other motive for the choice which the army made of Claudius, than that which they themselves professed, "His relationship to the whole family of the Cæsars." Claudius, who was now fifty years old, had never done anything to gain popularity, or to display those qualities which attach soldiers. He had been a rickety child, and the development of his faculties was retarded by his bodily infirmities; and although he outgrew his complaints, and became distinguished as a polite scholar, and an elegant writer,[3] his spirits never recovered from the effects of disease and of severe treatment, and he retained much of the timidity and indolence of his childhood.[4] He was the second son of Drusus and Antonia, and consequently grand-nephew to Augustus, who treated him with great consideration, encouraged him in his literary pursuits, and, at his death, left him a considerable legacy.[5] But during the reign of Tiberius, finding himself regarded at court with that mortifying contempt which always aggravates, and often generates intellectual deficiencies, he gave himself up to gross sensuality and to low company;[6] and consoled himself, under his degradation, with the security which it brought with it. Tiberius endeavoured by his will to compensate for his neglect during his life, and added liberally to the fortune of Claudius. When Caligula succeeded to the empire, his uncle had shrewdness to discover that his life depended upon maintaining his reputation for incapacity; and he not only yielded unresistingly to the natural phlegm of his temperament, but even affected an insensibility which he had not formerly exhibited, and Birth and early life of Claudius.

[1] Asprænas, Norbanas, Anteius, and some others of less note.
[2] Suetonius, *Claud.* 10. *quinadena.* H.S. £120 English to each man. Dion Cassius, lib. lx.
[3] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xiii. c. 3. Suetonius, *Claud.* 41. Dion Cassius, *passim.*
[4] Suetonius, *Claud.* 2. [5] Ibid.
[6] Dion Cassius, lib. lx.

A.D. 41. suffered himself to become the butt of court parasites, and the subject of their practical jokes.[1]

His conduct upon his accession.

The excitement of novelty, on his first accession, produced efforts of sagacity and prudence, of which none, who had previously known him, believed him capable. To have suffered Chærea to escape would have argued extreme weakness, and would have afforded a dangerous example; and the punishment of Lupus, who had assassinated the empress Cæsonia and her child, was a debt to public justice which could not be remitted: these two criminals[2] were, therefore, condemned to suffer death; and Sabinus, not choosing to survive them, died at the same time by his own hand.

Deaths of Chærea, Lupus, and Sabinus.

Act of Amnesty.

But, having made these indispensable sacrifices to his own safety, Claudius immediately published an act of indemnity for the security of all those who had, during the two days of anarchy which followed his election, attempted to restore the republic; nor would he suffer any man to be accused for having insulted or injured him when a private person; and he treated Galba with constant kindness and confidence, although he knew that he had been his competitor for the empire.[3]

Mildness and moderation of Claudius.

He recalled the two sisters of Caius Cæsar from banishment,[4] and rescinded all the sanguinary and tyrannical edicts of that bloody despot. The registers, entitled Pugio and Gladius, together with the criminatory documents of Tiberius, and the poisonous preparations which were found in the private cabinets of the late emperor, were committed to the flames.[5] But although he laboured to render his administration in all things opposite to that of his predecessor, yet with a show of unusual, and perhaps exaggerated delicacy, he forbade the anniversary of his own accession to be kept, because it was also the day of Caligula's murder.

His Piety,

Claudius displayed much of what was then termed piety, in the honours which he caused to be paid to the memory of his deceased relatives, even of those who, in his childhood, had treated him with unkindness and neglect.[6] But, although he appeared anxious to magnify the dignity of his ancestors, he was extremely moderate in assuming titles of distinction for himself, or for the living members of his family; he even declined the salutation of emperor, and would not accept that of *Pater Patriæ*, till he thought that his public conduct had merited it.[7]

He repealed the arbitrary law relating to high treason, which had been perverted to such oppressive purposes in the two preceding

[2] Suetonius, *Claud.* 7.
[2] Ibid. 11, appears to intimate that others of the conspirators suffered.
[3] Ibid. *Galba*, 7.
[4] Dion Cassius, lib. lx. Agrippina and Julia.
[5] Ibid. lib. lx.
[6] Ibid. lib. lx. Suetonius, *Claud.* 11.
[7] Suetonius, *Claud.* 12.

reigns,[1] and he took every opportunity of limiting the power of the Crown, by giving weight and influence to the other branches of the constitution. He revived the privy council which Tiberius had discontinued, and referred all matters of importance, even those by which the greatest popularity was to be gained, to the decision of the Senate; and when he thought proper to enter the Senate-house, with his usual escort of guards, he first requested the consent of the conscript fathers to the admission of the military.[2] He evinced the same respect for the authority of the consuls, to whom he paid in his own person no less marks of attention than they were accustomed to receive from every common citizen;[3] and he observed the constitutional privileges of all orders in the State with scrupulous courtesy. The tribunes of the people were highly gratified on a public occasion, by his apologizing for having no seats to offer them;[4] and the populace were delighted to find the private property of the emperor subject to the common law, and liable to the public burdens.[5] At the same time all the new taxes were remitted; and much of the property which had been unjustly confiscated, was restored to the rightful owners, or to their representatives; and, to prevent the injuries frequently offered to noble families by the selfish servility of the courtiers, he procured an act to be passed, declaring void all legacies to the emperor, bequeathed by any person having an heir-at-law.[6]

A.D. 41. Constitutional administration,

These, and many other just and salutary regulations, which the emperor was diligent in enforcing, and faithful in obeying, together with his affable demeanour, and generous temper, rendered him so popular, that upon a false report of his assassination, the mob assembled in a tumultuous manner, vociferating that the senators were "parricides," and the army "traitors;" and a dangerous insurrection would have followed, if the news had not been speedily contradicted.[7]

And popularity.

An attachment so strong could hardly have existed, had Claudius been really "so silly an emperor,"[8] (γέρων καὶ μωρὸς, Dion Cassius,) as historians have generally represented him; and indeed the great number of judicious and useful enactments made during his reign, which Suetonius[9] and Dion Cassius have related, in their usual desultory and unconnected manner, sufficiently prove that he was not only sincerely desirous to promote the public welfare, but moreover was well qualified to judge of the measures by which the great object might be secured. The magnificent works, and the noble sentiments which are ascribed to him, oblige us to attribute the fatuity which characterizes some parts of his conduct to other causes than

Capacity of Claudius.

[1] Dion Cassius, lib lx.
[2] Suetonius, *Claud.* 12.
[3] Suetonius, *Claud.* 23.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Dion Cassius, lib. lx.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Suetonius, *Claud.* 12.
[8] Crevier, vol. iii. p. 160.
[9] *In Claud.* 17, 19, 23, 25. Dion Cassius, lib. lx. *passim.*

A.D. 41. natural imbecility; and serve to show, that the most valuable qualities may become useless, and even contemptible, from the early and unlimited indulgence of sensuality.[1]

Uxorious disposition.

He had been, at an early age,[2] betrothed first to Æmilia Lepida, with whom he refused to consummate his marriage, on account of some offence taken by Augustus; and soon afterwards to Livia Medullina, a young lady of very high extraction, who died on the wedding day. He subsequently married Plantia Urgulanilla, whom he divorced with ignominy, on suspicion of adultery and murder; and Ælia Petina, from whom he was separated on slighter grounds. He then took to wife the infamous Messalina, whose revolting immodesty and abandoned profligacy have become proverbial;[3] and whose cruelty and falsehood prompted him to acts of oppression and injustice, equally against his inclination and his judgment.



[Messalina.—*Visconti Iconog. Romaine.*]

The influence of this wicked, but able woman, was supported by that of three favourite officers of the household, who from the base condition of slaves had been raised to situations of the highest trust and honour.[4] Pallas was made treasurer, Narcissus secretary of state, and Callistus a sort of minister of the home department; and this evil triumvirate so unblushingly enriched themselves at the expense of the public, that when the emperor complained of the poverty of his exchequer, he was told that he might be rich enough if he could prevail upon two of his freedmen to take him into partnership.[5] Into such hands the indolent habits and gross tastes of Claudius induced him to commit that power, which he was himself capable of exercising in the most beneficial manner; and abuses of the worst tendency were sanctioned by his authority, whilst he was indulging in the revelry of the table, preparing for renewed gluttony by the use of emetics, or sleeping off the effects of his intemperance.[6]

Governed by his wife and Ministers

[1] Gifford, *Pref. Trans. Juvenal*, calls him "a pedantic sot, unable to govern himself."
[2] Suetonius, *Claud.* 26.
[3] See Juvenal, *Sat.* vi. and x.
[4] Pliny, lib. xxxiii. c. 10.
[5] Suetonius, *Claud.* 28.
[6] Dion Cassius, lib. lx.

It is added, that his torpidity and abstraction were greatly aggravated by soporific drugs, which the empress administered in his drink, that she might securely leave her place by his side to be occupied by one of her maids, whilst she herself resorted by night to the public stews.[1] During the fits of languor which ensued, Claudius was perfectly indifferent to all that passed around him; and suffered his orders to be revoked, his appointments cancelled, and his friends of the highest rank treated with indignity in his presence. All the patronage of the empire became the property of Messalina and of the ministers; and whosoever presumed to remonstrate against their proceedings was sure to feel the weight of their vengeance. A.D. 41.

Julia and Seneca exiled by Messalina.

Their earliest victim was Julia,[2] the daughter of Germanicus, whom the empress thought proper to accuse of incontinence, and who was, in consequence, first exiled, and afterwards put to death. Seneca, the philosopher, was, at the same time, banished to Corsica as the partner in her guilt.[3] The real offence of the princess was the unbending haughtiness of her temper, which would not permit her to stoop to characters whom she despised; that of the man of letters was the influence which his talents might be supposed to possess over the emperor. There was no act in the whole reign of Claudius which tended so strongly as this did to reflect dishonour upon his administration, and to alienate those on whose suffrage depends the opinion of posterity.



[Julia daughter of Agrippina.—*Museum Florentinum.*]

Princes restored to their dominions by Claudius.

Dion Cassius places in the first year of Claudius the second restoration of Antiochus to the kingdom of Commagena, of which the late emperor deprived him, after having reinstated him in it.[4] About the same time, the Iberian Mithridates was liberated from prison, and sent back to his dominions in Armenia; and Mithridates, of the Pontic family, received the kingdom of the Cimmerian Bosphorus; Palæmon, who was obliged to relinquish it, being presented with part of Cilicia as a compensation for his loss.

War in Germany.

Whilst these arrangements were in progress, a war broke out in Germany, in which Galba[5] gained great credit, rather by his judicious manner of restoring the discipline of his army, than by any very brilliant action; but Gabinius Secundus, who commanded in

[1] Juvenal, *Sat.* vi. and x.
[2] Suetonius, *Claud.* 29.
[3] Dion Cassius, lib. lx.
[4] Ibid. Josephus, *Antiq* lib. xix c. 5, 6.
[5] Suetonius, *Galba*, 8.

A.D. 41. the north, distinguished himself by so many victories, that the emperor conferred upon him the surname of *Chaucius*, from the *Chauci* whom he had defeated,[1] an honour extremely rare under the imperial government.

And in Mauritania. These successes brought the contest with the German tribes to a speedy termination; but a revolt which occurred at the same period in Mauritania, was attended with more important consequences. It was occasioned by the death of king Ptolemy, whom Caius Cæsar had inhumanly put to death, and whose subjects rose in arms to avenge the treacherous murder of their sovereign; but they were unable to resist the military skill and experience of Suetonius Paulus, who pursued them beyond Mount Atlas, hitherto the limit of the Roman arms. In the next year the war was concluded by Cn. Geta, and Mauritania was reduced to the form of a Roman province. It was divided by Claudius into two governments, each of vast extent.

A.D. 42. The emperor assumed the consulship on the first of January, with the usual formalities, and held it two months, during which period he appeared anxious to gain popularity by his great moderation and courtly demeanour, no less than by an extraordinary attention to the duties of his office. He avoided all those pompous and expensive displays of power in which his predecessors had indulged; and even on the birth of T. Claudius Germanicus, better known by the name of Britannicus, the first son of a Roman emperor born during his father's reign, he would not permit any more than the usual rejoicings.[2] He was careful to remove the disaffection which had spread among the senators during the oppressive tyranny of Caius Cæsar, by his kind and familiar manner of visiting them, by consulting on all occasions their dignity and interest, and, at the same time, by rigorously insisting on their attendance in their places whenever business of importance was to be discussed in the senate-house. He examined strictly into the department of the public accounts, and reformed many of the abuses which had prevailed in the appointment of provincial governors.[3] A great number of salutary regulations were made relating to the police of the city, the supplies of the markets, and the preservation of the streets from fires;[4] and on one occasion the emperor remained two nights in the neighbourhood of an alarming fire, giving orders with the greatest promptitude and judgment to prevent its spreading to the adjoining streets.

[1] *In Claud.* 24. Crevier convicts Dion Cassius of two mistakes in his account of the German war. Both Dion Cassius and Suetonius wrote so carelessly, that their accounts of events do not always merit the name of authentic histories.

[2] Suetonius, *Claud.* 27.

[3] Dion Cassius, lib. lx.


[4] Suetonius, *Claud.* 18, 19, 20. Dion Cassius, lib. lx. *passim.*

The badness of the season, notwithstanding all the diligence of Claudius, produced a great scarcity and dearness of provisions; and the populace, seditious from hunger, vented their rage upon the emperor, wasting, in an attempt to injure him, as much bread as would have supported their families for some days.[1] Claudius, however, escaped from the shower of loaves which was intended to overwhelm him, and, instead of resenting this ill-treatment, endeavoured to relieve the public distress. His difficulty arose, in part, from the want of a sufficiently secure and capacious harbour for the importation of corn at all seasons, and in all weathers. Caius Cæsar had intended to remedy this inconvenience, by the construction of a pier at Rhegium,—a port peculiarly convenient for ships from Africa and Sicily, the great granaries of Rome; but the distance overland from the capital formed a serious objection to this plan, since the immediate supply of their wants was the only means of preventing tumult and sedition among the inhabitants of Rome. Claudius, therefore, resolved upon forming a harbour on a large scale, upon the right *embouchure* of the Tiber;[2] and, although the opinion of almost all the scientific men in Italy was unfavourable to the undertaking, he persisted in his design, and completed in the most magnificent manner, and with the most entire success.

A.D. 42. Famine and disturbances.

Great public works.

About the same time was completed the great aqueduct projected by Caius Cæsar, for supplying the whole city with water from



[The Claudian Aqueduct.—*Venuti, Antiquita di Roma.*]

reservoirs, about thirteen leagues distant. The expense of this undertaking, when its great extent and admirable workmanship are

[1] Suetonius, *Claud.* 18, 19, 20. Dion Cassius, lib. lx. *passim.*
[2] Pliny, lib. xvi. c. 40.

A.D. 42. considered, was extremely moderate, not exceeding four hundred thousand pounds of English money.[1] Vast sums were also expended in making and levelling roads, and in building bridges, to facilitate the inland communication; and a breakwater was constructed to protect the Lucrine Lake from the swell of the Tyrrhenean Sea,[2] to which it had been laid open by Augustus, in forming the Julian Navigation. But a work of incomparably greater cost and labour was the draining of the Fucine Lake, the failure of which, in the first instance at least, appears to have been attributable to the nature of the soil; though Pliny[3] seems to have thought that it might ultimately have succeeded, had Claudius lived to superintend it. The object of this prodigious undertaking,[4] which afforded employment for thirty thousand labourers during nearly twelve years, is not very distinctly pointed out by the authors who so warmly commend the design; nor is it easily to be conjectured: it might, not improbably, be intended, partly, to find occupation for a swarming population, too numerous for ordinary labour, and too dangerous to be suffered to remain in idleness.[5] It was not finished till towards the end of this reign, and no apprehensions appear to have been entertained of the result; for the emperor took the opportunity of its completion, to treat the people with a mock sea-fight, and with a combat of gladiators, in which it is asserted that the incredible number of nineteen thousand criminals were engaged to destroy each other.[6] The scene was unusually splendid; and the barbarous spectacle, provided for the amusement of the populace, was highly gratifying; but, after two attempts to open the channel, the water, either from the want of a sufficient fall, or from the choking up of the tunnel, remained in its place, and the lake exists to this day.

Treasonable practices against Claudius.

But whilst the emperor was laying the foundation of future reputation in such useful and magnificent designs, he was at the same time bringing upon himself the hatred of his subjects and the contempt of posterity, by yielding to that timidity of character, which, perhaps, even more than determined wickedness unfits men for command. The slightest apprehension of personal danger, was sufficient to make him forget all his humanity, and love of popularity,

[1] *Sestertium ter millies.* Pliny, lib. xxxvi. c. 15.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 56. *Destitutum successoris odio.* Pliny, *loc. cit.*

[4] Echard. *Claudius*, book ii. chap. iii., states that the object of the work was to increase the stream of the Tiber into which the lake was to have been drained through a tunnel, under a rocky hill, three miles in length. The lake is now called Celano.

[5] The population of Rome, in this reign, is stated at 6,844,000. One is tempted to believe this to be the number of Roman citizens, throughout the empire, rather than of the inhabitants of the city. Echard, *loc. cit.*

[6] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 56. Pliny, lib. xxxiii. c. 4. Suetonius, *Claud.* 20, 21, 32. Dion Cassius, lib. lx.

and to obtain his ready consent to the most hasty and ill-timed executions. If any nobleman had the misfortune to offend the empress by being too virtuous, or the Minister by an appearance of integrity, a hint that he carried a dagger for the destruction of his sovereign, was enough for Claudius—the death-warrant was immediately signed—and to make his rashness and cowardice as notorious as possible, the Senate was instantly convened; and the emperor in person attended to describe his dangers, and his terrors, with every symptom of infantine pusillanimity.[1] That some attempts of a treasonable nature were actually meditated by individuals, appears not improbable; but his suspicions were often founded upon the most imperfect evidence, or even upon the superstitious dreams of his wife and her accomplices in deception. A.D. 42.

The apprehension of having incurred the displeasure of the ruling party, is thought to have been the motive which induced Vinicianus to form a plot for subverting the empire, and restoring the ancient constitution.[2] Several senators and knights were implicated in the conspiracy; and, among others, Furius Camillus Scribonianus who, at that time, held a considerable command in Dalmatia. This general was so infatuated as to summon the emperor by letter, to surrender his power into the hands of the Senate and people, and to retire to a private station; and Claudius, whom fear always deprived at once of reason and of shame, actually took the opinion of his cabinet, whether the mandate should be obeyed. The soldiers, however, who were by no means desirous of a change in the government, took advantage of a pretended ill omen, to refuse obedience to Camillus, and, rising tumultuously upon their officers, slew all those who had been active in promoting the rebellion. The emperor delivered from his alarm, was prodigal of his acknowledgments to the troops, and rewarded them with high honours,[3] although for nearly a week they had been actually in arms against him. Those soldiers who had murdered their officers were put to death for their mutiny, by the general who succeeded to the command,[4] with the single exception of Volaginius, who had assassinated Camillus in the arms of his wife.[5] The audacity of the conspirators led to a natural conclusion that they had relied upon numerous and powerful accomplices in the city; and a great number of persons of quality were apprehended on suspicion, and examined by torture. Several were condemned to die, and their property was confiscated. Vinicianus escaped from justice by a voluntary death; and Cecina Pætus, better known as the husband of the affectionate and heroic Arria, followed his example. Junia,

Rebellion of Furius Camillus Scribonianus.

[1] Suetonius, *Claud.* 13, 29, 36, 37.
[2] Ibid. 13. Dion Cassius, lib. lx.
[3] Dion Cassius, *loc. cit.* Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii.
[4] Suetonius, *Otho*, 1.
[5] Pliny, *Epist.* lib. 3. c. 16.

A.D. 43. the wife of Camillus, though she denounced a number of her husband's accomplices, was banished for life; but Claudius would not suffer the children to be punished for the guilt of their parents; he pardoned the son of Camillus, and all the young men who were similarly circumstanced, and restored to them their family estates.

Conduct of the Emperor.

In most of these, and in a variety of less important trials, the emperor presided in person, and frequently gave judgment; but as he permitted his worthless Ministers to be his assessors and prompters on all occasions, there was often a strange contrast between his natural lenity, and the severity which he exercised in compliance with their mercenary views; and the attempts which he made to excuse these inconsistencies, as well as his constitutional want of firmness and discrimination, rendered him contemptible in his judicial capacity. He chuckled with cowardly triumph in the condemnation of a traitor; but was disposed to be lenient in most other criminal cases: in civil suits he occasionally displayed considerable acuteness, and one of his decisions has been compared to the celebrated judgment of Solomon; but he was, at other times, inexcusably negligent, and would decide a cause upon hearing only one side, or even without hearing either.[1] His want of personal dignity frequently exposed him to affronts from the advocates, whom he knew not how to repress; and Dion Cassius[2] relates that an enraged pleader once threw the whole contents of his portfolio in the emperor's face, and escaped with impunity. But although Claudius was not well qualified for a judge, his attention to the business of the courts occasioned some important consequences. He inquired strictly into the qualifications of the magistrates, and regulated the excessive charges of the lawyers, who had generally fallen into the custom of taking fees of their clients;[3] he scrutinized the claims of foreigners, who pretended to be Roman citizens, and he suffered no person to remain in office who spoke Latin with a foreign accent;[4] those who were detected in making false pretences to the rights of citizenship were punished with death;[5] the privileges of the citizens were maintained with a high hand; marriages were encouraged, and immunities granted to those who had large families:[6] and the slaves were on the one hand kept in order by strict regulations, and, on the other, protected from the arbitrary caprice of their masters by equitable laws.

Foreign policy.

In what may be called the colonial department, the administration was equally mild and vigorous. The rights of patronage, which Tiberius had violently usurped, were restored to the Senate; several States which had been deprived of their immunities, or laid under tribute, were, upon proper submission, restored to their freedom;

[1] Seneca, *Apoc.*
[2] Lib. lx.
[3] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xi. c. 4. Quintilian, *Inst.* lib. xii. c. 7.
[4] Dion Cassius, lib. lix.
[5] Ibid. lib. lx.
[6] Suetonius, *Claud.* 19.

but the Lycians, on account of their inextinguishable intestine discord, were deprived of their independence; and the Jews, whose animosity against the Christians disturbed the peace of the city, were commanded to depart from Rome.[1] Suetonius ascribes to the active influence of Messalina and the Ministry these, and many similar measures, which he briefly mentions without any regard to dates. But it is clear that the empress employed herself in very different pursuits, and that her passions were too unbridled for mild and moderate counsels; and the freedmen, who held the most confidential situations in the court, were men of mean talents and vulgar sentiments. The truth appears to be, that Claudius, when neither intimidated by evil counsellors, nor besotted by his own sensuality, possessed a sound judgment, considerable talents, and a gentle disposition; but when influenced by his fears, or his voluptuousness, he was easily induced to adopt the most oppressive, and the most contemptible line of conduct.

A.D. 43.

Conduct of Messalina.

This supposition is powerfully confirmed by the behaviour of the emperor in the expedition to Britain, which he was prevailed upon to undertake this year at the intercession of Vericus,[2] a fugitive Briton, who represented himself as having been extremely ill-treated by an opposite faction in his own country. Britain was at that time so little known, and so lightly esteemed, that no emperor since Julius had thought it worth the expense of an expedition, and the soldiers loudly objected to be sent "beyond the limits of the world."[3] Their murmuring, however, was little regarded; and Plautius embarked a large army for the coast of Kent,[4] where he landed without opposition or difficulty. The Britons, under the command of two sons of Cynobellinus, Caractacus and Trogodumnus, made a determined resistance, and availed themselves of the difficult nature of their country to harass the Roman legions, and retard their progress.[5] After several advantages obtained by Plautius, a battle was fought upon the banks of a river, probably the Medway, where the Roman army obtained the advantage by means of German troops, accustomed to ford and to swim across the great streams of their own wild country. In this action, Vespasian, afterwards emperor, and his brother Sabinus, particularly distinguished themselves; and C. Sidius Geta, after being nearly surrounded and taken prisoner, retrieved the fortune of the fight with so much skill and valour, that, although not of consular rank, he obtained the honour of a triumph. The Britons, upon this defeat, retired to the marshy lands near the mouth of "a river called the Thames," and by their superior knowledge of

Invasion of Britain.

[1] *Acts*, chap. xviii. ver. 2. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. iv. c. 43. Suetonius, *Claud.* 25. Dion Cassius, lib. lx.

[2] Dion Cassius, lib. lx.

[3] *Penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos.*

[4] *Crevier* lib. viii. sec. 2.

[5] Dion Cassius, lib. lx. Suetonius, *Claud.* 17.

A.D. 47. the flats and tides, exposed their pursuers to such dangers, that Plautius became alarmed, and resolved to await the arrival of the emperor, who was daily expected, to take the command in person. His coming was delayed[1] by unfavourable weather, in which he twice narrowly escaped shipwreck; and he was, in consequence, obliged to re-land and traverse great part of Gaul, till, embarking at Boulogne, he crossed the channel and effected a debarkation on the British coast. Immediately upon his assuming the command, Claudius passed his army safely over the Thames, and, engaging the Britons, defeated them with great slaughter, and pursued them to Camalodonum[2] the capital of king Cynobellinus, which soon fell into his hands. Several of the neighbouring clans, at the same time, professed their submission to the Roman empire.[3]

Return and triumph of Claudius.

Claudius remained but a short time in Britain,[4] and returned to Rome highly elated with his success. The Senate readily gratified his vanity, and decreed him all the honours which he could desire. The soldiers saluted him as a conqueror;[5] a magnificent triumph, in which the empress was permitted to appear, was conferred upon him; triumphal arches were erected; and the surname[6] Britannicus was bestowed upon the emperor and upon his son. The public rejoicings were celebrated with uncommon splendour, and an annual festival was instituted in commemoration of his achievements.

During the three following years no events of moment occurred at Rome. The war was continued in Britain with great success: Vespasian is said to have commanded in thirty actions; to have taken twenty towns; and to have overrun the Isle of Wight, which was considered as an important acquisition.[7] Plautius, in the meantime, subdued the country now included in the counties of Kent and Essex, and reduced it to the form of a Roman province; for which, on his return in the ensuing year, he was honoured with an ovation, and with particular marks of the emperor's favour and regard.[8]

These honours were conferred upon Plautius in the year in which Claudius, and the servile flatterer Vitellius were colleagues both in the consulship and censorship. In the latter office,[9] the emperor

[1] Suetonius, *Claud.* 17.

[2] Maldon, or, according to some others, Saffron Walden in Essex.

[3] Dion Cassius, lib. lx. Suetonius differs from Dion Cassius, and ascribes the whole conduct of the campaign to Plautius. He makes Claudius arrive only in time to receive the homage of the vanquished Britons. Dion Cassius has been followed in this instance, on account of the superior clearness and probability of his narrative.

[4] Suetonius says, "but a few days,"—but as Claudius was six months absent from Rome on this expedition, it seems probable that his stay in Britain was more considerable.

[5] *Imperator.*

[6] Juvenal calls him, *Generosus Britannicus*, *Sat.* x.

[7] Suetonius, *Vespasian*, 4. Dion Cassius, lib. lx.

[8] Ibid. *Claud.* 24. Tacitus, *Agricola*, lib. xiv.

[9] Ibid. *Claud.* 16.

exerted himself with laudable activity to stem the torrent of luxury and debauchery, which threatened to overwhelm the small remains of Roman virtue. He met the fate of most reformers, and became the object of ill-will, misrepresentation, and ridicule; it is most likely that he was often injudicious, and inconsistent, and unequal in the exercise of his censures and punishments; and the habits of the times were ill suited for the revival of a jurisdiction, always invidious, and long since disused. Nor was his unpopularity the worst effect of his zeal for the public morals. Conspiracies were formed against him,[1] which served as pretexts to Messalina and her minions for taking away the lives and properties of all who were obnoxious to them. Among these victims was Pompeius Magnus, the emperor's son-in-law,[2] who suffered death with his father and mother,[3] and Valerius Asiaticus, one of the most virtuous and distinguished noblemen of his time, whose wife, Poppæa, had the misfortune to displease the empress.[4] A.D. 47.

Sixty-four years only had elapsed since Augustus held the centenary jubilee, to which all subsequent ages have been indebted for the *Carmen Seculare* of Horace; but Claudius who, on most occasions, affected to take that emperor for his model, was so desirous to celebrate the "Secular Games," as they were called, that he thought proper to reckon according to the old style, in preference to the reformed calendar; and thereby he brought the century to a close in the present year.[5] The games and shows were exhibited with great splendour, and the emperor and princes of the blood, and the most illustrious of the nobility, endeavoured by their presence and condescension to conciliate the affections of the people; but the favourite was the young L. Domitius, afterwards the celebrated Nero, the son of Agrippina, who distinguished himself by his affability and magnificence. It was remarked that a comedian, named Stephanio, appeared on the stage who had acted before Augustus at the last jubilee.[6] The emperor, always fond of literary trifles, thought it a favourable opportunity for adding three additional letters to the Roman alphabet;[7] but as they proved of little service, they did not survive him. The Jubilee celebrated.

While all Rome was intent upon the entertainments of the jubilee,

[1] Dion Cassius, lib. lx.

[2] He married Antonia, the eldest daughter of Claudius's.

[3] Suetonius, *Claud.* 29.

[4] Tacitus gives a detailed account of the intrigues which led to this tragical event. *Annal.* lib. xi. c. 1, 4; lib. xiii. c. 45, &c.

[5] The Chronology adopted by Crevier has been here followed as the most convenient, if not the best supported. See Crevier, *Claudius*, lib. viii. sec. 2. Considerable difficulty will be found in reconciling the best authorities as to the precise A. U. C.

[6] Pliny, lib. vii. c. 48.

[7] Supposed to have been F the Eolic diagmma, Ψ *ps*, and *ts*. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xi. c. 13. Suetonius, *Claud.* 41.

A.D. 47. to which they attached an extraordinary importance,[1] the tranquillity of the provinces was disturbed both in Asia and in Europe.

Commotions in the Provinces.

The *Cherusci*, a considerable German tribe, had, by their frequent intestine broils, lost every member of their chieftain's family, with the exception of Italus, whose father had been a Roman citizen, and who was himself a settled inhabitant of Rome.[2] The party attached to his family invited him to assume the sceptre, and Claudius sent him into Germany with a handsome retinue, and with rich presents; but his Roman education and connections rendered him unacceptable to the opposite faction, and the civil wars of the *Cherusci* were renewed with increased violence. Claudius, however adopted the policy of Tiberius, and forbore to interfere in the internal dispute of his allies, as long as they were confined to their own territories. The *Chauci*[3] had the prudence to keep within those limits; but taking advantage of the death of the Roman general[4] who commanded in Lower Germany, they made incursions into that province; and, under the command of Gannascus, a Caninefate by birth, commenced a system of piratical depradations on the coast of Gaul, where long peace and commercial habits had rendered the inhabitants unfit for resistance, and at the same time tempting objects of plunder. The incursions were speedily repressed by the arrival of Corbulo to take the command: his men of war drove the privateers from the open seas, and he followed them into the shallows and estuaries in light armed vessels constructed for the purpose, which enabled him in a short time to destroy or take them all. The *Chauci*, however, though driven from the ocean were still formidable by land; and Corbulo was sensible that in the relaxed condition of Roman discipline, his legions would be liable to surprise and defeat in the mountain fastnesses to which it might be necessary to pursue them. He resolved therefore to restore the rigour of the ancient discipline in his army before he opened the campaign; and he effected his purpose with such extraordinary resolution and success, that the very reputation of his military character intimidated into submission the *Frisi*, who had for nearly twenty years maintained an independence of the Roman government[5] But Corbulo, though a good soldier, was of a base and selfish character; his object was to prolong and extend the war in order to increase his own opportunities of distinguishing himself; and he procured the assassi-

[1] The fondness of the Romans for all public amusements, is one of their remarkable characteristics.

Duas tantum res anxius optat,
Panem et Circenses. —Juv.

[2] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xi. c. 16, 17.

[3] (At Chaubi) a people inhabiting near that part of the country was called Friesland from the Frisi.

[4] Sanguinius Maximus. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xi c. 18.

[5] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xi. c. 19.

nation of Gannascus under the pretext of treating with the leading men of the *Chauci*.[1] Claudius, who perfectly understood his motives, sent him peremptory orders to conclude the campaign, and to retire behind the Rhine; and, as he was not in a condition to refuse obedience, he left the barbarians at peace, and employed his soldiers in cutting a canal three and twenty miles in length to connect the Rhine and the Maes,[2] which is supposed to be still in use.[3] The emperor, to console him for his disappointment, allowed him the insignia of a triumph, which his naval exploits had well merited; but the value of the honour was greatly lowered by its being shared with Q. Curtius Rufus, who commanded in Upper Germany without having come to action with the enemy.[4] A.D. 47.

Whilst these things were passing in the provinces, considerable agitation prevailed at Rome, in consequence of a claim made by the nobility of that part of Gaul, distinguished by the appellation of Gallia Comata,[5] to be admitted into the Senate, an augmentation of which body was then in contemplation. The Cisalpine and Narbonnese Gauls had long since enjoyed this envied privilege; and as the others had also been admitted to the rights of citizenship, they were ambitious of attaining to seats in the Senate, and consequently to all the highest offices in the empire. The ancient Roman families, descended, as they imagined, from the companions of Æneas, looked with great jealousy upon all senators of foreign extraction; but they felt that to admit into their body men whom they still regarded as barbarians, would be an intolerable degradation; and they opposed it by all the means in their power. But Claudius, who saw the advantage of consolidating the interests of the empire, and meditated a still further extension of the same privilege to all the provinces, persisted in his liberal intentions; and in some degree reconciled the Senate to the measure, by a speech which, as it is reported by Tacitus,[6] is remarkable for sound reason, and elegant language; though Suetonius affects to show that it displayed some technical ignorance of legal distinctions.[7] At the same time, to conciliate the old Italian families, the emperor created from among the noblest of the senators several new patricians, the number of those added by Julius Cæsar and by Augustus having been greatly diminished.[8] A.D. 48. The Gauls admitted into the Senate.

The credit which Claudius might have derived from his public conduct was completely destroyed by the scandalous circumstances of his private life. The empress, whose monstrous profligacy is unfit Infatuation of Messalina.

[1] Tacitus seems to excuse this baseness, on the ground that Gannascus had been himself a traitor.

[2] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xi. c. 20.

[3] Crevier, lib. viii. sec. 2.

[4] Ibid. *Annal.* lib. xi. 21.

[5] The part of Gaul conquered by Julius Cæsar, so called from the long hair worn by the nobility. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xi. c. 23.

[6] *Annal.* lib. xi. c. 24.

[7] *Claud.* 24.

[8] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xi. c. 25.

A.D. 48. either to be recorded or read, encouraged him in a course of low debauchery, which afforded her both opportunity and excuse for her own flagitious excesses; and she had long ceased to be restrained either by fear or shame in the pursuit of her pleasures.[1] She had some time since formed an intrigue with Silius, a young nobleman about the court, who was considered as the handsomest man of his time; and had obliged him to repudiate his innocent wife, that she might have no rival in his affections:[2] but, as if this was not sufficiently notorious, she now resolved, during the emperor's absence at Ostia, to contract a public marriage with her paramour; and she celebrated her nuptials with all the usual ceremonies, and with a pomp suitable to the rank of the parties. The wedding festivities were rather like Bachanalian orgies, than decent rejoicings; but in the midst of their revelry, a sudden cloud overcast their merriment; a loose character who acted as a sort of court buffoon, having climbed into a tree in the garden, upon being asked "what he saw there?" replied, "a terrible storm coming up from Ostia." And the guilty couple had not recovered from the effect of this speech, when intelligence arrived that the emperor was actually on the road, with the full purpose of calling them to a severe account. All instantly dispersed; and the empress, relying upon her habitual influence over her husband, hastened to meet him, and to avert the effects of his resentment.

There is some inconsistency in the accounts which all the historians give of the behaviour of Claudius on this trying occasion. Tacitus, who is by far the most candid, as well as the most authentic, attributes to him a strong feeling of just indignation struggling with a sense of shame, and of conjugal and parental affection; but he agrees with Suetonius and Dion Cassius in his description of the unaccountable apathy with which the emperor rather suffered than directed the necessary steps to be taken; and the strange indifference which he afterwards manifested to all that had occurred.[3] The death of Silius, and of several other persons guilty of adultery with Messalina, was promptly decreed; and they submitted to their sentence with more fortitude than could have been expected from the tenour of their lives. The empress, to the last, cherished a hope that the clemency, or the irresolution of Claudius, and the artful intercessions of her friends, would operate in her favour; but when she found that her condemnation was determined, and that her former associates in intrigue were now leagued against her, she made a feeble attempt to die by her own hand, and wanting resolution to

Death of Silius, Messalina, and others.

[1] See Juvenal, *Sat.* vi. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xi. Suetonius, *Claud.* Dion Cassius lib. lx. *passim.*

[2] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xi. c. 12. Tacitus attributes the proposal of marriage to Silius. Juvenal implies that Messalina threatened his life to induce his compliance. *Sat.* x.

[3] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xi. c. 38.

complete it, she was despatched, in an ignominious manner, by the officer commissioned to perform the execution. Claudius, deeply affected by his conjugal dishonour, which he was the last man in Rome to discover,[1] publicly declared that nothing should induce him to venture upon another marriage. A.D. 48.

The emperor, however, from his habits of life, was unfit to govern himself; and his Ministers were perfectly aware that he would be more safely managed by the intervention of a woman, than by their own direct influence. In the choice of a proper person to share the throne, each of the three favourite freedmen was eager to secure his own interest, by recommending a lady who should feel herself indebted for her elevation to him alone; Narcissus was desirous that the emperor should take back his divorced wife, Ælia Petina, who was still living; Callistus proposed Lollia Paulina, once the wife of Caligula; and Pallas boldly maintained the policy of uniting the branches of the Cæsarian family by a marriage between Claudius and his niece Agrippina.[2] This lady, though not charged with the vices of the late empress, was of a character sufficiently infamous: she had been, five years since, guilty of poisoning her second husband, the orator Passianus,[3] in order to become mistress of the vast property which he had bequeathed to her;[4] but her high birth, her suitable age and connections, and, above all, the artful blandishments with which she took care to allure her uncle, prevailed over every other consideration, and it was determined that she should be recommended to the emperor. No sooner was this decision of the cabinet known to Agrippina than she employed Vitellius, a cunning politician and servile flatterer, to break off the intended match between Silanus and the emperor's daughter Octavia, that she might strengthen herself by a double union of the families, and thus give to Domitius,[5] her son by her first husband,[6] a claim, by marriage as well as by descent, to the imperial purple. Vitel-

The Emperor marries his niece Agrippina.



[Agrippina, wife of Claudius.]

Disgrace of Silanus.

[1] Juvenal, *Sat.* lib. x. *Dedecus ille domus sciet ultimus.*

[2] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 2. Crevier (*Claud.* lib. ix.) complains of the *obscurity* of the text of Tacitus in this place. He, however, gives the sense of it correctly.

[3] Velleius Paterculus, lib. ii. c. 116.

[4] 200,000,000 sesterces, more than £1,500,000.

[5] Afterwards the Emperor Nero.

[6] C. Dom. Ænobarbus.

A D. 48. lius, acting, though somewhat irregularly, in his capacity of censor, degraded Silanus on a false and scandalous charge of incest; and the emperor, shocked at the enormity of the guilt imputed to him, peremptorily commanded him to think no more of his alliance.[1] But the charge against Silanus, however plausibly supported, was not well chosen; it served to awaken the conscience of Claudius, and to suggest to him the disgraceful and dangerous consequences of an incestuous marriage; and he refused to celebrate his nuptials with Agrippina, till his doubts could be fairly set at rest. Vitellius was too wily to be foiled by this specious difficulty: he proposed a decree of the Senate to legalize the marriages of uncles with their nieces, "which, he observed to the conscript fathers, were common among other nations, and were, at all events, more creditable than forced marriages with other men's wives;[2] alluding to the cases of Augustus and Livia, and of Caligula and Livia Orestilla, and Lollia Paulina. The law was easily obtained; and the people hailed it with their usual acclamations; but neither patricians nor plebeians were found to avail themselves of its sanction.[3] The imperial nuptials, however, were celebrated; and Agrippina became, in effect, the arbitrary sovereign of Rome.[4]

Marriage of Claudius and Agrippina.

A.D. 49. Nor was she remiss in exercising that power which she had been so active in attaining. The whole of the imperial establishment was immediately placed upon a new footing; the utmost attention was paid to dignity and decorum; a strict economy was enforced, and the revenue and fiscal dues were closely exacted; the enemies of the empress were banished or put to death, and their property was confiscated;[5] a vote of the Senate was procured, recommending the marriage of the young Domitius, now only thirteen years old, with Octavia; and Claudius was induced to adopt him, and thus to give him the rights of primogeniture, to the prejudice of his own son Britannicus, whom every one loved, every one pitied, and every one neglected.[6]

A.D. 50. The philosopher Seneca had been recalled, and appointed tutor to Domitius, who, in his fourteenth year,[7] assumed the *Virile* habit with the usual ceremonies and largesses to the populace, and

[1] Silanus committed suicide, his sister, accused with him, was banished. Suetonius, *Claud.* 29.

[2] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 16.

[3] Suetonius, *Claud.* 29, affirms that if one or two marriages took place under the act, they were procured by the influence of the empress.

[4] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 7.

[5] Among these was Lollia Paulina, her rival for the hand of Claudius. She was banished with only five millions of sesterces, £40,000, and afterwards beheaded. The rest of her vast property, of which the jewels alone were estimated at more than £350.000, was confiscated. Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 22. Pliny, lib. ix. c. 35.

[6] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 26, 58. Dion Cassius, lib. lx.

[7] It was not customary to take the *toga virilis* till the *completion* of the fourteenth year; viz. on the fifteenth.

appeared in public with a magnificent equipage, and nobly attended; A.D. 50.
whilst Britannicus was seen in his infantine dress, and with a mean retinue—the empress having taken care, under frivolous pretences, to remove from the court all who had served him in his infancy, or who were attached to his interest. Among these were Crispinus and Geta, the præfects of the Prætorian guards, who were succeeded in their command by Afranius Burrhus, a good soldier, and a most devoted adherent of the empress. At the same time Domitius was A.D. 51.
made *Princeps Juventutis*, and proconsul, empty titles, which, however, served to add to his rank and dignity; and Agrippina obtained the *entrè* to the Capitol in her carriage, a privilege of the priesthood so highly esteemed, that it added to the distinctions even of this illustrious lady, who was the daughter of an heir apparent to the throne,[1] and the sister,[2] wife,[3] and mother of emperors.[4]

Scarcity. The scarcity of corn, which prevailed throughout Europe during the greater part of the reign of Claudius,[5] was particularly felt at Rome in the winter of this year; but the providential mildness of the season,[6] and the admirable arrangements made by the emperor for the importation of grain, prevented the fatal effects of famine.

Troubles in the Bosphorus. The transactions with Parthia are related in another portion of our work, wherein will be found the unsuccessful attempt of Meherdates, and the triumph of the tyrant Gotarzes. About the same time,[7] Mithridates, the descendant of Mithridates the Great, and an inheritor of his bold and indefatigable genius, whose restoration to his Cimmerian dominions we have already mentioned in the beginning of this reign, took advantage of the defenceless condition in which the Bosphorus was left, to excite disturbances against the Romans, who, it seems, had again dispossessed Mithridates soon after they had replaced him, and had bestowed his throne on Cotys, whose disposition was more subservient to their will. On the first attack of Mithridates, Cotys fled for protection to Aquilia, the Roman commander; but he, being in no condition to oppose Mithridates by force, had recourse to the assistance of Eunones, chief of the *Adorsi*, who readily engaged to meet the enemy in the field, whilst the Romans were to besiege the principal fortresses. By this arrangement, Mithridates was speedily reduced to the utmost distress; and Aquilia obtained great credit for the able manner in which he had husbanded his resources, and gained an almost bloodless victory.[8] The vanquished monarch, distrustful of all his allies, and justly suspicious of Roman treachery, gave himself up to Eunones, on condition that his life should be spared, and that he should not

[1] Germanicus. [2] Caligula. [3] Claudius. [4] Nero. *Claudius*, lib. ix. sec. 1.
[5] *Acts*, ch. xi. ver. 28.
[6] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. [7] Ibid. c. 15.
[8] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 17, 21.

A.D. 51. be led in triumph. Claudius, who was personally hostile to Mithridates, hesitated whether to accept his submission on these conditions;

Surrender of Mithridates.

but, considering the expense and difficulty of renewing the war with a desperate enemy, and the uncertainty and fruitlessness of victory, he replied to the application of Eunones in favour of his captive, that "although Mithridates deserved the severest punishment, and that he possessed ample means of inflicting it, yet it was the custom of the Romans to spare the suppliant whilst they reduced the rebellious to obedience." Mithridates was accordingly sent to Rome, and appeared before the emperor with a haughty and dignified demeanour, saying, "I am not brought, I come hither; if you doubt it, set me at liberty, and take me again, if you can."[1]

Cologne founded.

The empress, meanwhile, desirous of handing down to posterity the reputation of her talents and influence, founded, at Ubii, the place of her birth, a Roman colony, which was named after her, Colonia Agrippina.[2] Whilst this was in progress, the Catti, a people of Upper Germany, disturbed the peace of the province by their predatory incursions; but they were speedily and signally chastised by L. Pomponius, who obtained for his successes against them the honour of a triumph; "a slender addition," Tacitus observes, "to the fame of a man, who will be so well-known to posterity by his poetry."[3]

Dissensions in Germany.

But although Claudius was active in giving directions to repel every attack upon the territories of the empire, he resolutely adhered to his policy of abstaining from any interference in the internal discussions of the petty states in Germany; nor could all the interest of Vannius, who had thirty years before been made chieftain of the Suevi by Drusus Cæsar, and was at this time expelled by his subjects,[4] induce the emperor to take any farther part in the quarrel, than to promise him a place of refuge and protection if he should be defeated by the rebels; and strict orders were sent to P. Atellius Hister, who commanded the Roman forces in the neighbourhood, to provide for the safe retreat of the vanquished party, and to prevent the incursions of the conquerors. Vannius and his adherents being thus left to their own resources, and to the precarious aid of their allies the Jazyges, were finally defeated and driven under the shelter of the Roman fleet on the Danube; and were soon afterwards peaceably settled in a domain in Pannonia, assigned to them by the emperor. The kingdom of the Suevi was divided between the two

[1] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 17, 21.

[2] Ibid. c. 27. *Hodiè* Cologne.

[3] Pomponius was kept seven years in prison by Tiberius, during which time he wrote several Tragedies, of which Quintilian speaks in terms of modified approbation. *Instit. Or.* book x. c. 1. Pliny, *Epist.* vii. c. 17, records his deference to public opinion in preference to that of the critics. "*Provoco ad populum*," was his usual appeal when criticised by his friends.

[4] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 29, 30.

nephews of Vannius, Vangio and Sido, who had been most active in promoting the rebellion. A.D. 51.

Protracted war in Britain.

The war in Britain, which was renewed at this time, assumed a very different character. The superiority of the Roman armour and discipline, and the dreadful carnage which ensued from a contest between soldiers cased in iron panoply, and brave but rash hunters defended only by leather and wicker-work, could neither quench the indignant love of liberty which animated the Britons, nor deter them from throwing themselves, in thousands, upon the spears of their invaders. P. Ostorius, who had succeeded Plautius in the command, found several of the most powerful tribes prepared to make a formidable resistance to his operations; and, in order to cut off their communications, he fortified the country between the Nen and the Severn:[1] the Iceni,[2] and their allies, attempted to destroy these works; and a furious contest ensued, in which, after performing acts of heroic bravery, the unfortunate islanders were defeated with a slaughter almost amounting to extermination.

This victory enabled the Roman general to advance against the Cangi into North Wales, where he penetrated to the coast of the Irish Channel: his principal object appears to have been plunder; and he collected a vast quantity of cattle and provisions for the supply of his army, the Welsh not daring to show themselves openly, and making but feeble attempts to harass the foraging parties. From this expedition Ostorius was hastily recalled to repress an insurrection of the Brigantes,[3] in which he easily succeeded; but the Silures,[4] a bold and numerous tribe, relying upon their own warlike character, upon the military skill of their leader, the celebrated Caractacus, and upon the difficult nature of their country, offered so determined a resistance to the tyranny of Rome, that Ostorius declared their utter extermination to be indispensable to the peace of the province.

The event of such an avowal may easily be anticipated. The Britons displayed the most exalted courage, and devoted themselves in the cause of their country; but the defect of their tactics rendered their valour fatal to themselves, and the want of defensive armour calculated to resist the weapons of the Romans, made their losses for a long time irretrievable. The wife, the daughter, and the brothers of Caractacus, were taken captives; the chieftain himself, with great difficulty, effected his retreat, and claimed protection from Cartismandua, queen of the Brigantes, whom she was pledged by a solemn promise to afford. This princess was unworthy of the people whom she governed, and of the race from she was descended.[5] She was an

[1] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 31. Camden, *Brit.*
[2] Inhabitants of the country about the Bedford Level.
[3] People north of the Humber. Crevier.
[4] People of South Wales.
[5] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 32-39. *Hist.* lib. iii. c. 45.

A.D. 51. adulteress, and a rebel against the king her husband. In the present exigency she purchased the favour of Ostorius by an act of treachery worthy of the rest of her conduct. The great Caractacus was betrayed into the hands of his enemies, and carried prisoner to Rome, with all his family and dependents.

He appeared before Claudius and Agrippina with manly and dignified composure, neither wanting to himself, nor insolent to his victors,—prepared to die, but not disdaining to live on honourable terms. The empress, who appears to have taken the lead on the occasion, graciously condescended to pardon the crime of which he had been guilty, in defending to the last the kingdom of his forefathers against unjust and unprovoked invasion; and this clemency, as it was called, was extolled by the Senate and people, as rivalling the noblest acts of self-denial and generosity recorded in history. Such were the moral feelings of the Romans in the age of Claudius! But the *Silures*, as Tacitus gravely observes, were neither to be soothed by indulgence, nor quelled by severity;[1] enraged at the loss of their leader, they collected the scattered remains of their broken forces; defeated the Romans in several engagements; and reduced Ostorius to such embarrassments, that he is said to have died from the effects of vexation and alarm. Upon his death they obtained still greater advantages; and, during the command of his successor, Didius, they were allowed to retain their independence, and to form a rallying-point for all the weaker tribes who refused submission to the dominion of Rome.

A.D. 52. Whilst these disasters were befalling the Roman arms in Britain, some of those phenomena, which the superstition of the ancients regarded as prodigies, perplexed the government at home with fears of change about to happen, and alarmed the emperor for his own safety.[2] This suspicion might perhaps have had a more rational foundation in the intrigues which the empress carried on, in order to secure the succession to her son, and to maintain over him that influence, by which she hoped to govern the whole empire herself.

A.D. 53. With this view she procured the accusation of Domitia, the sister of her former husband, who, having been particularly kind to the young Domitius during the disgrace of his family, retained a strong hold upon his affections, of which she was disposed to avail herself for the advancement of her own interests and political influence.[3] In this design the empress was opposed by Narcissus, who, foreseeing that there could be no safe medium between abject compliance and successful hostility, boldly impeached her of adultery with Pallas, and of treasonable designs against the State. Claudius was strongly impressed with the truth of these charges, and was impru-

Intrigues of Agrippina.

[1] *Atrocitate, loc. cit.*
[2] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 64. Suetonius, *Claud.* 46. Dion Cassius, lib. lx.
[3] Suetonius, *Nero*, 7. Dion Cassius, *loc. cit.*


dent enough to avow his suspicions; but Agrippina had so well concerted her measures, that Domitia was condemned to death, and Narcissus received a timely intimation that the warm baths of Campania would be more beneficial to his health than the air of the court. The removal of this vigilant Minister enabled the empress to carry into effect a design which she had long entertained to free herself at once of her uncle, husband, and sovereign. A stupifying poison was prepared by a wretched woman named Locusta, and administered in a dish of mushrooms, of which Claudius was known to be especially fond, and its effects were hastened by the pretended remedies exhibited by Xenophon, the emperor's physician.[1] It was given out that Claudius had suffered from indigestion, which his habitual gluttony rendered so frequent, that it excited no surprise: and his death[2] was concealed till Domitius Nero had secured the guards and had quietly taken possession of the imperial authority. The empress, meanwhile, affecting the utmost concern and anxiety, under various pretexts, kept Britannicus and his sisters out of the sight, and, it appears, out of the recollection of the citizens.

A.D. 54.


Death of Claudius.

[1] Tacitus, *Annal.* lib. xii. c. 66, *et seq.* Suetonius, *Claud.* 43, *et seq.* Dion Cassius, lib. lx.

[2] He died October 13, 54, in the sixty-fourth year of his age, and the fourteenth of his reign. Crevier.



[The Labican Gate.—*Overbeke, Les Restes de l'Ancienne Rome.*]



[Britannicus.—*G. F. Sargent.—From a Medal in Bronze, Op. di Winckelmann*

CHAPTER X.

NERO BRITANNICUS.

FROM A.D. 54 TO A.D. 68.

A.D. 54. Nero raised to the throne by the intrigues of Agrippina.

THE cruelty and intrigue which had hastened the demise of the late emperor, threw a deep stain on the beginning of Nero's government. The death of Claudius was concealed several hours, either that Agrippina might secure the co-operation of trusty partizans, or that the accession of the young prince might be delayed until the happy moment, indicated by the astrologers, should arrive; when the hidden powers of nature were supposed to acquire such influence over the destiny of man, as to secure success even for usurpation and bloodshed. Britannicus was in the palace when his father expired; but Agripinna, unwilling that his presence should awaken the sympathy of the soldiers, detained the boy in her arms, pretending to soothe his grief, while her own son, who had been already received by the Prætorian guard, was proceeding to enjoy the acclamations of the people. Nero, upon finding his claims confirmed by the army, repaired to the senate-house, where the members of that august body made haste to confer upon him all the titles of supreme power and of adulation which his extreme youth did not

render positively ridiculous. They only reserved for his maturer merit the proud appellation of *Father of his Country.*[1] A.D. 54.

The funeral obsequies of Claudius occupied the first cares of his successor; and in conducting these Agrippina at once gratified her love of magnificence, and insulted the remains of her husband with that detestible hypocrisy, by means of which she had betrayed both his life and character. The genius of Seneca supplied the new ruler with a speech, which was much more remarkable for eloquence than for truth; while the Senate, eager to promote the views of the imperial family, decreed divine honours to the deceased; and thus, as a Roman historian expresses it, placed among the gods a prince who hardly deserved the name of a man.

The young Emperor makes a funeral oration.

But the funeral oration created disgust in the minds of the veteran Prætorians, for other reasons besides its gross and ironical flattery. The people of Rome had been accustomed to admire in their governors the powers of a native and spontaneous eloquence; and could not, therefore, but feel themselves humbled, when they heard from the lips of their emperor a succession of glowing periods, formed and rounded by the skill of a professional rhetorician. They called to mind the polished and vigorous oratory of the dictator Cæsar—the persuasive and dignified eloquence of Augustus—and the energetic style of Tiberius, whose command of words enabled him at pleasure either to perplex or to convince; and even with regard to Caligula and Claudius, they remarked, that the frenzy of the one gave vehemence to his harangues, while the imbecility of the other infused into his speeches an attractive mildness and a softened elegance. Nero was the first sovereign of Rome who consented to borrow the pen of another to compose an address meant for the ears of his subjects; and neither his youth nor his inexperience formed a sufficient apology for this want of industry or of talent.[2]

Ambition and cruelty of Agrippina

It soon appeared that Agrippina, in setting her son upon the throne, had no other object in view than to secure the exercise of power under the semblance of his authority. In pursuance of her ambitious plans, she obtained from the Senate the privilege of being preceded by two lictors; to which was added, with ambiguous liberality, the dignity of priestess to Claudius, whose life she had taken away. To relieve her apprehensions with regard to some of the descendants of Augustus, she began by procuring the murder of M. Silanus, the brother of Lucius, whose death and disgrace she had reason to fear the former would at no distant day avenge: after which, she let loose her resentment against Narcissus, the secretary of the late emperor, who had resolutely opposed himself to her selfish and cruel designs; and who, even at the moment when he was about to satiate her malignity by an act of suicide, determined to

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xii. c. 58. Suet. *Claud.* 45, and *Nero*, 8.
[2] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 1. Suet. *Nero.* 9.

A.D. 54. disappoint her vindictive intentions, by committing to the flames every official paper which might, on the remotest grounds, criminate any of her personal enemies. So strong, indeed, was her desire to govern, that she was ready to violate not only every feeling of humanity, but also the decorum which belonged to her rank, and the modesty which should have distinguished her sex. Resolved to know every thing which was done in the Senate, she prevailed upon the members to hold their meetings in one of the rooms of the palace; adjoining to which was a private apartment, where, without being seen, she could hear every proposal that was made, and listen to every argument that was brought forward. On one occasion she even attempted to ascend the throne, in order to divide it with her son, who was about to give an audience to the ambassadors of Armenia—an extravagance which Seneca had the merit of preventing, by suggesting to the emperor to step forward from his seat and receive his mother; and, under the semblance of filial respect, to obviate a most indecorous proceeding.[1]

The influence of Burrhus and Seneca.

The bloodshed and violence with which Agrippina deformed the opening reign of Nero, would have been carried to a much greater extent, had not Burrhus and Seneca united their influence to disarm her ungovernable passions.[2] The former of these distinguished persons was respected for his talents in war, as well as for an austere and unbending integrity; the latter had obtained celebrity as a master in that species of learning which most successfully connected the study of mind with the maxims of active life, and of political wisdom. The education of a Roman prince could not have been entrusted to more accomplished tutors than the philosopher and the soldier who directed the first year of Nero's administration; and it is universally acknowledged, that the wise and moderate steps which distinguished his government till he passed his twenty-second year, were suggested or recommended by the faithful ministers whom we have just described. To save their country from disgrace, and their sovereign from destruction, they employed the weight of their powerful characters as a barrier against the dangerous influence of Agrippina, and a check to the fury of her impetuous temper.[3]

Promises of Nero.

Agreeably to these patriotic intentions, Seneca composed a speech which Nero was to address to the Senate, setting forth the liberal principles on which the public business was to be conducted. He assured his grave auditors that the lives and honours of the citizens should no longer be exposed to the caprice of favourites within the walls of the palace; and that cases which required the deliberation of cool and impartial judges, should not any more be determined by the cabals of a domestic tribunal. He declared, as his most solemn

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 5. *Ita specie pietatis obviam itum dedecori.*
[2] Ibid. c. 2. Dion Cassius, l. lx.
[3] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 2.

and unalterable resolution, that neither money nor personal influence should ever procure, at his hands, any employment which ought to be the reward of merit; that the affairs of State, and the direction of his household, should never be allowed to interfere with each other; that the senators should enjoy all their ancient rights and prerogatives; and that the interests of the people should continue to enjoy all the protection which was afforded to them by the spirit and usages of their original constitution.[1] A.D. 54.

And good conduct.

Nor did his conduct in these respects fail to keep pace with the sentiments which he was taught to express. He encouraged the Senate to make many wise regulations, with the view of checking that tendency to expensive and cruel amusements which had already began to infect the inhabitants of Rome; and which afterwards marked the progress of their luxury and depravity, when the spirit of the commonwealth no longer remained, either to excite a blush, or to impose a restraint. His forbearance, too, and self-denial, gave an air of sincerity to his professions. He declined the statues of gold and silver which were offered to him by the gratitude or flattery of the people; and he would not accept the compliment suggested by the Senate, to date the commencement of the year from the month in which he was born.[2] The public ear, moreover, was delighted with anecdotes of his compassionate and gentle disposition. He refused to listen to accusations conveyed to him against a personal enemy; and when a sentence of death was brought for his signature, he uttered a fervent wish that he had never been taught to write. His love of popularity induced him to give a frequent attendance at the games and other exercises, in which the people spent a great portion of their time; and thus, perhaps, paved the way for that excessive indulgence in theatrical exhibitions which afterwards degraded the Roman emperor into a contemptible buffoon. In short, the first five years of Nero's reign were proverbial in succeeding ages for the wisdom, clemency, and happiness by which they were distinguished; and Trajan himself declared that no prince had ever attained to an equal reputation, during a similar period, for all the virtues which characterise a sage and prosperous ruler.[3]

Marriage of Nero with Octavia, the daughter of Claudius.

But the ascendancy which had been obtained by Seneca and Burrhus, was soon found to irritate the ambition, and disappoint the hopes of Agrippina, and thereby to render her the most formidable enemy with whom the peace and stability of the empire had to contend. Nero, in the first year of his reign, united himself in marriage to Octavia, the daughter of Claudius; but his affections being seduced by Acte, a woman of low rank, whom he intended to raise to the throne, he exposed himself to the bitterest resentment of his mother, who, under the pretext of a virtuous indignation, gave vent

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 4. Dion. Cassius, *Epist.*
[2] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 5 and 10. [3] Aur. Victor. *Nero.*

A.D. 55. to her private chagrin and malignity. She chid the emperor in the most intemperate language, upbraiding him with his ingratitude, and the grovelling nature of his pursuits; and when he afterwards attempted to soothe her by sending some valuable ornaments, which he had selected from the jewels deposited in the palace, she rejected them with the utmost rage and contempt, as a glaring affront offered to the descendant of Augustus. Nero, suspecting that the aspiring views of his parent were stimulated by Pallas, who had continued to hold the offices of treasurer and administrator of the finances, to which he was raised in the time of Claudius, determined to divest him of these appointments, and thereby convince Agrippina that her furious invectives were no longer to be borne with impunity.[1]

Death of Britannicus meditated.

These steps, originating in vice and passion, hastened the fate of the young Britannicus, and first led Nero to think of accomplishing the objects which seemed necessary to the security of his power or the gratification of his appetites, by secret murder and inhuman parricide. Agrippina, after reminding her son to whom he owed the crown, intimated to him that the lawful heir of the empire was fast approaching the years of manhood, and would infallibly lay claim to the honours which belonged to his birth; and concluded by threatening, that she would forthwith confess before the world all the evils that she had, for his sake, inflicted on the unhappy family of Claudius; that she would conduct the boy to the camp; present him to the Prætorian soldiers; and, by an affecting appeal to their justice and compassion, try whether the daughter of Germanicus had not yet more influence with the armies of Rome than an old lame general and a prating philosopher. Her hand and her action, says the historian, kept pace with the fury of her words. She loaded the emperor with all the opprobrious names which her imagination could suggest; invoked the avenging shades of Silanus and Claudius; and charged him with the guilt of all the crimes which she had committed to promote his advancement, and for which she had received so inadequate a recompense.

And effected by means of poison.

The rage of Agrippina had no other effect than to deprive her entirely of the influence which she had hitherto maintained over the mind of Nero, and to mature the projects which had already occupied the emperor's thoughts, for the removal of his rival. Britannicus himself had shown, during the festivities of a banquet, that he was neither ignorant of his rank, nor insensible to the injustice with which his infancy had been visited; and the remarks which he made on that occasion sunk deep into the feelings of his adopted brother, who had penetration enough to perceive that his fate was thenceforth suspended upon the forbearance of the young prince, and the capricious policy of Agrippina. He therefore resolved to cut him

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. Suet. *Nero*, 26. Dion. Cassius, *Epist.* Tacit. xiii. c. 14.

off by means of poison; and, for this purpose, gave orders to the infamous Locusta to prepare the most deadly of her mixtures, and to place it in the hands of a trusty confidant. The cup-bearer of Britannicus, at an entertainment given in the palace, administered the fatal potion, the effect of which was so instantaneous and decisive, that the youth, as soon as he drank it, lost his speech, and dropped down senseless. The guests were alarmed, and some of them retired in confusion and dismay; but Nero, pretending to be ignorant of what had taken place, and affecting the greatest ease and indifference, assured his visitors that the boy had only fallen into one of those fits to which he had been subject from his earliest years. The funeral rites were performed during the night; and though, as Dion Cassius narrates, certain precautions were used to conceal the morbid effects of the destructive drug, a heavy shower of rain washed off the unguent with which they had anointed the body, and exposed the full extent of the crime which Nero had committed.[1] A.D. 55.

Agrippina, who witnessed the death of Britannicus, was struck with horror and alarm. She could no longer doubt that her son was capable of the greatest cruelty and dissimulation; and the murder of a brother could not fail to be regarded by her as a prelude to that of a parent, should her life appear incompatible with the fulfilment of his atrocious designs. She resolved, therefore, to strengthen her party in the government, and to adopt such measures, in concert with her friends, as might secure her from the danger with which she was threatened. With these views, she courted the ancient and more powerful families of Rome; amassed large sums of money; and invited to her house every one who had either the inclination or ability to oppose the emperor, and thwart his Ministers. Schemes of Agrippina.

The intrigues of his mother were not long concealed from Nero. To defeat her schemes, he began by depriving her of the guard which had been appointed to attend her, and afterwards removed her from the palace to a house at a considerable distance, which had been occupied by Antonia, the aunt of Claudius. Thither he sometimes repaired, accompanied by the principal officers of the army, to pay her a formal visit, as well, perhaps, as to satisfy himself that the reports communicated by his spies were not inconsistent with truth. In such circumstances of suspicion and mutual distrust, it was not to be expected that Agrippina could long escape the arts of the informer, and the snares of vindictive treachery. Junia Silana, who conceived herself injured by the empress, seized this opportunity of gratifying her revenge; and that she might secure for her design every chance of success, she determined to accuse her enemy of the weightiest crime that could be committed against the head of the Conspiracy against her.

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 17. Dion Cassius, l. lxi. Suet. l. vi. c. 33.

A.D. 55. government. Aided by two of her partizans, Iturius and Calvisius, she was prepared to charge Agrippina with an intention to dethrone Nero; and, by marrying Rubellius Plautus, a lineal descendant of Augustus, to ascend once more to the elevated station which she had formerly enjoyed. The emperor was at supper when the intelligence of this imaginary treason reached his ear. His fears were only equalled by his rage; and it was with the greatest difficulty that he was prevailed upon to delay, for a few hours, the execution of an order, which he issued on the spot, to put both his mother and Plautus to a cruel death. Burrhus entreated that a little time might be allowed to inquire into the truth of the accusation; promising that, if Agrippina were found guilty, he himself would inflict upon her the punishment which a crime so atrocious demanded, and that all her adherents should be for ever rendered incapable of disturbing the tranquillity of the imperial throne.[1]

She vindicates her conduct

Next day, Agrippina was informed of the accusations with which she was charged, while Burrhus and Seneca, on the part of the emperor, waited to hear her defence, or to receive an explanation. But her haughty mind, conscious of innocence, would not condescend to enter into particulars. She desired an interview with her son, in whose presence alone she would consent to speak on a subject so painful to her feelings; and, upon obtaining this request, she did not spend a moment in justifying her own conduct, which could not, she imagined, be open to imputation, but proceeded at once to demand the punishment of her accusers, and a solace for those of her friends whose motives had been impeached. Nero was overcome by the force of truth and eloquence. Silana, Iturius, and Calvisius, were banished; and one of the more active emissaries of the plot, was put to death; while, to indemnify his mother's vexation, he appointed, at her desire, Fænius Rufus, intendant of the provisions, gave to Arruntius Stella the management of the imperial games, and promised to Anteius the important government of Syria.[2]

Nero begins to become dissipated.

But Nero, when relieved from the apprehension of conspiracy, did not devote all the time which the cares of government left at his own disposal, to the pursuits of literature, or the lessons of philosophy. The wisdom of Seneca, and the republican austerity of Burrhus, were soon exchanged for the gay levity of Otho, and the mirthful dissipation of Senecion; and the monarch of a country which extended from the Atlantic to the Euphrates, did not think it unworthy of his rank to pass whole nights in taverns, and even to engage in drunken brawls in the streets. Tacitus informs us, that as soon as it became dark, Nero and some other young persons as mad as himself, were wont to sally out into the public ways, to attack, insult, and even rob the most respectable individuals; to

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 18, 19.
[2] Ibid. c. 21, 22. Ibid. c. 27. Seneca, *de Clem.* l. i. c. 2. Suet. l. vi. c. 10, 11.

break into houses and shops, wherever plunder was to be found; A.D. 56. and he adds, that the property which was thus stolen in the night, was next day sold by auction in the palace, and the money divided among his companions. As he performed these achievements in disguise, he for some time escaped detection, whilst he was occasionally roughly handled by those whom he thought proper to assail in the course of his frolics. In one rencontre he received so serious a wound, that he long bore the marks of it on his countenance; and in another, which he provoked with Julius Montanus, a man of senatorial rank, he came off with a chastisement so extremely severe, that he was compelled to confine himself during some days to his bedchamber. But he had sense enough not to indulge any feelings of revenge; and it was not until Montanus wrote a letter of apology, and solicited pardon for his unpremeditated offence, that the pride of the emperor was roused, and his dignity sustained an insult. The reply which was made to the senator was conceived in the full spirit of despotism: "Did Montanus strike me, and is he still alive?" The practice of the times suggested the expedient to which the answer of Nero was understood to have a reference; and the unfortunate Roman was compelled to become his own executioner.[1]

Acts foolishly in the Theatres.

It next occurred to this foolish prince, that the mad scenes which he had acted in the streets might, with greater safety to his person, be repeated in the theatres. Joining in the riots which were created by his associates, he had recourse to the most violent and disorderly means for maintaining his influence among the mob; and on one occasion, it is said, he broke a prætor's head, by hurling against him the fragment of a bench which he had aimed at some noisy antagonist, who stood near the magistrate. But Nero at length discovered that the theatrical factions were become too powerful, to be suppressed even by his prætorian guards; and despairing of being able to check the extravagance, of which he had given at once the example and the encouragement, he resolved to banish the performers, and to prohibit the exercise of their art in all the towns of Italy.[2]

But permits the Senate to promote the public welfare.

Being wholly employed in these youthful excesses, Nero allowed the Senate to proceed in the correction of many abuses, and in the establishment of some good and necessary regulations. The rights of freedmen, at no period well defined, had recently overstepped all the boundaries of law; for without having the privileges of acknowledged citizens, that class of inhabitants possessed, in many cases, a greater influence than the former, and were subject to fewer constitutional checks. The power of the popular magistrates also, the tribunes, and the ædiles, was occasionally found to degenerate into tyranny, and to interfere with the exercise of justice when admin-

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 25. Suet. *Nero*, 26. Dion Cassius, l. lxi.
[2] Suet. *Nero*. Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 20. Suet. *Othon*

A.D. 56. istered by the consuls and prætors. To remedy these evils the Senate proposed a number of rules for regulating the emancipation of slaves, and for restricting the operation of tribunitial authority. Nor was their care confined to the police of the capital; on the contrary, they procured the consent of the emperor to a measure for reviving the prosperity of certain decayed colonies in a remote part of Italy; and prevailed with him to issue an order for putting a stop to the practice adopted by the governors of provinces, and other inferior magistrates, of giving splendid entertainments to the people, with the view of silencing their complaints, and of fomenting their just remonstrances. It is worthy of remark, too, that Nero listened so far to the counsels of his ministers, as not to allow the amphitheatre to be stained with the blood either of gladiators or of criminals; and it was, perhaps, from motives founded on humanity that he imposed a tax on the sale of slaves; thinking, it may be presumed, that an impost of twenty-five per cent. to be paid by the seller, would tend to obviate all unnecessary change of masters. It is moreover mentioned by historians, as a proof of considerable generosity, that when, upon entering his third consulship, he learned that his colleague Valerius Messala was poor, he assigned him a yearly pension of four thousand sesterces, to enable him to support the splendour due to his name and family.[1]

And exhibits some tokens of generosity.

A.D. 58.

Judicious regulations in finance and commerce.

A.D. 57.

It has been likewise mentioned as a proof of Nero's kindness, or facility of disposition, that when he was importuned with complaints on the subject of the revenue, he seriously entertained the romantic project of relieving his people from all taxes whatever. The Senate interposed their influence to avert this ruinous innovation; and after some reasoning, which the Roman historians think proper to give at considerable length, they prevailed upon the emperor to commute the intended boon, for the more practicable and less expensive benefit that would result from checking the avarice of those who acted as the ministers of finance. For this purpose he gave orders, that the rates and amount of every tax should be posted up in some public place, and that no process should be instituted for the recovery of arrears that had been due more than twelve months. He also secured for his subjects, as well in the remotest provinces as in Italy, the right of appealing to the prætors and proconsuls, against the unjust exactions of the farmers of the revenue; abolishing, at the same time, an impost of two per cent. which had been surreptitiously laid on all goods carried by sea from one part of the empire to another.

These regulations were received with great joy, and reflected on the emperor a reputation for wisdom and humanity, which belonged only to those whose counsels he allowed himself to follow. But his

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 7.

generosity could never be rendered proof against the apprehensions which, from time to time, seized his mind, respecting a competitor for the throne. It is indeed doubtful whether Burrhus himself, tired of admonishing the headstrong folly of his prince, did not on more than one occasion listen to proposals for setting him aside; and, at all events, the rumour of such an intention in favour of Cornelius Sylla, the son-in-law of Claudius, did at an early period reach the ears of Nero. The character of Sylla, which was equally weak and unambitious, ought to have protected him from this suspicion; but the emperor gave himself credit for discovering that he was in reality a person of aspiring genius, and that he only assumed the appearance of imbecility to cover his deep and traitorous designs. No sooner, therefore, did he obtain for his fears the form of a legal accusation, than he banished the unfortunate patrician to the city of Massilia—ordering him to be confined within its walls, till greater boldness in crime suggested the expediency of taking away his life.[1] A.D. 58. Cornelius Sylla banished.

While these occurrences occupied the domestic thoughts of the Romans, other events of a more important nature engaged their armies in the east and north. Under the head of PARTHIA we shall shortly give an account of the war which arose with that country, out of the conflicting claims maintained by Vologeses on the one hand, and the Roman Senate on the other, for the homage, and consequently for the disposal, of the Armenian crown. The war in Germany had been brought to an inglorious issue by the capricious policy of Claudius; since which time, the commanders who succeeded the brave Corbulo, finding that the honours of victory were now lavished on dissipated young men who had never been at the head of a legion, granted to the enemy that repose which they themselves were encouraged to enjoy. Pompeius Paulinus, whose province stretched along the banks of the Lower Rhine, employed his troops in finishing the embankment which Drusus had begun about sixty years before; while Lucius Antistius Vetus, entering upon an undertaking still more magnificent, projected a canal between the rivers Moselle and Saone; which, by connecting the Rhone with the Rhine, would have effected a junction between the North Sea and the Mediterranean. This great work, not less useful than splendid, was thwarted by the jealousy of Ælius Gracilis, who commanded in Belgic Gaul; and who, imagining that it would prove more advantageous to the latter nation than to the Romans, obtained an order to have it interrupted.[2] Wars in Parthia and on the Rhine.

To secure their northern boundaries from sudden invasion, it had become the policy of the Senate to keep in a waste and uninhabited state, an extensive tract of land along both banks of the Rhine. The Movements of the Frisii, and other German nations.

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 44, 47. Suet. l. vi. c. 13.
[2] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 31, 35. Dion Cassius, l. lxii.

A.D. 59. *Frisii*, meantime, unwilling that so much good pasture should remain unoccupied, at first took possession of it with their numerous flocks; and, finding that the soil was capable of a very profitable cultivation, they at length proceeded to build huts and divide the ground into farms, according to the wants of their several tribes. Vibius Avitus, who had succeeded Paulinus, reminded them that the real territory which they were about to colonize, belonged to the Romans, and that he could not allow them to take an undisturbed possession of it; upon which two of the chiefs, whose names were Verritus and Malorix, and who, says Tacitus, at that period governed the *Frisii*, as far as German liberty would submit to be governed, undertook a deputation to Rome, with the view of obtaining from Nero a grant of the country. The barbarians were kindly received, both by the emperor and Senate, and were even gratified with the honour of citizenship; but, as their request could not be complied with, they were charged with the unpleasant tidings that their nation must either retire at the command of the proconsul, or expose itself to the more dreadful calamities of war. Some preferred the alternative of arms; but the greater part submitted to the award of the Senate, and retreated with undiminished numbers, into their marshes and forests.[1]

Fate of the Ansibarii, and conduct of Bojocalus.

A more severe and protracted contest, originating in the same cause, took place very soon after, between the *Ansibarii*, another German nation, and the Roman commanders who were serving on the Rhine. This people had been driven from their own territory by the *Chauci*, a powerful and ambitious race, and were now in quest of an asylum among a more civilized order of men; willing even, on moderate conditions, to acknowledge the sovereignty of Rome, and to serve under the banners of the emperor. Bojocalus, their leader, an old and faithful ally of the Romans, represented to Avitus, in very moving language, the suffering condition to which they were reduced; and entreated that, as the land was useless to the legions and citizens of Rome, he would give permission to the miserable fugitive under his care, to raise as much corn as would save their families from a horrible death. The Roman general replied, that they must submit to the law of force, and remove from the borders of the Rhine; that it was the will of the gods that the emperor and Senate should be supreme disposers of all things on earth; and that, therefore, they could give or take away at their pleasure, without being accountable to any one; but he concluded by assuring the German, in private, that though no part of the province could be conceded to the Ansibarian nation, he should in return for his services, have as much land as he chose for his individual wants. The generous barbarian rejected his offer with disdain. "We are

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 63

deprived of ground indeed," he exclaimed, "whereon to live; but we shall always find a spot of earth whereon to die."[1] A.D. 59.

The neighbouring nations, pitying the hard fate of the Ansibarii, promised to assist them with their arms against the Romans. But no sooner did Avitus pass the river, and receive a reinforcement of some legions from the Upper Rhine, than those faithless allies abandoned the cause of Bojocalus, and left his tribes to fight their own battles. The Ansibarii were almost totally extirpated; the young men fell by the sword, and the women and children were made slaves. The name, however, still remained; for we find it in after ages among those formidable bands, which amply avenged the wrongs of Germany on the degenerate armies of the imperial government.

Nero had entered upon the fifth year of his reign, when a new enemy arose against Agrippina. The lewd and ambitious Poppæa, Poppæa's ascendancy.



[Nero and Poppæa.]

whom Otho had first debauched from the arms of her husband Crispinus, and then had himself married, now obtained over the emperor such an irresistible ascendancy, that he no longer listened either to the admonitions of Seneca, or to the remonstrances of Burrhus; having herself violated all the bonds of chastity and connubial faith, the mistress of the emperor wished to become his wife; but as she could not hope to see Octavia repudiated while Agrippina lived, she employed every art of intrigue and falsehood upon the mind of her paramour, with the view of exciting suspicion against his mother, and of thereby paving the way for that act of parricide which has left on his character an indelible stain.

[1] Tacit. *ut suprà.*

A.D. 60. She incites him to kill his mother.

Stimulated by the jealousy of Poppæa, the weak soul of Nero readily acceded to the most atrocious designs against the life of his parent. He first thought of poison; but the surmises which had filled the public ear respecting the death of Britannicus, rendered that method of accomplishing his purpose both uncertain and dangerous; and, besides, it was generally believed that Agrippina had adopted a particular regimen which would completely counteract the effects of the most deadly potion. In this crisis, the defects of his invention were supplied by the vindictive ingenuity of his admiral Anicetus, who hated Agrippina, and was, at the same time, determined to spare no pains in securing the favour of the future empress. He proposed that the mother of Nero should be invited to a pleasure party at sea; in preparation for which he undertook to have a ship constructed in such a manner, that, upon a signal being given, it would immediately fall into pieces, and carry the princess with it to the bottom.[1]

Attempt to drown Agrippina

With the views now stated, Agrippina was invited from Antium, where she usually resided, to Baiæ, where was a country-house belonging to the emperor, that she might partake of the festivities with which the rites of Minerva were celebrated by the wealthy Romans. It is said, that intelligence was conveyed to her of the meditated shipwreck, and that, for this reason, she declined to go by water to the place of entertainment; but this statement is rendered exceedingly doubtful, by the fact that she manifested no reluctance to go on board at night, to be conveyed to Bauli, where she was to sleep.[2]

Fails and exposes Nero to danger.

Tacitus informs us that the moon shone with great splendour, and that the sea was perfectly calm, as if the gods had intended that the crime should be palpably evident, and that even the possibility of its being imputed to accident should be entirely removed. Agrippina was stretched on a couch, conversing with Crepereius Gallus, who stood near the helm, while one of her female attendants was leaning over her feet, congratulating her on the return of her son's affection, when, on a sudden, the signal being given, the deck fell in with a great crash; and masses of lead, with which it appears to have been loaded, were precipitated into the hold. The officer, to whom Agrippina was addressing her remarks, was bruised to death, and instantly expired; but, as some of the beams did not immediately give way, the empress and her maid had time to escape before the vessel went completely asunder; and, dropping gently into the sea, the two ladies, who had been accustomed to the exercise of swimming, directed their faces towards the land. The faithful Acerronia, perceiving that the life of her mistress was aimed at, had sufficient presence of mind to call out that herself was Agrippina; and, commanding the sailors to help the mother of their emperor, she was

[1] Dion Cassius, l. lxi. Tacit. *Ann.* xiv. c. 1-3. Suet. l. vi. c. 3.
[2] Tacit. *Ann.* xiv. c. 3-5. Dion Cassius, lib. lxii.

soon despatched by the agents of Anicetus. Agrippina received no other injury, besides a slight bruise on the shoulder; and being picked up by a small ship belonging to the Lake Lucrinus, she was soon conveyed to her residence at Bauli. A.D. 60.

Upon hearing that his mother had escaped from his snares, Nero was thrown into the greatest consternation and perplexity. Dreading the influence which she still possessed in the government, and the power of her numerous partizans in all parts of the empire, he is said to have had recourse to the wisdom of Seneca, and the courage of Burrhus, to relieve him from the perilous conjuncture into which his crimes had driven him. Tacitus is unable to deny that both the philosopher and the general had been privy, from the very first, to the guilty intentions of the emperor in regard to his mother; and Dion Cassius maintains, that it was the former who originally suggested to Nero the political expediency of putting her to death. At all events their counsel was used on the emergency created by the failure at Baiæ; and when Burrhus had declared, in reply to a hint from Seneca, that the prætorian soldiers would never consent to any deed of violence on the daughter of Germanicus, the task of completing the murder which he had devised, was finally imposed on the venal Anicetus.[1] New plot against her life.

The admiral engaged two ruffians as ferocious as himself, and repaired with them to the house of Agrippina. When they entered her chamber, she addressed them with her wonted firmness, and prepared for her fate; while the swords of the assassins soon accomplished the wishes of Nero, and deprived of life the grand-daughter, the sister, the wife, and the mother of an emperor. She was buried on the same night, without any ceremony; her obsequies being left entirely to the hands of servants. These faithful attendants, however, showed their affection for her, by several striking marks of respect. One of them stabbed himself, and then leaped upon the funeral pile; while the survivors erected a tomb to commemorate their attachment to her person, and to record the miserable end of one of the most accomplished females that gave celebrity to the house of Cæsar. Agrippina at length murdered by the hand of Anicetus.

The consciousness of a crime, at once so atrocious and unnatural, inflicted upon the mind of Nero the most acute suffering. Tacitus describes him as passing the night in sullen silence, interrupted only by sudden starts of terror, which seemed to shake his whole frame, and waiting the return of day, as the commencement of that execration and loathing, which, he had reason to suspect, would be directed against him by every order of his subjects. But the stern virtue of ancient Rome no longer remained to take vengeance on the imperial offender. On the contrary, the centurions of the prætorian cohorts, The act defended by Seneca in a letter to the Senate.

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiv. c. 8. Dion Cassius, l. lxi. Suet. *in Nero.*

A.D. 60. at the suggestion of their commander, presented themselves before the emperor, to congratulate him on the escape which he had made from the treasonable designs of his mother, and to praise the zeal of the trusty servant, who had saved his life for the future glory and happiness of his wide dominions. Nor was Seneca less active than his military colleague. He wrote a letter addressed to the Senate, which Nero despatched from Naples, setting forth, that Agerinus, one of Agrippina's freedmen, had been detected armed with a sword, and prepared to assassinate the emperor; and that she, conscious of her guilt in this nefarious undertaking, had inflicted punishment upon herself with her hand. He next charged her with an intention to usurp the government, and to reign over the Roman people in his name; averring that she relied upon the obedience and co-operation of the Prætorian cohorts, and even upon the concurrence, or, at least, the connivance of the whole Senate.[1]

The philosopher is blamed for his subserviency to Nero.

Seneca was greatly blamed for giving the sanction of his character to the propagation of falsehoods at once so groundless and extravagant. But even the senators, who were much inclined to ridicule the philosopher, gave ample proof that their own courage and honour had not passed free from the malign influence of a corrupt court. Each rivalled the other in his readiness to decree solemn thanks to the gods, in all the temples of the city; to appoint annual games to be held during the feast of Minerva, at which celebration the plot had been discovered; and even to set up in the senate-house an image of gold, in honour of that goddess, to be placed by the side of the emperor's statue. Nor could their loyalty be satisfied, until they had conferred upon Nero the very ambiguous compliment, of declaring that the day on which Agrippina was born, should henceforth be marked in the calendar inauspicious and unholy.

Flattery of the Roman people.

When the emperor returned to his capital, the tribunes went forth to meet him, accompanied by the Senate, arrayed in robes of festivity and triumph. Choruses of women and children sang his praises as he passed, and extolled him as equally great and good. The roads were covered with platforms, whereon the people might have a view of the great head of the Roman world; and, in fact, all classes carried their flatteries to such an extent, that Nero himself could hardly conceal his disgust at their abject and dishonest servility. He concluded this scene of hypocrisy and falsehood by ascending the Capitol, and offering a sacrifice of thanksgiving to the gods of Rome and of the Augustan family.

Remorse of the emperor.

Tacitus, influenced by the principles of the Epicurean school, was disposed to infer from the tranquillity and success which continued to smile on the government of the emperor, that the gods either

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiv. c. 10, 12. Dion Cassius, *ubi suprà.*

approved his guilty conduct, or took no concern in such matters. A.D. 60. Nero himself was, perhaps, inclined to adopt the views of the historian; but, in order to secure the affections of his people, and regain the public esteem, he resolved to exercise the utmost clemency towards all those individuals who had been the objects of Agrippina's dislike and persecution. He accordingly recalled from banishment several distinguished persons of both sexes, among whom were Iturius and Calvisius, Junia Calvina, and Calpurnia. Silana herself would have enjoyed the same indulgence, had she not died some time before at Tarentum, where she had been permitted to fix her residence. Still, the agitation of his conscience could neither be soothed nor subdued. He confessed that the ghost of his mother continually tracked his footsteps by day, and that the whips and flaming torches of the Furies disturbed all the visions of the night. He had recourse to the skill of magicians, who undertook, by mystic rites, and unknown sacrifices, to appease the offended spirit of Agrippina; and afterwards, when he went to Greece, he did homage to the authority of the great moral principle which Providence has implanted in the breast of every human being, by declining to be present at the Eleusinian mysteries, from which a herald warned all wicked and impious persons to keep at a distance.

He resolves to appear on the stage.

It is admitted by all the Roman historians, that it was not until Nero had freed himself from the restraint imposed upon him by the authority of his mother, that he began to render himself ridiculous as a charioteer, a musician, and a player. His passion for the amusements of the circus displayed itself at a very early period; and he appears to have also had a natural taste for poetry and music. To divert him from the absurd resolution of exhibiting his accomplishments in the theatre, his counsellors recommended that he should, in the first instance, limit his performances to the gratification of a select number of spectators, in a private garden. But the applause which he received from these partial judges increased the appetite which it fed, until, at length, nothing less would satisfy the emperor than the shouts and praises of all the people of Rome. The secluded valley of the Vatican, which had been enclosed and adorned for the learned exercises of the imperial amateur, was accordingly abandoned; and the consent of Seneca and Burrhus was reluctantly given, that their master should no longer be prevented from appearing on the stage, and taking a part of the labour in a public entertainment.[1]

When the happy moment arrived, which Nero identified with the most brilliant period of his life, and the curtain was withdrawn which concealed from the gaze of the multitude the performers who hoped to delight their ears, and to awaken the plaudits of their tongues, the emperor appeared, tuning his instrument with the

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiv. c. 15. Apol. Ty. l. v. c. 4. Dion. l. lxi. Suet. l. vi. c. 30.

A.D. 60. greatest care, and entering with deep interest into all the technical arrangements by which he was to secure the success of his important enterprise. A cohort of Prætorians formed his guard; and his person was surrounded by centurions and tribunes, among whom was the severe and stately Burrhus, whose looks condemned the folly which he was compelled to praise.[1]

His extravagances.

The extravagances of Nero are presented by several historians in very lengthened and minute detail. He is said to have formed a legion, whose sole business it was to clap and applaud in the theatre. These persons, continues Tacitus, performed their duty with the greatest exactness—spending whole days and nights in making a noise, and in lavishing upon the prince and his fine voice all the attributes of the divinity. Every favour, he adds, due to virtue and merit, was bestowed upon these mean flatterers; and though none were at first received but young men of the equestrian and patrician orders, the number was afterwards increased to about five thousand, taken indiscriminately from all ranks of the people, and requiring no other qualification than strength of lungs and a loud voice. But when we are told that the members of this singular body, who bore the honourable name of *Augustani*, were divided into separate bands, and were taught to shout in measure and harmony, we find out that their duty consisted in conducting the choruses of the theatre, and that they were in fact engaged to sing, and not merely to praise the performances of the emperor. The chief of each chorus had a salary amounting to nearly four hundred pounds of our money.

Becomes a Poet.

But horsemanship and music did not employ all the time and talent which the cares of government left unoccupied to Nero. He also indulged in the delights of poetry; and Tacitus remarks, that in order to obtain the reputation of that art without the pains of study, he used to assemble in his palace such of his friends as had a turn for writing verses, and to avail himself of their aid, and even of their contributions. Suetonius, on the other hand, assures us, that the emperor was the author of several original pieces; which, though neither of much length, nor of very distinguished merit, prove at least that he could write with help, and produce without borrowing. His style was florid and ambitious; but as he could bear to be laughed at for his bombast, and could listen to the severest criticism, we may infer, that though he wrote verses, he was not weak enough to consider himself a poet.[2]

The character of his writings.

War in Britain.

But we leave for a time the puerilities of Nero, to take a view of the conduct of his lieutenants in the province of Britain. The greater part of this island, southward of the Forth, was already in the hands of the Romans; and the conquest, which had not been

[1] *Et mœrens Burrhus ac laudans.*

[2] He had previously, when adopted by Claudius, been admitted a supernumerary member of the four colleges.

attended with much difficulty, was held sufficiently secure, as long as the victors continued to temper their government with mercy and justice. But in the year of our era 61, the tyranny and exactions of the persons in authority, so completely exhausted the patience of the natives, as to lead them to a revolt; the immediate consequences of which were attended with a serious loss to the arms of the invaders, and even threatened the stability of their power throughout the whole country. "All that we gain by our submission," said the Britons, "is an increase of bad usage on the part of our masters. Formerly we had but one king; now we have two set over us, the military governor and the civil intendant; of whom the one assails our personal liberty, and the other deprives us of our food and clothing. At the hand of the first we suffer all the outrages which the licentiousness of war can suggest; from the latter, we are condemned to endure rapine and insult. Nothing is secure from their lawless passions. In battle the right of plunder belongs to the strongest; but in our depressed condition, we are driven from our families and homes by cowardly despots, who tear away our sons to bear the arms which themselves can no longer wield with honour, and who seem to regard our endurance equal to any task but that of dying for our country."[1] A.D. 61.

Oppression inflicted by the Romans in that country.

These sentiments, which have been embodied by the pen of Tacitus, were, it should seem, very generally entertained by the people of the midland and eastern districts. Prasutagus, the king of the Iceni, or inhabitants of Norfolk and Cambridgeshire, having in his last will named the emperor as joint-heir with his two daughters, died in the hope that he had thereby secured for his family and subjects a powerful protector, who would shield them from all unjust aggression. But the effect was altogether different from that which had been contemplated. The Roman commanders, interpreting the deed of inheritance so as to gratify their own selfish views, claimed the whole of the Icenian territory as the lawful domain of their master. The celebrated Boadicea, widow of the deceased monarch, was treated with marked indignity, and her daughters were subjected to still greater violence. The chief men of the nation were robbed, and reduced to slavery; and even the king's nearest relations were treated as bondmen attached to the soil, and considered as no longer worthy to enjoy either freedom or property.

It is reported that the miseries of the Britons were aggravated by the avarice of Seneca, who, according to Dion Cassius, had lent them forty millions of sesterces at an usurious interest; and who, by suddenly demanding the payment of that large sum, which the unfortunate debtors could find no means of raising, drove them at once to revenge and despair. The Iceni privately engaged their

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiv. c. 29. *Vita Agric.* c. 14. Dion Cassius, lxii. Tacit. *Ann.* xiv. c. 15-37.

A.D. 61. neighbours the Trinobantes, and some other nations of the Roman province, whose spirits were not yet entirely subdued, to espouse the common cause, join all their troops, and make one brave attempt to recover their liberty.

The Britons take arms and gain advantages.

Nor was it long before the Roman governor supplied them with a favourable opportunity for carrying their designs into execution. Seutonius Paulinus, an officer of high military reputation, had resolved to add the island of Mona, or Anglesea, to the dominion of the emperor; and with this view he transported his legions across the narrow channel which divides it from the main land. The inhabitants resolutely opposed his inroad. The shore was covered with troops whose very looks, it was said, inspired terror and amazement. Amidst the crowded ranks of armed men, were seen women running up and down, like Furies, with dishevelled hair, and blazing torches in their hands. At a little distance were Druids, who, lifting up their eyes to heaven, entreated victory for their countrymen, and curses upon their enemies. The Roman soldiers, astonished at the novelty of such a sight, remained some time without advancing; but soon, animated by the exhortations of the general, and encouraging one another not to fear a crowd of mad women and fanatical priests, they proceeded to the attack, drove back the undisciplined barbarians, and, taking a number of prisoners, burnt them in their own fires: the rest dispersed and fled. Paulinus left a garrison in the isle, with orders to cut down the groves consecrated to the cruel rites of the Druidical superstition; for it was the custom of those people, says Tacitus, to sacrifice their captives at the foot of their altars, and to consult the will of the gods in the entrails of their unhappy victims.

The Roman general takes the field.

While Paulinus was occupied with his new conquest, intelligence was brought to him that the Britons were in a state of revolt, and had already ravaged the colony of Camulodunum (Colchester), which had been recently founded by Ostorius Scapula. The natives had suffered much from the insolence and rapacity of the veteran soldiers, to whom that portion of territory was assigned. They likewise beheld a strong fortress erected in it, under pretext of a monument built in honour of Claudius; but which they could not help regarding at once as a token of Roman ascendancy, and as the means of perpetuating their own subjection and disgrace. These reasons determined them to make Camulodunum the object of their first attack.

The colonists were not altogether unacquainted with the intentions of the Britons. Their apprehensions, too, were increased by the appearance of several prodigies, which both Dion and Tacitus have taken the pains to relate. In the absence of Paulinus, the chief command was intrusted to the Procurator Decianus, to whom the veterans applied for a reinforcement of troops, as they themselves could not muster in sufficient numbers to resist the attack with which

they were threatened. The procurator sent them only about two hundred men, badly armed; upon which, being convinced that they could not meet the barbarians with success in the field, they fortified the monument or temple of Claudius, and collected, with diligence, all such means of defence as their situation enabled them to provide. The assault of the Britons was not less sudden than irresistible. The town was taken by storm, pillaged and burnt; and the fortress, in which the soldiers had shut themselves up, did not stand out more than two days. A.D. 61.

In this conjuncture of affairs, Petilius Cerialis, who afterwards obtained the character of an able general, marched to the relief of the colony, with the ninth legion which was under his command. The Britons, elated with victory, met him on the road, attacked him with indescribable fury, cut his infantry in pieces, and put the horsemen to flight. Cerialis retreated to his camp, where he was assailed by the conquerors with so much resolution, that it was not without the utmost difficulty that he maintained himself behind his intrenchments, till they were pleased to retire. Preparations on both sides.

In the meantime Paulinus arrived; and though his army was but small and ill appointed, he boldly forced his way through the enemy's troops, and arrived at London; which, although it had neither the title nor privileges of a colony, was even at that period greatly frequented on account of its commerce. He hesitated for some time whether he should not make it the head quarters of his legions; but, reflecting on the limited number of troops under his command, and the evils which had arisen from the defeat of Cerialis, he determined to sacrifice a city in order to save a province. These considerations fortified him against the prayers and tears of the inhabitants. Such as were able to accompany his march, enjoyed the protection of his arms; but all who from age or sex were unequal to the fatigues of a rapid movement, were left to the mercy of the victorious Britons.

Verulamium (St Albans) shared the fate of London—being taken, plundered, and destroyed by the insurgents. In the three places which fell into their hands, no fewer than seventy thousand Roman citizens and allies are said to have perished; for as Tacitus relates, the fury of the barbarians was too great to allow them to think of taking prisoners, or to estimate the advantage which would have arisen from selling or exchanging them. On the contrary, they put all to the sword without distinction; and such as escaped the first heat of their rage, were only reserved for more cruel and ignominious deaths by fire, the gibbet, or the cross. It would indeed seem, adds the historian, that the Britons, aware that they were soon to pay the penalty of their revolt, had resolved to revenge themselves beforehand on the indignant and helpless Romans. The Britons take several towns.

No sooner had Paulinus assembled ten thousand legionary soldiers, than he proposed to engage the multitudinous army which had

A.D. 61. marshalled under the banners of the British queen. In the number of combatants, there was, no doubt, a great disparity between the contending parties; though we must make a considerable allowance for the vague and exaggerated statements of the Roman historians, who maintain that the host of Boadicea amounted to more than two hundred thousand men. But the discipline of the legions was of more avail in the hour of conflict, than crowded ranks and lengthened lines; and the experience of Paulinus gave to his little army all the advantages which a choice of ground and a wise disposition of horse and foot, of light troops and heavy, could secure for warriors accustomed to the evolutions of a protracted battle. He drew them up in a defile, backed by a thick forest; and knowing that his unskilful enemies would attack them with all their strength in front, he posted his legions in the centre, while he assigned the wings to the cavalry and provincials.[1]

Conduct of Boadicea.

The Britons occupied an immense tract of open country, which resounded with cries of revenge, and shouts of encouragement; and wherein their battalions and squadrons performed a thousand irregular movements. Confident of success they brought their wives to be the witnesses of their triumph, and to enjoy a share in the spoil, which, they hoped, was about to fall into their hands. Boadicea, seated with her two daughters on a chariot of war, went from rank to rank, exhorting them to behave like men who knew the value of the stake for which they were about to contend. She was tall, her look stern, and countenance martial; her hair hung down to her waist, and a military mantle was thrown over her shoulders. The heroine, addressing herself by turns to each of the nations of which her army was composed, reminded them that it was no new thing for Britons to receive in battle the orders of a woman; but added, that on the present occasiou she did not wish them to regard her only as a queen, descended from many illustrious ancestors, and claiming the rights and honours of her forefathers: "for," continued she, "were I a woman of no distinction or pedigree, should I not have a right to seek revenge for the loss of liberty, for the insults I have suffered in my own person, and for the dishonour of my daughters? The Romans have carried their violence to such a degree that they put us on a level with slaves, whom they punish by blows; they have respected neither the age of a queen, nor the virtue of princesses; and they now present themselves in the field to rivet our claims yet more firmly, and to subject us to oppression, contumelies, and insults still more galling and disgraceful. But the gods at length declare for us, and favour our just revenge. The only legion that dared to fight was cut in pieces; the rest, far from being able to resist our strength, will not be able to bear the very

[1] Tacit, *Ann.* xiv. *ut suprà*. Suet. l. vi. Tacit. *Agric.* Dion Cassius. l. lxii.

shout of so many thousand heroes. Think how vastly superior our number is to theirs; think of the motives which have induced you to undertake this war: never was greater reason to hope for an easy and complete victory; never was so strong a necessity imposed to conquer or die. Such, at least, is the example which a woman is resolved to present you: let men if they prefer it, live, and be slaves!" A.D. 61.

The Britons defeated.

The issue of the battle was fatal to the independence of the Britons. The furious onset of barbarian courage was speedily checked by the cool discipline of the legions; and Boadicea soon perceived that the numbers of which she boasted, were to prove the cause of their own defeat and dispersion. The lances of the Romans threw her ranks into confusion; the light-armed cavalry at once increased their dismay, and prevented them from rallying; and when, at length, their flight became general, they found that the waggons which they had placed in the rear, loaded with women and children, hemmed them in so completely as to occasion a more serious loss than was inflicted by the sword of the enemy. Eighty thousand Britons are calculated to have fallen in this memorable battle; while the Romans lost only four hundred men, and had about the same number wounded. According to Tacitus, the widow of Prasutagus put an end to her life by poison; but Dion relates that she died of a broken heart, occasioned by the defeat of her army, the desolate condition of her people, and the hopeless depression of her family.

Cruelties of the Roman general.

Paulinus pursued his victory with as little regard to mercy as to the best interests of Rome. Having collected all his troops, and received a reinforcement from the army on the Rhine, he carried fire and sword into every part of the country; and, in many parts, wherein the natives would have returned to their allegiance under a less severe governor, they continued to present a menacing attitude, and refused to lay down their arms. But famine soon lent its aid to the depopulating measures of the Roman general, and the Britons had an enemy to combat whom neither courage nor obstinacy could subdue. So many evils pressing upon them at once would have compelled them to receive, unconditionally, the law of the conqueror, had not Julius Classicianus, the successor of Decianus, encouraged them to persevere in their opposition; assuring the chiefs that Paulinus would shortly be recalled, and that they would find it more for their advantage to treat with a new general, who, having never made war against them, would not look upon them as enemies, and who would, therefore, in the conditions which he should propose, study less the pride of victory than the exercise of clemency and justice. Decianus, meantime, wrote to the emperor that the war could not be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, so long as Paulinus commanded in Britain; and did not fail to impute to the rigour and mistakes of that general, all the calamities which had befallen the

A.D. 61. Roman army and the people under their protection, during his government in the province.

His conduct inquired into.

The letters of the procurator determined Nero to send into Britain a commissioner, invested with full powers to conclude a peace, and to remove all causes of dissension between the general and his accuser. The person selected for this important mission was Polycletus, one of the emperor's freedmen, who, combining in his character a love of magnificence with the most offensive haughtiness, became an object of dislike to the Romans, and of ridicule to the simple Britons. These last could not comprehend how a man who had been a slave should arrive at so much consequence; nor why the commander of a victorious army should be compelled to render an account of his conduct to a person who was equally destitute of hereditary honours and military reputation.

But approved.

It pleased Polycletus to make a favourable report of the Proconsul, as well as of the general state of the province; for which reason Paulinus was continued in his command, till, meeting with an accident at sea, he lost a few ships and men, and was, on that account, finally superseded by Petronius Turpilianus. This officer did not attempt to purchase fame at the expense of peace and human blood. On the contrary, he gave the Britons full permission to enjoy that tranquillity, which both their affairs and their inclination led them to seek; and for some years accordingly, the occurrences which, in that remote part of the empire, employed the wisdom of the governor and the activity of the troops, make no figure in the history of Rome.[1]

Death of Burrhus. A.D. 62.

It was in the eighth year of his reign that Nero lost the services of Burrhus, his prætorian præfect, who died of a disease in the windpipe. Many were of opinion that his death was not natural, but that his end was hastened by a dose of poison, administered at the suggestion of the emperor. But there is no reasonable ground for loading the memory of this prince with the imputation of a crime which he had no motive to commit. Burrhus was an able and faithful officer, equal to all the duties of his rank, and ever ready to discharge them; but it does not appear that his scruples ever interfered so far with the amusements of his master, however puerile and licentious they might be, as to render his presence at court at all disagreeable, or his death at all necessary to any plans of debauchery which might be in contemplation.

Seneca loses ground, and prepares to retire.

The demise of the præfect was a great blow to the credit of Seneca. The philosopher, no longer supported by the high character and frank honesty of Burrhus, soon felt that his influence over the mind of the emperor was materially diminished. His immense wealth, too, and the avaricious means which he employed for its

[1] Tacit. *Ann. ut suprà.* Dion Cassius, l. lxii. Suet. l. vi. *et Vita Ner.*

still farther augmentation, turned against him the tongues of many: A.D. 62.
the profligate abused him as a time-serving hypocrite, who extracted riches from the credulity of the great, and from the wretchedness of the poor; while the friends of virtue regretted that a person, whose sentiments were supposed to be refined by the pursuits of philosophy, should degrade himself by practising the worst arts of the usurer and extortioner. Nor was the ear of Nero altogether inaccessible to such strictures on the reputation of his tutor. He was rather inclined, on other grounds, to laugh at all masters of wisdom, whose grave and formal discourses he could observe did not, in all cases, unfold the exact principles which entered into their conduct in the real business of life; and he wanted not penetration sufficient to perceive, that there was some slight discrepancy between the moral harangues of even Seneca himself, and the insatiable thirst for wealth which stimulated him to more than half his actions.



[Seneca.—*G. F. Sargent—From an Engraving by Vorstermans.*]

The increasing coldness with which the emperor received the visits of his instructor, convinced the latter that the time was at hand when his retirement from court would prove not less necessary to his reputation than to his personal safety. With this intention he requested a formal audience of Nero, in the course of which he pronounced an elaborate encomium on his imperial master, extolled his benignity and liberal disposition, and concluded, by offering to resign into the hands from which he had received them, his extensive lands and well filled coffers. He expressed a wish to end his days in the tranquil seclusion of private life, where the dedication of his mind to the pursuits of philosophy would occupy those precious hours which he had too long devoted to public business, and the cares of an increasing fortune.

Nero listened to this proposal with affected surprise and regret, and replied to it with equal insincerity. He bewailed the resolution by which he was to be deprived of his best friend, and the greatest ornament of his court, and condescended to entreat that he would not yet leave him. "At my age," said the pupil of Seneca, "I may easily be induced to go astray; your wise counsels will keep me in the right road; for though my mind may have fully comprehended the doctrines of your philosophy, your presence is still indispensable

A.D. 62. to teach me how to practise them. Were you to give up your riches, and retire from the society of the capital, none would praise your moderation or love of retirement, while I should certainly be accused of avarice and cruelty; and were you even sure of obtaining the approbation of the world, reflect whether it would become a wise man, like yourself, to seek applause at the expense of your friend's reputation."[1]

To these flattering expressions, Nero added every possible demonstration of regard and tenderness; but did not in the end seriously oppose the retirement of the philosopher. Seneca accordingly withdrew himself from a scene, where his complaisance and accommodating maxims had more than once carried him to a participation in measures, which his better principles could not sanction; and he spent the remainder of his life in composing those Treatises on Morals, and on the Theory of Virtue, which continue to throw splendour on his name, and which afford to his character a less ambiguous support, than his counsels and co-operation in the court of the Cæsars.

The passions of the emperor, no longer restrained either by respect or fear, carried him to commit the most flagrant crimes. He remembered that Cornelius Sylla and Rubellius Plautus were still alive, though in a remote exile; and as he never could forgive those whom public favour at any time exalted to the condition of rivals, he issued secret orders that the two patricians should be put to death. Having perpetrated this deed of low revenge, he addressed a letter to the Senate, setting forth the reasons why the rigours of government had been extended to the lives of such individuals—representing them as turbulent, restless traitors, whose views were inconsistent with the tranquillity of the empire, and directly hostile to the personal interests and safety of the sovereign. The senators, who were now willing to be deceived, resolved that thanks should be returned to the gods for their unceasing care of the emperor and his people, and then proceeded to erase the names of Plautus and Sylla from the records of their illustrious body.

Nero repudiates Octavia, and marries Poppæa.

Relieved from the apprehension of public enemies, Nero determined to avail himself of the ascendancy which he had just acquired, to accomplish the purpose which he had long entertained of divorcing Octavia, and of raising the unprincipled Poppæa to the rank of empress. The pretext for this harsh measure was the barrenness of his wife, for whom, as a modest and very prudent lady, he still professed to cherish the utmost regard; and who, on account of her father's name, and the affections of the people, was justly esteemed as the main prop of his government.

When Poppæa found herself on the throne, she perceived the farther necessity of fortifying her greatness, by depriving of life the

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. c. 53.

unfortunate daughter of Claudius. Nero, whom she already governed as she pleased, came readily into a design so agreeable to his own barbarous hatred; and both of them in concert suborned one of Octavia's officers to accuse her of adultery with a musician, called Eucerus, a native of Alexandria. In consequence of this accusation her women were put to the rack, some of whom, not being able to endure the torment, impeached their mistress; but the greater number courageously persisted in maintaining her innocence. She was treated, however, as if the crime had been fully proved, being, in the first instance, condemned to confinement in a retired part of Campania, and closely watched by a guard of soldiers. A.D. 62.

Insurrection of the people;

Such unjust and odious proceedings did not fail to irritate the public mind. Men in place, and those whose rank and fortune made them conspicuous, murmured in private; while the common people, who are more apt to follow the impressions of Nature, and are less scrupulous in their comments, because they have less to fear, complained so loudly, and with so much freedom, that Nero became apprehensive, and determined to reinstate Octavia in her former station and honours. The first notice of this resolution, on the part of the emperor, transported the people with joy; some ran to the Capitol to return thanks to the gods; others tore down the statue of Poppæa; and all united in extolling the virtues of a princess who was endeared to them, not less by her personal qualities than by the memory of her renowned progenitors. In their enthusiasm they hurried to the palace, begged that Nero would show himself, and receive in his own person their assurances of veneration and gratitude. They even forced their way within the gates, making the halls resound with shouts of joy and loyalty; when the soldiers, who appear to have acted at the instigation of Poppæa, fell upon them, striking them with their swords and other weapons, and finally drove them from the precincts of the imperial dwelling.

And death of Octavia.

The tumultuous delight which the people had manifested paved the way for the ultimate ruin of its object. Her rival, who feared as well as hated her virtues, and apprehended that the weak mind of Nero might not long be able to withstand the solicitations of his subjects, so strongly expressed, determined, by alarming his jealousy of power, to drive him to commit an act which would for ever put an end to all the pretensions of Octavia. The artful Poppæa told the emperor that his former wife was at the head of a party in the State, whose seditious designs had been demonstrated, somewhat prematurely and thoughtlessly indeed, by the late mutinous conduct of the populace; and assured him, that if he did not take immediate steps to defeat her plans, the banished empress would herself appear in Rome, escorted by a powerful army, to reclaim the right of empire, which belonged to her family, and which she had brought as a dowry into his house. The murder of Octavia was forthwith resolved

A.D. 62-3. upon; and, to procure some plausible evidence of her guilt, Nero prevailed upon the infamous Anicetus, who had been the executioner of Agrippina, to declare that she had attempted to engage the commander of the fleet at Misenum, to join her with the forces under his command; and of having, with that view, granted him the most criminal favours. She was condemned to have her veins opened; but such was the effect of terror on her delicate frame, that the blood refused to flow; and it was not until she was put into a hot-bath, that the sentence of her inhuman husband could be fully accomplished.

Nero recovers his popularity.

The popularity of Nero, which received a great shock by the murder of Octavia, was again confirmed among the lower orders, by the care which he bestowed upon the markets, and among the higher ranks, by the assiduity with which he ministered to their dissipation and amusement. Provisions were cheap and abundant, and the finances of the empire were managed with equal skill and economy. The Senate, too, was still encouraged in pursuing every plan which seemed calculated to advance the prosperity of the people, and the authority of law; and thus it happened, during a considerable part of this prince's reign, that his private life and his public conduct, formed to each other the most striking and melancholy contrast.

A daughter born to him, who dies in infancy. A.D. 63.

Nero had been nine years on the throne, before his hopes of progeny were gratified by the birth of a child. He immediately conferred on both mother and daughter, the flattering title of Augusta; and the Senators, who had made vows for the happy delivery of Poppæa, performed them with the greatest magnificence; dedicating a temple to fecundity, and appointing annual games to commemorate the auspicious event. The death of the princess, which took place before she was four months old, changed the nature of this courtly adulation; and the infant of the vindictive Poppæa was raised to a place among the gods, and supplied with the service of a priest, and the honours of an altar.[1]

Nero goes to Naples to sing. A.D. 64.

The war, which at this period raged in the East, did not disturb the tranquillity of Rome, the military genius of Corbulo compelled the Parthian king to listen to terms of accommodation; and we shall accordingly describe, under their proper head, the embassy of Vologeses, and the journey of his brother to Italy, to be crowned sovereign of Armenia by Nero. In the meantime, the emperor entertained his subjects, as well as the most distinguished visitors from foreign parts, with his musical performances on the stage. He went to Naples in order that he might publicly exhibit his powers; and as Tiridates, the Armenian prince, arrived while the emperor was discharging this pleasant duty to his people, the stranger had an opportunity of contrasting the studies which fitted a man for the throne, with those which were indispensable in the governor of a

[1] Suet. l. vi. Tacit. *Ann.* xiv.

remote province. The grave, formal, descendant of the Arsacidæ was amazed at the frivolities of Nero; and could not help expressing surprise that the warlike chief who commanded in Syria, and who had spread the terror of his name over the whole Parthian dominions, should acknowledge as his master, an effeminate youth, who placed all his glory in the arts of a slave.[1] A.D. 64.

Burning of Rome. The Emperor suspected as an incendiary.

But Nero has been charged with a greater crime than that of debasing, by trifling pursuits, the dignity of imperial power. The historians of Rome are almost unanimous in imputing to him the destructive fire which, in the tenth year of his reign, laid waste a great part of that city. Suetonius and Dion Cassius openly maintain the charge; while the more impartial Tacitus leaves it in doubt whether the calamity took place by accident, or through the wickedness of the prince. We need hardly remark, that an occurrence, the origin of which was left undetermined by a contemporary analyst, is not likely to receive illustration from modern conjecture; but, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, it appears extremely improbable that Nero commanded the burning of Rome. It is not easy to discover a motive which could induce an emperor, whose public cares were expended in securing for his subjects cheap bread, and a diminution of taxes, to consume more than one-half of their houses, and thereby expose them to the most distressing privations. It is said, indeed, that he disliked the bad taste of the old buildings, and the narrow, crooked, dark streets which composed the greater part of the city. It is even added, that he had cherished the design of founding a new capital, more worthy of the Roman empire, to be called Neropolis—the chief ornament of which was to consist of a most magnificent palace, surpassing in gorgeous splendour the loftiest imaginations of Eastern kings. But it does not appear that these schemes of improvement entered into his contemplation prior to the accident with which he is charged; and, assuredly, we are not permitted to infer that, because he availed himself of an opportunity to display his skill in architecture, he was willing to purchase such an occasion at the expense of the greatest crime that a depraved heart could conceive. Nero was at Antium when the fire began, and remained there till he was informed that the flames were about to reach his own palace. We are told that upon his arrival at Rome, he ascended to the top of a high tower, whence he could see the whole extent of the conflagration; and that, putting on a theatrical dress, he performed a piece of descriptive music, the subject of which was the sacking of Troy by the victorious Greeks. But, in all such cases, we are allowed to doubt the accuracy of personal anecdotes, particularly when directed against an unpopular character; and, in the present instance, our scepticism is completely

Doubts on the subject.


[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xv. c. 24. Dion Cassius, l. lxii.

A.D. 64. justified by the fact, that Nero acted towards the sufferers with great humanity and consideration; and therefore, unless we are ready to believe that the same man, on the same occasion, could conduct himself like a crazy buffoon and a wise ruler, we must hesitate before we admit the accusation with which his memory has been loaded. To accommodate the families which had suffered by the fire, he threw open the extensive buildings which Agrippa had erected in the Campus Martius. His own gardens were likewise prepared for their reception—small huts being built for their temporary residence, and an ample supply of provisions and furniture being conveyed, by his orders, from the public stores at Ostia. In short, his proceedings throughout the whole of this calamity, were equally humane and patriotic.[1]

His humane conduct.

The city repaired with taste and elegance.

The new city, it is allowed even by his enemies, was built with care and judgment. The streets were made wide and straight, and the houses were all confined to a certain height. Every dwelling was supplied with a court or yard, for the comfort of the inhabitants; and on the outside a portico extended from one end of the street to the other, which gave to the whole an air of elegance and tastefulness. Nero was himself at the expense of these ornaments, as well as of clearing the ground whereon the proprietors of houses were to build; and, that the work might be carried on with greater spirit, he proposed rewards, according to the different stations and wealth of



[Baths of Nero.—*Venuti, Antichita di Roma.*]

the people, for such as should finish their labour within a limited period. His baths were especially celebrated, and gave rise to

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xv. c. 33, 34. Suet. l. vi. c. 19. Dion Cassius, l. 62.

the well-known sarcasm of the Roman poet.[1] He ordered quantities A.D. 64.
of rough stone, of the proper quality, to be procured from a distance; and as the Alban and Sabine quarries afforded a species which resisted, better than any other, the action of fire, he instructed the architects to substitute that material for wood, in all parts of the houses wherein stone could be introduced. Proper arrangements were likewise made for the regular distribution of water throughout the city; and that a sufficient quantity might at all times be ready, in case of unforeseen accidents, every householder was obliged to have a cistern constantly full, placed within a few yards of his door. As a further precaution against fire, the houses were built at a little distance from each other; while, to render assistance more available, in the event of any casualty, the roofs were made flat and easy of approach, both from within and without.

The fire which reduced to ashes so large a portion of Rome, took place on the nineteenth day of July, B.C. 64, the same day of the same month on which the Gauls set fire to the city, four hundred and fifty years before. The conflagration raged six days and seven nights; and it abated at last only from want of fuel, after having destroyed every thing, from the great circus at the foot of Mount Palatine, to the farther end of the Esquiliæ, where a prodigious number of buildings were thrown down to prevent its more extensive ravages. After being partially extinguished, the fire burst forth again, and continued its destructive fury two days longer; and on this occasion, though the loss was less considerable in amount, the buildings consumed were of a much more valuable order, including some venerable temples of great antiquity, and several magnificent porticoes, which at once adorned the city, and ministered to the convenience and relaxation of all classes of the people. Tacitus mentions, that among the ancient buildings which were destroyed, his countrymen bewailed the great altar (Ara Maxima) which Evander is said to have erected and dedicated to Hercules, when he was honoured with a visit from that god; the Temple of Jupiter Stator, built by Romulus; the Palace of Numa; together with the fane of Vesta, in which the household gods of the Roman people were kept. To this devastation we must add, the various spoils which had been taken from the most celebrated nations of Europe, Africa, and Asia; the masterpieces of Grecian painting and statuary; the writings of ancient authors; and the other monuments of past times: a loss for which, in the estimation of the learned and curious, the beauty of the new


[1] "——Quid Nerone pejus?
Quid Thermis melius Neronianis?"
—*Martial.*

"What could be worse than Nero, or better than his Baths?"

A.D. 64. city, and the convenience of its buildings, formed but a poor compensation.[1]

Persecution of the Christians at Rome.

There is an occurrence connected with the burning of Rome too important to be omitted in the most abridged history of Nero's reign. We allude to the persecution inflicted upon the Christians by command of that emperor; who, according to Tacitus, was desirous to avert the public indignation from himself, as the supposed author of the recent calamity, to a sect of men who had already become objects of suspicion, as dissenting from the national superstition. Some of them were arrested, and, upon being interrogated, confessed that they belonged to the new sect; but, the historian remarks, it was more difficult to convict them of being incendiaries, than of entertaining an inveterate hatred against all mankind. Their punishment, however, was resolved upon; and, with much barbarous ingenuity, it was converted into an amusement for the people. Some were covered with skins of beasts, and, in that disguise, devoured by dogs; others were crucified; while a third portion, wrapped up in clothes covered with pitch and brimstone, were burnt in the night by way of torches. The scene chosen for these horrid spectacles was the emperor's own gardens, where he, at the same time, diverted the multitude with chariot-races, mixing with the crowd in a coachman's dress, or seated on a car, and holding the reins. Thence, concludes the philosophical historian, arose the pity which was felt for a description of persons, really guilty and deserving the severest of punishments; but who, on that occasion, were sacrificed to the inhuman pleasure of one, and not to the good of the whole.[2]



[Aqueduct of Nero.—*Overbeke les Restes de l'Ancienne Rome.*]

Character given of them by Tacitus.

The conduct of Nero towards the Christians, is not more easy to be explained, than the judgment which was formed of them by Tacitus, who was himself not less remarkable for his love of virtue,

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xv. c. 42–44. Plin. l. 33, c. 3.
[2] Tacit. *Ann.* xv. c. 44. Suet. *Nero.*

than for the acuteness of his observations, and his knowledge of mankind. It is well known, no doubt, that many groundless calumnies were propagated against the first believers in our holy faith; and that, in consequence of these misrepresentations, they were regarded, in several parts of the Roman empire, as equally infatuated and dangerous—as bad reasoners in religion—and as persons extremely disaffected towards the established government. The charge of atheism, with which they were also attacked, creates indeed neither surprise nor difficulty in the mind of any reader who is acquainted with the opinions of those times; and yet it was principally upon the ground of that very charge that the people of Rome rested their main suspicions, respecting the moral character and political views of the early Christians. Tacitus opened his ears to the rumours and surmises which employed the superstitious credulity of his countrymen; and, affecting a thorough contempt for the religious revolution with which the world was about to be visited, he loaded with execration, a system of belief which he had not condescended to study, and a class of men to whose manners and principles he was an entire stranger. A.D. 64.

In the eleventh year of his reign, Nero was on the point of becoming the victim of a formidable conspiracy, the knowledge of which extended to several of the most distinguished persons in Rome, and even to some of his principal officers, both civil and military. It was proposed to raise to the empire a senator, whose name was Piso; and who, besides being greatly esteemed for his personal virtues, was related to the most ancient and powerful families in the commonwealth. Subrius Flavius, the tribune of a prætorian cohort, and Sulpicius Asper, a centurion, were among the most zealous of his partisans; but the plot soon embraced in its designs, the celebrated poet Lucan, and Plautius Lateranus, one of the consuls elect. It is said that Lucan's disaffection originated in a literary jealousy; and that he considered Nero as no longer fit to reign, because the latter esteemed his own verses more highly than the epic strains of the Pharsalia. Lateranus, it is added, had no private pique against the emperor; love of his country, and regard for the public good, being the sole motives which induced him to hazard his life in the doubtful conflict of a civil war. Two senators, Flavius Scævinus, and Afranius Quintianus, were likewise roused to a sense of honour and revenge: the former on general grounds, as a disinterested patriot; the latter, because he had lampooned the satirical muse of the emperor. To these were joined Tullius Senecion, and Antonius Natalis, both distinguished members of the equestrian order, and Fænius Rufus, the præfect of the prætorian cohorts. Conspiracy against Nero. A.D. 65.

Subrius proposed to consummate their treason by attacking Nero whilst singing on the stage, or in the course of one of his midnight rambles in the city. The danger which attended this mode of pro- Suspicions excited.

A.D. 65. cedure, caused it to be rejected; and while the leading conspirators were deliberating on the means of effecting their object with smaller risk, or waiting the occurrence of a favourable accident which might throw the life of the emperor into their hands, the latter received information of the intended assault upon his person and throne. A female, named Epicharis, had been made acquainted with the plot; and, in her zeal to accomplish the object of her friends, she undertook to tamper with the chief officers of the fleet at Misenum, not doubting but that she would be able to draw them over to a participation in the measure. The tribune Volusius Proculus, whom she selected for her confidant, no sooner learned that a design was entertained against the life of Nero, than he hastened to the palace, and communicated all that he had heard. Epicharis was immediately arrested and thrown into prison; but as she had abstained from mentioning the names of the conspirators, the fears and suspicions of the emperor could not fix on any object, nor be gratified with any victim.[1]

Plan of the conspirators.

After debating a long time, the partisans of Piso at last agreed to execute their design during the games in the circus, which were celebrated on the twelfth of April, in honour of Ceres. Lateranus undertook to secure the person of Nero, by throwing himself at his feet, under pretext of presenting a petition—intending while on the ground, to lay hold of his legs with so much force, as to pull him down, and thereby expose him to the daggers of his confederates. Scævinus begged that he might be allowed to give the tyrant the first stab, having destined to that use a poignard which he had taken out of a temple, and aways wore about him as consecrated to some patriotic or generous deed. Piso was to wait the event in the Temple of Ceres, whence the præfect Fænius was to convey him, should they succeed in their attempt, to the camp of the prætorian cohorts, and proclaim him emperor. To consolidate their scheme still further, they had, says Pliny, obtained the consent of Antonia, the daughter of Claudius, who was prevailed upon to revive her pretensions to the throne, by marrying Piso; and who had promised to secure for him the favour of the people, and the co-operation of the army, as soon as he should clear the way, by the death of Nero, for her return into the palace of her father.

Conspiracy detected and punished.

The agitation of Scævinus, the night before the deed was to be done, betrayed the secret to his freedman Milichus, who immediately hastened to reveal the intended murder, to the emperor in person. The principal conspirators were instantly apprehended; and the application or threatening of the rack, soon drove them to a breach of fidelity in disclosing the names of all their accomplices,

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xv. c. 48. Plin. l. ii. c. 25. Dion Cassius, l. lxii. Tacit. *Ann.* xv. c. 56-60.

as well as that of the person in whose behalf the plot had been formed. Natalis was the first to yield; and, not satisfied with implicating those who had bound themselves to take an active share in the treason, he exposed to the fury of Nero a number of individuals who were merely supposed to approve its object. Among these last was Seneca, who, finding that he could not reform the emperor, consented to have him deposed; although Tacitus is of opinion that Natalis accused the philosopher with the view of gratifying Nero, who had long hated him, and that he was not even privy to the design of raising Piso to the throne. Most of the conspirators atoned for their crime, by a violent death. Seneca expired in a vapour bath, imitating, in his last moments, the firmness and eloquence of Socrates; and Lucan, whose veins were opened, beguiled the pains of mortality by repeating, from his own Pharsalia, the following verses, which describe a lingering death, similar to that inflicted upon himself:— A.D. 65.

Death of Seneca and Lucan the poet.

"Where'er the liquid juices find a way
There streams of blood, there crimson rivers stray;
His mouth and gushing nostrils pour a flood,
And e'en the pores ooze out the trickling blood;
In the red deluge all the parts lie drowned,
And the whole body seems one trickling wound."
—*Rowe's Lucan's Pharsalia.*

The city, says Tacitus, was filled with funerals—the Capitol with victims; for the fathers, the brothers, the relations, and friends of those who had perished, found it expedient to return thanks to the gods, to adorn their houses with laurel, as if a great victory had been obtained, and to throw themselves at the prince's feet, congratulating him on his happy escape.[1]



[Lucan.]

The death of the infamous Poppæa, which occurred about this time, is attributed to an ungovernable fit of passion in Nero, who kicked her while in an advanced state of pregnancy. Tacitus acquits him of the charge of poisoning her, and assigns as his reasons for disbelieving that her death was intended, that the emperor was both uxorious and anxious for children. Her body, contrary to Roman custom, was not burned, but embalmed; and Nero himself pronounced her funeral oration.[2]

No sooner were his fears relieved, than Nero resumed his

[1] Dion Cassius, l. lxii. Tacit. *Ann.* xv. c. 60.
[2] Tacit. *Ann.* xvi. c. 6.

A.D. 66. Nero goes to Greece, and gains 1800 crowns, or prizes, at the national games.

theatrical amusements, and the cultivation of his musical talents. So completely did he identify himself with the professional character, that he accepted an engagement to perform at the games which were to be exhibited by a Roman citizen named Larcius, and even allowed his treasurer to receive the fee of a million of sesterces, by which the wealthy commoner had promised to reward the exertions of his imperial master. To extend his fame as a performer, he made a journey into Greece, where he contended for all the crowns and other prizes which were given by the several States to stimulate the genius of their artists. The Olympic games were, by his orders, postponed two years, that he might have an opportunity of competing for the honours which so distinguished an assembly had to confer; and, having obtained the wreath of victory from the hands of the most accomplished judges in the world, he proceeded to challenge all the talent which appeared on the stage or hippodrome, at the Isthmian, Pythian, and Nemæan solemnities. The number of crowns which, during his stay in Greece, attested the rare skill or commanding influence of the emperor, amounted to no fewer than eighteen hundred.[1]

Triumphal entry at Naples and Rome.

Upon his return to Italy he resolved to commemorate his success, in a manner becoming his signal achievements. His first triumphal procession was reserved for Naples, because it was in that city that he made the first public trial of his voice and acting. A part of the walls was thrown down; and, according tc the custom observed in honour of victors at the sacred games of Greece, he made his entry through the breach in a chariot drawn by white horses. He entered Antium, where he was born, in a similar manner, and conferred the same distinction upon the ancient city of Alba; but it was at Rome where he intended to enjoy the full splendour of his triumph, and to astonish his subjects by the magnificence of his exploits. The eighteen hundred crowns were all carried before him, with inscriptions denoting the games, and the nature of the combat in which they had been gained, and the more celebrated of the antagonists who had been vanquished in the contest; and a scroll, bearing large letters, set forth, for the information of the people, that Nero Cæsar was the first Roman who, since the world began, had ever obtained those brilliant rewards consecrated to transcendant merit and unrivalled talent. Next followed the conqueror himself, seated in the same car which Augustus had used in his triumphs. He was clothed in a robe of purple, with a mantle covered with stars of gold. On his head he wore the Olympic crown, composed of wild olive, while in his right hand he displayed the Pythian garland, formed of the envied laurel. A musician sat by his side, the worthy companion of such a victor. The Senate, the equestrian order, the præfects,

[1] Suet. *Ner.* 23, 24. Apol.

and centurions, joined the pompous train, and rent the air with their repeated acclamations. A part of the great circus was thrown down that the imperial chariot might find a ready way to the temple of Apollo; for, though other conquerors were wont to deposit their laurels in the Capitol, Nero had resolved to lay up his in the presence of the god of arts.[1] A.D. 67.

Attempt to cut the Isthmus of Corinth.

The visit to Greece, which we have just mentioned, was signalized by an attempt, made at the command of Nero, to cut through the Corinthian Isthmus. The arrangements effected for this purpose, and the views contemplated by the emperor, were such as to create in our minds some doubt whether he had not in his eye higher objects than olive wreaths and laurel crowns. He certainly improved the constitutions of some of the Grecian states, and granted to several cities privileges which were highly prized both by Plutarch and Pausanias. He declared the whole country free, and exempted it from the payment of tribute; confiding the government, in every particular community, to native magistrates and the authority of their own lawgivers. In short, we find here, as well as in other parts of his history, that the character of Nero has not been very candidly exhibited; and there is reason to suspect that his biographers, disgusted with his vices and frivolities, have too hastily passed over the proofs of wisdom and humanity which mark some portions of his reign.[2]

Vindex revolts, and induces Galba to join him in opposing the authority of Nero.

At length Caius Julius Vindex, who commanded the legions in Gaul, was filled with indignation at the puerile excesses of Nero, and determined to relieve his country from the disgrace of acknowledging a master so unworthy to rule. He communicated his designs to Galba, the governor of Terragonia in Spain, an officer of unsullied reputation, whose high birth entitled him to aspire to the most elevated situation in the empire. Galba required a little time for deliberation, and to consult his friends; but Vindex, who was probably satisfied with regard to the real intentions of the veteran governor, unfurled the standard of revolt, and soon found himself at the head of a hundred thousand Gauls. Nero was at Naples when the intelligence was conveyed to him that his general was in arms to oppose his authority; and he listened to the tidings with very little emotion. But when the news arrived that Galba had likewise thrown off his allegiance, and had issued proclamations in the name of the Senate and Roman people, his weak mind was distracted by a number of contending passions. He hurried to Rome, and made preparations for meeting the rebels in the field—forming his marines into a legion, and calling in all the detachments that were within a moderate distance of the capital. Otho, the former companion of his pleasures, was the first to declare for Galba; and his A.D. 68.

[1] Dion Cassius, l. lxiii. Suet. l. vi. c. 24. Appol. Ty. l. viii. c. 14. Paus. *in Eli.*
[2] Ibid. l. lxiii. Plin. l. iv. c. 4. Suet. c. 19.

A.D. 68. example was followed by all the commanders and governors of provinces, except two, namely, Clodius Macer in Africa, and Virginius Rufus who was serving on the Rhine. The latter even marched against Vindex, and defeated him with great slaughter—turning for a moment the current of events in favour of Nero, who continued trembling in Rome. Unable to determine, and incapable of a firm resolution, the emperor spoke at one time of flying into Egypt, and actually gave orders to have a fleet prepared for the voyage; nor was it until he saw himself deserted by the Prætorian cohorts that he felt the necessity of running from his palace, to take refuge in the cottage of one of his freedmen, at the distance of four miles from the city.[1]

Galba proclaimed Emperor.

As soon as it was known in Rome that the Prætorians had declared for Galba, and that Nero had fled, the Senate assembled; and, assuming the exercise of supreme power, they pronounced the fugitive emperor a public enemy, and gave orders that he should be punished with the utmost severity of the ancient laws. At the same time, Galba was acknowledged as the sovereign of the Roman people, and all the titles and powers which belong to that high dignity were conferred upon him, with the full consent and approbation of all orders of men. The city resounded with shouts of joy, the temples smoked with incense, and every one allowed himself to believe that the liberty of the commonwealth was completely restored.

Death of Nero.

Meanwhile Nero, who had despaired of being able to retain his life, was meditating on the various means which presented themselves of terminating a miserable existence. We are unfortunately deprived of the assistance which would have been supplied by the discriminating judgment of Tacitus; and we have no better guide to a knowledge of the manner in which the emperor met death than is afforded by the malignant credulity of Suetonius, or by the scanty details of Dion and Pliny. It appears that when he learned his retreat was discovered, and that there was no longer any chance of escape, he plunged a dagger into his throat. The weakness of his arm, however, rendered the blow quite ineffectual; so that it became necessary for Epaphroditus, one of his attendants, to assist him in the act of suicide. He was still alive when the centurion arrived, who was charged by the Senate with the duty of carrying him to Rome; and, recognising the person of that officer, he reproached him bitterly with his treason and disaffection, after which he almost immediately expired.

Before his death, he requested that his head might not be delivered to his enemies, but that his body might be buried entire. His request was in this particular readily complied with, and his ashes were conveyed, by two of his female domestics, to the tomb of his

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* i. c. 90. Suet. l. vi. c. 40. Dion Cassius, l. lxiii. Plut.

paternal ancestors. In Nero perished the last of the family of Augustus; whose misfortune it was to labour for a posterity unworthy of him, and to give to the empire, in all the successors of his blood, none who were not scourges of his people, and objects of horror or contempt to mankind. A.D. 68

Estimate of his character.

It is very difficult to arrive at a just estimate of the character of Nero. That he was suspicious, cruel, and regardless of human life, admits not of any doubt; but that he was the ferocious monster described by certain historians, and so extremely depraved in his appetites as to have become incapable, as St. Augustine expresses it, both of the vices and virtues of mankind, is not by any means so clearly established. Suetonius, who was said to display in his writings all the sensuality and coarseness which his countrymen showed in their habits and mode of life, took pleasure in recording every popular calumny which reached his ear; and in composing his biographical sketch of Nero, he appears to have had no other object in view than to excite in the mind of his reader the mingled emotions of disgust, horror, and execration. His description, for example, of the indignities offered by the emperor to the corpse of Agrippina; the history of Sporus; and the assertion that incendiaries were employed by Nero to effect the destruction of Rome, are generally suspected to have no foundation in fact.

The fathers of the church, too, who denounced Nero as the first persecutor of the Christians, laboured to avenge their sacred cause by assailing the reputation of that prince. Augustine speaks of him as the most finished pattern of wicked rulers—as the first of that order of detestable men, who love power and despise glory—who are neither good, nor desire to appear so; and who, having no respect for the opinions of the world, are always ready to commit the greatest crimes. We find, moreover, in the pages of Sulpicius Severus, that, about the beginning of the fourth century, an opinion prevailed among divines that Nero was either to appear in the character of Antichrist in the latter times of disaffection and infidelity, or that he was to reign in the west, and give a new establishment to idolatry, while the true Antichrist should set up his kingdom of error and delusion in all the countries of the east. A passage in the Apocalypse was found to support this absurd expectation; and it had, accordingly, become an article of belief, among the ignorant and credulous, that the son of Agrippina was not actually dead, but was reserved in some secret place, by the care of Providence, until the measure of human iniquity should be accomplished.


But Nero was not so much detested by all his contemporaries, many of whom were zealous to honour his memory and to defend his reputation. Some of them continued for years to deck his tomb with flowers and other offerings of affection; to adorn his statues; and even to receive edicts as if published by his authority, and, as

A.D. 68. if he were shortly to appear, in order to resume the exercise of the power from which his enemies had driven him. Several impostors assumed his name, and thereby made a strong impression both on the army and the common people. A false Nero appeared in Greece, and another in Parthia; each of whom alarmed the jealousy of the reigning emperor, and nearly involved the nation in a bloody war; facts which go far to establish the popularity of the infatuated prince, whose name was borrowed among a large portion of his subjects.

Enough still remains, however, to justify the severity with which the memory of this emperor has been usually visited. As general of the Roman armies, he found his country placed under martial law; and the lives of all ranks of men were in his hand. The constitution of the government, which he was called to administer, almost necessarily made him a tyrant, because it compelled him to be a despot; and that he very frequently, in the latter part of his reign, abused his power to gratify personal resentment, or to satiate his boundless avarice, has been made manifest by a series of transactions, which will never fail to create in the breast of every one who reads his annals the deepest sentiments of pity and indignation.



[Terence Reading his Andria.—*From a Marble Cinerarium in the British Museum.—G. F. Sargent.*]



[Battle between Romans and Parthians.

CHAPTER XI.

PARTHIA.

FROM B.C. 53 TO A.D 64.

WE have already brought the details of the history of Parthia[1] down to the period at which Crassus was defeated, and his army driven from Mesopotamia with great loss and disgrace. We now resume the historical outline of that celebrated kingdom, with the intention of giving a more connected view of the wars and negociations which its rulers carried on with the Romans, about the commencement of the Christian era, than can possibly be derived from the brief incidental notices of these occurrences, which have been introduced into the crowded annals of the imperial government. B.C. 53.

The immediate consequence of the victory gained over Crassus, was a resolution on the part of Orodes to invade Syria; and ultimately, should he succeed in that undertaking, to expel the Romans from all their Asiatic provinces. Surena accordingly crossed the Euphrates with a considerable army, hoping to find the enemy's country in a state of panic and confusion, and entirely destitute of all means of defence. But fortunately for the interests of Rome, it fell to the spirit and zeal of Cassius to meet the pressure of this The Parthians invade Syria.

[1] See Chap. iii.

B.C. 53. formidable inroad. This distinguished officer, who had acted with so much prudence and bravery during the late campaign, made haste to collect the feeble remains of the vanquished legions, and such other troops as the exigency of the time could supply; and, advancing to meet the invaders, he assumed a position at once so strong and commanding, as to render it expedient for them to retrace their steps across the desert.[1]

Are repulsed by Cassius.

Renew the attempt.

But the Parthian monarch, though thwarted in his first attempt, did not relinquish the intention of subduing Syria. Early in the following year, he renewed his preparations, placing his son Pacorus at the head of a powerful armament, with orders to carry on the war with the utmost vigour; and that the inexperience of the prince might be assisted by the wisdom and valour of a tried commander, the duties of lieutenant-general were confided to Osaces, who at that period was esteemed one of the ablest leaders in the east.

To oppose these hostile demonstrations, the Roman Senate appointed to the government of the Syrian province the proconsul Calpurnius Bibulus, a man who was equally undistinguished in military as in civil affairs, and who is only known to history as the inactive colleague of Julius Cæsar. His inertness or his subserviency has been commemorated in a distich preserved by Suetonius,[2] implying that nothing had been done by Bibulus, but by Cæsar; for he had no recollection of anything being done in the consulship of Bibulus.

Are feebly opposed by Bibulus.

The new governor soon found himself compelled to abandon, to the ravages of the Parthian cavalry, the rich plains which extend from the shores of the Mediterranean to the eastern wilderness, and to seek protection for his eagles within the walls of Antioch. After some delay, he was relieved from the miseries and disgrace of a siege by Cicero, the renowned orator, who, having been invested with a military command in Cilicia, had at his disposal fifteen thousand men, whom he instantly resolved to conduct into the neighbouring province to the assistance of the unfortunate Bibulus.[3] Upon penetrating the rocky boundary of Amanus, he beheld the devastation committed by the victorious Parthians, who, having wasted Syria, were already threatening the fertility and repose of all Asia Minor. But his appearance at the head of so strong a reinforcement, completely checked their progress. They forthwith raised the siege of Antioch; and adopting, as usual, a hurried and tumultuous retreat, they fell into an ambush prepared for them by the vigilance of Cassius, in which Osaces and a great part of his army were cut to pieces.

And driven out by Cicero and Cassius.

[1] Livii *Epit.* cviii. Velleius Paterculus, ii.

[2] *Non Bibulo quicquam nuper, sed Cæsare factum;*
Nam Bibulo fieri Consule nil memini.
—Suet Jul. 20.

[3] *Epist. ad Attic.* v. 10. Plut. *Crass.*

It was with difficulty that Pacorus himself, the heir of the Parthian crown, was saved from falling into the hands of the conquerors, while the effects of this signal overthrow were so severely felt, throughout his father's dominions, that no attempt was made by him to disturb the Roman power in Syria, during the space of ten or twelve years. B.C. 53.

Labienus excites the Parthians to invade Syria.

The protracted struggle maintained by the members of the second triumvirate for the sovereignty of Rome, necessarily threw the remoter provinces into weakness and perplexity. Nor did Orodes remain long ignorant, either of the neglected state into which the eastern governments had fallen, or of the dissolute and unsoldier-like habits, which already began to stain the reputation of M. Antonius, and to alienate the confidence of his friends. But the ambition and revenge of the Parthian king were chiefly inflamed by the representations of Labienus, a son of a general of the same name, who had espoused the popular interest during the civil wars, and who himself appears to have led a contingent of troops, supplied by Orodes to co-operate with the republican army under Brutus and Cassius. This Roman assured his new master, that the discontent which prevailed in Italy, and the feebleness of the provincial authorities in Asia, afforded him a most favourable opportunity for permanently extending the boundaries of the Parthian dominions to Egypt and the Ægæan Sea. The advice thus given was not addressed to unwilling ears. To the king it appeared to be both wise and practicable; while by Pacorus, who was eager to revenge his defeat, it was received with all the enthusiasm of a young and warlike spirit.[1]

B.C. 39.

The early successes of Labienus, and the occupation of Syria, Cilicia, and Asia by the Parthians—their subsequent defeat by Ventidius—and the discomfiture and death of Pacorus have already been related, and it is from this point that we shall resume our narrative, beginning with those events which distinguished the reign of Phraates, and which hitherto have been only slightly touched upon.

Antonius joins his army before Samosata, and grants a capitulation.

The successes of his lieutenant were communicated to Antonius at Athens, having advanced so far on his return to the East. Upon hearing that Ventidius had laid siege to Samosata, the capital of Antiochus, in Commagene, he sent instructions to that officer not to listen to any terms of capitulation, till he himself should arrive to take the command of the army. The great fame of the triumvir had not raised him above a feeling of jealousy towards his inferior; and he displeased the soldiers by interfering with the operations of a siege, from which they expected both honours and emolument, and finally, by accepting a smaller ransom from Antiochus than their revenge or avidity had dictated. Ventidius was sent to Rome to

[1] Dion Cassius, xlviii.

B.C. 39. enjoy the honours of a triumph; and the proconsul of Asia returned to Greece, where Octavia awaited his arrival, prepared to resume those pleasures and amusements, which were now his greatest recompense for the anxious fatigues of war.[1]

Phraates ascends the Parthian throne. B.C. 37.

The repose which Antonius had hoped to enjoy in the West, was soon disturbed by the unwelcome intelligence, that a new king of great energy and ambition had assumed the throne of Parthia. This tyrant, who reigned under the title of Phraates IV., had opened the way to sovereign power by murdering his father, his brothers, and his own son; and, as he was known to cherish the most violent hatred against the Romans, it became expedient to anticipate his designs, and to carry war into the heart of his kingdom. Antonius, accordingly, at the head of a hundred thousand men, of whom twenty thousand were cavalry, began his march towards the Euphrates; but learning that Phraates was strongly posted on the opposite bank of the river, accompanied by the tributary prince of the Lesser Media, the Roman general determined to signalize the campaign by the reduction of Praaspa, a fortress belonging to the latter of these sovereigns. In this undertaking, Antonius relied on the co-operation of Artavasdes, king of Armenia, the hereditary ally of the republic, and then actually at war with the Satrap whose troops augumented the Parthian camp; but although the Armenian promised to send into the field a reinforcement of 16,000 cavalry, it does not appear that he was animated by any sentiment of zeal for the Roman cause, or that he really contributed to assist their views, either by his arms or by his counsel.

Expedition of Antonius.

Leaving behind his heavy battering machines under the protection of two legions, the Roman commander advanced to Praaspa by forced marches, hoping to surprise that valuable stronghold before the Parthians could afford it any assistance. But the rapidity of his movement could not deceive so active an enemy. Phraates attacked the two legions which composed the rear-guard, and cut them in pieces, notwithstanding a vigorous effort made by Antonius to arrive with a part of his army in time to save them. But this loss did not check the resolution of the triumvir. He made a rapid movement upon Praaspa, hoping that he would be able to carry it by assault before the garrison could arrange their means of defence; and even when he failed in this attempt he had recourse to the more dilatory operations of a siege, in which he persevered till all the surrounding country was completely exhausted, and his troops reduced to considerable distress. In a battle which ensued, he put the Parthians to the route; but the walls of Praaspa still resisted his most determined endeavours to force them, till at length the approaching scarcity of a northern winter, placed before his eyes the unavoidable

Siege of Praaspa.

[1] Dion Cassius, *ubi suprà*.

necessity of relinquishing his undertaking, and of providing for the safety of his soldiers in a milder climate. B.C. 37.

Antonius treats with the Parthian king.

But his retreat already depended upon the forbearance of the Parthian king. To secure, therefore, the most favourable terms that his situation allowed him to expect, he sent an ambassy to Phraates, informing him of his resolution to return into Syria, to withdraw the war from Media, and finally to desist from his attempt to extend the Roman power beyond the banks of the Euphrates. The son of Orodes received the messengers in the field, seated on a magnificent throne, and holding in his hand a bent bow, the inauspicious emblem of Parthian activity and revenge. He upbraided the Romans with their selfish and ambitious views, denounced them as the enemies of Asia, but concluded by expressing his willingness to allow them to retreat unmolested, provided they would pledge their faith to refrain from all hostilities.

And begins his retreat into Syria.

Antonius without delay withdrew his army from before Praaspa, and began to retrace his march towards the Syrian province; and at the same time the cavalry of Phraates put themselves in motion to cut off all supplies, to attack his flanks, to drive in his foragers, and to waste the whole country through which he was to pass. In the course of twenty-seven days, the contending parties engaged in eighteen battles; and though victory in general declared for the Romans, the greatest loss was on their side, and more than twenty thousand of their best troops fell a sacrifice to the obstinacy of their own commander, and to the perfidiousness of their barbarian enemies. The pursuit was not continued beyond the boundaries of the Armenian king; who, though affordng no assistance in the field, appears to have interposed his good offices in favour of his allies, and to have obtained for them a relaxation of that harassing warfare, in which the Parthians excelled all the nations of antiquity.

We need not repeat our account of the contest between Phraates and Tiridates for the throne of Parthia, which is the first event connecting that country with Rome after the repulse of Antonius. The restoration of the captured Roman eagles secured Phraates in his ill-gained sovereignty, and the bribe which Augustus received for a gross violation of equity, has been handed down to posterity as one of the most glorious incidents of his reign. B.C. 21.

The Romans give a king to Armenia.

After these transactions, nearly twenty years elapsed before the arms of Parthia threatened to disturb the tranquillity of the Roman provinces in the east. A brief retrospect of the Roman policy will point out the sources of renewed dissension. The kingdom of Armenia had depended by turns on the descendants of Arsaces, and on the great western republic; but in the time of Augustus it was become customary for the Armenians to receive a ruler from the nomination of the Senate. About two years before the commencement of the Christian era, for example, the Roman emperor awarded the crown B.C. 2.

B.C. 2. to Artabases; who did not refuse to acknowledge the obligation under which he stood to his powerful and ambitious benefactors, and even to co-operate with their several lieutenants, in confirming their power along the western boundaries of the Parthian dominions. Phraates could not tolerate the existence of a State dependent upon the Romans, in the immediate neighbourhood of his own territories, for which reason he fomented a conspiracy which had been formed against the new sovereign, assisted his subjects in expelling him, and finally took up arms to support Tigranes, his more popular successor.

An army sent against the Parthians.

Augustus was disconcerted at this resolute conduct on the part of the enemy. He was unwilling to embroil his people in a new war; but as it was a maxim of policy with him never to brook an insult offered by a neighbouring nation, he considered himself as placed, by the daring behaviour of the Parthians, under the necessity of inflicting upon them a severe chastisement. With this view he resolved to send an army into Armenia, the command of which he entrusted to his son Caius, a youth of nineteen, assisted by M. Lollius, an officer whose cunning greatly exceeded his military talents. The emperor took leave of the young general in these remarkable words: "My son, I wish you the valour of Scipio, the popularity of Pompey, and my own fortune"—a paternal benediction of which no part was realized.

Treaty between the Romans and Parthians.

The throne of Parthia was now filled by a grandson of Orodes, who, like his father, had stained his accession to royalty by the horrid guilt of parricide. This younger Phraates was exceedingly haughty and imperious, assuming to himself the lofty title of King of Kings, while he employed towards Augustus no higher an epithet than that of Cæsar. But the approach of Caius at the head of a powerful army, subdued his pride, and disposed him to listen to an accommodation. He met the Roman general on an island in the Euphrates, where the terms of a treaty were negotiated, and the limits of their respective dominions amicably determined; on which occasion the perfidy of Lollius was exposed to Caius by the Parthian, who appears to have become acquainted with his avaricious dealings and traitorous intentions.[1] Falling into disgrace, he escaped the punishment due to treachery by committing suicide.

Caius proceeds into Armenia.

The protection of the Parthians being withdrawn from the usurper of the Armenian throne, that prince found himself unable to oppose the Romans, and therefore had recourse to entreaty; and as Artabases, whom he had supplanted, was dead, he imagined that, in the absence of every other lawful competitor, he would be allowed to retain the crown. But the views of Caius were directed to a different object, and he forthwith made known his determination

[1] Suet. *Tiber.*

that Tigranes should be stripped of the sovereignty. The pretensions of either party came now to be decided by arms; and the Roman camp was accordingly moved into Armenia, where the usurper had collected all his forces, and assembled his remaining allies. The son of Augustus, more courageous than prudent, pushed the enemy to a battle, in which he exposed his person with so little caution, that he received a severe wound, the consequences of which soon proved fatal. But death did not overtake him until he had fully realized the objects of the expedition. Tigranes was deposed and reduced to an obscure condition; and the Armenian crown was given to Ariobarzanes, a Mede by birth, and an avowed adherent of the Roman ascendancy. Caius, whom the anxiety of his father had induced to set out on his return to Rome, died at Limyrum, in Lycia—leaving Augustus without a male heir to the succession of that imperial power which it had cost him so much toil, and so many sacrifices of friendship and principle, to attain.[1]

B.C. 2. Tigranes is deposed.

Caius is wounded and dies.

It was not till about seventeen years after the death of Caius that the peace of the eastern provinces was again interrupted. In the meantime, indeed, the Parthians had set aside Phraates the Younger, in order to make way for Orodes, a prince who derived his descent from the Arsacidæ, and who, after a short elevation, fell a victim to the caprice or indignation of his barbarian subjects. Being now without a king altogether, and having exhausted their strength and rage in a bloody civil war, they turned their thoughts to the sons of the elder Phraates, who had been confided by that sovereign to the care of Augustus. With this view they sent to Rome an embassy, composed of the chief men of Parthia, to request that Vonones, the eldest of the royal youths, might be sent back into his native country, where they had prepared for him an easy accession to the crown of his fathers.[2] The Roman emperor, desirous to place on the throne a monarch who had imbibed the maxims of civilized life, dismissed the grandson of Phraates, with many expressions of affection, laden with valuable presents, hoping that the relations of peace and amity between Rome and the Parthian and Syrian provincials would thereby be confirmed and perpetuated.

Vonones returns to Parthia. A.D. 16.

But the ardour with which the barbarians received their new king soon gave way to the feelings of suspicion and contempt with which his foreign education inspired them. They reproached themselves with having sent to Rome for a sovereign who knew not how to exercise authority over a free and magnanimous people, and of having thereby converted the dominions of the Arsacidæ into a province of the Roman empire. They asked each other, whether it was worthy of those who had slain Crassus and repulsed M. Antonius, destroying their armies and capturing their standards, to reverence as their

[1] Velleius Paterculus, ii. 102. Suet. *August.*
[2] Joseph. *Antiq.* xviii. 3.

A.D. 16. king a slave who had studied the arts of a sycophant at the court of Cæsar! A youthful prince, who ought to be constantly on horseback, exercising his warlike Parthians, or pursuing the wild beasts of the desert, was seen conversing with learned Greeks on philosophy and literature, indolently reposing in a carriage, or indulging in the luxurious gratifications of the banquet. His gentle manners and affable address were in their eyes the strongest proofs of a degenerated nature; and as his virtues and infirmities were entirely new to them, they hated equally what was laudable, and what was deserving of censure.[1]

His unpopularity.

The discontents of barbarians are seldom confined to words. The Parthians prepared their bows, and mounted their horses; and sending to Media for Artabanus, a member of their royal house, they made to him an offer of their crown, their allegiance, and their services. The adherents of Vonones met the disaffected in the field of battle, and in the first engagement gained a considerable advantage over them; but in a subsequent action the insurgents not only retrieved their loss, but entirely defeated the army which supported the interests of Rome, and compelled the king to seek an asylum in Armenia.

And dethronement by Artabanus.

As the throne in the latter country happened to be vacant by the death of Ariobarzanes, who had been raised to the sovereignty by Caius Cæsar, Vonones, who had the blood and rank of a monarch, was invited by the Armenian nobles, to become their head. But the policy of Artabanus required that his late rival should be removed to a greater distance from his native territory. He therefore waged war with Armenia; and as Vonones received no support from Tiberius, who was eager to avoid a rupture with the Parthians, he was obliged to yield to his inauspicious fortune, and to accept a retreat among the Romans, in the province of Syria. Silanus Criticus, the pro-consul, was instructed to give him the external homage due to a sovereign prince; but Vonones soon felt his condition to be nothing more than an honourable captivity, and that he was reserved by his ambitious protectors, as a fit instrument to promote their own views, should the course of events afford an opportunity.

Vonones finds an asylum in Syria.

The throne of Armenia was filled by Artabanus, who placed on it his own son Orodes. But when Germanicus was sent into the East, A.D. 18, he found that the son of the Parthian king had abdicated, or was expelled, and that the people were willing to receive a ruler from his hands. Complying with their inclinations, he raised to the royal authority Zeno, son of Polemon, who under the protection of the Romans, had reigned over Pontus and Cilicia. Zeno, from his childhood, had shown a predilection for the manners and

Zeno King of Armenia.

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* ii. 2.

customs of the Armenians; and he was accordingly crowned by Germanicus, in the city of Artaxata, with the applause and concurrence of the whole nation. His new subjects, when they did him homage, addressed him by the name of Artaxias, an appellation which had become associated in their minds with the memory of some of their best and most fortunate kings.[1] A.D. 16.

During these events, ambassadors arrived from Artabanus, the king of the Parthians, professing a desire to renew his alliance with the Romans, and to strengthen the bonds of amity which continued to subsist between the two nations. He even requested an interview with Germanicus, and declared that, for the sake of doing homage to the son of the Roman emperor, he would advance to meet him as far as to the banks of the Euphrates. But the motive which led to these demonstrations of friendship, was not altogether disinterested. He began the conference by desiring that Vonones, whom he had supplanted, should be removed from Syria, lest he should have an opportunity of corresponding with the Parthian lords, and thereby of disturbing the peace of the kingdom. He represented that the interests of Rome were deeply concerned in the tranquillity of Parthia, and entreated that a person so unfit to govern the undisciplined warriors of that extensive country, should not be allowed, by the proximity of his residence, to plunge it again into all the miseries of civil discord. Negociation of Artabanus with Germanicus.

Germanicus lent an ear to this plausible reasoning, though he could not fail to perceive the selfish grounds upon which it proceeded. He consented to remove Vonones from Syria into Cilicia, where he should be detained under such restraint, as would effectually prevent him from embroiling the affairs of his former kingdom. History has preserved no other incidents connected with the interview of Artabanus and the Roman commander: we may therefore finish the brief biography of the ill-fated son of Phraates, whose exile to a more distant land appears to have been the sole object of royal solicitude. We are informed, by Tacitus, that, in the course of the following year, the sense of his captivity began to press heavily upon him; and that having corrupted his guards at Pompeiopolis, he attempted to escape into Armenia. His object, it is conjectured, was to make an appeal to the generosity of the Scythian monarch, to whom he was related, and thereafter to attempt the recovery of his kingdom, by the force of arms; but his flight being discovered, he was speedily pursued and overtaken by a Roman officer, at the head of a party of horse, and soon afterwards assassinated by Remmius, a general, to whose superintendence he had been committed.[2] Germanicus sends Vonones into Cilicia. Flight And death of Vonones.

After the lapse of seventeen years, Artabanus was still on the Parthian throne, but no longer either beloved or obeyed by his

[1] Joseph. *Antiq.* xviii. 5. Tacit. *Ann.* ii, 56.
[2] Tacit. *Ann.* ii. 68. Dion Cassius, lviii.

A.D. 16. Artabanus defies the Romans.

capricious and restless subjects. As long as he stood in awe of the Romans, he was distinguished not only by a punctual observance of his public engagements, by great mildness, and an equal administration of justice. But these virtues did not outlive the circumstances from which they had sprung. Elated with the success which attended his arms against his immediate neighbours, and contemning the timid policy of Tiberius, which increased with his advancing age, he began to act with insolence towards the Roman government, and with cruelty towards his subjects. The throne of Armenia having become empty, by the death of Artaxias, whom Germanicus had raised to it under such happy auspices, the Parthian made himself master of the whole kingdom, and placed the sceptre in the hand of his son Arsaces. Not content with this glaring infraction of his treaty, he demanded from the emperor all the treasure which Vonones was understood to have carried with him into Syria; and in menacing letters to the Senate, he made known his determination to extend his authority to the ancient limits of the Persian and Macedonian empires; for that, as he looked upon himself as the successor of Cyrus and Alexander, he thought it not too much to claim the possessions of those illustrious conquerors.

A plot formed against him. A.D. 35.

While he was thus making an ideal conquest of all Asia, his nobles, having at their head Sinnaces, a man of birth and wealth, and Abdus, an eunuch, had already matured a plot to dethrone him. For this purpose they sent a deputation to Rome, to request that one of the sons of Phraates, who still continued to live in that capital, might be permitted to appear in Parthia, and relieve his country from the thraldom to which it had been reduced. This proposal coincided entirely with the cautious administration of Tiberius, who was more desirous to effect his objects among foreign States, by dexterous artifice, than by the expensive and hazardous operations of open war. He, therefore, very readily granted the request of the Parthian malcontents, and sent Phraates home with a retinue and splendour worthy of his birth, as well as of the high honour for which he was designed.[1]

His rage against Tiberius.

Artabanus, upon hearing the measures which were adopted against him, gave vent to his rage in an indignant letter addressed to Tiberius. In this, he reproached him with the most atrocious crimes, and advised him to satisfy the indignation of mankind by a voluntary death. This expression of resentment did not delay the execution of the plan which had been formed against him; but the demise of Phraates, which took place soon afterwards in Syria, paralyzed for a moment the exertions of the Romans, and disconcerted the plan of the conspirators. Abdus, the eunuch, had fallen by poison, and Sinnaces, upon whom devolved the chief support of the conspiracy,

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 31. Dion Cassius, *ut suprà.*

consented to practise with his sovereign, that rank dissimulation of which the latter intended that he should in due time become the victim. A.D. 35.

Tiberius did not relinquish his intentions of setting a new king on the throne of Parthia. He selected Tiridates, who was probably a grandson of the elder Phraates, to occupy the dignity which had been set apart for his uncle; and, in order still farther to distract the attention of Artabanus, he revived the ancient claims of Rome to the paramount authority in Armenia, and nominated Mithridates, a brother of the King of Iberia, to the exercise of the sovereign power in that country. It was in this latter quarter that the blow was first struck, A.D. 35. Mithridates, assisted by Pharasmanes and his Iberians, invaded Armenia, and took possession of the capital; while Artabanus, learning that his son Arsaces was murdered, sent a strong army to revenge his death, and to deliver his kingdom from the complete and disgraceful subjugation with which it was threatened. The invaders made preparations for defending the ground which they had taken, and for realising the object which had induced them to take up arms. Both sides enlisted foreign troops, and drew to their standards the mercenary but warlike soldiers of Albania and Sarmatia, being perfectly aware that the crown of Armenia, and the independence of Parthia, depended upon the issue of the battle in which they were about to engage.[1] A new king sent to Parthia and Armenia.



[Mithridates, King of Armenia.—*Visconti Icon. Greeque.*]

Orodes commanded the troops of his father, Artabanus. Unequal in number to the enemy, he repeatedly declined an appeal to arms; hoping that the arrival of his auxiliaries would throw the fortune of war so decidedly into his hands, that he should then fight with the certainty of success. But the impatience of his Parthians obliged him to depart from this wise resolution. In the engagement which ensued, the Iberian infantry proved more than a match for the irregular cavalry by which they were opposed; but the victory continued doubtful till the two generals met, and encountered each other in single combat, when Orodes was wounded, and fell. The report of his loss carried dismay into the ranks of the Parthians, and decided the conflict in favour of their enemies. The Iberians remained masters of the field, and thus gave to the nomination Wars in Armenia and defeat of Orodes, son of Artabanus.

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 33. Dion Cassius, lix. Joseph. *Antiq.*

A.D. 35. of Mithridates, that powerful sanction which a successful sword never fails to confer.

Artabanus himself defeated.

Exasperated by the death of his sons, and the defeat of his army, Artabanus resolved to assume the command of his troops in person. He immediately advanced against the conquerors, determined to hazard a battle, and to recover the reputation of Parthian valour; but having no foot soldiers to oppose to the disciplined infantry of Pharasmanes, his light horse could make no impression on the Iberian lines, and were finally compelled to betake themselves to flight. Artabanus, however, would not yet have relinquished his claims upon Armenia, had not Vitellius, who commanded the Roman legions in Syria, made demonstrations of his intention to invade Mesopotamia with a large army, and to avenge the cause of the emperor upon the richest provinces of the Parthian dominions. He therefore withdrew his troops from the contest, which now appeared hopeless, and left to Mithridates the secure and peaceful possession of the Armenian throne.[1]

Flies into Hyrcania.

The failure of his arms against Pharasmanes, soon led to a more serious overthrow. The disaffected grandees renewed their conspiracy; and Sinnaces having induced his father, Abdageses, the royal treasurer, to join them, gave the signal for a revolt, which instantly became general. Artabanus, who knew resistance to be vain, took refuge among the Hyrcanians, where he resolved to watch the current of events, and to avail himself of the first indication of returning affection on the part of his capricious subjects, who were always most disposed to be kind to those who had become the greatest victims of their injustice.[2]

The path being thus laid open, Tiridates met with no obstacle to the gratification of his ambition. Vitellius, at the head of the Roman legions, accompanied him over the Euphrates, on a bridge of boats, and introduced him into Mesopotamia, where they were immediately received by Ornospades, the governor of that province, attended by a strong body of cavalry. The army of the conspirators, in like manner, added to his strength and dignity, while the acquisition of the public treasures enabled the new king to support his rank, and to reward his adherents.

Tiridates raised to the throne of Parthia.

Before he left Tiridates to pursue the duties of his new office, Vitellius thought it expedient to address him in the presence of the Parthian lords, reminding him that he was the grandson of Phraates, and a pupil of the Cæsars, and exhorting him to act agreeably to such a birth and such an education. Having, in like manner, recommended to the nobles obedience, and a faithful observance of all their engagements, he withdrew his legions into Syria.

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 36. [2] Ibid. *ubi suprà.* Velleius Paterculus, ii.

The education at the court of Cæsar, of which Vitellius boasted so highly, proved in this case, as in others, the ruin of the prince upon whom it had been bestowed. At first, indeed, Tiridates was well received: the cities opened their gates, and the people flocked to meet him with the most joyful acclamations. But disaffection was already deeply rooted in the minds of several powerful chiefs; and it soon became manifest, that though the nation in general detested the cruelties of their late ruler, there was still a strong party among the nobles whose hopes were connected with his return to power. Accordingly, when the coronation of the new king was proposed, Phraates and Hiero, the governors of two extensive provinces, requested that the ceremony might be delayed—affecting a great desire to be present on so solemn an occasion, and to do honour to the commencement of a reign which promised to be so happy and advantageous. Others concealed their factious spirit under different pretences; and Tiridates found that whenever the crown should be at length placed on his head, he would have to seek for the means of giving it strength and dignity in the patronage, or in the arms of the Roman people. His first public undertaking afforded an opportunity for revolt. While he was engaged in an useless attempt to reduce a fortress, into which Artabanus had thrown his treasures, and the defenceless part of his family, a deputation of the chiefs waited upon the exiled monarch, and invited him to resume his throne, which, they maintained, was vilely dishonoured by the effeminacy and puerile habits which distinguished his successor.[1]

A.D. 35.

Is well received at first.

But afterwards deserted.

Artabanus, who saw that their hatred of himself was more than equalled by their contempt for Tiridates, made no hesitation to obey their summons; and he had already advanced into the heart of Parthia, before his rival was informed of the danger with which he was surrounded. Despairing of success in the field, the pupil of the Cæsars listened to the advice of Abdageses, who represented to him that the only chance which now remained of retrieving his affairs was to retire beyond the Tigris, and wait the approach of his allies, the Armenians and Elymeans, and especially of the Roman legions under the warlike Vitellius. But his troops had too little confidence in his talents, or in his fortune, to share with him the hazards of a retreat. They deserted his standards in such numbers, that he soon resigned the intention of fighting for his crown; preferring an asylum in Syria, and the society of Greeks and Romans, to the regal honours which had been conferred upon him by a barbarous nation, and which it was impossible to retain without divesting himself of every mark of civilization, and almost every feeling of humanity. He left to Artabanus the peaceable posses-

Artabanus restored to the throne.

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* vi 43. Dion Cassius, lix.

A.D. 37. sion of a throne, from which new troubles were, in a short time, to expel him.[1]

And craves an interview with Vitellius the governor of Syria.

In the beginning of the reign of Caligula, about the thirty-seventh year of our era, we find that this king of Parthia solicited an interview with Vitellius, the governor of Syria—professing great respect for the young emperor, whose abilities and character he overrated as extravagantly as he had undervalued those of Tiberius. A treaty was established between the Parthians and Romans, much to the advantage of the latter; on which occasion Artabanus burnt incense before the statues of Augustus and Caius, paid obeisance to the legionary standards, and delivered one of his sons as an hostage into the hands of Vitellius.[2]

Is again deposed, and a second time reinstated.

We have already hinted that Artabanus did not enjoy a long or uninterrupted tranquillity. Josephus informs us of a second revolution, which drove him once more from his dominions, when he was forced to fly for shelter to Izates, king of Adiabenum. It is added that Izates received him hospitably, and, moreover, succeeded so well in his negotiations with the Parthian rebels, that they consented to submit once more to the government of their exiled monarch. But the happiness occasioned by this renewed flow of good fortune was not of long duration. Artabanus died soon after his restoration, leaving his precarious dignity to his son Gotarzes.[3]

Dies and is succeeded by Gotarzes.

This prince, who appears to have inherited his father's cruelty and suspicion, stained the sovereign power by the murder of his brother, his sister-in-law, and nephew.[4] The Parthian nobility, alarmed by such instances of atrocious tyranny, and fearing that a similar fate might await a number of their own body, concerted measures for an immediate revolt; at the same time sending for Bardanes, another brother of the king, remarkable for his valour and activity, and who, it is conjectured, was, at the period in question, the governor of Armenia. Bardanes accepted the invitation with so much alacrity, that he is said to have ridden more than a hundred leagues in two days, and to have surprised his brother before he had time to prepare for resistance. The conqueror was immediately acknowledged by the neighbouring Satraps; but, instead of following up his advantage by pursuing Gotarzes, and intimidating his adherents, he wasted his time in an unavailing attempt to take Seleucia, on the Tigris, a strong town, and well supplied with provisions and arms. Before it was possible to effect his object Gotarzes was in the field, at the head of a large army of Hyrcanians and other barbarians, who had flocked to his standard from the expectation of a liberal pay, and

Gotarzes is deposed by Bardanes his brother. A.D. 47.

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 45. Velleius Paterculus, ii. Dion, *ubi suprà.*
[2] Suet. *Calig.* 14. Joseph. *Antiq.*
[3] Joseph. *Antiq.* xx. 2.
[4] Tacit. *Ann.* xi. 8.

who hoped to find, in the spoils of the vanquished, a full recompense for the toil and danger of battle. A.D. 47.

A bloody conflict was apprehended before the pretensions of the two brothers could be determined, or their partizans induced to enter into any negociation. But the course of events assumed a different direction. Gotarzes, discovering that treachery and disaffection mixed with the counsels of both armies, revealed the fact to Bardanes: upon this an interview took place, at which the sons of Artabanus, repressing their mutual grievances, pledged their faith to each other, by a solemn oath, that they would in the first instance inflict a signal chastisement upon their common enemies, and then refer to arbitration their respective pretensions to the Parthian throne. The umpires determined in favour of Bardanes, who was forthwith confirmed in his authority; while his elder brother, in order to remove all cause of suspicion and uneasiness, made haste to withdraw himself into the forests of Hyrcania.[1]

The brothers refer their claims to arbitration. Bardanes preferred.

The horrors of civil war being thus amicably prevented, the king of Parthia directed his first cares towards the recovery of Armenia, which had been for some time in the hands of Mithridates the Iberian. It was in the reign of Tiberius, as we have already seen, that this new dynasty was elevated to the throne of Artaxata, and chiefly, too, by means of the Roman legions under the governor of Syria. Mithridates, it is obvious, at the same time, had sustained a short interruption of liberty and power, inasmuch as he was at Rome a prisoner, in the reign of Caligula, and was sent back into the East, soon after the accession of Claudius. On his arrival there, he found his territory in the hands of the Parthians, who, taking advantage of his absence, had subdued the Armenians, and reduced them once more to the condition of vassals and tributaries. He was accordingly obliged to wait for a favourable opportunity to assert his rights, which did not occur till the civil war broke out between Gotarzes and Bardanes, when, assisted by the Romans and Iberians, he attacked Demonax, the Parthian governor, defeated him in repeated engagements, and finally drove him out of the country, which immediately returned to its allegiance.

Bardanes meditates war against Armenia.

Bardanes could not brook this diminution of his territorial power; but, availing himself of the peaceable condition to which his kingdom was restored, he entered upon preparations for carrying war into Armenia, and for reannexing its provinces to the Parthian crown. Nor can there be any doubt that he would have succeeded in his undertaking, had not the Romans commanded him to refrain, and to permit their ally to enjoy his dominions undisturbed. Vibius Marsus, the governor of Syria, was instructed to give him notice that, if he attempted to annoy Mithridates, he must expect

But is prevented by the Romans

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xi. 9. Dion Cassius, lix.

A.D. 47. an active war with the senate and people of Rome, in whose name the emperor was still accustomed to speak, when he wished to give weight and authority to his menaces. Bardanes was not in a condition to brave the displeasure of the Romans. His brother having repented of the facility with which he had surrendered the crown, and being invited by some powerful chiefs, to leave his place of retreat, had already at command a formidable army, with which he was about to advance to the frontiers.

Gotarzes returns and claims the crown.

On this occasion the rival claims of the two princes were decided, by an appeal to arms. A bloody battle was fought on the banks of a river, which Tacitus calls Erindes; where Bardanes, gaining a decisive victory, thought it not enough to pursue and disperse the troops to which he had been opposed, but, following his advantages, made considerable conquests towards Hyrcania, and subdued several nations which, till that period, were strangers even to the Parthian name. Nor was the tide of his success checked in its current till his own people, fatigued by long marches in a desert land, and impatient to revisit their homes, made their murmurs meet his ears, and suggested to him the expediency of retracing his steps. Yielding to wishes, which, when strongly expressed, were always regarded as the limits of prerogative to Parthian kings, Bardanes satisfied himself with erecting monuments of his victorious career, on the banks of several distant streams, the names of which, as they are differently written, have failed to determine accurately their geographical situation. He was killed soon after his return, by a band of conspirators, while engaged in the amusement of hunting. These chieftains declared that they could no longer endure the pride and haughtiness with which the success of his arms had inspired him, nor the uncontrollable ascendancy to which he had risen by the destruction of so many enemies and rivals.[1]

A battle is fought, in which Bardanes is successful.

The death of Bardanes gave new life to the hopes of his vanquished brother. Many were inclined to favour his views, and his restoration; but others, who had not yet forgotten his cruelties, gave their voices for Meherdates, son of Vonones, and grandson of Phraates, who was at that time at Rome, as a hostage. Gotarzes, who had the advantage of being present, carried the election; but instead of endeavouring to remove the bad impressions which his former tyrannical conduct had created, he continued to treat his subjects harshly and unjustly, and thereby excited against himself their warmest indignation. The friends of Meherdates found means to send to Rome, representing the miserable condition to which the Parthian people were reduced, and begging to have that prince

On the death of Bardanes, Gotarzes re-ascends the throne.

A.D. 48. nominated by the senate, to fill the throne of the Arsacidæ. They informed the Romans of the extent of their sufferings under Gotarzes;

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xi. 10.

that he spared neither brothers, relations, nor strangers; that he murdered women with their husbands, and children with their fathers, while he himself, sunk in idleness and effeminacy, defeated in all his wars, and despised by all good men, endeavoured to conceal his cowardice and shame, by perpetrating deeds of the most wanton barbarity. They gave assurance that they had no intention to lift the standard of rebellion against their royal house, nor to shake off their allegiance to the descendants of Arsaces; on the contrary, they were come to request that a prince of that ancient and revered stock might be set over them, in the room of the tyrant Gotarzes, who had become insupportable to the nobles, and to the people. Our nation, they concluded, has long been added to your empire; and it behoves you to assist allies, whose forces might perhaps rival your own in number and in bravery, but who, out of respect, willingly allow you the pre-eminence. We give you the sons of our kings as hostages, with the view that when we happen to be ill governed, we may have recourse to the emperor and senate, and receive from them sovereigns trained under their wisdom, used to their manners, and therefore more worthy to reign.[1]

A.D. 48. The Parthians seek a new king at Rome.

Claudius, who was present at this conference, took upon himself to answer the Parthian deputies. He began by extolling the greatness of the Roman power, the generosity of the maxims upon which his government was conducted, and the value which he put upon the sincere homage which they had just rendered to the majesty of the Senate. Comparing himself to Augustus, he assured them that their just request should be complied with; and, turning to Meherdates, he entreated him not to imagine that he was called to govern a high-spirited people, as a master rules over his domestic slaves. Let the Parthians find in you a protector and a fellow-citizen; and consider that your justice and clemency will render you so much the more respected by them, as these are virtues unknown to barbarians.[2] He likewise admonished the deputies to exercise forbearance towards their kings, for that frequent changes in this respect, were always attended with hurtful consequences to a State. Be not surprised, he exclaimed, that I give you this disinterested advice. Rome, satiated with glory and conquests, has attained such a pitch of superiority, that she is glad to see peace, happiness, and confidence, prevail in all other nations.

Meherdates is sent to Parthia

The care of conducting the new king to the frontiers of his country, was intrusted to Caius Cassius, the governor of Syria. Cassius, who was a prudent and very able commander, invited the Parthian nobility to meet him at Zeugma, and delivered to them their youthful sovereign, addressing to him at the same time, the

And enters into a war with Gotarzes.

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xii. 11.

[2] Ibid. *Ut non dominationem et servos, sed rectorem et cives cogitaret; clementiamque ac justitiam, quanto ignara barbaris, tanto toleratiora capesseret.*

A.D. 48. following judicious observations: that it was characteristic of all people in a low state of civilization to be very ardent at the beginning of an enterprise, but that if they were not immediately led into action, they soon cooled, and the zeal which animated them in favour of the cause that they may have happened to have espoused, was apt to change into perfidy and treason. He advised him, therefore, not to lose a moment, but to advance against the enemy with the utmost despatch.

Meherdates unfortunately did not listen to this sage admonition. He was young and fond of pleasure, and could not allow himself to believe that the moment he became a king, it behoved him to enter upon a system of mortification. He accepted of entertainments, and indulged in royal pageantry, while Gotarzes, in the meantime, was making the greatest exertions to meet him in the field of battle on more than equal terms. Carrhenes, the general of Meherdates, prevailed upon him at length to join the army; and, crossing the Tigris, they reduced Nineveh, a city which had risen upon the ruins of that destroyed by Arbaces, and took the celebrated Arbela, where the sceptre of Persia was wrested from the hand of Darius. Being reinforced by the junction of a body of troops under Izates of Adiabenum, they proceeded in search of Gotarzes, eager to bring his pretensions to the determination of a battle.

The deposed monarch, whose military strength was inferior to that of his rival, remained on the opposite side of the river, to which Tacitus gives the following name Corma, and continued to decline the challenge by which his caution had been repeatedly insulted. Meanwhile he practised, by means of his agents, on the wavering fidelity of Abgarus the Edessan, and of Izates, who appears never to have been hearty in the cause of his new ally; and at length succeeded in seducing these barbarians from the camp of Meherdates, to augment the number of his own. This prince, fearing a still more extensive desertion, pressed the enemy to battle more vigorously than ever; and Gotarzes, whose courage recent events had materially increased, did not think it expedient any longer to decline it. The two armies, accordingly, were led forth to action, when a most bloody and obstinate conflict ensued. The brave Carrhenes is said to have performed prodigies of valour, and to have cut down or put to flight all who presented themselves before his disciplined ranks; but allowing his ardour to carry him too far in pursuit of the fugitives, he was ultimately surrounded and slain. With this able general perished all hopes of Meherdates; who, trusting to a traitor, was soon after sold into the hands of Gotarzes, a prisoner, and in chains. The conqueror, indeed, saved his life; but, ordering his ears to be cut off, he condemned him to a miserable captivity.[1]

Meherdates is defeated. A.D. 49.

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xii. 14. Joseph. *Antiq.* xviii.

Gotarzes did not long enjoy the fruits of his victory. According to Tacitus, he sank under the infirmities of nature; but Josephus relates, that he again provoked a conspiracy among his subjects, whose resentment brought to a close at once his reign and his life. He was succeeded by Vonones, the governor of Media, who is supposed to have been his brother. The annals of this latter prince are short and undistinguished by any great events; and, in truth, he is only known to history as having transmitted the Parthian sceptre from Gotarzes to his own son, whose name was Vologeses. A.D. 49. Gotarzes succeeded by Vonones and Vologeses.

Soon after this youthful monarch had ascended the throne, a revolution took place in Armenia; of which the Parthians determined so far to avail themselves as to revive their former claims to the crown of that country. Mithridates, raised to the sovereignty by the arms of his brother Pharasmanes, and supported by the influence of Rome, had, during many years, exercised his authority among the Armenians in the utmost harmony and esteem. Nor was his repose at length disturbed either by internal disaffection or by foreign hostility. His troubles, on the contrary, arose altogether from the ambition of a nephew, the eldest son of the king of Iberia; who, impatient of the condition of a subject, had resolved to supplant either his father or his uncle. Pharasmanes, it is said, in order to find employment for the restless spirit of this young man, whose name was Rhadamistus, encouraged his views upon Armenia; reminding him that he himself had driven out the Parthians and given it to Mithridates, and that, therefore, he, his son, was only claiming a right which might not improperly be conceived to belong to the elder branch of their family. The crafty Iberian, however, concluded by exhorting his son to exhaust all the resources of intrigue, before he should bear arms against so near a relative, and a distinguished member of the royal house. Claims of Parthia to the crown of Armenia.

The artful youth took up his residence at the court of Mithridates, under pretence that he had been compelled to leave his father's presence, on account of a quarrel, originating in the wiles of his step-mother; and being well received at Artaxata, where no one suspected his base intentions, he found means to sow the seeds of disaffection, and even to form a party sufficiently strong to encourage him to adopt the ulterior measures, of which he had never for a moment lost sight. Supplied with troops from Iberia, he attacked his uncle, who having had no reason to suspect this horrible treachery, was totally destitute of all means of defence, and had scarcely time to secure a retreat to the strong castle of Gorneas, in which the Romans usually maintained a garrison. The arts of Rhadamistus against his uncle Mithridates.

The siege of such a place, conducted by Iberians, must have been protracted sufficiently long to give time to the governor of Syria to relieve the garrison, and restore Mithridates, had not Who is taken and put to death.

A.D. 51. Cælius Pollio, who commanded in Gorneas, insisted on a capitulation, and delivered up the fugitive king into the hands of his unprincipled nephew. Rhadamistus, after practising much vile hypocrisy, and violating the most sacred oaths, at length gave orders to deprive his uncle of life; and having, in this way, removed all obstacles to the fulfilment of his nefarious scheme, sat down on the throne of Armenia, in defiance alike of the Romans, who protested against his elevation, and of the Parthians, who were already preparing their arms to expel him from it.[1]

Conduct of the Romans.

The conduct of the usurper could not fail to awaken the resentment, and call forth the remonstrances of the Roman governor in Syria. Numidius Quadratus, therefore, held a council of the chief officers of the army, to consult what, in such circumstances, ought to be done. But the virtuous pride of the citizens of Rome, had already given way to low maxims of policy, which, placing, a higher value upon interest than upon reputation, led them to find a solace for their injured honour, in the weakness which civil war spread among their enemies. It was therefore resolved, that the government of Syria should connive at the ruin of their ally, and the accession of an usurper in Armenia; and that the pro-consul in Cappadocia, should carry his complaisance so far as to witness the ceremony of the coronation, and thereby give the sanction of the Roman name to one of the most flagrant acts of perfidy that had ever disgraced the ambition of an Eastern tyrant. To counteract, in some degree, the effects of this unworthy proceeding, Quadratus sent one of his lieutenants, Helvidius Priscus, at the head of a legion, with orders to vindicate the Roman character, and to redress all the just complaints of the Armenian people. But the Parthians were already on their march to chastise the insolence of Rhadamistus, and to deprive him of a throne which he had so iniquitously obtained; and accordingly, when Priscus found that he was likely to come into collision with the army of Vologeses, with whom the Romans wished to avoid all pretext for war, he suggested the propriety of being recalled into Syria.

An attempt to place Tiridates on the throne of Armenia.

It was the intention of the Parthian king to place his brother Tiridates on the throne of Armenia; for which purpose he led against Rhadamistus a chosen body of troops, before the latter could materially strengthen his interests among the nobles, or reconcile to his violent accession, the affections of the people. The barbarous Iberians, unacquainted with regular warfare, fled in consternation upon the first approach of the Parthian horsemen; and had not the severities of an early winter favoured their desultory mode of fighting, and created want and sickness in the camp of Vologeses, the conquest of Armenia would have rewarded the labours of the

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xii. 44. Joseph. *Antiq.* 20. Velleius Paterculus. Dion Cassius, lx.

first campaign. The Parthians retired, and Rhadamistus returned A.D. 51.
to his capital, where he gave vent to his suspicions and revenge, in acts of the most savage cruelty, and in threatenings which seemed to compromise the lives and property of all his subjects. Alarmed and incensed, the populace of Artaxata accomplished what the Parthians had begun; for, attacking the palace in which the despot resided, they barely allowed him time to save himself by flight, and to carry with him his favourite wife, Zenobia, mounted on a swift horse. Zenobia was far advanced in pregnancy, but her dread of the pursuing enemy, and her attachment to her husband, induced her for a long time, to support the sufferings to which she was exposed, by the rapidity and violent motion of the horse. Overcome with pain and fatigue, she at length entreated Rhadamistus to save himself, and to free her, with his own hand, by an honourable death, from the disgrace of captivity. Distracted by love and jealousy, equally fearful of losing her himself, and of her falling into the possession of another, Rhadamistus awhile embraced and consoled her, and hesitated to commit the dreadful act which she persisted to solicit; at length, drawing his scimitar, he struck the blow, and threw her into the Araxes, in order that even her lifeless body might escape from captivity. He then again put his horse at full speed, and reached his asylum in Iberia. Meantime Zenobia floated on the quiet waters, and was picked up, with signs of remaining life, by some neighbouring shepherds. Her beauty and the dignity of her form, assured them she was no vulgar prize, and they bound her wounds, and watched her till they were healed. On learning her name and condition, they bore her to Artaxata, where Tiridates received her with that courtesy and distinction which was justly due to the nobility of her birth, her courage, and her conjugal fidelity.[1]

The Romans interfere to prevent it.

The particulars of the war which followed between Rhadamistus and the Parthians, are not any where preserved in history; but it is ascertained, that upon the accession of Nero to the throne of the Cæsars, intelligence was conveyed to Rome which left it no longer doubtful that the generals of Vologeses had finally succeeded in making thenselves masters of Armenia, as well as in securing the crown to Tiridates, the brother of their sovereign. To permit that kingdom to remain under the direct influence of Parthia, was contrary to one of the leading maxims of Roman policy, as applicable to its provincial government, on which account, the Ministers of the Roman emperor advised him to make known to the Senate his fixed determination to augment his legions, and to despatch without delay an able commander into Syria, with the view of recovering in the Armenian states that wonted ascendancy, which had been found

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xii. 51.

A.D. 51. Corbulo appointed to command in the Parthian war. A.D. 54. indispensable to the safety of the eastern dominions. Nero gave much satisfaction by making choice of Corbulo as the general who was to serve against the Parthians; while he afforded proof of similar wisdom and activity, by sending instructions, in the meantime, to Numidius Quadratus to complete the number of his cohorts, and to put his whole force in motion towards the frontiers of Armenia. In like manner, he forwarded requisitions to such of the tributary kings as were in a condition to co-operate with the governor of Syria; of which number were Antiochus, king of Commagena, and Agrippa the younger, whom Claudius had first made king of Chalcidica, in the room of his uncle Herod, and afterwards promoted to the extensive tetrarchies of Iturea and Abilænum. The same orders were given to Aristobulus, son of Herod, and to Sohemus; both of whom he had named kings, the one of the Lesser Armenia, and the other of Sophena.[1]

The war for which Nero made these judicious preparations, was prevented for a time by the revolt of Vardanes, the son of Vologeses—an event which compelled the Parthians to withdraw their army from Armenia, but without submitting to any formal relinquishment of their claims, either upon its crown or territory. The Roman Senate, meanwhile, willing to gratify their young emperor, decreed to him the honour of an Ovation; encouraged him to assume the Triumphal robe; and commanded that a statue of him should be erected in the Temple of Mars the Avenger, as large as that of the god of war himself.[2]

The Parthians give hostages, and profess to desire peace. As the campaign, for the success of which these demonstrations of joy were made, was in fact yet to be begun, Corbulo set out for the East at the head of such an army, as raised his command to an equality with that of Quadratus. The latter general could not conceal the uneasiness which the presence of his colleague created in his mind; and the first step which he took in the negotiation with Parthia, indicated his resolution to disown a divided authority, at least within the limits of his own government, and to retain all the honour and responsibility which had always attached to his high office. He sent an embassy to Vologeses, exhorting him to prefer peace to war; to give hostages; and to pay, as his predecessors had usually done, a proper respect and deference to the Roman people. The Parthian, either to gain time, or to get rid of certain suspicious individuals near his throne, made no hesitation to deliver as hostages some of the most illustrious persons belonging to the royal family; and these were immediately intrusted to the Centurion Justeius, who, on this occasion, had appeared on behalf of the governor Quadratus.

No sooner was Corbulo informed of what had taken place, than he sent Arrius Varus, the præfect of a cohort, to demand that the

[1] Joseph. *Antiq. Ann.* xx. 3, 5. Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. 7. Dion Cassius, lx.
[2] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. 8, 9.

hostages should be given in his name, and not in that of the governor of Syria. To avoid the indecency of a dispute before the eyes of strangers, Varus and Justeius agreed to leave the question to the decision of the hostages themselves, and of the Parthian envoys by whom they were accompanied. The preference was given to Corbulo—a slight at which Quadratus was greatly incensed, and which, moreover, seemed to threaten consequences so extremely detrimental to the public service, that Nero deemed it necessary to procure a decree of the Senate, setting forth in both their names, that in consequence of the important achievements performed by Corbulo and Quadratus, in common, the emperor's fasces should be crowned with laurel. Soon after this occurrence, the latter officer, whose period of government appears to have expired, was recalled to Rome, and the conduct of the Parthian war accordingly devolved altogether upon the more popular commander. A.D. 54.

War renewed.

Two years passed away in comparative tranquillity, but amidst active preparations for war. It was suggested by the Romans, that, in order to prevent the effusion of blood, Tiridates should consent to hold the Armenian crown from the emperor and Senate, and should disown all dependence upon the court of Parthia. Vologeses, whose pride opposed itself to this arrangement, would not treat with his powerful enemies on the ground of such a concession; and choosing rather to abide by the determination of arms, strained every nerve to meet the threatened invasion with means so fully adequate to the emergency, as would put the vaunted skill of Corbulo to a severe test.



[Tiridates.—*Visconti Icon. Grecque.*]

A.D. 58.

A Roman officer engages without permission, and is defeated.

The commencement of hostilities was signalized by an advantage on the part of Tiridates. A Roman officer, who commanded a body of auxiliaries, tempted by the prospect of an easy victory, disobeyed the orders of Corbulo, and fought before a sufficient number of troops had arrived to support his attack. He was defeated with considerable loss, and thereby not only occasioned a deep mortification to the proconsul, who saw the Roman eagles disgraced by a barbarian triumph, but also inspired the enemy with a degree of courage, which gave a formidable aspect to the character of the approaching war. Tiridates committed many outrages upon that party among the Armenians who were attached to the cause of Rome, ravaging their lands, and destroying their property; and it was not

A.D. 58. till Corbulo had appeared in full force at the head of his legions, that this Parthian robber took refuge in one of his strongest fortresses, and confessed the superiority of the enemy.[1]

Preparations of Corbulo.

To disarm the vengeance of the Romans, the Iberian king, Pharasmanes, put to death his son Rhadamistus, who had recently usurped the Armenian throne, and deposed his uncle, Mithridates, and was now co-operating with the governor of Syria against the brother of Vologes. Other chiefs of provinces likewise volunteered to signalize their fidelity to Rome, and their hatred of the Parthians; while an insurrection of the Hyrcanians occupied the arms of the latter so entirely, that Tiridates was obliged to trust in the meantime to his own resources, supplied by the confederated nobles of Armenia. In these circumstances, he attempted to delay the progress of the Romans by remonstrances and treaties; threatening, at one time, a coalition of all the Parthian states, and a catastrophe more fatal than that which annihilated the army of Crassus, and immediately afterwards proposing a conference, or suggesting the terms of an amicable accommodation.

He takes Artaxata and Tigranocerta.

At length Corbulo, after reducing several places of strength, advanced against Artaxata, the capital, which he took and burned to the ground. For this exploit, performed by his general, Nero received the name of *Imperator*, and was loaded with all the other honours which could gratify the vanity of a thoughtless young man; the Senate decreed public thanksgivings to the gods, and to the prince, triumphal arches, statues, and consulships for several years to come. But Corbulo, less anxious to share in these honours than to deserve them, prosecuted his victories in Armenia until he had taken Tigranocerta, and subdued all opposition to the authority of Rome. The most formidable enemies with which he had to contend were hunger and fatigue; the country being for the most part wild and uncultivated, and all its magazines having been destroyed by the partizans of Tiridates. The armies of Parthia scarcely ever appeared in the field. Vologeses left his brother to his fate; and at the end of two years the territory and the crown of Armenia were at the disposal of the conquerors.[2]

Tigranes made king of Armenia. A.D. 60.

Nor was it long before Nero determined to exercise the rights of victory and nominate a sovereign. The person he selected for this high honour was Tigranes, a descendant of Herod the Great, and of Archelaus, formerly king of Cappadocia. Tacitus speaks of him with very little respect; saying, that while he lived as a hostage at Rome, he was fawning, cringing, and remarkable for very low inclinations. His reception by the Armenians was by no means general or unanimous. They could not be induced to forget the claims of the valiant house of Arsaces, whose manly character threw into the shade the effeminate qualities of the degenerate Idumean; and the greater part

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. 36.

[2] Ibid. *Ann.* xiv. 24.

submitted to be ruled for a time by this contemptible monarch, only in order that they might be delivered from the scourge of war, and from the haughty domination of the Parthians. To defend the person, or to grace the dignity of Tigranes, the Roman general placed under his command a thousand legionary soldiers, three cohorts of auxiliaries, and six hundred horsemen; and having, in this manner, settled the affairs of Armenia, Corbulo retired into the Syrian province, of which he had recently been appointed the governor.[1] A.D. 60.

Vologeses prepares for war, to reinstate his brother Tiridates. A.D. 62.

The peace which was thus established did not prove of long duration. No sooner was Armenia evacuated by the Romans than Vologeses resumed his favourite plans for its subjugation, and for the annexation of its crown to the honours of his family. Still the terror of Corbulo's name might have deterred him from this enterprise, had not the insulting conduct of the new king proved beyond all doubt, that, with such a neighbour acting as the instrument of a great foreign power, the independence of Parthia itself could not be deemed secure.[2] Tigranes had already in a hostile manner entered Adiabenum, a country under the protection of Vologeses, and was laying it waste with every circumstance of cruelty and contempt. The Parthian nobles were particularly incensed, not only because a friendly State had been unjustly attacked, but because the Romans had employed for that purpose a fawning, low-minded slave, whose insolence was only equalled by his notorious cowardice. The king of Adiabenum added his complaints to those of the nobles; while Tiridates used with his brother every argument that shame, ambition, or revenge, could render efficacious in the royal breast. Vologeses, who required no persevering importunity to induce him to draw the sword, assembled a national council; and setting forth in their hearing the injuries inflicted upon Parthia, by the unprincipled aggressions of the Romans, and also the just pretensions of Tiridates as a descendant and heir of the renowned founder of their house, he proceeded in their presence to the ceremony of coronation; then, placing on the head of the future sovereign of Armenia a magnificent diadem, he pledged the support of his arms, and the concurrence of all the grandees of his kingdom, in favonr of the attempt which the latter was about to make for the restoration of his rights.[3]

In pursuance of this resolution, Vologeses gave the command of an army to Monæses, one of the most illustrious men in Parthia, with orders to drive Tigranes from the province of Adiabenum, and afterwards to attack him in Armenia; promising that he himself, as soon as he could make up his quarrel with the Hyrcanians, would collect all the forces of his kingdom, and fall upon Corbulo in the heart of Syria.

But the Roman governor was not to be taken by surprise. The

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xiv. 25. [2] Ibid. xv. 1. [3] Ibid. xv. 2, 3.

A.D. 62. designs of Vologeses, as well as his whole plan of operations, were made known to him, and he left no means unemployed to thwart and ultimately to defeat them. He sent two legions under the direction of Verulanus Severus and Victius Bolanus, to assist Tigranes: he encamped his own legions along the borders of the Euphrates; raised troops among the provincials for guarding the remoter frontiers; built forts, and secured ample supplies of provisions and water. It was not his design to continue the exposure of his own fame or the blood of his soldiers for the sake of a monarch whom he could not respect, and whose interests, in reference to the Roman power, he did not value so highly as to justify any extensive hazard of life or reputation. In consequence of these views, he instructed the two lieutenants whom he sent into Armenia, to avoid all unnecessary risks, and to act chiefly on the defensive.[1]

Wise measures of Corbulo.

Monæses in the meantime had effected the invasion of Armenia, and compelled Tigranes to shut himself up in the strongest city of his kingdom. The Parthians, whose troops consisted almost entirely of mounted archers, were ill qualified to conduct a siege. The Adiabenians who attempted to scale the walls were repulsed; and as the forage on the ground was completely destroyed by a flock of locusts, Monæses perceived the necessity of retiring from the neighbourhood of Tigranocerta.

Retreat of Monæses.

Corbulo, who still wished to shun the alternative of war, wrote to Vologeses that, as the Parthians had committed hostilities against an ally of Rome, he should be reluctantly compelled to enter their territories at the head of his army, unless the king gave orders to his general to raise the siege, and to abstain from all acts of annoyance towards Tigranes. It is probable that the Roman commander availed himself of this opportunity to suggest to the Parthian sovereign, that the war might be brought to a close, and Armenia restored to his brother, provided the latter would consent to receive the investiture of it from the Senate. We find, at least, in the reply which Vologeses made to Corbulo, that he was willing to send ambassadors to the Roman emperor to request Armenia from him; and that upon so receiving it, he would be ready to conclude a firm and lasting peace. At the same time, he ordered Monæses to withdraw his troops from Tigranocerta; while he himself retired into the centre of his own dominions.[2]

Abdication of Tigranes.

It would appear that, preparatory to the cession of Armenia, Tigranes resigned the crown and left the country, for neither his name, nor his pretensions, are introduced into any of the transactions which follow. But Tiridates was not yet to be elevated to the throne which was thus vacated for him. The ambassadors returned from Rome with an unfavourable answer; the Senate refused to accede to

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 4.

[2] Ibid. xv. 5.

the proposal made by Vologeses; and the Parthians, accordingly, A.D. 62. resolved to renew the war with increased strength and vigour.

Corbulo had suggested that Armenia ought to be made a separate command for a Roman general, as Syria was exposed to great inconvenience from the frequent absence of its governors. Cæsennius Pætus was chosen for that appointment; and it was perhaps owing to the desire which he felt to distinguish himself in so important a province, that greater pains were not taken to prevent a renewal of hostilities. He crossed the Euphrates and entered Armenia, without allowing his resolution to be shaken by any of those incidental occurrences which his soldiers regarded as bad omens. Finding that the Parthians had taken possession of Tigranocerta, he determined to recover that valuable stronghold; and with this view he advanced into the country, laying waste the cities and the fields, and a number of inferior stations which had served for magazines and military stores. His devastations were first felt by his own army; and the cold of winter adding its rigour to the pressure of want, Pætus could not resist the necessity of relinquishing his conquests, and of returning into a milder and more fruitful land.[1]

Pætus appointed to command in Armenia.

Early in the following spring the Parthian cavalry descended upon the Romans, while they were still scattered in their winter quarters, and quite unprepared for the combined movements of a campaign. Pætus had scarcely time to despatch three thousand chosen men to occupy the principal passes of Mount Taurus, and to station his Pannonian horsemen in the adjoining plain, before his situation became so extremely critical, that he sent a messenger to Corbulo, to beg the assistance of his legions, and of his military experience. But Vologeses made greater haste than the governor of Syria. He forced a passage over the bodies of the three thousand warriors, whom Pætus had sent to oppose his march, and dispersed the Pannonian cavalry by means of his overwhelming squadrons. The wounded returned to the camp, where they spread the panic with which their defeat had inspired them. They exaggerated the valour of the king of Parthia, the prodigious number and ferocity of the nations which followed him; and they found their auditors equally ready to believe, and to adopt the impression of terror which their narrative conveyed. Even the commander himself despaired of a successful resistance. His only resource was in Corbulo; to whom he wrote again in the most pressing terms, entreating him to hasten instantly to save the standards of the legions, and the remains of an unfortunate army.[2]

His panic.

That cautious and warlike governor at length began his march, carrying with him a large supply of provisions, and a powerful reinforcement of excellent troops. The road by which he advanced was

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 5.

[2] Ibid. xv. 8.

A.D. 62. covered with fugitives, who represented to him in the strongest colours the miserable condition of their fellow soldiers, and intreated permission to place themselves under his command. He rejected the services of men who could abandon their eagles when menaced by an insolent enemy; and ordered them to return and solicit their general's pardon, and to assure him of a speedy succour.

The approach of Corbulo stimulated the impatience of the Parthian king, and gave vigour to his measures. He urged the Romans to leave their camp, and try their fortune in the field; he attacked them in their intrenchments; cut off their supplies; and threatened them, if they did not speedily surrender, with all the horrors and carnage of a final assault. Pætus desired a conference with Vologeses, which the latter declined; thinking that he condescended sufficiently to a defeated general by treating with him through one of the commanders of his guards, whose name was Vasaces. After much discussion, the articles of capitulation were concluded in the presence of Monobazes the king of Adiabenum, to the following effect; that all hostilities should cease on both sides; that the Roman troops should evacuate Armenia; that the fortresses, with the provisions and military stores, should be delivered up to the Parthians; after which Vologeses was to send an embassy to Nero, to consult respecting the final settlement of the crown and country. The Parthians, according to Tacitus, required, in addition to these terms, that the Romans should build for them a bridge over the river Arsania which watered their camp. Pætus complied; pretending, however, in order to conceal his shame, that he built it for his own use, though the route which he took betrayed his humiliation, and confirmed the report of his secret engagement.[1]

Pætus is compelled to surrender.

As Tacitus observes, the treaty in itself was sufficiently shameful to the Romans; but fame still farther increased the ignominy by asserting that they were actually put under the yoke. It does not appear indeed that the Parthians abused their victory so far; but the Armenians, whose national feelings had been greatly insulted, rushed into the camp before the Romans had time to leave it; and drawing up their troops along the roads by which the vanquished army was to retire, they seized upon all the slaves and property which they choose to call their own. They even proceeded to strip and disarm the soldiers, whose spirits were so much depressed, and whose pride was so completely subdued, that they were willing to bear any thing but the face of an enemy.[2]

And accedes to a shameful treaty.

The Romans retreated with a precipitation so extraordinary, that they marched forty miles in one day, leaving behind their sick and wounded, and betraying such other marks of terror and insubordination, as denoted clearly that they had ceased to feel either the

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 11. Velleius Paterculus. [2] Tacit. *Ann.* xv.

authority of their general, or the respect which was due to their own characters. Tacitus relates, that when they abandoned their camp, they left magazines full of all kinds of provisions and stores; while the Parthians, on the other hand, were so distressed for want of forage, that they were on the point of raising the blockade, and of retiring from Armenia, knowing that the legions under the command of the Syrian governor, were already at no greater distance than a march of three days. A.D. 62. Retreat of the Romans in great panic and disgrace.

Corbulo had reached the Euphrates when he met the fugitives of Pætus's army. The soldiers, who were advancing under the standards of Syria, with the hope of relieving their comrades from the disgrace of surrendering to barbarians, wept aloud when they beheld the miserable plight of their countrymen, disarmed and dejected, and exhibiting in their looks the sullen despair of cowards who have run away from the field of battle. The salutation of the two commanders, was short and unfriendly, each accusing the other as the author of the ignominy which had befallen the arms of Rome. Pætus, it is said, urged Corbulo to return with him into Armenia, which was left defenceless by the Parthians; but the latter, finding that his unfortunate colleague had pledged the faith of his country that no Roman soldier should enter that kingdom, until the opinion of Nero, in regard to the treaty, could be obtained, refused to accede to a proposal so utterly unworthy of his rank and fame. The governor, accordingly, returned into Syria, and Pætus formed his winter camp in the province of Cappadocia.[1] Corbulo checks the pursuit of the Parthians.

In this situation of affairs, Vologeses and Corbulo renewed their negotiations respecting the tenure of Armenia, as a Roman dependency; the king of Parthia having expressed his willingness to permit his brother to wear the crown of that country, in virtue of an investiture by the Roman emperor. To pave the way for this accommodation, Corbulo dismantled the forts which he had built on the eastern banks of the Euphrates; while the other consented to withdraw all his troops from Armenia, and to preserve a strict neutrality. Negotiations renewed between Vologeses and Corbulo.

The ambassadors of Vologeses, on their arrival in Rome, assured the senate that their sovereign desired nothing beyond a firm and lasting peace. They added, that Tiridates would not refuse to repair to that city, to receive the crown of Armenia, if he were not prevented by the order of priesthood which he had just received; but that, at all events, he would go to the Roman camp, and there, before the eagles and the images of the emperor, and in the presence of the legions, take possession of the kingdom.[2] And ambassadors sent to Rome. A.D. 63.

The narrative of the ambassadors, who did not omit to mention the capitulation and retreat of Pætus, opened the eyes of the Senate

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 15–17.

[2] Ibid. xv. 24.

A.D. 63. to the real state of things in the east. It appeared to the leading persons in the government, to be nothing better than a solemn piece of mockery, to grant the investiture of a kingdom which had been wrested out of their hands by force of arms. For this reason they advised the emperor to renew the war with Parthia, and to intrust the management of it to the tried courage and zeal of Corbulo. The ambassadors were accordingly dismissed, without receiving a distinct or favourable answer; but the presents with which they were gratified, indicated the good intentions of the imperial ministers; and it was, moreover, intimated to them, that, if Tiridates came in person to solicit what he desired, his request would not be refused.[1]

The Roman commander consents to an interview with Tiridates.

That Corbulo might devote his whole attention to the war with Vologeses, he was relieved from the administration of Syria; the government of that province being assigned to Cestius, an officer of respectable talents and reputation. Though the hopes of peace were not relinquished entirely on either side, active preparations were made by both, for a vigorous campaign. The Parthians never regarded Corbulo as an implacable enemy, nor as one who would plunge his country into a hazardous war, merely for the sake of the glory or wealth which he might happen to derive from its successful issue. On this account they resolved, before matters were carried to any degree of extremity, to send messengers to the Roman camp, with the view of asking advice relative to the main question about which two mighty nations were buckling on their armour; and to ascertain whether the evils of war might not yet be prevented by an amicable recourse to negotiation, on the basis formerly established during the conference at Rome. Corbulo entered so far into their wishes, as to consent to an interview with Tiridates, and even to send two hostages to the Parthian camp, to answer for the safety of the prince's person.

Ceremonial which followed, and resignation of the Armenian crown.

We are indebted to Tacitus for a minute account of the final ceremonial to which this interview was preparatory. The Parthian cavalry, with the standards used by that nation, was drawn up in squadrons, on the one side; on the other, the Roman legions were marshalled in order of battle, displaying their eagles and other military ensigns. The statues of the gods were so arranged, as to form a circular temple; in the middle of which a mound of turf was raised, whereon was placed a curule chair, supporting the image of Nero. This emblem of imperial majesty, was approached by Tiridates with every token of veneration and respect; and after offering up sacrifice, the prince solemnly took the diadem from his head, and laid it at the feet of the statue. A shout from the two armies sanctioned the peaceful nature of the ceremony; and the whole ended with a magnificent entertainment.[2]

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 25.

[2] Ibid. xv. 29.

Having thus divested himself of regal power and rank, it remained for Tiridates to undertake a journey to Rome, in order to receive from the hand of the emperor, the crown of Armenia, together with all the rights and securities which the Roman people and Senate could confer. Vologeses, whose consent to all these formalities, had been previously obtained, wrote to Corbulo, desiring that nothing might be exacted of his brother, which should savour the least of servitude or meanness; that he might be allowed to wear his sword, and be admitted to the salute by all governors of provinces; that he should not be required to wait in their ante-chambers; and that he should receive at Rome all the honours usually conferred upon consuls.[1]

A.D. 63. Tiridates consents to go to Rome for investiture.

Being of the Magian order, Tiridates found some difficulty in submitting to the necessity of crossing from Asia to Europe, by water; his religion inculcating the utmost sanctity in regard to that element, as well as to the principle of fire. After a tedious procession of nine months, accompanied by an immense retinue of military and of domestic attendants, this descendant of the victorious Arsaces, touched the Italian soil, as a vassal of the Roman empire.

Nero was at Naples when the Parthian prince arrived; and it was the pleasure of the emperor that their first interview should take place in that scene of imperial dissipation. Tiridates having paid the customary obeisance to his lord paramount, had no longer any reason to bewail the excess of ceremony or restraint; for Nero, who at all times despised decorum, seemed on this occasion to give his attention to no other objects, either at Naples or on the way to Rome, but such as might entertain his royal guest, and relieve his mind from the painful sense of superiority.

Meets Nero at Naples.

The great ceremony of installation took place in the Forum, the area of which was filled with an innumerable multitude of people, ranked according to their several tribes, arrayed in white robes, with crowns of laurel upon their heads. The Prætorian cohorts, with burnished arms and glittering standards, were drawn up in military order. The roofs of the houses were covered with spectators; and, as all this pageantry was arranged before the break of day, Nero made his appearance at a very early hour, attended by the Senate and his guards, and clothed in a most gorgeous triumphal robe. Having taken his seat in the curule chair, he awaited the approach of Tiridates, who, advancing with his train, between double ranks of soldiers, went up to the presence of the emperor, and knelt before him. Upon this, the shout of the people was so astounding, that Tiridates, who did not expect it, was somewhat discomposed; at length, recovering his presence of mind, he is said to have addressed Nero in the following words:—"Though I am the descendant of

Ceremony of installation exhibited in the Forum.

Speech of Tiridates.

[1] Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 31, 32.


A.D. 63. Arsaces, and brother to the king, and Vologeses, and Pacorus, I own myself your slave. You are my god, and I am come to adore you as I adore the sun. My destiny is to be determined by your supreme and omnipotent will, for I depend on you as on fate and fortune."

Reply of Nero.

Nero made a reply in a style neither more becoming in itself, nor at all suited to his high office and ceremonial in which he was engaged. "What your father could not leave you, and what your brothers, when they had given it to you, could not defend, my munificence is pleased to grant and to confirm. I make you king of Armenia, that the whole universe may know that it belongs to me to give crowns and to take them away, according to my sovereign pleasure." Upon pronouncing these inflated sentences, he placed the diadem on the head of Tiridates, who was sitting at his feet; an act which was immediately followed by the thundering acclamations of the army, and of the assembled people.[1]

The games and feasts which ensued were magnificent beyond description, and could not fail to alarm the temperance of the royal priest on whose account they were given. To crown the festivity, and to exhaust all his powers of pleasing, Nero condescended to display his personal accomplishments as a musician and horseman. He appeared on the stage in the presence of his vassal, after which he exhibited in the circus his various attainments in the management

Games and festivities.



[Amphitheatre excavated at Pompeii.]

of a courser, having exchanged the imperial robe for a green jacket and a postilion's cap. In return for this amusement, he importuned Tiridates for some of the magical arts which the Eastern sages were supposed to cultivate; but finding that the mysteries of his priesthood were confined to certain speculative tenets respecting the origin and constitution of things, and had no control over the fortunes of

[1] Dion Cassius, *Epit.* Suet. *Ner.* 13.

mankind, he abstained from any farther attempt to gratify his curiosity. Being again saluted *Imperator*, for his glorious victories in Parthia, he concluded the scene by proceeding in great pomp to the Capitol, carrying a branch of laurel; and assuming, on this slender ground, the merit of having given peace to the whole world, he issued solemn orders to shut the gates of the temple of Janus.[1] A.D. 63.

From this period the amicable relations of Rome and Parthia, continued uninterrupted till the reign of Trajan, when a dispute about Armenia again involved the interests of the empire, and induced the Roman emperor to march at the head of his legions, to the borders of the Euphrates. Peaceful relations with Parthia, till the reign of Trajan.

[1] Dion Cassius, *Epit.*



[Tiridates crowned by Nero.]



[Galba.]

CHAPTER XII.

SERVIUS SULPICIUS GALBA.

FROM JUNE A.D. 68 TO JANUARY 69.

A.D. 68-9 WE turn from the consideration of the Parthian kingdom to the history of Rome under the successor of Nero.

Galba, whom the good-will of the army and the concurrence of the Senate now raised to the throne of the Cæsars, was descended from the Sulpician family—an ancient and patriotic race, who distinguished themselves, in the early times of the commonwealth, as the enemies of regal power and domination. His mother Mummia Achaica, derived her lineage from Mummius, the conqueror of Corinth, and from Quintus Lutatius Catulus, one of the greatest, ornaments of the republic, and who was less powerful than his two great contemporaries, Pompey and Cæsar, only because he was more virtuous, and more sincerely attached to the interests of his country.[1]

Lineage of Galba.

Nero the last of the family of Augustus.

The extinction of the family of Augustus, which took place at the fall of Nero, forms an important era in the history of Rome. Though the imperial government originated in the military ascendancy which terminated a civil war, and had been supported hitherto by strength of arms, yet the respect which already began to be felt for hereditary right restrained the power of the soldiers, and prevented them from gratifying their avarice, as they afterwards did, by setting up the empire to open sale. But the death of Nero, as Tacitus remarks, brought to light a secret of State. It was then discovered that an emperor could be made elsewhere than at Rome; that force alone

[1] Suet. *Galba*, 2. *Statuarum titulis Pronepotem se Quinti Catuli Capitolini semper adscripserit.*

was sufficient to determine the choice; and, consequently, that the nomination of the Cæsars to the throne, was thenceforth to be regarded as the privilege of the army. A.D. 68-9

Galba was at Tarraconia in Spain when he listened to the first proposals of revolt against Nero, and took the first steps to succeed that infatuated prince, as the head of the Roman government. But being unwilling to incur the reproach which is justly attached to rebellion, his measures were for some time unsteady, and his views undetermined. He was desirous to ascend the throne, but was averse, notwithstanding, to the sanguinary counsels which were urged upon him by his confederates; and we find, accordingly, that even after he had assumed the title of lieutenant to the Senate and Roman people, he was more inclined to wait the issue of events, and to avail himself of some fortunate contingency, than boldly to open a path to supreme power by the arms of his legions. It required all the eloquence of Titus Vinius, an officer in the prætorian guards, to rouse him from his indecision. He was reminded that the army under his command had already proceeded too far to retreat either with honour or with safety; for that to have deliberated whether they should continue faithful to Nero, was in fact equivalent to having thrown off their allegiance. Galba adopts measures to secure the throne.

The defeat of Vindex in Gaul added greatly to his perplexity. Virginius at the head of a victorious army refused either to accept the empire himself, or to co-operate with Galba in raising a third person to the throne; persisting in his resolution to acknowledge no sovereign but such as should be elected by the Senate, and be recommended by that venerable body to the fidelity of the legions. Clodius Macer, who enjoyed a command in Africa, had more ambition and less principle than Virginius; for as long as he could hope to profit by the partiality of his troops, he did not allow the sense of his crimes to prevent him from aspiring to the purple. The general who led the army on the Lower Rhine, was likewise actuated by selfish motives—having resolved to reserve his power, either to promote his own views at Rome, or to purchase, by the employment of it, the countenance and protection of the new emperor. Distracted by a condition of things so little propitious to his undertaking, Galba, we are informed by Suetonius, was about to put an end to his life by an act of suicide, when the news was brought to him at Clunia or Colonia, by his faithful dependent Icelus, that Nero had just fallen a victim to the indignation of the people; and that the voice of the Senate, as well as the acclamations of the army, had already invited the great-grandson of Catulus to enter the Palace of Augustus.[1] His indecision and difficulties.

The example of the prætorians in the capital, was soon followed by the legions which were serving in the provinces. Virginius, who

[1] Suet. *Galba*, 10.

A.D. 68-9 was importuned by his soldiers to become their master, not only refused to accede to their wishes, but finally prevailed upon them to swear allegiance to Galba. Vespasianus, too, who at that period was prosecuting a war against the Jews, sent his son Titus to pay homage to the successor of Nero; and even the turbulent cohorts of Africa allowed the life of their unprincipled chief to be taken away, that they might be permitted to yield an undivided obedience to the new Cæsar.

The governors and generals support him.

The only cause of disturbance, which threatened the tranquillity of Galba's reign, arose from the ambitious designs of the worthless Nymphidius; who had betrayed the confidence of Nero, and turned against him, in the very crisis of rebellion, the powerful swords of the Imperial guards. This faithless adventurer, who had bribed the troops by the promise of an immense gratuity, first aspired to the distinction of being appointed for life sole præfect of the prætorian cohorts, and soon afterwards raised his views to the throne itself. He held Galba in contempt, as a feeble old man who could no longer endure the fatigues of military service; whilst he ascribed to himself all the merit of the late revolution, the triumph gained in favour of liberty, and the overthrow of an intolerable and disgraceful despotism. He knew, besides, that the emperor was at once too parsimonious and too much attached to the ancient discipline to gratify the inordinate expectations of the soldiers, by bestowing the largess which himself had promised; for which reason he found it easy to induce a great body of the prætorians under his command to identify his interests with their own, and to look forward to his preferment as the only means whereby their hopes could be realized. But his nefarious schemes were defeated by the prudent loyalty of Antonius Honoratus, the tribune of a prætorian cohort; who, by an eloquent speech which he addressed to the troops, excited so keenly their sense of duty, as well as their feelings of shame and resentment, that he prevailed upon the whole camp to avenge at once the cause of Nero, and to prove their fidelity to his successor, by bringing the factious præfect to a condign punishment. The soldiers immediately rushed to arms; and raising a shout, which they knew would bring Nymphidius to his post, they seized the opportunity of despatching him with a thousand wounds. His body was forthwith placed in an iron cage, and exposed to the view of the whole army.[2]

Nymphidius creates troubles at Rome.

Is put to death by the soldiers.

Character of Vinius.

Unfortunately for Galba, the men who succeeded to the power of Nymphidius, were neither more virtuous nor more deserving of confidence than that intriguing commander. Titus Vinius, who became the chief Minister of State, was dissolute in his manners, and tainted

[1] Plutarch, *in Galba*, tells us that he promised to pay to every soldier of the prætorian cohorts 7,500 drachmas, and to the troops quartered in the provinces 1,250 drachmas a man; a sum which it would have been impossible to collect without inflicting on the empire a greater evil than Nero had done during his whole reign.

[2] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 5. Plut. *in Galba.*

in his reputation. His early life was marked by vices so gross, as to have drawn down upon him the indignation even of Caligula, by whom he was cast into prison for attempting the virtue of his general's wife, while encamped in the presence of an enemy. He was afterwards suspected of stealing a golden cup at the table of Claudius—an offence which that emperor punished, by directing that at the next entertainment he alone should be served on earthenware. But daring, ingenious, and active, he was too valuable a person to be finally disgraced. He triumphed above all impeachment; and when he was intrusted by Nero with the government of Gallia Narbonnesis, he displayed so much integrity and zeal, as to render doubtful all the charges which had been brought against him. Tacitus describes him as one of those persons whose minds show an equal degree of intensity in the pursuit of virtue or of vice; and who, in order to reach a splendid reputation, require only the assistance of favourable circumstances and of suitable motives. But the height to which he was raised by Galba, proved the occasion of his final ruin; and the use which he made of the power with which he was invested, proved the cause or the pretext for the tragical events which attended the close of this monarch's reign.[1] A.D. 68-9

And of Laco, the Prætorian præfect.

Nor was Cornelius Laco, who obtained from Galba the office of prætorian præfect, possessed of either virtue or talent sufficient to support the interests of his imperial master. He appears to have been no less deficient in courage than in honesty; and the historian of these times, accordingly, gives way to his indignation so far as to remark, that the union of the most cowardly of men with the most wicked, drew hatred and contempt upon the government of the prince in whose service they were employed.[2] There is no doubt that almost all the faults with which the short reign of Galba was chargeable, ought to be laid to their account. His love of justice, good order, and military discipline, was of little avail, when opposed by the corruption and avarice of his principal servants; and though it was acknowledged on all hands, that the sovereign was animated with a desire to promote the welfare of his people, he was punished for the evil which he allowed his Ministers to commit.[3]

Austerity and cruelties of Galba.

But perhaps the severity of his manners, his advanced age, and his parsimonious habits, operated more unfavourably than even the misconduct of his servants, in alienating from him the affections of his subjects in the capital. Suetonius observes, that when the emperor began his journey to Rome, he was preceded by an evil report of avarice and harshness.[1] On the way, too, he affected a formidable appearance, wearing the military dress as if he had been about

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 48, and Plut. *in Galba.*

[2] *Invalidum senem T. Vinius et Corn. Laco, alter deterrimus mortalium, alter ignavissimus, odio flagitiorum oneratum, contemptu inertiæ destruebant.* Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 5.

[3] Dion Cassius, *in Galba*, lib. lxiv.

A.D. 68-9 to carry hostilities into an enemy's country; and carrying a dagger suspended to his breast, as if the dread of assassination had been ever present to his mind. Nor were his actions, during his progress towards Rome, at all calculated to soften the impression which arose from his menacing attitude. Enraged against certain towns in Spain and Gaul, which had deliberated too long before they had declared in his favour, he punished some by imposing exorbitant taxes, and vented his fury against others by demolishing their fortifications. Such officers, moreover, as had incurred his resentment or suspicion, were put to death without mercy; and in some instances he extended his brutal vengeance even to the wives and children of those who had fallen under the weight of his displeasure. Mithridates and Cingonius Varro, the accomplices of Nymphidius and Petronius Turpilianus, who had no other fault than that of being faithful to Nero, were ordered for military execution—a proceeding which gave great offence to the people of Rome; for as these distinguished persons were condemned without being heard in their own defence, they perished with all the commiseration which is usually bestowed upon the innocent and oppressed.

His conduct to the legion of marines.

But an event which occurred immediately before he entered the city, rendered the emperor an object of hatred as well as of fear, to the greater part of the inhabitants. The marines whom Nero had formed into a regular legion, and who had thereby acquired a rank more honourable among the Romans, than that which they formerly held in the public service, proceeded about three miles from the gates, to meet Galba, in order to solicit from him a confirmation of the honour which his predecessor had conferred upon them. The emperor, rigidly attached to the forms of discipline, attempted to satisfy them with an ambiguous answer, craving time to consider maturely a matter of so much importance. Regarding delay in this case, as equivalent to a refusal, the petitioners urged their suit with an importunity bordering on disrespect, and some of them even proceeded so far as to draw their swords with the view of intimidation. Such conduct could not escape the reprehension of Galba. He ordered the cavalry which attended him, to repel force by force; and a conflict ensuing, many of the marines, as well as of the unarmed multitude, were wounded or put to death. Dion Cassius writes, that seven thousand were cut to pieces upon the spot, and that a great number more were committed to prison, where they lay till the accession of Otho. Suetonius adds, that he decimated those who escaped the swords of his horsemen, and agrees with the other historians of his time, in remarking, that to have entered the city amidst so much blood and slaughter, was universally regarded as a most inauspicious circumstance. The people who had formerly been

[1] *Præcesserat de eo fama sævitiæ simul et avaritiæ.* Suet. *Galba*, 12.

taught to despise him, as a weak sluggish old man, now viewed him as an object of horror and apprehension.[1] A.D. 68-9

His unpopularity.

It was not to be expected that the public measures of such a ruler would be viewed in a favourable light. His justice was pronounced severity, his economy was called avarice, and the simplicity of his manners was held as rustic coarseness. He was greatly blamed for an act of patriotism, which, in better times, would have secured the confidence and applause of the Romans. He disbanded a cohort of Germans, the ordinary guard of the Cæsars, and intrusted the safety of his person to the fidelity of the native soldiers; thus putting an end to a practice which has always been found to keep pace with the progress of despotism, and the decay of public liberty. But Galba had not studied the valuable art of doing good things with a becoming grace. He satisfied himself with the wisdom and integrity of his conduct; and thus, while he laboured to restore the fortunes of his country, and to revive her institutions, his zeal met with no other reward than obloquy and distrust. Satire aimed its bitterest shafts at him. If an expression in a play, or a song, conveyed a satirical allusion to decrepid age, or stingy parsimony, the audience instantly applied it to their emperor, with shouts of merriment, and repeated the words again and again, with the strongest accents of derision and triumph. Invention was indulged to the utmost, in imagining cases equally ludicrous and mean, in which the unpopular monarch was supposed to have displayed his characteristic propensities. For example, the malicious wits of Rome maintained, that when the inhabitants of Terracona presented the emperor with a crown of gold, weighing fifteen pounds, he insisted that it was three ounces deficient; and that, to ascertain the fact, he ordered it to be melted down, and placed in the scales, divested of all extraneous matter. They gave out, too, that whenever he saw a sumptuous feast placed on the imperial table, his appetite was taken away by the recollection of the cost; and that, instead of eating, he could only utter groans and prudential maxims, and deplore the misery of his fate, which condemned him to witness such unseasonable profusion. They said that he rewarded the integrity of his steward, by the present of a few peas; and that on one occasion he was so charmed with the notes of a flute, which was played during an entertainment in the palace, that he drew from his purse a sum of money equal to three farthings, and bestowed it with an air of generosity upon the matchless performer.[2]

These ridiculous fictions were not lost upon the credulous malignity of the Roman populace; and a measure which Galba actually adopted, to repair the losses of the public treasury, contributed not a little to aggravate the rumours which were circulated against him.

[1] Suet. *Galba*, 1, 12. Plut. *in Galba*. Dion Cassius, lib. lxiv.
[2] Ibid. 13. Plut. *ut suprà*.

A.D. 68-9 He attempts to recover the donations made by Nero.

Finding, upon inquiry, that the foolish donations of Nero amounted to a very large sum, he resolved to have the whole refunded, with the exception of one-tenth; but, as Tacitus observes, the persons who had received the late emperor's benefactions, were too prodigal of money to have even one-tenth remaining, and had, besides, neither lands nor income which Galba could attach. Determined that this financial expedient should not be defeated, the thrifty monarch proceeded to adopt measures against those into whose hands the imperial presents had passed, either in the way of purchase, or in the ordinary transactions of trade. The vexation and inconvenience which attended this step, were extreme. Many houses and estates were brought into the market; and no fewer than thirty members of the equestrian order were implicated in the investigation, and exposed to great pecuniary loss.[1]

Conduct in regard to Tigellinus.

The public were not grieved to find, that those whom Nero had enriched by improper means, were now rendered as poor as those whom he had robbed; but they were indignant to perceive that Vinius, and the other favourites about court, to whose counsels the harsh measures described above, were every where attributed, indulged meanwhile in the most unbounded luxury—abused in a very shameful manner the influence which they had acquired over Galba—protected the guilty—oppressed the innocent—and set up to sale every office, privilege, and immunity, which the government could bestow. Tigellinus, one of the most infamous and mischievous of Nero's ministers, and whose punishment the people never ceased to demand, was observed in particular to enjoy the countenance of several powerful persons at the head of affairs. He had purchased the good offices of Vinius, by large sums of money, the fruit of his intrigues and corruption; and the latter induced Galba to publish an ordinance in defence of a miscreant who had been the principal agent in Nero's worst crimes, representing that he laboured under a mortal disease, which, in the course of nature, would soon terminate his life; and condemning the cruel and vindictive disposition, which thirsted for the blood of a man who was already enduring a severe affliction under the heavy hand of the gods.[2]

People irritated and disgusted.

From this period the most moderate and even patriotic measures pursued by Galba, were misrepresented, and made a foundation for dislike and suspicion. It was in vain that he kept the soldiers to their duty—that he punished with the utmost severity those who by their false accusations, had occasioned the death of innocent persons—that he delivered up to the vengeance of the laws, such slaves as had borne unjust evidence against their masters; that he recalled those who, under pretence of treason, had been driven into exile by Nero, and restored them to their rank and fortunes. His wisdom

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. 20. Suet. *Galba*, 15.
[2] Ibid. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 72. Suet. *Galba*, 14.

and good intentions were equally despised. The corrupted populace regretted the dissipation and spectacles which occupied the cares of the late reign; the theatrical amusements and exploits of the circus, in which their days and nights were passed. The more thoughtful perceived that the government would be at once capricious and severe, in the hands of an old soldier, whose rules of administration were derived from the habits of a camp; while the men of consular and patrician dignity, had already been made to feel, that the whole authority of their order, was sunk in the intrigues and venal ambition of a few military adventurers.[1] A.D. 68-9.

The army dissatisfied.

The crisis of Galba's fate was no doubt accelerated by his injudicious conduct towards the provincial armies, whose affections he ought to have secured, while he was engaged in suppressing the arrogance of the Prætorians at Rome. To the Gauls, indeed, who had been concerned in the conspiracy under Vindex, he was advised to grant, not only a remission of tribute, but even the more important



[Roman Legionaries.]

gift of citizenship, with all the honours and privileges which belonged to natives of Italy. The troops in Germany, however, who had followed the victorious standards of Virginius, and maintained the dignity of the empire, and the honour of the Senate, were allowed to pass unrewarded; on which account, though they were now commanded by a general nominated by Galba, they did not fail to express their disappointment, in language which breathed mutiny and rebellion. When intelligence was brought to Galba, that the guards were dissatisfied because no gratuity had been conferred upon them at his accession, he replied, in a spirit no longer suited to the character of Romans, that *he had been accustomed to levy soldiers, not to buy them.* This answer completely alienated the army at home

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 10. Zonar.

A.D. 68-9. and abroad. Insulted and angry at the haughty style which he assumed, the legions, as well as the Prætorian cohorts, showed themselves ready for a change; and nothing was now wanting, but a plausible pretext to induce them to invest a more liberal master with the ensigns of imperial power.[1]

Galba resolves to adopt an heir,

Galba at length opened his eyes to his situation, but he mistook the cause of the odium and contempt into which his character had fallen. He imagined that the Roman people despised him because he had no heir to succeed him on the throne; for which reason he determined to adopt a young man of such birth and qualities, as would revive, for the head of the government, that respect and affection to which his childless old age had, for some time, rendered him a stranger. Vinius was eager in his recommendation of Otho, a personage who figured in a manner not very creditable to his sense or virtue, during the reign of Nero, and who, on account of the equally abandoned Poppæa, was sent into an honourable exile, as governor of Lusitania. With the fickleness and want of faith which distinguished his whole life, Otho was the first commander of a province who declared against his master; and the strenuous exertions which he then made to secure the crown for Galba, arose, it is said, from the expectations which he even at that time entertained of being adopted by him, and raised to the name of Cæsar.

That hope was daily flattered by the partiality of the soldiers, and the assurances of Vinius; for the latter, whose daughter, it was reported, was to become the wife of Otho, exerted all his influence to effect an object so dear to them both. But the views of Galba were otherwise directed. He appears to have suspected the selfish motives of his minister, which were artfully exposed by Laco and Icelus; and Tacitus thinks that, in his choice of a successor, the old emperor was principally actuated by a regard to the public welfare, and by his knowledge of Otho's character, notorious at once for vice and insincerity. The love of virtue, and a sentiment of patriotism, determined his election in favour of Piso Licinianus, the son of M. Crassus and Scribonia, whose ripe years and pure morals, promised long happiness and prosperity to the empire.

And fixes on Piso Licinianus.

This unfortunate person had been adopted by one of the Piso family, probably after the death of his father and mother, who, as well as his elder brother, fell victims to the jealousy of Claudius. Another brother was slain by order of Nero, while Piso himself was driven into exile, whence he seems not to have returned till after the revolution which placed Galba on the throne. Suetonius assures us, that this emperor had been always fond of Piso, and had even resolved, long before he attained supreme power, to make him the

[1] Tacit. lib. i. c. 5. *Accessit Galbæ vox, pro Republicâ honesta, ipsi anceps, legi a se militem non emi.* Suetonius *in Galba*, 16, words it this way, *Legere se militem, non emere, consuesse.*

heir of his name and fortune. Others think that the new Cæsar owed his elevation to Laco, the Prætorian præfect, who had formerly been acquainted with him, but who, on this occasion, pretended to be an entire stranger to his history, in order that his recommendation might not be suspected of personal or interested feelings. At all events, it is certain that Galba was much delighted with the severe manners and spotless reputation of his adopted son. Taking him by the hand, at a meeting of the principal officers of state, he addressed him in an eloquent speech, in which he set forth with much earnestness, the duties which he had to perform, and the dangers and temptations which it should be his study to avoid. "Let the fate of Nero," said he, "ever be before your eyes. Think of the end of that unhappy prince, whose empty mind was inflated with pride, merely because he could reckon in his family a long line of Cæsars! It was not Vindex, with his thousands of unarmed Gauls, nor I, with my single legion, that overturned his Government. It was his own debauchery, and his monstrous cruelty, that forced mankind to shake off his detestable yoke; and to create an example, till then unknown, of an emperor condemned and punished. Though raised to this high station of rank and power, by the success of our arms, and by the more legitimate authority of a free and unanimous election; and though disposed to govern with the strictest regard to justice, and to all the rights and charities of social life, we must be prepared to meet the attacks of envy, and even of disaffection. Be not, however, dismayed though a few factious politicians, or mutinous soldiers, should disturb the commencement of your reign. When the act which I now perform is made known to my people, their affections to my government will be confirmed, and my old age, the chief occasion of their reproach and fear, will be entirely forgotten. The bad, it is true, will always regret Nero, but it must be our study that none except the bad may ever have cause to regret him."[1]

A.D. 68-9.

Address of Galba to Piso.

"The best and shortest rule that I can lay down for your conduct is, to reflect on what you yourself have approved or condemned in the conduct of other princes. Here, the government rests on the opinions and sentiments of those for whose behoof it is exercised; for there are not in this country, as in some others, only two classes of men, the one born to certain command, and the other to constant and unreflecting obedience. On the contrary, you are called upon to govern a people, who, as they are not qualified to enjoy a boundless freedom, so assuredly will not submit to an unlimited servitude.[2]

During this scene, Piso acquitted himself like one who had been long in the habit of repressing his feelings. No sign of emotion was perceived in him from first to last. His answer was full of respect

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 14—16 Plut. *in Galb.* Suet. *Galba*, 17.
[2] Tacit. *ut suprà*, and c. 18.

A.D. 68-9. towards his father and sovereign, and of modesty as far as it respected his own character and pretensions. He appeared, says Tacitus, neither elated nor insensible; and every one thought him more deserving of empire than eager to enjoy it.

Galba makes known the adoption to the army and Senate.

Galba proceeded, without loss of time, to make known to the prætorian guards and the Senate the adoption of Piso. Combining in his speech the brevity of an emperor with the manner and accent of a military chief, he informed the soldiers of what had just taken place; referring to the example of Augustus and the practice of the Commonwealth, as an authority for so important a measure. He neglected to mix any kind expression or soothing promise in his address to this most capricious portion of his army, accustomed to be courted, solicited, and praised; while they, on the other hand, looked gloomy and dissatisfied; indignant that they should be refused the largess which had usually been given to them on the most peaceful accession, in a case wherein the emperor owed his crown to their arms or approbation. Tacitus remarks, that a little liberality on this occasion, would have secured to Galba the affections of all orders of men, and bound to his interest the services of the prætorians; but he chose to persevere in his adherence to ancient maxims, though it was obvious to every one that the ancient spirit of the Roman institutions had passed entirely away.[1]

The address to the Senate was neither more lengthened nor more conciliatory than that which he pronounced in the camp. Piso indeed expressed himself in a kind and modest manner, and gained the hearts of most of his auditors. Many of the senators approved of his elevation to the purple; and even those whose views pointed in a different direction, were pleased with his gentle demeanour, and could not withhold their approbation from the choice of Galba. But

The Senate receive the notice favourably.

the tranquillity of the empire could no longer be secured by any political arrangements adopted at Rome. The mutinous legions in Germany called openly for a new master; threatening to cross the Rhine, and add force to their demand by joining with the disaffected in all the provinces of Gaul and Italy. The Senate, alarmed at the aspect of affairs, proposed to send a deputation of its members to appease the sedition; while the friends of the emperor suggested that Piso should be commissioned at the head of that body, in the hope that the name of Cæsar, added to the authority of the legislature, would bring back the soldiers to duty and submission. But the conspiracy, it is evident, had already extended to the capital; for no one would consent to discharge the office of deputy in the proposed mission to the army on the Rhine; and Galba, compelled to receive the excuses of his servants, became more and more an object of contempt and ridicule.

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 18. *Constat, potuisse conciliari animos quantulâcumque parci senis liberalitate: nocuit antiquus rigor et nimia severitas; cui jam pares non sumus.*

A.D. 68-9. Otho excites a conspiracy against Galba

Otho, meanwhile, availed himself of these circumstances, so favourable to his aspiring views. His private affairs had already reached that point of confusion and despair at which frugality is useless, and all the ordinary expedients of industry can afford no relief. He acknowledged that his debts amounted to a sum equivalent in our money to sixteen hundred thousand pounds; and that, unless he were raised to the sceptre, he could no longer hold a place in society. He assured his friends that the decisive moment of his existence had arrived; and that if he must perish, it was of no consequence to him whether it should be in the field of battle contending for a crown, or in the Forum struggling with his creditors. These sentiments, too, were supported in Otho by a firm and resolute courage, unlike the effeminacy of his manners, and the delicate exterior of his person. His dependents, moreover, accustomed to the voluptuous habits and the luxurious living which prevailed in the court of Nero, incessantly stimulated his ambition, and advised him to risk every thing in order to gratify it. Such exhortations were calculated to please his vanity; and his splendid dreams of imperial magnificence and power were almost converted into realities by the mystical assurances of the astrologers, who, it is said, revealed to him that he was chosen by destiny to fill the throne of Augustus after the death of Galba.[1]

His motives and conduct.

Having determined to encounter all the hazards of the momentous enterprise, he employed his freedman Onomastus, in whose hands he had placed about eight thousand pounds, to gain a party among the prætorians, who should hold themselves prepared for the most daring attempts. By his presents and promises, this agent bribed two inferior officers of that distinguished cohort, who undertook to provide a certain number of confederates well armed and resolute; and thus, says Tacitus, two soldiers engaged to dethrone one emperor and make another, and succeeded in their enterprize.[2]

Progress of the conspiracy.

On the fifteenth of January, the day fixed for the execution of the plot, Otho, according to custom waited on the emperor, and was received as usual; after which he attended Galba, who was about to offer up a sacrifice. At this rite the conspirators had the satisfaction to hear the priest who consulted the entrails of the victim, declare that there were strong signs of impending anger on the part of the gods, and of imminent danger proceeding from a domestic enemy.[3]

While he was thus employed, Onomastus presented himself, and communicated the signal to his master that every thing was ready. Otho, excusing himself on the pretence of private business, took leave of the emperor, and accompanied his freedman to the Forum, where he found only twenty-three soldiers, who saluted him by the title of Cæsar. His confidenee gave way at the sight of so small a number, and he appeared desirous, says Plutarch, to relinquish an undertak-

[1] Tacit *Hist.* lib. i. c. 21, 22. Suet. *Othon.* 5.
[2] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 24, 25.
[3] Ibid. c. 27.

A.D. 68-9. ing which had been so badly concerted. But the soldiers would not allow him to retrace his steps. They put him into a chair, and conducted him to the camp sword in hand, inviting their friends and companions to follow their example. The tribune who guarded the gate, either taken by surprise or being privy to the conspiracy, allowed them to enter without opposition; while the other officers on duty, unwilling to expose themselves to jeopardy in a falling cause, looked quietly on passing events, and permitted them to take their course.

Piso addresses the Prætorian cohort on duty at the palace.

Meanwhile Galba continued to assist in the pious duties of the sacrifice, and, as Tacitus expresses it, to fatigue with his prayers the unfriendly gods who had already declared for his rival. A report had already reached the palace that the camp was in a state of mutiny, and that some man of rank had placed himself at the head of the soldiers. Piso, in order to sound the dispositions of the cohort then on guard, assembled them under the windows of the imperial residence, and addressed them in a speech equally remarkable for eloquence and for knowledge of the several characters whose interests were at stake. His words and authority produced a salutary effect. The prætorians, accustomed to reverence the orders of Cæsar, drew up in order of battle, and professed their readiness to serve him. But the rest of the military were devoted to the rising fortune of Otho; and the zeal of the guards themselves, was not long proof against the revolutionary spirit with which the camp and the city was filled.[1]

Death of Galba.

The friends of Galba were divided in their opinions whether he ought to shut himself up in his palace, and fortify himself against the attempts of the infatuated soldiery, or go forth at the head of the bands which still remained faithful to him, and endeavour to subdue the sedition by force of arms. The emperor, who wanted neither courage nor dignity of sentiment, made haste to determine in favour of the nobler means; only it was deemed a proper precaution to send Piso beforehand to the prætorian camp, to prepare both officers and men for the reception of their imperial general. It was thought that the great name of the young prince, the recent splendour of his adoption, and the aversion which he was known to bear to Vinius, who was now detested by all classes of the people, would render him agreeable to the military. But the work of sedition was completed before he could reach the camp. Otho had given instructions to break open the armoury, and to bring forth a supply of weapons for all his adherents, soldiers and civilians; and he was already addressing them in a pompous harangue, full of invectives against Galba and his government, to which his audience were replying in shouts of triumph and congratulation. Upon hearing this tumultuous noise Piso returned towards the palace, when he met the emperor, who was now approaching the Forum. At the same moment, Otho despatched a party of soldiers to prevent any rising

[1] Tacit. *ut suprà*, c. 29.

in the city in favour of Galba, and these happened to reach the A.D. 68-9.
Forum, while the attendants of the aged monarch were striving to convey him through it, on his way to the camp. No sooner did the armed band appear, than the standard-bearer of the cohort which was with Galba tore that prince's image from the pole and threw it on the ground. This act of brutal insolence was the signal for a general revolt, and all the soldiers immediately declared for Otho. Those who carried Galba, disconcerted and alarmed, overturned the litter in which he was placed, and left him to the insults and violence of the enraged conspirators. His last words have been differently reported, according to the political bias of the several historians who have written his life. Some say that he humbly expostulated with his murderers, and promised to gratify their wishes on all points, if they would grant him an opportunity of reforming his government. Others assure us, that he boldly presented his throat to the assassins, A.D. 69.
and invited them to strike, if they thought the prosperity of the empire required such a sacrifice. The barbarity of those into whose hands he fell, was fully manifested by the numerous and unseemly wounds which they inflicted upon his body, even after he was dead. The soldier who cut off his head, at first wrapped it in his cloak, there being no hair on the forehead by which to hold it up; till exhorted by his comrades to show the trophy of their guilty exploit, he thrust his fingers into the mouth, and so raised it in the air, to gratify the curiosity and revenge of the sanguinary rabble.[1]

Vinius, whose crimes were the main cause of this conspiracy, and who, there is reason to believe, was privy to the designs of Otho, did not long escape with impunity. He was run through the body by the spear of a soldier. The virtuous Piso encountered the same fate; but it was not until Sempronius Densus, a captain of the prætorians, had sacrificed his own life to protect that of Cæsar. That generous centurion, the only man, says Plutarch, worthy of the name of Roman on whom the sun looked during that day of guilt and horror, drew his dagger, and upbraiding the assassins with their perfidy, turned their blows against himself, and thereby afforded Piso time to take shelter in the temple of Vesta. His retreat, however, being immediately made known, he was dragged thence, and butchered at the gates of the asylum. Piso fell at the age of thirty-one, leaving a name much more splendid than his fortune, and having enjoyed the rank of heir to the Roman empire, only during four unhappy days. And of Vinius and Piso.

The body of Galba remained for a long time exposed to every kind of insult, his head having been sold in order to gratify a mean species of revenge on the part of a freedman, whose patron had provoked the indignation of the emperor. At length the corpse of the descendant

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 40-42. Suet. *Galba.* 20. Plut. *in Galbâ.* Tacitus says, that having presented his throat, Galba exclaimed, *Agerent sic ferirent, si ita e Republicâ videretur.*

A.D. 69. of the Sulpicii and Catuli was given to one of his slaves, who conferred upon it a private burial in the gardens belonging to his family. Suetonius informs us, that the Senate, as soon as they were allowed, erected a statue to Galba, on a column in the Forum, at the spot where he was murdered; and adds, that Vespasianus, from a suspicion that assassins had been sent by that emperor into Judea to cut him off, ordered the decree to be cancelled, and the figure to be taken down.

Character of Galba by Tacitus.

Such was the end of Galba, at the advanced age of seventy-three, after enjoying a prosperous fortune during the reigns of five successive princes, and being blessed with a degree of happiness whilst others reigned, which he could not obtain from the possession of supreme power in his own person. His talents, says Tacitus, were not of the first order; and with respect to morals, he was rather free from vice than endued with any distinguished virtues. He was neither indifferent to fame, nor passionately fond of reputation. The wealth of other men never excited in him either envy or cupidity; he was economical in the disbursement of his own, and rigidly exact in the administration of the public finances. He was in too many instances governed by his friends and dependents. When these were honest, his facility did not hurt his reputation; bnt when they proved wicked, his complaisance rendered him despicable. The splendour of his birth, and the evil of the times in which his lot was cast, served in some degree to protect his character, and procured the name of wisdom for actions which were remarkable only for their imbecility. As long as he was a private man he appeared to merit a much higher station; and every one would have thought him deserving of supreme power, had he never been exalted to the condition of emperor.





[Otho.—*Museum Florentinum.*]

CHAPTER XIII.

MARCUS SALVIUS OTHO.

A.D. 69. FROM JANUARY TO APRIL.

OTHO was descended from an honourable family in Etruria, which, according to Suetonius, boasted the blood of the ancient kings of that country. His father, Lucius Otho, was a person of great weight in the counsels of Rome, during the administration of Claudius; and he is said to have borne so striking a resemblance to Tiberius, as to have been generally esteemed a near relation of that emperor. By his wife, Albia Terrentia, he had two sons; the elder of whom, Lucius Titienus, had the good fortune to remain in a private station; the younger, who was named M. Salvius, became the successor of Galba, whom, it is worthy of remark, he both raised and cast down by the guilt of conspiracy. A.D. 69. Lineage of Otho.

The history of Otho first attracts the attention of the reader in the early part of the reign of Nero. Sharing deeply in the vices and extravagances of that infatuated prince, he obtained not only his private friendship, but even a considerable influence in the affairs of State; till at length the rivalry which took place between them for the affections of Poppæa, produced such a degree of hatred and mutual suspicion, as must soon have terminated in the ruin of the favourite, had not Seneca procured for the latter the government of Lusitania, to which he was sent as to an honourable exile. The resentment with which this usage inspired him, sought a ready gratification in the revolt, which, originating with Vindex in Gaul, extended to the legion in Spain, and ultimately transferred the possession of power from the hands of Nero to those of Galba. Appointed governor of Lusitania.

A.D. 69. Having thus seen the last of the family of Augustus deprived at once of sovereignty and life, Otho busied himself in fomenting those disgusts and enormities which he found prevailing in the army, and which, he knew, would prove the most efficacious means for accomplishing the objects of his ambition. The result proved that his calculations were founded on an intimate knowledge of the materials which he had determined to employ; but he appears not to have been conscious that he was thereby calling into action a principle which he might never be able to control, and giving his sanction to the exercise of a species of military despotism, of which he was himself to experience the cruel and capricious effects.

Succeeds Galba.

His good conduct on the throne.

In the first days of his power, Otho seemed desirous to atone, by the mildness and wisdom of his government, for the base means which he had used in attaining it. He pardoned in a very graceful manner the obstinacy with which Marius Celsus, the consul elect, adhered to the cause of Galba, and for which he had been thrown into prison by the partisans of the new reign. He appointed men of character to all the important offices, as well in the city as in the provinces; and he satisfied the justice of the army and of the populace, by delivering up to punishment the infamous Tigellinus, so long the minister of Nero's vices and tyranny. As soon as he found himself invested with the purple, he resolved to forget all the injuries and quarrels which attached to his private history. He granted immunities to the soldiers, and held forth to the mass of the people the prospect of enjoying once more those public sights and festivities, which still endeared to them the remembrance of Nero's liberality. In short, he appeared all at once to have changed his nature; and, accordingly, those who had formerly regarded him as one of the most furious and depraved of mankind, now looked to him as the restorer of the Commonwealth, and a pattern of national virtue and decorum.[1]

Takes the name of Nero.

But it was remarked by the more discerning of his friends, that he carried his complaisance rather too far, when, to indulge a whim on the part of the populace, he permitted them to salute him by the name of Nero, and to set up in the most conspicuous parts of the city the statues of that emperor. It is even said, that, in official letters which he sent by couriers into Spain, announcing his accession to the throne, he coupled in his superscription the name of the son of Agrippina with his own; and it was not until he perceived that this practice gave offence to the higher classes of his subjects, that he was induced to discontinue it.[2]

Tumult by the Prætorian guards at Ostia.

The favour which by these and similar means he had gained with the Prætorian cohorts, proved the occasion of a very unseemly and alarming occurrence. He had issued orders to remove the seven-

[1] Plut. *in Othon.* Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 45, 46, and 71.
[2] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 78.

teenth cohort from Ostia to Rome; and the tribune Crispinus, on whom this duty was imposed, desirous to put the troops in motion with as little delay as possible, proceeded in the evening to pack up their arms and baggage, in order to send them to the city during the night, or very early in the ensuing morning. As soon as these preparations were observed, the most turbulent of the soldiers affected to entertain suspicions in regard to the object of such unusual haste and secresy. They cried out that Crispinus came with no good intention; that the Senate had some design against the government; and that the arms which he was so eager to convey to the capital were to be employed against the emperor, and not in his service. These fears soon spread among the corrupted and riotous Prætorians. Exasperated at the plot which they imagined had been formed against Otho, and which was now detected by their own sagacity, some of them seized upon the waggons, while others attacked the officers who laboured to quell the mutiny, and put Crispinus and two centurions to death. They forthwith resolved to march in arms to Rome, to protect the emperor from the designs of his enemies. Being informed on their arrival that about eighty senators and magistrates, with their families, were supping in the palace, they exclaimed that now was the time to crush, at one blow, all the adversaries of Otho. The imperial household was thrown into the greatest consternation, and the emperor himself was in unspeakable distress. He saw that his guests fixed their eyes upon him with looks of dread and suspicion; while, in regard to the ultimate designs of the military, he was as ignorant as they were. He desired the principal officers of the guards to go out and speak to the soldiers, with the view of learning their intentions and appeasing their fury; adopting, at the same time, the suitable precaution of sending away his company by private doors. Scarcely had these withdrawn, when the Prætorians rushed into the apartment, demanding with loud voices and the most impassioned gestures, to have all the enemies of Cæsar delivered up into their hands. It was with the utmost difficulty that Otho prevented them from hurrying to the most frightful extremities. Rising from his couch, and throwing aside the stateliness of his rank, he expostulated with the mutinous guards on the error and dangerous tendency of their conduct; and at length, after having condescended to employ entreaties, and even tears, he prevailed upon them to desist from their sanguinary project.[1] A.D. 69.

Otho appeases the soldiers.

Next day, says Tacitus, the city appeared as if it had been taken by an enemy. All the houses were shut up; hardly any person ventured into the streets; and the few who did show themselves seemed quite dejected and alarmed. Of the soldiers it was justly remarked, that there was more of sadness in their faces than of penitence in their hearts. After having presented the Prætorians

[1] Suet. *in Othon.* c. 8. Plut. *in Othon.* Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 80.

A.D. 69. with a handsome donation, Otho ventured to go into their camp; where he pronounced a speech more expressive of regret than of displeasure; and concluded by fixing on two of their number, the most noted for sedition and turbulence, for capital punishment.[1]

Movements on the part of Vitellius.

But the stability of Otho's government, it soon appeared, did not depend on the affections of the people at Rome, nor even on the partiality of the troops in the Italian provinces. The armies beyond the Rhine had already made choice of another emperor; and even before Otho had placed himself in the chair of the Cæsars, the legions which served in Germany under Vitellius and Hordeonius Flaccus were advancing with forced marches towards the capital, to make good their election at the point of their swords. The revolt of Vitellius was known at the seat of government before the death of Galba; and was only concealed from the public in order to prevent the domestic enemies of that emperor from taking advantage of an occurrence so favourable to their views. But secresy was no longer practicable. The veterans who had gained so many battles under the standards of Virginius, were now in possession of the strongest passes of the Alps, and ready to contend with Otho on the plains of Italy for the crown which he had so faithlessly usurped. To understand clearly the position which the fortunes of the rival competitors had thus assumed, it will be necessary to state the outlines of certain proceedings which took place immediately after the death of Nero.

State of the legions in Germany.

Upon the accession of Galba, Hordeonius Flaccus was sent to supersede Virginius in the command of the army upon the Upper Rhine, while Vitellius was appointed to assume the direction of the legions which served in the Lower Germany, and which had been recently commanded by Fonteius Capito. It has been mentioned in the history of Galba, that upon the death of Nero, the army of Virginius urged him to accept the imperial crown; and that it was not without much management that this disinterested general could induce his followers to take the oath of allegiance to Galba. Being soon afterwards deprived of this able commander, the legionary soldiers, who had never heartily concurred in the elevation of the aged governor of Terragona, showed themselves not only ready for a revolt, but also determined to obey no other master but such a one as they themselves should elect. Accustomed to war, and impatient of exile in a savage country, where the fruits of valour were confined to the bare honours of victory, they longed to prove the strength of their arms upon a more wealthy people; and to have a share in those splendid gratuities with which every new emperor was said to reward the fidelity of his partizans.[2]

The enemies of Galba took advantage of this mutinous and tur-

[1] Plut. *in Othon.* Tacit. *Hist.* lib.i. c. 83-85.
[2] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 9.

bulent disposition among the troops. They assured the credulous soldiers that it was the intention of the emperor to decimate them, for their avowed attachment to his rival, and to break their favourite officers, for not having taken a more decided part in his favour, upon the defeat of Vindex. They described him, too, as an avaricious old man, who was equally incapable of gratitude and of forgiveness; and they especially endeavoured to impress upon their minds that he was devoted to the interests of the Gallic faction which had taken arms in his cause, in opposition to the Germanic legions, who had fought for the privileges of the Senate and the liberty of the people. A.D. 69.

Vitellius takes the command on the Upper Rhine.

Under these circumstances, the arrival of Vitellius at the camp on the Lower Rhine was regarded as the signal for revolt in both armies. His name was illustrious in the annals of the republic; his father had been three times consul; and his own reputation, though not free from stains, was such as could not fail to render him popular in a nation of soldiers. He was affable in his manners, liberal in his disposition, and not very severe to mark slight violations of discipline. In particular, he gained honour by shunning the disgraceful cupidity of Fonteius Capito; who is said to have sold employments, and to have weighed the merit of all his officers by the amount of their fortunes, and their readiness to bribe.[1]

Is declared emperor.

It was on the second of January, a few days before Galba was put to death, that Vitellius was proclaimed emperor by the armies on the Upper and Lower Rhine. The principal agents in this revolution were Fabius Valens, who commanded a legion under Vitellius in the Lower Germany, and Alienus Cæcina, who held the same rank under Hordeonius in the Upper Province. The character of neither of those officers was entirely pure, nor such as to entitle them to unlimited confidence. Both had declared for Galba, and had even shown much zeal in promoting his advancement; but the former being disappointed in his expectations of a recompense, accused his master of insensibility and want of discernment, and accordingly made haste to offer his services to another; while the latter, detected and punished as a plunderer of the public treasury, determined to avenge his honour upon the fortunes of him whom he had injured; and, as Tacitus expresses it, to conceal his private wounds in the disasters of the commonwealth. Cæcina, in other respects, had every qualification fitted to gain the affections of soldiers. He was young, had a fine person, and showed a courage and an ambition equally boundless. His eloquence was spirited and powerful; his mien resolute and commanding, and his eyes full of fire. No one, in short, was better suited to wield the passions of the army in which he served, or to turn to the accomplishment of his own ends

Characters of Valens and Cæcina

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* c. 52.

A.D. 69. the mutinous spirit which at that period shook the camp of Hordeonius.[1]

The ardour of the soldiers was not fully seconded by the ambition of Vitellius. Luxurious in his habits, he was unwilling to sacrifice the ease and abundance which he enjoyed on the banks of the Rhine, to the chance of feasting like an emperor on those of the Tiber. He was, however, induced to allow Valens to advance towards the Cottian Alps at the head of forty thousand men, while Cæcina was to proceed by a shorter route, and enter Italy by the way of the Pennine Alps, securing as he advanced all the important passes in that mountain barrier. No sooner were these resolutions made known, than the legions pressed strongly for orders to march; and that little delay took place is manifest from the fact, that they had already made some progress on the road when they received the tidings of Galba's murder, which, as has been stated above, was perpetrated on the fifteenth of January.

The armies advance to Gaul.

The death of Galba made no impression on either army; it being to both of them a matter of absolute indifference whether they were to fight against him or against his successor; for the one was as much an object of hatred as the other, and each equally proved a bar to the advancement of their favourite Vitellius. The Gauls, indeed, who had been attached to the late emperor by a series of kind actions, which marked his accession to the throne, made a demonstration of warlike intentions, as the legions of Valens passed through their territory; but upon learning that their patron was no more, and having no personal regard for Otho, who had overthrown him, they unanimously declared for Vitellius, the terror of whose arms had begun to shake their constancy.[2]

The march of Cæcina through the country of the Helvetians, was productive of much distress to that simple but warlike people. Ignorant that Galba had ceased to reign, they refused to pledge their allegiance to Vitellius; and it was not until they had sustained several reverses on the field of battle, that they implored the clemency of the conqueror, and were allowed to resume the privileges of Roman subjects. The reduction of Helvetia was succeeded by an event still more important to the cause of Vitellius. A strong body of horse which had formerly served under him in Africa, and which was now stationed on the Po, no sooner observed the standards of Cæcina, moving towards Italy from the passes of the Alps, than they declared with one voice for their ancient commander, and induced four considerable cities in the neighbourhood to follow their example.[3]

And occupy the passes of the Alps.

When Otho was informed that his rival had made such formidable preparations for war, he addressed him several letters, inviting him to peace; offering him a large sum of money, and the highest

Otho makes proposals to Vitellius.

[1] Tacit. *Hist ut suprà, et* c. 54-56.
[2] Ibid. c. 64.
[3] Ibid. c. 67, 70.

offices in the government; or, if he should prefer a life of privacy, the choice of a retirement in any part of the empire, where he might spend his days in affluence and tranquillity. Vitellius replied to these propositions by making offers equally ostentatious and insincere: till, after a short exchange of heartless compliments, they both gave way to the natural feelings of their hearts, and loaded each other with the bitterest invective and reproach.[1] A.D. 69.

Arts resorted to by both parties.

Reluctant to embroil their country in the miseries of a civil war, each party endeavoured to thin the ranks of his opponent, by employing the usual arts of corruption among such as were open to the effects of deception or bribery, and by appealing to the patriotism and humanity of those who were willing to sacrifice their individual interests to the national welfare. These undisguised and more honourable attempts were followed by secret stratagems which proved equally disgraceful and unavailing; till at length the two competitors for the imperial purple sent assassins to murder each other. Otho possessed a powerful check on the designs of Vitellius, by having in his hands the mother, wife, and children of that commander, who were left by him in Rome, when he joined the army on the Rhine. The former consulted well for his reputation, by protecting from violence these innocent and helpless persons; and the generosity of Otho was amply requited by his successor, who employed the power which belonged to him as the head of the State, to shield from the calamities of a military revolution the relatives of his vanquished antagonist.[2]

The warlike means of Otho.

It has been already stated, that Vitellius was leading into the field the two armies which had been stationed in Upper and Lower Germany, and also such forces from Gaul as the influence of his generals had been able to draw over to their interests. The strength of Otho was not less considerable. Besides the troops in Italy, including the prætorian cohorts, he had on his side the legions of Dalmatia, Pannonia, and Mœesia, who readily swore obedience and fidelity to him. In addition to the provinces beyond sea, Britain, Egypt, Syria, and Africa, had professed their allegiance, and acknowledged him as their sovereign; not so much, perhaps, from affection to his person or respect for his character, as from the reverence which was still entertained in the remoter parts of the empire for the majesty of the Senate, and the name of the Roman people. On this principle, it was enough that the elevation of Otho was first announced to them, in order to secure all the duty and attachment which the provincials were accustomed to manifest towards the successors of Augustus. The power of each party, therefore, was nearly equal; and the chance of ultimate success

[1] Plut. *in Othon.* Dion Cassius, *Epit. Xiphil.* p. 203. Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 74.
[2] Tacit. *ut suprà.*

A.D. 69. appeared to be entirely suspended on the skill of the leaders, and the constancy of the soldiers.

His plan of the campaign,

The plan upon which Otho intended to conduct the campaign, has been described by Tacitus as follows: finding that the passes of the Alps were already occupied by the troops of Vitellius, he resolved to attack Narbonnese Gaul by sea; and for that purpose fitted out a fleet manned with the most trusty of his people, particularly the marine legion, which had been so cruelly treated by Galba, and whose commanders excelled all others in the knowledge of naval affairs.[1] Placing himself at the head of the land forces, he prepared to march against Cæcina and Valens, who were now descending rapidly upon the Po; having selected for his assistants in the field, Suetonius Paulinus, Marius Celsus, and Annius Gallus, three of the ablest and most experienced warriors that Rome then possessed. He reposed his chief confidence, however, in Licinius Proculus, one of the prætorian præfects; an officer whom Tacitus described as exceedingly well qualified for the duties of a city-guard, but entirely without experience in those higher parts of generalship which either insure victory or speedily repair the evils of defeat. The same historian adds, that he was a crafty and subtle calumniator, who knew how to cast an unfavourable light on the best deeds and qualifications of others, and to fill the prince's mind with fears and suspicions of those who to superior talents joined an habitual frankness and modesty.[2]

And character of his generals.

Sensation produced at Rome.

The preparations for war filled Rome with confusion and alarm. Since the reign of Augustus, the sound of arms, to be employed in actual hostilities so near the city, had not once been heard. The senators had grown grey in the habits and enjoyments of a peaceful life; the patricians were become enervated by the long disuse of military practice; and few of the equestrian order could boast of ever having made a campaign. All were smitten with fear; and the more they strove to conceal it, the more did their panic betray itself. The young, indeed, to whose imaginations war presented itself as a desirable occasion for displaying their fine arms, rich uniforms, and spirited horses, were busy in preparing for the field, and in feeding their vanity with hopes of distinction and future triumphs. The wise bewailed the loss of public tranquillity, and the disasters which were about to afflict the commonwealth; while the multitude, already smarting under a diminished supply of food, uttered their complaints in loud execrations against the authors of the war, and the restless ambition of the great.

Otho addresses the Senate and people.

Otho soon perceived the necessity of seeking a remedy for these evils in a prompt determination to bring his enemy to battle. On the fourteenth of March he convened the Senate, and formally

[1] Tacit. *ut suprà*, c. 87. [2] Ibid. *ut suprà*.

recommended to their care the safety of the republic. By certain acts of clemency and munificence, he laboured to gain their esteem, and to encourage the prospect of a mild and beneficent administration. He likewise harangued the people, and in his speech boasted of the greatness of the Capital of which they were citizens, and magnified the advantages which he derived from the suffrages in his favour of the august body of senators, who constituted the original and essential government of the empire. He refrained from mentioning the name of Vitellius. Of the partizans of that general he spoke with modesty and forbearance; charging them rather with ignorance and prejudice, than with dislike to his own person, or with treasonable feelings towards their country. A.D. 69.

Such conduct did not fail to produce, to a certain extent, the effect which was contemplated. The Senate applauded the wisdom of their emperor, and the common people saluted his ears with their flattery; which, says Tacitus, was as loud as it was false and deceitful. Nothing more could have been done, he adds; no stronger affection could have been shown, had the great dictator, Julius Cæsar, or the emperor Augustus been leaving the capital, to bring in chains to Italy the chiefs of distant Britain, or the vanquished king of the warlike Parthians. To so low a state had habitual servitude already brought the Roman people, that they appeared now in no better light than as a nation of slaves, consulting only their private ease and interests, and showing the utmost indifference for the public welfare and glory.[1]

And sets out to meet the enemy.

Otho had so far matured his plans, as to be able to despatch towards the north of Italy five prætorian cohorts, and a small body of horse, under the command of Anius Gallus and Vestricius Spurinna, who received orders to dispute with the enemy the passage of the Po. He himself followed at a small distance, with the rest of the prætorian cohorts and all the other troops which it had been possible to collect together; having deemed it inexpedient to wait the arrival of four legions, which were on their march from Dalmatia and Pannonia to join his standards. The personal deportment of the emperor, meanwhile, inspired his followers with the best hopes. Throwing aside the effeminate luxury for which he had been before remarkable, he armed himself with an iron breast-plate, and marched on foot at the head of his troops, regardless of the fatigue to which he was thereby exposed.

Success of his arms at Placentia.

The first events of the campaign were favourable to the cause of Otho. His fleet reduced to obedience the whole of Liguria and Narbonnese Gaul; retaining in his interests, at the same time, the important islands of Corsica and Sardinia. The army, likewise, gained considerable advantages.[2] The cavalry of Vitellius, aided by some Germans and Batavians, having forced a passage over the Po, and

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. i. c. 90.

[2] Ibid. lib. ii. c. 11-13.

A.D. 69. taken prisoners a Pannonian cohort, and a thousand marines, who had allowed themselves to be surprised, were induced by the ardour of victory to advance to Placentia, in which Spurinna had shut himself up with three Prætorian cohorts and a body of veterans. Cæcina, eager to strike a decisive blow, resolved to carry that city by storm; and though in the first assault he was repulsed with great loss, his failure only incited him to renew the attempt on a larger scale and with more adequate means. The night preceding the second attack was spent in mutual preparations. The soldiers of Vitellius made ready hurdles, sheds, and battering rams, with the intention of approaching and levelling the walls; while the garrison prepared long poles, and collected enormous masses of stone, lead, and other materials, to throw down upon the works of the assailants, and to crush those in pieces who should advance under the ramparts. Each party was sensible of the effect likely to be produced by a successful issue in this important enterprise. Scarcely had the day dawned, when the walls of Placentia were covered with defenders, and the adjoining plain seemed filled with troops, whose armour reflected the first rays of the morning. The legions in close order, and the auxiliaries extended over a large space of ground, prepared to assist each other in the attack; the latter being well practised in the use of missile weapons, and accustomed to run and climb with incredible swiftness. The Germans, who disdained the aids of defensive armour, exposed their half-naked bodies to the darts and arrows of the Prætorians; and even the legionary soldiers who advanced under a canopy of shields, found no protection in that military device against the huge masses which were hurled from the battlements. Cæcina, after two fruitless assaults, which cost him many lives, was compelled to raise the siege, and retire to Cremona.[1]

Defeat of Cæcina.

This advantage might have been further improved, had Annius Gallus seconded the ardour of his soldiers; who, learning the route which the enemy had taken, importuned their commander to follow and complete their destruction. The policy of Gallus, which has not been explained by any historian, led him to check the impetuosity of his men, and instead of advancing upon Cremona, to halt at a village called Bebriacum, where the fortune of the war was very soon afterwards determined.

This caution, which was condemned in Gallus, was imitated, about the same time, by Martius Macer, and Suetonius Paulinus. The former, after defeating a strong body of German auxiliaries, allowed them to pursue their retreat unmolested; and the latter permitted victory to slip out of his hands, after it had been almost achieved by the valour of Marius Celsus. Cæcina, to recover the reputation which he had lost at Placentia, formed a stratagem in order to ensnare the generals to whom he was opposed in the field. But his

Second defeat of Cæcina.

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 20-22.

artifice being discovered, was turned against himself with so much effect, that the imperial horse broke through his ranks, and would have completely destroyed his whole army, had they received the assistance of the foot commanded by Paulinus. This officer was noted for the caution and slowness of his movements, never thinking it time to conquer, says Tacitus, until he had removed every hazard of being vanquished. If the ardour of Paulinus in the pursuit, had been equal to his skill in the engagement, it is probable he would, on that day, have secured the empire of Rome to his master Otho.[1] A.D. 69.

The soldiers who served under Cæcina, perceived, with indignation, the fault of their commander, and were disposed to ascribe to treachery what, in fact, belonged to want of military talent. They put the præfect of their camp in chains, on a suspicion that he was corrupted by the enemy; and had not Valens arrived at this juncture, at the head of his numerous army, there is every reason to believe that the legions of Cæcina would either have dispersed, or have placed themselves under the standards of Otho.

Vitellius offers battle, which Otho is disposed to accept.

When the forces of Vitellius were thus united, they thought themselves in a condition to offer battle; and the wisdom of this determination became the more manifest, when they perceived that a spirit of jealousy and mutual aversion, actuated all the proceedings of the two generals. Cæcina despised his colleague for his low avarice, and Valens poured contempt on Cæcina, for his arrogance, presumption, and mean abilities. It was likewise discovered that the public judgment, on a comparison of the rival princes whose clains were about to be decided, was in favour of Vitellius; inasmuch as an indolent voluptuous character was less to be feared, than one which combined a variety of ungovernable and destructive passions. Otho, on the other hand, had urgent reasons for protracting the war, or at least for postponing a general engagement, in which his hopes might be irretrievably ruined. Several legions, the arrival of which would give a decided superiority to his army, were on their march to join him; all the strongholds on the Po were garrisoned by his troops; and he had magazines so amply furnished with provisions and military stores, that his soldiers, however numerous, were completely secured against the risk of scarcity.

Reasons urged by Otho's generals for delay.

These reasons, it is true, were less felt by Otho himself than by his more experienced generals, all of whom recommended a short delay. The emperor, it was suspected, could no longer endure the torture of suspense. The vivacity and impatience of his temper, made him prefer a speedy decision, whatever might ensue, to that painful uncertainty which had so long hung over his head; and he, therefore, gladly listened to the counsels of those who discovered an advantage in accepting the challenge of the enemy. The Prætorians, also, unaccustomed to the fatigues and restraint of actual service, became importunate for battle; imagining that they had only to

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 24-6.

A.D. 69. meet their adversaries in the open plain, to ensure for themselves the honours of a triumph, and all the indulgences and solace of a lasting peace. But a more urgent reason than any yet mentioned, may have influenced the determination of Otho, to appeal to the decision of arms. It was conjectured that the soldiers, on both sides, had begun to question the propriety of sacrificing their lives for two of the most worthless men on the face of the earth; and to take into their consideration, whether they might not render an important service to their country, by rejecting both the one and the other, and by conferring the title of Augustus on some meritorious and popular character, whose actions would not disgrace that proud appellation.[1]

Otho is determined to fight.

At all events, it was determined that a battle should be fought: after which resolution, Otho was weak enough to allow his advisers to agitate the question, whether he should be present in the field, or retire beforehand to a place of safety, at a convenient distance. It was resolved that the emperor should provide for the security of his person, by falling back upon Brixellum; a measure which Tacitus very justly regards as the main cause of Otho's defeat and ruin. In the first place, he carried with him a part of the Prætorian cohorts, and some other of his best troops, and thereby deprived those which remained, of their usual courage and confidence; and, secondly, he intrusted his fate to the mutual suspicions and jealousy of his commanders, who, having doubts of one another's fidelity, required more than ever some presiding genius to direct their movements, and make them act in concert. In such circumstances, the prudence and experience of Paulinus, were of no avail. The brother of the emperor was, upon the retirement of the latter, invested with the title of his lieutenant; but the chief power resided in Proculus, the Prætorian præfect, a man who possessed hardly any one military qualification, while he was equally insolent and vain in the discharge of his office. It was no longer doubtful that a general action, and the downfal of Otho, were rapidly approaching.

The battle of Bebriacum or Cremona.

The conflict took place at Bebriacum, a village not far removed from the banks of the Po. It was begun by an attack of cavalry, on the part of Otho's generals, who, urged by their master to hasten an engagement, had proceeded by forced marches in search of the enemy. The inequality of the grouud, or the precipitate manner in which the contending legions were brought into contact, occasioned considerable interruptions in either line; so that the battle, though general, was divided into a number of separate fights. In such circumstances, the fortune of war could not fail to present a variety of aspects. In one part of the field, the impetuosity of Otho's troops, subdued all opposition, and bore off in triumph the eagles of their antagonists; while, in another quarter, this success was more than counterbalanced by the steady bravery of Vitellius's veterans, and by the furious onset of his German and Gallic confederates. At the

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 31, 32, 37.

close of the day, Vitellius, though still lingering in Gaul, found himself a conqueror, and master of the Roman world; for next morning, Marius Celsus, and Annius Gallus, went to the camp of Cæcina and Valens, in order to sue for peace, offering to acknowledge him as their emperor. The negotiation was neither long nor difficult; all parties found their interest in coming to a speedy accommodation; and as soon as the deputies returned to the camp, the gates were thrown open, and the soldiers who so lately had fought for Otho, now showed the utmost alacrity in swearing allegiance to Vitellius.[1] A.D. 69. Otho defeated, and Vitellius declared emperor.

The account of the battle given by Plutarch, differs considerably from that which has been preserved by Tacitus—the former introducing into it a number of incidents which evidently belong to the martial engagements which took place before the armies met at Bebriacum. He admits, indeed, that those from whom he received the details, were ignorant of many of the particulars, owing to the confused manner in which it was fought; but, he adds, that long afterwards, when he was passing over the field of battle, Mestrius Florus, a man of consular dignity, pointed out to him an old man, who, in his youth, had served under Otho, and who gave him such information respecting it, as sufficiently established the fact that the struggle had been both obstinate and sanguinary.[2]

Otho waited at Brixellum the event of the conflict which he had so injudiciously accelerated. When his misfortune was first announced, he bore the intelligence with considerable firmness, but gave manifest indications of the fatal resolution which he was about to carry into effect. The guards who were admitted to his presence, entreated him not to abandon the empire, nor to desert an affectionate and devoted army, ready to die for his sake. One of the præfects even proceeded so far, as to repeat, in his ears, the usual commonplaces against suicide, and to remind him, that there was more real courage in bearing adversity, than in sinking under it; that brave men should struggle against fortune, and, in spite of her frowns, should still hope and strive for better times; and that it belonged only to the character of cowards to permit their fears to carry them to despair.[3] Conduct of Otho after defeat.

The reflections of philosophy were in vain addressed to a mind which had never been taught to exercise control over its own passions, nor to regulate its movements by the calculations of reason. Tacitus puts into his mouth a speech filled with lofty sentiments, and which may be said to express the very fanaticism of self-murder; but it is manifest, notwithstanding, that Otho resolved to die, because he had not strength of character to bear, any longer, the anxious suspense and uncertainty of a civil war; and because he was determined that no chances of fortune should ever place him at the mercy of Vitellius, or compel him to court the clemency, or add to the triumph of a man whom he had lately denounced as a rebel, and

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 44, 45. Dion Cassius, *Epit. Xiphil.* p. 203.
[2] Plut. *in Othon. ad finem.* [3] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 46.

A.D. 69. reproached as one of the most contemptible and depraved of human beings. He spent the last evening of his life in attempting to comfort his nephew, Salvius Cocceianus—in writing a letter of condolence to his sister—and in recommending the care of his ashes to Statilia Messalina, the widow of Nero, whom, it is said, he intended to marry. At break of day he desired to be left alone, that no one might be accused of being an accomplice in his death; immediately after which he fell upon his sword, and almost instantly expired.

His suicide. His remains, at his own request, were interred without any delay, as he was apprehensive that his head might be cut off and exposed, or other insults inflicted on his dead body. The soldiers erected a monument over his grave, inscribed:—

TO THE MEMORY OF MARCUS OTHO.

The early debaucheries of Otho, threw a stain upon his reputation, which his good conduct in Lusitania, and his mildness as emperor, did not altogether remove. The treatment which he received from Nero might, in some degree, justify his rebellion against that prince;

His character. but no palliation can be found for the treason and cruelty with which he was chargeable towards Galba. In all things his actions were marked by a culpable extreme; and perhaps both the good and the evil which appeared in his life, were the result of circumstances, rather than of virtuous principle, or of fixed and incurable depravity. He died on the fifteenth or sixteenth of April, at the age of thirty-seven, having reigned exactly three months.[2]

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 49, 50.





CHAPTER XIV.

AULUS VITELLIUS.

FROM APRIL TO DECEMBER, A.D. 69.

A.D. 69.

The lineage of Vitellius.

THE pedigree of Vitellius cannot be traced, with certainty, higher than to his grandfather Publius, who, in the reign of Augustus, held an office in one of the lower departments of the revenue, and was raised by the same emperor, to the order of knighthood. Suetonius informs us, on the authority of a tract composed by Quintus Eulogius, that the Vitellian family, in ancient times, reigned over the whole of Latium; and that they were descended from Faunus, king of the aborigines, and Vitellia, a female of mortal origin, but who derived, from the superstition of the surrounding country, the reverence and worship due only to a celestial being. The same biographer draws from certain local names and traditions, known to the inhabitants of Rome, an additional species of evidence in favour of the antiquity of this race; but he admits, at the same time, that there is much probability in the arguments of those who maintain that the successor of Otho was the great-grandson of a slave, and of a baker's daughter.[1]

And early history at court.

Lucius Vitellius, the father of the emperor, enjoyed under Tiberius, the dignity of consul, and had afterwards conferred upon him the government of Syria. His high rank, and the influence which he appears to have possessed with his imperial master, enabled him to procure for his son, the doubtful advantage of a courtly education; for it is mentioned by Suetonius, that the young Vitellius passed his infancy and early youth at Capreæ, in the society, or attached to the

[1] Suet. *in Vitell.* c. 1, 2.

A.D. 69. establishment of the prince.[1] The luxurious habits which were formed at that important period of life, determined his future character, and laid the foundation of that systematic licentiousness and gross sensuality, which destroyed in his mind every noble principle and manly feeling, and which has entailed upon his memory a load of contempt and reproach. Vitellius became remarkable for the most expensive gluttony—measuring the value and extent of his power, by the means which it afforded him of gratifying his pampered appetite, and of placing on his table a variety of rare and costly dishes, which could no where else be seen. At the court of Caligula, he rose into reputation as an expert charioteer—he gained the favour of Claudius, as a gamester—and he placed Nero under a deep obligation, by requesting that emperor to sing at a public entertainment, and by assuriug him that his subjects longed so much to hear the charming melody of his voice, that they would accept of no apology. By such means it was, that Vitellius, beloved and favoured by three succeeding princes, was elevated to the highest offices of the magistracy and priesthood; joining, in every instance, as it has been emphatically remarked, the greatest grandeur to the greatest vice.[2]

We have observed, when speaking of his conduct at the head of the legions in Germany, that he was free from the stain of avarice, the besetting sin of almost every Roman commander in those evil times. During the two years, likewise, that he governed Africa in quality of proconsul, he discharged his duties with impartiality and moderation; no complaint having ever been made against him by the people over whom he ruled, that he either plundered or oppressed them. When his profusion had reduced him to indigence, and compelled him to rob, he chose for his victims the revenue of the State or the wealthy establishments of Rome; for we find that when charged with the care of the public buildings, he was suspected of removing the ornaments, and of withdrawing part of the donations and offerings which were presented in the temples; substituting pewter in the room of silver, and gilded brass instead of gold.[3]

Sent to Germany by Galba

It was the policy of Galba to promote to the highest military posts those persons from whom he had least to fear, and who, he imagined, would be slow to encourage any seditious proposals in the armies over which they presided. On this principle, he sent Hordeonius Flaccus to supersede Virginius, whose popularity had become dangerous; and gave to Vitellius the command of those legions on the Lower Rhine, which had been stirred up to revolt by the arts of Fonteius Capito. The successor of Capito was too much devoted to the pleasures of the palate to be disturbed by the dreams of ambition; and it was not till the soldiers laid hands on him, carried

[1] Suet. *in Vitell.* c. 3. [2] Ibid. c. 4, 5.
[3] Suet. *ut suprà.*

him into the street, and proclaimed him emperor, that Vitellius gave his consent to be saluted by the title of Augustus. No sooner was this ceremony concluded, than the master of the Roman armies took refuge in a house, where he was told a feast had been prepared for him; and from which he was with difficulty removed, even after a fire, which had broken out in the apartment, threatened to reduce the whole building to ashes. In fact, he was a mere puppet in the hands of Cæcina and Valens, who, sensible that they themselves had neither name nor rank to justify the expectation of imperial power, determined to raise their general to the head of the empire, and thereby to open up a path for their own ambition, as the leaders of victorious armies.

A.D. 69. And proclaimed emperor by the legions on the Rhine.

It was mentioned, at the close of the last reign, that Marius Celsus and Annius Gallus entered into a treaty with the victorious generals, and that the soldiers under their command professed their readiness to swear allegiance to Vitellius. But besides the army actually engaged, there was the strong detachment of troops which Otho had conducted to Brixellum; who, retaining the greatest affection for their prince, refused to acknowledge for emperor, the besotted epicure whom the seditious legions had brought from the Rhine. We find, accordingly, that immediately after the funeral rites of Otho were performed, the troops applied to Virginius, whom they had forcibly detained at Brixellum, to accept the vacant diadem; renewing on that occasion the violence to which he had formerly been exposed, and threatening to compel him by all the means in their power to assume the duties of the supreme government. Virginius would not receive from the hands of a beaten army, the boon which he had twice refused when offered by the legions in the moment of victory. He declined even to undertake the adjustment of an accommodation with Cæcina and Valens; and making his escape from the furious soldiers, who were now more inclined to engage in intrigue than in battle, he left them no choice but to submit to the conqueror.[1]

Virginius still refuses the empire.

The accession of Vitellius created hardly any sensation at Rome.[2] The inhabitants were employed at that moment in celebrating the festival of Ceres; and upon learning that Otho was dead, and that the troops in the capital had already taken the oath of allegiance to the new emperor, they unanimously applauded the conduct of the armies, approved of their new master, and continued their amusements. The multitude, meanwhile, carried to all the temples the statues of Galba, adorned with flowers and laurel; and erected in the Forum, on the spot where he was murdered, a pyramid of crowns in form of a tomb. Nor was the Senate more backward in their expressions of adulation. By one degree they granted to Vitellius all the privileges and honours which had been conferred upon his

The accession of Vitellius received with indifference at Rome.

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 51. Plut. *in Othon.*
[2] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 55.

A.D. 69. predecessors, at different times, and after the lapse of many years. Thanks were likewise voted to the German armies for their zeal and patriotism; deputies were named to convey their homage to Vitellius, and to congratulate him on his accession to the throne of the Cæsars; and, in a word, the proudest of that once illustrious body lavished on the despicable glutton whom a military faction had set over them, all the praises which the most rigid personal virtues, and the most eminent public services could have merited in the best times of their Commonwealth.[1]

War presses on the provinces of Italy.

But though Rome escaped the horrors of civil war, the weight of that calamity was severely felt by the country at large. The troops of Vitellius, unchecked by their officers, who had neither power nor firmness to oppose their excesses, spread themselves over the richest provinces of Italy, plundering the towns and villas, robbing temples and private houses, and adding every where to their violence the most shameful debauchery. Cæcina, less covetous than his colleague, was more disposed to yield to the caprice and rapacity of the soldiers; while Valens, noted for his own extortions, could not refuse to connive at the faults of those who, in their worst actions, only followed his own example.[2]

Vitellius leaves Gaul for Rome.

Vitellius was still in Gaul, when his army on the Po conquered for him the highest dignity of the empire. He had with him all the forces which were left in the Lower province at the departure of Valens and Cæcina; to which he had added eight thousand men levied in Britain, and a considerable number of recruits, which he raised in his march towards the Alps. When the news reached him that the battle of Bebriacum had placed him on the throne, he assembled his troops, conveyed to them the important intelligence that he was now their emperor, and made preparations for his journey to Rome.

Clemency and liberality of the new emperor.

His principal officers recrossed the Alps to meet him, and attend his progress to the capital. Valens and Cæcina were loaded with favours, and received the honour of having a seat on each side of the imperial chair. He listened to the submission of Paulinus and Proculus, and gave a ready audience to Marius Celsus, who had induced the vanquished troops to acknowledge his authority. With a few exceptions, he extended his clemency towards all the tribunes and centurions who had fought for Otho; and, in no case did he harass the families of those who had shown the greatest zeal for his antagonists, either by forfeiture of their estates, or by deprivation of their rank. Nor did he retain any hatred to the memory either of Galba or of Otho. On the contrary, he allowed the coin stamped with their impress to continue in circulation, and their statues to receive respect, in every part of the empire. He sought popularity,

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 55, *ut suprà.*

[2] Ibid. c. 56.

too, by remitting such arrears due to the public treasury as could not be paid without distress; and by allowing the benefactions and immunities which had been granted by his predecessors, to be enjoyed by those who held them, without disturbance or reproach.[1] A.D. 69.

His gluttony and expensive living.

His conduct so far was praiseworthy and seasonable; but he disgraced these good deeds by a mixture of mean actions, and particularly by indulging to a disgusting excess in the pleasures of the table.[2] He made four meals regularly every day with a sharp and craving appetite; using emetics to relieve his stomach, and to create a desire for food. Earth and ocean were ransacked to find dainties wherewith to stimulate his palate. The countries through which he passed were impoverished by his unceasing voluptuousness; and Tacitus assures us, that the principal inhabitants of the cities were ruined by the inordinate expenses of the entertainments which they found it expedient to give him, on his way through their territory. He dined with one, and supped with another; but still the burden was intolerable, as no feast could be served up before him which did not cost at least four hundred thousand sesterces.[3] The duty of eating with him, too, was not less oppressive than that of supplying his table. Vibius Crispus, falling ill, was relieved from his attendance at those murderous feasts; and declared that he must soon have been a dead man if he had not been overtaken by sickness.[4]

Instances of his excess in gratifying the palate.

As the insatiable appetite and extragavance of Vitellius were the most remarkable features in his character, and even conferred a species of distinction on his reign, the annalists of Rome have not thought it unbecoming the dignity of history to record some instances of his sumptuous gluttony. Suetonius tells us, that Lucius, the emperor's brother, gave an entertainment in honour of the new dynasty, at which were served up two thousand fish, and seven thousand rare and expensive fowls. The emperor himself made a solemn dedication of a silver dish, which, on account of its prodigious size, he denominated "The Shield of Minerva, the Guardian of Cities;"[5] and this he filled with livers of a very scarce fish, with the brains of peacocks and pheasants, the tongues of redwings, and with the roes of lampreys. It was preserved as a monument of imperial luxury till the reign of Hadrian, who gave orders to melt it down, and convert the material to a more useful purpose. The expenses of such an establishment could not fail to be very great; but our belief is startled at the enormous estimate made by Dion Cassius, who says that Vitellius spent during the eight months he was on the throne nine hundred millions of sesterces, a sum which

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 60.

[2] Ibid. c. 62.

[3] About £3,200. Tacitus remarks of this emperor, *Epularium fœda atque inexplebilis libido—Exhausti conviviorum apparatibus principes civitatum; vastabantur ipsæ civitates.*

[4] Suet. *Vitell.*

[5] Ibid. c. 13. *Clypeum Minervæ πολιοῦχου.*

A.D. 69. exceeds seven millions of our money.[1] Nor were the regular supplies of his table found sufficient to allay the cravings of his inordinate desire for food. At sacrifices he was ready, as his biographer relates, to snatch from the burning coals the flesh of the victims which had been offered up, and the sacred cakes which usually accompanied the solemn oblation. If, in passing along the streets, the cooks' shops or stalls presented any dressed victuals or fragments of broken meats, he seized with his own hand the tempting morsels; regardless as to who had feasted on it before him, or from whose kitchen it had been sent for sale.[2]

Corruption of the soldiers.

Under such an emperor, the corruption of discipline could not but advance at a rapid pace. The soldiers imitating his example, while they despised his person, gave themselves up to all manner of licentiousness; and the officers, unable to restrain their followers, seemed willing to shelter their reputation under the conduct of their chief. Hence arose many acts of violence and disorder. The march of his army was tracked by waste and plunder; the peasantry were impressed, and made slaves to their military tyrants; and the wealth of the provincial towns became the booty of the fierce Gauls and barbarous Germans who had espoused the cause of Vitellius. At length, the legionary soldiers and the auxuliaries proceeded to open war with one another; and on the arrival of the emperor at Ticinium, he found that two cohorts of the latter were actually cut to pieces by the swords of his regular troops. The confusion which thus disgraced his own camp, was augmented by the haughtiness of the conquered army, which had been induced to submit after the death of Otho; and as the symptoms of insubordination were becoming every day more alarming, Vitellius resolved, by dispersing some of his legions and by breaking others, to reduce the power of his military once more within due bounds. He ordered the Batavians back to Germany, and the 14th legion to Britain; while he inflicted on the prætorians, whose attachment to the late emperor had hastened the crisis of civil war, the suitable punishment of disbanding all the cohorts which were on the Po. He dismissed, at the same time, all the militia raised in Gaul; regarding them as more proper to swell the ranks of an invading army, than to increase the strength or respectability of a peace establishment. Devoted as he was to the lowest species of sensuality, he could not fail to perceive that the danger which he had most to apprehend, arose from the turbulent disposition of his soldiers; and that the civil authorities of the empire could not be reinstated in the exercise of that just power on which the lives and liberty of his subjects depended, unless the arms of the Republic were again placed under the control of the Senate. With this view he proceeded to reduce the number of men both in

Vitellius disbands a great part of the army.

[1] Dion Cassius, *Epit. Xiphil.* p. 206, and Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 95.
[2] Suet. *Vitell.* c. 13.

the old legions and auxiliaries; a measure which is condemned by Tacitus, not only without reason, but in opposition, we think, to the clearest principles of political wisdom.[1] The historian questions the policy of the step, because the duty of the soldiers was thereby increased; a sufficient cause, we admit, for the dissatisfaction of the military; but when he adds, that their bodily vigour was diminished by their luxurious habits, we are at a loss to connect his remark with the occurrence to which it seems to bear a reference. A.D. 69.

Vitellius, who was still on his progress towards Rome, repaired from Ticinium to Cremona, where Cæcina entertained him with a banquet and a combat of gladiators. After this, he expressed a desire to see the plains of Bebriacum, where the battle was fought which set him on the throne; and as forty days had not yet passed since the conflict took place, there still remained many proofs that the empire had not been determined without a severe struggle and the shedding of much blood. The emperor enjoyed the minutest details of the fight, and witnessed without horror the mangled limbs of the brave men, whose lives had been sacrificed to the ambition of two worthless adventurers. His eye wandered over every part of the dreadful scene, betraying not the smallest emotion at the sight of so many thousands of his countrymen deprived of the decent honours of burial. On the contrary, he is said to have indulged in the most unbecoming merriment, replying to those who complained of the stench which proceeded from the putrid carcases, that nothing smelled more sweetly than the body of a dead enemy, particularly when that enemy was a citizen.[2] He visits the field of Bebriacum.

An entertainment and another exhibition of gladiators, provided by Valens at Bononia, supplied to the luxurious emperor sufficient spirits to proceed to his capital. He was followed on his way thither by sixty thousand armed men, who knew neither order nor discipline, and who dragged after them a still greater number of slaves and attendants. As he approached nearer to the city, there issued forth to meet him a multitude of actors, singers, buffoons, and other ministers of courtly dissipation, who claimed the privileges of friendship, or the rewards of former services. To these were added many senators and Roman knights, who went to salute their new sovereign; some from fear, others from flattery, but all in order to prevent any bad construction being put upon their slowness to sanction the choice of the victorious army, and to offer their homage to the imperial commander. Vitellius had resolved to enter Rome as a place taken in war; but his friends succeeded in dissuading him from a step so extremely unpopular. He began his procession at the Milvian bridge, And proceeds to Rome, which he enters in state.

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 69. *Exitiabile id reipublicæ, ingratum militi, cui eadem munia inter paucos, pericula et labor crebrius redibant: et vires luxu corrumpebantur, contra veterem disciplinam et instituta majorum.*

[2] Suet. *Vitell.* c. 10. *Optimè olere occisum hostem, et melius civem.*

A.D. 69. mounted on a fine horse, and completely armed; but when he reached the gates he put on the *toga prætexta*, and converted the military spectacle into a peaceful pageant, suited to the character which he meant to assume, as well as to the wishes of the better part of the citizens. When he reached the Capitol he found his mother waiting to receive him. He embraced her with an appearance of affection, and conferred on her the title of Augusta, though he himself had accepted no higher honour than the appellation of Cæsar.[1]

Next day he convened the Senate and people, to listen at once to professions which were never to be reduced to practice, and to boast of activity and temperance which had no foundation in truth. Though every one knew that he had travelled from the Alps to the Tiber, either asleep or stupid from dissipation; the emperor reminded his auditors of his unceasing vigilance and unwearied assiduity in promoting the interests of Rome; upon which the giddy populace, now accustomed to echo the flatteries which were addressed to their rulers, redoubled their acclamations in his ears, and prevailed on him at length to accept the title of Augustus. He pursued, at the same time, all the other means of acquiring popularity which were most likely to gain the suffrages of the multitude. In the theatre, he bestowed his applause and protection on such actors as were most agreeable to the people; and in the circus, he espoused the cause of the Blue Faction, though interest and inclination must have led him to give his countenance to their rivals. He attended the Senate, too, at every meeting, whether the business to be transacted was important or trifling; bearing the opposition of those whose opinions differed from his own, with a degree of placidity which denoted either craft or weakness.[2]

He addresses the Senate and people.

Cæcina and Valens, who had been raised to the consulate, enjoyed all the power of the government, while the emperor was compelled to execute their orders, and to rest satisfied with the mere semblance of supreme authority. The consuls, meantime, were jealous of each other; and the two prætorian præfects, Publius Sabinus and Julius Priscus, took, in like manner, different sides; the former lending the weight of his influence to Cæcina, while the latter endeavoured to strengthen the interests of his antagonist. The pomp and arrogance of these officers gave great umbrage to the Roman people. They loaded themselves with riches, and took possession of houses and lands which belonged to the ancient nobility; and it was remarked that many of this illustrious order, who were recalled by Galba from an honourable exile, were not restored to their property, but allowed to languish in indigence and neglect. Vitellius recommended these high-minded patricians, who had sacrificed their liberty

Conduct of Cæcina and Valens, the new consuls.

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 90. [2] Ibid. c. 91.

and estates for the good of their country, to avail themselves of a law which compelled freedmen, in case their master should ever be in want, to supply them with the necessaries of life, and to leave to them at their death the one-half of their goods. A.D. 69.

Relaxation of manners at court, and sufferings of the people.

The army, as has been already observed, was greatly reduced in number, but not improved in discipline. It soon became necessary to replace the prætorian cohorts, which the fears or resentment of Vitellius had induced him to disband; and for this purpose twenty thousand men were levied, and divided into sixteen cohorts called prætorian, and into four, which were denominated urban, or city cohorts. As this was a favoured service, the soldiers showed great eagerness to be enrolled; and as the choice of candidates devolved upon the consuls, in their quality of commanders of the army, who had gained great credit by the victory at Bebriacum, assumed the chief management in the new levy, and, by admitting his friends into the ranks of that powerful corps, confirmed the ascendancy which he had already acquired. The jealousy of Cæcina's temper now took the alarm; and Tacitus remarks, that from this period the fidelity of the consul began to waver. Vitellius, blinded by the incessant glare and ostentation of imperial luxury, perceived not the dangers by which he was surrounded. The mutiny of his soldiers was appeased by the sacrifice of the most virtuous citizens, or of the most patriotic among the nobility; the extravagance of his establishment was maintained by rapine, extortion, and the meanest arts of finance; and the corrupted taste of the furious populace was constantly gratified by the exhibition of gladiators and combats of wild beasts. The same profusion and venality which had disgraced the court of Nero, were revived to the fullest extent. Honour and integrity were equally despised; and the only way to attain power was to lavish on the gluttony of the emperor the most sumptuous feasts that wealth could supply or luxury invent. Rome already groaned under the weight of such oppression. The freedmen and other dependents of Vitellius accumulated immense fortunes, derived from the fears or ambition of those whose fate depended on the caprice of that dull and grovelling epicure. In the course of four months, the inhabitants had smarted under the exactions of Otho and the tyrannical inflictions of his successor; had given up their property to the infamous ministers of both; had gratified the avarice of Vinius, Icelus, Asiaticus, and Valens,[1] and met the enormous expenses of the imperial kitchen. The patience of all classes was nearly exhausted; when the good began to hope, and the bad were made to fear, that the reign of Vitellius would soon be brought to a close.

The cruelty of Vitellius.

To these evils, which threatened the speedy ruin of the country, the emperor at length added the most wanton cruelties against

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 93-95.

A.D. 69. private individuals. Many with whom he had been intimate from his childhood, and whom he allowed to indulge in the privileges of friendship, were condemned to ignominious deaths; and against such of his creditors as had in any manner teased him for the payment of his debts, he cherished a hatred so violent and implacable, that nothing short of a capital punishment could satisfy his vindictive mind. One of these persons, who waited on him to pay his court, was ordered from his presence into the hands of the executioner; but altering his intention, he immediately desired him to be brought back and stabbed before his eyes, saying that he wished to have the pleasure of seeing an enemy's blood. On another occasion, two sons who besought him to spare their father's life were condemned to the same death. A Roman knight exclaimed as they were dragging him to execution, that he had made the emperor his heir. Vitellius commanded the will to be produced: and finding that the testator had made one of his own freedman a joint inheritor, he issued immediate orders that they should both be put to instant death.[1]

Prepares his subjects for revolt.

Such instances of tyranny prepared the minds of the people for the revolution which was already planned in the East. The miserable condition of the empire, and the persuasion of those who wished to see the supreme power exercised with greater wisdom and clemency, had more weight with VESPASIANUS than any motives of personal ambition in determining his conduct at this important juncture. He had abstained from taking any share in those occurrences which deprived Nero of the throne and of his life; and so far was he from entertaining any designs against Galba, that he sent his son Titus to pay homage in his name to that emperor on his accession to power. Titus, on his arrival at Corinth, received information that the imperial seat was again vacant, or rather was claimed by two competitors, equally unworthy of occupying the throne of the Cæsars. Returning to Palestine he found his father in appearance determined to support Otho, to whom he had induced the legions to take the oath of fidelity; but, at the same time, he was engaged in a correspondence with Mucianus, the governor of Syria, with the view of concerting measures whereby the Commonwealth might be restored, under a virtuous sovereign, to its ancient dignity and vigour.[2]

Character of Vespasianus, and of Mucianus, the governor of Syria.

Vespasianus and Mucianus were men of very different characters, and had even been for some time at variance. The one was a warrior, and the other excelled in the arts of negociation; the former was distinguished for his simplicity and economy, the latter delighted in show and magnificence, living more like a prince than a private man. Vespasianus was great in action, Mucianus stood high as an eloquent and persuasive speaker. An excellent prince, says Tacitus, might have been formed out of the two generals, could their good

[1] Suet. *Vitell.* c. 14. [2] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 96.

qualities have been blended, and their respective frailties been entirely removed.[1] A.D. 69.

They united in a sincere fidelity to Galba, whose principles they respected, and from whose administration they anticipated the happiest results; but when they found that the empire was to fall a victim either to Otho or to Vitellius, they called to mind that patriots have higher duties to perform than merely to yield obedience to a successful usurpation, or to submit to that worst of all despotisms, the absolute power of a military chief. They began, therefore, to estimate the strength that would be necessary to put down a government founded on principles so entirely selfish, and supported by means at once so oppressive and so disgraceful to the Roman people. The forces at their command, or under the influence of the motives which were to guide their enterprise, appeared fully equal to the accomplishment of the great end which they had in view. Judæa had three legions, inured to the fatigues and privations of an obstinate war; Syria presented four, well trained and equipped, and animated with the best spirit towards their country and their officers. Egypt, with its two legions, was ready to increase their ranks; and the troops in Asia Minor, Pontus, Cappadocia, and Armenia, indignant at the arrogance of the legions on the Rhine, who claimed the right of giving sovereigns to the empire, were burning with desire to assert their own privileges, as well as to share the ease and luxury which were enjoyed by their brethren in the Italian provinces.[2] Their confederacy.

Though perfectly confident with regard to the inclinations and valour of their soldiers, the generals were disposed to wait the issue of the war between Otho and Vitellius. It was of little consequence to them which of the two rivals should ultimately prevail, and even whether the troops which were defeated under the one should join the victorious standards of the other. They knew that no sincere reconciliation could take place between the legions which had been opposed to one another in the field; and they were sufficiently acquainted with the characters of the contending emperors to foresee, that if the fortune of arms should destroy the one, the gratification of his hopes would overthrow the other. They wait the issue of the civil war.

But even after the battle of Bebriacum and the death of Otho, Vespasianus continued to hesitate. Nay, he proceeded so far as to go through the ceremony of taking the oath of allegiance to Vitellius; himself dictating the formulary in which the army was called to plight its faith, and adding prayers for the happiness and prosperity of the new emperor. Perhaps he was not grieved to observe that the soldiers remained in sullen silence, or reluctantly repeated the Vespasianus still hesitates.

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* c. 4, 5. *Egregium Principatus temperamentum, si demptis utriusque vitiis, solæ virtutes miscerentur.*

[2] Ibid. lib. ii. c. 73-87.

A.D. 69. words which he put into their mouths; but it is not concealed that the dangers connected with the undertaking, to which the sense of duty impelled him, appeared in their full magnitude to his imagination, and kept his mind in painful suspense. "How important," said he, "how solemn, and how pregnant with perilous contingencies must that day prove, in which a father, threescore years old, shall expose himself with his two sons in the flower of their age to all the hazards of war. Those whose views do not extend beyond a private station, may, if success appear impracticable, relinquish their attempts; they may limit their risk according to the prospect of advantage; but he who aims at sovereign power can pursue no middle path, and must either gain the highest elevation or sink to the lowest depth of misery, contempt, and despair."[1]

At length forms his decision.

His principal officers and friends laboured to dissipate the fears which prevented the future emperor from coming to a final determination. It required all the eloquence of Mucianus, who addressed him in a set speech, as recorded by Tacitus, to remove the obstacles which encumbered the resolves of his colleagues; nor was it until they reminded him of the numerous presages which the soothsayers had revealed to him, of the greatness which he was destined to attain, that his confederates overcame his reluctance to accept the crown. He was desired to recollect those splendid predictions which gave to him, and his children after him, the possession of imperial power; that even the books of the Jews, against whom his arms had been so long employed, announced that a sovereign was to arise in the East, whose kingdom should extend to the remotest parts of the earth; and that the knowledge of futurity which was granted to his own astrologers, amply confirmed the oracles which were delivered at other shrines.[2]

And is saluted emperor in all the countries of the East.

Vespasianus was first acknowledged and proclaimed emperor in Alexandria. On the first of July, the legions there under the command of Tiberius swore allegiance to him; and hence that day was afterwards reckoned the first of his reign, though his own soldiers did not take the oaths till the third of the month. The impatience of the troops both in Judæa and Egypt, anticipated in some degree the maturer counsels of Mucianus and Titus; for while these commanders were engaged in concerting measures, for securing to the accession of Vespasianus the popular effect of a simultaneous and general proclamation by all the armies of the East, the soldiers in

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 75, &c.

[2] We cannot refrain from quoting the reflections of M. Bossuet on this misapplication of the Jewish prophecies. "Blind, indeed, so to give away the hopes of Jacob and of Judah to strangers, by seeking in Vespasianus the son of Abraham and of David, and by ascribing to an idolatrous prince the title of Him whose light was to convert the Gentiles from idolatry." (*Hist. Universelle.*) Vespasianus had so much confidence in soothsaying, that when emperor he publicly maintained at Court an astrologer called Seleucus.

his own camp saluted him emperor, calling him Cæsar and Augustus, A.D. 69. and giving him every other title which belonged to supreme power. The governor of Syria, however, did not fail to secure the co-operation of his legions in favour of their new master; so that before the fifteenth of July, Vespasianus was acknowledged by the whole of that important province. This example was soon followed by the kings of Saphæna and Commagena, and by the younger Agrippa, the king of the Jews. All the Roman dependencies in Asia Minor declared themselves in favour of the same cause; and nothing now remained but to form a plan for bringing into the field the powerful armies which were engaged to dethrone Vitellius.[1]

Mucianus prepares to invade Italy.

Mucianus made preparations to cross from Asia into Europe, with a force consisting, chiefly, of light troops, and not exceeding in number thirteen thousand men. The fleets of Pontus were ready to assist him in his enterprize, having received directions to wait in the harbour of Byzantium his approach on the opposite coast. Many individuals contributed from their private fortunes the means of conveying this army to the scene of action on the shores of Italy; the zeal of all classes of men was inflamed by the hope of delivering the Roman world from the tyranny of a heartless glutton; and every thing contributed to ensure to Mucianus the best prospect of success, when an event occurred which placed the emperor on the throne without the instrumentality of the Syrian legions.

Character of Antonius Primus.

Antonius Primus, a Gaul by birth, commanded the seventh legion in Pannonia; and though his character was stained by many of the vices which spring up in revolutionary times, he was reputed a man of considerable influence, both in civil and military affairs. Learning that the troops in Mœsia had in a body revolted from Vitellius, and finding, moreover, that the affairs of that emperor were every where assuming a very unfavourable aspect, he resolved to declare for Vespasianus, and to gain over to the same interest the legions which were serving in the several provinces of Illyria. He was joined in his undertaking by Cornelius Fuscus, the intendant of Pannonia, a young man of an energetic but unsteady temper, who is said to have loved danger for its own sake, and to have preferred the agitating excitement which proceeds from hazard and uncertainty to the most affluent fortune if fixed and established. They immediately wrote to the fourteenth legion in Britain, and to the first in Spain—both of these having held out for Otho against Vitellius. They sent messengers to every part of Gaul to give notice of their intended movement; and by these means they organized the insurrection on so wide a scale, that, by the time the Illyrian armies were prepared to take the field, the legions in almost all the other provinces were ready to follow their example.[2]

[1] Tacit. *ut suprâ.*

[2] Suet. *Vitell.* 15, and Tacit. *ut suprâ.* Dion Cassius, *Epit. Xiphil. in Vitell.*

A.D. 69. Vitellius was sunk in his usual sloth and dissipation, when the news was brought to him that the third legion had revolted in Mœsia. Reports had already been conveyed to his ears that Vespasianus was a great favourite with all the armies in the east, and that there was reason to apprehend that their views with regard to that commander were inconsistent with the stability of the new reign: but when he was informed that the soldiers in those provinces had followed the example of their officers, and sworn fealty to him, his alarm gave way to habitual indolence, and he believed himself perfectly secure. Nor would he allow the impression to rest in his mind, that the sedition of the troops on the eastern shores of the Adriatic was at all connected with the intrigues of Vespasianus. He regarded it merely as the insurrection of a single legion, originating in a particular cause which did not in the least affect the principles of the rest of the army. As a suitable precaution, indeed, he sent couriers to Britain, Germany, and Spain, instructing the generals in those countries to set in motion towards Italy all the disposable forces which they had under their command.[1]

Conduct of Vitellius.

Is roused to a momentary exertion.

At length the approach of the disaffected legions, threatening to invade the northern states of the kingdom, roused Vitellius to a little exertion. He ordered Cæcina and Valens to take the field at the head of the armies which had lately vanquished Otho. The former of these, who alone was able to obey the imperial mandate, immediately despatched a body of horse to secure the important post of Cremona. But the fidelity of Cæcina had already been shaken, both by the ascendancy which his rival, Valens, had attained, and also by the knowledge which he appears to have possessed of the extent of the conspiracy directed against the power of Vitellius. It is imagined that he had listened to proposals on the part of Flavius Sabinus, the brother of Vespasianus, who was præfect of the city; and, further, that he made use of the intelligence which he had thereby gained to seduce from Vitellius the inconstant Lucilius Bassus, the admiral of the fleets at Ravena and Misenum. The result proved that treasonable counsels had poisoned the minds of the emperor's most confidential servants; for Cæcina betrayed his army in the presence of their enemy, and Bassus surrendered all the ships intrusted to his care, for the purpose of being employed against his master.[2]

Primus advances into Italy.

The partisans of Vespasianus were more faithful to their duty. Antonius Primus urged the necessity of immediate and decisive action, before Vitellius could receive reinforcements from Germany or Spain. Letters were sent to Aponius Saturninus to hasten forward with the Mœsian legions; and, in the meantime, Antonius himself, and Arrius Varus, whom he selected as a coadjutor, passed the Pannonian

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. ii. c. 96.

[2] Ibid. c. 98, 99.

Alps, at the head of a chosen body of horse and foot, and poured down on the plains of Italy. He took possession of Opitergium, Altinum, Padua, and Ateste, and afterwards reduced Verona and some other towns of less importance. A.D. 69.

Cæcina, whose strength was greatly superior to that of Antonius, neglected several opportunities of bringing him to an engagement. Having sold his fidelity to the enemies of his master, he only waited for a proper occasion to avow his deed; for which reason he no sooner heard that Bassus had delivered up the imperial fleets, than he assembled the chief officers of his army, and made known to them his intention of acknowledging Vespasianus as the emperor of Rome. Those who were in the secret applauded the speech of the consul, and swore allegiance to the sovereign whom he recommended to their fidelity; while many of the rest, taken by surprise, or already wavering in their attachment, were induced to follow the example of their companions.[1] Revolt of Cæcina.

When the soldiers were informed of the step which had been thus taken, they rushed tumultuously to the quarters of their general; where, upon finding that the name and statues of Vitellius were already succeeded by those of Vespasianus, they gave utterance to the most impassioned expressions of grief and indignation. After a short delay, the fifth legion proceeded to replace the images of the emperor, throwing down those of his antagonist; and, having loaded Cæcina with irons, they chose Fabius Fabullus their own commander, and Cassius Longus, the præfect of the camp, to head them in the field of battle. So great, indeed, was their rage, that the unfortunate sailors, who had no concern in the defection of the fleet, happening to fall into their hands, were massacred without pity. They forthwith left their camp, and, marching back to Hostilia, took the road to Cremona, in order to join the two legions which Cæcina had sent thither with part of the horse.[2] Discovered by his army.

Antonius, aware of what had taken place, resolved to prevent the junction of the three legions, and, if possible, to attack them singly. He accordingly threw himself between the fifth legion and Cremona, and succeeded in bringing on an action, which was contested chiefly by the mounted soldiers. Night put an end to the skirmish, which was not attended with any decisive result; but while Primus, with the view of gratifying the resentment or the avarice of his men, was preparing to attack the defences of the city, intelligence arrived that all the troops which were encamped at Tarentum under Cæcina, having heard of the defeat inflicted on their comrades, were advancing by forced marches to Cremona, to avenge their reputation. This army consisted of six legions, with the usual contingent of auxiliaries. Antonius Primus had but five legions, together with The armies meet.

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. iii. c. 1–5.

[2] Ibid. c. 12–14.

A.D. 69. the Prætorians who had been disbanded by Vitellius, and a large band of Suevians, led by their kings, Sido and Italicus.

And come to action.

The two armies fought in the dark with various success and with great loss and confusion on both sides. Courage, strength, and skill were worse than useless, where no one could distinguish friend from enemy. Both parties were armed alike, their language was the same, and the word was so often given and returned, that it soon ceased to discriminate those who fought for Vitellius from those who fought against him. A glimpse of moonlight restored a momentary order to their ranks, but it was not till the sun arose upon the field of battle that the advantage was observed to be on the side of

The result.

Vespasianus, whose generals had manifested throughout the protracted and sanguinary struggle an equal degree of resolution and military talent. Of the vanquished legions, some found an asylum in Cremona, and others in the fortified camp by which that city was surrounded; and since the victory could not be regarded as complete so long as the army of Vitellius remained entire, the troops of Antonius formed the determination of storming the lines, and even of forcing the town itself to surrender.[1]

The victors resolve to storm the camp at Cremona.

The camp now mentioned was constructed by the German legions in the war against Otho, and carefully strengthened by means of a ditch and rampart; to which other works of a more regular description had been recently added. Primus saw the hazard of attempting to carry such fortifications, and afterwards a town surrounded by strong walls, with troops so much harassed and fatigued. But the ardour of the soldiers themselves put an end to his hesitation. According to Tacitus, they feared danger much less than delay. They suspected all measures that savoured of prudence and reserve; the rashest schemes gave them the greatest satisfaction; and they regarded wounds, the loss of blood, and even of life, as matters of no moment, compared with the honour and booty which they hoped to obtain.

Fury and obstinacy of the assault.

The assault made upon the camp is minutely described by the Roman Annalist, and with an ostentation of professional terms for which modern language, with all its resources, does not supply an adequate list of synonymes. Suffice it to say, that the fury of the assailants was equalled by the courage and obstinacy of those who defended the ramparts; and that, when at length the conquerors forced their way over the ditch and mound, a battle ensued which covered the whole space between the camp and town with blood and mangled bodies. Cremona itself still held out, and was even prepared for a formidable resistance. The walls were high, the towers were strong, and the gates were lined with iron; the soldiers of Vitellius, burning with shame, indignation, and revenge, longed for another

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. iii. c. 25, 32.

opportunity to encounter the enemy, and to signalize the defence of that important place by deeds of valour or despair, which would preserve the memory of it to the latest posterity.[1] A.D. 69.

Camp and city taken.

Primus had already burned down the suburbs, and prepared his machines for levelling the walls, when the principal officers within the city, thinking it imprudent to strive any longer against fortune, came to the resolution of opening their gates to the conqueror. They took down the name and statues of Vitellius from all the public edifices; and releasing Cæcina from confinement, begged that he would employ his influence with the prevailing party to procure for them favourable terms of capitulation. Cæcina, whose pride and anger were equally roused, refused to intercede in their behalf; and enjoyed, says Tacitus, a malignant satisfaction in seeing so many brave men reduced to the necessity of imploring the good offices of a miscreant who had sold them to the enemy. The legions within the walls surrendered at discretion, and were allowed to retire, stripped of their arms and standards. The conquerors were drawn up on each side, and at first insulted and threatened them; but when they saw them so humbled and abashed, as scarcely to notice the contumelies with which they were assailed, their resentment was turned into pity; and they called to mind that those were the very same men who only a few months before had behaved with great moderation when victors in the field of Bebriacum. Both armies were deeply incensed at the perfidy of Cæcina; and when he was observed to advance from the gate with all the pomp of consular authority, arrayed in a robe of state, and preceded by his lictors, the indignation of the soldiers gave vent to the most cutting reproaches against his pride, cruelty, and treason. Antonius screened him from the violence with which he was threatened, and sent him to Vespasianus; who, though he rewarded his defection with a few kind words, never conferred upon him either employment or respect.

Cremona destroyed.

Primus, who could direct the valour of his soldiers in the field, soon discovered that he had not power to control their turbulence and cupidity in the hour of victory. They demanded the spoil of Cremona as a solace for the fatigues and dangers which they had lately encountered; while he, either unable to oppose their determination, or unwilling to hazard his popularity by refusing a gratuity which he could not otherwise supply, was induced to connive at their licentiousness, and to permit the ruin of one of the finest towns in Italy. During four days Cremona was a prey to the rapacious troops; who, consisting of various nations, Romans, allies, and foreigners, were not restrained by those feelings of kindred and brotherhood which might otherwise have alleviated the horrors inseparable from the sacking of a populous city. The adherents of

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. iii. c. 32, 33.

A.D. 69. Vitellius are said to have lost in the siege, and the two preceding battles, not less than fifty thousand men; their antagonists, according to Josephus, had to lament the slaughter of four thousand five hundred officers and soldiers.[1]

Continued inaction of Vitellius.

Vitellius continued to divide his time between useless fears and the debasing pursuits of the lowest sensuality. Being acquainted with the treason of Cæcina and the defection of Bassus, he sent Valens at the head of a small force to assist the legions on the Po, which were still faithful to his interests, in repelling the invasion of the Pannonian insurgents. But this general had scarcely removed from the capital, when he received intelligence that the troops on whom all his hopes had rested, were completely beaten and dispersed at Cremona; upon which, instead of advancing to dispute the conquests of Antonius, he formed the bold resolution of sailing into Gaul, of raising soldiers in that country, of joining the legions in Germany, under Hordeonius Flaccus, and then of descending into Italy with such an army as would enable him to renew the war on an extensive scale, and with a more certain prospect of success. This plan was rendered abortive by an accident. Being driven ashore upon an island near the coast of Gaul, he was taken prisoner. His ships and men fell into the hands of Valerius Paulinus, a steady friend of Vespasianus; and the unfortunate consul soon afterwards was put to death.[2]

The capture of Valens proved a signal to all the western provinces to declare for the new emperor. In Spain, the first, sixth, and tenth legions assumed the standards of Vespasianus; and in Britain, the second legion, which had served under the immediate command of that general, and was well acquainted with his bravery and virtues, acknowledged him with the greatest alacrity. In fact, at this stage of the war, Vitellius possessed only that part of Italy which is bounded by the Appenines and the Western Sea—the rest of the empire, including the principal provinces, having abandoned his cause, and offered their allegiance to the conqueror of Judæa.[3]

Primus advances to Rome.

Primus having begun his march to Rome, occasioned considerable alarm in that capital. To ward off the danger with which the city was threatened, Vitellius despatched the two prætorian præfects, Julius Priscus and Alphænus Varus, with fourteen cohorts and all the auxiliary horse, to secure the passes of the Appennines, and thereby to check the progress of the insurgents. The emperor himself, whose presence was solicited by the soldiers, joined the camp at

[1] Tacit. *ut suprâ*. *Hic excitus Cremonæ anno CCLXXXVI. a primordio sui. Condita erat Ti. Sempronio et Cornelio Consulibus, ingruente in Italiam Hannibale.*
[2] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. iii. c. 36.
[3] Ibid. c. 42.

Mævania in Umbria; but his ignorance of war, his sottish habits, A.D. 69.
and the evil omens which attended his person, contributed to depress the hopes and extinguish the zeal of his troops. When bad news arrived, Vitellius discovered by the paleness of his countenance the fears which agitated his bosom; and the only refuge which he sought from the terrors by which he was pursued, was in speedy and complete intoxication. The approach of Primus towards the central mountains, soon afforded an excuse for his return to Rome; and, as was to be expected, the troops finding themselves deserted by the man for whom they were called to hazard their lives, followed the example of his prudence, and left the passes of the Appennines open to the legions of Vespasianus.[1]

The citizens bestir themselves.

After a momentary effusion of zeal on the part of the citizens, Vitellius found himself reduced to the necessity either of dying in arms, or of submitting to negociate with the conqueror. His temper naturally disposed him to prefer the latter alternative. Flavius Sabinus, the præfect of the city, had several private conferences with him relative to an abdication of the throne; and, at length, it was agreed that he should resign the supreme power to Vespasianus, on condition that he should receive a yearly pension of about eight hundred thousand pounds, have the expenses of his kitchen defrayed, and be allowed to retire to Campania, where he proposed to spend the rest of his days.[2]

Vitellius resolves to abdicate.

On the eighteenth of December this unhappy prince left his palace, clothed in mourning and followed by his household, in extreme dejection and melancholy. He walked in procession through a crowded part of the city, to the place where he was to make a solemn renunciation of his rank and power; a spectacle nothing similar to which had ever before engaged the thoughts or awakened the compassion of the people of Rome. The dictator Cæsar, as Tacitus remarks, had perished by the sudden explosion of a conspiracy. Caligula was cut off in the same manner. Nero's humiliation was concealed by the darkness of the night, and few were witnesses of his death. Galba and Piso fell as it were in battle; but Vitellius—in the midst of his people, surrounded by his soldiers, and even by women, whose curiosity had brought them to behold so extraordinary an event,—walked forth with a sorrowful heart to renounce the empire.

The act of renunciation, which he read with much feeling, declared that, for the peace and welfare of the Republic, he resigned for ever the supreme power, trusting for protection and maintenance to the generosity of the Roman people. A flood of tears choked his utterance, upon which he took the sword from his side, and presented it to the consul Cæcilius Simplex, who stood next him, denoting by that action the relinquishment of his judicial authority. The consul

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. iii. c. 56. [2] Ibid. c. 65.

A.D. 69. declined to receive the sword, and the multitude, whose sympathies were now fully excited, would not permit him to divest his person of the badges of the imperial dignity. Vitellius could not resist the affectionate importunity of his people; and, accordingly, instead of retiring as a private individual to the house of his brother, he was conducted back to his palace with acclamations and vows of everlasting fidelity.[1]

Changes his mind, and returns to his palace.

The temple of Jupiter Capitolinus destroyed.

This change in the conduct of Vitellius led to a deplorable catastrophe. Sabinus, the city præfect, happening to appear in the street, during this transient fit of enthusiasm, was attacked by a party of soldiers attached to the opposite interest, and compelled to take refuge with his surviving attendants in the fortress of the Capitol. The troops which continued faithful to the abdicated sovereign assembled in haste, and laid siege to this stronghold; during which they employed a variety of inflammatory substances as missiles, which set fire to the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, and consumed it to ashes—an august edifice, says the historian, the sanctity of which neither Porsenna, to whom Rome capitulated, nor the Gauls, who took it by storm, presumed to violate.[2]

The soldiers of Vitellius urged the assault with so much vehemence, that the citadel soon fell into their hands. Sabinus and Quintus Atticus were brought forth loaded with chains, and carried prisoners to the palace; where the former was almost instantly murdered by the mob, notwithstanding the earnest entreaties of the emperor, who did all in his power to save him.



[Temple of Jupiter.]

Rome taken by the soldiers under Primus.

The victorious army under Primus had been for some time within a few days' march of Rome, waiting either the arrival of Mucianus, who was desirous to enter the capital at the head of Vespasianus's legions, or the result of certain private negociations, of which the object has not been distinctly announced. The destruction of the citadel, and the death of Sabinus, put an end to the unseasonable delay. The soldiers pressed forward to the walls of Rome; where the last effort for Vitellius was about to be made by the remains of his German cohorts, whose zeal appears to have increased in proportion as the chance of success diminished. Their hopes were crushed in a double defeat. The authority of Primus could not prevent his men, at once heated with resentment and flushed with victory, from entering the city as conquerors, and from indulging in those excesses which too frequently disgrace both valour and good fortune, when soldiers take forcible

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. iii. c. 67. [2] Ibid. c. 71, 72.

possession of a crowded town. It has been remarked that, during the day on which this violence was committed, (being one of those dedicated to the Saturnalian festival,) the appearance of Rome was strange beyond all imagination. In one place were bloodshed and slaughter; in another, the baths were open, and the taverns full of drunkards. Scenes of debauchery were associated in the same street with torrents of blood and heaps of dead bodies; every concomitant of voluptuous sloth and licentiousness, was intermixed with the horrors that attend storm and pillage; so that the city appeared to be at once raging under fury and madness, and intoxicated with pleasure and festivity.[1] A.D. 69.

Capture of the Prætorian camp

The capture of the prætorian camp, which continued to hold out for Vitellius, alone remained to complete the success of the party of Vespasianus. A dreadful conflict took place between the victorious Pannonians and the few brave men who had retreated to that asylum; the former having resolved to force it, and the latter to maintain it, as their last hope and resource, at the expense of their lives. The prætorians, who had been disbanded by the one emperor, and restored to their rank by the other, carried to the assault all the animosity which the remembrance of an affront could kindle in their minds, and all the revenge that could be excited by beholding their former quarters in the hands of those, whose unquestioned fidelity had raised them to the dignity of imperial guards. The besieged were actuated by motives equally strong, and thought of nothing but how they might sell their lives at the dearest price, and preserve to the end their high reputation for courage and constancy. Covered with blood they embraced their standards and altars, the last consolation of dying soldiers; many of them who were mortally wounded strove to ascend the rampart, that they might expire in the presence of an enemy; and at length, when the gates were forced, the few remaining combatants rushed upon the victors, received their swords in their bosoms, and sank dead at their feet.[2]

The reign of Vitellius was now terminated; but before the scene closes on his unhappy and disgraceful history, we must give the outline of certain events connected with the fate of the empire; which, though they did not affect the personal character or proceedings of Vitellius, are nevertheless of too much importance to be passed by unnoticed.

Insurrection of the Dacians.

Two slight insurrections were occasioned in the East, by the removal of the troops which were sent to Italy to serve against Vitellius. The first, which was an inroad of the Dacians into Mœsia, was easily subdued by the governor of Syria, who happened at the time to be marching along the borders of that province in

Suppressed.

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. iii. c. 83. *Prorsus ut eandem civitatem et furere crederis et lascivire.*

[2] Ibid. c. 84.

A.D. 69. order to join Antonius Primus. He sent the sixth legion against them under the command of Fonteius Agrippa; and, with the view of preventing any renewal of the attempt, he farther strengthened the camp in Mœsia by a detachment from the Illyrian armies.[1]



[Dacian Horseman.]

Another disturbance originated in the ambition of Anicetus, a freedman of Polemon, the last king of Pontus, who, impatient of the yoke imposed upon that country by the Romans, induced some of the neighbouring tribes to flock to his standard, and endeavour to regain their independence. He attacked Trapezus, or Trebisond, an ancient Greek colony, and took it, cutting the garrison to pieces. Finding that the Roman fleet in the Euxine had been greatly

And of Anicetus.

weakened by Mucianus, who had withdrawn many of the ships to Byzantium, for the purpose of conveying his army from Asia to Europe, he fell upon it with fire and sword, ravaged the coasts of Pontus, and made himself master of the adjoining seas. Vespasianus had not yet left Judæa; and hearing of these disturbances, he sent Virdius Geminus, a brave and experienced officer, who having with him a considerable detachment of excellent troops, found no difficulty in defeating the barbarian chief, whose followers were ignorant of discipline and loaded with plunder. Anicetus fled for shelter to the court of the king of the Sedochezians, whom he had gained over to his cause by large sums of money and a share of his booty; but the terror of the Roman arms, or the promise of a larger bribe to the venal monarch, soon deprived him of that asylum, and he was de-

Suppressed.

livered up to Virdius, together with the principal individuals among his adherents.[2]

Of the Britons.

In connection with these events, Tacitus mentions a considerable commotion in Britain, occasioned by the intrigues of Cartismandua, queen of the *Brigantes*, and of Vellocatus, the armour-bearer of her

Of the Batavians.

husband. But the most important foreign defection during the reign of Vitellius, was the Batavian war which broke out in Germany, and gave rise to much bloodshed and alarm. The Batavians were descended from the *Catti*, a nation of distinguished fame in that part of Europe. In order to escape from the dissensions which frequently agitated their tribes, they had fixed their residence on the right arm of the Rhine, near its junction with the sea. At the

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. iii. c. 46. [2] Ibid. c. 47, 48.

period in question, Claudius Civilis was at the head of their councils; who besides his personal bravery and knowledge of affairs could boast a royal lineage, and a long series of warlike ancestors. Having taken some umbrage at the Romans, who without any good cause had put one of his brothers to death, he resolved to avail himself of the confusion incident to a civil war, and to lead his countrymen into the field against the enemies of German independence. He soon obtained the concurrence of the inferior chiefs, who like himself thirsted for revenge; nor had he more difficulty in securing the cooperation of a powerful horde, the *Canninefates*, who had the same origin, language, and territory, with the *Batavi*, and were equal to them in every thing but number. He likewise gained the eight Batavian cohorts, formerly attached as auxiliaries to the fourteenth legion, which, being suspected by Vitellius, were ordered to rejoin the camp under the command of Hordeonius Flaccus.[1] A.D. 69.

Success of the Insurgents.

The *Canninefates*, led by their general, Brinno, were the first to commence hostilities; for Civilis, unwilling to throw off the veil till his plans should be completely matured, continued to profess allegiance to the Romans, and even to act in conformity to their instructions.[2] Success attended the first motions of the insurgents, who cut in pieces two cohorts, which they surprised in their tents; and at length the Batavian prince, discovering that his artifice was exposed, conducted his people, accompanied by the *Canninefates* and the *Frisii*, to try their fortune in a regular battle. An important victory again crowned the efforts of the barbarians. The *Tongri* deserted to them in the middle of the fight, and the Gauls, who composed a large proportion of the Roman army, appeared to waver in their attachment to the eagles under which they were accustomed to rally, and only to wait a sufficient opportunity or inducement to turn their weapons against their masters.[3]

Hordeonius Flaccus had hitherto in some degree connived at the proceedings of Civilis, because he wanted to retain on the Rhine the legions which Vitellius had more than once ordered to be sent into Italy. But when he saw an encampment forced, cohorts cut to pieces, and the Romans driven out of the Batavian territory, he regarded the commotion as much too serious to be longer neglected, and forthwith directed Mummius Luperculus, who commanded two legions stationed at Vetera, to take the field and march against the enemy. Among the auxiliaries belonging to the corps of Mummius was a regiment of Batavian horse, who, in the battle that ensued, deserted to Civilis, and thereby once more secured a decided advantage in favour of their countrymen. Immediately after this victory,

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. iv. c. 12-15.

[2] Ibid. c. 15. *Erat in Canninefatibus, stolidæ audaciæ Brinno*, a characteristic description of the barbarian chief.

[3] Ibid. c. 16.

A.D. 69. the army of the rebels was augmented by the arrival of the eight cohorts of Batavians whom Civilis had persuaded to abandon the service of the Romans; but, it is remarked by Tacitus, that this great accession of strength did not unduly elate the barbarian general, nor make him forget for a moment the fearful odds with which he had to contend. On the contrary, he persisted so far in his plan of dissimulation, as to make all the troops under his command swear allegiance to Vespasianus; and even solicited the two legions which he had recently defeated, and which had shut themselves up in Vetera, to exhibit the same proof of loyalty. Upon their refusal, which was conveyed to him in haughty and insulting language, Civilis resolved to besiege the camp—a step which was attended with very important results, affecting the interests of either party.[1]

Siege of Vetera.

The ignorance of his Germans in all the arts of attack and defence soon rendered it necessary for him to convert the siege into a blockade, and at the same time to adopt measures for averting the hazard of a general action with the forces under Hordeonius Flaccus. This commander, upon hearing that the camp at Vetera was invested, thought it his duty to send relief; for which purpose he despatched Dillius Volcula, a brave and resolute officer, with a strong body of legionary soldiers, intending to follow in person at a convenient distance. Civilis was no sooner informed of Vocula's approach than he renewed his attempt on the camp, hoping to be able to take it by storm before the succours could arrive; but meeting with the same obstacles which baffled his former endeavours, and having lost a great number of his bravest men, he was compelled a second time to withdraw his cumbrous engines, and to rest satisfied with the confinement of his enemies within their fortifications.[2]

Repulse of Civilis.

When matters had arrived at this crisis, intelligence was received in Germany that the Battle of Cremona was gained by Antonius Primus. It was expected that an event so important, which had decided the dispute between Vitellius and Vespasianus, would also bring over the Germans to the cause of the victor, and force Civilis either to submit to the emperor to whom he had voluntarily sworn allegiance, or at once declare himself an enemy to the Romans. With this view, Vocula, who, as well as all the other chief officers, was friendly to the interests of Vespasianus, sent a messenger to Civilis, with orders to remind him that the time was now gone by when he could hope successfully to disguise a foreign war under the false pretence of civil discord; and that if his real design were to assist Vespasianus to ascend the throne, he should no longer continue in arms, as that object was already happily accomplished.

Propositions to Civilis.

The person employed on this delicate service was by birth a Gaul named Montanus, and was not, at heart, more attached to the

[1] Tacit. *ubi suprà*, c. 17, 18. [2] Ibid. *ubi suprà*, c. 23.

government for which he bore arms, than the individual was to whom he carried the remonstrance of Vocula. Civilis soon discovered the bent of his character, and dexterously turned the resentment and pride which he perceived rankling in his bosom, to promote his own ulterior designs. He impressed upon the envoy a deep sense of the degradation and shame which were now branded upon the vanquished tributaries of Rome; he magnified the numerous blessings of liberty and independence; he placed before him, in a vivid light, the advantages of the present opportunity and the certainty of success; and he concluded by assuring him, that, even if they should fail in their attempt, their circumstances could not be rendered more hopeless or painful than they were in their actual predicament. These considerations produced the desired effect on the unsteady mind of Montanus. He returned to Vocula with an evasive answer, concealed the change which his sentiments had undergone, and was prepared to watch every opportunity in order to practise upon the minds of his countrymen, and lead them on to the measures which they were soon afterwards induced to take.[1] A.D. 69. His intrigues.

Civilis had resolved to prosecute the war with vigour. Dividing his forces, and leaving a part before Vetera, he marched with the remainder to attack Vocula, who had encamped his men at Golduba; and he succeeded so completely in surprising his antagonist, that had not some Spanish auxiliaries arrived during the battle, and afforded succour to the Romans, their army would have been entirely destroyed. But the seasonable aid of the Spanish cohorts decided the fortune of the day in favour of Vocula, who soon afterwards gained another victory over the rebels, which enabled him to raise the siege of Vetera, and thereby free from restraint the two legions so long hemmed in by the barbarian conquerors. His defeats.

Instead of pursuing the beaten enemy, Vocula thought it enough to enter the camp which they had invested, and to repair the breaches which had been made in the ramparts by the repeated assaults of the Batavians. Confining his cares to the supply of provisions, he sent parties of soldiers into the neighbouring country to collect corn and other necessaries for his legions. A convoy being attacked by the vigilant squadrons of Civilis, Vocula found himself compelled to march out, in order to protect his detachment; upon which the active German threw his troops round the camp of Vetera, and a third time renewed the blockade, which the other had fought two battles to raise. By these means, all the advantages which Vocula had gained were not only lost, but the affairs of the Romans were reduced to a worse situation than before. Civilis seized every post, which, through neglect or weakness, was left undefended; and, on one occasion, he attacked the cavalry of his antagonist with so much skill and impetuosity, as to defeat them with great slaughter. And successes.

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. iv. c. 23.

A.D. 69. But the Romans themselves, now every where turbulent and seditious, presented to him the most favourable opportunity to avenge the liberty of his countrymen, and to concert his schemes of future conquest. Incensed against Flaccus, whom they otherwise disliked for his inactivity and want of courage, the legionary soldiers resolved to call him to account for the gratuity which had been sent to them by Vitellius, upon his accession to the throne. Hordeonius, intimidated by their threats, produced a sum of money, which he delivered to them in the name of Vespasianus. But the military were not satisfied either with the grant, or with the manner in which it was bestowed. They charged him with perfidy to the emperor, and treason towards the republic; and, accordingly, bursting into his bedchamber, during the darkness of the night, they dragged him forth, and put him to instant death. Vocula would have suffered the same fate, had he not effected his escape, dressed in the habit of a slave.[1]

Assassination of Hordeonius Flaccus.

This occurrence, as well as the revolt of the Gauls which followed it at no great distance of time, had a great effect on the proceedings of the Batavian war; but as the subsequent events connected with that insurrection belong strictly to the reign of Vespasianus, we shall here pause until we have described, in a few sentences, the last hours and character of his miserable predecessor.

Vitellius, upon finding that Rome was taken, and the Prætorian camp stormed, conveyed himself privately out of the palace, took refuge in his wife's residence on Mount Aventine, taking with him only two domestics, a cook and a baker. Pursued by his own fears, he could not remain in that asylum. He returned to the palace, but found it quite deserted. Even the lowest of his slaves refused their assistance. His cook and baker followed the example of the rest, and forsook him in his distress. The solitude terrified him. He ran from one apartment to another, and finding them all silent and empty, his spirit sank within him. He shuddered at the reflection of his own fall. At length, exhausted by fatigue and despair, he tied about his waist a girdle stuffed with gold, and hid himself in a hut belonging to a slave. But this mean retreat did not save his life. The conspirators who had traced his flight dragged him from the hole, the entrance to which he had endeavoured to block up, put a rope about his neck, and led him to the Forum like a criminal about to be executed—the mob meanwhile pelting him with mud, and the soldiers pricking him with the point of their spears. At length, after loading him with every invective and contumely which their brutal malice could invent, they hewed him in pieces with their swords, stuck his head on a pike, and drew his mangled body through the Tiber with a hook.[2]

Death of Vitellius.

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. iv. c. 36.

[2] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. iii. c. 85. Suet. *Vitell.* 16, 17. Dion Cassius, *Epit. Xiphil. in Vitell.*

Such was the miserable termination of a life which extended to fifty-five years, a considerable part of which was spent in the enjoyment of the highest dignities. But Vitellius, it has been remarked, owed little to his personal merit. He was indebted for his great preferment to the reputation of his father; and he rose to the consulship and a distinguished place in the Senate, in virtue of hereditary fame and the good character of his family. Those who raised him to the empire, says Tacitus, did not know him. He had no talent for government, was indolent, and even cowardly; and yet his liberality and frankness of manners secured him many friends, and gained for him, in the eyes of the army, a degree of favour which is not always bestowed on the bravest and most skilful generals.[1]

A.D. 69.

His character.

[1] Tacit. *Hist.* lib. iii. c. 86.



CHRONOLOGY OF ROME.

B.C.
5 Roman oppression in Gaul.
Splendid palaces of the Roman nobles.
Luxury, refinement, excesses, vice.
Pompey and Crassus consuls a second time (B.C. 70); the former governs Spain, the latter is appointed to Syria.
Crassus leaves Rome for Syria.
Pompey resides at Rome; and governs Spain through his lieutenants.
Cato sues for the censorship—suit rejected.
Gabinius restores Ptolemy to Egypt.
Cæsar's Alauda, or Gallic legion.
He heads an expedition agnst. the Germans.
Cæsar's first invasion of Britain.
The Veneti introduce iron chain cables.
Flourishing period of Roman literature.
The Trebonian Law, giving a military command for ten years to the consuls.
Law of Pompey, for retaining Cæsar three or five years longer in Gaul.
Death of Lucretius.
Virgil, the poet, assumes the Toga Virilis.
4 *The Parthian war*; Crassus proceeds towards Parthia (53.)
Domitius and Appius Claudius, censors.
Cæsar's second invasion of Britain.
Asinius Pollio accuses C. Cato.
Infamous agreement of the consuls with Pompey, Mennius, and Calvinus, disclosed.
Gabinius accused; defended by Cicero; condemned; goes into exile.
Cicero and Cæsar reconciled.
Restoration of Ptolemy, king of Egypt.
Death of Julia, wife of Pompey, and daughter of Julius Cæsar.
Crassus plunders the temple of Jerusalem of 10,000 talents (see Parthia, 53.)
3 Total annihilation of the army sent into Parthia; Crassus is killed, and the Roman standards are taken by the Parthians.
[The hoarded property of Crassus has been estimated at two millions sterling.]
Revolt of Alesia and Vercingetorix in Gaul.
Popular disturbances at Rome.
Clodius a candidate for the prætorship (58.)
Digest of Roman laws by Servius Sulpicius.
Rivalry between Clodius and Milo.
Milo's cause strengthens daily.
2 Fray between their respective slaves and gladiators; Clodius is killed (Jan. 20.)
Riot in Rome, occasioned by the murder of Clodius; the populace burn the body in the senate house, which is itself burnt.
Pompey sole consul; he is entitled "defender of the Republic."
"Lex Pompeia," agnst. bribery at elections.
"Lex Censoribus," for the removal of convicted censors from office.
Laws for inquiring into Clodius's murder, and for allowing Cæsar to become candidate for consulship while absent in Gaul.
Milo tried, convicted, and banished.
Cæsar takes Alesia and Vercingetorix.
51 Cæsar quells the Gallic revolt this year.

B.C.
51 *Gaul* is made *a Roman province.*
Cæsar supports the claims of the people north of the Po, to the rights of Roman ctznship.
Pompey and Cæsar jealous of each other.
Cicero sent into Cilicia as governor.
Marcellus, in the Senate, proposes extreme measures against Cæsar.
Resolutions of the Senate inimical to Cæsar.
50 Pompey's efforts for the disbanding of Cæsar's army.
Expulsion of Sallust from the Senate.
Cæsar sends Mark Antony from Cisalpine Gaul to protect his cause in Rome.
A water mill erected on the Tiber.
Aretæus, a physician of Cappadocia, introduces the use of blisters at Rome.
Curio, the tribune, deserts the aristocracy, and advocates the cause of Cæsar, for a bribe of about £80,000.
Cæsar's cause in Rome advances notwithstanding the efforts made to crush him.
49 Letter from Cæsar to the Senate, offering to resign the command of his army if Pompey would also resign.
Decree of the Senate for disbanding Cæsar's army, negatived by the Tribunes.
Flight of Mark Antony and the Tribunes to Cæsar at Ravenna.
Civil war between Pompey and Cæsar.
Pompey is invested with the command of the army of the commonwealth.
Cæsar crosses the Rubicon at the head of 6000 men, exclaiming "the die is cast," and in two months is master of all Italy.
Pompey quits Rome; Cæsar enters it.
The Senate retires to Capua, afterwards to Brundusium, and finally to Dyrrhachium.
Cæsar is dictator for eleven days.
Cæsar in Spain; Pompey's troops surrender.
Death of Antiochus Asiaticus.
The Era of Antioch.
Murder of Seleucus Cybiosactes by his wife, Berenice, which appalling crime ends the race of the Seleucidæ.
48 Battle of Dyrrhachium.
The war carried into Thessaly.
The Athenians declare for Cæsar.
Battle of Pharsalia; total defeat and flight of Pompey; he retreats towards Alexandria.
Cicero returns to Italy.
Pompey falls ingloriously in Egypt, aged 58.
The Alexandrine war.
Cæsar appointed dictator for twelve months.
Marriage of Marcellus and Octavia, niece of Julius Cæsar (41, 40.)
47 Cæsar victorious in Asia Minor.
Battle of Zela; Pharnaces defeated.
[Cæsar's "Veni, Vidi, Vici."]
On Cæsar's return he is made dictator for another twelve months.
Asinio Pollio tribune of the Plebs.
"Lex de Fenore," for regulating differences between creditors and debtors.
Cæsar proceeds into Africa.

46 *The African war*; Scipio and Juba defeated by Cæsar at Thapsus.
Cato's suicide at Utica, aged 49.
Cæsar, under the guidance of Sosigenes, reforms the calendar, by the insertion of ninety days; hence this year is called "the year of confusion."
Bissextile, or leap year, first introduced.
Return of Cæsar to Rome; he is created dictator for ten years.
Sallust is made prætor.
Vitruvius, the celebrtd. architect, flourishes.
45 *The first Julian year.*
War in Spain; Cæsar defeats Pompey's two sons at Munda.
End of the African war (46.)
Cicero divorces Terentia; marries Publilia.
On his return to Rome Cæsar is made perpetual dictator, and elctd. consul for 10 yrs.
Triumphs of Cæsar, Favius, and Pedius.
Two Curile Ædiles and four Plebeian Ædiles appointed.
"Lex Municipalis," or Table of Heraclea.
Corinth rebuilt by Cæsar.
44 Cæsar plans an expedition against Parthia.
He adopts his nephew, Octavianus.
Ovation of Cæsar from the Albanian Mount.
Assassination of Cæsar (aged 56) by Brutus, Cassius, and others, in the senate-house, on the Ides of March.
[Cæsar enriched the Roman treasury by about eleven millions sterling.]
Great struggle in Rome, between Antony and Octavianus, heir of Julius Cæsar.
Law of Antony, abrogating the dictatorship.
Antony proceeds to Cisalpine Gaul.
He besieges Brutus in Mutina; hence
The Mutine war (43.)
Cornelius Nepos and Diodorus Siculus, fl.
43 Public declaration against Antony.
Defeat of Antony at Mutina.
Reconciliation of Octavius and Antony, which results in the formation of a
Second Triumvirate;—Antonius, Octavius, and Lepidus, triumvirs (B.C. 60.)
Severe proscriptions in Rome against the mutual friends of the triumvirs.
Cicero put to death to glut the revenge of Antony (aged 63.)
Varro, the histor., being proscribed, escapes.
"Lex Rubria," uniting Cisalpine Gaul to the Italian territory.
Birth of Ovid at Salmo, March 20.
42 *Civil war*; the Triumvirate agt. the republicans in Greece, under Brutus and Cassius.
Battles of Philippi; Cassius and Brutus, the last of the republicans, defeated and slain.
[Horace served under Brutus in this battle.]
Lands in Italy distribd. among the veterans.
Antony goes into Cilicia, where he meets with Cleopatra of Egypt (40, 37.)
41 *Oligarchical civil wars* (30); at Prænestе 300 senators, and other distinguished Romans, are sacrificed to the manes of Julius Cæsar by order of Octavius.
The Perusian war; Octavius against Lucius, Antonius, and Fulva (M. Antony's wife.)
Death of Marcellus (48.)
40 *War with Parthia*; Labienus and the Parthians invade Syria.
Defeat of Lucius, &c.; death of Fulva.
Reconciliation of Cæsar and Antony.
40 Antony marries Octavia, Cæsar's sister (3
Mæcenas negociates a marriage betwe
Octavius and Scribonia.
39 Ventidius sent against the Parthians.
Birth of Julia, daughter of Octavius.
Peace of Cæsar and Mark Antony wi
Sextus Pompeius.
Cornelius Nepos, the biographer, flourishe
38 *The Spanish Era*, or Era of the Cæsars, Jan.
Victory of Ventidius over the Parthians.
Cæsar marries Livia (40.)
Renewal of the Triumvirate for 5 yrs. longe
War with Sextus Pompeius unsuccessfu
Octavius and Pompey at war.
Antony proceeds into Syria.
He dethrones Ariobarzanes, king of Pon
37 Antony is so captivated with Cleopatra th
he sends back Octavia (40.)
36 Pompey defeated in Sicily by Cæsar.
Unsuccessful expedition of Mark Ant
against the Parthians.
Fall of Lepidus; is expelled the Triumvir
35 Death of Pompey at Miletus, aged 49.
War against the Illyrians, Pannonians, &
Second act of Antony's repudiation of Oc
via; he refuses to meet her, though sh
to his aid with soldiers and money (37.
34 Armenia subdued by Antony.
Death of Sallust, May (Alexand. Chron. 3
33 The Parthians overrun Media and Arm
Dissension between Antony and Cæsar, whi
leads to *civil war*.
The libraries of Pergamus number more th
200,000 volumes at this period.
32 Voluntary starvation of Atticus Pompon
at the age of 77.
Antony sends Octavia a bill of divorce.
31 Antony defeated at Actium.
Magnificent theatre of Marcellus, capable
accommodating 40,000 persons.
Codicils to Wills first introduced—by th
Civilian Trebatius Testa (see 29.)
30 Antony's Roman fleet and army join Cæs
The war carried into Egypt.
Death of Antony (aged 57) and Cleopatra
Egypt a Roman province.
New colonies for veterans established.
Conspiracy and execution of Lepidus, son
Lepidus, the disgraced triumvir (36, 1
Rome a monarchy from this year; Cæsar A
tavius being sole master of
The Empire of Rome, which event
Terminates the Roman Republic.
[Some, however, maintain that the Repub
existed till the year B.C. 27.]
The first Roman standing army:—consisti
of 10,000 prætorian guards in and aro
Rome, an army of 400,000 soldiers, and
navy numbering 50,000 seamen.
29 The three triumphs of Cæsar Octavius.
The temple of Janus is shut; the Roma
armies are employed on public works.
Codicils to Wills declared legal.
Direct trade with India for silks.
Alexandria and Ephesus the two princip
places of trade in the Roman empire.
Legislation of the Emperors begins this yea
Dionysius, of Halicarnassus, in Italy; be be
gins to write his Roman Antiquities (7.
28 Census; Roman citizens in the empire
16,500,000, F.C. 17,258,761; census of Rome
4,164,000 (? 4,101,017, or 4,063,000, F.C.

28 Death of Varro, the historian, aged 88.
Various taxes: *direct*, on inheritances; *indirect* (the first), on goods sold; *fines*, on celibacy, &c.
Custom duties extended, being an *ad valorem* impost of from one-fortieth to one-eighth on all imports and exports. East India and Arabian goods pay the highest duty.
27 *Rome ceases to be a Republic.*
The title *Augustus* conferred on Cæsar Octavius, on the ides of January.
"Lex de Imperio Principis, by which Cæsar sustains the four-fold dignity of consul, tribune, imperator, and (after the death of Lepidus in B.C. 12) potifex maximus.
He accepts the sover. power for 10 yrs. only.

The Empire of Rome.

The provinces are divided between Augustus and the Senate.
Revenue of the State, about £40,000,000 sterling of English money.
Augustus departs for Spain.
Tiberius assumes the Toga Virilis.
Treasures of Egyptian art brought to Rome.
The Pantheon built.
Livy, the historian of Rome, flourishes.
26 War agt. the Cantabri and Astures in Spain.
Prosperous condition of the manufacturing and commercial interest of the Roman empire; linen is exported from Spain, silks from Sicily and from India, cottons from Malta, purple dyes from Toulon, &c.
25 Northern Spain and western Gaul subdued by Augustus.
Mæcenas, the emperor's minister (40.)
Golden period of Roman literature; Horace, Virgil, Livy, Strabo, &c. flourish.
Temple of Janus again closed by Augustus.
The Greek language introduced at court.
Marriage of Marcellus and Julia, the sister of Augustus (23, 21.)
24 Cæsar having subdued the Cantabri, returns.
Disastrous expedition of Ælius Gallus, prefect of Egypt, into Arabia.
Decree of the Senate, exempting Augustus from the operation of all laws.
Death of Quintilius Varus, of Cremona, one of Horace's friends.
Isis worshipped at Rome (10.)
23 Augustus made tribune for life.
Ambassadors from Parthia arrive.
Tiridates retained at Rome.
Death of the Ædile Marcellus (21.)
22 Revolt of the Cantabri in Spain.
Conspiracy and death of Murena.
Theatrical pantomimic dances intro. at Rome.
21 Conspiracy against Augustus frustrated.
Marriage of Agrippa and Julia—the widow of Marcellus (25, 23.)
20 Splendid imperial buildings at Rome.
The standards taken from Crassus by Orodes, of Parthia, restored (53.)
Arrival of ambassadors from Porus, king of India, and from the Scythians.
The pantomimics, Bathyllus and Pylades, flourish; the theatres are splendid and extensive; 3000 female singers and an equal number of dancers perform on the stage.
Birth of Caius Cæsar, grandson of Augustus.
19 The revolt in Spain subdued (22.)
Aqueducts constructed by Agrippa.
Death of Virgil, Sep. 22, aged 50.
The Parthians defeated by Tiberias.
18 Augustus accepts the sovereignty of Rome for five years more (12, 8.)
"Lex Julia de Ambitu," against bribery at elections (see 432 and 358.)
"Lex de Maritandis ordinibus" of Augustus.
Death of Tibullus, the poet.
17 Fifth celebration of the "Ludi seculares," (Decemviri festivals.)
Birth of Lucius Cæsar, who is adopted by his uncle, the emperor Augustus.
Agrippa, accompd. by Julia, goes into Syria.
Dedication of books first introduced.
"Lex Petronia," making it a crime for a master to cause his slave to fight with wild beasts.
16 The Romans are defeated by the Germans.
The emperor in Gaul.
The two schools of Jurisprudence, under Capeto and Labeo, flourish.
15 Rhætia and Vindelicia conquered by Tiberius and Drusus.
"Lex Junia Norbana," annulling informal manumission of slaves.
13 Return of the emperor from Gaul.
Agrippa returns from Asia.
12 Augustus made *pontifex maximus*, thus reuniting the civil and religious power which had been distinct since the days of Tarquin.
Death of Lepidus (43,) and Agrippa (21.)
Tiberias reduces *Pannonia*, which henceforth becomes *a Roman province.*
11 Marriage of Tiberias and Julia (21.)
Theatre of Marcellus dedicated by Cæsar.
Death of Octavia (40, 37.)
War with the Germans by Germanicus; Pannonia (Hungary) conquered.
10 Claudius Cæsar born at Lyons, August 1.
The religious rites and mysteries of Egypt displace the national religion (24.)
9 Livy's history ends about this period.
Decline of the Comitia Tributa.
"Lex Papia Poppæa."
8 Augustus accepts the sovereignty for an additional five years (27, 18, 12.)
The calendar corrected by Augustus; the month Sextilis named Augustus (August.)
"Lex Julia de Ambitu" (see 18 B.C.)
Tiberias first acts treacherously towards the Germans, and afterwards defeats them.
He locates 40,000 Sigambri and Suevi on the left of the Rhine.
Death of Horace and Mæcenas.
Census of Rome, 4,233,000 citizens.
7 Ænobarbus sent against the Marcomanni on the Upper Rhine.
Completion of his history by Dionysius (29.)
6 Tiberius made tribune for five years.
He goes into voluntary exile (Rhodes.)
5 Varrus, governor of Syria.
Cyrenius, governor of Judea.
Caius Cæsar assumes the Toga Virilis.
4 Birth of Jesus Christ in Judea, Dec. 25.
[Casiodorus and Clemens place this event in B.C. 3; Eusebius has it in B.C. 2; and Tertullian places it in B.C. 1.]
3 Galba born near Terracina, Dec. 24.
2 Lucius Cæsar assumes the Toga Virilis.
Julia banished to Pandataria.

THE CHRISTIAN ERA.

"*The Christian Era*, or Era of Jesus Christ, or, as it is often called, of the Incarnation, commenced on the 1st day of January, in the middle of the 4th year of the 194th Olympiad, the 753d of the building of Rome, and in the 4714th of the Julian period. This era was first used about the year 527 by Dionysius, surnamed "Exiguus," but better known as "Denys le Petit," a monk of Scythia, and a Roman abbot: in consequence of which it is sometimes called "Recapitulatio Dionisii." It was not introduced into Italy until the sixth century, and though first used in France in the seventh, it was not universally established there until about the eighth century. An instance of the use of the Christian era in England is supposed to have occurred as early as the year 680; it was generally adopted in the eighth century; and it was ordained by the Council of Chelsea, in July, 816, that all bishops should date their acts from the year of the Incarnation of our Saviour. In Spain, the Christian era, though occasionally adopted in the eleventh, was not uniformly used in public instruments until after the middle of the fourteenth century; nor in Portugal, until about the year 1415. In the Eastern empire and in Greece, it was not universal until after the capture of Constantinople by Mahomet II., in 1453. Considerable difference has, however, existed, not only in various countries, but even in the same place, in the same country, and at the same period, respecting the commencement of the year."—*Sir Harris Nicolas.*

"Dionysius began his era," says Dr. Hales, "with the year of our Lord's incarnation and nativity in U. C. 753 of the Varronian computation, or the 45th of the Julian era. And at an earlier period Panodorus, an Egyptian monk, who flourished under the Emperor Arcadius, A.D. 395, had dated the incarnation in the same year. But by some mistake, or misconception of his meaning, Bede, who lived in the next century after Dionysius, adopted his year of the nativity, U. C. 753, *yet begun* THE VULGAR ERA (which he first introduced) *the year after, and made it commence Jan.* 1, U. C. 754."

"Chronologers have discovered that the Vulgar Christian Era, which was invented by Dionysius Exiguus, is four years too late. It is now, however, so generally received, that this gross error in calculation is but seldom regarded; and as this Era is generally understood to be dated from the epoch of Christ's birth (though not so in reality) it has obtained the title of *The Vulgar Christian Era.*"—*T. Hartwell Horne.*

"*The Vulgar Christian Era* is a fictitious and imaginary date. The era from the foundation of Rome is still more fictitious. The Vulgar Christian Era is only four or five years below the true date; but who shall say by how many years the Varronian era of Rome ascends above the true year of the foundation? But as this date, by the years of the city, is not on that account the less useful and fit to be applied in Roman history, so the years before Christ, according to the common era, although proceeding from an erroneous point, are necessary, because they proceed from a point universally acknowledged and received, and because they alone can render the date to which they are affixed, perspicuous and intelligible to every reader."—*Fynes Clinton.*

A.D.
1 Olymp. 195. U.C. Varro. 754.
Birth of JESUS CHRIST *in Judea*—Vulgar Era.
War in Germany.
2 Return of Tiberias to Rome (see B.C. 6.)
Death of Lucius Cæsar at Massilia.
3 Augustus accepts the imperial rule for another ten years (B.C. 27, 18, 12, 8.)
"Lex Ælia Sentia," restrictions on the manumission of slaves.
4 Death of Caius Cæsar in Lycia.
Augustus adopts Tiberius.
Tiberius commands in Germany.
Julia removed to Rhegium (B.C. 2.)
Death of Asinius Pollio.
5 Famine in Rome.
Second German campaign of Tiberius.
A new province formed in Germany.
6 Revolt of Dalmatia and Pannonia.
The "Ærarium Militare" established, for providing military supplies.
7 Germanicus commands in Germany.
The Illyrian war (9.)
"Lex Furia," restricting the number of slaves manumitted by wills.
The Chaise invented by Augustus.
8 Revolt in Pannonia suppressed.
Quintilius Varus in Germany.
Ovid is banished to Tomos in Dec. (17.)
9 Dalmatia reduced to subjection (6.)
Poppæus Sabinus, grandfather of the mistress and wife of Nero, consul.
Tiberius ends the Illyrian war.

A.D.
9 Slaughter of the Roman army in Germany, under Quintilius Varus; Varus kills himself.
Vespasian born at Reate, Nov. 17.
10 The German war prosecuted by Tiberius and Germanicus.
Apple-tree introduced into Italy from Syria.
11 The war of Tiberius in Germany concluded, after which he returns to Rome.
Strabo, the geographer, Celsus, the physician, Vellius Paterculus, the historian, and Phædrus, the fabulist, flourish.
12 A triumph granted to Tiberius for suppressing the late revolt in Germany, &c.
Several manufactories of arms now exist in various parts of the empire.
Caligula born at Antium, Aug. 31.
Sotion, the philosopher, Seneca's preceptor, flourishes.
13 The empire conferred upon Augustus for another ten years (3.)
Census: citizens of Rome, 4,190,117.
14 Death of Augustus at Nola, Aug. 19.
Tiberius Cæsar succeeds (aged 56) and reigns with despotic sway.
Expeditions of Germanicus and Drusus to quell the revolts of the legions, &c. in Pannonia (Hungary) and Germany.
A lunar eclipse assists in suppres. the revolt.
The powers of the Comitia Tributa transferred to the Senate (B.C. 9.)
Census of Rome, 4,097,000 citizens.
Julia dies of consumption, aged 54 (4.)

15 Rise of Sejanus; he obtains a command in the prætorian guards.
Germanicus at war with Arminius.
Drusus, junior, made consul.
Confiscations become an established mode of augmenting the treasury.
16 Two schools of jurisprudence established by Sabinus and Proclus, scholars of Capeto and Labeo (B.C. 16.)
Celsus, the physician, who introduced the system of Hippocrates at Rome still fl. (11.)
Decrees for the expulsion of the mathematicians and philosophers from Italy.
17 Germanicus recalled; he is honoured with a "triumph," and then sent into Asia.
Cappadocia reduced by Germanicus; Archelaus, its last king, bequeaths his kingdom to the Romans.
"Lex Julia de Adulteriis coercendis."
Earthquake in Asia; twelve cities destroyed.
War against Tacfarinas in Africa (21.)
Death of Ovid, in exile, at Tomos, aged 59.
18 Livy dies at Patuvium, aged 76.
19 Germanicus visits Egypt, which gives offence to the Emperor Tiberius.
Suspicious death of Germanicus at Epidaphne in Syria, Oct. 9, aged 34.
Expulsion of the Jews from Italy.
Drusus sent into Germany.
20 Agrippina arrives in Rome from Syria, bearing her husband's ashes.
L. Piso is accused by Granius of a design against Tiberius, but dies suddenly (? by his own hand) before his trial.
21 Junius Blæsus serves agnst. Tacfarinas (24.)
Drusus subdues the Marcomanni.
Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus, historians, &c. flourish.
22 Theatre of Pompeius burnt.
Drusus raised to the tribunate.
23 Unbounded influence of the prætorian prefect, Sejanus, over the emperor (15.)
Tyranny of the government; the *judicia majestatis* of Tiberius.
Drusus dies, being poisoned by his wife, Livia, in concert with Sejanus.
24 The African war brought to a close; the Romans having obtained an ally in Ptolemy, king of Muritania (17.)
Birth of Pliny, the younger, at Verona (323.)
25 Death of Strabo about this time.
Banishment of Votienus Montanus.
Death of Cremutius Cordus, historian.
26 Tiberius retires to the island of Capræ.
The Thracians subdued by Sabinus:—*Thrace becomes a Roman province.*
Castra Prætoriana established.
The family of Germanicus persecuted.
The Elegiasts, Tibullus, and Propertius, fl.
27 Fifty thousand persons crushed to death by the fall of a theatre at Fidenæ.
28 Marriage of Agrippina, daughter of Germanicus, to Domitius Ahenobarbus.
Revolt of the Frisons (47.)
29 Livia, the emperor's mother, dies aged 82.
Pomponius Mela, the geographer, flourishes.
Thrasyllus, the philosopher, flourishes.
30 Agrippina banished to Pandataria.
Imprisonment of Asinius Gallus.
Philo, the Jew, flourishes at Alexandria.
Seneca, the moral philosopher, fl. He writes his "Questiones Naturales" abt. this time.
31 Sejanus made joint consul.
Discovery of the guilt of Sejanus with reference to Drusus' death (23.)
Sertorius Macro supersedes Sejanus, who is forthwith executed, with many of his friends and nearest relatives.
32 Births of Otho and Nerva, emprs. (68, 96.)
Columella and others flourish.
33 Death of Agrippina in exile (30.)
Her son, Drusus, is also put to death.
Conquest of Mauritana.
Death of Asinius Gallus in exile.
Conversion of Cornelius, the centurion.
Valerius Maximus, historian, flourishes.
34 Persius, the satirist, born at Volaterræ, in Etruria, Dec. 4.
35 Conversion of Saul of Tarsus.
36 Death of Thrasyllus.
37 Tiberius suffocated by Macro's order, March 16, aged 78. His nephew, *Caius*, or *Caligula Cæsar*, the only remaining son of Germanicus, succeeds in his 26th year.
Many of his relatives put to death; among them is Tiberius, son of Drusus.
Agricola born at Forum Julii, June 13.
Birth of Nero at Antium, Dec. 15.
Appion, of Alexandria, grammarian, called the "Trumpet of the world"—flourishes.
Birth of Josephus, the Jewish historian.
Death of Maroboduus, the chief of the Marcomanni, at Ravenna.
38 Drusilla, the best beloved sister of Caligula, dies; the emperor becomes frantic.
Horrid cruelties of the emperor.
The disciples first called Christians at Antioch, according to Butler (Tacitus, A.D. 40; others, A.D. 60.)
39 Lepidus (great grandson of Augustus) put to death on a suspicion of conspiracy.
Banishment of Agrippina and Drusilla to the island of Pontia (41.)
Philo-Judæus flourishes.
Caligula goes into Gaul to extort money from the inhabitants.
Discovery of a conspiracy against him.
40 He leads his army to the coast, gathers shells, and returns to Rome.
Death of Ptolemy, king of Mauritania.
Intercession of Herod on behalf of the Jews.
Banishment of Tigellinus for an intrigue with Agrippina (28.)
Birth of Titus, son of Vespasian, Dec. 30 (79.)
41 Assassination of Caligula, by Chæreas and Sabinus, Jan. 24 (aged 29.)
Claudius Cæsar (uncle of Tiberius)—the first emperor chosen by the prætorian guard.
Amnesty to the republicans proclaimed.
[The court, in this reign, was under the control of freed-men, Polybius, Narcissus, &c., and the emperor's wives, &c.]
Victories of Galba and Germanicus over the Germans.
Seneca banished to Corsica (49.)
Release of Agrippina and Drusilla from Pontia (39 and 49.)
42 Conspiracy of Annius Vinicianus, &c.
Cruelty of Claudius and Messallina.
The Moors conqurd. by Paulinus and Geta.
Mauritania finally conquered by Plautius, and formed into two provinces.
Birth of Octavia, the daughter of Claudius and Messalina (62.)

43 Plautius Aulius in Britain. The emperor Claudius also visits Britain.
Food riots and tumults in Rome.
Lycia reduced to *a Roman province* by Plautius.
Martial, the epigrammatist, born at Bilbilis in Spain (66.)
44 Return and triumph of Claudius.
Plautius reduces *Judea*, and forms it into *a Roman province*.
45 Mediation of Agrippa, the younger, with Claudius, on behalf of the Jews.
Paul and Barnabas preach the gospel at Cyprus and other places.
Pomponius Mela still flourishes (29.)
46 Perseus comes to Rome (34, 62.)
Polybius, the paramour of Messalina, put to death by her intrigues (41.)
47 Thrace finally reduced by Plautius.
Celebration of the "Ludi Sæculares."
The Frisons submit to Corbulo (28.)
Vespasian commands in Britain.
48 Messalina marries Silius, for which she is charged with conspiracy, and put to death by order of Narcissus (41.)
Census of Rome: 6,984,000 citizens.
[According to Mr. Fynes Clinton, the number should be 5,984,072, or 5,944,072.]
Roman citizens throughout the empire, 25,419,066.
49 Claudius marries his niece, Agrippina (41.)
Seneca recalled through the interest of the empress, Agrippina (41.)
50 Claudius adopts Nero (Domitius Ahenobarbus) the son of Agrippina.
Colonia Agrippina founded.
Birth of Domitian, Oct. 24 (81.)
Paul preaches at Athens.
51 Caractacus, the king of the Silures in Britain, is brought before Claudius.
Lucan, the heroic poet, flourishes.
The Toga Virilis assumed by Nero.
52 Birth of Trajan at Italica (98.)
Heraclides, discip. of Didymus, fl. at Rome.
53 Marriage of Nero and Octavia; the former 16 years, the latter 11 years old (42, 62.)
Aqueduct of Claudius.
Silanus kills himself.
54 Agrippina poisons Claudius; her son *Nero Claudius Cæsar*, succeeds, Oct. 13.
War against the Parthians.
Domitius Corbulo sent into Armenia (58.)
55 Britannicus, the son of Claudius and Messalina (48) and brother of Octavia, the wife of Nero, poisoned; nearly 14 years old.
Paul visits Ephesus and Cæsarea.
56 Rotterdam in Holland built.
58 Successes of Corbulo in Armenia; Tigranes expelled (66.)
Otho sent to Lusitania, that the emperor might have his wife (68.)
59 Nero has his mother put to death (28.)
Influence of Sabina Poppæa, wife of Otho, over the emperor (58, 68, 69.)
Epictetus, the philosopher, at Rome.
Shipwreck of Paul on the island of Melita.
Death of Cn. Domitus Afer.
60 Institution of the "Quinquennalia," or "Neronia;" games—musical, gymnastic, and equestrian.
Rubellius Plautus banished Rome.
Agricola in Britain, under Suetonius.

61 Roman arms successful in Britain.
Tacitus born about this period.
Paul a prisoner at Rome.
Galba commands in Spain.
62 Seneca retires into private life to avoid danger apprehended from Nero.
Octavia (42, 53) murdered by Nero's command in Pandataria.
Pamphila (Greek authors) flourish.
Nero marries the wife of Otho (59.)
Death of Perseus, Nov. 24, aged 28.
Birth of Pliny, the younger, at Como (61.)
63 Tigellinus, prætorian prefect (40.)
Paul set at liberty; he returns to Jerusalem and from thence travels through Asia Minor, Greece, &c.
64 Fire at Rome; suspicion falls on Nero, Tigellinus and others.
Josephus comes to Rome.
Nero's golden palace, so extensive that its gardens, &c. are enclosed within it.
65 First persecution of the Christians.
Paul beheaded and Peter crucified.
Piso's conspiracy disclosed by Lucan.
Piso bleeds himself to death.
Seneca's death, age about 70.
[He was ordered to be bled to death by his pupil. See 62.]
Tigellinus's rapacity unbounded.
Poppæa killed by a kick from Nero.
Exile of Cassius Longinus, the jurist.
A pestilence rages throughout Rome.
Rome rebuilt on a regular plan.
66 Martial comes to reside in Rome (100.)
Tiridates, king of Armenia at Rome.
Revolt in Judea; Vespasian commands the Roman army.
Glass bottles in partial use.
Thrasea and Barea put to death, and Priscus banished, for republicanism. (D)
Linus, bishop at Rome.
Pliny, the elder, natural historian, fl.
Quintus Curtius, the historian, and Persius the satirist, flourish.
67 Nero celebrates the Olympic games.
He invites Corbulo to come to him.
Nero condemns Corbulo to death; but Corbulo kills himself at Cenchrea.
68 Revolt of Vindex in Gaul.
Galba, governor of Spain, is proclaimed legate of the senate.
Revolt of Otho in Lusitania.
Death of Nero, by his own hand, June 9th; with him the house of Cæsar expires.
The army in Spain proclaim *Galba*, who is acknowledged by the senate.
Death of Vindex; recall of Priscus (68, 70.)
Piso adopted as Galba's successor.
The feasts of Easter, Ascension, and Pentecost, instituted by the Christian church.
69 Galba murdered by the prætorian guards, Jan. 15; he is succeeded by *Otho*, whose claim Vitellius contests.
Suicide of Tigellinus at Sinuessa, on hearing of his condemnation.
Battle of Bedriacum; defeat of Otho; he destroys himself, April 16.
Suspension of the Jewish war.
Vitellius succeeds, but is deposed and killed by the soldiers of Vespasian, after a reign of eight months and five days.
The Capitol destroyed by fire.

CHRONOLOGY OF PARTHIA AND ARMENIA.

B.C.
96 *Tigranes* I. king of Armenia, &c. son-in-law of Mithridates, the Great, king of Pontus.
Tigranes, a descendant of Artaxias, the original founder of the Armenian kingdom (188), asserts his independence of all patronage, establishes an unshackled regal government, wars with neighbouring States, and extends the limits of his kingdom by conquest.
94 Arsaces at war with Tigranes I. of Armenia.
93 Tigranes is unable to maintain himself against Pacorus of Parthia; a peace succeeds.
92 First treaty of Parthia with Rome; ambassadors from Pacorus received by Sylla, Roman prætor of Cilicia.
Pacorus puts one of his ambassadors to death for having sat on Sylla's *left* hand.
87 *Arsaces* X. (Mnasciras) Parthia.
War of succession; Sinatroces contends for the Parthian crown.
83 Tigranes, after several successive victories, becomes master of Syria, with its dependent province, Cilicia.
Tigranocerta, a new capital for the Armenian kingdom, founded by Tigranes.
76 Sinatroces deposes Arsaces, whom he suc. as
77 *Arsaces* XI. king of Parthia.
War between Arsaces, of Parthia, and Tigranes, of Armenia.
Civil war in Parthia.
76 Tigranes concludes a dishonourable peace with Arsaces; he cedes much territory to Parthia.
72 Mithridates, the Great, driven from Asia Minor, takes refuge with Tigranes.
69 Lucullus crosses the Tigris, and invades Armenia; Tigranes opposes him.
Pacorus renews his alliance with Rome.
Battle of Tigranocerta; defeat of Tigranes and Mithridates by Lucullus.
68 They are again defeated at Artaxata.
Mutiny in Lucullus' army.
Tigranes recovers his lost territory.
Arsaces XII. (Phraates III.) Parthia.
67 During the war between Mithridates and the Romans, the alliance of Arsaces is courted by both parties.
66 Tigranes, of Armenia, defeated by Pompey near the Euphrates.
Phraates protects the son of Tigranes.
64 Armenia Minor seized by Dejotarus, tetrarch or king of Armenia Minor.
63 Tigranes having lost all his possessions except Armenia, submits to the Roman general.
Marriage of Tigranes, the younger, with a daughter of Phraates.
Phraates raises an army for the restoration of his son-in-law, but is compelled to abandon his design on Pompey's approach.
Treaty with Rome renewed.
60 Assassination of Phraates by his two sons, Orodes and Mithridates; the latter succds.
Arsaces XIII. (Mithridates III.) Parthia.

B.C.
59 Expulsion of Mithridates for his cruelty.
War between Orodes and Mithridates.
58 Mithridates obtains possession of Babylon.
57 Babylon besieged by Orodes.
56 Surrender of Babylon; whereupon
Orodes deposes and murders his brother, Arsaces, and reigns as
Arsaces XIV. (Orodes I.) king of Parthia.
55 *Arduasdes* I. (or Artavasdes) k. of Armenia.
Mesopotamia overrun by Crassus on his approach towards Parthia.
Parthia invaded by the Romans, under Crassus—"an expedition undertaken not for military reputation, nor political ascendancy, but from a rapacious love of wealth."
53 Crassus is misled by his guide, Ariamnes, an Arabian chief.
Dreadful slaughter of the Romans; the younger Crassus and his officers, seeing no hope of escape, commit suicide.
Retreat of Crassus; the Parthians, under their able commander, Surena, pursue.
Crassus again deceived by a guide.
Cassius escapes to Syria with 500 horse.
Assassination of Crassus, and destruction of his army; the Roman standards taken.
[In this unfortunate manner, and with effects so disastrous to the arms of Rome, terminated the expedition of Crassus—with the loss of 30,000 men; 20,000 of whom perished in the campaign, and 10,000 were made prisoners. It has been said that the Persians, in order to pour contempt upon the motive by which Crassus was actuated, poured melted gold into his mouth after his decapitation.]
52 Orodes sends Surena to invade Syria; he is repulsed by Cassius.
Orodes becomes jealous of the fame and popularity of Surena; he puts him to death.
51 Syria again invaded by Pacorus, the son of Orodes, and his general, Osaces.
They compel Bibulus to retreat within the walls of Antioch.
50 Defeat and death of Osaces, and overthrow of the Parthian army by the Romans, under Cicero and Cassius, at Antigonea.
42 Arsaces, an ally of Rome, sends a contingent of troops, under Labienus, to co-operate with Brutus.
41 Mission of the younger Labienus to the court of Parthia; before his return he is proclaimed an exile from Rome.
40 Labienus, the younger, instigates Arsaces to make war on the Roman territories in Syria and Asia Minor.
He forthwith sends Labienus to invade Syria, and other Roman provinces.
Decidius Saxa defeated, made prisoner, and afterwards put to death, by Labienus.
Conquest of Syria and Palestine.
39 Labienus conquersCilicia; Plancus, governor of Asia, is compelled to retire.

38 Arsaces' army repulsed by Ventidius, and his general, Labienus, deftd. and put to death.
37 Pacorus invades Syria; defeated and slain.
Insanity of Orodes; throne seized by his son *Arsaces* XV. (Phraates IV.) who,
Upon his accession murders his father, and his thirty brothers, and his own son.
The Romans anticipate Arsaces, by sending an army against him under Antony.
Antony besieges the Parthians in Praaspa.
36 Distress of the Roman troops; Antony sues for permission to retreat.
Retreat of Antony; the Parthian horsemen harass the Romans; Antony narrowly escapes with his life.
[The Romans lost more than 20,000 men in this campaign.]
Archelaus created king of Cappadocia by Augustus; hence, from this period
Armenia Minor is dependant on Rome.
34 War between Armenia Major and the Roman power.
The Romans inveigle Artavasdes into their power; he and his family are banished to Alexandria.
Artaxias II. king of Armenia.
30 Great dissatisfaction in consequence of the cruelties of Phraates.
28 Rebellion of Tiridates; deposition of Phraates; Tiridates made king.
27 Phraates obtains the aid of some of the Scythian tribes for the recovery of his throne.
25 Tiridates, defeated, flees for refuge to Rome.
Tiridates carries with him a son of Phraates, whom he delivers to Augustus.
24 Augustus refuses to aid Tiridates in his design of again displacing Phraates, king of Parthia.
23 Alliance of Parthia with the Romans; Augustus restores to Phraates his son (25.)
20 *Tigranes* II., king of Armenia, established on the throne by Tiberius Nero.
Arsaces restores the Roman standards taken from Crassus; in return for which Augustus sends him a trustworthy female slave, named Thermusa.
18 The four sons of Arsaces sent to Rome as hostages, and to be educated.
Thermusa governs the king of Parthia so as to gratify the Romans.
Armenia Major is henceforward chiefly dependant upon Rome.
10 *Arduasdes* II. king of Armenia.
7 He is expelled by his subjects.
6 *Tigranes* III. king of Armenia.
The Romans appoint *Artabazus*, but Phraates defends the claims of Tigranes.
4 Artabazus having died, and Caius having driven Tigranes out of Armenia the Romans appoint
Ariobarzanes, king of Armenia.
2 *Erato*, widowed queen of Artabazus, reigns in Armenia.
She is soon after deposed.
Interregnum and confusion in Armenia.

A.D.
2 *Arduasdes* III. (or Artavasdes) appointed by Augustus in Armenia.
War between Arduasdes and Phraates; the former is expelled Armenia.
10 Arsaces is poisoned by his wife and son.
12 Thermusa makes her son
Arsaces XVI. (Phraataces) king of Parthia.
14 Phraataces put to death.
Arsaces XVII. (Orodes II.) king of Parthia.
He is put to death for his cruelty.
15 *Arsaces* XVIII. (Venones I.) returns from Rome and reigns—Parthia.
16 Artabanus, of Media, deposes and expels Venones; he ascends the throne as
Arsaces XIX. (Artabanus III.)—Parthia.
Venones I. king of Armenia Major.
[This was the exiled king of Parthia.]
He is expelled his kingdom; and
18 Germanicus favours the pretensions of *Artaxias* III. (Zenon) to the thrn. of Armenia.
34 *Arsaces*, king of Armenia (son of Artabanus, the king of Parthia.)
35 Assassination of Arsaces of Armenia, by hirelings employed by
Mithridates, who is established over Armenia by the Roman emperor, Tiberias.
36 Tiridates is sent by Tiberias as a rival of Artabanus III. king of Parthia.
39 *Cotys*, king of Armenia Minor—appointed by Caligula of Rome.
44 Civil commotions in Parthia; decline of its prosperity and power.
43 *Arsaces* XX. (Vardanes)—Parthia.
He seizes Atropatene in Media.
47 *Arsaces* XXI. (Gotarzes)—Parthia.
Meherdates aspires to the Parthian throne, under the influence of Rome.
50 Defeat and death of Meherdates.
Arsaces XXII. (Vonones II.)—Parthia.
52 *Arsaces* XXIII. (Vologeses I.)—Parthia.
Defeated by Corbulo, Roman general.
Mithridates expelled Armenia, and put to death by his nephew,
Rhadamistus, who seizes on the throne.
Tiridates is set up by the Parthian king.
54 *Aristobulus*, king of Armenia Minor.
58 Arsaces XXIII. at war with Rome for Asia Minor; alternate successes.
59 Artaxata destroyed by Corbulo, and Tigranocerta occupied by his troops.
60 *Tigranes* (the Cappadocian) appointed king of Armenia by Corbulo.
61 Vologeses again invades Armenia on behalf of Tiridates.
62 Terms of pacification between Vologeses and the Roman general, Pætus.
63 Death of Tigranes of Armenia.
End of the war betwn. Parthia and Rome.
Tiridates (of Cappadocia) made king of Armenia by Nero, emperor of Rome.
78 *Exedaris*, king of Armenia.
90 *Arsaces* XXIV. (Pacorus II.)—Parthia.
He makes a treaty with Rome.
100 Ctesiphon enlarged and embellished.
107 *Arsaces* XXV. (Chosroes)—Parthia.
War with Rome, owing to a dispute respecting Armenia.
114 Armenia Major conquered by the Romans; it is now *a Roman province*.
115 Roman invasion of Parthia.
116 Ctesiphon captured; Chosroes deposed by Trajan, and Parthamaspates made king.
117 Chosroes restored to his kingdom by Adrian.
Kingly government restored to Armenia Major, but dependant on Rome.
120 *Parthamasaris*, king of Armenia.
121 *Arsaces* XXVI. (Vologeses II.)—Parthia.

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