


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A Prospectus of the Terms

UPON WHICH

A PRIZE OF ONE HUNDRED POUNDS

IS OFFERED

FOR A CONCLUSIVE DISPROOF

OF

UNIVERSAL IMMATERIALISM.

For the purpose of more clearly showing how little can be advanced in opposition to the doctrine of UNIVERSAL IMMATERIALISM, *and of thus more fully establishing the truth of that doctrine, a prize of one hundred pounds is hereby offered to the* FIRST *person who shall, within* TWELVE *calendar months from the date hereof,* PUBLISH *such arguments in refutation of the said doctrine as shall be declared conclusive, and in accordance with sound logical principles, by* ANY *twelve gentlemen* PUBLICLY KNOWN *as men of scientific or philosophical attainments,* INCLUDING *the Professors of Moral Philosophy and Logic in the principal Universities of Great Britain and Ireland.*

The said twelve Approvers to be CHOSEN *by the Candidate himself, by him* SUPPLIED *with copies of the arguments* ON BOTH SIDES, *and* APPLIED TO *by him for their opinion. If any gentleman, when selected and applied to by the Candidate, shall, from any cause, refuse to pronounce a favourable judgment upon the arguments of the said Candidate, the latter has the option of referring* SUCCESSIVELY TO ANY NUMBER OF GENTLEMEN HE THINKS PROPER, *until he obtains the testimony of the required number, provided always that the gentlemen so referred to be in all cases such as above described, and be recognised as such by the Proposer of the Prize, either prior or subsequently, to their being referred to by the Candidate; and the utmost facility and promptitude shall be uniformly afforded in obtaining the Proposer's approval of any list or name submitted to him.*

As there may be occasion for a reply to the arguments adduced by the Candidate, NOT LESS THAN TWELVE *calendar months are to intervene, nor* MORE THAN EIGHTEEN *between* THE DAY *on which the aforesaid arguments of the Candidate are made public and* THE DATES *of the attestations given by the twelve gentlemen whom the Candidate shall ulti-*

mately succeed in prevailing upon to recognise the validity of his arguments.

The Candidate who, TWELVE *months after the publication of his arguments, shall* FIRST *send in (directed to the Publisher of this work) the* UNEQUIVOCAL *and* AUTOGRAPH *declarations of* ANY *twelve such gentlemen, stating, individually, that they had perused the arguments on both sides, and that the Candidate's arguments upon the three points prescribed below appeared to them* INCONTROVERTIBLY CONCLUSIVE, *together with the* PERMISSION *of these gentlemen that their declarations should be made public, such Candidate shall be considered entitled to the Prize of One Hundred Pounds, and shall be forthwith paid it.*

The Prize is not offered for the BEST *refutation of the doctrine, but for the* FIRST *that is declared incontrovertible. And the opinions required of twelve Adjudicators are not as to whether* THE DOCTRINE *is (in their own opinions) true or false, but as to whether* THE ARGUMENTS *brought forward by the Candidate are or are not, upon sound logical and scientific principles, conclusive arguments against the doctrine,* AND SUCH AS WOULD BE ADMITTED TO BE SO ON ANY OTHER QUESTION OF SCIENCE,

The said twelve Approvers to be CHOSEN *by the Candidate himself, by him* SUPPLIED *with copies of the arguments* ON BOTH SIDES, *and* APPLIED TO *by him for their opinion. If any gentleman, when selected and applied to by the Candidate, shall, from any cause, refuse to pronounce a favourable judgment upon the arguments of the said Candidate, the latter has the option of referring* SUCCESSIVELY TO ANY NUMBER OF GENTLEMEN HE THINKS PROPER, *until he obtains the testimony of the required number, provided always that the gentlemen so referred to be in all cases such as above described, and be recognised as such by the Proposer of the Prize, either prior or subsequently, to their being referred to by the Candidate; and the utmost facility and promptitude shall be uniformly afforded in obtaining the Proposer's approval of any list or name submitted to him.*

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PHILOSOPHY, OR PRACTICAL LIFE. *It is neceſsary, also, that the separate* GROUNDS *of* EACH *Adjudicator's opinion be distinctly stated; and that the name of each, as well as that of the Candidate, be given.*

The arguments brought forward by the Candidate are to be as follow:

I. A CLEAR DISPROOF OF BERKELEY'S DEMONSTRATION, EITHER IN ITS PREMISSES, OR IN ITS CONCLUSION.

II. A CLEAR DISPROOF OF THE TWO NEW DEMONSTRATIONS CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME.

III. ANY ONE CONCLUSIVE PROOF THAT THERE IS A MATERIAL SUBSTANCE IN THE MATERIAL WORLD.

And, since there is a kind of matter that is denied, and another that is not denied, GREAT EXPLICITNESS *as to the* PARTICULAR KIND OF THING IN DISPUTE *(under the name of matter) is indispensable* THROUGHOUT *both in the arguments of the Candidate, and in the autograph opinions of those who arbitrate.*

A copy of whatever pamphlet is published, containing the arguments of the Candidate, must be sent in to the Publisher of this work as soon as such pamphlet iſsues from the preſs.

London, December, 1847.

ON THE NATURE AND ELEMENTS

OF THE

EXTERNAL WORLD:

OR

UNIVERSAL IMMATERIALISM FULLY EXPLAINED AND NEWLY DEMONSTRATED.

"Hypotheses non fingo."—Sir Isaac Newton.

"If this notion be singular, it is a shame it should be so, at this time of day, and in a Christian country."

Bishop Berkeley.

ON

THE NATURE AND ELEMENTS

OF THE

EXTERNAL WORLD:

OR,

UNIVERSAL IMMATERIALISM

FULLY EXPLAINED

AND

NEWLY DEMONSTRATED.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED THE PROSPECTUS OF THE PRIZE OFFERED IN 1848.

By T. COLLYNS SIMON,

AUTHOR OF "THE MISSION AND MARTYRDOM OF ST. PETER,"
"SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTIES IN PLANETARY LIFE,"
"THE PHILOSOPHICAL ANSWER TO THE ESSAYS AND REVIEWS," ETC.





LONDON:
JOHN CHURCHILL, NEW BURLINGTON STREET.
MDCCCLXII.

~~250. a. 38.~~
265. i. 109.


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DEDICATION.

TO

DR. CHRISTIAN AUGUSTUS BRANDIS,

PRIVY COUNCILLOR TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA;
ORDINARY PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN;
KNIGHT OF THE RED EAGLE,
AND OF THE ROYAL ORDER OF THE REDEEMER,
ETC. ETC. ETC.

My dear Sir,

It is to me a source of much gratification to know, that in consigning this volume to the protection of your name, I do nothing that will be unacceptable to you; because I am thus afforded an opportunity of testifying to you my gratitude for much personal kindness, and my participation in that great esteem with which your character must inspire all who know you.

The interest also which I take in the success of the doctrine inculcated in these pages, adds much to my satisfaction in dedicating them to you; for

no one will bring a more enlightened and unbiassed mind than you will, to the examination of that beautiful and most valuable doctrine, nor will any one appreciate more justly than you, whatever little merit there may be in the proofs and explanations of it which are now submitted to the world.

Your intimate acquaintance with the language in which I write will guarantee my words from misapprehension in your own case, and your well-deserved influence on the literature of your country will, in the day of need (I doubt not), protect what I have written from being misunderstood by others.

I am, my dear Sir,

Very truly yours,

THE AUTHOR.

LONDON, *October*, 1847.

PREFACE.

IT is at last well understood among thinking men, as the Materialists themselves have from the first insisted on, that there is no intermediate position between Materialism and Immaterialism. It was a mere oversight to assign two causes for effects which are completely accounted for by one.

The sole question, therefore, now is, Which doctrine is right—Materialism or Immaterialism?

The object of the following pages is to place in a clear light the philosophical error of Materialism; and it will contribute to this end that the public should now be informed that no Essay was sent in by any Candidate for the Prize of £100, offered by the Author (upon the first appearance of this Work, in 1848), for a single argument in favour of the vulgar hypothesis on the Nature of Matter—viz., that it consists of something besides phenomena and their laws; a firm and general belief in which hypothesis was the original basis of Materialism.

This absence of Candidates will, for most people, constitute abundant proof that there is no pretext in nature or philosophy for the hypothesis in question.

And this appears still further, from the fact that the only notion now alleged by the more enlightened Materialists, as a basis for their theory, is a sort of "hoping against hope"—viz., that their hypothesis of a supernatural or occult matter *may* be true for all we know to the contrary, and although, as they admit, not the slightest reason can ever, by any possibility, be assigned for our supposing that it *is* true.

Even if Materialism were a principle of much value to mankind, no rational man would choose to hold it as a truth upon such a plea as this. It amounts to saying that even if no human being can see an octavo volume on the bare table now standing there before me in the open daylight, there nevertheless *may* be such a volume, existing invisibly and intangibly, upon the table; since man is not the measure of all things! Although we cannot perceive it by the reason or by the senses, it *may* nevertheless exist! Nothing in science or in common life is ever recognized even as a possibility upon a pretext so fanciful. Such has been, however, for many years the only basis that philosophy had left at the disposal of the Materialists; and this volume demonstrates that there is not, in this case

at least, even that fanciful possibility, for a basis of Materialism.

The original Prospectus of the Prize above alluded to is prefixed to this Volume, that the Public may still have an opportunity of judging of the terms upon which it was proposed—terms which a distinguished authority in such enquiries (the late Sir William Hamilton, of Edinburgh) declared to be of a liberality unprecedented in philosophical investigations.

The question as to the permanence and identity of Material things, which some regard as a difficulty in Berkeley's doctrine, and have therefore wondered not to find treated of in these pages, is not, in any sense of the expression, peculiar to this doctrine (see pp. 179—181). It stands as much in need of explanation in the theory of Materialism (or in any theory) as here; although no Materialist has ever attempted to give an account of it.

The real point to be determined is this: What is the nature of that identity which we are conscious of in the colours of any object—of a room, for instance—from one day to another, or from one minute to another? What is the nature of that permanence in these phenomena which makes them appear to be independent of living beings, while Physiology proves to us, in the clearest manner, that they are not so?

This point, although, as has been just said, not

at all resulting from the doctrine here defended, is nevertheless an interesting problem respecting these phenomena, and will, together with the Principle of Causation, be fully explained in a small work on "Berkeley and his Living Critics," which is now being prepared for the press by the Author of the present Volume.

T. C. S.

BATH,

April, 1862.

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INTRODUCTION.

BERKELEY's arguments in favour of Universal Immaterialism have been declared unsatisfactory. Two new arguments are here proposed in defence of it.

His explanation also of the thing he proves is so far from sufficiently explicit, that the majority of people look upon that thing as something contrary to common sense. A fuller explanation of the subject is therefore here offered to the public, and such a one as shall, it is hoped, place this interesting doctrine within the reach of the most ordinary understandings.

Berkeley's arguments went no farther than to show that the physical substance was an hypothesis, and a gratuitous one,—that we have no reason whatever for supposing that there is such a thing in our universe. The more reasonable of his adversaries have admitted these two points; but insist that, although we have no knowledge of the existence of this substance, it may nevertheless exist; as we must not suppose that nothing exists but what

we know of, or (as they express it) that "man is the measure of all things." The proof, therefore, of Universal Immaterialism, which is now submitted to the public, is intended to meet this difficulty, and goes to show that it is physically impossible there should be a material substance in our universe; not that it is probable there is no such thing, nor that it is morally certain there is not, but that it is contrary to the nature of things that there should be this physical or material substance in any portion of the known universe, within the limits of the most distant stars.

That of which the contrary is physically impossible, is the only kind of proposition which can be mathematically demonstrated to be true; and it is upon the physical impossibility of the substance in question that I have founded the demonstration here proposed—a demonstration of the same nature as that which leaves no doubt as to the equality of the angles at the base of the isosceles triangle, or which has established, to the satisfaction of all people, that the sun is *not* above the horizon when we see him first to be above it in the morning.

They who have attained to such an acquaintance with the material theory as to see it is incomprehensible, yet content themselves with saying of it that it is a mystery and an enigma, instead of first inquiring whether it is not physically impossible, may surely, without much injustice to themselves, sus-

pect that they act thus from a biassed mind; and cannot, without great illiberality and dogmatism, refuse attention to that sort of argument against it which removes all doubt whatever of the fact, that matter is not only no portion of our universe, but cannot, from its nature, be a portion of it. I freely admit that if the non-existence of a material substance in the universe does not admit of demonstration, its existence there is not physically impossible, and that if its existence in the universe is not physically impossible, nothing could be more wild than to attempt, in the present misconception and state of feeling on the subject, to expostulate even with enlightened people upon their belief in it. But, on the other hand, if its non-existence in our universe admits of a mathematical demonstration, all will, I think, then concede that its existence there is physically impossible, and that it will be childish to give such an hypothesis a place any longer in the philosophy of an instructed people. Nothing, therefore, which is not demonstration in these pages, must on any account be confounded with what is so. The prejudices and misstatements which prevail have rendered many explanations and suggestions necessary, which, however, no attentive reader can mistake for the demonstration I allude to.

I am conscious of having entered more largely into these explanations than the subject itself

(which, after all, is a very simple one) can, strictly speaking, be said to call for, even in a popular treatise like the present. I have done this in the hope that I shall thereby render Berkeley's own arguments, in the cause of Universal Immaterialism, more effective than they have hitherto been; for, there can be no doubt of it, that their not having produced the general conviction that might have been expected from such clear reasoning, arises mainly, if not solely, from men's having mistaken, or having been able successfully to misrepresent, what the thing was that he was arguing.

The doctrine of Universal Immaterialism must be looked upon as having been universally rejected in Germany, France, and England, for the few writers who seem to approach nearest to the views of its founder, connected such other tenets with it as may convince any one that their views of the subject were not identical with his; and the opposition to it has been of the same nature in the three countries, so much so as to make it unnecessary to discuss separately the observations of every one who wrote against it. As Dr. Reid and Mr. Dugald Stewart were the first who assailed the doctrine, and as their writings contain all that has been said by the German and French philosophers against it, I have more exclusively confined myself to their animadversions than either the reasonableness of their opposition, or their importance as philosophers,

would otherwise have warranted. Besides, I cannot but consider that much of the misconception of Berkeley's doctrine that prevails in foreign countries, as well as in England, has originated in the wilful misrepresentation of it by these writers. I admit that its original rejection, both at home and abroad, has arisen, to some little extent, from other minor causes,—partly, for instance, from the jealousy of scientific men, whose preconceived notions it totally contradicted, — partly from the atheistical and other absurd consequences of doctrines supposed to be identical or connected with it,—partly from Berkeley's own exposition of it being expressed somewhat too philosophically, and in the language of a school no longer in repute,—partly because it was looked upon as a pious effort on the part of an ecclesiastic to refute the atheists, whose favourite notion is that a material mechanism is the cause of all things,—but mainly, I think, from the gross misrepresentation of it by the popular British writers just alluded to. I do not propose to examine these minor causes of its original rejection; but I cannot omit this occasion of observing, that a main present cause of the doctrine being unintelligible in Germany and France is, that the most distinguished philosophers in these countries hold, without attempting any proof, but rather in direct opposition to all our knowledge, not only that things existing in mind—such as feel and

colour, pain and pleasure—are mere appearances, and *not real things*, but also that all such things are states or modifications of the mind. It is strange that such tenets should prevail in countries so distinguished for philosophy, especially as the obvious consequence of the first of these tenets is, that the most violent toothach is an appearance without any reality; and of the second, that the mind becomes transformed into a table, if it perceives a table,—into a tree, if it perceives a tree,—and so on, into whatever object of sense it perceives. I shall not discuss these points, for they need no discussion; but shall merely repeat here, that this most groundless and absurd notion about "the subjectivity of the object and the objectivity of the subject," as well as that other strange notion about the unreality of the "I," and the reality of the "non-I," (which need only a plain statement of them in common words to refute them,) are, whilst they exist, insuperable barriers to the reception of a doctrine which involves that blue is not a state or modification of the mind, but of something within the mind; and that nothing can be more real than what is real within the mind.

An eminent British philosopher and advocate of the material theory, Sir James Mackintosh, who has candidly acknowledged that whoever supposes Berkeley's principles of Immaterialism to be inconsistent with common sense, proves himself to be

devoid of metaphysical discernment, has, singularly enough, asserted of these same principles that they are of no importance to philosophy or to religion. As this writer is not without much influence in England, and as it is not improbable that a similar opinion respecting their inutility may have led many others to disregard the proofs of them, I shall here observe, that "whether there is in nature anything except mind which can subsist independent of, and unconnected with, mind," is a question, the importance of which has never before, that I know of, been denied, and is well known to all those whose studies have exhibited to them the inconsistencies and other evil consequences which are attendant upon the groundless but prevalent hypothesis that there is such another substance. Some philosophers have argued that there is no mind; others, that there is no matter; others, that there is neither; others, that there are both;—all which is strong proof that the question respecting the existence or non-existence of matter is not without a large share of philosophical interest. According to the received hypothesis of two independent substances in nature, it is necessary to believe, among other very strange things, and all British philosophers and men of science do believe, that *the colours of objects are "mere optical illusions," and do not in reality at all exist in the objects!* To say nothing of other absurdities, can anything be looked upon as of no

value in philosophy, which divests it of such an absurdity as this is?

In religion, the received hypothesis is of course attended with still greater evil than in science and philosophy. Dr. Dwight, the well known American theologian, declared himself an advocate of the material theory, yet declared (and every theologian knows the same) that the only reliance of atheism is upon matter. Nor is this the report of theologians only. "The powers," says Dr. Reid, "which inanimate matter is supposed to possess, have always been the stronghold of atheists, to which they had recourse in defence of their system. This fortress of atheism must be most effectually overturned, if there is no such thing as matter in the universe." (Intel. Powers, Ess. II., ch. 10.) I am not aware of any writer who has denied this; and who is there that, with this experience, can pretend to say with Sir James Mackintosh, that it is unimportant, or not very important, whether there be this thing or be not this thing in nature?

Again, if there be any truth in the proposition that all the real objects of sense are results produced within the human mind by the immediate action of a superhuman spirit without the aid or agency of any intervening substance of any kind, then not only does this principle furnish the directest and clearest evidence of which the thing is capable, that God is constantly present with us and constantly

occupied about us; but also makes out that that presence and that that occupation are more immediate, and in that respect more like these things in a fellow-creature, than men—even pious men—are in the habit of supposing them to be. Now, to say nothing of many other important particulars in which religion is affected by such a doctrine, what stronger motive to piety can there be than the intimate knowledge of this fact from demonstrations and common sense? or what greater source of resignation in our more trying hours than to know, upon this most unquestionable evidence of which truth is susceptible, that every event, independent of our own will, not only comes to us from the hands of God, but comes, moreover, in the same direct and immediate manner from Him, and with the same unintermitted attention and intention, on His part, throughout the minutest details of daily life, as are required for maintaining the feels and colours of His sensible creation within such a substance as mind is? Who that understands it, can say that this is unimportant knowledge? Who that understands it, can say that when he neglects such knowledge, he does not neglect one of the talents God has given him,—one, perhaps, of the most important points of science that are adapted to, or intended for, mankind? To believe what cannot be known, is often virtue; but to exact belief in spiritual matters where knowledge is attainable, is

creating an unnecessary difficulty in religion—a difficulty which God has not left us to contend with, and which, in this case at least, it only requires a little attention to remove.

The natural immortality of the soul, too, or the great doctrine that, in the course of nature, the soul remains untouched by the body's dissolution, is freed from the slightest uncertainty by these principles. The degree of evidence they afford on this point is not only incomparably higher than human reason has ever yet afforded, even in the sagacious reasonings of Bishop Butler, but is the very highest degree of evidence which, on any point, human reason can afford. The great difficulty respecting the immortality of the soul arises from not knowing the whole relation which subsists between mind and body, and the nature of their connexion. When, therefore, this relation is wholly known, that difficulty disappears. When it is ascertained in the clearest manner that the body is only a cluster of sensations, common indeed to many minds, but subject chiefly to the control of the one connected with it, for the very obvious purpose of rendering that one perceptible to the rest, there is no one who cannot see that a change, whatever it may be, in such a thing as the body, cannot, in the course of nature, extend to such a thing as the mind.

There is also another circumstance in the relation and connexion thus discovered between mind and

body, which removes the only plausible grounds that ever existed for supposing that the destruction of the body affects the spirit. This circumstance is, that the body exists within the mind, instead of the mind, as was supposed, having its existence within the body. If the mind existed within the body, there might appear some reason for thinking that this internality implied dependence, and that

> "When the shrining casket's worn,
> The gem within will tarnish too."

But if, on the contrary, it can be clearly and mathematically demonstrated that it is the body that is within the mind, then the mind's independence is relieved even of the doubt derived from that consideration: and no one, not even the absurdest sceptic, will suppose that the mind is at all likely to perish, merely because what is contained within it perishes; nor does the course of nature, as has been seen, even so much as suggest such a conjecture. Let any one judge for himself whether the ablest arguments of the ablest writers are not far surpassed by the light thus thrown upon this subject, so deeply interesting to all. How, then, is it, I again ask, that any one has been found to say that Universal Immaterialism was but of little consequence to religion?

Upon these principles, also, it appears in the clearest and exactest manner, that we have precisely

the same kind of proof of the existence of an Almighty Spirit as we have of the existence of any one of our fellow-creatures; and that it would be as unreasonable to say that we do not think the cause of the sensible world to be conscious of itself, as that we do not think a fellow-creature to be so. There is, I say, the same kind of proof; but so much more of this proof as to make it appear to be (what in reality it is not) of a totally different description. When we perceive a human being, we only perceive directly a set of sensations which, by their changes, direct us to the conclusion that there is a spirit, like that of which we are ourselves conscious, connected with these sensations and placed by them in communication with us. It is thus also that we perceive God, except that His presence is made manifest to us by an incomparably larger assemblage of sensations and changes than that by which the existence of a human spirit is made manifest to us. Such proof as this is of God's existence (I mean, if the principles upon which it is founded be demonstrated), the world has never yet had from any other argument, or from all other arguments put together. Would it not then be, at the least, a most erroneous notion—not to say a frivolous one—to suppose, with all these points before our eyes, that Berkeley's principles, however true, are unimportant?

But it will be asked, how does it happen, that since this doctrine is demonstrable and so impor-

tant, it has never hitherto been established by the discussions of the learned, even notwithstanding the impediments already alluded to? It is, I think, an abundant answer to this objection (if objection it be) to state that the thing has been rarely discussed, and even then at very long intervals, in obscure language, by those who on both sides misunderstood it, and never by contemporaneous writers. No one discussed it with Berkeley, nor would do so. Even Dr. Clarke (powerful logician as he was) declined to discuss it with him. Malebranche, indeed, is said to have had a short conversation with Berkeley upon the subject, in October, 1715, but it was never published; nor was it until upwards of half a century had elapsed, and until Berkeley was no longer present to reply, that the first attempt at a rational opposition was published by Dr. Reid, and subsequently by Mr. Dugald Stewart. Neither while these writers lived, nor since, has any one (until very lately, and even now imperfectly) attempted to expose the weakness, unfairness, and inconsistencies of their opposition. Indeed, so studiously ambiguous was the language of these Scottish Materialists, that few even know what it is that they opposed, or what exactly it is that they defended. This absence of contemporaneous discussion, and the argumentative irresponsibility consequent thereupon, are, as far as I can judge, the main causes why the impediments mentioned in a former page have been able

to prevent the truth of Universal Immaterialism from having been long since recognised. I trust, from certain indications, that this evil is at an end, and that there are those in the present age who will not decline this discussion, if there be anything to be said, in these enlightened times, upon the other side of the question; for surely it cannot be matter of indifference to the patriot or to the philosopher whether a British doctrine of such manifest importance be true or not,—and if true, who can be indifferent to its universal reception?

The following estimate of Berkeley's character by a late distinguished Materialist, already mentioned, cannot but tend to conciliate the fair investigation of almost any principles, inculcated with earnestness by the person so described: "Ancient learning," says Sir James Mackintosh, "exact science, polished society, modern literature, and the fine arts, contributed to adorn and enrich the mind of this accomplished man. All his contemporaries agreed with Pope in ascribing

'To Berkeley every virtue under heaven.'

Adverse factions and hostile wits concurred only in loving, admiring, and contributing to advance him. Even the discerning, fastidious, and turbulent Atterbury said, after an interview with him, 'So much understanding, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had

been the portion of any but angels, until I saw this gentleman.' "

Can a doctrine, promulgated by such a man, and represented by him both as "demonstrable" and as "highly advantageous to all true philosophy," fail, if justly expressed, to engage the attention of a British public?

Some, indeed, think that the doctrine is very abstruse, and requires a great deal of knowledge to enable one to understand it. There cannot be a greater mistake. The commonest elementary school-books teach us that colours, feels, sounds, tastes, and smells are sensations; and this is all the knowledge, all the science that is requisite. We only need to employ a little care in attending to the difference between our sensations, and whatever may be the cause of them; for the cause of a sensation must necessarily be something totally different from a sensation; the cause of blue, for instance, something totally unlike blue, and the cause of a sound something totally unlike a sound. There is nothing very abstruse in all this.

CHAPTER I.

EXPOSITION OF THE QUESTION.

THE most common opinion of unscientific people is, that a material object consists of qualities—a mass of qualities clustered together—and of nothing else; —that a chair, for instance, consists of various feels and colours, shapes and sizes, grouped together in a particular manner, all which are qualities perceptible to the senses. I do not think it can be said that the generality of people ever think of anything else as being in the chair, except these things; and the mass thus formed they call "matter"—sometimes they even call it "a substance."

Some, however, even among the unscientific, hold an opinion somewhat different from this. These people think that, besides all the qualities of a chair, besides its feels and colours, its shape and its size, there is also something else entering into the composition of it—something distinct from its qualities, and to which they adhere. They call this something the *subject* of the qualities, and apply to the chair

thus constituted (not to the subject by itself) the same terms, "matter" or "substance." Sometimes they call it a "material substance."

Both these classes of persons, however, (and they constitute the generality,) understand by what they call matter, something that has colour in it as part of it, and that would not be complete if it had not what we call colour really subsisting in it.

The most common opinion of scientific men and philosophers is different from both of these opinions. All men of scientific education know that the colours and feels connected with a chair are sensations, and must therefore be in our mind. This they know in the most undoubted manner, and upon demonstrated principles, which are to be found explained in almost any elementary book on physical science. They thence conclude that the shape and size are the only real qualities of the chair among those mentioned, and that our sensations (the feels and colours of it) are not qualities of the chair at all, but only effects produced in our minds by hidden qualities of some substratum in the chair, which hidden qualities are united with the shape and size of the substratum. Such people therefore consider that the real chair has not its feels or colours really in it; and the supposed substratum of its qualities is what these people call the "material substance" or "real matter" of the chair—terms which they admit do not ever, in the sense they use them, com-

prehend any quality of the chair, but are confined solely to the substratum of it.

This opinion may be otherwise thus expressed. The chair is supposed to consist of an invisible substratum called "matter," which has a certain figure and extension, but which has neither what we call colour in it nor feel. This substratum has, however, certain occult powers in it of exciting in our minds the feels and colours which seem to us connected with the other qualities of the chair.

Such is, in plain language, the scientific opinion against which Berkeley contended. What, he asked, is this substratum that you speak of? You admit that it is not composed of the feels and colours, shapes and sizes, of the chair, but that it is something else in the chair, quite different from these, and quite imperceptible to the senses. I deny that there is any such thing whatever in the chair.

But, replied the philosophers, (and the same thing is still often repeated,) it does not follow that the thing does not exist, merely because we do not perceive it, or any trace of it. Man is not the measure of all things, and it may exist without being perceptible to us.

Upon the same principle, said Berkeley, there may be an invisible elephant in the room with me, or a solar system in a nutshell. I admit that such things, not being physically impossible, may be true, although I do not perceive them. I am not the mea-

sure of all the things that may exist invisibly in a nut-shell or in a chair. But pray remember that, in the ordinary affairs of life, people who talk in this way are thought to be most unreasonable in their notions; and the thing so spoken of is thought to have no existence except in people's own brain.

Further, said Berkeley, I not only say that it is contrary to common sense to suppose that there is an invisible material substratum in the chair when you perceive no trace there of such a thing, but I also say that it is contrary to common sense to suppose that the shape and size which I see and feel in that chair are not in identically the same place as the feels of it and the colours of it. I say, for my part, that the shape and size are qualities inherent in the feels and colours, and exist with them in our minds.

But, exclaimed the philosophers, this is madness —this is saying that the whole chair exists in our mind, and therefore that the whole universe exists there too.

I see no madness in this conclusion, said Berkeley; I think it is contrary to common sense to come to any other. If the colours and feels of the chair were not sensations, but things outside mind, I should admit the absurdity of what I now say. But since the feels and colours of a chair are a principal portion of it, and since they can only subsist within mind, I look upon it as the natural conclusion to

consider that the whole chair and the whole universe exist there also.

Such is the opinion, or, more properly speaking, the principle of science which I now propose to explain and to defend.

The general opinion is, that the universe consists, in a great measure, of a physical or material substance, which is not only the substratum of all things, but acts upon us and upon itself according to certain laws implanted in it, and which when once set going, can carry on its operations without the aid or presence of a superintending mind. Some few even go so far as to assert that mind itself is but a result from the operation of these laws. I propose to show, in language intelligible to everybody, the physical impossibility of there being any such material substance in our universe at all, and to show that when Berkeley denied the existence of such a substance as the substratum of the chair, he was neither a dogmatist nor a sceptic. I speak of physical impossibility. Now, all who know anything of science, know that what is physically impossible, can be demonstrated to be so. The arguments, therefore, which are now to be adduced, are demonstrations.

But besides the physical impossibility of a material substance, there is another and highly important point just alluded to, to be unfolded and explained in these pages—a point which not only

exhibits the physical impossibility in question, but moreover determines, in the fullest manner, the relation in which body stands to mind. That point is, that the objects of sense by which we are surrounded, are of such a nature that they can only subsist *within* the mind, and not by any means *outside* the mind, as people generally suppose. The table at which I write, for instance, is within my mind, and would be equally within the mind of any number of persons who were present. The composition of the table is such that it cannot be outside my mind and all other mind.

Very little reflection makes this scientific principle quite clear. The table or chair consists (as far as our senses enable us to judge) of feels and colours, and of certain other qualities that belong to feels and colours. Now all men of science, and, indeed, most men of education, know that feels and colours can only exist within the mind. If the table or chair therefore is composed of them, it is clear that it can only exist where these, its component parts, exist—that is, within mind. These matters shall be fully explained in another page. No one can fail to see, however, that what is true of the table in this respect, must be true of our own bodies and of the universe. The whole universe subsists, and can only subsist, within such a sentient, invisible, and conscious thing as the mind is known to be. In this way, each human mind must have within it

a separate universe of its own, but so exactly the same in all minds, that every object of sense, and every movement of every object that is to be found in the universe of one mind, is to be found also in the universe that is within the other mind; the general effect of all which conditions is much the same as that which would be produced if several people were all dreaming, exactly at the same time, exactly the same dream.

Such are the two main points of Berkeley's Universal Immaterialism:—that the whole sensible universe can exist only within mind, and that the universe has not a material substance (different from all the things that we perceive) constituting any portion of it. The evidence by which these two points are made out may be inferred from what has been already said. It is as follows:—

Mathematical and scientific demonstrations place it beyond all doubt that colours are sensations, and therefore subsist only within the substance of our minds.

Our senses teach us that the colours of visible bodies are identically in the same place in which the visible bodies themselves are. Common sense forbids us to deny this.

Therefore all the visible bodies in the universe subsist only within the substance of our minds.

Such is a summary of the proof for the internality of the universe to our minds and to other

sentient natures. As each point shall be hereafter fully examined into, I shall only draw attention here to the circumstance that this proof depends upon the scientific fact that colours have been clearly discovered to be things within our minds. This is a principle now well known to, and admitted by, all scientific men. I know of no modern writer upon optics who has ever pretended to contradict it, and most writers even of elementary books afford illustrations; it is therefore unnecessary to illustrate it or demonstrate it here.

Berkeley made out the other point of his doctrine by showing that we have no trace of a material substance, either in itself or in its effects, and that it is unreasonable to assume the existence of a thing of which we see no trace. It was replied, that this does not establish the physical impossibility of the thing, and that things may exist without our perceiving them. The following is an outline of the demonstration by which I propose to show the physical impossibility of the thing:—

The material substance cannot, from its nature, subsist within the mind.

The universe has been shown to be within the mind.

Therefore, the material substance cannot, from its nature, subsist within the universe, or, with it, within the mind.

Having thus given a general view of the two

principal tenets of Universal Immaterialism, and of the facts upon which these tenets are founded, I proceed, under this head, first to obviate a few misconceptions, and then more fully to unfold the doctrine in detail.

I am well aware how contrary it is—not (as has been falsely said) to common sense, for nothing capable of demonstration can be contrary to common sense, but how contrary it is to the common opinion of mankind, to suppose that the universe has this spiritual subsistence. I am well aware, that to say even of our own bodies that they are within our minds, instead of our minds being within our bodies, is as contrary to common opinion as it is to say that we walk about with our heads suspended downwards, or that the sun is not really above the horizon when we first see him in the morning. I am well aware that all such doctrines are contrary to common opinion, and that, moreover, minds impatient of reflection are ever prone to speak of what is contrary to common opinion as necessarily contrary to common sense also. But I am equally convinced that in this enlightened age there are many who will not suffer themselves to be deterred from the examination of an important scientific principle, merely because it is contrary to the common opinion on that subject, and who, if the proofs are sufficiently clear, will not be deterred from accepting what is proved, merely because all the world

do not accept it. There is no educated man, for instance, who would not be now ashamed to deny that we do really walk about with our heads suspended downwards, and our feet clinging to the earth quite as much as we do with our heads erect, or that the sun is really still below the horizon when he appears to us first in the morning to be in a line, above it, with our eye; and these cases, as well as some others of the same description, encourage me now to confront the general opinion, and to hope that with regard to Universal Immaterialism also, there are men in our proud land who will scorn to be hoodwinked by the prejudices of any one, and who will patiently attend to the demonstrations and explanations which are offered in this volume.

When I state that the main object of the treatise is to prove that the objects of sense are within our minds, just in the same way as what we see in a dream is within our minds, it is very necessary, for the sake of explanation, to state also, and often to reiterate, that the meaning of this is not by any means that things do not *really* exist, but merely that their position with respect to our minds is *internal*, or, in other words, that the relation in which they stand to our minds is precisely the same as that which subsists between our sensations and our minds—a relation which all agree to indicate by the terms expressive of *internality*. There is,

there can be no question as to whether things have that existence which we perceive them to have; but only as to *how* they have it, and as to whether it is possible for them to have it *outside* all minds—that is, whether it is possible for them to have any other except a spiritual subsistence, similar to that which sensations have, and the reality of which no one denies. This is the only question that the founder of Immaterialism has raised, and the only question that is now at issue. Berkeley had, it is to be presumed, the same senses as we have, and is said, even by his opponents, to have possessed a more than ordinary share of intelligence. Things were in his day and around him existing as they are in ours and around us. To assert, therefore, that Berkeley disputed the existence or reality of these things is perfectly frivolous—as frivolous as it would have been in Berkeley or any other man to have disputed it. This is the most paltry argument of all that have been set up against his doctrine, and shall be more fully inquired into hereafter. I shall only repeat here that the question will be found to be, not whether a millstone is really heavy, or whether a millstone is really hard, but whether the elements which enter into the composition of the millstone are not of such a kind that it would be contrary to the nature of things, and to the evidence of our senses, to believe that the hard and heavy millstone they compose can subsist in any other way except

by being situated within the precincts of some substance capable of sensation, in the same way as knowledge can only exist within some substance capable of thinking.

Another point to be distinctly stated is, that when it is said the universe exists within our minds, the meaning of this is, *not* that the universe exists within our *bodies*, as many have frivolously supposed the thing to mean, but that the universe exists, as we perceive it to do, *outside* and *beyond* our bodies—greater and mightier than they—yet that both our bodies and the universe exist within our minds. This point cannot be too much insisted on, because (absurd as it is to suppose a sensible and intelligent man saying so much nonsense) there are many who suppose that what Berkeley wrote about was to prove that the chairs and tables are within our bodies—the earth within our bodies—the sun, moon, and stars there also. It is hard to imagine even an idiot setting up such a notion, to say nothing of that enlightened and most practical man. But be that as it may, Berkeley was far from doing this. Berkeley's object was to teach that the foregoing things, as well as our own bodies, are all equally existing within our minds, and are all equally of such a nature—so composed of colours, feels, and such things—that they can only exist within some such kind of *sentient* thing as the human spirit is.

Nor is it (as many also imagine) any part of Immaterialism to suppose that the objects of sense —that real trees and flowers, for instance, are *creations of our own minds.* Berkeley has abundantly explained that his principles involve no such nonsensical supposition as this is; but quite the reverse. According to his principles, the universe and all the objects it contains, are the creations of an Omnipotent Spirit, and are shown to be such with the most splendid evidence—with a kind and degree of evidence, in fact, with which no other philosopher ever proved it. So far was Berkeley from inculcating anything so preposterous as that our real trees and flowers are the creation of our own minds!

Another erroneous misconception respecting this doctrine is that of supposing it to inculcate that the mind of one person exists within that of another. All that this doctrine represents as existing within minds are feels and colours, with their shapes and sizes, and the various objects which such things can compose. Feels and colours are sensations, and as such can exist only within mind or some other such sentient thing. Shape and size are qualities of feels and colours, and therefore exist also within mind. What we call objects of sense are (it will be shown) made up of feels and colours, shapes and sizes, and these objects of sense are the things which Berkeley thus proves to be within mind. Each person's body, therefore, (as we perceive it,) has this sort of

existence, and can have no other; but who has ever spoken of the mind as an object of sense or a sensation?—or upon what ground can any one impute so extravagant a tenet to Immaterialism? Berkeley has denied, in the strongest language he could use, that one person's mind could possibly exist within another's, and even cautioned his disciples against being deceived into such a misconception by the vagueness of the language in which some men express themselves.

Two other strange misinterpretations require to be mentioned here. Berkeley did not mean that when an object exists within the mind, the mind, or any portion of the mind, constitutes a portion of that object; nor does he ever mean, when he speaks of a *sentient* substance, anything that is visible or that can be felt. The brain itself, according to his principles, cannot exist except within the sort of sentient substance which he speaks of, and which is necessarily something as impalpable, invisible, and conscious as the mind is. These two mistakes respecting Berkeley's views have probably arisen from the fact, that there have been some writers wild enough to assert them both—both that the table which a person sees or feels is that person's mind invested with the qualities of a table, and that the visible and palpable human brain contains the rest of the human body, together with the whole visible and palpable universe. Whoever takes the

trouble of attending to the explanations given in this work, will see that the Immaterialism of Berkeley is perfectly exempt from all such extravagance, and strictly in accordance with all common sense and all true philosophy.

But to return to the real question which this writer has raised—the real and sole question which is now before us; that question relates only to the *means* adopted by the Omnipotent Spirit to make us perceive all we do perceive by the senses. It is not (as has been so often and so idly asserted by his prejudiced adversaries) as to whether things really exist or not—a question started, I believe, by no modern writer—but only as to *how* and *where* they exist; or, in other words, as to the *elementary* materials of which they are composed, and as to the kind of substance upon which such materials admit of being constructed, or rather, in which such materials can alone subsist.

Now the general opinion of English and Scottish philosophers upon this point is (as has been already stated) that the only real elements which our senses perceive in a chair are its shape and its size; that its feels and colours are no real portion of it, however much they may appear to be so; and that the substance in which the shape and size of a thing subsist, or upon which they are constructed or exhibited, is a senseless and inanimate kind of stuff, which none of our senses can perceive, but with-

out which it is supposed that the shape and size of an object cannot be kept together. This is the most generally received opinion of scientific men in Great Britain, being that set forth in the writings of Locke, Reid, and Stewart. It ought therefore to be attended to by all who seek to understand this subject, as, by comparing it with Berkeley's, it will contribute much towards understanding what Berkeley means. These Materialists think that there is a sort of dead thing (therefore totally different from mind), which dead thing has the power (given to it by the Almighty) of exciting certain feels and colours in our minds, which feels and colours are so combined as to produce the optical illusion of appearing to us to be diffused over the shapes and sizes that are, they say, really inherent in that sort of thing which affects our minds with colours and with feels. According, therefore, to this opinion, the shapes and sizes of things are the only real elements of them which we perceive by our senses; and these real elements are constructed upon, and kept together by, another real but imperceptible element—that sort of invisible and dead, yet active thing, totally inaccessible to the senses, which not only produces feels and colours in the mind, but produces them in such a way as to make them correspond with its own form and with its own extension. Such are the *means* which a great many people think the Almighty has

adopted to make us perceive all the figured and extended objects that we perceive—the only possible means, some of them pretend to say, that we can imagine of His doing this.

Berkeley's opinion differs totally from the foregoing. He has shown, with that clearness and exactness which, we shall see, even his adversaries do not scruple to call "demonstration," that we have no one reason to believe any other instrument or means adopted by the Omnipotent Spirit to create the feels and colours, shapes and sizes, which we perceive, but the direct, immediate, and constant action of that Spirit's will upon our minds; that these feels and colours, shapes and sizes, with the other sensations, and the other qualities of sensations, constitute all that we perceive in figured and extended objects; and that to suppose a thing to exist wrapt up in them, of which we do not perceive the slightest trace, is a gratuitous and frivolous hypothesis that ceased to have any pretext for it after it was once ascertained that colours and feels were sensations. Nay, it can further be shown (as is done in a future page) that it is still farther from common sense than merely gratuitous and frivolous; for that since the thing supposed is of such a nature as cannot subsist within mind with the feels and colours, it is physically impossible that such a thing should exist within such objects at all, and therefore perfectly absurd to suppose it does.

From this statement it will be seen that a main point of difference between Berkeley and his adversaries consists in his thinking that the shapes and sizes of things exist within the sentient nature as well as their feels, colours, tastes, smells, and sounds. Berkeley considered that shape and size (or, in philosophical language, figure and extension) are qualities of colours and of feels, and that therefore they exist with colours and with feels, wherever these exist; whereas the British philosophers, on the contrary, consider (as has been already stated) that feels and colours are qualities of figure and extension; and, what is equally remarkable, that these qualities do not require to be in the same place—in the same part of the room, for instance—as the figure and extension which they qualify; the figure and extension being supposed to be outside the mind, while the feels and colours can only be within it.

In justice to the advocates of the material theory in France and Germany, and in further illustration of the precise question upon which Berkeley has joined issue with them all, I must here observe that all the more explicit of these writers follow Kant and Cousin in acknowledging that the whole sensible creation exists, and, from its nature, can only exist, within our minds. On this point, there is no dissension now among the learned of France or Germany. All admit (Hegel and Schelling and Fichte,

as well as all the rest) the physical impossibility of there being real shapes and real sizes without feels and colours, or (which is the same thing) of the shapes and sizes of things being in one place, while their feels and colours (by which the shapes and sizes are delineated) are in another place, and therefore admit that the shapes and sizes are situated with the feels and colours in the sentient substance only. So far they agree with Berkeley; and it is evident that in agreeing with him in this, they agree with him, also, in thinking that there can be no material substratum situated within the precincts of figured and extended objects, for all parties are agreed that this substratum is not a thing that, from its nature, can exist in any way within the mind.

But then these writers differ with Berkeley as to what is likely to be the proximate cause—or rather as to what is manifestly the proximate cause (for all think it manifest) of these feels and colours with their shapes and sizes—that is, of these sensations thus variously combined and variously qualified within the immaterial substance. They agree, indeed, with him, and he with them, so far as to suppose that there must be *some* cause—that it must, moreover, be a *permanent*, *substantial*, *omnipresent*, and *external* cause—that, whatever this cause of combined and qualified sensations is, it is imperceptible to us except by its *effects*, precisely in the same manner as the cause of gravitation is, or as

the mind of another person is to any one of us; and finally, that this omnipresent proximate cause must either be a living source of power, as mind is known to be, or a dead source of power, as matter is supposed to be—a living, active substance, independent of space and capable of volitions, or a substance beyond the utmost confines of the visible universe and utterly devoid of volitions, of activity, and of life. But here is the point at issue between the materialists of France and Germany upon the one side, and Berkeley on the other. They think (but without attempting to offer any proof of it) that the Superhuman Spirit either cannot or does not choose to produce the objects of sense as we perceive them, without an apparatus of unseen, corresponding objects, which is, and must ever be, wholly imperceptible to us;—that He does not choose to produce within our minds the objects which are composed of feels and colours, shapes and sizes, by the direct and immediate action of His own will simultaneously exerted upon all sentient natures; but that He chooses to do so through the instrumentality of an imperceptible kind of unextended substance, very much like mind except that it is dead and without the faculty of perceiving anything—that this inanimate substance, without any knowledge of what it is doing, placed at an inconceivably great distance from our bodies, and without being perceptible except to the Creator who employs it, administers

to finite spirits and other sentient natures that magnificent and varied universe, as we all perceive it, of combined and qualified sensations; and that this substance is in a great measure enabled to produce this effect by the correspondence in shapes and sizes which it bears to the objects of sense, and by a certain property which it possesses of simultaneously assuming into itself, in some unknown manner, whatever forms or subdivisions these objects may assume. If, for instance, I cut an apple with a knife, the separation which is thus effected in my sensations, is supposed to be accompanied by a similar separation in the material substance corresponding to the apple, and placed beyond the confines of the universe.

Such was the material theory of Kant, and such is the curious doctrine of all the modern Materialists in Germany and France; but this hypothesis, as I have said, and as may well be imagined, its warmest advocates do not even pretend to prove. Whereas Berkeley, on his side, has pointed out, upon the clearest principles of reason and analogy, that not only is a Superhuman Spirit alone a sufficient cause —external, permanent, omnipresent, and substantial —of our sensations, of their attributes, and of all the objects that these things compose, but that it is a gratuitous conjecture to suppose any other and subordinate cause of these things, as well as an extravagant inconsistency to suppose a senseless, in-

active body producing things like extended feels and extended colours in our minds, when it is necessary to suppose this body to be situated beyond the utmost limits of the visible creation.

It is in this point only—in this supposition of a material cause outside our universe — that the French and German metaphysicians differ from Berkeley, agreeing with him as to the constitution of the objects which we perceive by sense, and as to the total absence of matter from the interior of these objects. But others of his opponents approach even still nearer to his views in as far as the existence of matter is concerned. Dr. Cudworth, for instance, and Descartes, and some other eminent writers, hold, but also without proof, that the size of things is the cause of all the other qualities of them, and that there is no other kind of matter except the size of things, or (as they express it) that extension is the essence of matter. These writers, of course, deny the existence of matter as much as Berkeley—indeed, rather more so, since Berkeley considered the feels and colours of things to exist as really, and to be quite as real a portion of the things as their size is, which these writers deny, alleging that there is nothing really existing in things except their size only. They differ, however, from Berkeley, inasmuch as they think, *first*, that there can be the size of a chair where there are neither its colours nor its feels; *secondly*, that size can act upon mind; and, *thirdly*,

that size can cause both feels and colours—three points connected with the size of things which Berkeley looked upon as physical impossibilities.

But although Descartes and Cudworth denied, like Berkeley, the existence of matter, they cannot be said to belong to the school of Immaterialism while they assign a dead proximate cause of any description to our sensations, and while they assign to extension a place outside all mind. Nor did they pretend to belong to this school. There are, however, some very eminent modern metaphysicians who agree with Berkeley even upon these points of his doctrine, who not only agree with him that there can be no matter combined with the objects of sense, but agree with him also both that extension is within the mind, and that the cause of our sensations, as well as of their attributes, is a living, active cause, such as we know mind to be. It is very difficult to say what real difference there is between these philosophers and Berkeley. I confess that (if they mean what they say) I can discern none. Yet it is but fair to state that they themselves consider the difference to be both real and extreme. In their writings, the only difference which can be at all traced is the merely nominal or verbal one, consisting of these two points:—*First*, that the body of living powers and volitions which excites our sensations, and which Berkeley called the Divine mind, seems

to be sometimes called "matter" by these philosophers, although nothing could be farther than they are from thinking mind and matter to be the same thing. *Secondly*, that they apply the "term world" to that same body of living powers and volitions, whereas Berkeley, with the majority of mankind, applies this term to the body of sensations only, which those living powers and volitions produce within our minds; not, as these philosophers do, to the living powers themselves. No one can fail to see that such a difference is one of names only. It is from knowing how little and how reprovingly Berkeley's Immaterialism is spoken of by the more eminent of these writers that I feel myself at all justified in classing them among the adversaries of that doctrine. To me they appear to be thorough-going Immaterialists under a very thin disguise. The following, for instance, is M. Cousin's statement of his opinion respecting the external or material world, and it is well known how sedulously he has elsewhere defended the common theory of materialism—

"Le monde extérieur n'est qu'un assemblage de causes correspondantes à nos sensations réelles ou possibles;

"Le rapport de ces causes entre elles est l'ordre du monde.

"Ainsi ce monde est de la même étoffe que nous, et la nature est la sœur de l'homme;

" Elle est active, vivante, animée comme lui;

" Et son histoire est un drame tout aussi bien que celle de l'humanité."—(*Fragmens Philos.*, *Préface.*)

The meaning of which words exempted of all prevarication is literally as follows:—

" The world, which we call external, is nothing more than a combination of invisible powers which are capable of producing sensations within our minds, and which correspond to the several sensations which they there produce, nay, even to those sensations which they do not produce, yet which they are capable of producing.

" The relation in which these invisible causes of sensations (or, of sensible things) stand to one another is the order of invisible causes; and as the invisible causes are called the world, their order is the order of the world.

" Thus this world (that is, the aforesaid combination of invisible causes) is of the same substance as the human mind; and nature (which is but another name for the world or combination of invisible causes) is something kindred with ourselves.

" That combination of invisible causes is, as well as our own mind, an active, living, animated substance;

" And all the events connected with these causes involve as much conduct and dramatic action as those which originate in the passions of mankind."

These sentiments so much resemble the senti-

ments of those who deny the existence of a material substance, that it is but fair to repeat distinctly, that M. Cousin is one of the most zealous, and, at the same time, most enlightened, of those who oppose Berkeley. He differs indeed from most other Materialists, inasmuch as he thinks, with Priestley, that it is an active, living substance like the mind; but he agrees with Priestley, and all of them, in thinking that it is not mind. How such conclusions can be made to harmonize with true philosophy, I cannot determine.

But it must be owned, that by far the greater part of Berkeley's opponents look upon matter not only as the cause of our sensations, and of the order in which they arise, but as something dead, with certain laws of action—chemical and mechanical—ay, even mental—inherent in it, and as a considerable portion—indeed, the main portion—of the sensible object in which our sensations (they tell us) only *seem* to inhere; as a sort of invisible and impalpable framework for every object of sense, upon which framework the Almighty diffuses the visible and palpable qualities of things—a framework without which the qualities of an object would collapse upon some unexplained principle of gravitation, or totally disappear (no immediate cause of them being present) and the whole universe so shrink into nothing.

This juxtaposition of Berkeley's principles with

those of his opponents will be sufficient to enable most people to understand what Berkeley taught; but as this doctrine has been hitherto little attended to, and greatly misunderstood, the following further illustration of it may not be superfluous.

That any one man should proceed to account, by the hypothesis of an invisible framework, for his own sensations of feel and colour, if others did not experience the same sensations at the same place and time as he did, would, however vivid these sensations were, be admitted by all to be preposterous. It would be thought quite a sufficient account of these sensations, to ascribe them to disease in that man, and view them as existing purely in his mind without any other frame or apparatus whatsoever. And if it were impossible to give this account of the phenomena—if there were the strongest possible evidence of health and reason, and the case were an authentic one of what is called "second sight," it would not, I apprehend, be accounted unreasonable to ascribe the sensations—the feels and colours—of which we suppose that man conscious, to something peculiar in his organization, or (which is the same thing) to the immediate action of the Almighty Spirit upon his mind, without the aid or intervention of any other imperceptible substance, except alone that Almighty Spirit. In fact, no other account could be given of the phenomena in question. We should not imagine an invisible frame for

every feel and colour which that man perceived; and there is no room for the least doubt as to its being physically possible for him to experience *all* the same feels and colours as those which attend what we call "real things;" there is no room for the least doubt that as surely as there is an Omnipotent Spirit, so surely that Omnipotent Spirit could act in so powerful a manner upon that man's mind, as to give to his sensations all that intensity and reality, which we have allowed ourselves to look upon as unattainable without the invisible framework. Yet in the case we put, no one has any difficulty in seeing the endless absurdity of supposing some imperceptible apparatus—some invisible machinery (that is not mind) for the Almighty to act with—some translucid frame to construct the objects of sense upon, and to present them on, to that man's mind. Now what is that difference between this man's sensations and what we call "real things," that makes the invisible framework necessary in the one case and not in the other? Such is the real question upon which Berkeley has joined issue with modern metaphysicians. What greater reality do these things derive from unperceived frames than from none at all? There is extension and movement, and figure and solidity, and every other quality, perceived in both cases. What greater need is there then of invisible things in the one set of sensations than in the other?

So far we have considered a solitary case of immaterial perceptions, produced by the immediate action of the Almighty Spirit; and it will not, I presume, be one instant questioned that it would be equally possible for that Almighty Spirit to produce exactly the same powerful effects upon the minds of two men, simultaneously, in such a manner that the two men shall be able to converse, each about his own sensations, as if they were those of the other, and under the conviction that those of the other are precisely the same as his own. Each of the men would be, by his own consciousness, convinced that the other was not deceived in his perceptions, and by the other's conduct, each would be convinced that he was not himself deceived. They would observe the order and connexion of the various phenomena, and regard these phenomena as the real, existing things with which they had to deal. All this, however extraordinary it, at first sight, and as an exception, may appear, would, nevertheless, it is evident, be reasonable and possible enough in the case of an Omnipotent Spirit choosing to act so. I mean, there is nothing in it physically impossible. The mere fact of the same perceptions being simultaneously supplied to two minds is not, in reality, a more extraordinary fact than that any given set of perceptions should be supplied to a single mind; and the mere fact of the same perceptions being simultaneously produced within a million of minds,

may arrest our attention more, but is not, in reality, a more wonderful or unaccountable circumstance than it is that these perceptions should be so produced within only two minds. This uniform and contemporaneous action upon all human minds, extending, moreover, to all other kinds of sentient substance, is perhaps the only point connected with Berkeley's doctrine which can appear even to the unreflecting to be more incredible than that co-operation of dead matter in which others believe. Yet there is not anything incredible—much less anything physically impossible—in this uniform and simultaneous action; nay, there is something even in human affairs very similar to it; for it is only in magnitude and in the nature of the production that this superhuman action differs from the action of the orator who simultaneously produces, upon each of ten thousand minds, such ideas as he chooses to supply out of his own.

But to return to the case of two men simultaneously, uniformly, and powerfully affected with feels and colours and other such perceptions by the immediate action of a Superhuman Spirit; what should we think of these men if they began to talk to us about the imperceptible part of their perceptions —about a sort of invisible apparatus or substance, totally different from mind, totally different from sensations, and totally different from any of the known qualities of sensations, which substance or

apparatus the Almighty was employing between Himself and them, by means of which He acted from outside upon their minds, and without which they could not imagine how it were possible for Him to produce, in that contemporaneous, impressive, and very orderly way, all the groups of feels and colours of which they and they alone were conscious? This, I believe, we should not be disposed to think a self-evident portion of the phenomena of which we are speaking, nor any very reasonable hypothesis respecting these phenomena. We should, I apprehend, be apt to ask the percipient parties why they supposed there was such a thing as this extra-mental apparatus, since they admitted it to be equally distinct from all feels and from all colours —from all the shapes and sizes combined with feels and colours, and from all mind? And if they told us (as Mr. Dugald Stewart and Dr. Reid and some others have done of a material substance) that they really could not tell why they supposed that there was such a thing, for that it was altogether incomprehensible to them, both what the thing was in itself, and of what use it was in explaining their phenomena, and even why they supposed it, but that they did suppose it, and that it was scarcely possible for any reasonable man to avoid supposing it, on account of the irresistible enforcement and intensity of the realities they had to deal with; indeed, that it was much too evident a thing (which

is the whole argument of the Scottish School) to admit of their assigning any reason for believing it —too evident, even, not to be involved in uncertainty and doubt by any attempt that might be made to prove it—what, I ask, should we think of this account of these men's "material substance?"— or is there anything unreasonable or unintelligible in supposing their "real things" to be immaterial? Now, what is here supposed to be the case of two men is, in these pages, demonstrated to be the case of all mankind, and has been shown to be so with other arguments by Bishop Berkeley. The details of this doctrine are as follows:—

1. All the objects of sense with which we are acquainted and have to deal, are things excited, or brought into being, within the substance of our minds by the immediate agency of the Omnipotent Spirit acting simultaneously upon each separate human mind; something in the same manner as a musician or an orator supplies at pleasure a series of simultaneous perceptions to the minds of a multitude.

2. Each mind is therefore furnished with a distinct universe of sensible objects; and the universe thus contained within one mind, so exactly corresponds in all its minutest lights and shadows of detail and change with the universe contained in another, that each mind regards its own perceptions as even numerically identical with those of others;

whereas, in point of fact, this numerical identity is as physically impossible as the numerical identity of the blue which two people perceive at the same time is known by scientific men to be physically impossible.

3. The hand which I perceive, and the hand which another person perceives, under the same circumstances of the organ of sense, or (in other words) when we are both looking at the same hand, are as much the same identical hand as the idea which remains upon my mind after having seen a hand, is the same identical idea as the idea which remains upon another person's mind after he has seen the same hand; or as the idea one has of his own hand to-day is identically the same as the idea he had of it yesterday; or as the pain occasioned by cutting off the right hand is identically the same pain as that occasioned by cutting off the left. But in none of these cases is the identity numerical.

4. As our bodies with their organs of sense are themselves objects of sense, even they also exist precisely in the same way as a table or any other object of sense, and cannot from their nature exist otherwise; that is, they consist of feels and colours, variously combined and variously qualified, which feels and colours are excited into existence by the immediate action of some superhuman power operating upon or within the substance of our minds; and therefore the bodies and organs thus

composed — even the brain itself — are as much within mind, within the substance of our minds, and dependent on that substance for their subsistence, as any one of our ideas, or as any one of our sensations, is.

5. Human bodies are perceptions excited or worked up in human minds, for the obvious purpose of making these minds perceptible to each other. For, if each mind had not such a cluster of sensations or sensible qualities connected with it as should indicate its presence and volitions—if each mind had not a body so connected with its volitions, that it should possess more control over that body or cluster of sensations than over any other, and over other bodies only through its control over that one, and that it should thereby sufficiently indicate its volitions—if, I say, each mind or spirit had not such a body connected with it, we should not, it is quite evident, be perceptible to each other as we are now.

6. Death is no more than the disconnexion between a mind and that set or cluster of qualified sensations by which that mind had previously the power of indicating its volitions to other created minds. But this disconnexion does not so much as involve the mind's being precluded from afterwards receiving sensations as before—much less does it involve the mind's own subsequent incapacity to receive them—and least of all does it involve the

slightest pretext for supposing that the mind does not go on existing after this disconnexion, since it is manifest that the mind must have existed prior to the connexion thus brought to a close. There could have been no sensations originally where there had not previously been some mind.

7. If there are any things (as there doubtless are very many) which the superhuman Power does not make perceptible to us, either by exciting them in our minds, when their nature admits of their being produced there (as is the case of bodies), or by merely exciting some trace of them in our minds when the nature of these things does not admit of their being produced within our minds (as is the case of spirits), it is quite impossible that we should know anything about such things, even so much as whether they exist or whether they do not; but if there is no trace whatever of a thing's existence in a given place, and, still more, if its existence there is physically impossible, it is accounted contrary to common sense to say that that thing exists in that place.

8. The mere bodies of other spirits like mine are in themselves no evidence to me of the existence of those other spirits, as such bodies are only perceptions excited by an Almighty Spirit upon mine and other minds, and can, from their very nature, have no *necessary* connexion with the spirits they serve to indicate.

9. The only evidence I have of the existence of those other spirits is derived from the actions which I am enabled to trace to them by means of these bodies, and by the inference which I can thus make that there are volitions similar to my own.

10. By these volitions thus indirectly exhibited to my mind, I perceive that these other spirits are similar to myself, or to my own spirit, but they have no existence, sensible or otherwise, within my mind, as those perceptions have which make them known to me.

11. My own spirit cannot be a perception produced within itself by an Omnipotent Spirit in the same way as some other perceptions are produced within it, since such an account of it would involve a contradiction, but must subsist prior to, and independent of, all its own perceptions—although its perception of itself may not subsist prior to, and independent of, all its other perceptions.

12. Those other spirits, or centres of volitions, exist in the same way as I am conscious of existing myself; which, whatever difficulties may be started as to the form of definition to be adopted for it, is as real and *bonâ fide* an existence as it is possible to speak of, or imagine, or understand, or possess, or care for.

13. As by actions and volitions similar to our own, we perceive the existence of spirits also similar to our own, and thus look upon that existence as

self-evident, so by actions and volitions infinitely more numerous and powerful than our own, yet exhibited to us by the same apparatus of sensations as the volitions of finite spirits are, we perceive even still more evidently the existence of a Spirit infinitely more powerful than our own spirits are, and on which even for their existence our own spirits evidently depend.

14. There can be no real cause that we know of except a Spirit's will for the uniform contiguity of any two or more sensations, as heat and light—a feel and sound, &c.,—the words "power" and "cause" being merely for the convenience of practice and language applied to that, and regarded as attributes of that, which, in a sequence of perceptions, is the first perceived. Light, for instance, when it precedes heat, is regarded as the cause of heat, and is said to have the "power" of producing it (as in the case of flame), but when heat precedes flame (as sometimes occurs in haystacks, &c.), then heat is, in its turn, regarded as the "cause" of flame, and is said to have the "power" of producing it.

15. To suppose one object of sense or sensation to be the real and *bonâ fide* cause of another and different sensation, on account of its being made, in the course of nature, to accompany it or to precede it (as we say flame is the "cause" of heat), is precisely the same thing as saying that an Omnipotent

Spirit could not have made ice to be accompanied by heat, and flame by cold, whereas it can be proved that this might have been the order universally imparted to these phenomena as well as that which has been given to them.

16. The Almighty's not having chosen to reverse the present order of such phenomena, or to have given them any other order but that which He has given them, is no proof whatever of His being involuntarily bound, by certain laws of nature or of things, not to have done so. But His continuance of the original order is a proof of His constant attention to the understanding of His creatures, since that understanding requires the uniform contiguity of such natural phenomena to guide it and to occupy it; it being evident, and admitting of the clearest proof, that the understanding could have no use or exercise without this undeviating uniformity in the succession of the various phenomena with which our present business of existence lies.

17. Such things are, therefore, only the signs or precursors of one another. This order and these signs which He has established for us among things perceptible to the senses, are not to be regarded as indicating any power or capacity of causation in the things themselves, nor any inability on the Almighty Spirit's part to have arranged them otherwise, or to do so at any moment that he may choose it (which is a common error, as well as

impiety of the Materialists), but only as indicating the power and the capacity of causation inherent in a spirit.

18. The organs of sense (inasmuch as they consist, like the brain and other parts of the body, wholly of sensations and of the attributes of which sensations are susceptible) cannot without absurdity be regarded as, in any sense, productive of other sensations in our minds, nor as anything else but mere conditions under which sensations are excited in us. When the eyes, for instance, are turned in a particular direction, this is to be considered the *condition* under which we receive certain sensations, and not the *cause* of them—the direction and the sensations accompany each other — but that is all; just as the shades and colours of fire are accompanied by the feel called "heat" without being the causes of our feeling it; or as the colour and the shape of a millstone are accompanied by, and associated with, its hardness, and are therefore looked upon as signs or conditions of hardness, but never as causes of it.

19. The organs of sense, which are thus only signs or conditions, and not causes of sensations, are of considerable importance in the manifestation and exercise of the will and of the understanding; which fact will easily appear to any one who takes into account, that if we perceived sensations without the organs of sense, we should neither know the

conditions under which we might expect sensations, nor should we be able to avoid them or to seek them as we might desire, and as we now do.

20. In the manner of their subsistence or existence, an object of sense and a spirit are as totally different from one another as an idea is totally different from the spirit in which that idea resides; and the nature of the difference is in both cases exactly the same, inasmuch as sensations bear exactly the same relation to the mind as ideas do—that is, they are both things existing within it, and depending upon it for their existence.

21. That which is immediately perceived (like sensations and their attributes) so totally differs in its very nature from that which perceives it (like mind), that none of the laws applicable to the one can, in any true sense, be applied to the other, with the single exception that they are both dependent upon the volitions of the Superhuman mind. As far, therefore, as the laws of nature or the sensible universe are concerned, the mind cannot be, by any of them, obliterated or destroyed, so that in the course of nature the mind is indestructible and immortal.

22. As it is contrary to the course of nature (or sensible things) to suppose a thing of any kind beginning to exist without a cause, and as the only real cause of things we know of is a Spirit's will (of which, as a real cause, we are all of us conscious),

so, *first*, every one of our sensations indicates the necessary existence of a volition as its cause, which volition, we are conscious, is independent of our own will; *secondly*, the constant regularity of our sensations indicates, in the same necessary manner, the constant attention with which these volitions are exercised; and *thirdly*, the interminable difference which subsists between these mental creations (or sensations) so excited, and those other mental creations (called "ideas") which we excite at our own pleasure, either within our own mind or within the mind of some other person, indicates that the power of the Superhuman Spirit, by which we are affected, is incomparably greater than the power of our own spirit.

23. The propositions upon which this Immaterialism is founded, and of which it consists, do not require, any of them, to be taken for granted, or to be regarded as probable, or as instinctive, or as revealed, or as attainable by inspiration, as the Material theory is said to require, but admit of having the severest laws of intuitive evidence and common sense applied to each of them.

24. There being exactly the same kind of evidence (and much more of it) respecting the existence of the Omnipotent Spirit, as there is respecting the existence of other spirits like ourselves, and the same kind of evidence respecting the natural immortality of our own finite spirit as there is respecting

its being something independent of its own ideas—these two facts afford the most satisfactory explanation that can be desired why any disclosure of the Almighty's will or purpose should only require what is called moral evidence to secure its reception among us, with our compound nature of reflection and emotion. The communication which professes to come from one whom we know to be living, and whom we love, requires much less proof of its authenticity to influence our conduct than that which professes to come from one whom we do not love, and whom we believe to be dead, or do not with certainty know to be alive. Our belief in, or knowledge of that person's existence, and our solicitude about that person's wishes, complete the evidence, and would be the better (because the more severely) tested, where the communication we speak of was accredited by such evidence only as it requires the affectionate heart and the expecting spirit to receive.

Such is the whole of that doctrine which Berkeley taught, and strange beyond measure has been the reception which it has met with. Some have said of it that the doctrine itself was a most desirable one to establish, but that the proofs of it are insufficient and easily refuted. Others say that the proofs are incontrovertible, but that the doctrine itself is so unintelligible that all proof of it is useless. Others again have gone to the ridiculous extent of

saying that the doctrine is intelligible enough, and that the proofs are incontrovertible (as indeed they have never been refuted), but that this is not enough—that the mere impossibility of refuting a proof is no reason for accepting it, for that some proofs cannot from their nature be refuted, although evidently groundless. Not less extraordinary and inconsistent has been the opposition which it had to encounter in a theological point of view, and to which I would here invite a more particular attention.

There are persons who, however true and evident the doctrine were, would refuse to examine it, and even seek to repress it, as being impiously inquisitive, if it were not brought forward for some religious purpose; and much more so if it could, by any imaginable sophistry, be turned against those feelings which (whether there be such a thing as matter or not) man ought to entertain towards his Maker.

There are also other persons who would act precisely the same blind part from precisely the opposite motives—who would, without examination, reject this doctrine respecting the immateriality of the universe (however evident, however demonstrable that doctrine may be), because it might have some religious bearing, indeed bore strong marks upon the face of it of being intended solely for religious purposes, and might, for all they could tell,

afford what to them would be perplexing, if not appalling evidence that they have a mightier Spirit to deal with than their own.

The plan which Berkeley pursued between these opposing factions was to connect his doctrine as little with theology as was consistent with showing that it involved no innovation in that respect, and that it was not in any point at variance either with what was natural or with what was revealed. He hoped that, by exhibiting it in this way, those who were solicitous about its effect upon religion, could not fail to see, ere long, how great that effect would be, as well with regard to the fact that the Creator is constantly occupied about His creatures, as with regard to that other scarce less important fact, that the spirit is totally independent of the body with which it is connected; and he hoped that those who were not solicitous about that effect of the doctrine, but rather the reverse—those, at least, who might think that its truth was to be the more suspected on account of its connexion with theology—he hoped that, in this way of exhibiting it, such persons would not be deterred, by its religious tendency, from a just appreciation of whatever real merits as a subject of human knowledge his doctrine might possess. The practical result, however, has hitherto been, that the less pious portion of the philosophical world, partly from the incompatibility of his principles with their own, but more especially from mere idle pre-

judice against the writings of a Bishop, have ridiculed and misrepresented even the most evident and universally admitted tenets of his doctrine; and that (with a few exceptions) those philosophers whose own piety led them to consult for that of others, have feared to connect with their professions all this ridicule and all this misrepresentation.

Nevertheless, there can, I think, be little doubt as to the wisdom of Berkeley's method in unfolding the subject. It is to the intellect alone that it can be effectually addressed; and it must be addressed to the intellect, not as what is good and probable, but as what, whether good or evil, is as certain as demonstration can make it. The doctrine itself will do the rest; for I am persuaded that the man who would see with terror the word IMMORTALITY suddenly written in fire from horizon to horizon upon the midnight sky, will see with equal terror the conclusion to which the proofs of Immaterialism inevitably led him; and if there be a man (as there are, doubtless, very many) whose heart would leap with joy before that radiant word, that man will experience a very similar confidence and a very similar joy, when these demonstrations have been made familiar to his mind.

CHAPTER II.

MISREPRESENTATIONS OF IMMATERIALISM.

I. BERKELEY has been misrepresented in four important particulars by those who undertook to write down his doctrine:—*First*, it has been said of him that he denies the real existence of the things which we see and feel, or otherwise perceive by our senses. *Secondly*, that even if he does not deny the reality of the things we see and feel, he denies something which it is contrary to common sense and common experience to deny. *Thirdly*, that even if his doctrine is not contrary to common sense and common experience, yet it has an irreligious tendency in unsettling the minds of men. *Fourthly*, that even if it is not possible to show that its tendency is irreligious, yet as the doctrine has been adopted by an intelligent writer, of irreligious principles, it ought therefore to be regarded with suspicion.

Mr. Dugald Stewart and Dr. Reid were the most enlightened Materialists who first advanced or sanctioned this misrepresentation; and it was eminently

successful in its object; for at this day little else is known of Berkeley but that he was a very good man, and a Bishop, who wished to make people disbelieve their senses, and who, in his zeal for religion, unwittingly inculcated the most absurd, if not the most pernicious, notions. Even Kant describes Berkeley as a dogmatist, a mystic, and an enthusiast.

It would be, perhaps, an abundant refutation of all this frivolous slander of the Scottish school to state that Berkeley is acknowledged, even by these very adversaries of his doctrine, as one of the most virtuous and most discerning persons of his day—that, in short, few have ever had as much praise for piety, intelligence, and good sense as he has had. This, I say, would probably be a sufficient refutation of his slanderers,—for how is it to be for one instant believed (upon a mere assertion) that such a man could have written books in favour of anything pernicious or absurd? But I shall not content myself with this refutation. I shall expose each misstatement separately; and, first, that Berkeley denied the reality of chairs and tables, or of any other thing that we can see or feel.

In his "Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge," he has these words—"All the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth—in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind;" and these words are represented by the Materialists

to mean that there are no such things whatever really existing anywhere as those things which we see, or taste, or hear, or feel, or smell; that there is no real choir of heaven—no real furniture of the earth—not even a real earth; that, in a word, all is delusion. "The Bishop shows me," says Dr. Reid, "that I see not a human face." (Essay VI., ch. 2.) And in the same place Dr. Reid states it as a first principle denied by Berkeley, "that those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be."

Now, Berkeley's words, even the most stupid of us can see, mean no such thing as this—not even anything that a fair mind, with ordinary intelligence, can by any possibility or from any the most peculiar habits of reflection, so interpret. It is quite true that everybody may not be able to understand what Berkeley meant by a subsistence within the mind, and many do not understand this; but unquestionably everybody can understand, who understands anything, that this expression does not mean "no real existence of any kind." No one, at least, except the most infatuated Materialists, would suppose that a spiritual existence—an existence within the mind—must certainly be less real than any other; or, that the words, "subsist in mind only," are synonymous with the words, "do not really exist at all." To suppose this, we must have first

arrived at the conclusion that some other substance has a more real existence than mind has, or rather, that mind is not the sort of thing that really exists at all, and therefore, that nothing depending on it for existence can be real. And this is the principle upon which the Materialists have decided that Berkeley denied the reality of things. Their theory represents mind and what exists in mind as less real than matter and what exists in matter; and accordingly, when Berkeley proved that the things which he and everybody else found really existing, were things which can, from their nature, exist in that real state, only within the sort of thing called mind, forthwith he is denounced as one who disbelieves his senses, and as one who denies the reality of things. Had the Materialists adopted the contrary principle—had they considered that mind and what is contained within mind are things more real than—or even only as real as—matter and what is contained within matter, how different must have been their conclusion as to the import of Berkeley's propositions! They would not then have had any room for saying that Berkeley denied the reality of things, since no one who thinks that the existence of the mind is a real existence will suppose that it is denying the reality of a thing to suppose that it has its subsistence within the mind. This at least was evidently Berkeley's view of matters. He knew as well as any of us what is meant by the

reality of a real chair or table. It is frivolous to suppose that he did not. Yet he did not think it inconsistent with that reality to show that a real chair or table has a spiritual existence, and consists of such elements as can, from their nature, subsist only within a mind. This is not denying the reality of things. It is only ascribing to mind a reality and a power of communicating this reality to whatever is connected with it, which reality and which power are not commonly ascribed to mind; and which, however groundless they may be considered, can in no sense disparage the reality of things, nor be fairly identified with a denial of it. If a man is found even unintelligible enough to think that a table which he admits to be a mahogany table, is manufactured out of gold, it is evidently false to say that such a man denies the table to be a mahogany table. It is true that it rests with him to explain how mahogany can be manufactured out of gold; and when his explanation is given, there may be but very few who are capable of understanding it, or to whom it shall seem sufficient; but he clearly does not consider that the table is not a mahogany table. To say he does, is false, and evidently a mere cloak to hide our own incapacity to understand what he means, or to disprove it. Such is the nature of that false imputation against Berkeley which we are now exposing. When he said that a real table could only have a spiritual

existence, his adversaries represented him as saying that a real table had no reality. Every one can judge of the falsehood and unfairness of such a statement. Every one can perceive that it is (as Sir James Mackintosh describes it) a mere subterfuge of incapacity.

But further, Berkeley not only did not teach anything in the slightest degree inconsistent with the reality of our chairs and tables when he taught that they are subsisting within the mind, but he even cautions his readers, in the most elaborate manner, against the error of supposing that anything he has written is inconsistent with that reality—a reality about which there can be no dispute, since it is a thing which we all know and all experience. Nor is it once that he gives this caution, nor twice, nor three times; but so often, and in such terms, that one might imagine he was writing for some college of Idiots, who were likely to suppose that when a man spoke of the real chair that he was sitting on, he might only mean the idea of a chair, or the shadow of a chair, and that it was quite possible for an intelligent man to think that the real chair he is sitting on is only the idea or the shadow of a chair. For hear what occurs in the short space of one octavo page of his "Treatise," in evident anticipation of this doltish misconstruction.

"By the principles premised (says Berkeley,

Sec. 34, &c.), we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or in anywise conceive or understand, remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever." "I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection." "That the things I see with my eyes, and touch with my hands, do exist, really exist, I make not the least question." "If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could think of." "The sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night, is the idea of the former." "It is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and, in general, each part of the mundane system, is as much a real being by our principles as by any other."

It is in the face of all these protests, and of twenty times as much in different parts of Berkeley's writings, that his adversaries have had the effrontery to publish to the credulous, that Berkeley denied the reality of things, and that the credulous have had the weakness to believe such a thing of such a man.

But further. To say nothing of the dulness or unfairness of having overlooked these protests—to say nothing of the fact that they who consider Berkeley to have denied the reality of things, must, before they can make that charge, have first themselves denied the reality of the mind; and, to say

nothing of the incapacity for metaphysical studies, which, Sir James Mackintosh most justly observes, is betrayed by those who think that Berkeley's doctrine is inconsistent with reality—to say nothing of these things, what, I ask, are we to think of those persons who, like Berkeley's adversaries, imagine that an intelligent and sensible man may very well deny the reality of the table he is writing at—may very well think that it does not, really and in point of fact, exist in the way in which he and we perceive it to be existing; and all this without being a whit the less an intelligent and sensible man? Is there not something most preposterous in this? Few men have been more lauded for intelligence and discernment by their friends than Berkeley has been by his adversaries; yet these very adversaries have not thought it anything inconsistent in themselves to report of him, that he did not think the table he wrote at to be a real table, or the chair he sat on to be a real chair, but that he thought both the chair and the table to be less real even than their shadows. What, I again ask, can be more unreasonable or inconsistent than to impute such an opinion to such a man, even had we no other evidence that it was not his opinion? Dr. Reid, indeed, has sought by a singular expedient to give some air of plausibility to this strange imputation. He says, that not only is it quite possible for a sensible man to deny the reality of the table he is writing at, but that even he

himself was once in this predicament. He frankly tells us that he had once been a believer in Berkeley's doctrine, and that what he understood by it, when he believed it, was, that there are no such things whatever really existing in the world as chairs and tables, or anything else which we perceive by our senses—that, in short, there is no world for them to exist in—that all is a delusion. Berkeley, as has been seen, anticipated this misconception of his principles in minds that were not of a metaphysical turn, and adopted the precaution of repeatedly saying, "If you think so of my doctrine, you do not understand it." The natural effect of such a hint would be, one might suppose, to make an enlightened man suspect that his own view of the doctrine was inaccurate, rather than that the doctrine itself detracted in the slightest degree from the reality of things. But Dr. Reid was not to be disconcerted by the exactions of this enlightened justice. To suppose that he did not understand, and could not understand, a thing, would be an absurdity as great as any other. Accordingly, he began to suspect the reality of the chair he sat on, under the delusion that in doing so he was embracing (as he calls it) the whole of Berkeley's system. Now, notwithstanding this remarkable instance of philosophical infatuation, I maintain that there is something frivolous in supposing that a sensible man can entertain such doubts, and be a sensible man at the

same time; and that Berkeley could not possibly have possessed the "uncommon penetration" which even Dr. Reid ascribes to him, if he thought that his pen and paper were not real things, or that the chair he sat on was not a real chair.

The sum of what has been said by the Materialists against Berkeley upon this head is, that his doctrine positively does deny the reality of things—that he is not to be believed when he says it does not—that the poor man denied this reality without knowing that he was denying it—that there is nothing more natural than that a sensible man should deny this reality from excess of intelligence—that a mental reality is tantamount to no reality at all—and that there is nothing so real as matter is. It does not require much fairness or much sagacity to perceive how false these notions are, and how much they have militated against the reception of Immaterialism by mankind.

II. Another misrepresentation employed against Berkeley was, that even if he did not deny the reality of things, he nevertheless denied something which it was contrary to common sense and common experience to deny. Now, before I speak of what that really is which Berkeley denied, I shall here state two facts which will convince any unprejudiced person that what Berkeley denied cannot (whatever it is) be, after all, so contrary to com-

mon sense as some have chosen to represent it. One of these facts is that just alluded to, that in the earlier part of Dr. Reid's life he denied everything that Berkeley's doctrine denies, and maintained everything that Berkeley's doctrine maintains. It was once his lot, he ingenuously tells us, (Intell. Powers, Essay II. ch. 10,) "to embrace all Berkeley's system." How, then, we may ask, can the Materialists—how, then, can the admirers of Dr. Reid, the great champion of the Materialists, say that anything inculcated in that system is manifestly downright nonsense—manifestly contrary to the plainest instincts of our nature? They may say, indeed, that this fact does not prove the doctrine to be true; they may say that it does not even prove it to be probable; but does it not constitute very strong grounds for our suspecting that the doctrine does not contain anything perhaps, after all, so outrageously contrary to common sense and to common experience as people generally are taught to suppose? Besides, it is well known that there have been several enlightened men, of as sound practical common sense as Dr. Reid, who believed Berkeley's doctrine, and who all their lives continued to believe it. The second fact which I have to state is, that Mr. Stewart and Dr. Reid have themselves declared, over and over again, that anything more strict and accurate than Berkeley's reasoning there could not be; and that

the whole error which Berkeley committed— his great violation of common sense and common experience—lay in his agreeing with Locke, Sir Isaac Newton, and all the rest of the philosophers, upon a point on which Locke, Sir Isaac Newton, and all the rest of the philosophers had the misfortune not to agree with Mr. Stewart and Dr. Reid. (See Phil. Essays, Essay II. ch. 1; and Intell. Powers, Essay II. ch. 7; also Essay VI. ch. 5.) I shall not dwell upon the puerility of the assertion made by these two Scottish gentlemen, who thus gravely tells us that they are in themselves so much higher an authority in metaphysics and in common sense than Locke, or Sir Isaac Newton, or Plato, or any other philosopher from the days of Plato to their own, as to make it sheer nonsense in any one not instantly to prefer their opinion to that of any one else; but I think that even the most bigoted partizan of the material theory will not fail to see and to acknowledge, that if (as they say) Berkeley's not agreeing with them instead of with Locke and Newton, is all that stands between him and common sense, it is a very little thing indeed, and much less than people are apt to imagine when they hear that Berkeley's doctrine contradicts the instincts of our nature.

Having premised these two historical facts, which everybody has the power of attesting to his own satisfaction, and which are, I think, highly calcu-

lated to make reasonable men suspect that Berkeley may not perhaps be altogether so much more unreasonable than other mortals, I now proceed to inquire what that thing really is which he has denied, and what that thing really is which he has maintained. In plain, brief language, then, his propositions are—1. "That there is no such thing as matter in the sensible universe;" and 2, "That the sensible universe itself has its subsistence within our minds." Such are the propositions—such the "reveries," as Mr. Dugald Stewart calls them, by which a very good Bishop has so much diverted or scandalized (as the case may be) the learned coteries of the civilized world. I shall examine what there is absurd in each of these propositions separately; and, first, what there is absurd in saying that "there is no such thing as matter in the whole sensible universe."

"There exists (says Berkeley) no such thing as matter in the universe, yet the universe itself exists exactly in the state of reality in which we perceive it to exist;" or (lest either proposition should seem to have an undue priority), "the whole universe really exists as we perceive it to exist, yet there exists no such thing in all that universe as the sort of stuff which philosophers understand when they speak of matter." It is clear that this does not inculcate that there is no real universe, and equally clear that it does inculcate the total absence of the

thing called matter. What! (it will be asked,) a real universe and no matter in it! Are not these contradictory propositions?

Whether these are or are not contradictory propositions—whether it be sense or nonsense to speak of a real universe or a real chair without the due quantity of matter in it, must, I think, depend wholly or principally upon the sort of stuff that is, which we are to understand by the word matter. For if this matter is something that people can even only see, like the colour of a rose-tree, it will certainly be very great nonsense to deny that it exists where it is seen; but if, on the contrary, you can neither see it, nor feel it, nor taste it, nor perceive it any more, by any sense, than you perceive sugar in the same rose-tree, what is the meaning, then, of saying that it is great nonsense to deny its existence? If there is a kind of matter as imperceptible to the senses as sugar is in a rose-tree, what is there so contrary to common sense and common experience in suspecting that such matter as this is, may not perhaps, after all, have an existence anywhere.

To judge this question fairly, therefore, we must first determine what the word "matter" means. Now, there are two very different kinds of stuff called by this name, the difference between which is universally agreed upon. One consists wholly of colours and feels, and of the modifications of which such elements are susceptible; that is, it has colour

in it as part of it, and feel in it as part of it, and size in it as part of it, and figure in it as part of it. These things are not only qualities belonging to this matter, but are constituent portions of it. It can therefore be felt and seen, measured and admired. This is not the sort of matter that Berkeley denied. On the contrary, he takes great pains to declare his firmest belief in this sort of matter, and represents it as the sort which every one except the Materialists believes in. "If," says he, "by material substance is meant only sensible body—that which is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world, I dare say, mean no more), then I am more certain of matter's existence than you or any other philosopher pretend to be." (Third Dialogue.) This sort of matter, however, the Materialists do not ever even call by the name "matter" or "material substance" at all, nor do they allow that this sort of thing is any real thing at all, or any real part whatever of the objects that are really existing round us. On which point Berkeley again clashes with the Materialists; for he not only says that this was the only kind of matter he could ever discover anywhere, but he goes so far as to insist that he found this kind of matter really existing everywhere, and speaks of it throughout, in the highest terms, as that of which our chairs and tables are composed. This is not therefore the matter whose existence Berkeley has denied.

The other kind of matter is supposed to consist wholly of something unknown, which has neither colour in it as a part of it, nor feel in it as a part of it, nor size in it as a part of it, nor figure in it as a part of it. It is supposed to have the power of creating feels and colours in other things, but has in itself neither a feel nor a colour, nor anything that is in the slightest degree similar to a feel, or to a colour. It is therefore in itself something quite impalpable (i. e., without the slightest feel) and quite invisible (i. e., without the slightest colour)—something incomparably more impalpable and invisible than the air—something quite as impalpable and as invisible as the mind. In speaking of this kind of matter, some of the less ingenuous Materialists, conscious of their bad cause, have indeed endeavoured to create a confusion in their favour between colour and the cause of colour, by calling both of them "colour," as well as between feel and the cause of feel, by calling both things "feel;" but the attentive reader may easily surmount this confusion by reflecting that the same epithets will not apply to a thing itself and to the cause of it. The epithet "visible," for instance, or "handsome," will serve as a test of the sense in which, on each occasion, the word "colour" is used, inasmuch as a real colour is always visible and often handsome, whereas the cause of colour is always invisible, and can in no case, I believe, be called a handsome cause. But to

return. The invisible matter we are now speaking of, is said to be neither a solid nor a fluid; and although it is perfectly free from every sort of feel or colour, taste, smell, or sound, yet it is generally supposed to be lurking about in whatever neighbourhood these last five things are. I need only state further that Dr. Reid, the stoutest advocate that matter ever had, after distinctly and honestly declaring the fact that, "strictly speaking, we have no notion of the thing at all," makes this remarkable confession: "I am afraid it must always be obscure until men have other faculties." (Essay II. ch. 19.) This is the matter whose existence Berkeley denied —the only thing that is called matter by the philosophers, and therefore the only sort of matter, or material substance, now in question.

I have already said that if Berkeley had denied the existence of that mixed matter which is composed of feels and colours, and which is perfectly well known to us all, he would have been doing a very unreasonable and inexcusable thing. But if the matter, whose existence he denies, is this pure ethereal matter, which its warmest advocates are obliged to admit to be utterly unknown to mankind, and known only to beings of some higher order, how can we assert that it is contrary to common sense and to common experience to say that there is no such matter in the universe? I am not now asking whether there is or is not this mat-

ter, nor whether it is probable or not that there is this matter—what I now ask is, whether it is a physical impossibility that the universe should exist without a due quantity of it—so clearly a physical impossibility as to make it contrary to common sense and common experience to suppose that the universe has none of it wrapt up in it? Sugar exists in beetroot in precisely the same imperceptible manner in which the pure matter is supposed to exist in it; yet, before the sugar was clearly proved to be in the beetroot, who could have said that it was contrary to our common instincts and our common reason not instantly to see, without any showing, that there was this invisible sugar in the beetroot? So, also, it is not common sense or common experience that has ever taught any one the existence of the invisible matter now in question. It is therefore false to say that it is contrary to common sense and common experience to deny it.

The most inexplicable part, however, of the whole business is, that this translucid and impalpable thing called "Matter" is an essential part, and the principal part, of every particle we eat and drink—an essential and principal part of our own bodies—the largest portion of everything, hot or cold, light or heavy—of the sun as well as of a snowball—of a feather as well as of a millstone. Nor is this all. The thing is carried one other stage. For we are told in the mildest terms imaginable, that whoever

entertains the least doubt of all this, must be well nigh crazed—a very worthy poor man, doubtless, he may be, but still a very poor man indeed, and wholly led into this unhappy state of scepticism by having had the weakness to adopt the common opinion of enlightened and scientific men. "Bishop Berkeley surely," says Dr. Reid, "did not duly consider that, by depriving us of the material world, he deprived us, at the same time, of family, friends, country, and every human creature; of every object of affection, esteem, or concern, except ourselves. The good bishop surely never intended this." "This dismal system, which, if it could be believed, would deprive men of every social comfort, a very good bishop, by strict and accurate reasoning, deduced from the principles commonly received by philosophers concerning ideas. The fault is not in the reasoning, but in the principles from which it is drawn." (Essay VI. ch. 5.) Seeing the immense importance which Dr. Reid attaches to this matter, we cannot, perhaps, wonder at the indignation with which he receives a bishop's attempt to convince him that there was not anything of the kind at all anywhere. This it is easy to understand; but let others who may have more self-possession, and less interest, it may be, in the issue of the question, not suffer themselves to be carried away with the same unphilosophical precipitation. Let them determine, on the broad merits of the case, whether it

is indeed after all so outrageously contrary to all the common reason of mankind to prove that this imponderable and transparent stuffing does not enter into the composition of the bodies by which we are surrounded. For this is the thing which Berkeley has done. There is no use in attempting to disguise the fact. The poor man did do this; and all that now remains for us to do on his behalf is to ask whether this is indeed so very absurd a reverie—so very shocking, and so wild a notion, that no man with the common instincts of our nature can be at the pains of reading even twenty pages on the subject? Let us strip the thing in question of the protection afforded to it by a stolen name. Let us not call it matter. Let us speak of a thing of the same description—equally free from all colour and from all feel. Let us call it $x-y$. Now, if I have the weakness to think that there is no such thing as this $x-y$ in any particular kind of tree—in an oak-tree, for instance, am I to be pronounced mad?—am I not to be listened to? Is it manifest that I must either be a fool myself or think others fools if I even express a doubt about it? Might it not perhaps be true that there is no such thing as $x-y$ in the oak-tree? Might not other people who believed they had found some, have been in some way mistaken about it? For only think how perfectly invisible the thing is supposed to be. And if, upon examination, I really find none—if, upon the minutest

chemical analysis, I can discover not the least particle of $x-y$ in the oak-tree, in any state of which $x-y$ is known to be susceptible; if, under these circumstances, I have the boldness or weakness to declare to the world that my understanding is of such a nature that it leads me to believe there is no such invisible substance in the oak-tree, am I to be represented as a most "strict and accurate" analyst a good deal addicted to nonsense—as a very good kind of person, weakly opposed to a very simple fact—opposed even, and, of course, weakly opposed, to all the common sense of the whole wide world? "Ah, my Lord Bishop (the Materialists exclaim), this is your great error. You forget the world with which you have to deal, and which you so stoutly confront. Study and virtue are not enough against a whole world. Your virtue and your study will never convince people that there may not be something in the oak-tree more than we see, and feel, and hear, and taste, and smell. No, no; your moral excellence and your midnight lamp, and your extreme acuteness, and your mitred brow, can only lead people the more to suspect you are a simpleton; so manifestly contrary is it to the dictates of nature to think that there is no unknown substance of any description, neither $x-y$ nor $y-x$, in oak-trees—nothing but what we hear in them, or taste in them, or smell in them, or feel in them, or see in them. You ought to know, my Lord Bishop, that there is a

great deal more in an oak-tree than that. You ought to know that the most important, and by far the largest part of the whole—the thing, in short, which constitutes the oak-tree — is what has neither feel nor colour, taste nor smell. This, at least, my Lord Bishop, is what we Materialists call common sense; and this is the common sense you violate."

It is not, I think, improbable that the point here in question may strike plain practical men in a very different light from that in which it seems to present itself to the Materialists. It is not, I say, improbable that there will be many people found who, far from sympathising with the foregoing remonstrance, will look upon it as most unjust and most false to denounce a man to the world as a visionary and a sceptic, because he says that you may search in vain through the whole universe of created things for the translucid and impalpable thing called "matter" by the philosophers; that he, for his part, could find nothing of the kind in any of the objects of sense upon which his experiments were tried; and that he can easily demonstrate the physical impossibility of its existence. One need not be a visionary and a sceptic to deny the existence of this invisible stuffing. Plain practical people will, I suspect, be apt to look upon the thing in this way, and will think that what is just and true in this case, is, not to represent Berkeley as a visionary and a sceptic, but

to represent as a visionary the man who thought he had discovered such a substance; and as a sceptic, the man who thought that the universe never could get on without it. Plain practical men, at all events, will see at once that there is nothing contrary to common sense or common experience in saying that there is no such thing as matter in the Universe.

We have next to consider what there is absurd in saying that the whole sensible universe has its existence within our minds. I have already fully explained that Berkeley did not mean by these words to say, either that the universe is within the precincts of our bodies, nor that it is the produce of our own minds, nor yet that it is an idea, in the usual sense of that word. These frivolous notions have proved stumbling-blocks to many—even to highly intelligent and scientific men, upon the very threshold of the subject, who, because they could not, at first sight, understand the doctrine without supposing some one or more of these unreasonable things, thought, as they well might do, that the whole doctrine was as unreasonable as their supposition. But enough has been said in a former chapter to make patient and impartial people understand that the proposition now before us is perfectly exempt from all such nonsense.

Before any one can judge whether it is unreasonable or not to suppose such a thing as the sensible universe existing within such a thing as mind,

it is necessary that he should first well consider what is meant by the expression, "existing within our minds;" and that this is not a superfluous consideration is evident from the misconceptions respecting it which have been just now alluded to. To exist, then, within mind means to be of such a nature as to be incapable of subsisting except when it is perceived; to be such, that like pain, whenever it is not perceived, it does not exist; and there are many things which are known to be capable of only this sort of subsistence within the mind, although they are at a great distance from us, and although they are much larger than ourselves, and although they appear to be the most unlikely things in the world to exist within the mind. The green colour of a field, for instance, is attended with all these peculiarities; it occupies more space than we do; it is at some distance from us; and it is totally unlike anything that we are in the habit of supposing to be within the mind. Yet it is perfectly well known to all scientific and educated men, that a green colour cannot exist anywhere except within a mind. "A moment's reflection," says Mr. Dugald Stewart, "must satisfy any one that the sensation of colour can only reside in a mind; and yet our natural bias is surely to connect colour with extension and figure, and to conceive white, blue, and yellow as something spread over the surfaces of bodies." (Phil. of the Human Mind, ch. 1, sec. 2.) Since

colour, then, subsists within the mind, and is acknowledged to do so by all the philosophers and scientific men, Materialists and Immaterialists, it is, I think, very clear that most people do not know what is meant by saying that a thing subsists within the mind, although they cry out upon Berkeley for having said this of the universe.

Pain is another thing which has this spiritual subsistence, without being ever almost thought of in this light. There is nothing perhaps more evident to the peasant than that the pain in his foot is a thing outside his mind. Yet there is nothing in the whole range of human knowledge known with more certainty, or more undisputed, than that the pain in the peasant's foot is a thing within the peasant's mind — a thing which, from its very nature, will cease to exist when it ceases to be perceived, when it ceases to reside within a sentient substance, such as mind is known to be; and it is scarce necessary to explain, that when the philosophers speak of a violent pain in the foot as being something within the mind, they are far from meaning, or from being understood to mean, that this pain is what is commonly called an idea, or that it is in any sense the creation of one's own mind. Now, when we hear that a thing so apparently outside the precincts of our mind as a real and violent pain in the foot, is nevertheless known to be a thing existing only within the mind, is it

not evident that things exist within the mind at the very moment when to all appearance they exist outside it; and that their seeming to us to exist outside it, is no reason at all for our supposing that they do so, unless we otherwise know the thing to be a fact. The shape of the foot, for instance, appears to the peasant to be as much outside the mind as the pain of it (not more so, I think, but quite as much); yet when we know that it is not contrary to common sense to say that the pain in the foot is something resident within mind, how can we pretend to assert that it is contrary to common sense to say that the shape of the foot is also resident within the mind, or that any other thing, to all appearance equally outside the mind, is nevertheless quite as much within it as the pain is? How, at least, can we be quite certain that common sense is outraged in the one case and not in the other? May we not be mistaken about it? May not that which is true of pain and colours, be, for all that we can tell, true also of the whole sensible universe? Some intelligent men have thought that Berkeley was right in this point; may it not be better to examine it a little, before we dogmatically declare that the thing is physically impossible?

Heat is another thing as unquestionably, to all appearance, outside the mind as the object in which the heat resides. If the foot feels hot, for instance, I do not think that there is any one who (until he

has consulted scientific men or books upon the subject) is not convinced that the heat in his foot is something quite as much outside his mind as his foot itself, or anything belonging to it. He would, there is no doubt, quite as soon think of saying that his foot or his shoe was within his mind as that the heat of his foot was there. Yet it is known to be an error to suppose that this heat is outside the mind, and not within it; an error moreover so gross and so clear that there is no scientific man who would not be ashamed of having it attributed to him. Thus we see that it is nothing so unheard of to say that real things subsist within the mind, nor anything so extravagant or unnatural to say that what seems to subsist outside the mind, subsists not outside it, but within it. Indeed, to a person who is told that the heat and pain and colour of his foot subsist in his mind, without its being explained to him how that is known, it must be rather a perplexing matter to determine what part of his foot does, and what part does not, subsist in the same way within his mind. And so also in other things. No one can help thinking that, if the heat of a room is a thing subsisting within his mind, perhaps, as far as he can judge of what is meant by that expression, one of the chairs may be there also; for how can he be supposed to know that the heat of the room is not where its chairs are? If the mental position of the heat is perfectly according to com-

mon sense, how can any one say that the mental position of the chairs is totally contrary to common sense? Both the heat and the chairs seem to all who call themselves plain, matter-of-fact people, to be equally outside the mind; and such people would naturally conclude that if the heat is within it, there is nothing necessarily absurd in supposing the chairs within it also. This is the main point to be now attended to; and let me not be misunderstood about it. I freely admit that if nothing in the room was known to be within the mind, it might very well seem contrary to common sense and common experience to say that the chairs were within it. But since it is agreed upon, and perfectly well known, that there are many things in the room which are, and can only be, within the mind, — the heat, for instance, and the colours of the chairs,—what outrageous offence is it against common sense and common experience to say that the chairs themselves are within the mind? Also, I do not mean to say that an uneducated peasant would be doing anything contrary to common sense in denying that the heat of his foot was within his mind—for I think he would not. I think the natural conclusion for him to come to with his knowledge is, that this heat is outside his mind, and that the foot also is outside it. But what I do mean to ask is, if he believes men of science and research, as to the fact that the heat and pain of the foot subsist within the mind,

how can he be reasonably sure—much less perfectly certain—that the foot itself is not there also? How, at least, can any one pretend that it is quite contrary to common sense for the peasant to surmise that it may be where its heat and pain are. What distinction can he be supposed to draw? Upon what grounds is he to think that the pain and heat of his foot subsist in one place (within his mind), but that it is absurd and utterly contrary to common sense to suppose that its shape or size, or anything else belonging to his foot, is in the same place? I do not say that he must necessarily think the shape and size of his foot, to be where its heat and its pain are (although I cannot well see how he could think otherwise), but I do say that he will not be apt to think it absurd if he hears that even the foot itself is where its pain is. What such a person would perhaps be apt to think absurd is, that the foot should be in one place and its pain in another place, or that anything belonging to the foot should be within the mind; but, at all events, he will clearly see that, however the truth or falsehood of the thing may be, the absurdity of supposing the foot within the mind has ceased from the time of its being ascertained that such real and external things as heat and pain and colour *can* subsist there, and especially that the heat and pain and colour of the foot really *do* subsist, in this supposed way, within the mind.

To show still further that what is meant by a subsistence within the mind is nothing in the slightest degree incompatible with that external position which things evidently have with reference to the body, I need only observe that every one of our sensations which we have by the senses has this external position. Sounds, tastes, smells, and feels of all kinds, as well as colours, have it, and have, therefore, all this appearance of being outside the mind, without seeming in any respect to be in the slightest degree within it. Yet it is within the mind only that these things can be. There is no man of scientific attainments of any sect or country, who now denies that these things are sensations, and that a sensation is incapable of subsisting anywhere except within a substance that is sentient like the mind. There are different, and very different opinions as to where and what the cause of tastes, smells, sounds, feels, and colours is, but only one opinion even on the part of the Materialists as to the position of these things themselves within the mind. (See Essays on the Intell. Powers, Essay II. ch. 17.) No reasonable man who pays attention to this fact will see any thing so very contrary to common sense and common experience, as he was led to believe, in saying that things beyond our bodies, may exist within our minds, and that, as far as its distance from us is concerned, the whole sensible universe may exist there.

There can, I think, be no doubt that the reason unscientific people think it absurd to say that the universe subsists within the mind, is because they think that colours, feels, sounds, tastes, and smells exist outside it; nor any doubt that, when the Materialists raise the cry of absurdity against Berkeley, it is upon this error of the unlearned that they calculate; for any one who knows that the external things here enumerated are things in mind, will not only not think it contrary to common sense to say that the universe exists there also, but will be very much inclined to think it contrary to common sense not to suppose that it does. From all which, it is very clear that if there is anything unreasonable in saying that the universe exists within our minds, that unreasonableness does not arise from any distance that there is between the universe and our bodies (for this distance, we see, does not prevent things from being within our minds), but must arise from some supposed disproportion in size between the universe and the human mind, or from some supposed impossibility that all the elements of which the universe is composed could, from their nature, subsist within a thing like mind.

Upon the first of these points, people ask, how can the mind contain so much? Not reflecting that the mind has no more relation to size than blue has to sound, and that you cannot say a mind is smaller than a house any more than you can say

that any given yellow is more bright than thunder. These people also omit to take into account that the mind when it contains a colour, contains also the space occupied by that colour whether that space be measured by a foot or by the diameter of Saturn's orbit, and that there is therefore, in this respect, no greater difficulty in supposing the universe to be within one's mind than in supposing the peasant's foot to be there.

Those who derive their imputation of absurdity against Universal Immaterialism from the nature of the elements which are known to compose the universe have as frivolous a ground for their imputation as the rest have. All the known elements of the sensible universe are the five sensations already enumerated as received at the five senses, and the various modifications of which these things are capable, and which are discoverable in these things. Now, nothing can be better adapted to a subsistence within mind than such elements as these; nor is there the slightest trace of any other element, known or unknown, discoverable in the objects of sense. Take away all the feels connected with Mont Blanc, so that the mountain shall become impalpable; and take away all the colours connected with it, so that it shall be invisible; what will then remain in the space of earth and air now occupied by the mountain? Is it common sense to believe that any portion of the mass remains? Is it not as

clear as human reason can make it, that if Mont Blanc became invisible and impalpable, there would be,—there could be, no real Mont Blanc? And so it is also with all the rest of the universe. Feels and colours, tastes, smells, and sounds, being taken away, not a particle of the sensible creation will remain. Every object of sense consists wholly of these things, unless there is something in it that is unknown. Earths and metals, as well as all vegetable and animal substances, are found, upon the minutest analysis, to have nothing else that can remain, and to become annihilated, when we suppose them to be quite free from these five things; and every one can satisfy himself of this fact by reflecting for a few minutes upon the share which these elements have in the composition of any sensible object that is near him. Thus, those who represent it as contrary to common sense to speak of the universe as subsisting within mind, on account of the known component elements of the universe, have, if that were possible, a slighter pretext for their representations than any others, inasmuch as the examination of those very elements affords the amplest grounds for thinking that the universe really does exist within the mind, and that it would be physically impossible for it not to do so. I would here merely observe, that to say or believe what is physically impossible, is what, in common language, is called "absurd."

Neither, then, on account of the externality of

other sensible objects to our own bodies, nor on account of the distance of these objects from our bodies, nor on account of the great size and number of these objects, nor yet on account of the elements of which these objects are known to be composed, is there the slightest reason for suspecting that the spiritual subsistence of the universe is contrary to common sense, and there is no other reason alleged for thinking that it is so. But the mere fact of its not being contrary to common sense—the mere fact of its involving no inconsistency to think that the objects of the sensible universe are within our minds, must not be misrepresented as, nor mistaken for, a demonstration of the thing itself, nor even for a probability in favour of believing it. It has been said that this spiritual subsistence of the universe is absurd. It has been now shown that it is not. But this is no proof that the thing is certainly true. The demonstration of this is given in another page; but I do not think this an inappropriate place to lay down two strong arguments of its probability (if, indeed, they are not found to amount to a great deal more), since they further illustrate how perfectly free Berkeley's proposition is of anything absurd. One of these arguments is founded upon the principle that "the unknown situation of the whole may be determined by the known situation of any portion of it, when that portion is known not to be disunited from the whole." The second of these

arguments is, that "it is contrary to common sense to think that the colour of a chair is not united to the chair, but that the chair and its colour are in two different parts of the same room at the same time."

To exhibit the first argument, let us for an instant suppose that the universe consists of a considerable quantity of unknown elements—elements respecting which there is nothing known, not even whether they are or are not capable of existing within the mind. Let an intelligent peasant be invited to pronounce upon the question as to whether this universe, so composed, has its position within mind or not; and to guide his judgment, let him be merely apprized of the fact that all parties are agreed as to the position within the mind of at least one important portion of this universe. He will probably remark, that much must depend upon what that portion is which has this spiritual subsistence; since, if it has little extent, or cannot be proved to be with the rest of the universe, its spiritual subsistence will not determine that of the rest; whereas, if it be extensive, or can be proved to be with the rest, especially if both these things be true of it, then its spiritual subsistence renders it unreasonable not to believe that of the whole universe. Inform the peasant, then, that that portion of the universe whose position within the mind is perfectly ascertained and undis-

puted is its colours. "Its colours!" he will exclaim; "do you mean the colours of coloured objects on the earth's surface, as well as the colours of the skies and stars?" Tell him that it is perfectly ascertained by scientific persons, that these and all other colours are within the mind; and if he accepts this fact, I believe no one can have the least doubt of what the peasant's judgment will be upon all the rest of the universe.

Or, instead of colours, let him be apprized that light is that portion whose spirituality is undoubted, (the light next the earth's surface, as well as that where the most distant stars are.) Will he begin upon this to reflect how it may be possible for him to suppose that the light which is in the distant stars may be in one place, and that the stars themselves are in another; or will he not rather instantly conclude that even the distant stars are in the same place and substance in which their light is, and that the spaces delineated by all these lights are where the delineating phenomena themselves are?

Or, let the portion of the universe selected to guide his judgment be its feels. Let him be informed that every imaginable kind of feel, however qualified—i. e., feel in all its modifications of sharp, round, broad, long, soft, &c.,—whether these modifications be such as are found peculiarly in feel alone, or such as are assumed as well by colour as by feel –let him be informed that feel of all kinds

subsists, and can, from its nature, subsist only within a recipient or percipient substance like the mind. Can there be any doubt as to whether he will look upon the feels of things as a sufficiently extensive, and sufficiently inseparable portion of the universe to determine the position of all the rest? Is he likely to think that the universe can exist very well without its feels; and that it is therefore unnecessary to suppose that it exists with them within the mind? That a single stone can exist without some feel, is what, I venture to say, no peasant can understand.

Or, instead of the foregoing portions of the universe, let us give him its sounds. Let him be informed that it is well known by all who have made the subject their study, that every sound in the universe subsists spiritually, and can only so subsist; that thunder, for instance, is a thing solely within the mind, as well when the first crash of it is heard in the clouds above our heads, as when its last echoes are dying along the distant mountains. Can it be supposed that the unsophisticated peasant will not be strongly tempted to suspect that the whole universe is where the thunder is, whether that be inside or outside our minds? Will he not be as sure as of anything else that his senses teach him, that the noise in a street is really in the street, where it seems to be, and that in whatever place the noise is, the street is also.

I think it is perfectly indifferent which of the foregoing portions of the universe we represent to the peasant as subsisting within our minds, and that whichever of them we select, that one will be sufficient to make him sure that the universe, whatever else it be composed of, must have its being either inside or outside the mind, according to what is true as to where that portion has its being. It is not at all improbable that the peasant will ask for a distinct understanding as to whether our own bodies are to be looked upon as sharing the same fate in this respect as the universe (since he will see a great absurdity in supposing the mind which contains the universe to be within the human body), and also, a distinct understanding as to whether things are to be looked upon as subsisting within our minds in the regular manner in which we perceive them, without a more adequate cause for that regularity than any cause we can detect within our own minds, (since he will see another absurdity in supposing that the spots in a peacock's tail can have that order and steadiness without some better cause of order than his own mind.) On these two points let him have the amplest satisfaction. Let him be reminded that the same reason as there is for thinking the universe to be in our minds, exists in equal force for thinking that our own bodies are there also; and that there is the same cause and object for the order that exists in all the natural phenomena which we

perceive, as there is for the phenomena themselves, the cause being in both cases a Spirit, the limits of whose power we cannot perceive; and the object being in both cases to render our minds perceptible to one another, as well as the Divine mind perceptible to all, and to open an intercourse between each of our minds and the other, as well as between all and that which is Almighty. Nothing further will, I apprehend, remain to embarrass the decision of the impartial peasant, nor do I think that even the most prejudiced will fail to see the truth of the principle upon which this argument is founded, and that, however some of the learned may think proper to decide, the unlearned peasant will decide for Berkeley.

But if there be any grounds, unperceived by me, for doubt as to what the peasant would conclude,—if it is not clear, that when he is convinced that any one portion of the universe exists within the mind, he would instantly conclude the same thing of the whole; if this, I say, is not clear, then try what he will think of it when you tell him, as with truth you can, that all the foregoing portions of the universe exist within the mind, and can only exist there; not only one portion, as was at first represented to him — not only feels, or only colours, or only lights, or only sounds, but *all* these four portions of the universe *together;* let him be apprized that they all are well ascertained to have their subsistence within our minds — what, is it supposed,

will be the effect of this startling communication upon the peasant's mind? Is there now any room for doubt as to what will be his conclusion? or, as to what he will think of those who tell him this, yet ask him whether, nevertheless, the rest of the universe may not subsist outside, and at a distance from, all mind whatever, and whether he does not see that it is totally contrary to common sense to deny that it does so?

The second argument which I have proposed to introduce here respecting the probability of the proposition that the universe subsists within our minds is totally distinct from the preceding, and consists in the fact that it is contrary to common sense to suppose that the attributes of a chair, for instance, are not all together in the same place, as they seem to be, but are in different parts of the room, according to the distances at which people stand from the chair. I assume that this is contrary to common sense; yet an instant's reflection will convince any one that it is a necessary consequence from supposing one part of the universe in our minds and the other part outside them. If it be true that light and colours, feels, sounds, tastes, and smells are the only portions of the universe that subsist within the mind, it is clear that the colour of a chair can only be in that part of the room where there is a sentient or percipient substance (whether it be that of a man or of a brute), while the shape of the chair may

be where there is no such substance; so also that the noise of a trumpet is not where the trumpet itself is; nor a fragrant smell in that part of the garden where the plant itself is, but in another and different part of it; nor the hand where its pain, and its colour, and its heat are; and that there must be, at all events, some slight local distance between the fire-place and the heat of it, which distance varies according to the position of the sentient substance. I assume that all such things are contrary to common sense and to all our most intimate convictions. I offer no proof that they are so. If to any one they do not appear so, as they do to me, he need take no account of them, nor of what I have said of them. But if, on the other hand, any one is disposed to regard them as inconsistent in the extreme, I desire he may reflect that all those who have any knowledge on this subject, and who think that the universe does not exist within the mind, think, and admit that they think, and are by their principles under the necessity of thinking, that the attributes of things exist in that strange and scattered manner now described. Any one who chooses to make himself acquainted with this branch of science, can obtain the utmost certainty as to the prevalence of this hypothesis, and whoever sees that it forms a necessary part of the supposition that the universe is outside the mind, will be very apt to regard this supposition as a wild and shocking paradox, utterly

at variance with all our common instincts and with all our common knowledge.

Thus, then, I have examined what there is physically impossible either in the principle that there is no matter in the universe, or in the principle that the universe subsists within our minds; and it is left for the judgment of an impartial reader whether there is any such thing as a physical impossibility connected with either of these principles. It is to give him a complete view of the circumstances of the question that it has been set in so many different lights; and my own impression is, that if he be a plain, practical man, and the advocate of no theory, he will be very apt to consider that the physical impossibility of the thing is wholly upon the other side of the question. At all events, he cannot fail to see that the two propositions which Mr. Stewart and Dr. Reid represent Berkeley as having strictly demonstrated upon the common principles of all enlightened men except themselves, are, as might be expected, propositions which, after all, neither clash with our experience, nor with that proud common sense to which we all aspire.

III. The third misrepresentation circulated by the Materialists respecting Berkeley's doctrine was, that it had a tendency irreligiously sceptical; and, as might well be anticipated in a moral and religious country like England, this misrepresentation,

although levelled against one of the brightest ornaments of the church, had quite as much effect as—if not more than—any other.

This misrepresentation has, for the most part, been carried on by such hints and insinuations as were best calculated to produce the desired impression, without a direct or specific charge; especially by constantly coupling Berkeley's name with that of a professedly irreligious writer. But so far is there from being any direct charge preferred, or any even plausible grounds indicated for these insinuations, that the parties who originated them have elsewhere expressly acknowledged that there were no grounds for such a charge. Mr. Stewart says distinctly in one place, that he does not regard Berkeley's doctrine "as an error of any serious moment," and in another he speaks of it as "an inoffensive tenet;" while Dr. Reid proceeds to the extent of making the following remarkable concession respecting it:—"The evidence of an all-governing mind, so far from being weakened, seems to appear even in a more striking light upon his (Berkeley's) hypothesis than upon the common one." (Intell. Powers, Essay II. ch. 10.)

As I look upon this as but a very imperfect account of the merits of Immaterialism in a theological point of view, and as the insinuations I allude to have not only had much weight with many people, but have also derived an air of plausibility

from some absurd and illogical conclusions attributed to the doctrine, I shall here exhibit, in addition to what is to be found in the Introduction, a sufficient outline of Immaterialism, in its theological bearings, to enable any one to see the utter groundlessness of these insinuations.

To do this, I need only observe, that all external and material things are represented by this doctrine as of such a purely spiritual or mental nature that they can no more subsist independent of mind or spirit of some description, than a mere idea can so subsist. Not by any means that things are represented as being ideas in the ordinary sense of that word, but only as being (like pain) of the same immaterial nature as ideas are; so that whether it is in my mind or outside my mind that sensible objects are, it is only within a mind or sentient nature of some description that it is physically possible for them to be; not by any means within the compass of the human body or of any other body, let it be carefully observed, but within the compass (to adopt a figurative expression) of the human mind or of some other kind of sentient substance; that, in short, all the objects of sense are represented as consisting wholly of sensations variously modified and variously put together, and that, as such, they can only subsist within our minds. Thus much admits of the exactest demonstration.

Now, the three great principles of natural reli-

gion—that there is a God, that He is constantly attentive to the expectations of His creatures, and that the soul is incorruptible—derive the following powerful light from the foregoing doctrine:—

First. That it is a spirit which excites into existence the objects of sense is determined by the fact, assented to by all writers, that sensations, however qualified and however combined, are but ideas (in the philosophical sense of that word); and by the other fact, equally assented to by all writers, that it is not only contrary to common sense to think that any other thing we know of, except mind, can *make* or *impart* ideas; but also, that we are every one of us *conscious* that what is commonly called a mind can do this.

Secondly. That God is constantly attentive to the wants and expectations of created spirits is determined by the extremely *transient* nature of sensations, and by the arbitrary manner in which we require or expect them. For a sensation is a thing of such a nature that it cannot sustain itself, but would instantly disappear, if not continuously sustained as well as originally excited; so that the simple exercise of power which excites the sensation blue, for instance, is not sufficient to maintain blue any length of time beyond the instant of its first appearance, a *continued* and subsequent exercise of power being absolutely indispensable to produce this continued and subsequent effect. And the

Supreme Spirit does not excite our sensations at stated periods, nor wholly against our wills. If He did so, we might have room to suppose that He attended to us at certain periods and neglected us at others; but since He does not do so—since He excites our sensations to a very considerable extent according to our own conduct and volitions, which we are conscious are quite arbitrary, we are precluded from supposing the slightest intermission of His care. When we place the ear, or eye, or hand, in a given situation, we receive certain sensations of sound, or of colour, or of feel, which otherwise we should not receive, and which even by this act or volition of ours, we could not receive, if the Supreme Spirit were inattentive to us. When, for instance, we place the eye and ear in such a situation as induces us to expect that our minds shall receive the sensations (the sounds and colours) which belong to, and constitute, in great part at least, a distant sea, we find that that Spirit attends to this expectation, and makes or produces these sensations; for that He has left some sort of invisible dead thing there with the power of producing these sensations in us, will be found to be a physical impossibility by any one who carries his reflections upon this subject far enough. And whatever numbers of people go to the sea-side with this same expectation, not one of them will be forgotten, nor any particle of the phenomena be omitted in the case of

any one of them. The sensations which form the visible and audible sea are excited in the minds of all without exception who are able and willing to place their organs under the required conditions for having such sensations produced within their minds. And the same in the case of feels, or the palpable sea. Even persons who are both deaf and blind,—to whom the visible and audible sea can no more exist than the toothache can to a man who has no teeth,—even they, if they place the organs of touch in the appointed places, may be certain that they will experience the feels (or the sensations) which form the palpable sea. In all such expectations—whether they be hopes or fears—the most insignificant of us is not forgotten, however many there are to act upon, and however complicated all these actions may be. This constant attention to our rational expectations in the minutest details of physical (or sensible) existence, renders all doubt frivolous as to the permanence of the same attention to whatever other rational expectations we may form with reference to the goodness or to the power of God.

Thirdly. That the soul is, according to the course which the Supreme Spirit pursues in these creations, perfectly indestructible, immortal, and uninvolved, to the slightest extent, in the disorganization and dispersion of the human body, is determined under this doctrine, and exempted from all doubt, by the

fact that the conscious mind is perfectly independent of *all its present sensations*, as well those which compose the *body connected with it*, as those which compose the sun, moon, earth, stars, and all the other bodies in the universe. That our minds may have originally their consciousness by means of the first presence of these sensations within them, every one who can reflect upon it must acknowledge; and it is even possible that, as things are, our minds might never have attained to this consciousness, without the presence within them of such sensations. But that our minds or spirits have also *subsequently* a conscious existence without the presence of sensations is a fact of which there is not one of us unconscious; the termination, therefore, of our sensations cannot involve in any case, or in any sense, the termination of that conscious existence with which God has invested mind.

Now, as to the particular set or body of sensations by which the volitions of one mind are rendered perceptible to another, and which for that obvious purpose are associated with our volitions, these sensations (as far as they are sensations) are evidently not in the slightest degree different from all other sensations, except only in their office; and the association which subsists between them and our volitions is evidently of the same *unnecessary* and *arbitrary* kind as that which subsists between flame and heat, or between the feels and colours of a mill-

stone, or between any two physical objects which are in the relation we call cause and effect. By "unnecessary," I mean, that they are not, from their nature, incapable of existing unassociated; as a sensation, for instance, is physically incapable of existing unassociated with a mind; and by "arbitrary," I mean, wholly dependent upon the will of the Supreme Spirit as all things are, of which a different association is not physically impossible. Therefore, that my mind should be able to move the arms associated with it, is no more a necessary law than that my mind should be able to arrest the earth's progress, or to move the table which is at a distance from my body, without the intervention of any other body. These two points, then, being clearly ascertained—*first*, that our bodies are, *in their nature*, like all other sensible objects, merely sensations within our own and other people's minds; and, *secondly*, that any possible connexion between sensations of any kind and the recipient mind itself in which they are, is such as to make it *physically impossible for the mind to be prevented from going on subsisting by the mere fact of its not having any of these sensations any longer, in this way, or in any way, associated with it*—these two points, I say, being ascertained beyond all doubt, it becomes as frivolous to suppose that the mind may be destroyed by being totally separated from that set of its sensations which we call its body, although we do not see how

this destruction can, in the nature of things, take place, as it is to suppose any other physical impossibility; that there may be, for instance, a case in which two and two would cease to make four, or in which the whole may cease to be greater than its part, although we cannot see or explain or understand how these things could in nature be made possible.

To recapitulate in a few words what has been said: There are three important points of theology in which this doctrine transcends the common one. First, the existence of any one object of sense, whether it exhibit contrivance and design or *not*,—a rock, for instance, or a desert, or a chaos, or even one single colour, or one single sound,—necessarily implies the presence of a superhuman mind to produce it; whereas, under the Material theory, this is only implied (and that not irresistibly) where there is contrivance. Secondly, the existence of all such objects of sense can, from their very nature, only endure co-equally with the *attention* of that superhuman mind, and must instantly cease when that attention is withdrawn, since sensations cannot, from their nature, maintain themselves; whereas the theory of matter supposes that things are capable of going on in their existence, by the aid of certain laws implanted in them, without the presence or attention of any mind at all. Thirdly, the mind cannot, without absurdity, be supposed to depend

for its existence upon its connexion with the things which it contains within it, BY VIRTUE OF ITS PRIOR EXISTENCE; and cannot, therefore, without supposing a physical impossibility, be supposed to depend for its subsistence on its connexion with the body; whereas no one will deny how much room the hypothesis of matter leaves for supposing, not only that the mind does not survive its disconnexion with the body, but even that the mind is a mere state or result of bodily organization.

It remains that we should inquire what is the irreligion discoverable in all this? What doubt—what irreligious scepticism does it seem to cast upon the precious things which Providence has given us? In what does it rob even the field flowers of their eloquence, or obstruct the holy thoughts which descend from our evening sky? The only answer which we can collect to this question from the writings of the more enlightened Materialists, and the point to which all their theological objections at last dwindle, is, that it does not, in point of fact, at all signify for religion whether things exist in mind or (externally to mind) in matter, since they can exist as really in the one substance as in the other; that what alone does signify is, whether (now that people's minds are made up about it) things have matter in them or not; but that they cannot have matter in them, if they are themselves in mind, and that for this reason it is of the utmost importance

to religion, and all settled principles, that the sensible universe should not be thought to be in mind. It is this denying that matter is wrapt up in the sizes of things which Mr. Dugald Stewart represents as "the principal stumbling-block" in Berkeley's doctrine, "unhinging completely (as he says) the natural conceptions of the mind with respect to a truth, about which of all within the reach of our faculties we seem to be the most completely ascertained;" and again this same writer elsewhere describes this unsettling influence of the doctrine by saying, that it "tends to unhinge the whole frame of the human understanding, by shaking our confidence in those principles of belief which form an essential part of its constitution." — (Phil. Essays II.)

Now, laying aside the cloak of philosophical language, the facts of the case are these: Although matter has been (which shall be hereafter fully shown) as much and as long an object of research among the learned as ever the philosopher's stone has been, Mr. Stewart and Dr. Reid were the first who pretended to have discovered it with perfect certainty, and in very large quantities, in the objects of sense; in oak-trees, for instance, and in other such things, and (what is rather remarkable, considering the length of time its existence was in doubt) constituting the chief ingredient of the tree. Every assurance, indeed, that could reasonably be

expected, these gentlemen have given of their discovery; but (strange to say) they have given no account of how they discovered it, nor have they suggested any experiment by which others may establish its existence. They have even gone so far as to say that it was too evident a portion of the tree to need any proof of it; that to them its existence seemed as manifest as that of our sensations themselves; that the thing was as large as these—as intense as these—and, indeed, that it was irreligious as well as nonsense even to talk of proving its existence. On the other side of the question, and prior to the report of these naturalists, Bishop Berkeley, who seems to have studied trees more than most people have done, and who, notwithstanding all the probabilities advanced by others, entertained from the first strong doubts as to whether any of this pellucid matter entered into the composition of an oak-tree, proceeded at last to the strictest analysis of which the subject was susceptible, and, to his amazement, after all that had been said about it for thousands of years, not only found nothing approaching to the description given of it, but even discovered that, owing to the materials of which the rest of the tree is composed, it would be physically impossible that a thing of that description should be any portion of the tree at all—to his own amazement, indeed, but to the horror and consternation of the Materialists. For what, they

ask, can be more obvious than the wickedness and irreligion of this? Is it not the same thing as saying that the whole universe is but a hoax—a mere deception? What! a tree without this sublimate of matter! and still more terrible, a whole universe without it! "Oh, my Lord Bishop," gravely exclaims the enthusiastic Materialist of the Scottish school, "reflect—reflect, I beseech you, upon the disastrous consequence of saying such a monstrous thing as this amounts to. It is a handle for wicked men. You surely do not consider what you are about. If you must think such rank nonsense, do, pray, keep it to yourself. Promulgate nothing, I implore you, so fatal to religion. Do you not see that if that substance, invisible though it be, does not exist, nothing exists? Is it not, as it were, the mind of the tree, which, if disproved, disproves all other mind whatever? Read Hume, followers of Berkeley; Hume will convince you of what I say. Besides, you unsettle men's minds. All the world acquiesce constitutionally and quietly with us philosophers as to the existence of that transparent, unknown substance in our trees, and why disturb this constitutional belief? Why unhinge their understandings? We plead guilty to having deceived people with the equivocal term 'matter.' We plead guilty to having pretended that what we spoke of was the matter that consists of feels and colours, whereas what, in fact, we were

speaking of was the matter which consists of neither, and we admit that it was by this artifice that we supplanted you in the estimation of the British public. But vengeance is not yours; and again, I say, unsettle not men's minds. All firmly believe that this pellucid matter exists; nay, we have even taught men—yes, right or wrong, we have taught men that nothing else really exists at all in trees but that; and now you tell them that this is the only thing that does not really exist in trees or in anything! What a reverie! What a wild and shocking paradox! What a shaking of man's confidence! What a subversion of his believing powers! The consequence must be, that people will leave off believing anything. Philosophy and religion must both suffer. Reflect, I once more implore you, my Lord Bishop, upon this imponderable, ethereal, and invisible thing we speak of. How simple, how inoffensive it is! Just to suppose that it is in our trees, what harm can that do? Even if it is a fraud on our part, it is a pious fraud, and ought to be respected. Reflect, I say, on this, and tremble. Tremble at the appalling consequences of saying that there is no such thing; the appalling consequences to all that is best beneath the sun, and dearest to this clinging heart of our fallen nature; most undoubted by a much doubting world, and held most sacred where most things are profaned. Reflect, my Lord Bishop, on all this, and tremble.

Tremble at thus tearing down the sanctuary of man's belief, and thus annihilating the great source of his confidence in God."

Such is the irreligious scepticism of which Berkeley is accused. Will any man of enlightened mind sympathise with this expostulation of the Materialists? Will any man not be, by it, more convinced than ever that Berkeley's doctrine is not attended with any unsettling of the mind that can have the slightest tendency to irreligious scepticism?

As to the perfect harmony which subsists between the principles of Universal Immaterialism and the Mosaic account of the creation, I need add nothing to the ample details which Berkeley himself has published on that subject. But I am unwilling to lose this opportunity of expressing my total dissent from those who (like the author of a modern work upon The Vestiges of the Creation) think that a natural history of the universe does not entail upon its author the necessity of establishing its consistency with the account of the universe afforded to us in the Pentateuch. If this were true in any case—if in any case a discrepancy were excusable, it would, I think, be so when the proposed doctrine admits, like the present, of undisputed demonstration. Yet even thus, how much more a man must be able to demonstrate respecting his doctrine than merely that it is true, before he allows it to cast its shadow on what is good! If it be pleaded that truth can

never do a good cause harm, let it be remembered that this can only hold of the whole truth, or of truth in all things, but that a mixture of truths and falsehoods can do as much harm as falsehoods alone can do—if not more—and that we cannot, in an instant, banish all falsehood from the world. Until this is done—until we have ascertained the truth of all things human, we shall act most generously towards our fellow-men by adopting the utmost caution as to what truths we mix with the errors and falsehoods that it is not in our power to remove. I at least cannot but look upon it as an important recommendation of Berkeley's doctrine, that it perfectly accords with the Mosaic account of the Creation.

IV. The fourth misrepresentation to be exposed is, that Hume adopted Berkeley's doctrine to maintain his own views, which are supposed to have been that there is no such thing as a cause of anything, and that there is no mind whatever, divine or human, in existence.

This misrepresentation has been chiefly carried on, like the third, by hints and insinuations, especially by that conveyed in the frequent combination of the names Hume and Berkeley — a combination with which every reader of Mr. Stewart's and Dr. Reid's works must be well acquainted, and the object of which may be perceived by reflecting what

would be the effect produced upon our minds by finding, in a moral treatise of some authority, a constant junction of the names "Dugald Stewart and Thomas Paine," or "the Atheists and Dr. Reid."

To show that Hume no more agreed with Berkeley as to the non-existence of matter, than Mr. Stewart or Dr. Reid did (as can easily be shown), might perhaps sufficiently answer the purpose of repelling the calumny now under consideration; but on account of the gravity and alarm with which Hume's philosophy has been received by those who only know it by the reports which confound it with his attacks upon religion, and the consequent disrepute into which everything falls that is supposed to be at all connected with it, I shall discuss this division of my subject at greater length than many will consider it requires. I shall point out what Mr. Hume's opinions really were, not only as to the existence of matter, but also as to the existence of minds, and as to the existence of causes; from which it will clearly appear, *first*, that the non-existence of minds, which Mr. Hume is said to have deduced as a corollary from Berkeley's demonstration, is, in point of fact, a conclusion at which he does not even pretend to have arrived at all, besides being one totally at variance with the said demonstration; *secondly*, that the non-existence of causes is what Mr. Hume does not deduce, and never intended to deduce, from anything; and *thirdly*,

that he was quite as much a Materialist—a bigoted, dogmatical, infatuated Materialist—as either of his countrymen, Dr. Reid or Mr. Stewart.

1. As to mind, then, Hume says that all the mind we have evidence of is a bundle of ideas, existing where these exist, and ceasing to exist where these cease; and this, he says, is true upon the same principle as that all the matter we have evidence of is a bundle of qualities. Now, I admit that Berkeley's principle respecting matter is that here stated; but what can be more evident than that ideas are not all we know of mind? and that the mind does not consist wholly of ideas in the same manner as the objects of sense consist wholly of qualities? No one idea is capable of thinking; nor do we see anything in two ideas, or in twenty ideas, if they could exist together, which makes it appear even in a slight degree reasonable to say that, after any given period of time, the twenty ideas could together create one new one. Yet all agree that there is something connected with ideas which can do this—which can think and reason—which not only can perceive the ideas presented to it from without, but can also start other ideas either connected or disconnected, at its own pleasure, from within. This is what (in common language) we call "mind," and is therefore a thing quite different from any idea, or any combination of ideas, with which it deals. Nor is it only in forming or con-

necting ideas that this thing differs from an idea, or cluster of ideas, but in being conscious of itself, and in willing. I believe all people are able to judge that no one of our ideas can be conscious of itself, or can be interested in doing anything; nor can one idea perceive another. In will, then, and consciousness, and in reasoning and perceiving, what we commonly call "mind," is a thing very different from any one, or all, of the ideas of which the witty sceptic says it is composed; whereas not in any one single point whatever is an object of sense different from the joint effect of all the qualities which distinguish it. Who will deny that all the things just now enumerated are known properties of a thing which is not an idea, nor a body of ideas? Yet who will point out a single known property of that thing (called "matter") which is said to be wrapt up and hidden in the qualities of things? and how then can the arguments which apply to matter be said, in any sense, to apply to mind? That there is this thing called "mind," with all these foregoing qualities, properties, or powers, every man is conscious; he is not only sure of it, but he can prove it; although every man may not at all hours call it by the same name. Mr. Hume, for instance, sometimes calls it "a bundle;" but never meant to say that this bundle did not will and understand, or was not conscious and inventive—nor, above all things,

did he mean to say that the said bundle did not exist. He has said the contrary over and over again. He has said that it did most really exist—that he was one himself; that, in his case, this bundle was conscious of itself, and was conscious to itself of being able to start new ideas, and possessed within it that sort of existence in which all men feel an interest. I therefore conclude that Hume did not mean to say that what is commonly called "mind" does not exist; nor does he anywhere put forward such a statement, but the very contrary in almost every page. And still less (if that were possible) does he mean to say that the same arguments which disprove the existence of pure matter, disprove the existence of this bundle also. He was not one to lose sight of the difference between an unconscious bundle of ideas and a conscious one. Mr. Dugald Stewart, indeed, might have made this confusion, and has made it, and has been led by Mr. Hume to make it; but Mr. Hume himself was very far from the regions of confusion.

And further, Berkeley's reasonings have been described by Mr. Stewart and Dr. Reid as the most accurate and demonstrative imaginable, except where they accord with Locke's essay; yet a large part of these reasonings is employed to establish the nature and to prove the existence of minds, which it is said that Hume, by the very same line of reasoning and the very same accordance with Locke's essay,

demonstratively disproves. Is it not, I ask, a glaring inconsistency to say, that what most accurately proves the existence of spirits, most accurately proves their non-existence also?

2. Hume is likewise represented to have said that things may begin to exist without a cause—that a house, for instance, may be destroyed without anything to destroy it, or a world created without anything to create it. "I believe," says Dr. Reid, "Mr. Hume was the first who ever called in question whether things that begin to exist must have a cause." This is pure misrepresentation, nor is it easy to see in what such gross and incessant misrepresentation can benefit philosophy or mankind. Hume has suggested impious thoughts enough without our thus gratuitously inventing and suggesting others for him. He has not said that things began their existence without causes. Nowhere has he said this. What he says is, that it is custom, or nature, alone which prompts us to attribute causes to effects and effects to causes; that if, for instance, fire sometimes caused cold as well as heat, and frost caused sometimes heat as well as cold, we should not consider that fire is the cause of heat, or frost the cause of cold. The word custom or experience in this argument shocks Dr. Reid. But does he mean to say, that if fire uniformly made things freeze, it would still be self-evident that fire would burn? or does Dr. Reid mean to say, that if we

never perceived a volition of our minds to cause anything, or anything of any kind to be caused by, or to cause another thing—or, in other words, if he never knew of anything that could be called a cause, and never knew of anything that could be called an effect, he would still be irresistibly compelled to believe that there are such things as effects and such things as causes? Dr. Reid cannot mean this. Yet this is all, on this point, that Hume seems to have denied; for I know not where he has asserted it as his opinion, that our world, or anything, ever began to exist without a cause. On the contrary, he acknowledges that everything connected with the world, or what is called the whole established course of nature, leads the mind irresistibly to consider that the world must have had a cause. That that cause must be something superior to the world, and to everything connected with the world, we did not require Mr. Hume to teach us. Now, that it should be, not from any supposed necessity, but from the established course of nature itself that we learn to assign a cause to nature, is so far from being an objectionable doctrine, that it would be difficult to imagine one more highly calculated to remove all irreligious uncertainty than this is; for if we may suppose the Omnipotent Spirit to intend that the feelings and intelligence of His creatures should lead them towards Him, rather than that they should be directed to Him under the influence of some blind

necessity, the obvious method of effecting this (as far as a man can judge) is to make the course of nature such, that it would be unnatural not to ascribe it to a cause. I do not mean to say that Hume inculcated this point, for his concern was not about religion; but he has left it to us to make what use we choose of it, and has not said one word that does not corroborate it. Thus, neither with regard to the non-existence of causes, nor yet with regard to the non-existence of spirits, is there the slightest ground for the report given by Dr. Reid of Hume's opinions, nor for the odium which the former sought to cast on Berkeley's reasonings, by saying that these enabled Hume to disprove the existence of all mind and of all cause. Even if Hume were an Immaterialist, it is clear that his Immaterialism never led him to either of these most preposterous conclusions, since any one who understands plain English can see that he never arrived at these conclusions at all. But,

3. I have now to show that Hume was not an Immaterialist—that he did not agree with Berkeley as to the existence of the sensible universe; on the contrary, that he was as bigoted and sneering a Materialist as either Dr. Reid or Mr. Stewart.

Berkeley had two distinct convictions: one, that the sensible universe really existed; the other, that it has no material substance in it. Now, I shall adduce passages to show that, on neither of

these points did Hume even profess to agree with Berkeley. For (inconsistent as this may appear) he thought, unlike Berkeley, that the objects of the sensible universe had no real existence of any kind, yet declares that Berkeley's arguments against matter did not succeed in convincing him, and never would convince any one. I do not mean to say that Hume had any fixed opinion on these subjects: I only mean, that what he has left us in writing does not justify any one in the assertion that he agreed with Berkeley, but reduces that assertion to a gratuitous misrepresentation.

The first point I have to establish is, that Hume denied the reality of sensible objects, or adopted what is called a universal scepticism, which fact is clearly proved by what Dr. Reid himself says in a chapter devoted to Hume's doubts. "All we would ask," says Dr. Reid, "of this kind of sceptic is, that he would be uniform and consistent, and that his practice in life do not belie his profession of scepticism with regard to the fidelity of his faculties; for the want of faith, as well as faith itself, is best shown by works. If a sceptic avoid the fire as much as those who believe it dangerous to go into it, we can hardly avoid thinking his scepticism to be feigned, and not real." (Essay VII., ch. 4.) That Hume really was sometimes of the opinion here imputed to him, that fire and other objects of sense did not exist, is corroborated by his own words: "Neither

I," says he, in his Treatise of Human Nature, "nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism has really disputed without an antagonist." It is very evident that there is here no question about invisible substances or airy nothings, but about the plain objects of sense; and it is equally evident that Hume has sometimes expressed himself (since he himself admits it) of a totally different opinion from those who looked upon the objects of sense as really existing.

The other point to be established is, that Hume continued to be a Materialist, notwithstanding all the arguments adduced upon the subject, and that, whenever he had reason to believe an object of sense existing, he also firmly believed that it had the invisible substance in it, contrary to Berkeley's demonstrations. For this purpose I need do no more than refer to the second Section in the fourth Part of his Treatise, where, in expressions too diffuse for quotation, he declares (as he repeatedly does elsewhere), that although he can give no good reason for believing the universe to exist otherwise than in sentient nature, he, nevertheless, as well as everybody else, finds himself constantly actuated by a sort of instinct to believe that it does, and cannot help so believing, notwithstanding his utmost efforts to resist the instinct. That long chapter is occupied with his reasons and those of others for this belief

in a material substance. In all which, both with respect to himself and other people, he was precisely in the same predicament of creed as Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart themselves. But the clearest and simplest fact upon this point is, that this writer has, as forcibly and as deliberately as any other, said that it is utterly impossible to yield assent to Berkeley's arguments. "They produce," says Hume, "no conviction." Nor is this all. It is not to be expected that a writer of pious principles, with any pretensions to intellectual merit, could escape the vilification of a man like Hume. Accordingly, we find that Berkeley came in for a considerable share of the scoffs and jeers of the Scottish sceptic. "Most of the writings of that very ingenious author," says Hume, in speaking of Berkeley, "form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted. He professes, however, in his title-page (and undoubtedly with great truth) to have composed his book against the sceptics, as well as against the Atheists and freethinkers. But that all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are in reality merely sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no answer, and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion which is the result of scepticism." Thus it is clear that Hume not only did not accept Berkeley's doctrine of Imma-

terialism, but even vilified and laughed at it; and that it was a gratuitous slander to accuse Berkeley of having, in this respect, obtained Hume's applause.

I have thus gone over each of the four main points in which Berkeley's doctrine has been misrepresented, and have shown that what is true respecting it, is the direct contrary of what its enemies have said of it. On the *first* point, I have shown that Berkeley not only did not deny the reality of things, but that he asserted it in the strongest and most unqualified manner. On the *second*, that his doctrine is not only not contrary to common sense, but that the present one is so, and therefore that Berkeley's doctrine (even before proof is given of it) is the more credible. On the *third* point, I have shown that it not only has no irreligious tendency, but that its tendency is more directly and unquestionably religious than that of any other human doctrine, inasmuch as it not only proves the immortality of the soul more clearly, but shows God to be nearer to us, more attentive to us, and more powerful, than any other human doctrine has done; and on the *fourth* point, I have shown, not only that Hume did not adopt it, or maintain the non-existence of minds and causes by its aid, but that he even took pains to disparage its credibility with other men, and declared it as his opinion that no one could believe it.

CHAPTER III.

THREE PRELIMINARY PROPOSITIONS.

BEFORE I proceed to state the demonstrations of Universal Immaterialism, I shall seek to conciliate the more attention to them, by first offering proof of the three following propositions—viz.,

I. That the existence of matter is not self-evident.
II. That it has not been proved, or even rendered probable, by argument.
III. That there is no necessity for any such hypothesis as that of a material substance.

The contrary of a self-evident proposition is contrary to common sense, but nothing else is so. In the section, therefore, of this work in which it has been shown that Universal Immaterialism denies nothing which it is contrary to common sense to deny, enough has, I think, been said to satisfy any impartial person that the existence of matter is not

self-evident. As, however, this is a point of very great importance, I shall here present the reader with a separate and more copious illustration of it.

But although a proposition may not be self-evident, yet the proof of it may be so. It is not, for instance, self-evident that six times six are thirty-six; yet this conclusion may be arrived at by a series of truths, each of which shall be self-evident. And although neither a proposition nor the proof of it be self-evident, yet there may be such proof of it as shall constitute moral evidence—I mean proof affording some degree of probability, whether that degree be the highest moral certainty or the very lowest presumption, or some probability between these two degrees. Although, therefore, the existence of matter is not self-evident in itself, it might be so in the proofs of it, or at least there might be probable evidence of it. The second proposition to be now considered is, that there is no evidence of it of any kind.

Further: Although a proposition be not self-evident, and although there be not even the slightest positive proof that it is true, yet it may so completely serve to account for other propositions which are known to be true, and which cannot otherwise be accounted for, as shall deter any reasonable man from regarding it as doubtful. This is the case with regard to the central position of the sun in the planetary system. This central position of the

sun is not self-evident, nor is there any demonstration of it, nor is it perhaps physically possible that there should ever be any such proof; yet, on account of the explanation which this hypothesis affords of facts which cannot otherwise be explained without absurdity, no reasonable man now entertains the slightest doubt as to the sun's occupying a central position in our planetary system. That no such plea as this can be set forth on behalf of matter, is the third of the propositions which are to be considered in this chapter.

Section I.

The first preliminary proposition, then, which I propose to prove is, "that the existence of matter is not self-evident."

Let us clearly and constantly bear in mind what philosophers understand by the term "matter" and by the term "self-evident." At the risk of being thought superfluously explicit upon the meaning of the term "matter," I shall here observe (in addition to what I have already said about it under the head of Misrepresentations), that we must distinguish broadly between two very different kinds of things, each of which is indiscriminately called "matter." One of these things consists entirely of what M. Cousin (as well as most other metaphysicians) calls the phenomena of consciousness, which phenomena are feels and colours and the qualities of feels and

colours. That which is composed of these phenomena can only, it is evident, exist within the conscious mind where its ingredients are, and is always of the same material as the feels and colours are of which it consists. This body of phenomena is one of the things called "matter," and the only kind of thing which unphilosophical people understand by that word; but it is not the kind of matter which philosophical people ever mean when they speak of matter, nor is it what is called the physical substance of the universe. What M. Cousin and the rest of the Materialists call "matter" is the thing which causes this body, or cluster, of mental phenomena—a thing, therefore, which is not made up of feels or colours, or shapes or sizes, or of any other of the phenomena which it causes, but of some unknown stuff quite distinct from all these things, yet to which all these things seem to attach themselves in an unknown manner. I say "seem," because it is admitted on all hands that the phenomena of consciousness are not really combined with the thing that excites them, but only seem to be so; inasmuch as the phenomena are within the mind, whereas that which causes them is held to be of such a nature that it cannot possibly be within the mind. When, therefore, we see the colour or the size of an object of sense, or feel its shape and hardness, we neither feel nor see the stuff which excites these phenomena in us, and to which they

seem to attach themselves, but only these phenomena themselves. The stuff itself is supposed to be of such a nature, that the keenest eye could never detect a colour in it, nor the most delicate touch ever detect the slightest feel; nay, it is such that no imaginable improvement of the microscope or any other instrument of human invention can ever enable us to discern it. It is utterly impalpable and invisible. In this respect, it is like what the mind of another person is to any one of us. We neither see nor feel it, but only things connected with it. Moreover, it does not think, nor does it feel anything, nor is it physically possible for it to be (like thoughts and feelings) within a substance that thinks and feels. There can, I apprehend, be no confusion respecting these two kinds of matter. One is compound—the other, simple; one consists of sensations and their qualities, and is believed by every one to exist—the other consists of neither of these things, nor of all of them together, nor of any parts of any kind; and it is not difficult to remember that this latter is the disputed material substance of the philosophers—the substance which is now in question, and of which the most zealous Materialist has distinctly and honestly told us, that we have, "strictly speaking, no notion of it at all," nor can hope to have with our present faculties.

Let us now attend to the meaning of the word "self-evident." When a proposition is such that

any one who merely understands the meaning of its terms, sees it at once to be physically impossible that the proposition should not be true, such a proposition is called "self-evident." That every side of an unloaded die has an equal chance of being turned up, that the whole is greater than its part, and that the tree which we see in a garden is really in the garden in which we see it, are self-evident propositions,—that is, propositions, the physical necessity of which every one can instantly perceive who has merely the degree of intelligence that is requisite to understand the terms of them. There is no alternative between supposing either that such things are not self-evident, or that the person who doubts, or disbelieves, or is slow to understand them, is deficient in the average amount of understanding and common sense. There are few, if any, who would choose to speak of such a person as a man "of uncommon penetration," or even as one possessed of the most ordinary intelligence.

The question, therefore, to be now determined is, not whether it is a decided physical impossibility that there should be a tree without a colourless and impalpable kind of something in it; for there might be this impossibility, without its being self-evident; there might be time or reasoning necessary to discover it. The question is not in this chapter as to whether matter exists or not, but as to whether its existence is or is not self-evident; as to whether the

physical impossibility of there being a tree without something transparent and impalpable wrapt up in it, is, or is not, so obvious to everybody's understanding that it requires neither time nor reasoning to discover it. For, even although it were true that there must be this sort of stuff wrapt up in the objects of sense, yet if this fact does not appear to an ordinary intellect without time and reasoning to discover it, then the existence of such stuff cannot be said to be self-evident.

It may be proper here to observe that Dr. Reid and Mr. Dugald Stewart have been the first writers to assert that the existence of matter is self-evident, to assert that not any one other fact in the whole world—not even that two and two make four—is more evident to the common reason of mankind, or more universally and instantaneously believed even by uneducated people, than it is that there must be this invisible kind of stuff existing in this imperceptible state throughout the universe. I offer the following six proofs that the existence of matter is not self-evident.

FIRST ARGUMENT.

My first argument against this self-evidence shall consist in a mere appeal, not to the feelings or habits of anybody, but to the unbiassed understanding of those who care for what is true. Will any impartial and reasonable man agree with even

as popular a writer as Mr. Dugald Stewart that the existence of this sort of transparent material in our chairs and tables is self-evident—quite as self-evident as the chairs and tables themselves are? and that even to dispute it is absurd? Or will he not be infinitely more disposed to acknowledge that perhaps there may be no such thing at all,—that, for his part, he sees no ground whatever for the supposition; and that at least the thing requires proof? Mr. Stewart and Dr. Reid and some others have, indeed, asserted that every one in his senses believes this kind of thing to be existing, and that they never found any such person among their acquaintance who did not believe it. My experience has been exactly the reverse of this. I have never found any unphilosophical person who saw the slightest reason, much less necessity, for thinking that there is anything which is, at the same time, impalpable and transparent in a table or in a chair. This notion I have found to be only peculiar to a few philosophers, and not by any means so general as to appear, from its reception, to be a self-evident proposition. I only desire that the question may be put, without concealing any part of it, to any man—educated or uneducated—not whether there is, or is not, this sort of transparent and impalpable material (for that is not the point before us), but whether it is not *self-evident* that there *is;* and I greatly suspect that the mere effect of the question

upon the countenance of the person interrogated, will abundantly prove what there is, and what there is not, self-evident in that question. It will then be seen who approaches nearest to the regions of fairy tales and reveries—George Berkeley or Dugald Stewart—he who thinks that there must be this material in every kind of object, or he who thinks that it is in none. Nor is it necessary that *every one* should think there is no such material in things; for if *only one* person with common sense doubts a proposition, then it cannot be considered as self-evident. This principle is recognised by Dr. Reid himself in the fourth chapter of his Sixth Essay upon the Intellectual Powers.

SECOND ARGUMENT.

The second proof I shall offer against the self-evidence of this impalpable material is every page which has been written by Mr. Stewart, Dr. Reid, and some others, in opposition to those who have denied it; for nothing is more clear than that no one would gravely write even one single octavo page against a man who declared he could not see that the whole is greater than its part, or undertook to demonstrate that two and two make six. Any one, even the most brilliant of the age, who disputed these self-evident propositions, would hardly have tempted one of Mr. Stewart's or Dr. Reid's genius to descend to a single written word in opposition to

him; much less to page after page, and chapter after chapter—ay, and volume after volume, of the most cautious language, and abstrusest, indeed, almost evanescent arguments. Or is it so that people ever deal even with their dearest friend, if that friend tell them that he has misgivings upon his mind as to the inequality of the whole and its part, or as to the reality of the table which they all think they see and feel before them in the room, or as to any other thing that is self-evident? My own impression is, that the man who should have the simplicity to write one solitary serious line against such a "reverie" as this disbelief about the furniture of the room, or about the whole and its part, would run a considerable risk of being looked upon in the same unfavourable light as the man who originally entertained it. As, therefore, Mr. Stewart and Dr. Reid (of whose good sense Materialists think very highly) undertook, of their own accord, to write a good deal against Berkeley, it will be allowed, I think, that this fact is abundant proof, if there were no other, that Berkeley did not (as these gentlemen so often assert) dispute a self-evident proposition, or an instinctive belief, or anything "constitutional" to the human understanding; i. e., that the existence of the translucid substance in our chairs and tables is not self-evident.

THIRD ARGUMENT.

My third proof that matter is not self-evident is, that a man of mature mind, who does not appear to have laboured under any intellectual defect, but on the contrary to have enjoyed, even among his adversaries, the highest reputation for intelligence, and to have evinced, moreover, in all his conduct an undeviating regard for truth and virtue, did, in fact, unequivocally declare that, to his apprehension of things, the existence of this matter was not self-evident, but that its non-existence admitted of the clearest proof. Berkeley has made this declaration, yet Berkeley's most unsparing adversary, Dr. Reid, has said of him: "He is acknowledged universally to have great merit as an excellent writer, and a very acute and clear reasoner on the most abstract subjects, not to speak of his virtues as a man, which were very conspicuous." "Several authors attempted to answer his arguments, but with little success, and others acknowledged that they could neither answer them nor assent to them. It is probable the Bishop made but few converts to his doctrine; but *it is certain he made some*, and *that he himself continued to the end of his life firmly persuaded* not only *of its truth*, but of its great importance for the improvement of human knowledge, and especially for the defence of religion."—(Intell. Powers, Essay II. ch. 10.) Yet this man, who was,

all acknowledge, neither a fool nor a madman, nor an idle disputant, nor a profligate Athiest—this man, of whom the talented have said that he was most talented, and to whom Pope ascribes "every virtue under heaven"—this man has deliberately acknowledged, and lived a long time acknowledging, that to him the existence of matter was not self-evident; so far from it, that to him it was its non-existence that was self-evident. There are, I think, few who will not see, in this single circumstance, clear proof—as clear proof as there can be of anything—not, of course, that Berkeley's reasonings are more correct than those of Mr. Stewart and Dr. Reid (for that is a separate question), but that they are not directed against a self-evident proposition.

FOURTH ARGUMENT.

My fourth argument against Dr. Reid's assertion, that matter is self-evident, and an argument totally distinct from the preceding, is, that Dr. Reid himself, during the earlier part of his philosophical career, did firmly and wholly believe in Berkeley's doctrine respecting the non-existence of matter, and therefore, of course, admitted that this translucid substance was not then self-evident. No writer of any note ever called the existence of matter self-evident, until Mr. Dugald Stewart and Dr. Reid, as I have before said, chose to do so. These two writers, however, often do so, and often

declare all argument about it, for it or against it, to be absurd—as absurd as it would be to argue that we had, or that we had not, heads upon our shoulders. Yet Dr. Reid has frankly told us, in his discussions about ideas (and Mr. Stewart has put this fact respecting Dr. Reid forward upon the Scottish side of the question), "If I may presume to speak my own sentiments, I once believed this doctrine of ideas so firmly, as to embrace the whole of Berkeley's system in consequence of it." Surely this is a proof that the existence of matter is not self-evident, for what he calls Berkeley's system is the non-existence of matter. Surely it cannot be fair to call that proposition "self-evident," which is so one day, and the direct contrary of it so another day, to the same full-grown intelligent man, with the same understanding of the terms in which it is conveyed. Nor is it unfair to insist that a proposition cannot be self-evident to a man of ordinary intelligence, such as A, B, or C, however well he may understand its terms, if it has not been so to a man of greater intelligence, such as Dr. Reid is supposed to be, who equally well understood the terms of it. No one can use the word self-evident in this strange way, unless he does so from that known and common weakness in human nature which leads us to regard all as self-evident that we ourselves believe. If Dr. Reid admitted that matter was not self-evident, even for one day, after his judgment

had attained maturity, is it not most clearly this same common human weakness in him, ever at a subsequent period of his life and knowledge, to call the direct contrary of that admission self-evident. I need delay at this point no longer. There are few enlightened men who will not regard this temporary acquiescence of Dr. Reid's in the non-existence of the translucid substance, not only as good grounds for considering that the existence of such matter is not self-evident, but as constituting a very strong case of argumentative dishonesty upon his part, in having, ever subsequently, sought to set up the notion that it was.

FIFTH ARGUMENT.

The fifth argument that I have to offer is, that Mr. Dugald Stewart himself, and Dr. Reid himself, and a great many of the most distinguished Materialists, have really not, even in their most infatuated moments, regarded the existence of matter as self-evident. When Dr. Reid became a convert to this invisible skeleton of the visible world, he often, it is true, used or misused the expression "self-evident" in speaking of it; but, nevertheless, in various passages he has ingenuously told us that his own private suspicion was, that it was by some "good inspiration" that he himself believed it (see Intell. Powers, Essay II. ch. 20, sec. 9), and all acknowledge that what is obtained by inspi-

ration is often, or rather always, very far from self-evident. Hume, Fichte, and Dugald Stewart have assigned a sort of faith or instinct as the grounds of all their knowledge of it. Father Malebranche, on whom Dr. Reid lavishes no small praise, said that the material world, of which he was as strenuous an advocate as Dr. Reid himself, was very far from self-evident; that, in short, it was by revelation only that he, for his part, knew of its existence, and that without revelation he, at least, should never have known anything about matter. But he certainly does not explain of what importance this revelation could be to mankind, nor does he point out any passage of Scripture in which this invisible and pellucid substance is particularly mentioned. Indeed, Dr. Reid, conscious of inspired knowledge, seems a little disposed to quiz him about his revelation; but, at all events, Malebranche did not look upon the existence of matter as self-evident. Descartes, also, another determined Materialist, and greatly admired by Dr. Reid, has roundly declared that, for his part, it was by reasoning only that he could attain to a knowledge of the imperceptible frame-work supposed to be latent in the lights and shadows of our perceptible world. In this opinion, Descartes is followed by M. Cousin, and by all the more eminent Materialists both of France and Germany. "Since the time of Descartes," says Dr. Reid, ch. 7, "philosophers

have very generally thought that the existence of external objects of sense (i. e., the *imperceptible substance* of them) requires proof." Nor ought we here, perhaps, to omit the opinion of so popular a writer as Lord Brougham upon the evidence which we have of matter. He also, although a firm Materialist, acknowledges that it is by reasoning we know of it; but differs from other Materialists of the same school, inasmuch as he considers that the arguments he finds in favour of it leave it still perfectly possible that there may be no such thing at all. A bare possibility of this is all that he admits, but he takes some pains to show that this possibility is perfect. "Indeed," says he, in his Natural Theology, "it is barely possible that all the sensations and perceptions which we have of the material world may be only ideas in our own minds: it is barely possible, therefore, that matter should have no existence." Are not these curious facts to find connected with a self-evident proposition? But quite as remarkable a fact remains. Mr. Stewart, who has insisted in as puerile a manner as Dr. Reid that a skeleton universe exists self-evident, has given us the following elaborate proof that what he insists on is not true, and that it never was thought to be so until he and his friend Dr. Reid began first to think it. "It is well known," says he, "to all who have the slightest acquaintance with the history of philosophy, that among the various topics

on which the ancient sceptics exercised their ingenuity, the question concerning the existence of the material world was always a favourite subject of disputation. Some doubts on the same point occur even in the writings of philosophers whose general leaning seems to have been to the opposite extreme of dogmatism. Plato himself has given them some countenance by hinting it as a thing not quite impossible that human life is a continued sleep, and that all our thoughts are only dreams. This scepticism (which I am inclined to think most persons have occasionally experienced in their early years) proceeds," &c. &c. (Phil. Essays, Essay II. ch. 1.) Thus there have been ancient philosophers, of all sects, who looked upon the existence of matter as anything but self-evident! Plato himself admitted that there might be none, and that the real objects of sense might very well exist as dreams do!! Nay, *most people*, at some period of their lives, experience these misgivings about matter!!! A more extraordinary account of a self-evident proposition was perhaps never before recorded. Let us imagine all this uncertainty respecting the proposition that two and two make four, or that all the sides of a die have an equal chance of being turned up, and we shall thereby be better led to see how completely all such dissension annihilates or disproves the self-evidence of a proposition.

SIXTH ARGUMENT.

One more argument to show that matter does not exist self-evident, and I have done with this absurdest part of what is all over very absurd. A whole nation, or rather all the educated people in it, are, or were, believers in Universal Immaterialism, as the following quotations from the writings of Sir William Jones place beyond all dispute. By the way, it may not be inappropriate to observe, that Mr. Stewart, in his eternal disproof of what he himself asserts, alludes to these statements of Sir William Jones as being remarkable for "great clearness and precision." "The difficulties," says Sir William, "attending the vulgar notion of Material substances, induced many of the wisest among the ancients and some of the most enlightened among the moderns, as well as the Hindoo philosophers, to believe that the whole creation was rather an energy than a work, by which the Infinite Mind, who is present at all times and in all places, *exhibits* to his creatures *a set of perceptions*, like a wonderful picture or piece of music, always varied, yet always uniform." Again: "The Vedantis, unable to form a distinct idea of brute matter independent of mind, or to conceive that the work of supreme goodness was *left a moment to itself*, imagine that the Deity is ever present to His work, and constantly *supports* a series of perceptions, which in one sense they call

illusory, though they cannot but admit the reality of all created forms, as far as the happiness of creatures can be affected by them." And again: "The word maya, or delusion, has a subtile and recondite sense in the Vedanta philosophy, where it signifies the system of perceptions, whether of secondary or of primary qualities, which the Deity was believed by Epicharmus, Plato, and many truly pious men, to raise by His omnipresent Spirit in the minds of His creatures, but which had not, in their opinion, any existence independent of mind." Nor will the following passage (also taken from Sir William Jones's writings) be inappropriate, provided it be remembered that neither Berkeley nor any one else ever denied (as some have pretended) the existence of such matter as could be felt or seen. "The fundamental tenet of the Vedanti school consisted," says Sir William, "not in denying the existence of matter—i. e., of solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure (to deny which would be lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no essence independent of mental perception; that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms; that external appearances and sensations are illusory, and would vanish into nothing, if the divine energy, which alone sustains them, were suspended but for a moment—an opinion which Epicharmus and Plato seem to have adopted, and which has been maintained in the present cen-

tury with great elegance, but with little applause, partly because it has been misunderstood, and partly because it has been misapplied by the false reasoning of some popular writers, who are said to have disbelieved in the moral attributes of God, whose omnipresence, wisdom, and goodness are the basis of the Indian philosophy. I have not sufficient evidence on the subject to profess a belief in the Doctrine of the Vedantà, which human reason alone could perhaps neither fully demonstrate nor fully disprove. But it is manifest that nothing can be further removed from impiety than a system wholly built on the purest devotion." Why, there is something even in Sir William's own language calculated to impress one with a suspicion that he himself was not a thorough-going Materialist, certainly not one of the self-evident school.

I am well aware that there are those who will still persist in calling the impalpable and invisible matter of the universe self-evident; but I maintain that to every man of an enlightened mind, any one of the six foregoing arguments will, by itself, constitute an incontestable proof of the fallacy existing in Mr. Stewart's and Dr. Reid's proposition, that the existence of this matter is self-evident,—that the belief of it is "constitutional to human nature" (in common language, "instinctive"), and founded upon some curious "ultimate law" of "natural belief" about "mathematical affections," "which

belief (adds Mr. Stewart, the inventor of these literary curiosities) is *evidently altogether independent of any exercise of our reasoning powers.*" I maintain, I say, that no man, of an enlarged and unbiassed mind, will after the foregoing proof to the contrary be imposed upon by the assertion that the existence of matter is self-evident; so far from it, that if he is not already acquainted with the writings of Mr. Dugald Stewart and Dr. Reid, who have asserted it to be so, he will be much more inclined to suspect me of misrepresenting them when I say that they assert it, than them of having made so unaccountable and ridiculous an assertion. He will reflect, that if it were self-evident, it would not have been so strongly, so often, and so long a disputed proposition. A whole nation never denied a self-evident proposition. All the educated men of a large nation never even doubted that they and all the rest of the world had their heads upon their shoulders, that two and two make four, or anything else self-evident. Does the whole history of human nature afford us an instance of even fifty men in their senses—even five men—even one man in his senses, in doubt about these things? Much less have we ever heard of a book gravely written by a man, avowedly extremely virtuous and clever, to disprove these things, or other such things as these; and why is there this universal absence of the least doubt in the one case about such things and not in

the other about matter? Simply because such things are really self-evident—simply because it is really self-evident that people have their heads upon their shoulders, but not at all self-evident that these heads are made of the invisible and impalpable kind of substance of which Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart will have it to be self-evident that they are made.

Many will, I doubt not, think that I have given more proofs than were necessary to establish my first preliminary proposition—viz., that the existence of matter is not self-evident. I have been induced to multiply these proofs for three reasons. *First*, because the stoutest advocates of matter, Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart, have said that if it were not self-evident, there would be no reason for supposing that there was such a thing at all—an opinion in which I have reason to suspect that there are many others who are ready to concur. *Secondly*, because I am firmly convinced that it is a sort of vague belief in its self-evidence, which is at the root of all that inattention upon the subject that prevails among those who are not devoted to philosophy. *Thirdly*, and principally, because it seems to me that this same sort of unexamined notion, that common sense requires us to believe it, has led to all that labouring of the modern philosophers in England, Germany, and France, to find out some other more scientific reasons for believing it; and

that this vague belief has had the effect of stimulating their exertions much more than any of the absurd and impious conclusions which Hume and others have sometimes pretended to derive from Immaterialism.

Section II.

But although the existence of a matter distinct from feels and colours is not self-evident, yet there may be such a physical impossibility of the universe going on without this matter as affords grounds for, and is detected by, a demonstration, in the strictest sense of that term; or if no demonstration of matter has been discovered, yet there may be some argument in favour of it, affording at least that probability of its existence which would justify us in believing a thing of which there is no other evidence except that probability. The second preliminary proposition, therefore, of which I have proposed to offer evidence is, that the existence of matter has not been demonstrated, nor even rendered probable by one single argument.

Mr. Dugald Stewart has neither originated, nor adduced from other writers, any one proof, or attempt at proof, in favour of it. He has gone farther. He has even declared it frivolous and absurd to attempt the proof of that existence. "The attempt of Berkeley," says he, "to disprove the existence of the material world, took its rise

from the attempt of Des Cartes, to demonstrate the truth of the contrary proposition. Both undertakings were equally unphilosophical; for to argue in favour of any of the fundamental laws of human belief, *is not less absurd* than to call them in question." "The fault of the Hindoo philosophy is, that it pronounces dogmatically on a mystery placed beyond the reach of our faculties, professing to describe the mode in which the intellectual and material worlds are connected together, and to solve the inexplicable problem, as Bacon has justly called it. *In the present state of our knowledge*, it is equally absurd to reason for it, or against it." (Phil. Essays, Essay II., ch. 1.) It could answer no purpose to add to these quotations of Mr. Stewart's own words; they sufficiently attest the absence of all argument upon the subject from his pages, beyond the mere dogmatical assertion, that "there can be no doubt of it."

Dr. Reid, although in reality he has pursued the same line of conduct in this respect as Mr. Stewart, has, nevertheless, affected to invest his opposition with a slight show of argument, by alleging, *first*, that there is no reason for disbelieving matter, except that which Berkeley has assigned; *secondly*, that Berkeley's reason for disbelieving it is entirely founded on the supposition that we can have ideas of the objects of sense; *thirdly*, that we have not, and cannot possibly have, ideas of the objects of

sense; and *fourthly*, that there is, therefore, no reason whatever for disbelieving the existence of matter. This singular argument has obtained the public acquiescence of such men as Sir David Brewster and M. Cousin.

The facts are these. Berkeley represents the objects of sense as composed wholly of sensations, combined and qualified in a certain manner. The common doctrine of ideas is, that there are ideas of sensations as well as sensations, and ideas of chairs as well as chairs; which ideas of things remain after the things themselves are annihilated or removed.

Now, if I grant (for the sake of the argument) that we have no ideas of chairs or of sensations, how does it follow from this that a chair is not composed of sensations (i. e., of feels and colours) combined and qualified in a certain manner? What imaginable connexion can so eminent a philosopher as Sir David Brewster have seen between these propositions? Ideas and sensations (in the ordinary sense of those words) are not the same things; but, on the contrary, things as different as possible. If there were no sensations, I can admit that there might be no ideas; but there can be no doubt that there are sensations, however much we may choose to imitate Dr. Reid in his scepticism about ideas. Although a mind were so imbecile as to be incapable of forming what is commonly called an idea, there

is no room for doubt as to its being still able to receive its sensations; and if its sensations existed, so could also those things exist which are composed of sensations.

All this is so plain, and the contrary of it so unintelligible, that it should have had no mention here, were it not for the distinguished men in Germany, France, and England who have been induced by their misapprehension of Immaterialism, to listen to any, even the most superficial opposition to it, when expressed in the dignified language of philosophy. Berkeley has frequently spoken of our "sensations" as "ideas," or "ideas of sense," and has shown that these sensations are the sort of things which compose the objects of the universe. Dr. Reid, losing sight of this distinction, has falsely asserted of Berkeley, that he has represented the sun and moon as ideas, in the ordinary sense of the word "idea;" and after creating this confusion between things totally different, proceeded to discover reasons for concluding that there are no such things whatever as ideas in that ordinary sense. The inference from which, under the confusion alluded to, is, that as there are no ideas, the objects of sense cannot be, as Berkeley alleged, composed of ideas, but must consist of something else. Surely, however, Sir David Brewster, as well as the rest, must see that this is to deny the existence, not of ideas only, but of sensations also. Surely he must admit

that there are ideas of sense or sensations, although there be no other ideas, and that these sensations, or ideas of sense, are all that Berkeley's argument requires or supposes.

I need dwell no longer on this very superficial argument of Dr. Reid's, which is wholly founded on the erroneous supposition that Berkeley wrote about ideas, when, in point of fact, he wrote about sensations—I need, I say, dwell no more upon this blunder, both because the slightest attention detects it, and because it is put forward as an argument merely against Berkeley's method of proving Immaterialism, and not as an argument against Immaterialism itself; a point which has strangely escaped the notice of some of the Materialists, and which shall be more fully exposed in another chapter. It is not impossible that Reid may have himself imagined that it was an argument in proof of the material substance; but that his friends did not think it so—that even those who were best acquainted with his writings, did not look upon this, or upon anything else he wrote, as even slight proof of a material substance, is abundantly attested by the following quotation from Mr. Stewart's Philosophical Essays. "Dr. Reid," says he (Essay II.), "does not follow the example of Des Cartes in attempting to confirm our belief of the existence of matter by the aid of deductive evidence. All such evidence, he justly observes, must necessarily take

for granted some principles not more certain nor more obvious than the thing to be proved." "The belief, therefore, of the existence of matter is left by Dr. Reid on the very same footing on which Des Cartes found it; open as it then was, and as it must for ever remain, to the sceptical cavils which affect equally every judgment which the human mind is capable of forming." Nothing can, therefore, be placed more out of all question than it is that Dr. Reid has not even attempted a single argument in favour of what to him appeared so self-evident. Yet, can it be doubted that if there was anything to say, he would have said something, and Mr. Stewart something, besides that deceitful self-evidence, which they alone, of all the philosophers, appear to have had the power of perceiving.

Fortunately for our present purpose, Dr. Reid has left us a few passages in which he has taken extreme pains to show us that no argument worth the least attention has been advanced even by the most zealous Materialists up to his time in favour of their theory; and these passages will also clearly show how impossible he considered it to prove by any reasoning that there is any other substance connected with the universe, except mind, that is at the same time impalpable and invisible. The quotations are from his Essays on the Intellectual Powers; and it is unnecessary to observe, that when he speaks of objects of sense, he means mere matter,

or these objects, as they would be by themselves when divested of all feel and of all colour. "They (the philosophers) were taught," says Dr. Reid, "by Des Cartes and by all that came after him, that the existence of the objects of sense is not self-evident, but requires to be proved by arguments; and although Des Cartes and many others had laboured to find arguments for this purpose, there did not appear to be that force and clearness in them which might have been expected in a matter of such importance. Mr. Norris had declared, that after all the arguments that had been offered, the existence of an external world is only probable, but by no means certain. Malebranche thought it rested upon the authority of revelation, and that the arguments drawn from reason were not perfectly conclusive. Others thought that the argument from revelation was a mere sophism," &c. "Whatever others might do, the philosophers had no title to look upon it (Berkeley's opinion) as absurd or unworthy of a fair examination. Several authors attempted to answer his arguments, but with little success, and others acknowledged that they could neither answer them nor assent to them." (Essay II. ch. 10.) "Des Cartes himself was resolved to support the existence of matter. To do this consistently with his principles, he found himself obliged to have recourse to arguments that are far-fetched and not very cogent. Sometimes he argues that our senses are given us

by God, who is no deceiver, and therefore we ought to believe their testimony. But this argument is weak; because, according to his principles, our senses testify no more but that we have certain ideas, and if we draw conclusions from this testimony which the premisses will not support, it is we who deceive ourselves. To give more force to this weak argument, he sometimes adds, that we have by nature a propensity to believe that there is an external world corresponding to our ideas. Malebranche thought that this strong propensity is not a sufficient reason for believing the existence of matter, and that it is to be received as an article of faith, not certainly discoverable by reason." "Mr. Locke acknowledges that the existence of a material world is not to be received as a first principle, nor is it demonstrable; but he offers the best arguments for it he can, and supplies the weakness of his arguments by this observation, that we have such evidence as is sufficient to direct us in pursuing the good and avoiding the ill we may receive from external things, beyond which we have no concern." (Ibid.) "Malebranche shows that the arguments brought by Des Cartes to prove the existence of a material world, though as good as any that reason could furnish, are not perfectly conclusive; and though he acknowledges with Des Cartes, that we feel a strong propensity to believe the existence of a material world, yet he thinks this is not sufficient,

and that to yield to such propensities without evidence, is to expose ourselves to perpetual delusion. He thinks, therefore, that the only convincing evidence we have of the existence of a material world, is that we are assured by revelation that God created the heavens and the earth." (Ch. 7.) "Father Malebranche agreed with Des Cartes that the existence of a material world requires proof; but being dissatisfied with Des Cartes' argument from the perfection of the Deity, thought that the only solid proof is from Divine revelation. Arnauld, who was engaged in controversy with Malebranche, approves of his antagonist in offering an argument to prove the existence of the material world, but objects to the solidity of his arguments, and offers other arguments of his own. Mr. Norris, a great admirer of Des Cartes and of Malebranche, seems to have thought all the arguments offered by them, and by Arnauld, to be weak, and confesses that we have at best only probable evidence of the existence of the material world. Mr. Locke acknowledges that the evidence we have of this point is neither intuitive nor demonstrative; yet he thinks it may be called knowledge, and distinguishes it by the name of sensitive knowledge; and, as the ground of this sensitive knowledge, he offers some weak arguments which would rather tempt one to doubt than to believe. At last Bishop Berkeley and Arthur Collier, without any knowledge of each other, as far as

appears by their writings, undertook to prove that there neither is, nor can be, a material world." (Essay VI. ch. 7.) "When it is maintained that all that we immediately perceive is only ideas or phantasms, how can we, from the existence of those phantasms, conclude the existence of an external world corresponding to them? This difficult question seems not to have occurred to the Peripatetics. Des Cartes saw the difficulty, and endeavoured to find out arguments by which, from the existence of our phantasms or ideas, we might infer the existence of external objects. The same course was followed by Malebranche, Arnauld, and Locke; but Berkeley and Hume easily refuted all their arguments, and demonstrated that there is no strength in them." (Essay III. ch. 7.)

Thus we see, upon Dr. Reid's own showing, not only that none of the writers before this time thought the matter without feels and colours a thing self-evident, but that none of them could allege even the slightest possible grounds for believing such a thing existing. Nor has any fresh argument appeared since Dr. Reid's time. All modern writers of note upon this subject admit, as Des Cartes and the rest did, that the feels and colours which *seem* to be external to the mind, even those of our own body, are really within our minds, and that the *cause* of feels and colours, which is something totally different from feels and

colours, is outside the mind, and always present outside the mind. On these points all, both Materialists and Immaterialists, are agreed, and differ only in the application of them. That there must be a cause of feels and colours, and that this cause must be something identical, permanent, and substantial, although the things it causes are not so, are two facts which I believe no one pretends to entertain the slightest doubt of. But that these two facts involve the necessity of supposing a dead cause instead of a living one—matter instead of mind—is totally the reverse of self-evident, and (as has just been seen) was admitted by all the more enlightened advocates of matter to the days of Dr. Reid as incapable of being satisfactorily or even tolerably established. How is it, then, that so many of the modern Materialists look upon this inference as self-evident—or if not self-evident, yet as calling so little for illustration or explanation as to render it unnecessary for them to offer any in their writings? I, as well as everybody else, admit the two foregoing facts to their full extent; but as these facts involve no such necessity as that alluded to, and as no one has pretended to prove even that it is not inconsistent with common sense to suppose they do, I shall only refer the reader to the passages just given, in which Dr. Reid says of M. Cousin's argument (when it was adduced by Locke), that it would " rather tempt one to doubt than to believe,"

and shall postpone to the last chapter of this work all that I desire to say further respecting the cause of colours and of feels.

I shall close this evidence that there is no proof of matter by the following quotation from the writings of Dr. Timothy Dwight, the celebrated American theologian, who died in 1817, and will scarcely be considered an incompetent or prejudiced judge of the proofs of what he himself believed:—"The existence of the very matter to which so much is attributed, and on which such reliance is placed by Atheistical philosophers, can never be evinced. I myself believe, indeed, that it exists, but I also know that its existence *cannot be proved.*"

Thus, it is quite clear that there has really been no proof, either demonstration or probability, in favour of matter, set forth by the advocates of the material theory. That Mr. Stewart and Dr. Reid should have insisted upon the self-evidence of it, and have therefore not attempted to prove it by any process of reasoning, is intelligible enough; but that those Materialists who did not look upon a physical substance as self-evident should have left us so totally in the dark—should have deliberately told us that it was not possible to give any clear or forcible argument in favour of it—in short, none that Mr. Stewart did not think "absurd,"—this cannot but be regarded as a very remarkable announcement in connexion with their doctrine;

and certainly the startling nature of the fact is very much heightened, when we reflect that every exertion of human genius, and human zeal, and human eloquence has been employed to find out and to work up one single argument. Nor is that all. Who will not wonder to hear that the only arguments adduced in the controversy, which have by all parties been pronounced "*unanswerable*," are those of Berkeley, which go to prove that matter is a "dream," "a reverie," "a wild and shocking paradox"? But I must not be tempted beyond the limits of my proposition. From what has been said, it clearly follows—all impartial men will conclude from it—that even upon the showing of the ablest and most popular advocates of matter, there exists no demonstration, nor even the slightest proof of any kind, that there is any such thing as this matter in the universe.

Section III.

But, although the existence of a matter distinct from feels and colours is not self-evident, and although there is not the slightest proof that there is such a thing, yet (as has been remarked already) the supposition of the thing's existence, although not known to be true, may so completely serve to account for other things which are known to be true, and which cannot otherwise be accounted for, as shall deter any reasonable man from regarding it

as doubtful. The third, therefore, of the preliminary propositions which are to be established is, that matter is an unnecessary hypothesis.

We call that an unnecessary hypothesis which, without involving the slightest inconsistency or absurdity, accounts for many or for all the phenomena, yet which is not by any means the only supposition which, with equal consistency, accounts for them. If the phenomena of the planetary system had no more necessary connexion with the central position which we suppose the sun to have than with any other position which we might assign to him, then this central position of the sun in our planetary system would be a mere unnecessary or gratuitous hypothesis.

Upon the same principle, although matter is neither proved nor self-evident, yet if, without involving any absurdity, it can be shown to account for all the phenomena of feels and colours, and is the only way in which we can account for these phenomena, we must regard this hypothesis (unproved though it be) as an incontestable fact, in the same way and for the same reason as we think the centrality of the sun's position incontestable. But if, on the contrary, it can be shown that the phenomena of feels and colours and their qualities really do exist when and where there is no matter to operate, then it follows that there is no need of matter to account for these phenomena at all; that is, that matter is an unnecessary hypothesis.

Let it be attentively observed that, in this place, I take it for granted both that matter could cause all the phenomena in question, and that its being supposed to do so involves no inconsistency. These points shall be fully examined in a future chapter; but at present I take them for granted, and confine myself to showing that all the phenomena of the senses are capable of existing totally independent of material substances corresponding to them; and that there is, therefore, no necessity for supposing, on their account, any such material corresponding substances.

I shall adduce three distinct arguments to prove this.

1. The first of these is derived from the following words of Mr. Dugald Stewart, who calls extension and figure "the mathematical affections of matter." "The notion," says he, "of the mathematical affections of matter presupposes the exercise of our external senses, inasmuch as it is suggested to us by the same sensations which convey the knowledge of its primary qualities."—(Phil. Essay II., ch. 2.)

We have here Mr. Dugald Stewart making the admission, that it is *from our sensations only* that we acquire our notion of extension, figure, movement, and all the other qualities called "primary." Dr. Reid also makes the same admission in his "Enquiry," (ch. 5,) and elsewhere. "No man," says he, in one passage, "can conceive any sensation to resemble any known quality of bodies, (i. e. of matter,)

nor can any man show, by any good argument, that *all* our sensations might not have been *as they are*, though no body, or quality of body, had ever existed." But not here only. He often and distinctly acknowledges, that without our sensations we should have no notion of the qualities in question, but that with our sensations we have a notion of them. And that the case is so, every one may easily satisfy himself. I should have no notion of the movement of a bird flying past me, if the bird were colourless, and therefore invisible, nor of the size of a table in the dark, if the table had no feel. It is, therefore, not only granted by the Materialist, but also in itself is very evident, that it is to our sensations alone (i.e., to feels and colours) that we are indebted for our knowledge of the primary qualities. What, then, can be more obvious than it is that, if it is our sensations that suggest these qualities to us, or, in other words, excite our perception of these qualities, these qualities themselves must be apparent in our sensations? How else is it possible that the mere contemplation of our sensations should give rise to the notion of these primary qualities? They are clearly, therefore, the concomitants of the sensations we call feels and colours — so intimately and constantly their concomitants, that the sensations and the qualities reciprocally qualify and are qualified by one another. A colour there cannot be unless it is extended, nor

can there be extension unless there be a feel or a colour created to depict it.

Since, therefore, shape and size are inherent in our sensations, and the notions of shape and size are suggested to us by our sensations, what need can there be of matter to suggest them? It has been justly observed, that there would be no shape and size, nor any notion of these things if there was not some peculiar kind of thing for them to be in, and for the notion of them to be suggested by; and it is sometimes pretended that this fact renders it absolutely necessary for us to suppose an unknown substance for these primary qualities to exist in, and for the notions of them to be suggested by. But why suppose this *unknown* substance? What can be more satisfactory than to have feels and colours for that purpose? Feels and colours suggest (as all admit) the notion of shape and size. Feels and colours are therefore clearly a sort of thing in which shape and size can be—not less perfectly, and perhaps rather more intelligibly, than in anything else which is not feels and colours. The plea, therefore, that matter is an hypothesis which is rendered necessary by the physical impossibility that shape and size should exist without matter, or that the notions of shape and size should be suggested without matter, is here shown evidently to be without the least foundation, even upon the principles laid down by the Materialists themselves. But since the shapes and sizes of things

do not involve the necessity of supposing a material substance of any kind outside our sensations and sentient nature, for these things to be placed in, and since it is admitted that no other phenomena do so, so much as these, none of the phenomena, therefore, connected with our sensations make the hypothesis of matter necessary to account for these phenomena.

2. The second proof that there is nothing in the shapes and sizes of things, which makes it necessary to suppose that these qualities cannot subsist without portions of an unknown substance adapted to them, and present where they are, is, that in a mirror we have the shapes and sizes of several objects, yet in a mirror there are no portions of a material substance corresponding to the lines and angles by which these qualities of objects are there marked out in colours. It will perhaps be superficially objected, that the objects alluded to are not real objects. I admit this: but the question does not regard the objects, but the qualities of the objects; and I assert that the shape of an object in a mirror is as real, and its movement as real, and its size as real, and its colour as real, as the shape, size, movement, or colour of the real coloured object. Is it not, then, perfectly evident that the lines and angles by which shape, size, and movement are marked out in colours to the eye, may, as far as these lines and angles are concerned, subsist very well in real bodies without a material substance in various compartments cor-

responding to these lines and angles? I mean, by real bodies, the objects we feel as well as see. Is it not very clear from this experiment, that the independent presence of these coloured qualities within the mirror, proves that there is no necessity whatever for the supposition that their presence in real bodies is dependent in any way upon the simultaneous presence of some material substance corresponding to them? If it could have been the intention of a Creator to establish this fact by the most unquestionable evidence possible in the course of nature, is it possible to conceive more unquestionable evidence of the fact than a mirror or a lake supplies?

If we could find a case or experiment, equally clear and simple, to show that the shape and size, which we feel, were as independent of everything except feel, as the shape and size which we see are independent of everything except colour, there would, I think, be an end to all pretext for the hypothesis of a material substance. Any one who reflects upon this point will admit, of how much importance such an experiment would be to this subject. But although there is nothing that can counterfeit mere feels as satisfactorily as the mirror counterfeits mere colours, yet when we reflect that a feel is quite as much a thing in the mind as colour is, and a thing to the full as independent of anything like matter as colour is, it is quite clear that whatever proves to our satisfaction that the

shape and size which are in colours do not require the presence of a material substance corresponding to them, proves with equal clearness, though by a process one step longer, that the shape and size which are in feels do not require the presence of a material substance in pieces corresponding to them, nor of any other thing but of feels only. For colour and feel are both sensations, and therefore bear both of them the same relation to matter,—that is, subsist both of them apart from, and independent of it; so that the shape and size of one sensation can, under no pretext, be supposed to bear a relation to matter, more close than, or different from, the relation borne to matter by the shape and size of the other sensation. I do not here pretend to fix what that relation is between matter and sensation. I only affirm what has never yet been disputed,—that this relation is the same between feel and matter, as between colour and matter; and therefore the same between matter and the things of feel, as between matter and the things of colour; between it and the shape and size of feels, as between it and the shape and size of colours. But it has been shown (in the case of the mirror) that the phenomena which qualify colour, involve no necessity for the hypothesis of a matter corresponding to them; neither, therefore, do the phenomena of feel involve the necessity of this hypothesis. And as there are no other shapes and sizes of things which are supposed to be de-

pendent upon matter, except those of which the notion is suggested by colours, and those of which the notion is suggested by feels; and as it has been shown that the shapes and sizes of both these descriptions are really not dependent upon matter for their subsistence, it therefore follows, that as far as the subsistence of these qualities is concerned, matter is by no means an indispensable hypothesis.

3. The third proof that matter is not requisite for the support even of those qualities which are said to require it the most, consists in the fact, so familiar to almost every one of us, that there is no sort of sensible object (i. e., no sort of sensation, or quality of sensation, or combination of these things) in our waking hours which we have not in our dreams; that we have them in our dreams without the aid of any kind of matter, and that therefore we may have them in our waking hours without it. This fact, which has been looked upon by many as most clearly indicating the way in which all the phenomena of the universe, its shapes and sizes, as well as its feels and colours, might be worked up simultaneously within our minds without the agency of matter, has been objected to by others upon the same ground as that alleged for rejecting the evidence afforded by the mirror—viz., that the objects of our dreams are not real objects. But although the man we dream of is not the real man, may not his extension, as it is called, be the same

as the extension of the real man? and when he moves, does the movement in a dream differ in any one imaginable point from the movement in real life, except that the one occurs in real life, and the other in a dream? The only really argumentative objection which I have met with to this reason for not thinking matter necessary is, that in some superficial remarks of Mr. Dugald Stewart's upon Immaterialism, he seems to deny that, when we are awake, we retain any notion of the shapes or sizes of the things we have been dreaming of; for he says, that whenever we have a notion of the shape or size of anything, we cannot help believing that that thing exists totally separated from and external to our minds. "This notion (of extension and figure) involves" (these are Mr. Stewart's own words) "an irresistible conviction, on our part, not only of the external existence of its objects, but of their necessary and eternal existence." (Phil. Essay II. ch. 2.) On this objection to the argument derived from dreams, I shall only observe, *first*, that if the notion of a thing's shape or size involves this, it involves an irresistible error, together with a considerable degree of impiety, in supposing that the Deity cannot annihilate what he has created; *secondly*, that this objection (as many others of the same writer) leads one to think that the externality he speaks of is externality to our bodies, whereas the externality in question is externality to our

minds; and *thirdly*, that the thing which seems to be alleged is so evidently contrary to the experience of every one who dreams, that it is unnecessary to discuss it. Any one with a capacity for metaphysical subjects will see and admit, that whatever phenomena subsist within the mind in our waking hours, may equally well subsist in it in our dreams; and that the superior force and vividness of such things in our waking hours are abundantly accounted for by the superiority of the power which then produces them. The inference is the same as in the two preceding arguments—viz., not (as an inattentive reader might suppose) that it is utterly impossible for matter to be in our universe, but that it is quite unnecessary to suppose that there is any such thing—quite unnecessary to suppose that the shapes and sizes, feels and colours of our bodies and of other things would not subsist at all, or would not hold together, if there were not matter of some kind connected with these qualities. This is the third of the introductory propositions which I undertook to establish for the purpose of conciliating the more attention to the demonstrations of Immaterialism; for who will refuse attention to the demonstrations of a doctrine which neither is evidently false nor has been proved false, and which is not at variance with any of the phenomena that require to be accounted for?

CHAPTER IV.

A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DEMONSTRATION BERKELEY USED, AND OF THE OBJECTIONS PREFERRED AGAINST HIS PREMISSES.

THE only demonstration with which Berkeley controverted the existence of a material substance, and the sceptical notions connected with a material substance, is the following:—

All the objects which we perceive by the senses are merely masses of sensations. The only substance in which such things can subsist is a perceiving substance; because, when such things are not perceived, they cannot subsist at all; therefore there can be no dead unperceiving substance for such things to subsist in or to be united with.

If any one thinks that our sensations, (i. e., colours, feels, smells, tastes, and sounds,) which can only be in our minds, are like other things which are outside all minds, and that these other things require the unperceiving substance for them to subsist in, he can easily satisfy himself that he is mis-

taken, since a sensation cannot be like anything but another sensation, and no sensation can have place in an unperceiving substance and outside all mind.

Or if any one thinks that although our sensations do not require an unperceiving substance, extension and figure (which are evidently not sensations) may exist outside mind, and may, therefore, require this unperceived and unperceiving substance to inhere in, such a person can also easily satisfy himself that he is mistaken; for the extension and figure of objects are (it is admitted) perceived things, and nothing that is perceived can be perceived independently of all mind, or (in other words) outside all mind; therefore, these perceived things exist (wherever they are) in a perceiving substance, and do not, therefore, necessitate the existence of an unperceiving one.

But another reflection which may satisfy any one of his mistake on that point is, that as the extension and figure of an object are manifestly qualities inherent in, and delineated by the sensations of that object, this extension and figure must therefore exist, with the sensations, in the sentient or perceiving substance.

A third reflection, which may show us that extension and figure are not in an unperceived and unperceiving substance is, that if such a substance existed, it must be distinctly separate from the perceiving one or mind, and that, in this case, the

extension and figure would also be distinctly separated from the colours and other sensations connected with the object; whereas, every man's experience convinces him that the extension and figure of every object is in the very same position, and at the very same distance from him, as its colours and its feels are.

There is, therefore, (concluded Berkeley) in the nature of things, no reason whatever for supposing that there is an unperceived and unperceiving substance in our universe.

I have, in a former section, explained that there has never been offered any proof *for* the existence of a material substance. I shall now speak of the little that has been said in opposition to this argument of Berkeley *against* the existence of such a substance.

The only way in which this reasoning has been assailed is by that flourish of sophistry which may be called the *argumentum ad ignorantiam*, and which relies for its plausibility wholly upon the ignorance or inattention of those who listen to it;—an argument very much the same as though one should say that the Copernican system cannot be true as there is a river in the moon—a fact which, singularly enough, escaped the telescopes of Copernicus. This is the only course which has been hitherto pursued against Berkeley. Not one of his adversaries denies any one of his premisses. Not

one of them accepts his conclusion. Yet not one of them denies that it is fairly and logically drawn. In this state of things, half perplexed and half ashamed, they have said everything at random that they thought at all calculated to make the world disbelieve those very premisses which each of them felt conscious it was not in his power to disprove; and for this purpose each brings a separate nostrum.

1. One writer says that the fundamental error of Berkeley's system was its contradiction of our constitutional belief in the externality of space.

2. Another, that he totally overlooked our irresistible belief in the existence of things when they are unperceived.

3. Another insinuates that the flaw in his reasoning is the supposing that visible extension is perceived simultaneously with the colour that delineates it.

4. Another, that he does not seem to have been aware that the mind is active in sensation.

5. Another says, that if by the senses we perceived nothing but sensations, Berkeley's argument would have been well founded.

6. And another, that he evidently mistook states of mind for ideas.

This is the sum of all that has been levelled against Berkeley's reasonings, and few will fail to observe, of themselves, the argumentum ad igno-

rantiam in all these cases. I shall, however, point it out in each case successively.

1. And, first, with respect to the externality of space; what externality is meant? externality to what? The only externality of space that Berkeley denied was its externality to all mind—a sort of externality that very few people think about at all, or even know the meaning of, much less perceive by the senses. The sort of externality that people "constitutionally" believe space to have, is externality to our bodies, and this externality Berkeley did not deny. He believed, as much as any one, that there is a good deal of space between our bodies and the fixed stars; and that there is double as much of it between the fixed stars on one side of our globe and those on the other; and that, in short, we can prescribe no limits to all the external space of this kind that there may be in nature. Now this is the only externality of space that our "constitution" leads us to believe, and Berkeley has nowhere denied or disputed anything so obvious. If Mr. Dugald Stewart meant to say that spirits require space to subsist in as well as bodies do, I cannot say that this seems to me at all a constitutional belief, or a notion which it is at all possible for a reasonable person to accede to. Thus the externality of space which Berkeley denied, is not at all that externality which we all find ourselves believing; but even if it were this, and if he had established the point upon the

same intuitive premisses as that upon which he has established the non-existence of matter, there are, I suspect, no men of science and understanding who would not conclude with him upon this point, notwithstanding its contradiction of our constitutional belief, as well as they agree with Sir Isaac Newton, in those principles of refraction which leave no doubt that the sun is *not* above our horizon when we first *see* him with our eyes to be above it, in the morning. I speak, however, of a case which does not exist; for Mr. Dugald Stewart knew very well (when he asserted the contrary,) that Berkeley did not deny that externality of space which we all believe.

2. Then with regard to the second point, is it true to say that Berkeley was the person who established the principle by which it is clear that the things which we perceive do not exist when they are unperceived? This assertion has been made by a modern writer, whose fairness in other respects entitles him to some attention, and for this reason I notice a statement which I should have imagined any enlightened man would have felt the injustice of making against Berkeley. It is asserted by this writer, that the things which we perceive are independent of any percipient. What! Is it pretended by this gentleman, that the colour which we perceive exists when it is unperceived? Or that the tastes which we perceive—the smells—the sounds —the feels which we perceive—is it pretended that

these things are not sensations, or that, being sensations, they can exist unperceived? I shall not do any man's understanding or scientific knowledge so much injustice as to suppose him ignorant of such things. The writer I allude to well knew, that, however irresistible our belief may be that colours exist when we do not perceive them, they nevertheless do not exist, and cannot from their nature exist, when unperceived. He knew the same of feels, sounds, tastes, and smells. Then why should he commit an act of such flagrant unfairness towards Berkeley as to say that it was Berkeley's doctrine that contradicted our irresistible belief on this point. Had the thing not been done before Berkeley's time? and what had Berkeley to do with the doing of it? But the belief that colours, for instance, exist independently of being perceived, is called "irresistible," "obvious," "universal." Now, it appears to me that there is also in these words a most unwarrantable concealment of facts. Ten thousand men—at the lowest computation—ten thousand of the most enlightened men in the world, do not believe, and say they do not believe, that colours can exist independently of a percipient. Upon what pretext, then, can such a belief be called irresistible, obvious, or universal? No, no; it is not true nor honest to say of Berkeley's doctrine, that it lays down any new principle respecting those colours and feels, of whose existence, when they are unperceived, we

have the same sort of irresistible belief as we have that it is the sun and not the earth that moves to make our day and night. This irresistible belief is now discovered, and has long been discovered to be an error in both cases; and Berkeley might as well be condemned for founding a doctrine upon the Copernican System, as for founding one upon the sensational nature of colours. I admit, indeed, that Berkeley has denied that there are colourless and impalpable skeletons of chairs and tables remaining in a room, when the coloured and palpable chairs and tables are no longer perceived in it; and I admit that he has totally overlooked people's irresistible belief in the existence of such skeletons. But whose irresistible belief, I ask, is this? Is it true to say that any one believes in the existence of such things except the most infatuated Materialists? Is it true to say that even the most infatuated Materialist has an irresistible belief in them? Colourless and impalpable skeletons of things! Even if it is not nonsense to talk of such things, (and I suspect most people will have an irresistible belief that it is,) I think it can hardly be pretended, by any conscientious advocate of the material theory, that all men have an irresistible belief in such things, and an irresistible objection to any doctrine that denies the existence of them.

3. Berkeley has nowhere said that the perception of an object's size is *simultaneous* with the per-

ception of its colour; and I think there is very little room for doubt that it is not, but that it is *gradually* acquired as we acquire the perception of size in feels. If, however, he had said that extension and colour were simultaneously perceived, what proposition of his premisses could this affect? Is not the colour just as much characterized and limited and qualified by the extension in the one case as in the other? Or is it reasonable to say, that in any case the extent of the colour may be greater or less than the colour itself is? Thus, even if this fact had escaped the penetration of Berkeley (as his adversaries express it), it is quite clear to any one who reflects about it, that it does not in the least disturb his reasonings, but, on the contrary, even assists to illustrate the manner in which feels (or tangible minimums) give magnitude, and are, collectively, qualified by it.

4. That the mind is active in sensation is another of the wild and random statements put forth in the hope of casting uncertainty upon Berkeley's premisses. Who has ever felt that he had the power of perceiving a chair by any amount of mental activity he might exert, unless there was really a chair present, which (when he looked at it) compelled him to perceive it whether he would or not? I deny that the mind acts in the excitement of its own sensations, and I admit that Berkeley has denied it also. But even if it were active on these

occasions, how would that prevent the sensations from being sensations, and the objects they compose from existing in a perceiving substance? What need would there be of an unperceiving substance for our sensations in the one case more than in the other? This is perhaps one of the boldest instances on record of the argumentum ad ignorantiam. The thing asserted is itself glaringly false, and its connexion with Berkeley's premisses is glaringly false also.

5. One of Dr. Reid's favourite arguments against Berkeley was, that the difference between extension and a sensation had totally escaped the bishop. "If all that the senses present to the mind (said Dr. Reid) is sensations, Berkeley must be right—but Berkeley assumed this premiss without any foundation or any proof of it. The size and shape of things are presented to us by our senses, yet every one knows that size and shape are not sensations." Dr. Reid advances this argumentum ad ignorantiam with great emphasis, in his inquiry into the Human Mind. "This I would therefore humbly propose as an *experimentum crucis* by which the ideal system must stand or fall; and it brings the matter to a short issue. Extension, figure, and motion may, any one or all of them, be taken for the subject of this experiment. Either they are ideas of sensation, or they are not. If any one of them can be shown to be an idea of sensation, or to

have the least resemblance to any sensation, I lay my hand upon my mouth, and give up all pretence to reconcile reason to common sense in this matter, and must suffer the ideal scepticism to triumph." Now, nowhere has Berkeley denied that by our senses we have more than mere sensations. Nowhere has he denied that we have extension, figure, and motion by our senses. Nowhere has he said that extension, figure, and motion are sensations, or things bearing the least resemblance to sensations. Nowhere has he denied—nowhere has he not openly acknowledged—that our sensations had qualities inherent in them; that these qualities themselves were not sensations; and that extension, figure, and motion were some of these qualities. He has neither said the contrary of this, nor anything that could possibly ever be mistaken for the contrary of it. Of what service, I ask, can it be to the material scepticism or to the cause of common sense (which is always the cause of justice) that Dr. Reid should impute this extravagance to Berkeley, well knowing, as he did, the falsehood of such an imputation? Berkeley reasoned with a full knowledge that the size of an object is no sensation. It is, notwithstanding this difference—this utter dissimilarity between size and a sensation, that Berkeley's reasonings have been pronounced unanswerable. And certainly there is nothing in this difference to shake these reasonings. What Dr.

Reid seems to have intended to insinuate is, that as extension inheres (as a quality) in our sensations which are unperceiving things that we perceive, it must also inhere in an unperceiving substance that we cannot perceive. But every one may see the *non sequitur* in this. The brilliancy which characterizes the colour that we perceive, could not, it is evident, characterize anything whatever that we could not perceive. Then as to the pretence set up in the foregoing passage, that Berkeley's reasonings are more at variance with common sense than Dr. Reid's own reasonings are, and that the ideal scepticism (as he calls Berkeley's doctrine) is more at variance with the reality of what we see and feel than the material scepticism of Dr. Reid can be said to be, I believe the hour is at hand in which all men will see, with scorn, the audacious sophistry of such pretensions.

6. Another of Dr. Reid's arguments against Berkeley—indeed, his main argument, and in which he had also the support of Mr. Dugald Stewart—is, that we have no ideas of things—that what Berkeley thought to be ideas of things are only states or conditions of the very mind in which the said ideas were supposed to be,—and that, therefore, Berkeley's doctrine was founded upon an erroneous supposition. I shall not here enter into the question whether the states and operations of the mind are, or are not, to be considered identical with what we

call its ideas. I shall confine myself to showing, that even if it was as Dr. Reid and Mr. Dugald Stewart supposed—even if these things really were identical, the disproof of a material substance would be equally easy—nay, might still stand in the very same form in which Berkeley arranged it. But as Dr. Reid's own language on this point is too evasive for argument, I shall here cite the more explicit language of his disciple and interpreter, Dr. Thomas Brown. "Our ideas (says Dr. Brown, speaking of Berkeley) he evidently considered, not as states of the individual mind, but as separate things existing in it, and capable of existing in other minds, but in them alone; and it is in consequence of these assumptions that his system, if it were to be considered as a system of scepticism, is chiefly defective. But having, as he supposed, these ideas, and conceiving that they did not perish when they ceased to exist in his mind, since the same ideas recurred at intervals, he deduced, from the necessity which there seemed for some omnipresent mind in which they might exist during the intervals of recurrence, the necessary existence of the Deity; and if, indeed, as he supposed, ideas be something different from the mind itself, recurring only at intervals to created minds, and incapable of existing but in mind, the demonstration of some infinite, omnipresent mind in which they exist during these intervals of recurrence to finite minds, must be

allowed to be perfect. The whole force of the pious demonstration, therefore, which Berkeley flattered himself with having urged irresistibly, is completely obviated by the simple denial that ideas are anything more than the mind itself affected in a certain manner; since, in this case, our ideas exist no longer than our mind is affected in that particular manner which constitutes each particular idea; and to say that our ideas exist in the Divine mind would thus be to say that our mind itself exists in the Divine mind. There is not the sensation of colour in addition to the mind, nor the sensation of fragrance in addition to the mind; but the sensation of colour is the mind existing in a certain state, and the sensation of fragrance is the mind existing in a different state."

From this passage, it is clear that these philosophers have fallen into the continental error of looking upon our ideas as mere states or forms of the mind; and they have the candour to acknowledge that our sensations are to be considered in the same predicament as our ideas—that they also are mere states or modifications of the mind. Now, I am here at liberty to take Dr. Brown at his word, when he says that our ideas and sensations are nothing more nor less than our minds themselves in particular conditions, and I shall examine the argument against Berkeley in this sense of Dr. Brown's words. But, as a very singular consequence results

from this sense of them, and one which it is hard to believe his predecessors, Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart, ever dreamed of (however near they went to it), I shall also consider the argument with reference to the fact, that the state of a thing is by no means identical with the thing itself, and that, however much our sensations and ideas might be states of our minds, it does not at all follow that they must be the thing in us which thinks and feels. It is probable, I say, that Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart did not mean this. It is probable they did not mean to insist on more than that our ideas and sensations are only states or forms, which our minds are made to assume. I shall therefore dispose, first of this interpretation of the argument against Berkeley, and then deal with the other, which is more peculiarly Dr. Brown's.

If, then, ideas and sensations be taken to mean states of the mind (which I admit is not the meaning Berkeley attached to those words), is it not quite reasonable to say that a state of the mind can never exist except in *some* mind, and can never be like anything except a state of the same or of some other mind; that all we perceive by sense in the universe are these states of mind, and the qualities by which they are modified—and that it is repugnant to common sense to suppose that either these states or their qualities can inhere in or have anything whatever to do with a substance that is

equally unperceiving and unperceived. This is what Berkeley said of ideas, and it is all he said of them. In either form of expression, the conclusion is irresistible—a dead, unconscious, physical substratum or cause, unperceived and unperceiving, is a thing that no amount of mental states could ever attest the presence of.

This brought Berkeley in collision with two sets of objectors. One argued thus: Nothing is more certain than that the things which we call sensible objects continue to exist when they are present to no one, which could not be the case if these sensible objects were wholly states of mind. They must, therefore, have something more permanent in them than a mere state of mind can be. In reply to which Berkeley said: If this is so certain, all that it proves is, that our states of mind must have their archetypes in some omnipresent and omnipotent mind, where they continually exist; but it by no means proves (as is intended to be insinuated), either that the sensible objects which we perceive are anything else but states of mind, or that a state of mind can exist independent of all mind. I am not aware that any one has attempted to reason against Berkeley upon this point, yet Dr. Reid and his successors have persisted in dogmatically asserting, contrary to common sense, that nevertheless there is—there must be something dead which has states of mind in it—something in which states of

mind or things like states of mind may permanently abide.

The other class of objectors said: We admit that it is contrary to common sense to suppose a dead physical substratum which has states of mind associated with it, and abiding in it permanently or not permanently, but this does not hinder that there should be a dead physical substance to cause our states of mind. We therefore conclude that there must be this dead physical substance in an unperceived state; for if there were not, how is it that our states of mind are so steadily and regularly and universally excited? No mind, however powerful, however omnipresent, could ever produce in other minds such a steady, minute, and universal effect as this is.

I think (replied Berkeley) that it could. I think that it is a much more reasonable thing to attribute our states of mind and the changes in them to something living than to something dead; especially as we have no knowledge of anything except minds and states of mind, nor therefore of anything dead except states of mind, I think it is much more reasonable to attribute this effect to mind than to its states, since these could not with any reason be preferred to mind as a cause for anything either dead or living. This is my private opinion (said Berkeley), and I think that any one who is not cheated out of his common sense will admit that it

is utterly inconceivable how a state of mind should be supposed (without prejudice) a more efficient agent than a mind; but this is not the point at issue. All that I undertook to prove is the absence of a material substratum from the objects of our universe; and I have proved this.

Thus the expedient adopted by Dr. Reid and Mr. Dugald Stewart of substituting states of mind for ideas, leaves Berkeley's argument precisely in its original position; perhaps even a little clearer than before. There is, however, an objection to regarding our ideas as states of mind, which will, I think, deter all exact psychologists from doing so. For let us reflect for an instant on the difference between a state of the mind and a sensation, in the ordinary acceptation of this term. A sensation is not supposed to qualify the mind in connexion with which it exists, whereas a state of mind is considered to do this. The sensation purple, for instance, does not make the mind purple, but the state of mind called purple would assuredly produce this effect. I suspect that this reflection alone will render most people dissatisfied with Dr. Reid's expedient, and tempt them to reconsider it.

The next point of view in which this Scottish argument requires to be exhibited, is according to Dr. Brown's notion. The mind, he says, and the state of the mind, are not two things, but one and the same thing. A blue colour is not an affection of

the mind but the mind itself; so that, if that colour has a round form, it is the mind that is round; if a square one, it is the mind that is square, &c. By this doctrine, smell is mind — taste, mind— sound, mind—everything that we see or feel is our mind,—in a word, the whole sensible universe is our mind. This is the theory, by the aid of which Dr. Brown hopes to upset Berkeley. "The whole force," says he, "of the pious demonstration, therefore, which Berkeley flattered himself with having urged irresistibly, is completely obviated by the simple denial that ideas are anything more than the mind itself affected in a certain manner;" and to make these words more clear, he afterwards adds, in the passage already quoted — "There is not the sensation of colour in addition to the mind, nor the sensation of fragrance in addition to the mind, but *the sensation of colour is the mind* existing in a certain state, and *the sensation of fragrance is the mind* existing in a different state." Now, I do think that in these enlightened days it will appear to most people that the mere statement of such a notion is sufficient refutation of it, and that very few people in England will think such a notion capable of disproving anything. That upon the sight of a tea-pot, my thinking and perceiving principle becomes converted into that shaped and coloured object which we call a tea-pot, is a notion of so astounding a nature, that people will naturally enough inquire

what could induce Dr. Brown to adopt it; and when they are told—when he himself tells them, that he was induced to adopt this strange notion from his wish to refute Berkeley more effectually than his predecessors had done, or (as he expresses it) to obviate completely Berkeley's pious demonstration, they will, with great justice, suspect that there must be very little indeed to be said against that pious demonstration, if it requires such a straining of common sense to refute it.

But let us see what refutation Dr. Brown's views really afford, of what Berkeley sought to demonstrate. Dr. Brown says, that the colour of an object does not exist in addition to the mind, but is the mind itself, existing in a certain state. Let us for a moment grant him this extraordinary assertion. He says the same of its feels. Let us grant him this also. He says the same of its smell. Granted. The same of its taste. Granted. The same of any sound emitted from it. Granted. Thus, if I take a rose in my hand, its feels, smell, and colours (as well as any taste or sound connected with it) are all things, each of which is identical with my mind; so that its colour can think, its smell can think, its feel can think. Now, in what part of all this is the material substance? or what in all this proves its existence anywhere, since Dr. Brown admits that it bears no resemblance to my mind, and, therefore, none to colour, to feel, or to smell,

which are but mind? Where, I ask, is the material substance of the rose situated? Dr. Brown says it is in the rose. Now, if there be any meaning in this, does it not mean that the material substance is in the midst of the colour, within the very precincts of it? But the colour, Dr. Brown tells us, is the mind. The material substance is therefore within the very precincts of the mind; which is impossible, as it is admitted on all hands to be physically impossible, and contrary to the nature of things, that matter should be, in any sense, or at any time, in mind.

Thus it appears that even this bold hypothesis of Dr. Brown's does not afford a particle of proof in favour of a material substance anywhere; nay, is moreover manifestly inconsistent with the presence of such a thing within the rose, or any other object of sense; and this is the second interpretation of Dr. Brown's words that we had to consider. Now when we reflect that the whole point for which Berkeley contended was the non-existence of a material or physical substance in the objects of sense, it cannot fail to excite the utmost astonishment in all reasonable minds, that the Scottish school of metaphysicians should have called upon the world to consider that there was a complete refutation of this point in such assertions and hypotheses as these.

Before I leave this extract from Dr. Brown's

writings, I wish to point out an illustration or two of the hostile and misguiding spirit in which he speaks of Berkeley. In the words above given, he insinuates that Berkeley founded his doctrine on "assumptions," and not on reasoning;—but let it be observed that what Dr. Brown designates an assumption is Berkeley's having said that sensations (whether they are states of mind or not) can only exist in minds. I admit that Berkeley assumed this, and offered no proof of it; but this arose from the fact that nobody requires proof of it, or thinks it possible for a sensation (whatever kind of thing it is) to exist in anything else except in mind. When Dr. Brown was condemning such an assumption as this, he must have hoped that the precise thing he was condemning would escape detection.

In the same part of the passage, he seems to have taken it into his head that Berkeley pretended to "a system of scepticism," and accordingly inveighs against this supposed system of scepticism as being in sundry respects a defective one, especially in consequence of the foregoing assumption being part of it. Now, there is no use in gainsaying this. Berkeley's doctrine is anything in the world but a good system of scepticism. It is lamentably deficient in all that ought to characterize a sceptical system; and assuredly his not doubting (when he might have doubted it) whether sensations may not

exist independent of all mind, was a great inadvertence upon his part in the construction of this sceptical system, if he really wanted to construct one. Besides, what he has written consists wholly of a series of truisms, and an irresistible inference from them, without a single hypothesis or conjecture in any part of it. A very bad system of scepticism no doubt. But pray, Dr. Brown, what makes you think that Berkeley wanted to construct a system of scepticism? Was this an honest assumption upon your part? What should you think of any one's stating publicly that your "Lectures," considered as a system of immorality, were in many respects defective? Should you consider this fair dealing?

Another illustration of this unfair and unfriendly —ay, and unphilosophical spirit, is to be found in Dr. Brown's misrepresentation of the proposition which Berkeley undertook to demonstrate. That proposition is, that we have no reason for supposing a material substratum or substance in objects; whereas Dr. Brown, in the passage we have given, pretends that what Berkeley wanted to demonstrate was the existence of God; and that he inferred this from the necessity men see for supposing that sensations exist even when they are not perceived by mankind. This, which Dr. Brown calls "a pious demonstration," has been already explained as being merely an incidental reply to an anticipated

objection. It formed (as has been explained) no part whatever either of Berkeley's conclusion or of Berkeley's premisses.

But this is enough. It has been shown that in none of the objections that have been raised against Berkeley's propositions is there any one thing that affects, in the slightest degree, either the reasonableness or the truth of these propositions.

CHAPTER V.

TWO NEW DEMONSTRATIONS.

FIRST DEMONSTRATION.

THAT there is no material substance in the universe, and that all the real objects of sense are results produced in the human mind by the immediate action of a Superhuman Spirit, without the aid or agency of an intervening substance of any kind, are two distinct propositions; but so far dependent on each other, that whatever proves the one, removes the only grounds that there are for denying the other. If matter does not exist, there is no room for supposing that the universe subsists in any other sort of substance except a sentient one like mind; and if the universe which we perceive by sense—not the cause of the universe, but the universe itself which we perceive by our senses—can only subsist in a sentient substance such as mind is, it becomes, as will be seen, a physical impossibility that matter should be any portion of a universe so subsisting.

For all purposes, therefore, it is sufficient to confine ourselves to the question, whether there is, or is not, in the objects of the sensible universe, that sort of thing which is called pure matter by the philosophers. If there exists such a thing at all, it is in these objects of sense that it must be; and if there exists no such thing in the objects of sense, there is no longer any motive nor any room for supposing that the thing exists at all, or for supposing that the objects of sense are not wholly creations and productions within mind. I propose now, therefore, to prove by two separate demonstrations that there cannot possibly be any such thing as this pure matter in the objects of sense, nor, consequently any such thing anywhere in the universe. The first of these demonstrations consists of the data and inferences contained in the following thirty-six propositions:—

1. All admit that every object of sense consists wholly of certain qualities, and of a subject of these qualities.

2. All admit that the qualities of an object of sense are of two kinds—viz., 1. Those which are sensations; and 2, Those which are not.

3. All admit that the qualities which are sensations can reside only in a sentient substance, and where there is a sentient substance for them to subsist in.

4. All admit that all those qualities which are not sensations can only reside in the very same place and substance in which that one of them which is called extension resides.

5. All admit that the extension, which is a quality in the objects of sense, is limited extension.

6. All admit that limited extension is of two kinds, local and temporal.

7. All admit that local limited extension is limited space.

8. All admit that limited space (or bulk) is that quality of bodies which is now in question.

9. All admit that limited space is of two kinds—viz., 1. Real or sensible. 2. Ideal, or that which is independent of sensations.

10. All admit that it is the real or sensible limited space which is here in question, and not that which is ideal or insensible.

11. All admit that limited space is that which has limits, which cannot be without or at a distance from limits; which, therefore, is only in that very place and substance where its own limits are, and cannot be in a place or substance where its own limits are not.

12. All admit that real limited space is that which has real limits,—which cannot subsist at the least imaginable distance from real limits,—which therefore is only in that very place and substance in which its own real limits really are present, and

cannot possibly be in any place or in any substance where its own real limits are not capable of subsisting.

13. All admit that the real limits of real limited space are either visible or tangible limits; and that the limited space, which has neither visible nor tangible limits, is not, and cannot possibly be, real limited space.

14. All admit that a visible limit is wholly composed of colours, and that a tangible limit is wholly composed of feels; insomuch, that without colours (as in darkness) there can be no visible limit, and that without feels (as in a mirror or a painting) there can be no tangible limit.

15. All admit that that which is composed of things is, and can only be, in the very place and in the very substance where the things which compose it are present and are combined.

16. Therefore a tangible limit and a visible limit are, and can only be, in the very place and in the very substance in which feels and colours are present and are combined.

17. But all admit that feels and colours can be combined only in the very place and in the very substance in which they are present.

18. All admit also that feels and colours—not the cause of feels and colours, but the very feels and colours themselves—can only be present in a sentient substance, and in the very place where a

sentient substance is, being utterly incapable of subsisting in a dead material substance, or in any place where there is not a sentient substance present for them to be in.

19. Therefore a tangible limit and a visible limit are, and can only be, in a sentient substance, and where a sentient substance is.

20. But (by Proposition 13) tangible and visible limits are the only real limits belonging to real limited space.

21. Therefore the real limits of real limited space can only be in a sentient substance, and where there is a sentient substance for them to be in.

22. But (by Proposition 12) real limited space can only subsist in that very place, and in that very substance, where its own real limits really are present, and cannot possibly subsist in any other place or in any other substance.

23. Therefore real limited space can only subsist in a sentient substance, and where there is a sentient substance for it to subsist in.

24. But (by Propositions 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) real limited space is that extension which is a quality in the objects of sense, and which is now in question.

25. Therefore that extension which is a quality in the objects of sense, and which is now in question, can only subsist in a sentient substance, and where there is a sentient substance for it to subsist in,

being utterly incapable of subsisting in any other place or in any other substance.

26. But (by Proposition 4) all the rest of those qualities which are not sensations, can reside and subsist only in the very same place and substance in which extension resides.

27. Therefore all the qualities of an object of sense which are not sensations, can subsist and reside only in a sentient substance, and where there is a sentient substance for them to subsist, and reside, and be present in.

28. But (by Proposition 2) the qualities of bodies are of two kinds—those which are sensations, and those which are not.

29. And (by Proposition 3) the qualities which are sensations, can reside only in a sentient substance, and where there is a sentient substance for them to subsist and to reside in.

30. Therefore all the qualities of an object of sense—both those which are sensations and those which are not sensations—can reside only in a sentient substance, and cannot, any of them, possibly reside where there is no sentient substance for them to reside and to subsist in.

31. All admit that a subject of qualities really resides and is really present in whatever place its qualities really reside and really are present.

32. Therefore the subject of all the qualities belonging to an object of sense—whether they be

sensations, or be not sensations,—really resides, and is really present, within a sentient substance.

33. But (by Proposition 1) all the qualities in an object of sense, together with the subject of them, constitute the whole object of sense.

34. Therefore the whole object of sense really resides, and is really present, within a sentient substance.

35. But all admit that matter, from its very nature, cannot, by any imaginable possibility, reside or subsist within a sentient substance.

36. Therefore matter, from the nature of it, cannot, by any imaginable possibility, subsist, be present, or reside in an object of sense.

NOTES ON SOME OF THE PROPOSITIONS OF THE FIRST DEMONSTRATION.

The following comments are only intended to assist the less experienced reader in his investigation of the principles contained in the foregoing propositions; not by any means to offer the least proof of any of them, for they are all of them first principles, upon which all men conversant with philosophy and science are as perfectly agreed as upon the equality of the angles at the base of the isosceles triangle. When, therefore, in these propositions and elsewhere I use the expression, "all admit," I do not mean, as Materialists do, all men who have the

common sense necessary to be of one's own opinion. I mean, all men who are competent to understand the terms I employ, whether such persons are supposed to have common sense or not; and most especially I mean all those who are not of my opinion upon the general question now at issue.

(PROPOSITION I.)

Although there is no dissension as to whether an object of sense is, or is not, composed of qualities and their subject, and of nothing more, there is some dissension abroad as to what is to be considered as the subject of the qualities. Some think that the true subject is some one quality to which all the rest adhere. (Dr. Cudworth, for instance, speaks of extension as the subject of all the other qualities of bodies.) Some think that all qualities are mutually subjects to one another. Some think the true subject to be something unknown, which they call pure matter, which is supposed to have powers inherent in it for creating feels, colours, &c., and which is the thing whose existence is here in dispute. Some think that the only imaginable subject of each quality is the mass of all the other qualities put together. Four subjects of qualities are thus proposed; but let it be well observed that there is here no question as to whether there is, or is not, a subject of qualities, nor yet as to whether the

subject and its qualities constitute the whole sensible object. A sunbeam, for instance, consists of extended light. The question is, *first*, whether the light or the extension is to be considered as the subject; *secondly*, whether they may not be considered as mutually subjects to each other; *thirdly*, whether some unknown matter with powers in it is to be supposed to be resident in the sunbeam, and to act as subject both to the light and to the extension; *fourthly*, whether the complex object, consisting of both qualities, is to be considered as the subject of each quality. It is evident that no amount of dissension on these points affects our first proposition.

(PROPOSITION II.)

The first of these classes comprehends tastes, colours, smells, feels, and sounds, in all the varieties of which each of these is susceptible. These qualities are admitted, upon all hands, to be sensations, and are, by the Materialists, supposed to correspond to certain other things which they think must inhere in the unknown thing called matter. These other things are sometimes called "powers," or "invisible qualities;" but all agree that as surely as there are such things as these powers, so surely they can only be in material substance, and that if they exist in objects of sense, it is only because matter can be shown to be in these objects. It is

therefore unnecessary to say more of these powers than that the reader should take care not to confound them with the feels and colours, &c., which they are said to cause. We must lay our account with finding these powers in the objects of sense if we find matter there, and with not finding them in these objects if these objects have no matter in them. The second class of qualities mentioned in this proposition comprehends what Materialists call the primary qualities, which are extension and figure, motion and rest, solidity and fluidity, unity and number, roughness and smoothness, hardness and softness—in short, all the other qualities of bodies which are not included in the first class.

(PROPOSITION III.)

Although this is a point upon which all the philosophical writers of every sect are perfectly unanimous, and to the illustration of which many of them allot some portion of their writings, yet when these writers wish to exaggerate the singularity of Berkeley's principles, they studiously evade on such occasions all mention of this unanimity, and seek, by the aid of whatever ambiguous language they can find, to divert attention as much as possible from the fact of this unanimity, or even to give the impression that they deny it. It is proper that the reader should be warned of this disingenuous conduct of the Materialists; for there is not in the

whole circle of the sciences a more undoubted point than that contained in the third proposition, nor one more universally known and understood by thinking and scientific men. Yet on account of this unfair suppression on the part of those who advocate the material theory, it will seem here quite a new doctrine to unscientific people, to hear that there can be no noise where there is no one to hear it—no colour in a room where there is no living being present to see it, and no heat in fire except when some one feels it. Most people will regard this doctrine as something peculiar to Berkeley's principles, and are encouraged by his opponents in so thinking of it; yet so far is this from being true, that it is to the writings of the Materialists themselves that the reader is referred for the best proofs of it. These proofs are in their pages so abundant and so clear as to render anything further upon that subject superfluous.

That colours, feels, sounds, tastes, and smells, are sensations, is the common doctrine of all scientific men; but that the qualities of each of these are also in mind only, and cannot possibly be outside it, is, in point of fact, the sum and substance of Berkeley's Immaterialism. Any one, at any age, who has understanding sufficient to see that our sensations are in the mind, will have no difficulty in seeing that their qualities, and therefore all the external world which is so evidently made up of these things,

are where these things are, or exist as these things exist. Who is there that possesses learning or intelligence sufficient to know that the smell, feels, and colours of a rose are things really within mind, —not things outside mind,—that cannot be easily made to understand that the whole rose is where these things are, and that in whatever sort of place these things cannot possibly be, there cannot possibly be a rose there? There is scarcely a child twelve years of age to whom this point may not be made intelligible, however much disputants may affect to think it unintelligible. The real, the only difficulty to contend with in the question is that on which these disputants agree, and by concealing which, they make all the rest seem difficult.

(PROPOSITION IV.)

Since the qualities which are not sensations are so numerous as to render a separate examination of each a very tedious process, I have confined that part of the demonstration which relates to these qualities to only one of them, and have selected for this purpose that variously termed "magnitude," "extension," "bulk," "size," or "space;" not by any means because the case of extension is more evident or more simple than that of figure, motion, or any one other quality which is not a sensation, but, on the contrary, because the Materialists insist upon extension being outside the mind in stronger

terms than they insist upon any other quality of our sensations being outside the mind, thereby indicating that its externality is the least controvertible of all; and because, at the same time, all these writers, without exception, agree that the rest of the second class of qualities subsist in the same place and substance as extension subsists in, and have the same sort of existence as extension has.

To obviate all confusion upon this point, it ought to be distinctly stated, that although the Materialists do not pretend to say that there is any distance between extension and any other one of the second class of qualities, yet they do pretend to say that there is always a distance, sometimes a very considerable distance, between colours and extension. The distinction to be here attended to is between the qualities which are sensations and the qualities which are not. The Materialists hold that the qualities which are sensations are not really in the same place as extension is, but only seem to be in the same place. Yet all, to a man, hold that the qualities which are not sensations are really in the same place and at the same distance from us as extension is. They think that the green colour of a forest, at three miles distance from us, is full three miles distant from the size of the trees, with which it seems to be combined. But not any one of them says that the shape of the trees is not in the same place as the size of them, and at the same distance from

us. All invariably concur in saying and insisting that the shape stands in the same relation to place and to mind as extension stands in; and so also of all the other qualities which are not sensations. In no page of their writings is there the least shadow of dissension upon this point.

Yet it must not be supposed that none of the Materialists hold extension to be in the mind. All I assert is, that they universally regard extension as the rendezvous of all the other qualities of the second class. That extension is placed by them sometimes in the mind, will sufficiently appear from the last of the three following interesting facts with respect to extension, which, for sundry reasons, it may not be inappropriate to repeat here: —1. Dr. Cudworth, a strict Materialist, thought that matter and extension were identical, as Des Cartes seems to have done, and that mind and extension were the only two heterogeneous substances in nature. 2. Mr. Dugald Stewart says of the externality of extension to the mind, that it is "a truth about which, of all within the reach of our faculties, we seem to be the most completely ascertained." 3. Dr. Hutcheson, another advocate of the Material theory, says of extension (and, singularly enough, with great praise from Mr. Stewart for his discernment), that "it as well as all the rest of the primary qualities are properly *ideas* which accompany the sensations of sight and touch." In which

opinion Dr. Hutcheson is sustained by Dr. Hutton, another eminent Materialist, who distinctly states, that "magnitude and figure do not exist externally in relation to the mind—but that these are purely spiritual, or ideas in the mind." The reader ought to be very much upon his guard not to allow these endless dissensions and inconsistencies of the Materialists, on some points, to mislead him as to their unbroken unanimity upon the first principles in the data of the present demonstration.

(PROPOSITION VIII.)

I take no account here of infinite space, both because I find no unanimity among those who write about it, and because it is not a quality in the objects of sense. Some say that it is irresistibly comprehended; others, that it is utterly incomprehensible. Some, that the Almighty could create it, but could not destroy it; others, that He could do both; others, like Mr. Dugald Stewart, that He could do neither; some, that it is one of the qualities of the Almighty; others, that it is a quality of matter. Dr. Reid speaks of it as in its nature closely allied to nothing; which is the more remarkable, as there are few things more unlike nothing than what we call limited space, bulk, size, or magnitude. I feel, however, the less concerned to treat of infinite space, as I believe the Materialists are pretty generally agreed, that if finite space subsists within

minds, infinite space must subsist there also; and because I treat here only of the objects of sense, no one of which, that I know of, has infinite space as one of its qualities.

(PROPOSITION IX.)

The word "real" has two significations. It is either used in contradistinction to insensible and ideal, and then signifies what is received at the senses; or in contradistinction to fictitious or false, and then "real" signifies true. The existence of the mind, for instance, is real in one sense, and not so in the other. The word is used in this demonstration to signify what is accompanied by sensations, and in contradistinction to what is purely ideal, or insensible, like a square of a thousand miles diagonal, or a man fifty feet high. No one pretends that the ideal sort of magnitude requires the physical substance to be combined with it; for then this substance would have to be with it in the mind, where alone the ideal magnitude or idea of magnitude can subsist; but this, according to the definition of matter, is as impossible as that 2 and 3 should make 10.

And let not the confused statements of Dr. Reid on this subject lead any one to suppose that he did not fully assent to this proposition. He seems, it is true, to give it as his opinion (Essay II. ch. 19) that there is really more bulk, space, or size in the objects

of sense, than what we feel or see; in fact, that the real size of the object is very different from that which any measurement of ours can determine; and he throws out a hint, that perhaps the angels may know much more about the sizes of things than we do. Yet notwithstanding his curious and confused remarks about the sizes of things, he nowhere asserts anything which amounts to saying, that if it pleased the Almighty to annihilate all the feels and all the colours, and even shades of Mont Blanc, the real magnitude of Mont Blanc would still remain in the very locality in which it now stands, and might be perceived by intelligent beings of a higher order to be there. He as well as every other writer on this subject admits in his less confused statements, that we have real limited space, or the sizes of things, at only two of the senses, the touch and the sight; and that if we had not these two senses, or one of them, we should have no such thing as limited space at all.

But the real limited space of sight, and the real limited space of touch, are two totally distinct kinds of real limited space, which, however coincident and correspondent with one another, are admitted upon all hands to be as different in nature from one another as three sounds are from three tastes; so different, in short, that a knowledge of the one could not, without experience, suggest a knowledge of the

other, the real magnitude which is seen being no more capable of being felt, nor that which is felt capable of being seen, than three tastes are capable of being heard, or three sounds of being tasted. The following quotation from The Intellectual Powers (Essay II. ch. 10) will assist the reader in judging of less distinct statements of the same author. "The notion of extension and figure (says Dr. Reid) which we get from sight, and that which we get from touch, have been so constantly conjoined from our infancy, in all the judgments we form of the objects of sense, that it requires great abilities to distinguish them accurately, and to assign to each what truly belongs to it. So difficult a thing is it, as Berkeley justly observes, to dissolve a union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit. This point he has laboured through the whole of the "Essay on Vision," with that uncommon penetration and judgment which he possessed, and with as great success as could be expected in a first Essay upon so abstruse a subject." The division, therefore, which Dr. Reid, as well as every one else, makes of real limited space, is into that which is visible and that which is tangible—the seen and the felt. Take these two away, and you take all real limited space away, for there is no other division of it. As well might we say that if all sounds were removed from the three sounds, there would

be any real three of any kind left in the place where the sounds were, for angels to perceive, as that when the feels and colours are removed from real size, there is any other real size of any kind left remaining in the place where the feels and colours were.

(PROPOSITION X.)

The inexperienced reader ought to be here apprised that several remarks of Dr. Reid's and Mr. Dugald Stewart's, which seem to relate to real limited space, profess to relate only to that which is abstract, or at least ideal and insensible;—that, as has been already remarked, neither abstract nor even ideal space requires matter to be connected with it; and that, therefore, the present question is untouched by any remarks that these writers may have made respecting abstract space, or ideal space. It will assist much in detecting their meaning, to observe attentively whether the remark is made of extension itself, or only of the notion of extension; for it is clear that what we call the idea, notion, or conception of a thing, is not what we understood by the real thing itself. Also, it should be observed, that when these writers speak of space or extension, without the word "limited," or some equivalent epithet prefixed to it, they generally mean infinite space, which, as I have said before, is not supposed to be in any of the objects of sense, and is not therefore connected with the present question.

(PROPOSITION XIII.)

The universal admission that the sensible limits of space are sensible to the sight and touch only, and never to the other senses, is a point which requires to be carefully attended to, in connexion with this subject, and of which the writings of the Materialists afford the fullest explanation and acknowledgment.

(PROPOSITION XIV.)

Here the reader must be again warned not to allow himself to be deceived by Mr. Stewart and Dr. Reid, when they speak of that which is intangible, like the cause of feels, as being tangible, like feels themselves; or of that which is invisible, like the cause of colours, as being visible, like colours themselves. Feels, and the qualities of feels, are the only things that are tangible. Light and colours, and the qualities of light and of colours, are the only things that are visible. The causes of these things are neither tangible nor visible. Of these facts every one may easily assure himself, and no writer denies them. Even those just alluded to, when they apply the word "visible" to the invisible cause of colour, or "tangible" to the intangible cause of feel, admit that it is only with latitude of expression that this can be done;—the same latitude of expression, as when a person says he hears a

carriage, or sees how hard a stone is; a sort of phraseology to be carefully excluded from all exact investigation.

Since, then, what is visible can really only consist of colours and their qualities, and since what is tangible can really consist only of feels and of the qualities in feels, whatever is tangible and whatever is visible only consist of these things. A visible limit, therefore, and a tangible limit consist of them;—the visible limit, of colours and the qualities of colours—the tangible limit, of feels and the qualities of feels. This point, besides being universally admitted, is itself very obvious; yet to assist the less philosophical student, I shall observe further, that a visible limit cannot exist (i. e., cannot be a visible limit) without at least two different colours, and that a tangible limit cannot be a tangible limit (i. e., cannot subsist) without at least two different feels. To see this point in a clearer light, it need only be remembered, that if all things, our own bodies, the air and all, had exactly one and the same colour and shade, we could distinguish nothing by sight, but should be in precisely the same predicament as if we had no sight to distinguish by, and should therefore be constantly knocking ourselves against everything harder than our own bodies. There would not even be a shade or shaded line to be seen. All would be of one piece to the eye, as things now are in a dark room. In

other words, if we had always but one sensation of colour, it is evident that, whether this one sensation was white or black, red or blue, there would never be any shape, or magnitude, or movement, or other primary quality for the eye then, in that uniform colour, more than there is now in utter darkness. Likewise, if all things—our own bodies, the air and all—had always exactly the same uniform, uninterrupted feel common to all, as the visible objects in a painting or in a mirror have, the effect to us would be the same as if things had no feel at all. We could distinguish nothing by touch more than if we had no touch to distinguish by. All the things we see, the chair for instance, and the air adjoining it, although with different colours as now, would be all of one piece to the touch. There would be no felt lines, or lines of feel, between the air and the chair; no felt surfaces, and no felt angles. All would be what the air now is to our touch, or what the water is to the diver, or what the objects in a painting, or in a mirror, are; that is, consisting in all parts of one uniform feel, so that one part is not tangibly distinguishable from another; and let it not be forgotten that to make the illustration of any use, this feel must be supposed to be in all respects the same as that of our own bodies. Any one who reflects upon these two cases of feel and colour, will see that if our own bodies, the air and all things, had one and the same

universal colour, and one and the same universal feel, we should have no felt or coloured body to deal with—no real magnitude—no real limit of any kind. The moment, however, that the least colour presented itself different from all the rest of the uniform colour, or the least feel different from all the rest of the uniform feel, we instantly perceive something by sight or touch; but not before. It is not, therefore, a single colour, but the combination of at least two different kinds of colour; nor a single feel, but the combination of at least two different kinds of feel, which makes objects of sense for our sight or for our touch; that is, which forms what is felt or what is seen. Since, then, what is visible cannot exist without the presence of at least two different colours, nor what is tangible without at least two distinct feels, neither a visible limit nor a tangible limit—that is, no real limit—can exist without them.

(PROPOSITION XXVII.)

The felt qualities of bodies are much more apt to make people think them to be outside the spiritual substance, and to entangle our thoughts respecting that unfelt substance which we call matter, than their coloured qualities are. I shall therefore make a few remarks on solidity, which is that one of the felt qualities, by which the more unphilosophical kind of people are chiefly led to believe that there must be that kind of matter in bodies which the

foregoing propositions demonstrate to be physically impossible.

1. There can, I think, be no doubt that if there were nothing around us more solid than the atmosphere; nothing through which we could not pass our hand with as little impediment as through the body of what is called a ghost; if the earth we walk on was a mere vapour, and our own bodies something still more ethereal than a vapour is; if there was nothing so hard as rock, or metal, or wood, nothing, in short, that would affect our touch more than mere air now does, there can be, I say, no doubt that, in this case, people would be much less inclined to talk of matter, visible or invisible, than they now are. Yet, as far as we know anything of matter, it is just as probable that it may be very light indeed, as very heavy; and very loose or elastic, as compact or incompressible. Those who know anything of what they speak of when they speak of matter know this, for they know that it is something exempt from every quality known by the hand or by the eye.

2. None of the more eminent Materialists regard solidity as affording any obstacle to the reception of Berkeley's opinion. Mr. Dugald Stewart, for instance, did not think it was so. He distinctly says, that he agrees with Berkeley about solidity; and only says of it that it implies "the existence of something external and altogether independent of

our perceptions;" which is quite true, but true also of every other perception that we have, as well as of that modification in feels which we term solidity. Berkeley saw this as well as Mr. Stewart. Berkeley saw as well as any one else—perhaps better than most philosophers—that there must be some cause of all that we perceive, as well of sensations as of the qualities of sensations; and that this cause is external to ourselves, and independent of all it causes, are two propositions which it did not require much wisdom to discover, or much piety not to dispute. Even the disputatious Mr. Hume did not dispute these things.

3. Whoever carefully attends to the meaning of the word "solidity," will be surprised to find how little it can have to do with any idea which is attached to the word "matter." In chemistry, the term is opposed to fluidity; but in philosophy and in connexion with the Material theory, it is synonymous with "resistance to pressure from opposite sides," or "incompressibility;" and in this sense the waves are as solid as the rocks they beat against, or considerably more so, "for adamant (says Locke) is not more solid than water." Solidity, therefore, does not depend either upon the hardness or upon the heaviness of bodies; not upon their hardness, for rocks and adamant are harder than water; not upon their heaviness, for rocks and adamant are heavier also than water is. Resistance alone, or

mere force, does not constitute solidity, for no one calls even a hurricane a more solid body than the stillest air, nor is the cannon-ball more solid at its departure from the mouth of the cannon than at the end of its course. Nor is solidity that perfect cohesion of all the parts of a body, which leaves not the least interstices between those parts, because there is in nature no such thing known as this perfect cohesion. Every tangible body is considered as a little distended. Any one may easily inform himself that it is one of the undisputed tenets of natural philosophy, that there are always some slight, though very slight, interstices between the parts of bodies. Solidity is, therefore, neither this perfect cohesion, nor hardness, nor weight, nor force. It is, as has been already said, the being incapable of being condensed by other bodies, or resistance to pressure from opposite sides. This is what really constitutes the solidity of bodies; and there is a state of even common air, in which it is as solid (that is, as incapable of compression) as adamant is. Thus we may see, when the precise meaning of the word is taken into account, how little reason we have for being puzzled when we hear that there may be solidity without matter in the objects of sense; or, in other words, that matter is not essential to the solidity of bodies.

4. But that solidity is a very arbitrary and merely relative quality of bodies, and can have

nothing to do with what they are composed of, is evident from the fact that you can increase and lessen the solidity of a body as much as you can its visible magnitude. A cubic inch of water could be distended easily to a cubic yard of vapour without the addition of the slightest material particle; and it is said to be possible to augment or diminish the solidity of air by forty thousand times, without augmenting or diminishing its elements. But what sort of thing is that solidity which enables the same body at one time to fill forty thousand times as much space as at another? to be at one time forty thousand times less solid than at another? One cannot in strictness apply the term solidity to any one thing in this body when it occupies most space; yet the body when greatest contains everything that it contained when smallest, and we speak of solidity as being in it when it is smallest. If a cannon-ball were distended or expanded every way, so as to be forty thousand times its original size, who would speak then of its solidity? who would fear its doing mischief? yet, upon compression, without the least additional ingredient, it would again be said to be a solid body, and again be feared. If the solidity of a body is a thing that can be thus created or destroyed without creating or destroying matter, what can solidity have to do with matter?

5. But is it not clear of this quality, as well as

of all others, that since we can dream, and often do dream, of solid bodies, matter can be no essential concomitant of the solidity that we perceive? And is it not equally clear that since solidity is the resistance between the combined feels of opposite sides, solidity is a result from the combination of two or more separated feels, and is therefore a mere relation subsisting between the feels? Now, no one can pretend to say that a relation between two feels can be anywhere except where those feels are; and all admit that those feels are in the mind. What, therefore, can be clearer than that solidity has the same spiritual subsistence as the feels have.

6. Another reflection which will show how little solidity even when combined with strength and hardness exists independent of sentient nature is, that if the strength and hardness and solidity of our own bodies were one thousand times greater than they now are, while the strength, hardness, and solidity of all other objects of sense were to remain what they now are, a piece of mahogany would really and substantially be a thousand times less solid, less strong, and less hard than it now is. To conceive this, it is necessary to reflect what half the present solidity of mahogany, or a quarter of it, or a twentieth part of it, would amount to. It would be a great diminution of its solidity. Yet the merely giving strength, hardness, and solidity to one body ought not to take solidity from the other

body, if it be indeed true that solidity is not a relative and ideal quality. Besides, what should we think of the solidity of mahogany which was a thousand times less solid than mahogany now is? Should we speak of such a substance as having solidity in it at all? Certainly not; yet it would, in point of truth, be the same as it is now. Thus, if it were required to show that there is no matter connected with a mathematical or unextended point, it would not be more easy to show this than to show that there is none connected with solidity.

(PROPOSITION XXXI.)

It seems superfluous to say one word upon this proposition. That the qualities of an apple and the subject of these qualities are exactly and really in the same place, is a universally admitted fact which the Materialists have defended and insisted upon, as if they had heard of some one who intended to dispute it. I need, therefore, say nothing upon that point. But their also arguing and insisting that the colour of the apple is not exactly and really in the same place as the subject and the other qualities of the apple are, renders it necessary for me to state here, that the Materialists do not consider colours or any other sensations as real qualities, but only as apparent qualities of things—mere "optical illusions"—"curious mental phenomena" —as Mr. Dugald Stewart calls them—which some

people are, says he, "dexterous and amusing" enough to talk of as really being in the things themselves. (Phil. Essays, Note L.) Thus, when the Materialists place the subject of qualities at a distance from sensations, they do not think that they place it at a distance from qualities, but from illusions. The subject of an apple's qualities they look upon as a real portion of the apple, existing in the very place where the real qualities are, and being at the very same distance from the feels and colours of the apple as the real qualities are from us. Nowhere do they speak of the size and shape of an apple as being in one part of a room, while the subject of these qualities is in the other.

That the colours and feels of objects are mere illusions and not really in the objects, is one of three remarkable paradoxes, put forward in support of the Material scepticism, and, in fact, essential to it. Another of these paradoxes is, that "an object of sense may exist, and yet be nowhere." Hume, who has been so falsely represented as one of Berkeley's disciples, endeavoured to overthrow Berkeley's principles by defending this contradiction of a very plain matter of fact. But the most extravagant paradox, perhaps, of all put forward for this purpose is, that "we have no ideas of the objects of sense;" which marvellous theory Mr. Dugald Stewart and Dr. Reid have laboured hard to establish in the same wild and pious expectation,

that if people could only be brought to believe that they had "no ideas of sensible objects," this strange belief would have the inevitable effect of making them adopt the Material scepticism, and reject the two great tenets of Berkeley's philosophy, which are, *first*, that there is no rival substance in the universe to mind; and *secondly*, that the Almighty is the sole and immediate cause of our perceptions. It is strange that two such tenets should be lightly cast aside; and still more strange that they should be accounted incredible, merely because if they were true, the necessary consequence would be, that we should in that case have ideas of sensible objects, that an object of sense could not exist without existing somewhere, and that sensible objects would have really upon them, and as part of them, the feels and colours which they seem to us to have.

SECOND DEMONSTRATION.

DEFINITIONS.—1. A subject of qualities is that, apart from, and independent of which, the qualities in any object cannot possibly exist; and this subject is qualified by those things to whose existence it is necessary. Thus, a sunbeam is that without which the extension of a sunbeam cannot exist; and this sunbeam is qualified by its extension.

2. A substance of qualities or of other things is that, apart from, and independent of which, the qua-

lities and other things cannot possibly exist; and this substance is not qualified by those things to whose existence it is necessary. Thus mind is that without which neither the sensation we call "blue" nor the idea of blue can exist; yet the mind is not qualified either by blue or by the idea of blue.

AXIOMS.—1. It is universally granted that matter is not any one, nor any combination of the qualities that are in an object of sense.

2. That matter cannot subsist in mind.

3. That if matter is not a portion of the objects of sense, there is no matter anywhere in the universe.

4. That whatever thing is figured and extended, is in the very place where its figure and extension are.

5. That every object consists wholly of qualities, and of a subject of qualities.

6. That matter can only be in such objects of sense as are figured and extended.

7. That (even if there be more than one substance, viz., mind,) there are not more than two substances in the universe—viz., matter and mind.

(PROPOSITION I.)

"Matter cannot be at the same time both the subject and the substance of the qualities which are in an object of sense."

For if it be the subject of those qualities, it is

qualified by them (Def. 1). And if it is the substance of them, it is not qualified by them (Def. 2). But to be qualified, and not qualified, by the same things, at the same time, is impossible. Therefore matter cannot be at the same time both the subject and the substance of the qualities which are in a sensible object.

(PROPOSITION II.)

"Matter cannot be the substance of the qualities which are in an object of sense."

For if it be, then it is the substance of figure and extension (Axiom 6). And if it be the substance of figure and extension, then figure and extension do not qualify it (Def. 2). But if it be not qualified by figure and extension, it is not the subject of them (Def. 1). And if it be not the subject of figure and extension, it is no portion of an object of sense (Axiom 1, 5 and 6). And if it be no portion of an object of sense, there is no matter anywhere in the universe (Axiom 3). But, by the hypothesis, there is matter in the universe—which is absurd. Therefore matter cannot be the substance of the qualities which are in an object of sense.

(PROPOSITION III.)

"Matter cannot be the subject of the qualities which are in an object of sense."

For if it be, then it is the subject of figure and

extension (Axiom 6). And if it be the subject of figure and extension, it cannot be the substance in which they are (Prop. 1). But there are not more than two substances—viz., mind and matter (Axiom 7), and the substance of figure and extension must be one of these. Therefore the substance in which figure and extension subsist, is mind. But the subject of figure and extension subsists in the very place where figure and extension subsist (Axiom 4). Therefore the subject of figure and extension subsists in mind. But (by the hypothesis) matter is the subject of figure and extension. Therefore matter subsists in mind—which is impossible (Axiom 2). Therefore matter cannot be the subject of the qualities which are in an object of sense.

(PROPOSITION IV.)

"There can be no matter anywhere in the universe."

For the objects of sense are wholly made up of qualities and of the subjects of qualities (Axiom 5), and matter is neither any one of these qualities nor any combination of them (Axiom 1). Nor can matter be the subject of these qualities (Proposition 3). Therefore matter can be no portion of the objects of sense. But if it can be no portion of these objects, there can be no matter anywhere in the universe (Axiom 3). Therefore there can be no matter anywhere in the universe.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE CAUSE OF OUR SENSATIONS.

It has been shown to be physically impossible that a material substance should be any portion of our universe, or existing anywhere in it. This is the main tenet of Universal Immaterialism.

But there is not in this a sufficient disproof of the existence of such a substance somewhere else; for it might, it is said, exist beyond the precincts of our universe, and cause, from thence, the various objects of which our universe is composed—an opinion much more prevalent among Berkeley's adversaries than, from its strangeness and improbability, any one would suppose. It is the opinion professed by M. Cousin, and by the greater part of the metaphysicians in France and Germany. It is, in fact, the opinion of all those (and there are some of them in England) who oppose Berkeley, yet admit that extension exists where sensation does.

It is therefore necessary to exhibit now the unreasonableness of supposing that there is anything

material, outside our universe, exciting those qualified sensations, which, when combined, constitute the real universe, and all the real objects that the universe contains.

The opposite and only other opinion that there is room for on this subject is, that mind is the proximate cause of these sensations. But let us state more fully the difference between these two opinions.

The Materialists say that a sort of substance—not in this world, but in another—a substance unknown to us, but known to the Author of our being, is by Him applied in some mysterious manner to our minds, as it possesses a power (given it by Him) of exciting and grouping there those sensations, and qualities of sensations, which the real objects of sense are made of; and that without the aid of this substance, to us unknown, it is not possible to conceive in what other way even the Almighty could excite and group in our minds the elementary sensations which form the figures and the sizes of real things. They mean to say that His being able to do so without something else besides His own mind and ours, appears to them to be a physical impossibility. The Immaterialist, on the other hand, affirms that the elementary sensations called feels and colours, and therefore all that they form—the sizes, distances, and shapes of bodies—are excited, localized, combined, and kept

together in the sentient substance immediately by the Creating Spirit, without the presence or intermediate aid of any other substance, known to us or unknown to us, in our universe or in any other, except the affecting and affected mind.

After the most attentive consideration of the language adopted by the Materialists, I am not aware that I have here offered the least misstatement or exaggeration of their views. But I cannot deny that the circumlocutions and ambiguities which they are constrained to make use of, in order to conceal from the uninitiated the real thing they are asserting, often render it exceedingly difficult to disentangle what they mean, and sometimes present passages which are apparently at variance with the above statement; but very little attention on the part of the reader will enable him, not only to perceive that any such passages are not really at variance with this statement, but to find abundance of other passages which leave no doubt whatever that the authors mean what is here attributed to them. As to our sensations, for instance, being caused by this matter, there is nothing more distinctly stated by the Materialists than that these sensations arise from powers implanted in matter, or, as they express it, from qualities latent and resident in the material substance of objects (which, however, is only the circuitous way of saying that matter is the cause of our sensations), yet elsewhere

these same writers would lead one to suppose that they, as well as every one else, considered that the powers of the Almighty were capable of being exerted without any of that aid from extraneous things, which human powers are admitted to require; and that they, as well as others, thought the phrase "occult qualities," mere unphilosophical and unmeaning jargon. But, in reality, there is no room whatever for prevarication or subterfuge between the Materialists and the Immaterialists. The doctrine of the Immaterialists is, that there is no other thing in that universe with which we are acquainted but things like minds, and such things as can subsist in things like minds; and that what subsists in a thing like mind can only be created either by a mind or by some higher order of substance which comprehends what we know of mind. The Materialist denies both these propositions, and asserts that there is something else in the universe besides things like minds, and what can subsist in things like minds; and that this something, whatever it is, is the only thing capable of creating that portion of what can subsist in things like minds, which may be denominated "modified sensations," and which mainly consists of feels and colours, shapes and sizes. There is no intermediate doctrine between these two. He who, although he believes in the third something, does not give it the name of "matter," is very much mistaken if he thinks that

he differs in any respect from the Materialists, since all that they pretend to give the name of matter to is something of which they know precisely as much, and precisely the same things, as he knows of his unnamed something. And if there be any one who admits that an Almighty Spirit is the sole and immediate cause of our sensations and their various modifications, yet regards the presence of these things within his mind as affording the strongest possible reason to believe that there is something corresponding to them in another state of being beyond his sensations and beyond his mind, which something is neither the creating mind, nor like mind of any order, nor like anything which subsists in any mind, then such a person deceives himself very much if he supposes that the Materialists look upon matter as being the cause of our sensations in any other sense or to any greater extent than he does. He, as well as they, considers that our sensations and their qualities could not exist, or would not exist, if this other something were not existing also. He, as well as they, considers that, except our sensations and their qualities, there is no other thing that might not exist very well without it. He, as well as they, considers that the power exerted to create sensations belongs to the Almighty Spirit, but that the Almighty Spirit could not by any physical possibility have employed that power upon our minds without the existence and the

presence somewhere of that something. If, again, there be any one who considers that he is not a Materialist, as he thinks the existence of matter to be only probable or possible, and not by any means certain, let him know, that to admit even that it is only possible there should be such a thing in our universe—to admit only that there is the mere sort of space necessary to contain it, is, in the worst sense of the term, to be a Materialist; for it is to assert, as all Materialists do assert, that a thing may exist when there is not the slightest trace imaginable of its existence—it is to assert that there is a sort of space external to all mind, which is a kind of thing that all Immaterialists deny the possibility of. He, in short, who thinks matter possible, must see a contradiction in its being supposed impossible, and must therefore see an impossibility in Immaterialism, the main tenet of which is, that it is physically impossible for matter to be any portion of the universe —as physically impossible as it is for it to be any portion of a dream. Such a man therefore is not an Immaterialist. If any one was found capable of supposing that invisible material substances drew near us in our dreams, corresponding to the objects with which our dreams presented us, who would ask whether such a person considered that doctrine to be placed beyond all doubt, or to be only possible? Is it not evident that we should regard the person who maintained its possibility in precisely the same

light as the one who maintained its certainty? It is the same with the invisible material substances of our realities. Whoever thinks them merely possible is as truly a Materialist as he who thinks them probable or certain. Whoever holds that there can be anything connected with the universe besides things like mind, and the contents of such, advocates the Material theory. Whoever holds that there cannot, advocates Immaterialism. Thus there is, I again repeat it, no room for prevarication or subterfuge between the Materialists and Immaterialists. Whatever absurdity — whatever physical impossibility attends the existence of matter, attends also the possibility of that existence; nor is this absurdity in the slightest degree diminished (if it be not considerably increased), when, instead of the bulky and ponderous matter of some philosophers, we speak of an evanescent entity attenuated and subtilized beyond the remotest confines of imaginable existence.

The demonstrations by which I have proved that matter is no portion of the objects of sense are, in the strictest sense of the term, mathematical demonstrations—but the argument which I here offer to prove that matter is not the cause of these objects, is, although equally satisfactory, by no means a mathematical demonstration, and I do not wish any one to suppose that I represent it as such. It consists of no more than that same sort of appeal to the understanding of the reader—that same sort of

explanation respecting each part of the proposition, which would be used to make it clear that the whole cannot possibly be equal to its part. It should be well borne in mind that although the one argument is a demonstration, the other is not; and that although the one argument is not a demonstration, the other is—and this is very little disadvantage to the point to be now settled. That point is, that matter is not the cause of the objects of sense. I think there can be no doubt that if matter had not been supposed to be in the objects of sense, it would never have been thought of as the cause of our sensations, and of whatever else was necessary to constitute those objects. I think that no one would ever have supposed that matter placed in any other part of the universe—at the South Pole, for instance —would be a reasonable cause to assign for the sensations I now perceive of the paper that is before me; and that the only thing which makes it at all reasonable to suppose matter to be the cause of these sensations is, its being supposed that there is matter in the paper itself. As soon, therefore, as we relinquish all supposition that there is matter in the objects of sense, there is not the shadow of a pretext for the supposition that matter is the cause of these objects, —at least, no more pretext for it than there is for supposing that the matter of some star creates the flowers in our garden. That the argument, therefore, in this case, is not strictly demonstrative, is of

very little importance, very little argument at all being necessary to expose the unreasonableness of the supposition we are considering.

I propose then to make it clear, *first*, that matter, however modified, is not, even upon the acknowledged principles of the Materialists, an admissible proximate cause of our sensations, or of whatever else goes to constitute the objects of sense; and *secondly*, that upon these same principles, mind is an admissible proximate cause of these things.

And first, what are the conditions that the Materialists recognise as indispensable in a proximate cause? Dr. Reid says, "The first rule of philosophizing laid down by the great Newton, is this: 'Causas rerum naturalium, non plures admitti debere, quam quæ et *vera* sint, et earum phænomenis explicandis *sufficiant*.' This is a golden rule; it is the true and proper test, by which what is sound and solid in philosophy may be distinguished from what is hollow and vain." Thus we are furnished with a test, of a zealous Materialist's own choosing—a test approved of by all the scientific men of Germany, France, and England,—and nothing can be more explicit than the terms in which it is conveyed. "In natural philosophy," says Sir Isaac Newton, "no things ought to be admitted to be the causes of other things, but such as are themselves otherwise known to exist, and to be things adequate to the production of the effects

in question." I append the following passages for the sake of the illustration which they afford to these two essential conditions of a cause.

"When men pretend (says Dr. Reid) to account for any of the operations of nature, the causes assigned by them ought, as Sir Isaac Newton has taught us, to have two conditions, otherwise they are good for nothing. *First*, they ought to be true, to have a real existence, and not to be barely conjectured to exist, without proof. *Secondly*, they ought to be sufficient to produce the effect." (Intell. Powers, Essay II. ch. 3.) "While we have no proof of their existence to apply them to the solution of phenomena, and to build a system upon them, is, what I conceive we call, building a castle in the air." (Ibid.) "The world has been so long befooled by hypotheses in all parts of philosophy, that it is of the utmost consequence to every man, who would make any progress in real knowledge, to treat them with just contempt, as the reveries of vain and fanciful men, whose pride makes them conceive themselves able to unfold the mysteries of nature by the force of their genius." (Essay I. ch. 3.) "Let us therefore lay down this as a fundamental principle in our inquiries into the structure of the mind and its operations, that no regard is due to the conjectures or hypotheses of philosophers, however ancient, however generally received." (Ibid.) "If a philosopher, therefore, pretend to show us the

cause of any natural effect, whether relating to matter or to mind, let us first consider whether there be sufficient evidence that the cause he assigns does really exist. If there be not, reject it with disdain, as a fiction which ought to have no place in general philosophy. If the cause assigned really exist, consider, in the next place, whether the effect it is brought to explain necessarily follows from it. Unless it have these two conditions, it is good for nothing." (Ibid.) "It is a dictate of common sense that the causes we assign of appearances ought to be real, and not fictions of human imagination. It is likewise self-evident that such causes ought to be adequate to the effects that are conceived to be produced by them." (Essay II. ch. 6.) "Supposing gravitation to be accounted for by an ethereal, elastic medium, for instance, this can only be done, *first*, by proving the existence and the elasticity of this medium; and, *secondly*, by showing that this medium must necessarily produce that gravitation which bodies are known to have. Until this be done, gravitation is not accounted for, nor is its cause known." (Ibid.) Also in speaking of Dr. Hartley's theory, that matter by its vibrations produces thought as well as sensation within the mind, Dr. Reid observes, "But how can we expect any proof of the connexion between vibrations and thought, when the existence of such vibrations was never proved. *The proof of their connexion cannot*

be stronger than the proof of their existence: for, as the author acknowledges that we cannot infer the existence of the thoughts from the existence of the vibrations, it is no less evident that *we cannot infer the existence of vibrations from the existence of our thoughts.* The existence of both must be known before we can know their connexion. As to the existence of our thoughts, we have the evidence of consciousness, a kind of evidence that never was called in question. But as to the existence of vibrations in the medulary substance of the nerves and brain, no proof has yet been brought." (Ch. 3.) What is here said of the vibrations of matter may with equal truth be said of matter itself; and that the existence of a thing otherwise not known to have any existence at all, is not regarded even by Materialists as a reasonable inference merely from the known existence of other things which, if this one were otherwise known to exist, it might serve very well to account for, is still further shown by Dr. Reid's animadversions upon Dr. Hartley's attempt at this kind of inference. "But," says Dr. Hartley, "supposing the existence of the æther (proposed by Newton) and of its properties to be destitute of all direct evidence, still, if it serves to account for a great variety of phenomena, it will have an indirect evidence in its favour by this means."—"There never was," says Dr. Reid upon this passage, "an hypothesis invented by an ingenious man, which

has not this evidence in its favour. The vortices of Des Cartes, the sylphs and gnomes of Mr. Pope, serve to account for a great variety of phenomena." (Ibid.)

It is evident, then, that the necessary conditions of a cause in natural philosophy are, *first*, that the kind of thing supposed to be the cause shall be known to exist, upon other evidence beside the peculiar set of phenomena which we seek to account for by it; and *secondly*, that the kind of thing thus independently known to exist, must also be known from its very nature to be capable of producing phenomena in some degree at least similar to those to be accounted for; or, in other words, must be known to be uniformly accompanied, in the other cases of its existence, by phenomena somewhat similar to those we seek the cause of; and that nothing can be more unphilosophical or unreasonable than to assign a thing as the cause of an effect, when all you know of that thing is, that if there were such a thing, it would produce that effect.

Let us apply this test to the matter and its occult qualities which Materialists suppose to be the causes of sensations; and we shall find, not only that there is no evidence whatever of there being such things anywhere, but that even if there were such things, there is not the slightest reason for supposing that

they could produce the phenomena in question, or any other description of phenomena.

1. As to the first of these facts, the Materialists are fortunately all agreed, that if we had no sensations, but had our thoughts originally excited in some other way, just as they now are by sensations, there would be no reason for supposing that this matter had existence. Even if, therefore, it were self-evident that the thing we call matter could cause our sensations, yet to look upon it as the cause of them is to act in direct opposition to that regula philosophandi which is prescribed by Sir Isaac Newton, and which is so deservedly commended by all. For do we not then assign as a cause a thing which is not otherwise known to exist at all than by the effect which we are seeking to account for? The existence of the elastic, ethereal fluid would have been an infinitely better cause for gravitation than matter is for sensations; but as Newton did not find any other reason for supposing this fluid to exist, except his own want of it to explain the phenomena of gravitation, he did not assign it as the cause of these phenomena; he did not think this true philosophy. It were well if his admirers among the Materialists would act with the same self-denial, and not conjecture (contrary to his rule) that anything exists as a cause until they have first established the reality of its prior and

independent existence in some sense or in some degree. It will be long before scientific men attain to this point with respect to matter and its qualities; it will be long, therefore, before a Sir Isaac Newton assigns the unknown something called matter as the proximate cause of our sensations.

But, independently of the great philosophical principle thus violated, let us look a little more narrowly into the pretexts for supposing a material cause of our sensations, and we shall see that even our sensations do not call for this hypothesis. The advocates of the Material theory say that "sensations are caused by occult qualities which are not where the sensations are. But these occult qualities (say they) cannot subsist by themselves. Sensations, indeed, can subsist by themselves, because they subsist in mind, and things in mind may subsist by themselves; but things outside mind cannot subsist by themselves. They must have something to localise them, and to keep them together; something, in short, for them to subsist in. Now, we have no knowledge, direct or indirect, of anything outside mind in which these occult qualities can subsist. We cannot even pretend to imagine any sort of thing suited to that purpose; but, since our sensations are proofs to us that there must be a proximate cause of them; since the same proximate cause cannot serve for all our sensations, each kind of sensation requiring a different cause; since that

cause is something independent of and therefore outside or external to our minds; since each of these proximate causes must be what is commonly called a quality; and since qualities which do not subsist in a sentient substance cannot subsist by themselves, but must have something else for them to subsist in, as their subject or their substance, we are, in consequence of these facts, constrained to conclude that there is something outside the sentient nature besides the occult causes of our sensations, in which something these occult causes or qualities may reside; and although it must be admitted that we have not the least knowledge of what that thing is, and that it is therefore itself also occult, yet it appears to us conducive to the interests of philosophy, and avoids a collision with the common sense of mankind, to believe not only that there is some such thing outside the mind, but that it is the only real thing connected with our sensations. It is this which we call occult or pure matter, and this is all that we pretend to believe or to know about it."

Such is the process of reasoning, such the motives, by which the Materialists defend their hypothesis; and in this defence we find the four following remarkable admissions. It appears from it, *first*, that if qualities could subsist by themselves outside mind, there would be no need of matter for them to subsist in; *secondly*, that if our sensations

were not caused by qualities, but by substances, there would be no need of matter, as substances can subsist by themselves outside mind; *thirdly*, that if one and the same proximate cause produced all our sensations, that cause could only be a substance, and would not therefore require the pure matter to sustain it; *fourthly*, that it would not be utterly unreasonable to suppose that we might have all our present sensations and their qualities quite as well, without this apparatus of occult qualities and an occult substance, were it not that the common sense or ordinary intelligence of mankind would be shocked at such a supposition, having been long accustomed to interweave these occult things with its belief in what is manifest, and this to such an extravagant degree, that people have come at last to look upon these occult things as the only real things with which they have to deal.

Upon each of these four admissions of the Materialists, I observe as follows: *Upon the first*, that there appears no good reason—in fact, no reason at all, for supposing that qualities cannot exist by themselves as well when outside mind (if they ever are outside mind) as when within it. There is so much less professed to be known respecting things external to all mind, than respecting the things internal to all mind, that a much greater latitude exists in the former case for conjecture and possibility than in the latter; in so much that, whatever

is possible within the mind, may, for all we know, be possible outside it also. We know of nothing, then, to prevent qualities subsisting by themselves outside mind, in the same manner as the quality blue subsists within it, and if they can thus subsist alone, the Materialists admit that there may be no need of matter.

Upon the second, that there is not the slightest reason, either assigned or imaginable, for saying that our sensations are caused by qualities rather than by substances. That each of them is caused by something, all agree; but that that which causes each of them must be a quality rather than a substance, has not a shadow of foundation in anything known about this cause; and since it is quite as possible that our sensations are caused by corresponding substances, as by corresponding qualities, the reasoning in defence of matter admits that, in this case also, it is possible that there may be no need of matter; quite as possible as that there may be need of it.

Upon the third, that, to make out a necessity for supposing matter, it is necessary to make out first, that all our sensations and their qualities are not created by one and the same proximate cause; and who will undertake to make this out? Does not every one's experience teach him that one and the same proximate cause may produce effects which not only differ, but are directly contrary to one another? The same state of the air which causes

the sensation, heat, is known to cause the sensation, cold, also. The same individual mind which is capable of exciting in me a certain set of ideas, is capable of exciting in me another set of ideas, either of a directly contrary description, or totally different. Why then conjecture that one and the same proximate cause cannot produce sound and colour? They are both sensations, and there can be no greater difficulty in supposing that the same kind of thing can excite or create two different sensations, than two different ideas; and there can be no greater difficulty in supposing that one and the same thing can create five different sensations and fifty qualities of these, than two sensations and two qualities of them. It is, therefore, by no means improbable, still less impossible, that one and the same proximate cause creates all our sensations. Indeed, if we attend closely to the doctrine of the Materialists, and do not allow it to escape through their words, we shall find it in reality to involve that very fact; for they say that one and the same piece of matter produces various sensations by means of certain powers called "qualities," inherent in it; and this is all I mean when I say that one and the same proximate cause may produce our sensations; for, of course, I do not mean that one cause with only one power, or the power of producing only one thing, can nevertheless produce five. And this is but one of the numerous contradictions of which the Materialists are guilty.

They admit, that if all our sensations, and all the qualities of these could be created by one and the same proximate cause, the necessity for supposing a material substance would be done away with; and yet their own doctrine is, under a very slender subterfuge, that one and the same matter is the proximate cause of our sensations and of their qualities; for they admit that the powers of a thing are parts of a thing, and that the power of a thing cannot be said to be a nearer cause than the thing itself of which it is a power.

Upon the fourth admission, I have only to observe, that the ambiguous language in which this admission is always carefully expressed is all that preserves it from being laughed at. The assertion as to what would shock the common sense of mankind, I humbly take upon me, in the name of that common sense, to deny. All that common sense requires is, that we should believe in what we see and feel, or otherwise perceive by the senses, and in the chain of causes and effects which we find in the things so perceived. If common sense is instructed, that by matter we understand our sensations and their qualities, and what these things form, there is no doubt that common sense would be shocked at our denying matter; but if common sense is instructed, that by matter we do not understand our sensations or their qualities, but a certain unknown body of powers which is the cause of these, the common sense of mankind will

be very apt to say, "then you must mean the Divine mind."—If, however, common sense is further instructed that it is not the Divine Mind that is meant, nor any other mind, nor anything else like anything of which we have any knowledge, but a sort of occult substance, like the "materia prima" of the schools, used by the Divine Mind to create all the feels and colours which we experience, and which this substance creates by the aid of certain powers which the Divine Mind has imparted to it, but of which we know nothing, and the only object of which powers and substance is to enable that Divine Mind to create the feels and colours, and the masses of feels and colours, which we perceive to be really existing, then I doubt not but that the common sense of mankind will indeed be shocked and outraged;—will record the names of all those philosophers who have argued for such a substance, and will denounce them as enemies that stand between mankind and God. I therefore believe, and most firmly believe, that as far as the common sense of mankind is concerned in this question, it would be much less shocked than M. Cousin or Mr. Dugald Stewart supposes at a demonstrative disproof of matter, and would, for its part, indignantly disclaim having ever believed in anything so preposterous as this huge invisible machinery of occult qualities and their still more occult substance. If the demands of common sense therefore constitute

our need of matter, how little need of it there appears to be! How little reason there is for saying that people of common sense look upon anything, unseen and unfelt, and unspiritual, as the only real cause of the things they see and feel! But very different from theirs is the predicament of the Materialists, who all to a man look upon this as the only intelligible proximate cause of our sensations. One of them, indeed, or two, may be so moderate as to say that it is possible there may be no such thing, but most of them regard it as a shocking fit of wildness to entertain the shadow of a doubt about it.

In the foregoing review of the arguments in favour of matter, it appears that an additional error connected with this hypothesis lies in these two suppositions; *first*, that as sensations and their qualities are qualities, the causes of them must be qualities also; and, *second*, that as our sensations and their qualities are most of them different from one another, each of them must have a separate and different cause. The non-sequitur of these two inferences is obvious from what has been said, and adds considerably to the unphilosophical character of the material hypothesis. For thus it appears that it is not merely by its violation of Newton's rule that the selection of a cause made by the Materialists is faulty. Their selection is further marked by *gratuitous* peculiarities—peculiarities quite uncalled for by the sensations to be accounted for; there is *no*

necessity that the cause of a quality should be a quality, nor that every sensation should have a separate cause. To conjecture that a thing exists which barely accounts for the phenomena, when we have no other knowledge of its existence but these phenomena, is bad enough, and unphilosophical enough; it is like Des Cartes' hypothesis of the vortices; but to conjecture, under such circumstances, that there is anything more than, or different from, what is absolutely indispensable to account for the phenomena,—to suppose, for instance, that the cause is a quality when substance would do as well, or that there are several causes when one is enough,—this is still more imaginative and still more unphilosophical; it is what Pope did when he devised the machinery of sylphs and gnomes in the Rape of the Lock.

But over and above these very obvious considerations, two fresh arguments against a material cause of our sensations (even supposing the physical possibility of such a thing) arise from the demonstrations now given, that matter is no portion of this universe. One of these arguments is, that when we assign matter as the cause of feels and colours, and of the qualities of these things, we, in point of fact, assign it as the cause of the sensible universe, of the sun and moon, of the earth, air, and stars,—a use for which I believe matter was never intended, even by its most infatuated advocates. The other

argument consists in the difficulty which there is as to a place in which this matter may be supposed existing. It evidently is nowhere in this world, or in any part of our universe. Where, then, are we to suppose it to be? The matter which causes the table now before me is demonstrated not to be any portion of the table itself, nor to be capable of being in any other part of the room, or in any other part of the house, or in any other part of the whole sensible universe. Where, then, are we to suppose that matter to exist which is the cause of the sensible table now before me? We are clearly reduced to the alternative of supposing either that there can be no such material cause anywhere, of the feels and colours, and other qualities, which constitute this table, or that that material cause must be in that other world—that other state of being, which we commonly think of as adapted only to what is spiritual. As well, then, on account of the acknowledged unfitness of matter for that spiritual atmosphere, as on account of the acknowledged impiety of supposing matter to have made the universe, as well on account of the non-sequitur discoverable in the reasonings of those who have undertaken to determine what sort of cause shall be assigned to our sensations, as on account of Newton's great philosophical principle, infringed by the supposition of a thing otherwise unknown, nothing can, I think, be more clear or more un-

questionable than that even if the sort of thing called "matter" can be shown to be capable of causing sensations, it is not the cause of the feels and colours, nor of any of the other sensations with which we are acquainted.

2. But (to come to the second condition essential in a cause) although we should grant that there is abundant proof of the prior and independent existence of that "materia prima," or pure matter, which is said to have the secret qualities or powers in it productive of our sensations,—suppose, I say, that from a variety of most satisfactory evidence we can entertain no doubt whatever that there is, in some other state of being, a substance which neither is mind nor can exist within mind—is it not manifestly contrary to Newton's golden rule to call this substance the cause of our sensations, until we have first shown that it is adequate to the production of them? and who will undertake to show that this sort of substance—this pure matter—possesses the power of producing the sort of sensations of which we are conscious? Is there the least reason for supposing that it does? Is it like anything which we have ever otherwise known, or ever can otherwise know, to produce anything in sentient nature? Far from it. If we had the strongest reason for thinking that this latent substance really did exist, nothing would appear more difficult to imagine, if it were necessary to do so, than that it should have

this power of producing sensations. We should almost make choice of anything in nature, for this purpose, rather than pure matter; nor is it to be told what curious conjectures men have had recourse to, to give the thing—I will not say an air of probability, but the more indispensable conditions of what is physically possible. Some, indeed, have roundly asserted that it was even self-evident that all our sensations must be caused by something dead, rather than by something living. This is an obvious delusion, which seems to have been wholly occasioned by the supposition that the matter in the object caused the feels and colours of it. But since it is now known that there is no matter in the object, there is no longer the same ground for supposing this self-evident as there was before. Besides, what it is very difficult to believe, or even to understand, can hardly be called self-evident. There may or may not be signs of this connexion between matter and sensations,—there may or may not be sense in it; but that it is self-evident, or even very probable, that the sort of things which we understand by sensations can be brought into existence by the sort of thing which we understand by matter is really so far—so very far from being true, that such a result is one of the most perplexing things imaginable,—what Mr. Dugald Stewart most justly calls "inexplicable," and what Dr. Reid calls "mysterious."

To appreciate, however, to their full extent, this mystery and this inexplicability, we must take account of all that matter is supposed to be the cause of; we must consider that everything which appears to our senses in an object of sense—its feels and its colours—its shape and size—the particular position of these qualities in one place rather than in another—and their all remaining closely united to one another, instead of being variously scattered throughout the universe, are all things which must be caused by something, and which, by some unaccountable infatuation, are supposed to be caused by a thing which all admit to be without a knowledge of what it is so judiciously performing, and without judgment, or even life of any kind to enable it to act. We shall also the better see how inconsistent this supposition is, if we reflect that the same kind of matter causes all the phenomena, both of a rose-tree and of an oak, at the same time. Pure matter has neither kinds nor parts; so that the activity and discernment which would be necessary to administer at the same moment, and without the least confusion, all the qualities of the rose-tree in one place, and all the qualities of the oak in another place, are, by this singular hypothesis, ascribed to that pure matter, from which these two sets of phenomena proceed; or, can anything be so preposterous as to suppose that the same undiscerning thing which creates the feels and colours, shapes and sizes of a

rose-tree, shall create, also, and also without mistake or confusion, the feels and colours, shapes and sizes of an oak? and that the same kind of matter which causes one object of sense, causes, at the same instant, all the other objects of sense throughout the universe? How can we, with the least show of reason, ascribe all this discrimination to a thing which we believe to be as inanimate as a stone? or, if we do not ascribe discrimination to it, how can we suppose it capable of all these performances? Even if it possessed the extraordinary power of exciting feels and colours in the mind, yet how can a dead thing group these qualities with so much judgment? or when it has excited and grouped them, by what power inherent in dead things can it be supposed to keep them in their places? These are effects of living powers which it is not reasonable to look for in a stone; and whatever absurdity there is in supposing that a stone could produce the phenomena of a rose-tree, there is, also, in supposing that matter could produce those belonging to a stone.

But it will be said that a stone, dead though it be, can excite things (pain, for instance), and can even serve to keep things together, (for instance, the particles of earth that adhere to it.) To this I answer, that although people believe these things of matter, they do not believe that feels and colours can give the pain which the blow of a stone is sup-

posed to give; nor do they believe that the colour of a stone would keep the particles of earth together on it. The moment it is understood what the stone wholly consists of, people will no longer believe the absurd things about it which they now do. They will know, indeed, that a certain pain will accompany a certain movement of the colours and other qualities which constitute a stone; but they will not think that these colours and other qualities can cause this pain. They will refer the union of such phenomena to the Divine will alone, when they have no matter in the object to refer them to.

It will also be said that, although a dead thing has not naturally in itself the living powers competent to the production of feels and colours, yet the Almighty might, nevertheless, confer these powers on it. To this I answer, that if a dead thing (wherever situated) really possessed the powers of discernment and activity adequate to the production and grouping of all the phenomena of the universe, and which the Almighty might, of course, impart to it, that dead thing would cease to be what is commonly called "a dead thing." Matter so qualified would become as much a living substance as mind now is, and be then, in point of fact, only another name for mind. But beside this, how frivolous it is to suppose that the Almighty would invest with His own creative powers a brute matter whose exercise of these powers cannot, in the effects, be

distinguished from His own. Would not His own answer quite as well?

The distance, too, from matter, at which the effects of matter are produced by it, augments, in no inconsiderable degree, all the rest of the absurdity. If there could really be matter in a tree, that this matter should excite the feels and colours belonging to a tree, is not without some slight show of plausibility; but since there cannot be in the tree the matter which excites these feels and colours,—since if it existed at all, it must be at a great distance from the feels and colours it produces,—at a greater distance from them, for instance, than the sun is, what can carry the climax of absurdity higher than to suppose a dead thing, situated incomparably farther from me than the sun, producing and grouping all the feels and colours and their qualities which combine in the formation of the tree before me?

Since, then, we do not know that pure matter in another world (even if it were physically possible for such a thing to exist there) is competent to produce the sensations which form the objects of sense in this, or sufficient to account for any of the phenomena belonging to these objects, but, on the contrary, appears to all of us, as far as we can judge, totally disqualified for these purposes; and since, in addition to this defect, we have no other evidence, direct or indirect, of any kind, in proof of its existence, except that drawn from its supposed

fitness to produce our sensations, nothing can be clearer than that which Sir Isaac Newton affirms in the rule above given, that matter and its powers ought not to be admitted as the cause of our sensations. A material proximate cause, therefore, of our sensations is not admissible even upon the acknowledged principles of the Materialists; and this is the first proposition which I proposed to prove respecting the cause of our sensations.

My second proposition is, that an admissible proximate cause of feels and colours is a superhuman mind. As to the real existence of the thing called "mind," it is, I believe, admitted on all hands that there can be no reasonable doubt about it; since every one of us is conscious of there being some such thing, totally distinct from all the ideas and sensations which we perceive to be connected with it. Further; we are every one of us conscious that mind possesses the power of exciting or creating things within itself, since we perceive that we can do this or omit to do it, in a great measure, as we choose. Nor is it within itself alone that the mind can excite these things, but in other minds also, which every one of us has hourly experienced. We all of us also have experienced that the things so produced within our own or other minds, are susceptible of great varieties in force and vividness, according to the circumstances attendant upon their production. Further; the things so excited within the mind are of various kinds, but they are all such

as can only have subsistence within minds, and cannot possibly subsist within other things like themselves, nor in any other imaginable way. The feels and colours to be accounted for are things of this description.

Mind, therefore, is known to exist upon other evidence than the mere presence of the things which are now to be accounted for; and this is the first of the two essential conditions of a cause. But mind is also known to be capable of producing things of the same spiritual nature as feels and colours, with a greater or less affinity to feels and colours, and this is known upon other evidence than the mere presence of the feels and colours to be accounted for; which is the second essential condition of a cause. According, therefore, to the avowed principles of the Materialists, mind is a perfectly admissible proximate cause of the sensations called feels and colours, as well as of the qualities that belong to these sensations.

But further; as we know that there are things produced within our minds that are not produced there by human minds—nay, that are of an incomparably more powerful and steadfast nature than the things produced there by a human mind, we infer, from these facts, the agency of a mind incomparably more powerful and steadfast than human minds; and this superhuman mind is therefore, upon the principles of all true philosophy, a perfectly admissible cause of feels and colours, and therefore

of all the qualities and combinations of these things which we perceive to constitute the universe and its laws.

Some, indeed, there are, who employ all their learning and all their imagination to discover, if possible, some other admissible cause; but the more we observe of nature, and the more we reflect on what we observe, the stronger conviction we shall acquire that a Superhuman Mind is the only admissible cause of feels and colours. A writer of the utmost acuteness and research in these matters, whose professed object it was to involve everything connected with human nature in as much uncertainty as possible, tried his ingenuity also upon the cause of our sensations and their qualities, and has signally, almost ludicrously, failed in his efforts to evade the above conclusion. He has acknowledged that we have the option of only three different causes of these things,—and that they must be either produced by themselves, or produced by our own imagination, or produced by a Divine Mind. He does not, indeed, say why he thinks a Divine Mind can produce anything in a human mind; nor why he thinks that five hundred people's imaginations can, in the course of nature, produce in themselves, at the same moment, and without a concerted plan, the same sound or the same colour; nor does he say what induces him to think that a feel, or colour, or sound can, in the course of nature,

create itself. He has left us these opinions so carefully wrapt up in philosophical phraseology as to be scarcely distinguishable to an inattentive reader; but they are distinguishable, and I do not think that, considering his reputation, the result of his researches is misplaced here. "Their ultimate cause (says Hume, speaking of our sensations) is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason,—and it will always be impossible to decide *with certainty* whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from the Author of our being." (Hum. Nat., b. i., part 3, sec. 5.) I apprehend that it requires a person to be of a peculiar moral constitution in order to be incapable of deciding upon this point with certainty, notwithstanding all the difficulties in which Hume sought to involve it, and even pretended that it was involved.

As the only residue of pretext for supposing that there may be a material substance—not in this universe, for that is physically impossible, but in some other imaginable universe, or in some other state of being—arises from whatever grounds there are for reasonably supposing that there can be something else which is as much qualified to make the things which subsist in mind, as mind itself is qualified to do this, I shall append to what has been already said, the following short suggestions on this subject.

If the cause of our sensations and of the forms they take can be ascertained at all, it must be by reason, and that only such reason as is allotted to human nature. If, therefore, this cause be something unlike anything which we have experienced,—as unlike our experience, for instance, as a visible feel, or a tangible colour, or an audible taste,—it must remain unknown, at least unascertained, by us; or if there can be sundry distinct causes assigned, all agreeable to our experience of the course of nature, and any one of them adequate to the production of the effects in question, in this case, also, the true cause must remain unknown, or, more properly speaking, uncertain. But if we find a thing whose existence is otherwise known and unquestionable, very obvious, moreover, perfectly adequate to the phenomena to be accounted for, and the only one thing within our whole range of knowledge comprehending all these conditions, then it must be from some repulsion within our own mind that a cause for the phenomena of sense remains unknown to us, and unascertainable. What human reason teaches us on this point is as follows:—

1. That there is a cause of our sensations and their qualities, because we are conscious that these things begin existence, and because we find nothing in our experience of things to begin existence without a cause.

2. That this cause is not any power in ourselves

of which we are conscious—that is, is external and independent of our own powers.

3. That it is neither the whole, nor any portion, of the thing produced, since it is absurd to suppose a thing, or any part of a thing, to be the cause of, or to produce that thing itself.

4. That volition is the only originating cause of things with which we are acquainted.

5. That of the real existence of the thing called "volition," every one of us is conscious (which is the highest kind of evidence), and also conscious that it is competent to create things in minds.

6. That it is impossible to comprehend volition except in conjunction with intelligence or understanding, and that these two things constitute what we call "spirit."

7. That if there exists any substance around us which is beyond the reach of our substance (or understanding), yet is employed in the production or presentation of what is not beyond the reach of our substance, something which we do not perceive by our senses, yet which is employed in the creation of what we do perceive by our senses, it is evidently for the creating and not for the perceiving spirit that this substance is employed; for to be anything to the perceiving spirit, it must be perceptible either directly and immediately, as ideas and sensations are, or indirectly and mediately, as other spirits are, or by consciousness, as a spirit is perceptible to itself.

8. That an inferior spirit, assisted by an apparatus of any kind, is a more complicated cause than a superior spirit unassisted, and since there is no necessity for this complication in the cause of our sensations (the effect being in either case the same), the supposition of such a cause is unwarranted, and therefore as absurd as to suppose anything else, that has no foundation in the known effects for which we seek the cause; as to suppose, for instance, that the Almighty has invested some star with the power of creating the sensations that compose the universe, or that there are two different kinds of pure matter instead of one.

These are points which human reason teaches, and which no one seems to call in question, not even the most strongly prejudiced of the philosophical Materialists. It remains for the reader to determine which is the more rational course to pursue, — the more in accordance with common sense and true philosophy,—to conclude with Berkeley that there is a mind or spirit which directly, and without the least intermediate apparatus, affects our minds, every moment, with all the sensations, their qualities and combinations, which we perceive, and which are the real things intended by mankind when they speak of the things that they attain to by the senses; or to conclude with M. Cousin and the Materialists of these days, that the proximate cause of our sensations, and of the qualities which

attend them, is an inert substance, placed beyond the precincts of our universe, a sort of substance which cannot exist within mind, and which, external therefore to both the Divine and human mind, is so interposed between them, that we perceive none of the actions of the Divine Mind directly, but only through the intervention of the actions of this substance which He has deputed to act for Him, and qualified for that purpose, by investing it with certain powers which resemble the known powers of mind, but transcends them as immeasurably as the Divine Mind transcends the human. For these writers think that nothing can be more unreasonable than to suppose that a mind, however powerful, should be able to create the sensations which we experience, as well as the qualities and combinations which attend them, without the intervention of this invisible matter.

Well might Berkeley speak of such a notion as a disgrace to those who live in a Christian country, and in an enlightened age.

THE END.

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