




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THE

NEW QUARREL IN CHINA.

A STATEMENT

DRAWN FROM THE

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

LONDON:

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1859.


"WE have heard much of late—a great deal too much, I think—of the *prestige* of England. We used to hear of the character, of the reputation, of the honour of England. I trust, Sir, that the character, the reputation, and the honour of this country are dear to us all; but if the *prestige* of England is to be separated from these qualities—if it is to be separated from the character, from the reputation, and from the honour of this country—then I, for one, have no wish to maintain it. To those who argue, as I have heard some argue, 'It is true we have a bad case—it is true we were in the wrong—it is true we have committed injustice, but we must persevere in that wrong, we must continue to act unjustly, or the Chinese will think that we are afraid.' I say, as has been said before, 'Be just, and fear not.'

"Whatever we lose in *prestige*, of which I do not presume to be a judge, I am convinced that the honour and character of this country will be raised higher by such a policy. Never will England stand higher in the world's estimation, than when it can be said, that though troublesome and meddlesome officials prostitute her arms, and induce a brave Admiral to commence hostilities which ought never to have been begun, yet the House of Commons, representing her people, have indignantly declared that they will be no party to such injustice, and that neither for commercial advantages, nor for political advantages, nor for any other immediate advantages to their country, will they consent to stain that honour which, after all, has been and must be the sure foundation of her greatness."—*Lord John Russell's Speech in 1857.*



INTRODUCTION.

WE are fully convinced that, naturally, the people of this country are not only a just, but a generous people. But then, unfortunately, as Mr. J. S. Mill says in his recent work "On Liberty," "their thinking is done for them by men addressing them or speaking in their name, *on the spur of the moment*, through the newspapers." And it is a most unhappy circumstance for the interests of truth and right, that whenever any difficulty or complication arises in our foreign relations, this latter class, who "do the thinking" for the great mass of the community, are never presented, in the first instance, with full materials for forming a fair judgment on the merits of the case. The intelligence comes to them in vague, fragmentary reports, always strongly coloured by the interests and passions of those who are the agents in the transaction to be judged, and whose first care, of course, is to put the matter before the public in such an aspect as is necessary to vindicate their own wisdom, and to conceal their own errors. But the journalist must, or imagines he must, pronounce instantly and peremptorily on every question. Having done so, he is committed to an opinion, and—as he must never acknowledge himself misled or mistaken—whatever additional information may come, must, at the cost of any amount of suppression or perversion, be made to harmonize with the original utterance of the oracle. This is precisely the history of the present China question as it now stands before the public. It may seem a very hopeless task to turn the tide; but the writer of the following pages feels bound to do what little in him lies to place the truth before the public, and so discharge his own conscience of all share in that course of injustice into which our country is being now forced, as regards the Chinese Empire.



THE NEW QUARREL IN CHINA.

HOSTILITIES have once more broken out between us and China. We cannot pretend to feel the least surprise at this intelligence. It seems to us to be the natural, necessary, all but inevitable result of the last war, and of the conditions of peace which we forced upon the Chinese, against all their traditions and prejudices, and in spite of the most earnest remonstrances and entreaties on their part. That our readers may be in a position to form their own judgment of the merits of this new quarrel, we will endeavour to state the facts, so far as they are known, as clearly and concisely as we can. When tidings of the outbreak of the "*lorcha Arrow War*" reached this country, Lord Elgin was sent out as Plenipotentiary to terminate hostilities, and to re-establish friendly relations between us and China. Having succeeded in this mission, and concluded a Treaty of Peace with the Chinese Government, known as the Treaty of Tien-tsin, the Hon. Mr. Bruce was appointed as British Envoy to go and exchange the ratifications of this Treaty, between Her Majesty and the Emperor of China.

Mr. Bruce appears to have arrived at Hong-Kong in his capacity of "Envoy Extraordinary" quite at the beginning of May, as his first despatch from that place is dated May 4th. But he did not proceed to Shanghae until a full month later, the first letter indicating his presence there, bearing the date of June 8th. It is important to mark these dates, because one of the excuses assigned by Mr. Bruce for the headstrong course he afterwards took was his anxiety to exchange the ratifications of the treaty of Tien-tsin, as had been agreed, "within a year" of the day when it was signed by Lord Elgin and the Chinese Commissioners. His instructions from Lord Malmesbury were, "not to remain at Hong-Kong longer than is absolutely necessary, but to proceed to Shanghae on your way to the Peiho." But he did remain at Hong-Kong for more than a month. He may have had sufficient reasons for this. But at any rate it was not the fault of the Chinese authorities that he did not reach Shanghae till the 7th or 8th of June, and thus leave the briefest possible time for fulfilling the object of his mission within the stipulated period. Mr. Bruce wrote to Commissioner Kweilang from Hong-Kong, announcing his arrival, and stating that he is "about to proceed, without delay, by ship, to Tien-tsin." When he reached Shanghae he found three letters waiting for him from the Imperial Commissioners, Kweiliang and Hwashana, who had negotiated the treaty with Lord Elgin, two of them written in anticipation of his arrival, in consequence of the announcement made to them by Lord Elgin, before his departure, that he (Mr. Bruce) had been appointed to be his successor as Her Majesty's representative in China. The third letter was in answer to that of Mr. Bruce written from Hong-Kong.

There was, therefore, no lack of promptitude to enter into communication with him. In these letters the Commissioners refer to an engagement which, they allege, Lord Elgin made with them, for a further conference, to consider and decide matters not yet settled. They say that as Lord Elgin had departed for England, without returning to Shanghai according to promise, it was of course impossible to consider the matters left over, with him. But, they add, "Mr. Bruce having received the commands of Her Majesty to succeed him in the administration of all things essential, and now occupying a position identical with that of Lord Elgin, his predecessor, the proper course to be pursued is, doubtless, to appoint a day for a conference." In reply to this proposal, Mr. Bruce says, that "he must positively decline any interview with them at this place" (Shanghai). Now, in order to understand the full significance of this, the first act of Mr. Bruce in fulfilment of his mission, it is necessary to refer to one of the articles of the very treaty, the ratifications of which he was commissioned to exchange. Article five of that treaty is as follows:—

"His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees to nominate one of the Secretaries of State, or a President of one of the Boards, as the high officer with whom the Ambassador, Minister, or other Diplomatic Agent of Her Majesty the Queen, shall transact business, either personally or in writing, *on a footing of perfect equality*."—(*Blue Book*, p. 348.)

Now, Kweiliang, one of the two Commissioners whom Mr. Bruce treated so cavalierly, was the very Secretary of State appointed under the above article to transact business "with the Ambassador, Minister, or other Diplomatic Agent of Her Majesty," on a footing of perfect equality. Mr. Bruce knew this perfectly well, for the letters he bore accrediting his own mission were addressed to Kweiliang in that capacity. His first act, therefore, was to put a gross affront upon this high dignitary, who was in all respects his equal in official character and authority. But that is not all. Not content with peremptorily refusing an interview with the Commissioners, Mr. Bruce thought fit to construe the mere asking for such an interview into an evidence of treachery, and a design to evade the fulfilment of the treaty, and instantly wrote to them what has been justly entitled "an insolent and dictatorial note"—which was only his second communication to the Commissioners—in which he charges them with interposing "delays and hesitations ill calculated to cement a good understanding." What ground is there for this injurious charge? The Commissioners, be it remembered, proposed an interview and conference expressly on the ground that Lord Elgin had told them, before his departure, that this was necessary to settle certain matters that had been left unsettled. Was that true, or not true? Well, on page 479 of the *Blue Book* published a few months ago, entitled "Correspondence relative to the Earl of Elgin's Special Missions to China and Japan," we find a letter headed "The Earl of Elgin to Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana, &c.," in which the Earl tells his correspondents that he is proceeding to Canton, "where it is possible that the accomplishment of what he proposes to effect

may detain him a few weeks." The letter then proceeds thus:—" *He will then return to Shanghai, to discuss with the Commissioners the various questions of which a settlement is still pending. Should he not find their Excellencies at Shanghai, he will at once proceed to the capital.*"

Now, we entreat our readers to observe, that not only does Lord Elgin in the above letter explicitly declare that there were "various questions of which a settlement was still pending," which he must discuss with the Commissioners, but that he expressly charges them to remain at Shanghai, under the threat that if they do not, he will at once proceed to Peking. Well, and did he ever return to Shanghai, "to settle" the "various questions" still pending? It is not pretended that he did. And yet Mr. Bruce makes the very fact of the Commissioners being at Shanghai, where Lord Elgin had peremptorily ordered them to remain, a ground of complaint against them, and converts into an act of gross treachery their proposal of keeping with him, as Lord Elgin's successor, the engagement which that nobleman had made with them, but neglected to fulfil. Now suppose, after such a letter as the above, the two Commissioners had left Shanghai before the arrival of Mr. Bruce. Is it not perfectly certain that their doing so would have been construed into a proof of wishing to evade the treaty, by getting out of the way? "This conduct," some of our war journals would have exclaimed, we have no doubt, with a great show of virtuous indignation, "is all the more inexcusable, as Lord Elgin had positively requested the treacherous barbarians, to remain at Shanghai."

But how does Mr. Bruce meet this reference to Lord Elgin's engagement with the Commissioners? In his reply to them he ignores it altogether. But in a despatch to Lord Malmesbury, he meets it by a subterfuge so contemptible, that if it had been attempted by any Chinese official it would have been trumpeted over the whole land, as a proof of "the low cunning" of the "barbarians." "I found," says he, "three letters from the Imperial Commissioners, . . . alleging as their reason for waiting at Shanghai that the Earl of Elgin, on receding to the south, had left some of the details unfinished. On reading, however, Lord Elgin's letter of March 3rd, addressed to them on his leaving China, I saw that there was nothing to justify the delay." Now, Mr. Bruce knew perfectly well when penning these sentences, that the letter of March 3rd was *not* the one to which the Commissioners referred, but another, which they most distinctly and accurately specify, as written *before* that. And he knew, moreover, that nothing whatever had occurred since that "earlier letter" was sent, to do away with the necessity which Lord Elgin alleged to exist for another interview, to discuss questions, the settlement of which was still pending. But he turns to another and totally different document from the one indicated, and then exclaims, "I see nothing here of what these people talk about!"

And what were the points on which the Commissioners were solicitous to come to an understanding with Mr. Bruce before he went to Peking? Were

they matters of small moment, either to them personally or to their country? Let us see.

It is well known that there was one article of the treaty of Tien-tsin that was exceedingly offensive to the Chinese, and conceded as the Commissioners say, and Lord Elgin admits, under "the pressure of an armed force." This was the right to have a resident Minister at Peking. The objection to this did not spring, as our Plenipotentiary admits, from any feeling of mere pride or obstinacy, but from a strong conviction on the part of the Commissioners that it would be a fatal blow to the stability of the Empire, by lowering the dignity of the Government in the estimation of its own subjects. They pleaded the cause of their country, on this point, with a really pathetic earnestness, though with the utmost courtesy towards our representative.

"The established reputation of your Excellency," say they in one of their memorials to Lord Elgin, "for justice and straightforwardness, for kind intentions and friendly feeling, make us place the fullest confidence in your assurance, that when you exacted the condition referred to, you were actuated by no desire whatever to do injury to China. The permanent residence of Foreign Ministers at the capital would, notwithstanding, be an injury to China in many more ways than we can find words to express. In sum, in the present critical and troublous state of our country, this incident would generate, we fear, a loss of respect for their Government in the eyes of her people; and that this would indeed be no slight evil, it will not be necessary, we assume, to explain to your Excellency with greater detail. It is for this reason that we specially address you a second letter on this subject, and we trust your Excellency will represent for us to Her Majesty your Sovereign, the great inconvenience you feel the exercise of this right would be to our country, and beseech her not to decide in favour of a permanent residence at Peking. When we bethink us of the lustre shed by the well-doing and justice of Her Majesty, we feel assured that she would not wish, by being peremptory in a matter so hurtful to our country, to involve it in embarrassment, and our country will not fail to be impressed with gratitude."—(*Elgin Blue Book*, p. 411.)

The Commissioners had, moreover, a personal interest in the matter; for they declared that if they signed those articles without any modification, "they would incur severe punishment." Lord Elgin admits the same. "If," says he, in one of his despatches to Lord Malmesbury, "after having, in terms so ample and in language so respectful, acceded to my requirements, they are compelled to report to the Emperor that they have failed to obtain from me any consideration whatever for the representations urged by them on behalf of their Sovereign, *I fear that their degradation and punishment will be inevitable.*" Moved by the arguments which the Commissioners had urged, the force of which he was obliged to admit, Lord Elgin yielded on this point, and stated, in his last note to them, "that Her Majesty had been pleased to direct, that if her Representative be properly received at Peking, when the ratifications are exchanged, and full effect given in all other particulars to the Treaty of Tien-tsin, he shall be authorized to choose a place of residence elsewhere than at the capital, and to make his visits there either periodical, or as frequent as

the exigencies of the public service may require." And what rendered it still more important that the Commissioners and Mr. Bruce should have an explanation on this point before going to Peking, was the fact, that while Lord Elgin had made the above concession in the terms cited, and while Mr. Bruce (for he was out with Lord Elgin, and engaged in the negotiations) had consented to admit such a modification into the *Chinese* text of the treaty, the English text retained the article in its unqualified form.*

Now this was one of the questions—a question, as will be seen, of really vital importance, both to the stability of the empire and their own personal safety—on which the Commissioners were anxious, and naturally and properly anxious, to have an understanding with Mr. Bruce before going to Peking. But the stability of a Government exercising sway over three hundred millions of souls, and the lives of the two officials with whom he had been previously engaged in friendly personal negotiation, were matters on which our Envoy would not condescend to bestow a thought. He had only one answer to give to all representations, however respectfully worded: "I will have nothing to say to you. I am going to Peking, and woe be to you if you don't meet me there!"

The reply of the Commissioners to Mr. Bruce's bullying note, positively refusing an interview and charging them with interposing "delays and hesitations," was, notwithstanding all this provocation, perfectly calm and courteous. They tell him that since he declined intercourse with them, "the only course open to them was to represent the matter fully to His Majesty the Emperor, and to request him to be pleased specially to select some high officer who might proceed to Tien-tsin to make arrangements for Mr. Bruce's reception." They assured him that a memorial to this effect had been already sent forward to the capital with the utmost expedition, "at the rate of 200 miles a day," and that they themselves would follow "post-haste" to Peking, in order to meet him there. They merely stipulate, that on his arrival at the mouth of the Tien-tsin river, "he should anchor his vessels of war outside the bar, and then without much baggage, and with a moderate retinue, proceed to the capital for the exchange of treaties." And in this, their last communication, they add this emphatic assurance:—"With the peaceful relations now established between the two nations, nothing certainly will be done that is not in conformity with the provisions of the treaty, and the Commissioners, accordingly, *pray Mr. Bruce at once to put away all misgiving on the subject.*"

The above letter is dated the 12th of June. The scene now changes to the mouth of the Peiho. Admiral Hope reached that spot on the 17th, and ordered the authorities there to clear the river, which they declined. Mr. Bruce arrived there on the 20th. On the 21st, the very next day after his arrival, he writes to Admiral Hope, stating that M. de Bourboulon

* "They stated that their chief objection was to the words 'permanent residence,' in Art. 14, and to the permission given to Her Majesty's representative to take his family to Peking. . . . After some discussion, Mr. Bruce consented to the substitution of one of the characters for another."—Elgin *Blue Book*, p. 339.

and he had resolved "to place the matter in his hands," and to request him to force his way up the river by violence. The Admiral, who seems to have been a little cooler than Mr. Bruce, took no action until the 24th. On that night he sent a portion of his force to cut away and blow up some of the obstructions in the river. But as the Chinese did not fire a shot at them during this operation, there was no conflict. It was determined, however, to make a formal attack on the Chinese forts on the following day, the 25th. Now let it be borne in mind that in the last letter of the Commissioners to Mr. Bruce, after he had expressed his determination to go up to Pekin, *via* Tien-tsin, they had told him that a memorial had been sent to the Emperor with the utmost expedition, praying that some high officer might proceed to Tien-tsin to make arrangements for Mr. Bruce's reception. Would it have been more than a display of the most ordinary prudence and courtesy, if, with the full knowledge of this fact, he had waited, without commencing hostilities, at least a sufficient time for the above message to reach the capital, and a reply to be despatched to the mouth of the Peiho? But did he do so? A little attention to dates will enable us to answer that question. It was on the 12th that the Commissioners informed Mr. Bruce they had just sent off their memorial to the Emperor, from Shanghai. They informed him at the same time, that, travelling at the rate of 200 miles a day, it would reach Pekin "in some eight or nine days." That will carry us on to the 21st. Mr. Bruce himself admits that it takes forty-eight hours to send from Pekin to Taku, at the mouth of the Peiho. It would have been impossible, therefore, that a "high officer" could have reached the spot before the 23rd, even if the appointment had been made by the Emperor without an hour's delay for selection. Well, on the 23rd, probably late at night, the Governor-General of Pechilee did actually arrive at Peh-tang-Ho, about ten miles from the place where Mr. Bruce was anchored, *and at nine o'clock in the morning* of the 25th, he had in his hand a letter from that high officer, apprising him that he had come by express commands of the Emperor, "to be of any service, or to do the honours to Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy." We have already stated that it had been determined to attack the Chinese forts on the 25th; but the letter of the Governor-General was delivered to Mr. Bruce five hours before the attack actually commenced. Did he make any attempt to arrest the attack, after receiving this missive of peace? Not at all. What does he say? "As the attempt to pass the river was to be made at 10 A.M., it would have been difficult for me at that late hour to have communicated with the Admiral, who was at a distance of nine miles." Admiral Hope's own despatch shows that the actual fighting did not begin till two o'clock in the afternoon. What the formidable "difficulty" was does not appear, that stood in the way of Mr. Bruce communicating with the Admiral in time to save the slaughter of some 300 or 400 of our unfortunate countrymen, and probably double that number of Chinese. What we know with certainty is,

that after he had received a letter from the official representative of the Emperor of China, announcing, in language the most courteous and respectful, that he had come to "welcome Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy to Peh-tang-Ho, whence he can proceed to Peking," he allowed that fatal attack to be made on the Chinese forts, which ended in such a bloody and terrible disaster. It is true that Mr. Bruce, while floundering in the miserable mess of explanations and apologies by which he attempts to cover himself from blame, after this bloody calamity into which he had led our countrymen, had taken place, affects to find all manner of faults with this letter, affirming that it was not this or that, or the other. But we believe no unprejudiced man who reads this document can doubt either its sincerity, its reasonableness, or its perfect respectfulness. That our readers may judge for themselves we subjoin it, *in extenso*, in a note.*

We have carefully read all the papers bearing upon this subject, and we declare our solemn conviction that, apart from mere suspicion and rumour, there is no evidence whatever that the Chinese meant to evade the execution of the treaty. It is true that the Commissioners, wished to confer with Mr. Bruce in regard to some of its provisions before going to Peking, and they had the amplest reason to expect that he would do so from Lord Elgin's letter, the very last he wrote to them before leaving Shanghai. It is true, also, that the people at the mouth of the Peiho did not receive with any exuberance of satisfaction the large and threatening naval force, with which our Envoy thought it decent to present himself before them in order to inaugurate an embassy of peace. But is that any wonder? The squadron with which he made his appearance at the mouth of the Peiho consisted of *seven steamships, ten gun-boats, two troop and store ships, and several hundred marines and royal engineers*, brought there with the avowed intention of "forcing, if necessary, admission to Peking, and the proper exchange of ratifications." Whether the presentation of this formidable armament at the mouth of the river leading to their capital, with a peremptory demand of free passage, was adapted to inspire confidence or to awaken suspicion and jealousy on the part of

* GOVERNOR HANG TO MR. BRUCE.

In obedience to the commands of His Imperial Majesty, the Governor-General has come to Peh-tang-Ho, a port (or harbour) to the northward of Taku, to be of any service (or to do the honours to) Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy.

As to the negotiations of the treaty made last year, His Majesty the Emperor has issued a decree commanding the Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, and the President of the Board of Civil Office, Hwashana, to return from Shanghai to Peking, and they may arrive any day. If the Envoy of Her Britannic Majesty will have the goodness to wait until the Chief Secretary Kweiliang and his colleagues reach the capital, they will thereupon receive him at once, and he will enter the capital to exchange the treaties (or will exchange the treaties in the capital).

At Peh-tang-Ho itself there has always been a military station and a battery for the defence of the coast. Orders have been issued to remove the troops and guns to the rear, and, as soon as this shall be effected, a vessel (or vessels) will be prepared for the Governor-General to proceed with outside the bar to welcome Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy to Peh-tang-Ho, whence he can proceed by land to Peking.

the Chinese, we leave our readers to decide. It is clear, from the evidence just adduced, that the officials of that country did not refuse permission to the allied ministers to go to Peking; but only refused to admit them by that particular route, and accompanied by so menacing a convoy. That we were the actual aggressors in the conflict which ended so disastrously, is perfectly obvious from the account given by our own officers. It is true, indeed, that the Chinese had repaired the fortifications on the river, which our forces had destroyed last year during the war. But they had done this openly, and had commenced the work so far back as November last. And who on earth could find fault with them, upon the principle of self-defence, which is universally adopted by all nations? Lord Elgin was too fair an opponent to do so; therefore, writing to the Earl of Malmesbury in reference to these very works, he says:—"We know, from the *Peking Gazette*, that the Emperor has issued orders for the reconstruction of the forts which we knocked down at the mouth of the Peiho, and for the erection of other works to protect Peking. *It would hardly, I think, be reasonable on our part to require that the Emperor of China should leave his capital undefended for the express purpose of enabling us, whenever we see fit to do so, to attack him there.*"* And yet, when our vessels set themselves to destroy the obstructions that had been raised to the navigation of the river, though this was most clearly an act of war, no attempt was made to oppose or molest them, even when, it appears, the Chinese might have taken us at great disadvantage. One of the officers who was present, after describing the various attempts made "to remove the barriers that the Chinese had placed across the entrance of the river," says:—"Strange to say, during the six or eight hours during which these preliminary measures were being effected, neither was a single gun fired from the forts. Every embrasure was screened with matting, and not a head was visible over the ramparts; and this, although the gun-boats were all only from 500 to 700 yards distant, and were all at sixes and sevens, from some getting aground, while others had to haul them off, and the space in which they had to move being too confined to allow of their manœuvring." And the Chinese officer in charge of the forts, in a letter to the Emperor says, that he was restrained by "the reflection that the measure of pacification, which was now in its second year of process, would be utterly deranged, were a fire once opened." Here, surely, is clear evidence that there was great reluctance on the part of the Chinese to come into collision with us, and that they only committed themselves to hostilities when we had absolutely forced them to do so in self-defence.

But then we are told that there was "treachery" on the part of the Chinese at the Peiho.† Wherein did it consist? It will be seen that the re-construction

* *Blue Book*, on China, p. 406.

† Nothing can be more explicit on this point than the testimony of Captain Longley, son of the Bishop of Durham, who was personally engaged in the affair, and has just returned to this country. An address was presented to him on his arrival, which spoke of "the dastardly attack on her Majesty's forces on the Peiho." In reply to this, Captain Longley very frankly

of the forts had been openly proclaimed in the "Pekin Gazette," and perfectly known to Lord Elgin seven months before. Nor did those in occupation of the forts conceal from the strangers that they were instructed to deny them a passage in that direction. The American Commodore, in his despatch to his own Government, says, that, prior to the action, he sent a boat to the nearest fort, with his flag-lieutenant and others, to inform the commanding officer that the American minister was on his way to Tien-tsin. "They were met at the landing," he adds, "by an officer professing to be of low rank, who said that *his orders were not to permit the removal of the barriers and to fire on those attempting it*; that he believed a high officer had been appointed to meet the ministers at the North." The commander of the Chinese forts himself, in the account of the affair which he sent to Peking, after describing all the preliminary operations of Admiral Hope on the 24th and 25th, during which, he says, "not a shot was fired at them from guns or small arms by our men," thus proceeds:—"Just as the action was about to commence, an officer with a communication from the Taoutai of Tien-tsin, was sent once more to warn them. The barbarians would not permit the letter to be handed in, and their vessels advancing like a swarm of bees, right up to the second fort on the southern bank, bore straight upon the iron chains twice; but being brought up by these, they opened fire upon our batteries."

Now, if this be a correct version of the case, is it not obvious, that the disaster which has befallen us in China, is the result of a spirit of haughty and headlong violence on the part of our envoy, utterly at variance with the character he bore as an ambassador of peace? Who ever heard of a man going to exchange ratifications of a treaty of peace, insisting upon his right to approach the other contracting party with a large armed force, expressly for the purpose of menace and coercion? Would we have attempted such a thing as regards any but what we conceived to be a weak power? Would we have tolerated such a thing towards ourselves from any power whatever? As the case has been put fairly and forcibly, we think, by one of the daily journals, "What should we say, if a French ambassador, charged with a similar duty, declined to land at Dover and come to town by rail, in the ordinary course, but insisted upon being accompanied up the Thames by a

remarked that it was "on our part the declaration of war was made, and that there was no treachery in the case at all. We saw the masks on the embrasures," he continued, "we knew by these that there were guns there; the Chinese had fired one gun to warn us to keep off; they had waited for us to draw away our forces; had they opened the whole of their batteries upon us, I do not think a single gunboat would have escaped—so I hope we shall hear no more about treachery." Nor did this gallant officer shrink from condemning the policy which led to this attack. "If an old crusty gentleman," said he, "wishes to live by himself, and we should go and say we wanted to get into his house to civilize him, would he not be perfectly right in defending himself from a forcible entry? In England every man's house is his castle, and the same regard ought to be paid to the Chinese. With all due respect for the immense trade with China, I do not think we are justified in forcing our civilisation upon them."

squadron of frigates and gun-boats, and anchoring them in the port of London?"

The plain fact is, as proved by the whole tenor of his correspondence, that Mr. Bruce entered upon his mission in a suspicious and arrogant spirit, which could hardly fail to lead to sinister results. Acting expressly, it would seem, on the doctrine, which his far abler and wiser predecessor, Lord Elgin, had emphatically denounced, "the doctrine that every Chinaman is a knave, and manageable only by bullying or bravado," he set himself, from the first moment of his arrival at Canton, to collect and give heed to all sorts of vague and unauthorized "reports," and "rumours," described by himself as "the gossip which circulates in the streets of Pekin," in reference to the disposition of the Chinese authorities towards him and his embassy. And the principle which he adopted as the rule of his conduct evidently was, to do everything in the form that he believed would be most offensive and humiliating to the Chinese. Thus, according to his own acknowledgment, he framed his very first letter in such a manner as "to *compel* the Chinese Government to declare themselves on those points *that he knew to be most unpalatable* to it." And in a communication addressed to Lord Malmesbury, attempting to justify his rash and disastrous enterprise on the Peiho, he declares his own conception of his duty to be "*to ensure a reception at Pekin on terms to the last degree mortifying to Chinese arrogance.*"

But be the merits or demerits of this case what they may, a large portion of the press of this country has already peremptorily made up its mind as to the course that is to be pursued. Our envoy may have conducted himself absurdly and arrogantly, our admiral may have acted with unjustifiable precipitancy. That does not signify, the Chinese must be chastised; the *prestige* of the British arms must be restored, at any cost, even at the sacrifice of truth, justice, and humanity; the nations of the East must be taught the absolute invincibility of England. Therefore, let large armaments be forthwith prepared and sent out, to batter Chinese forts; to bombard Chinese towns; to carry havoc and slaughter into peaceful Chinese homes, and to do any amount of butchery and blood that may be necessary to redeem British honour, and to reassert British supremacy. This is the doctrine we find now everywhere proclaimed, unrebuked, nay, unblushingly echoed, even by the conductors of our religious journals. There is no sort of squeamishness or hypocrisy affected about the matter. It is declared openly, that the ascendancy and *prestige* of England are the first things to be cared for. If these can be made to harmonize with truth and right, desperate efforts will be made to do so at the expense, we have no doubt, of all fact and probability. But, harmonize or not, and cost what it may, these must first of all, and above all, be held inviolate. Now, if our voice were the solitary one throughout these islands to be raised against it, we must, with all the energy of our souls, denounce this doctrine, as nothing else than practical atheism—a doctrine that goes to dethrone God and enthrone the devil in the government of the world, and a doctrine by reducing which

to practice, we are committing England into desperate conflict with those eternal principles of equity and right which, after all, in spite of any temporary appearance to the contrary, do constitute the corner-stone of the Divine administration; and whatever may be our power, prowess and pride, as a nation, we may be quite sure of this,—that “whosoever,” be it a nation or an individual, “shall fall upon that stone shall be broken; and on whomsoever it shall fall, it will grind them to powder.”

The journey of Mr. Ward the American ambassador to Peking, and his reception there with all respect and honour, immediately after the blundering and disastrous failure of our own diplomatists, was, of course, an extremely untoward fact to the war party in this country, who wanted us to believe that the Chinese had determined, with premeditated treachery, to prevent Mr. Bruce’s visit to their capital, and to cancel the treaty made with Lord Elgin. Here was a “great fact,” standing out broad and firm, which gave the lie most emphatically to their theory. What then was to be done? Why, the effect of it must, if possible, be neutralized, at all hazards. Accordingly, certain of our journalists set themselves by gross caricature and—the language is not too strong—by direct and daring falsehoods, to misrepresent utterly all the facts connected with the American ambassador’s visit to Peking. They made it appear as if this gentleman and his suite had been treated with studied indignity by the Chinese, from the moment they came into contact with them at Pehtang, until their return to Shanghai. But happily for the interests of truth, a detailed account of the visit, written, if not by Mr. Ward himself, evidently under his direction by a member of the embassy, has been published in the *North China Herald*. A brief abstract of this narrative given as nearly as possible in the very words of the writer, will show in what an utterly unscrupulous way the truth has been distorted by the fillibustering part of our press. Mr. Ward, a few days after the battle of the Peiho, sent a letter to the Governor-General of the province of Chili, signifying his intention to go to Peking. “The despatch of Hangfuh, the Governor-General,” in reply, we are told, “was couched in the most courteous terms, expressing his great desire to carry His Majesty’s orders into effect, and to do everything to facilitate the journey of the American envoy and his suite to Peking.” When they went to meet this official at Pehtang, “they were met by three junks handsomely fitted up, in one of which they proceeded two miles to the landing-place, which was likewise ornamented with coloured silk festoons. A guard of honour lined the streets up to the house, and the foreigners rode to it in carriages; and though the equipage of these vehicles, and the discipline and uniform of the soldiers, were not equal to what they would have been in Paris or Vienna, *they exhibited as much courtesy as could be desired.*” An escort of twenty officials was appointed to wait upon Mr. Ward, to Peking, by whom he was received “with great politeness.” “The carriages provided for them were the common vehicles of this part of China—a covered box, set on one pair of wheels, and drawn by one horse, or by two, tandem;

the occupant sits on cushions laid on the bottom, and the driver rides outside between him and the horse, himself and the animal being both sheltered by an awning." Their first halting-place was at a village sixteen miles up the country. "At this village the Minister was met by the provincial treasurer, who courteously entertained him. . . . Several officers of rank came in to pay their respects to Mr. Ward and the treasurer; among whom, Hu, the prefect of Tientsin, a venerable man of sixty, was one of the most engaging for his unaffected politeness. . . . At Pehtang, ten miles above Tien-tsin, by the river, five boats of different sizes had been provided for the Embassy, in which the gentlemen found good accommodation." When they came to the end of the boat navigation, "the escort," continues the narrative, "*whose attention to our comfort was unwearied*, had provided the same sort of carriage to take us up to the capital;" though, owing to the extreme badness of the roads, they preferred to walk or ride on horseback. When they reached the capital "they were met by two high officers, deputed by the *fu-yin*, or mayor of Pekin, whom he had appointed to wait on the visitors." When Mr. Ward met the Imperial Commissioners, they stated that the Emperor wished to give him an audience; and in speaking of the mode of approach to His Majesty, "*it cannot be said*," observes the narrator, "*that the ko-tau,* in any shape, was demanded of Mr. Ward by the Chinese as a preliminary to his audience of their sovereign*." All that was ultimately required of him was, that he would "either touch one knee or his fingers to the ground" on going into the presence of the Emperor. But as Mr. Ward declined even so much ceremony, the interview did not take place, and the treaty was ordered to be ratified by commission at Pehtang, while the Prime Minister, Kweiliang, was authorized to receive the President's letter.

"The troublesome points," continues the narrative, "were now arranged, and Wednesday was fixed by Kweiliang for receiving President Buchanan's letter. It was taken by him with much respect, lifting the box above his eyes as he delivered it to an attendant and gave orders for a guard of honour to be placed over it. An entertainment was served in a style which would have done honour even to Soyer himself, and the Prime Minister *appeared, as he usually had done, a mild and courteous gentleman*. He informed Mr. Ward during the interview, that his functions as Imperial Commissioner and those of his colleague Hwashana would now cease, and they would soon return their seal of that office to his Majesty. It is impossible not to feel a high degree of respect for a man like Kweiliang, although he may have the vices and failings of a pagan—not only from his high political position as the first statesman in the kingdom, but from his venerable age and the unaffected urbanity and kindness of his demeanour." When they departed from Pekin they were attended by the same escort as had previously accompanied them. "The return to Pehtang was by the same route and in the same boats as the journey to the

* The "ko-tau" is the ceremony of kneeling and knocking the head, required of those who approach the emperor.

capital; and the assiduous attention of the escort, especially Tsunghau, could not be exceeded, while his gentlemanly conduct won the regards of all."

Such is the account given by the members of the American embassy themselves of their journey to Peking and back, and their reception there. We leave our readers to judge how far it corresponds with the elaborate caricatures which English journalists have not been ashamed to palm upon the public as truth. No doubt the roads over which Mr. Ward and his suite had to travel were bad enough, nearly as bad as they were in many parts of England less than a hundred years ago. No doubt, also, that the carriages in which they were conveyed were far from being so luxurious as our first-class railway carriages. But they were the best the Chinese had; for it is expressly stated, in the narrative from which we have so copiously extracted, that when the highest ministers of state in Peking waited on the American legation, "*they came in the same sort of carriages that are used in the capital, and had been furnished the embassy on the journey.*" And, surely, if the representatives of the Western Powers insist upon forcing their way into the interior of China, where their presence and company are not at all coveted, even Western insolence can hardly make it a ground of quarrel with the Chinese Government, that their envoys should be obliged to travel over the same roads, and in the same conveyances, as the inhabitants of the country on whom they thrust their acquaintance.

So much with regard to this particular transaction on the Peiho. But we ask our readers' attention for a moment to the general policy we are pursuing as regards China, especially as illustrated by the contents of the *Blue Book* to which we have so often referred. As we have already intimated, the Chinese Commissioners remonstrated respectfully but most earnestly, against the proposal to have a British minister resident in Peking, and yielded only to the pressure of peremptory threats held out by the officers of our legation. On what grounds did they take exception to this measure? Was it on grounds of mere captiousness and obstinacy; or on such as were sound and reasonable? We are at no loss for materials to guide our judgment to a solution of this inquiry, from the candid admissions of our own plenipotentiary and his coadjutors, in the Chinese mission. The reasons assigned against it were these:—First, that in the peculiar condition of China at the present moment, when a great chronic rebellion is seeking to overturn the government, and menacing the whole country with anarchy, it is of the utmost importance to that Government, to avoid any measures which shall tend to impair its authority, in the estimation of its own subjects. That the measure in question would have that effect, is admitted on all hands. "In the eyes of the Chinese government," says Lord Elgin, "the concessions demanded amount to a revolution, and involve the surrender of some of the most cherished principles of the traditional policy of the empire. They have been extorted, therefore, from its fears." Kweiliang, one of the Commissioners, while conferring on this point with Mr. Lay, the Assistant Secretary to Lord

Elgin, "prayed him to aid in getting the proposition for a resident minister at Peking withdrawn. To allow all nations free access to the capital would be fraught with evil to China; and he appealed to Mr. Lay to say, from his knowledge of the country, whether what he said was not correct. *Mr. Lay could not help, to a certain extent, acquiescing in his Excellency's argument.*" Now, how much is there of generosity or justice in extorting, at the mouth of the cannon, from a government in the agonies of a fierce internal revolution, concessions to our pride, which we know and acknowledge will, by inflicting upon them a bitter humiliation in the sight of their own people, tend to shake the very foundation of their power, and deliver over 300 millions of people to a mere chaos of confusion and horror? And what do we propose to do with those millions when we have unmoored them from all their traditionary reverence for their own authorities? We suppose no one would be so insane as to imagine, that if we succeeded in breaking up the present *régime* in China, we can undertake to rule it, when we are at our wit's end how to deal with our own possessions in India.

The second objection raised to the residence of an ambassador at Peking was founded on the fact, that the people of that city are of a jealous and irritable temper; that they are wholly unused to foreigners; and that the presence of the latter might lead to popular outbreaks which the government would be unable to control, and thus, instead of improving, still further embarrass the relations between the two countries. In a letter from the Chinese Commissioners to Lord Elgin, they say: "Now the majority of the inhabitants of the capital are Bannermen [apparently a species of militia], who, never having been beyond its walls, or in intercourse with other people, are quite ignorant of the feelings of men or the ways of the world outside. If foreigners reside in Peking, it will certainly come to pass, that in their movements something will create misgiving and surprise on the part of the multitude; any slight misunderstanding will be sure to beget a quarrel; and great indeed would be the injury to our country were some trifling cause of difference to attain serious dimensions." Now is not all this perfectly rational and sensible? Can any one, disposed to use his common sense, doubt that the apprehensions expressed here, as to the probable result of a number of Europeans residing among a people so wholly different to them in all their views, feelings and habits, would be speedily realized?

Still more likely will this appear, when we fairly weigh the force of a third reason urged by the Commissioners, arising out of their past experience of the arrogance and hot-headedness of some of our officials. Lord Elgin, in a despatch to the Earl of Malmesbury, candidly represents their views on this point:—"They are wont to urge," he says, "in the first place, of course, the traditional policy of the Empire, and then the difficulties in which, if he were constantly resident at the capital, the idiosyncrasies of an individual foreign functionary, of violent temper and overbearing demeanour, might involve them. As regards this latter point, they are in the habit of illustrating

their meaning by examples. 'If we were quite sure,' say they, 'that you would always send to us men thoroughly wise, discreet, and considerate, it might be different; but if, for instance, So-and-so* were appointed to represent a foreign Government at Peking, a month would not elapse before something would occur which would place our highest officers in the dilemma of having either to risk a quarrel or submit to some indignity which would lower the Chinese Government in the eyes of its own subjects.'"—(*Blue Book*, p. 406.) Now, are these objections urged in good faith, or were they mere attempts to throw dust in the eyes of our Envoy? Surely the mere statement of them must carry, to every candid mind, the conviction of their reasonableness and validity. Lord Elgin, though evidently hampered by his instructions to insist upon having a Resident at Peking as a *sine quâ non*, was just and fair enough to admit, to a great extent, their force. We specially commend the words we are about to quote to the attention of those very imperious spirits who imagine that they can solve all the difficulties of this case by hurling against the Chinese opprobrious epithets, such as "dishonest scoundrels," "treacherous barbarians," &c. "No doubt," says Lord Elgin, adverting to some of the objections alleged by the Imperial Commissioners, "such apprehensions are, to some extent, chimerical; but I am bound to admit that I do not consider them to be altogether so. *The doctrine that every Chinaman is a knave, and manageable only by bullying and bravado*, like the kindred doctrine that every trading junk carries guns and is piratical, *is, I venture with all deference to think, sometimes pushed a little too far in our dealings with this people*. Be this, however, as it may, I advert to this point now only because I wish your Lordship to understand that I believe that the objections to the permanent residence of foreign ministers at Peking, which the Chinese authorities urge on this head, are sincerely entertained by them, and not entirely groundless."—(*Blue Book*, p. 406.)

It is the fashion to denounce the Chinese in unmeasured terms as a perfidious, treaty-breaking people, always trying to evade their engagements, and to render null the concessions wrung from them by other nations. But what is the evidence adduced in support of these sweeping charges? Apart from the arrogant and passionate declamations in which it is our habit to indulge against every people with whom we happen to be at variance, that evidence is infinitesimally small. We believe it is demonstrable, even from our own official documents, that they have kept faith far more strictly than we have done. With the exception, indeed, of the one and only instance always cited against them, namely, their refusal to admit us into Canton, according to the provisions of the treaty of Nankin, we know of no fact which their accusers ever pretend to produce. And even in regard to that, it is notorious that, in consequence of express instructions to that effect from Lord Palmerston, we consented to waive our right on the ground stated by our own plenipotentiary, Sir George Bonham, "that no material advantage to our com-

* Probably Bowring or Parkes.

merce would be gained by British subjects being admitted indiscriminately to Canton." In other respects the very last Blue Book on China contains abundant proof, not only that the Chinese have faithfully observed the treaties entered into with us, but that they have done much more, and by the liberal construction they have put, or suffered to be put, upon many articles in those treaties, have enlarged our privileges of intercourse and commerce far beyond what we were entitled to by the strict letter of their engagements. Thus Mr. Consul Robertson, in a Memorandum addressed to Lord Elgin, under date of Feb. 1st, 1858, says:—"Omitting Canton, which forms an exceptional case, the obligations of treaties have been fairly kept by the Chinese Government at all the ports; *more liberty to foreigners has been permitted than guaranteed or provided for by those compacts.*"—(*Elgin Blue Book*, p. 168.)

Again, the same gentleman, in another Memorandum, dated Dec. 7th, 1857, says:—"It may be observed that in no other country has so broad and liberal a construction been placed upon a tariff as in China; articles subject under it to *ad valorem* rates of duty . . . are admitted free. Other articles such as coals, building materials, &c., coming under the unenumerated clause, are also exempted. . . . The custom-house has even made reductions in the duties levied, when they seemed out of proportion."—(*Ibid.* p. 109.) To the same effect is the testimony of the British merchants at Shanghai, who, in a communication, signed "Jardine, Matheson, and Co., and twenty-eight others," sent in reply to an inquiry of Lord Elgin, as to "the operation of the existing tariff of duties levied at the open ports of Canton," say:—"Taking a view of the tariff, as established by the treaty [of 1842], we think that it affords little ground for complaint, as we are not aware that a much more liberal one exists in any country in the world." They further say, in the same document, "that though the right to participate in the coasting trade of China has never been granted to British subjects, by express enactment, yet this is now so well established," [by the sufferance of the Chinese Government] "and is rapidly growing into so much importance, that it has become requisite to guard and define it by specific regulations." (*Ibid.* pp. 70, 71.) To this may be added the evidence of the Protestant Missionaries at Shanghai, who, in an address to Lord Elgin, very naïvely admit, that for years they have been accustomed, habitually, to violate our part of the treaties; and, through the forbearance of the Chinese Government, with very little inconvenience to themselves. "During the last few years," say they, "we have, in the discharge of our duties as teachers of Christianity, visited many cities not mentioned in the treaty. . . . The prohibition of entrance into the country beyond the five ports has become a dead letter, through not being enforced."—(*Elgin Blue Book*, p. 252.) Now we should like to know what European or Christian Government with whom we have treaties, would put upon them such a liberal construction, or permit them so frequently to be violated with impunity?

But now, before closing this pamphlet, we want briefly to discuss this larger

question—Is the reluctance of the Chinese to grant to Europeans freer access into their country, and fuller intercourse with themselves, an unreasonable and unjustifiable prejudice, or a wise and salutary precaution? For our own part, we are bound to say that, whether they act from reason, or instinct, or experience, they seem to us to be acting wisely in resisting closer contact with the Western nations. In the first place, there stands this broad and terrible fact, confronting us in the history of the past, that from the time when what is called Christendom began, in the fifteenth century, to overflow its ancient boundaries, in the form of maritime discovery and colonization, there is not one solitary instance on record where a Christian nation has come into close contact with a heathen one, without that contact having become the source of infinitely more misery than advantage to the latter. In some instances, whole races have utterly perished from the face of the earth at the approach of Europeans; and in all instances they have been oppressed and degraded, robbed of their country and of their national independence, and reduced to a state of abject social and political servitude to the stranger. This assertion may startle some of our readers. But let them examine the facts. Look at the Spaniards in Mexico, Peru, and Paraguay. Look at the Portuguese in Brazil and India. Look at the Dutch at the Cape. Look at the French in Canada and Algeria. Look at the Pilgrim Fathers and their descendants in North America. Look at the English in South Africa, in India, in China. For the Chinese—and this leads us to our second remark—have themselves had considerable experience of Europeans, and notably of the English, whereby to guide their policy towards foreigners. And can any candid man say that this experience has been such as to make them long for closer acquaintance? How did European intercourse with China commence? We answer, in the language of Mr. Alcock, long the British Consul at Canton:—"It is just three centuries ago since Simon Andrade, and, at an interval of a few years, Fernando Mendez Pinto, both Portuguese, sailed up the Chinese coast ostensibly for traffic in the north, where a flourishing trade and foreign settlements had already been established at Amoy, Ningpo, and Japan even, on the Island of Formosa and elsewhere. After plundering the tombs of seventeen kings of an ancient dynasty, in which treasure had been buried, and making many piratical expeditions and forays from Ningpo as a base of operations in the adjoining districts, they drew down upon them the vengeance of the surrounding population, which rose upon them *en masse*, destroying not only their fleet of thirty-seven vessels, but 800 resident Portuguese and 12,000 Christians, it is averred."—(*Blue Book*, p. 58.) A hopeful beginning—was it not?—of the enterprize which we are assured by certain benevolent spirits is the object of European policy, to bring China into the pale of civilization, to force her, if necessary, to enter the sisterhood of civilized nations, who live, as the history of Europe so abundantly testifies, in such a blessed state of friendship and harmony among themselves!

And has the intercourse of the English with China been such as might

reasonably be expected to awaken in the heart of the Chinese Government and people a strong appetite to extend it and draw it closer? What are the salient facts best known to them in regard to us? First, our insatiable greed of gain, as seen by the headlong and reckless zeal with which we push our commerce among them, with no regard whatever to either law or equity. Secondly, the utterly unscrupulous spirit with which, in defiance of their fiscal laws, of our own treaty obligations, and of all the restraints of morals, religion, and humanity, we insist upon pandering to the vices of the lowest classes of their population, by pouring in among them a seductive and pernicious poison, which destroys their health, ruins their fortunes, and miserably degrades and demoralizes their character. Thirdly, the arrogant and brutal violence with which, on pretexts the most flimsy or the most false, we are prepared to use the terrible power which a depraved civilization has placed at our disposal, for scattering horror, havoc and slaughter, among their people. If any nation on the face of the earth could have had two such affairs as the "Opium War," and "The Lorchow War," with another nation without contracting towards them the most intense antipathy and abhorrence, they must indeed be as morally degraded as we sometimes pretend to believe the Chinese are.

We profess to wonder and be indignant at the mingled insolence and folly of the Chinese in resisting, as they do, the blessing of more intimate acquaintance with us. It is probable that there really are some simple-minded people at home who sincerely pity their infatuation, and believe that, in acting as they do, they are standing in their own light, and that it would be of great advantage to them to open their country to a perfect freedom of commerce and intercourse with us. But how have the concessions already made by them, or rather wrung from them, been found to answer? We wish particularly to call the attention of our readers to a very important document, contained in the lately published *Blue Book*, which throws a flood of light on this question. It is a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Alcock, "Her Majesty's Consul at Canton," who was in this country on leave of absence when Lord Elgin went forth on his mission. It was forwarded to that nobleman by Lord Clarendon, with the remark that "it might be found deserving of his Excellency's consideration, as embodying the opinions of a gentleman who has had much practical experience in China." And what is the purport of this elaborate document? It is to show that every privilege we have received or extorted from the Chinese has been grossly abused, to their detriment and annoyance, and to the dishonour of our own national character. Here is a description, drawn from past experience, of what may be expected from access to the inner waters of China, provided for by the treaty.—"The worthless character of a numerous gathering of foreigners of all nations, under no effective control, is a national reproach, as well as a public calamity. They dispute the field of commerce with honest men, and convert privileges of access and commerce into means of fraud and violence.

In this career of license, unchecked by any fear of their own government, and protected, in a great degree, by treaties from the action of the native authorities, the Chinese are the first and greatest, but by no means the only, sufferers." Further on, Mr. Alcock, adverting to some concessions made to us by the treaty of Nankin, says:—"But this gain brought with it an attendant evil. *Foreign merchants in direct custom-house relations with Chinese authorities all more or less venal and corrupt, launched into a wholesale system of smuggling and fraudulent devices for the evasion of duties.* Chinese laws and treaty-stipulations were alike disregarded, sometimes by one party with forcible infractions of port regulations; oftener by bribery and collusion between the native authorities and the foreigners. The Imperial revenue was defrauded by both; and foreign trade was demoralized and converted into a game of hazard and over-reaching." And he justly remarks that if the Chinese were then loth to make those concessions, how much less disposed they must be to extend them, with "*the knowledge they now possess, that no conscientious payment of duties, or respect for treaty stipulations, can be looked for at the hands of foreign merchants, if the Chinese themselves cannot find the means of making evasion impossible.*"—(*Blue Book*, p. 56.)

Referring, again, to another right acquired by that former treaty, "exemption from territorial jurisdiction," he thus describes the use that has been made of it by the Europeans:—"Contempt for all Chinese authority, and disregard of inherent rights, habitual infraction of treaty stipulations, license and violence, wherever the offscum of the European nations found access, and peaceable people to plunder; such were the first-fruits of this important concession, and time only served to increase their growth. Our whole intercourse since the Treaty of Nankin has been carried on under a perpetual menace of hostile collision and interruption of trade. The French and the English are both in arms at this moment, each to assert rights that have been mainly brought into peril by unchecked abuses. If gross abuse of foreign flags, and the immunities they gave by treaty, had not been habitual and matter of notoriety, *especially in the class of lorcha vessels—smugglers and pirates all*—the particular ground of quarrel in which the Canton difficulty began would, in all probability, never have arisen."—(*Blue Book*, p. 56.)

These statements are abundantly confirmed by Lord Elgin's own despatches. In his reply to the Missionaries, he speaks of "many vile and reckless men, protected by the privileges [obtained by treaty stipulations] and still more by the terror which British prowess has inspired, who are now infesting the coasts of China. It may be that for the moment they are able, in too many cases, to perpetrate the worst crimes with impunity; but they bring discredit on the Christian name, inspire hatred of the foreigner where no such hatred exists, and, as some recent instances prove, teach occasionally to the natives a lesson of vengeance, which, when once learnt, may not always be applied with discrimination."—(*Blue Book*, p. 253.)

And how have Europeans conducted themselves as between the Chinese

Government and the horde of rebels that have so long desolated the country? Mr. Fortune, in his last work, *Residence among the Chinese*, describes what he witnessed at Shanghae, after the city had fallen into the hands of the insurgents. He characterizes the men themselves as "a debauched band of robbers," who "spent their days and nights in smoking opium, in drunkenness, and in all kinds of debauchery." "A more blackguard or unruly collection of human beings," he says elsewhere, "I had never before seen." The Imperial Government sent a force against these banditti, which encamped at various points round the city-walls, in order, by gradually cutting off their supplies, to compel them to capitulate. "Here again," he continues, "their plans were to a certain extent frustrated by *neutral* foreigners. The foreign settlement, as it is called, occupies a large tract of ground situated on the north-east side of the city just outside the walls, and is bounded on the east by the Shanghae river. Notwithstanding the complaints and remonstrances of the Government of the country, many persons were unscrupulous enough to keep supplying the insurgents with arms and ammunition of all kinds in large quantities, for which they were liberally paid with the spoils stolen from the public treasury or wrung from the inhabitants. Some were in the habit of making large sums of money by running cargoes of gunpowder, carrying it into the city, advising and counselling the rebels, and then, when danger approached, sneaking back to the foreign settlement for the protection which the flags of England or America afforded them. Nor was this conduct effectually checked by either of these Governments for a considerable length of time, although they had full power to have done so. And this is what we call being neutral!" *

To the same effect is the testimony of an intelligent American long resident in China, who, in a pamphlet recently published, adverting to the assertion that Russians were engaged in repelling our attack on the Peiho forts, says:—"Russians, Russian diplomacy, and Russian guns, are bugbears that pursue Englishmen to all corners of the earth. . . . We have now the customary clap-trap of Russian guns at the Peiho. No doubt the Chinese in their trade obtain *matériel* of war from Russia; but if the forts of the Peiho contain one-tenth of the Russian guns that have been introduced into China, *through Hong Kong, in British ships from England, under full official cognizance, for the use of the rebels against the present Imperial Government*, Admiral Hope might well have met with his unexpected reception there, while the guns imported from my own country added, would possibly place Hong Kong itself in danger, if all their present owners joined against the British colony."†

Is it any wonder then, that after such experience of us, the Chinese should be rather disinclined to encourage nearer acquaintance?

* *Residence among the Chinese*, pp. 125-128.

† *A Foreigner's Evidence on the China Question*, p. 9.